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THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS IN GRAND STRATEGY

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
3 October 1961

by

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower



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Admiral Austin, Admiral Nimitz, and gentlemen: I cannot tell you how distinctly honored I feel when I am invited to come to meet with any group such as this comprising picked officers of the armed services, and who are in their work pondering and thinking about the problems confronting the armed services and our nation in the situation that we see ourselves in today -- the world situation. The reason that I have so much enjoyment in this kind of a meeting is not because I can particularly give you any new ideas. I can just, as one of you, testify to my faith in the officer corps and the enlisted units of our great services, and how with you I would like to study and ponder for this brief period these problems of which I speak.

Now as I say, there cannot possibly be any new idea that I can bring forth. The most I can do is possibly to emphasize such truths that may escape you or to give you some food -- mental food to think about these things in a slightly different light. What I should like to do today is this: is to talk for a short while with you and then -- and I think I have Admiral Austin's permission to do so -- to throw this meeting open to questions should there be anybody feeling that he would like to put such queries to me. So what I am going to talk about is this: the weight of responsibility and the scope of responsibility that rests upon anybody today who now is in the position of leader-

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ship in the armed services of the United States, and everybody in this body -- is in some degree or another in that position of leadership. Even so long ago as when Admiral Nimitz and I were youngsters, our only thought outside of the annual Army and Navy game was the learning the techniques of our own services, and they were rather simple. The equipment we had, as compared to the equipment today, is like the bow and arrow to a machine-gun. It was relatively a simple life that we led and we lived in relatively simple times. Even the war of 1914 did not fully awaken us to the tremendous changes that were just then over the horizon. When we came out of that war, again we went back into our narrow channels. I happened to be a junior officer in the War Department in some of the years between the wars, and I was at times a party with the groups that were trying to arrange co-operation or co-ordination with the then-two services, and all of us had a hard time. And strangely enough, and I think it is all right for me now as a relatively old man to say this, we, as young officers found nearly -- found no such difficulty in getting together as did our bosses. We got the orders from them and we had to take the rather recalcitrant attitude, but that's the way it was. Everybody had his job; the Navy was going to fight in the sea and the Army at the land and that was that; and the Air Force that was coming along was looked on as a mere interloper -- at least our bosses did.

Now how this has changed! Today for anyone to be a good naval officer, an army officer, an air officer, a marine officer, any kind of an officer in the armed services, is to dedicate himself to a study of the world, its history, its situation as it now is (and particularly the conflicting ideologies in which most of the world lives), its economy -- particularly the economy of this country and of other free, or at least independent countries, independent of communist

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domination. We have to think of the moral or spiritual side of our strength and, frankly, the military side comes almost last in your calculations. Therefore, your research and your study means that you've got to understand what a new weapon or a new weapon system means to the economy -- what it does to the psychology of our people. I think we could just illustrate what I mean for a moment.

Every one of us knows that one of the victories that the communists seek is to break the economy of the United States, an economy that is based upon free enterprise and a sound currency. If we, therefore, measuring it in a simple fashion, put one more dollar into a weapon system than we should, we are actually weakening the defense of the United States because the defense of the United States is spiritual, economic, say intellectual, and military, and the equation for finding our full strength is a multiplication, a product, not an addition, because if you take any one of these factors and make a zero the whole equation becomes zero. Consequently, you cannot, as an adviser to the President (possibly not the immediate adviser, but one of the group that brings to him formalized studies), you cannot say, "I am interested only in the Polaris (or a new fighter, or a new bomb, or missile)." You must say, "What does this mean to the United States, and what does it mean to our psychology?" Because now we see in our magazines we are going to fight wars by -- make a nice exchange of our nuclear stockpiles, and then I don't know what happens to the rest of us, but that's war; it is war -- not as we understand it -- that's not one opponent against another; that's just potential destruction against survival.

We, therefore, as we become one of the leaders, one of the teachers of our own, and one of the teachers of our compatriots, lay citizens -- we have

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got to think of all of these different factors --different influences -- if we are truly going to be leaders. This applies to anyone who is in the State Department or the AEC or the CIA, as well as it does to the uniform services. It is not enough that we just have weapons. The mightiest armaments in all the world cannot themselves assure the defense of the things in which we have the greatest interest in defending because we are not defending merely territory, not even homes nor hearthstones, not even our lives. We are defending a way of life and you can destroy it in more ways than one. This is the kind of burden of responsibility that's on you as a member of the great group, and in some direct or indirect way you are always a part of that group to give the products of your thinking, your brain, and your heart to your next superior so that the most broadly based advice that is possible to give the commander in chief are given to him, and this brings me to the other point that I want to make: the need for organized study.

America, at least long ago, abandoned and rejected the theory of superman government. We distrusted the despots of Europe in the 1760s, 1770s, and 1780s, and we established what we called representative or self-government with great values that we have set up to live by and defend. Now, as I said earlier, you must have a comprehension of human psychology, the reactions to different types of threats, and how are we going to meet our problems? You must have a knowledge, an understanding of the economics of the free enterprise system certainly. You must understand how all of these factors come together to make America strong so that it can be confident. You naturally cannot be an expert in each of these and the only answer is to -- while we each have a general understanding of these things we have certain people in the staffs that are really experts in these fields, then we blend these great -- this thinking together to make one great

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orderly exposition to our chiefs so that they can make the answers.

What, then, the leaders of the armed services become is this: You are the hinge between the great body politics, the 180 million people that make up this nation and the top leaders that finally have to make the decisions controlling our destiny. You, of course, have to be masters each in your own professions. You have to know how to run the ships and fire the Polaris and all the rest of it. Indeed, technicians today I think some day are going to be Ph.D. philosophers, but the fact is, you will not ever be doing your complete duty if you can confine yourself just to be the greatest navigator, or the greatest bombardier, or the greatest technician in your own services. We must understand this world because in such a great fashion this struggle is spiritual, and I mean a little bit more than morale.

Frankly, gentlemen, I think it would not -- and I think we would be a stronger nation if we examined ourselves a little bit closer about religion because if there is one certain difference between communism and representative government, it is that we believe in a supreme being of some sort; and they say we're cattle. I think, therefore, we ought to think about this great difference and try to exploit it among ourselves, among all our people, so that regardless of your particular sect or denomination, or even if you're not a particularly religious person certainly by profession, but to realize that in this struggle of which we speak, you are stronger if you say, "I'm defending something that I believe is more precious than just the interests, the physical, even the intellectual, esthetic interests of myself, or even my family. I believe that we must remember always that none of us would stand up here now and say, "I am nothing but an educated mule for my government to use me as it sees fit, and with no other end in life except extinction -- its extinction."

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What I am trying to say again and again, and probably very awkwardly, but nevertheless sincerely, we must as people dedicated to the defense of our nation, say first to ourselves, "We are dedicated to the defense of something that is even more precious than life itself." Remind ourselves once in a while of Patrick Henry's statement, "Give me liberty or give me death." And so we must think of our material strength -- all of the capacity of this great industrial and agricultural productive machine that is the United States to support all the things we ask for, and can do it on the long term because this is the one thing when we talk about crisis that we must think and not think of crisis in the terms of a war of 3 years or 4 years or 7 years or anything else. We are talking now about a way of life that we have got to support for years and decades if we are going to win. Therefore, the effect upon our lives, our thinking, our productivity, all the rest of it, must be so gauged that we do not destroy the systems in the beliefs that we have held and that have made America so great. These are the things that I would urge upon you; they are fast; they are merely stated in generalization.

I see no reason for talking about Berlin because Berlin itself has not become a place merely. Berlin has become a symbol of our determination, of our dedication to freedom, of our devotion to principles rather than a place. It's not merely a spot on the earth that we are going to fight about, but we must think of it in terms of moral values and the basic institutions of freedom. So I say again, if we do these things I believe we will have no less, no real differences among ourselves arising out of the differing colors of our uniforms, or even differences between ourselves and the population of which we are a part. We'll be dedicated to deep, undying values, and we must so condition ourselves in our thinking, our beliefs, that we shall never let down the nation that we so dearly love.

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Now these were the thoughts that I so roughly wanted to express to you this morning, gentlemen, and unless, Admiral, there is some objection I would rather subject myself to trying to answer questions than to go further with my own philosophizing, so if you will permit I will do that, sir.

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QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD

QUESTION:

Please identify some of the major problems facing the commander of a multi-national military force which derive from a multi-national composition?

ANSWER:

I will start off by reminding you of a statement that I saw a long time ago in a staff college study and this study started off and said -- the author of it said he always admired Napoleon very extravagantly. He said, "I thought of him as the greatest soldier the world ever knew until one day I looked through all his history and saw that he fought only allies."

Now the greatest problem that faces any commander is to teach his own staffs and his own army groupments that they must readily divorce themselves from the traditional command channels that they have known, because if each man, for operational problems, writes, telegraphs, or telephones to his bosses at home, soon there is no unified plan and no unified direction. This is indeed difficult and it's a -- I think its difficulty probably goes up in the geometric proportion according to the number of nations you have in the command, but I will say this: I think that both General Gruenther and after him General Norstad have done a remarkable job in the NATO field. But the first one is to make certain that all of the commands look to the commander for their direction in the fighting of the war. Now this, and they've got the problem of differentiating when it comes to all the logistic support because naturally recruits from Britain, for example, have to come from Britain. The supplies have to come from Britain because they are of the calibers and the makes and so on that only the British use. You

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have very many complicating problems that give the commander a reason for staying in close touch with his own government. But the biggest one, I would say and I think all of the other problems you could possibly conceive flows out of this one, any time you do not have the military, operational loyalty of the command you will be in trouble. I could give you many instances about this. I think though if I must state that one problem or that one truth that this is what you must do, that you will find all the others will soon be solved by getting that kind of operational subordination from your allies.

QUESTION:

In view of the requirements of security, can there be a meaningful public debate on military policy and the military posture in a democratic society?

ANSWER:

Well, this is what you have got: You've got a double-edged question here for the simple reason, like most answers or most problems that involve vast numbers of humans, you are apt to find a proper logical more-or-less middle ground. I might say, parenthetically, it is my conviction that, except in the field of morals, there is no extreme that is ever correct, so what you have to do here is to find the middle way. The population must be informed because we have self-government. Right in time of war we have to have our elections. How can an individual make a reasonable, logical selection of the people that he wants to represent him in the highest office or down to councilman, unless he is informed in some way? On the other hand, I think the revealing of secrets that we know to be secrets, is almost the worst crime that anyone can commit. Consequently, it is a job that can be solved only by the rule of reason. Everyone of them, within broad limits, presents a problem of its own. We were all shocked, you will recall, in World War II when one newspaper put out the news that we had

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broken -- that the government -- the Navy, I guess, had broken the Japanese code. To this day I still think that was one of the worst things I had ever heard of in my life. On the other hand, to keep secrets that the country ought to know, I believe, is almost as bad. I think through certain agreements still made in World War II we are still not able, except for the most tortuous process, to get some of our papers of World War II put out in public, and I think one of all the secrets almost that you can divulge, the one is sources of information, because then you can break down the entire system by which an intelligence system is set up. Where are those sources and so on? I would say again this can be handled only by the people with the kind of understanding that I was trying to talk this morning and solve it as a simple, individual problem.

QUESTION:

General, would you recommend any changes to the present-day command structure of the military services?

ANSWER:

I think not particularly as I feel I say this: Indeed I believe greatly, as I said a while ago, in organized study. I believe that this organization of staffs on the theory that they're making committee decisions and so on; this is just tommy rot. But I think that, by and large, the system of command we have set up for our several services, and for the unified commands is very satisfactory, and again it comes back to this. No detail of organization is really too important if you've got the right men because the right men can make any organization work.

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QUESTION:

The grand strategy of the USA and consequently NATO and the free world is, in effect, a defensive strategy to defend and preserve a way of living. The Russian aims are quite different, i.e., world domination. Should not, therefore, the grand strategy of the free world be changed to a more offensive contest?

ANSWER:

Well, I think in the moral field it should be. I think we have not been sufficiently articulate in expressing our true dedication to the high ideals that our founding fathers spoke about. When they said that we are endowed by our creator with certain rights, that was the explanation they gave for our kind of government. In other words they said this: unless a human has a soul, our kind of government doesn't work. Now what we are talking about here is an aggressive philosophy that seeks power for its own sake, and although I think they are dedicated communists, I think they do fall prey to this. When they talk about, as an interim measure, the dictatorship of the proletariat they really say, "Well, through our lifetimes we will be dictators;" and this theory that some day all the people will be the dictators of our lives is just really a dream that will never come true. Consequently, we can in the field of, I think, moral values we can be far more aggressive than we are, but when we come into the physical, that is the use of threats and so on, now I ask you How do we do this? Because the advent of the bomb and the guided missile and the Polaris and all of the other deadly weapons has constantly accentuated the element in war of surprise. How can a democracy carry out surprise unless you say, "All right, we will defy democracy; I will make myself superman; I'll push the button and that's that." And therefore if we do that now we are -- and the question, I believe, said how are we going to defend our rights and our

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values? Well, we can't defend our values if we have destroyed them by our own acts, so therefore democracies, even one democracy, cannot be aggressive as I see it because you have to make decisions that are represented and reflected by the action of the President and of the Congress, and while that's going on what is your enemy going to do, because now we're talking about minutes, not about the time when you had sailing ships and cannon that would shoot one mile. I don't believe we can take in the military field an aggressive action other than that of making certain of our own defenses, but from this field -- from this position of confident strength, we can both morally and economically, I think, act more intelligently and more aggressively than we have in the past, and that includes what I tried to do during those times. I believe that we must find ways to develop better methods, better doctrines, and better strategy in these two fields.

QUESTION:

General, would you give your opinion as to the political and military significance of the race to the moon?

ANSWER:

Have the door locked and no one can get out. This is what I believe thoroughly. The United States has got priority tasks, and we ought to keep our minds on those priority tasks, and in the defense field they, indeed, are strong enough to command our really, our greatest efforts within the services and in our productive capacity. I believe that some day humans are going to circle the moon, take pictures of it, and may get to a planet and back at this time. I don't know. But I believe those things ought to come about as a bi-product of all the research we are doing today in missiles and in bigger engines, and so on. I think to make the race to the moon, so-called, as a major element in our

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struggle to show that we are superior to the Russians, is getting our eyes off the right target. I believe that we don't have many enemies on the moon.

QUESTION:

General, during your period of office you instituted the program where we have a Cold War Program within the services and that has been now toned down. Do you feel that that has been justified and why?

ANSWER:

I wouldn't want to comment on anything that has happened since my tenure of office that indicates some repudiation of some of the things I instituted. I think this: There are different methods for achieving our aims and consequently I would certainly uphold the right of any president to organize his staff -- his own personal staff -- his whole system of study and work -- to get what he needs and therefore to make the kind of decisions. I do not, however, believe that any man in the office of the presidency can act efficiently unless he is very careful in the kind of organization he sets up for himself and the aims he sets including the fighting of the cold war. Those aims he must set up very clearly for himself and must find the highest type of individual that the nation affords to help him out. So I wouldn't want to comment specifically on the action of which you speak.

QUESTION:

We have heard speakers here and on television who have criticized the U.S. decision-making process to the effect that we take too long in consultation and we come out second best. Would you comment on the free world problem of consultation vs. over-consultation in the light of our need for rapid decisions?

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ANSWER:

Yes, I'd be glad to. I think everyone of you, from the day you entered the academies or entered the military services in any other fashion, has learned to distinguish between those things that have to be decided this moment, and those things which take a little consultation. Now I believe that you reach the best conclusions when you have the atmosphere in which real analytical study ought to take place. I believe that, finally, we must insist that one man must make the decision, whether it's in the company or with the nation, but I do say he should be compelled -- anybody should be compelled to make an immediate decision only when the situation demands it. I would assume that the naval officers fighting his ship has to make decisions probably every 2-3 minutes, everything from changing direction to changing the range, or even changing the targets; I don't know. I haven't been there. But I do know this: When you've got time to study out the problem use the brain God gave you. Use all your training. Use your staff. Make the decision and then don't be afraid to stick with it, so all of this. Now I didn't -- I am sorry -- I missed one part of your question that was about allies. The same thing applies. So far as I know, and certainly in my time, the agreements of our allies were that we did certain things in consultation, but always there was the proviso that in emergencies everyone had to take care of himself whether he was abroad or whether he was in another country, or whether he was home. He had to take that decision, and, of course, we had to assume that the others would approve it. But I really believe the people who write about these things in our columns and so on, really never had to make a decision and they have never understood the word organization. They think of organization as something

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that's static, routine, stodgy, and brings everything down to the mediocre. We, as people, who from the moment that we had to command squads or sections or artillery guns -- anything -- we have learned that an organization for all human affairs is absolutely necessary, and far from delaying proper decisions is what facilitates proper decision, and I think that most of the understandings we have with our neighboring nations -- allied nations -- are about as good as they can be made so as to permit action in emergency but to give us opportunity for consultation when time permits.

QUESTION:

General, do you believe that the unification of Europe will help solve the present-day problems?

ANSWER:

Yes, indeed I do. As a matter of fact I can quote myself. I made a speech in 1951 (I think it was either July 1 or 4) at the Pilgrims Club in London, in which I pointed out that in western Europe we have some 225 highly educated and cultured people. We have a group there that have a skilled labor force something almost double ours. Combined they are a tremendous power and like us products of the same culture. They are dedicated to human dignity and freedom. If those people unite and become and realize their true potential economically and militarily and spiritually, there will be two great forces in the world confronting the single esthetic, dictatorial, aggressive ideology that we have to look at unafraid and firmly, but in our case we also have to be conciliatory. But with those two powers I would think that our security was very vastly increased.

QUESTION:

General, in one of your last talks to the Navy as President, you warned against permitting the armament industry from being too much of an

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influence on our national policy. What can the military do in this regard to suppress this tendency?

ANSWER:

I would think that my little early sermon was about as good an answer as I can give you on that question, but what I did say was this: It wasn't merely the armament industry. I said we are getting a such combination of influences that affect our own interests in so many places that we must be very, very careful that we don't go on the wrong path. For example, I as an army officer, if they offer me more armies, more missiles, more of this and that and the other thing, I say, well at least that will give assurance, doubly assurance in my case. All the other services certainly feel the same way and I am sure they would -- exactly the same way. Now, therefore, we want when we come down to it all we can get and I might remark here that the JCS constantly would tell me the sums proposed and projected for placing before the Congress are quite ample for our defense, but each always said that he needed a little bit more of the pie. Now, if we are going to solve this particular problem, we have got to recognize that the nation's resources are not unlimited, therefore if you get one group -- let's take the congressman -- let's say there is a new defense establishment in his district -- let's say it does take a company in Los Angeles or Denver or Baltimore that wants another order for airplanes. Let's find the services who want to use it and let's find even armies of scientists who want so terribly to test out these newest views, and you have got a lobby, not necessarily deliberately formed, but a lobby which is formed out of a community of interests that almost touches every individual in the world and in the United States. This is the thing we have got to watch out for, and I think that all of us should be very, very careful that we don't let, as I say let

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unconsciously formed lobbies influence our thinking too much, because the heavy responsibilities that fall upon you people as the advisers must be completely disinterested and disassociated from your own, let's say, ideas that wouldn't it be nice to have another dozen carriers or a hundred more Polaris and so on. This is the kind of thing I was talking about when I made a little talk of this kind six months ago.

QUESTION:

I have frequently heard the criticism that wars are too important to let the generals and admirals run them. Do you agree with that?

ANSWER:

Well, Chester, I must remind you I am no longer president. I am a general now. I think you might make a corollary or invert this thing a little bit and say that peace is too important just to allow the diplomats to lose it. All I was talking about, and Admiral Nimitz is correct when he was quoting me, is this: If we're thinking only in the military field, then we shouldn't be allowed to run it because the war is not something that is just the fighting forces on the battle front. The armed forces are sort of the cutting edge of a tremendous machine -- a tremendous machine, as I said before, that is made up of the spiritual, intellectual, economic, and military power of this whole country, and of these remember, as you people well know, the morale of your ship is more important than those guns. Well, it is the same way here. There is the power that this nation needs and therefore I will change my statement now, Admiral, to say this; if you and we can make sure that all of our officers are growing up to understand not only the problems of the citizens, and the citizen leaders as well as his own, as well as his tactics and techniques, and his strategy of a purely military case, then I say that the generals and the admirals ought to be certainly while subordinate to their commander-in-chief, they should be running the war rather exclusively.

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QUESTION:

Very recently, in the class of foreign officers, the subject has been very much among us, which is the possibility of the formation of a United States of Europe. Do you have any concept on how this can be brought about?

ANSWER:

One of my great friends in this effort, and who with me believed that we needed very much closer union in western Europe was Giordani. Giordani believed this for years. He was, for a while, head of the Coal and Steel Community, and he was one of the founders of the Euratom unit, and he is in the forefront of those that brought about the Inner Six, the Common Market. I believe that it will eventually come about by necessity. You must remember each of our colonies was very proud of its own traditions and history. They were formed under different conditions. The Puritans were particularly religiously -- rather widely separated -- from, let us say, the Maryland colony. Georgia was made up originally of debtors from prison and we had all sorts of differences. As a matter of fact there were times of wisdom and times of despair of getting the co-operation of these different people -- to cooperate with them in fighting the war. Now we had then the federation of states and it was very unsatisfactory, but it was our first recognition that certain functions had to go to the nation as a unit, then we made a treaty -- we made a treaty with the British; I think it was the treaty of 1783 and in return for paying some of the debts we owed them, the British were going to abandon the forts, particularly the ones up in Detroit in that region. Well, the colonies wouldn't pay the debts and the Britons wouldn't abandon the forts and we were almost in war again. Now the United States of Europe is going to come about in the same way. Maybe their differences are founded in greater, older traditions, different languages; that is something we had in common, although some people have said that a common

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language separates the English speaking people. But I think that the thing has got to exactly what is going forward now. You have had a number of movements -- three separate ones that have brought them more and more together and what you are talking now, Can they be brought together politically in the tight-enough federation that they can have, say, a common foreign policy and so on. That, I think, will take some years because it will have to be a generation that is grown up under this constant -- well, the influence of these centrifugal forces or bringing to a common center. When that happens then it will occur; it won't occur in my opinion suddenly.

QUESTION:

General, in reference to a previous question, in our present form of government, is there any effective way to nullify or negate the pressure group or lobbyists when they operate not in the best interests of our nation?

ANSWER:

This is a question that certainly plagued presidents, including me. I don't know exactly how this can be brought about. Now I thought that when the president finally had a congress that by composition was politically compatible, then he could go to the committee chairman and say, "I hope you will not create dissention by asking to get every single individual in the army, navy, air force and marine corps, who happens to differ with the administration's plan to come down and because he does differ, and under the guise of free speech and speaking his own convictions to a committee get publicity that does not or is not wanted by the importance of his particular conclusion. I just don't know how it's going to be done, but I do know this, successful democracy implies self-restraint, and I believe that if the people who find themselves differing with the decisions

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of their chiefs -- if they do, instead of going down or getting probably some columnist or somebody else to engineer an invitation, I think a man owes it to a chief to say, "Sir, I differ and ask to be sent out to line command." Because this must be the attitude each of us has. He is loyal to his chief because otherwise military organization becomes meaningless. It's all right for him to have his ideas to go and differ with the admiral or the general or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and so on, but I don't believe that he should go down and as a member of that organization, one for which I have the most profound respect, say "Out of my personal wisdom I disagree completely, and I think until we can -- well, you might say inculcate that kind of self-restraint among our people we will have it in this democracy because they will seek it -- there's nothing more a congressman likes than to get his picture in a place where there's headlines and if it will go all over the United States that's better than if it's local. So maybe sometimes there are others of us who like it. But the point is we have a higher duty than to just go down and air our own personal convictions when we are part of the body that has laid its recommendation before the chiefs. They modified them, or approved them, and censured the president -- their convictions and beliefs. I don't believe that it's our duty to go down before the congress to show they're wrong.

QUESTION:

Is the spiritual side of the free world being developed to keep in step with the military developments, and if your answer is No, what are the proper steps to achieve this?

ANSWER:

Well, this is, of course, a problem that has engaged the attention of philosophers so long that I feel almost embarrassed to attempt to give an

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answer of any kind because we have so long known that man's genius for inventing things that were evil created for him problems of control that sometimes ... it seems his spiritual strength is not up to the task. I can say this and what I believe. I believe that in a way the military forces are a priesthood. I can't tell you how deep is my respect for the responsibility they carry. If they will take the lead in saying, "This is what we are -- our most dedication -- as we put it in names of our country or your country or anybody else's country, but we put those ideals of human liberty and human dignity so high that we can handle and can think of this problem in such a way as we ourselves certainly will never offend. Our problem, of course, is this: we have an intransigent enemy. He's going to bluff, to threaten; he's going to use everything that will divide us, our nation from yours, from Britain, from France, Germany -- everybody, so he has no spiritual values, and I think the best thing we can do is on the very deepest values that we possess to try to get the very profound understanding with all the nations to which we are allied and with which we are friends. Those forces that bind us together are far more important than the little problems that guide us. We have problems about buying cotton, subsidizing cotton and trading cotton, and all forms of problems involving prestige and the others -- this thing and the other thing, but if we will put our eyes on the values that bind us together then I think our own certainty, that we may at least control our side of this material destructiveness, is not only well nigh perfect but will be the strongest element we've got in making the other fellow be very, very careful himself. Now I see no other way except reminding ourselves, and I apologize again for appearing to talk in terms of sermonizing. I am not. I believe this is practical as is the need for tying your own shoe in the morning, to dedicate ourselves more profoundly to those values that

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bind us together, whether it's among ourselves or with our friends and allies. And this is the best defense we have, both against the other fellow and against ourselves sometimes.

QUESTION:

Mr. Khrushchev has said, "We will bury you." Do you consider Russian economic growth a serious challenge to the United States and what can we do about it?

ANSWER:

I don't think it is so much the economic growth in its over-all sense. We are far more productive than the Russians, but since, of course, they started from a very low point, their rate of growth is quite good, but the big danger is this. They, with their dictatorial methods can direct all of their productivities toward the particular things that they want to use. You go -- and if you will talk to the Russian about automobiles, I think as I recall, they produced about 100 thousand last year. We produced 6-1/2 million. I took Mr. Khrushchev in a shopper ride around Washington and he was amazed about the number of big roads running out of the city. He said, "We don't need roads like this." And I said, "Well, how do you people get around." And he said, "They don't want to travel." Then I very proudly showed him all of these housing developments, each with its yard, and he said, "We don't believe in individual houses; they are very expensive and our people don't want them. They want to live in apartment houses." And he said that those who have been there have seen how far they have gone in building these great apartment houses. So I think that you have got to remember when you are talking about their economy, it's an economy directed to the particular things that the government thinks should be achieved, and we can't. Ours is a free thing and we each want to satisfy our own wants. Therefore, I would say this: You can be sure that the things they

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are doing, and to which they are directing their productivity, are those things they believe will frighten us -- that will tend to divide us and our allies one against the other -- that they can use in uncommitted countries of their own choosing -- and they will probably give, in my opinion, a sufficient amount to consumer spending in their own country so that there's a little bit of rise, and as long as there is a rise, that gives hope and satisfaction; and indeed, I am quite sure that in certain phases morale is quite high. But, by and large, this country can outproduce them and certainly will for decades outproduce them very, very materially, and the only thing is if they try finally to get us responding so much to every threat that we hysterically jump too high up with any kind of spending and spend ourselves, let's say, into bankruptcy, this will be the biggest victory that they will ever need and they can then hang up their arms. So I think that this contest between the economies must be such that we stay faithful to our system, get the things we need and give them first priority, and give the other things -- put it on the old -- (what is the old saying?) -- guns before butter. They were bound to do that; their system does it, so that we have to be careful for that reason, not for the over-all productivity of the nation. That won't come for a long, long time as a contest. But as to the use you make of that productivity -- that really does pose for us a problem and we'll have to be very careful. In my opinion we must, except for those things we know we need, we must look at every other dollar of expenditure with a jaundiced eye and just say, "Was this dollar necessary?" That's the only answer I can give to that question.

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