

"LEADERSHIP IN COMMAND" ✓

A lecture to be delivered by Commander
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Student officers of the Command and Staff
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Richard G.

In beginning this talk, I first want to try to maneuver clear of a small shoal^{area} marked on my charts "Semantics."

Here at the War College as I recall it, you use the terms leadership, command, and command decision without very clear distinctions, although each term certainly implies something different. In preparing this talk I have considered command and military leadership to be approximately synonymous. I consider command and decision as a special part of leadership into which I will not venture, except to identify it as that part of military leadership which relates to the employment of forces.

I also want to ask you not to restrict your thinking of leadership to the narrow sense of the conduct and personality of the commander. I have found that these features often tend to dominate our thinking about this subject. One of the MARKS of good leadership is the ability of the commander to imbue his subordinates with liking, respect, and sometimes even with affection for him personally, and to earn their confidence. His personality, his bearing, and his relations with his subordinates seem to have a great deal to do with this, and because they are so prominent, and because we greatly admire them, they often obscure other qualities that are even more essential. So it's usually a mistake to concentrate your examination of military leadership on the commander's behavior, because you are so apt to be led astray by superficialities that vary widely between individuals.

Let me give you several examples to illustrate my point. General MacArthur was aloof, almost Olympian; General Eisenhower was approachable and unreserved. Admiral Nimitz was patient and forbearing, but Admiral King was impatient, intolerant, and sometimes harsh. Admiral Spruance was detached and cool, while Admiral Halsey was bluff, pugnacious, and noisy. ^{well} These men were so different in behavior and personality that to find the key to their leadership, if indeed there is a key, I think we must broaden our examination considerably. My conclusion is that we must look at the commander's undertakings [§] as well as his image.

Therefore, in considering military leadership, or command, I am disinclined to settle for definitions of leadership which read like this very good one by Field Marshal Montgomery: VG 1A ON

"The capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose, and the character which will inspire confidence."

Instead I would suggest this: VG 1B ON

"The ability to exercise authority over men in ^{order} such a way as to enhance ~~their chances of~~ success, inspiring those who would willing support the ~~common~~ cause, and compelling those who would not."

LET THESE SINK IN

I object to the first definition because it suggests that personal attraction is a major element of leadership.

I also object to the first definition because it does not recognize that leadership must sometimes "compel" men as well as "rally" them.

I prefer the second definition because it addresses itself more directly to the essence of military leadership: the exercise of authority over men.

I also prefer the second definition because it discloses the significance of professional ability, and the responsibility for success which is attached to the authority of the leader.

My discussion of leadership is going to be based on my definition. I will be discussing the exercise of authority over men, so as to enhance their chances of success, ~~and to~~ inspire^{ing} some and ~~compelling~~ ^{compelling} others. My frame of reference will be the command responsibilities which I hope you will all encounter in the near future.

I have intended my definition to imply that military leadership is a combination of things to be done and of techniques for doing them. The things to be done are those things which will "enhance the chances of the men for success". I would like to point out that the greatest emphasis should be placed on the element of success, because the success of the common effort is the object of leadership and the responsibility of the commander. Also, as you all know, success at the moment of testing comes as the result of

the individual efforts of the men, and rarely as the result of the direct involvement of the commander. The decisions of the commander will determine the tasks which a man is confronted with, or the ground he fights on, or the means at his disposal,

but the matter of success or failure is up to him. ~~Someone once~~ ^{you may recall that}

the statement

wrote that a battle is a large number of individual combats going on at the same time, ~~and~~ ^{and} although we may have to substitute a weapons system crew for the single soldier, ^{well} I think this is still true and should be kept in mind. Because of this, military leadership begins with a clear realization of the importance of the man to the outcome of the common effort, and of the responsibilities of the commander in preparing the man for the tasks required of him. Therefore I want to talk first about the very practical side of leadership which contributes most directly to success, and later on discuss other things of a more abstract nature which will effect the commander's relations with his subordinates, and will be principally responsible for his so-called "image."

To suggest to you what I mean by the practical side of leadership let me ask you ^{some} ~~one or two~~ questions.

4 What did Bonaparte do as General and First Consul to bring order to the military affairs of France after years of revolutionary chaos, and to transform the French military system into the most powerful in Europe?

3 What did Wellington do in the Peninsula to shape an army from what he called "the scum of the earth", and to maintain this Army successfully against sizeable numerical odds on almost continuous campaign for seven years?

2

What did General Pershing do when he was sent 3000 miles away from home with carte-blanche orders as commander of an expeditionary force which had virtually no men, no settled organization, no training, no general staff, practically no equipment, and no psychological preparation for modern war? Within 18 months ~~the~~ ^{his force} ~~the AEF~~ numbered 2 million men and was the most effective and vigorous army on either side.

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What would you have done had you been Admiral Nimitz taking command of a shattered fleet and of an ocean area largely held by the enemy, while you brought into use naval forces of a size and character never seen before?

I think it is ~~in the actions of these commanders~~ and in the actions of commanders such as these that we will find the study of leadership most rewarding. I say this because the practical undertakings of these commanders to prepare their men to succeed are the common factors of their leadership, regardless of differences in their personalities. ~~And these practical undertakings are the keys to leadership, whether you are a great captain or a small commander.~~

(GEN. PERSHING)

Now, for some small glimpses of military leadership working ~~hard~~ to enhance the chances of a command for success - glimpses which will disclose these practical undertakings - I want to read several diary entries made in 1940 and 1941 by another distinguished soldier who was also coming from behind, so to speak.

and who later became one of the chief architects of the Allied victory, as CIGS.

They were made by General Sir Alan Brooke, who was at the time in command of the land defenses of England. You will recall the circumstances ^{in 1940,} how the British Army was in a desperate situation, having lost virtually all of its equipment at Dunkirk. Note how in each instance the direct and energetic participation of the Commander is involved. VG 2 ON

1. ORGANIZATION

"July 23--- (Flew to York) and had both corps commanders meet me for a discussion on organization of defenses."

"Sept 12--- Had long talk with PM on organization of defenses on the narrows."

"Jan 5--- Had a lecture on Armored Division organization, signal lay-out, and administrative organization."

Comment: The Commander must ensure that his organization best suits his tasks. He must further ensure that the organization is understood by his subordinates and that the duties of every man are clearly established.

PAUSE

VG 3 ON

2. TRAINING

"July 27 --- visited 46th division found it in a lamentably backward state of training, barely fit to do platoon training."

"Jan 5 --- went to Staff College for the big exercise in armored forces that I am running there. Gave opening address."

Comment: Men must be taught the uses of their weapons and to coordinate them in the way envisioned by the commander. Since it is the commander's concept of operations which governs all coordination of arms, the commander himself is vital to the process of instruction. *The same principle applies to administration.*

3. TESTING

VG 4 PAUSE

"Nov 1940 --- A very useful exercise, judging from the number of mistakes I saw. It is lamentable how poor we are in Army and Corps Commanders. We ought to remove several."

"May 1 ---- got up at 5:15 AM to watch 1st Armored Division exercise, based on one I had carried out theoretically during the winter."

Comment: Testing is vital to the Commander to disclose deficiencies in organization and instruction, and to measure the capabilities of subordinates.

4. EQUIPMENT

VG 5

"Jan 1941 --- I raised the lamentable lack of arms ---
(Which) did not please Winston at all. He
considered it most ungrateful of me to com-
plain --- I considered that it was my duty to
draw attention to the shortages that prevailed."

"Apr 29 --- Went to see demonstration of new anti-tank
weapon - was very much impressed. Am going
to press hard for their rapid development."

"May 13 --- Attended second 'Tank Parliament' at 10 Downing
Street. Discussed maintenance and spare parts."

Comment: Because of the interaction between his mission and the
means at his disposal, the commander is the officer best qualified
to present the needs of his command for equipment to the authorities
who must provide it. He therefore must exert himself to be in-
formed of the capabilities and limitations of his equipment and of
the measures required to maintain and improve it.

SP?

VG 6

5. PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION

"Jan 8 ---- Finished up armored exercises and then made my final remarks. The latter gave me an opportunity of instilling a little more offensive spirit into the Army, and also of expressing my views regarding the present stagnation of higher training."

Comment: Psychological preparation is the "invisible armor" of men in battle or emergency. Without it, the results of all prior training may be nullified by the shock of realities. It is also the device used by the commander to condition his subordinates to emphasize lines of action or policies which are of primary importance.

6 OFF

I have assembled these diary entries to give you a capsule picture of military leadership hard at work on essential undertakings. These five ~~things~~^{undertakings} - organization, training, testing, equipment, and psychological preparation constitute which we might call the ~~core~~^{FRAMEWORK} of successful military leadership. They are essential because the chances of failure are increased whenever any one of them is neglected, whether we are considering ~~encountering~~^{meeting} enemy ~~forces~~^{forces} in wartime, or meeting arbitrary standard of readiness in peacetime. I feel sure you will all recognize that these ~~undertakings~~^{they} apply very directly to the smaller commands ~~that~~^{or} you and I will hold. There's ~~no~~ need to dwell on that point, ^{so} but I would like to discuss ~~these things~~^{them} briefly ~~in general~~, to bring out ~~one or~~ ^{some} ~~two~~ other points that may not be so obvious.

3) You all know the old expression, that a leader must know his men. What are you supposed to know about them? Personal details? State of training? Likes and dislikes? Reliability? Perhaps. ~~But~~^{though,} I suggest that there are really only two basic questions to be asked about any man. First, is he competent to do his job? Second, will he willingly give his best to support the common effort, or, to put it frankly, must he be compelled to do so?

Most men can be made competent, in a somewhat narrow sense, by instruction or by reassignment to easier duties. But a man is not really competent unless he is exerting his best efforts in performing the job he's been trained for. In other words, competency in a broad sense, is equal to training plus motivation.

Now when an officer assumes command, he cannot at first know which of his men are well motivated,- that is, who can be inspired to give their best efforts. He also does not know the actual degree of competency of his men, as compared to their reported or presumed competency. So the first steps a leader must take often stem from the need to answer these basic questions about his men.

2 Well, first he should organize his command in such a way that the responsibilities of every man are clarified and are distinct and separate from the responsibilities of any other man. He does this so that as his men perform their duties day by day, they are standing as much as possible on their own efforts, and are neither being advanced or retarded by the performance of others. Unless this is done, he will be unable to measure individual performance. Whenever there is overlapping or dual responsibility, you will find that the good man will not give his best efforts because he doesn't like to share credit for results with the slacker who may be riding on his back. And the slacker will drift along counting on the good man to get him by.

Second, ^{the commander} ~~he~~ should ensure that a vigorous training program is in effect and that it is oriented towards the mission of the command.

I have found that where ~~rigorous~~ command attention is lacking, this vital matter becomes disoriented and perfunctory due to the intrusion of extraneous material, and to natural inertia. ^a *that seems to stand this subject*

And, third he should keep his command at work on various tasks that will test the performance of individuals. Of course he should be careful not to ask for undertakings that are beyond them, but he should ensure that as their abilities increase, more difficult undertakings are required. As a practical matter, the testing of a command is relatively easy. What is required is that the commander possess sufficient knowledge and experience to know what situations each element of his command might encounter and also the ingenuity and energy to impose these situations upon them.

Throughout this process, the commander should be watching his men as well as their results. He must never lose sight of the basic questions: who is competent and who is not ---- who will willingly give his best efforts and who will not.

I am sure you all will agree that unless these steps are taken, so that the men are sorted out and identified with individual responsibilities, for which they are then instructed, the commander is building on sand. No matter how personable and persuasive a man he is, he will end where he begins --- with a mob instead of a team.

And if he fails to test his command, both as a team and as individuals, he is living in a world of dreams and assumptions, because he ~~will not~~ ^{won't} know until too late where his Command is strong and where it is weak.

Well, Organization, ~~I~~nstruction and ~~t~~esting are three of the factors that the success of your men will depend on. I have been very brief with these because I don't want to belabor fundamentals. My only advice to you is never to take them for granted. Now let's look a bit more closely ^{at} one of the other factors, which is certainly no less important, but which is the least often identified or discussed.

When men are confronted with the realities of combat or an emergency, for which they have been trained, whether or not their training is applied is often a question of their psychological preparation for the impact of these realities. I am sure that you have all experienced situations where men with the same training in procedures or techniques have reacted very differently in moments of stress, so that some were effective and others were not. It's quite possible that the psychological preparation of these men may have been the variable factor.

I want to impress on you that as commanders of combat units, you will have a responsibility for ensuring that your men are psychologically battle-ready, as well as battle-ready in their procedures and equipment. I must admit that in peacetime this is often hard to do, for one reason because battle readiness is frequently the victim of lip service and subsidiary matters become the real goals - such as administrative perfection, economy of operation, spit and polish, and so on. Nevertheless, we must not neglect this responsibility, and should conscientiously give it the attention it deserves.

How this can best be done is a subject in itself. The key seems to be the personal communications of the commander to his men. In wartime, many of these communications have become historic,

especially the brief ones. I think that Nelson's famous signal "England expects every man to do his duty" was probably the essence of psychological preparation.

V6 / Now here is a photograph of another commander engaged in a personal effort towards the psychological preparation of troops. General Eisenhower's remarks to these men consisted of telling them what to expect of their enemy, what to count on from their own training, and how important were their tasks.

Most of these men were facing combat for the first time. The General was perfectly forthright about the fact that many might be killed. But he stressed their advantages in training and equipment, and in the element of surprise, and he dwelt on the honor of any sacrifice made in the service of one's country in war.

I think this talk had in it the essential elements of this business ~~of psychological preparation~~: ⁽¹⁾ A realistic picture of future events, ⁽²⁾ the basis for self-confidence, and ⁽³⁾ acceptance of the probability of hardship and even death. When these men had their night drop into Normandy they encountered many difficulties, but lack of psychological preparation was not one of them.

Let me give you one more illustration of this point. Here ^{is} ~~is~~ another great man whose leadership ~~will not~~ ^{will not} soon be forgotten. In the summer of 1940 Mr. Churchill circulated through the inner circles of his government a document ~~which I would~~ ^{I'd} like to read to you. I think you will find it an interesting example of what we are talking about. This is what he said:

"On what may be the eve of an attempted invasion or battle for our native land, the Prime Minister desires to impress upon all persons holding responsible positions in the Government, --- their

duty to maintain a spirit of alert and confident energy. While every precaution must be taken that time and means afford, there are no grounds for supposing that more German troops can be landed in this country, either from the air or across the sea, than can be destroyed or captured by the strong forces at present under arms. The Royal Air Force is in excellent order and at the highest strength yet attained. The German Navy was never so weak, nor the British Army at home so strong as now. The Prime Minister expects all His Majesty's servants in high places to set an example of steadiness and resolution. They should check and rebuke the expression of loose and ill-digested opinions in their circles, or by their subordinate. They should not hesitate to report, or if necessary remove, any persons --- who are found to be conciously exercising a disturbing or depressing influence. Thus alone will they be worthy of the fighting men who have already met the enemy without any sense of being outmatched in martial qualities. "

It's interesting to take this historic admonition apart. Did you note that it began with the psychological preparation of subordinates for the shock of coming events? Then the basis of self-confidence was stressed in such an adroit way that no doubts were admitted. The vision of worthiness was summoned as inspiration, but the glove was taken off and the heavy hand of compulsion was laid bare. There was to be no flinching or whimpering. Putting all this in less formal language, when he

was urging his countrymen to go after the invaders with fowling pieces and pitchforks. Mr Churchill coined the phrase "You can always take one with you".

In my comment of General Brooke's diary entries which illustrated this point, I said that it was also the device used by a commander to condition his subordinates to emphasize lines of action or policies of primary importance. No doubt you have all done this on numerous occasions, perhaps without being aware of it. Anytime you may have told your men about the importance of a clean ship, or proper dress you were building into them a reflex against dirt and litter and sloppy personal appearance. And this matter applies to far more important things than dress. It applies to the manner in which men will do technical work, where they cannot be supervised, where the degree of care and accuracy is perhaps a matter of life and death to someone else. If you want an area in which you can obtain a day to day reading on the quality of leadership in a command, this one will do better than most, because it is the one wherein, the personal intervention of the commander can be most effective, and is really indispensable. ~~As a matter of fact, when considerations of leadership are limited to the behavior and personality of the commander, this is probably the area that's being examined.~~

I have save the essential undertakings which I called "Equipment" until last, because I find I cannot talk about it without

blending in something about organization, instruction, testing, and psychological preparation.

When General Brooke was watching the first anti-tank weapons based on the shaped charge, or discussing tank spare parts with the Prime Minister, his object was the provision of means to commanders in the field. You and I have a different object regarding equipment.

Our object is to employ it successfully and as you all know ^{at least half of our problem} ~~is in making our own work.~~ At some point then, leadership comes face to face with machinery. As you and I get older, and the machinery gets younger, the situation can become "curiouser and curiouser".

We cannot inspire a machine with talk, we cannot reward it, we cannot give orders to it, we cannot bring it to mast. Yet it can make or break our operations. Well, do machines lie entirely in the hands of the technicians? Can they be influenced at all by leadership? Must the Commander himself be a technician? In brief, what is the relation between leadership and machines?

Well, obviously the relationship is with the technician and not with the machine. But I find that many people fail to understand this, particularly young officers. To them, the machine is the object with personality. It is "well" or it is "sick". It is warm to the touch. It has light. It moves. It is capable of pleasing or aggravating the Captain. In short, it can become the center of attention, so much so that the technician may become a mere human adjunct to the machine, somewhat de-personalized, and not the center of attention at all.

All that is required for you to correct this situation when you encounter it is to depersonalize the machine and to make the technician the center of attention. Then exercise your authority to ensure that he is not the victim of disorganization, that he has received the necessary instruction, that his work is being tested to ensure compliance with standards, and that you are constantly embuing him with self reliance, self-confidence, a sense of responsibility, and a burning sense of anxiety for success. When he succeeds let him be the one to get the praise; don't pat the airplane on the wing and praise it.

In addition I'd suggest that you exert yourselves to be informed of equipment capabilities in specific terms. Otherwise you may be tolerating an unacceptable condition unwittingly, or you may be demanding impossibilities. I'd also suggest that you always be receptive to the man who wants to explain his technical problems, in technical terms, whether or not you can fully understand them. If you are unwilling to do this and direct your interest ~~to~~ only ^{to} results, you are going to give the impression of being more interested in the machinery than in the men.

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Well, so much for the practical side of this ~~business~~ ^{SUBJECT}. I hope from the foregoing to confirm that command ^{isn't} ~~is not~~ just a pose to be maintained in the presence of subordinates. Command is a continuing series of positive actions taken in pursuit of certain essential tasks. And deeply involved in these positive actions are the techniques employed by the commander for accomplishing tasks through subordinates.

This is where the broad subject of command narrows to an area called personal leadership, where we have to consider the commander and his subordinates, and this brings me to the second part of my talk.

^{Here} ~~Since~~ we are entering the area of conduct and personality, ^{so} we can expect to have to deal with many variables. We can certainly find specific guidance here, but we should remember that while we can learn from observing others, we will only appear foolish if we try to imitate them. At all times we must be ourselves, frankly recognizing that we will do things differently because we are different. The best use we can make of the examples of others is to note the common principals that are evident in their personal leadership and then by analogy and a reduction in scale, try to apply these principals ourselves.

I think that the personal leadership of great commanders has been distinguished primarily by almost unabating energy in personally coming to grips with the problems confronting their commands, whether on the field of battle or in administration. Of course, a touch of genius has helped, but nevertheless, a generous willingness to expend energy in applying personal ability has been the predominant quality.

Here is a contemporary description of Napoleon lending his personal leadership to the historic and often tedious business of revising the legal code of France:

"In these sittings, the First Consul manifested those remarkable powers of attention and precise analysis which enabled him for ten hours at a stretch to devote himself to one object without ever

allowing himself to be distracted by memory or by errant thoughts.
Not only are thirty-seven laws discussed at this table - the Consul
propounds question after question concerning other matters --
how is bread made? How shall we make money? How shall
we establish security? Ruling, administering, negotiating,

with that orderly intelligence of his, he gets through 18 hours work everyday. In three years he has ruled more than the kings ruled in a century."

And it does not matter what activity the leader is engaged in, the same principal of energy applies. Here is another description, of Napoleon in the field, contained in a ^{Rebuke} ~~letter~~ he wrote to his ~~fourth~~ ~~youngest~~ brother Jerome, who had been given the throne of Holland and who was unable ^{to go soldiering without the} ~~to leave the ladies at home~~ when he ~~was~~ ^{in command of a large camp.} ~~went soldiering.~~

"You make war like a satrap! God in heaven, you never learned that from me! When I am in camp I need neither ministers or luxury. I ride in front of the skirmishers and don't even allow my minister for foreign affairs to follow me. You must camp with the advance guard, be in the saddle day and night, march with the advance guard, so that you get all the news without delay. If you don't like that you'd better stay home in your palace."

And of course there are dozens of other examples of this. The Duke of Wellington did his own reconnaissance also, and undoubtedly would have agreed with Napoleon that there were no such things as details, that he could safely allow to remain beneath his notice. Wellington wrote that his dreams were full of army biscuits. He said "it is very necessary to attend to all this detail and to trace a biscuit from Lisbon into a man's mouth on the frontier, and to

provide for its removal from place to place, or no military operations can be carried on, and the troops must starve."

Now please do not make the mistake of thinking that leadership of this sort is reserved for the men at the very top, and in great moments of battle. Everyone in command is at the top, of something, and everyday in command is a battle of a sort. Just remember that men ^{Rise} use to the great commands through success in smaller ones, ~~I think it can be shown~~ ^{and} that the techniques of their personal leadership ^{have} usually remained constant in the process.

How we ourselves can apply this principal of energy is a somewhat ^{touchy} ~~tough~~ problem for me to discuss, because it's a personal one for each of us. Energy seems to be a combination of mental attitude, backed up by physical vigor, both of which we have some control over. The mental attitude can be shaped by constantly ordering ourselves to get off our ditty boxes, and to go look at the problem, wherever it is. Physical vigor is a matter of conditioning to maintain a high level of physical activity. At your ages, you probably take your energy for granted, but you should begin now to safeguard your resources against the many influences that will tend to dissipate them. Certainly, if energy is a dominant factor in ~~your~~ personal leadership, as I believe it to be, this problem deserves your conscientious attention.

The second dominant factor, after energy, ^{in personal} ~~in personal~~ personal leadership, is professional ability. Professional ability will largely decide for a commander how he can best undertake the essential tasks of organization, training, testing and so on. And in the development of professional ability, there seem to be no substitutes for experience and study.

Time, and the Bureau of Naval Personnel, will have a lot to do with increasing your experience, but except for such marvelous opportunity as you are enjoying here at the War College, study will be up to you. I have heard Admiral Austin refer to this as

doing your homework. If you will observe the great leaders in history, as well as the leaders of today, I think you will find this capacity for study is characteristic of them all. The general direction of their efforts seems to have been towards preparing themselves for future situations which they could estimate would occur, which amounts to gaining some synthetic experience to augment actual experience. Without the advantages ^{at} occurring from study - that is from doing our homework - we can expect to be caught flat-footed when a new situation confronts us. When this condition becomes widespread and nobody is doing his homework, you can expect serious ramifications. I think General Pershing's arrival in France in 1917 ^{was} a classic example of this.

*and I would like to read you what he said about it.
Here is what he said about it:*

"As soon as the formalities incident to our arrival were over - - we got down to work, ~~as it was urgent that we should begin at once~~ to lay the foundations for the development and employment of the American Army. The size of the army, its organization, its place at the front and the selection of ~~line~~ lines of communication, all had to be determined. --- Figuratively speaking, when the Acting Chief of Staff went to look in the secret files where the plans to meet the situation --- should have been found, the pigeon hole was empty. In other words, the War Department was ~~face~~ face to face with the question of sending an army to Europe and found that

the general staff had never considered such a thing. No one in authority had any definite idea how many men might be needed, how they should be organized and equipped, or where the tonnage to transport and supply them was to come from."

This is a rather serious indictment, don't you think? I think it's understandable why General Pershing's most over-taxed expletive soon became "to Hell with the War Department!"

In relating the factor of experience, that underlies professional ability, to you and me, I want to make one or two observations. I recall that the late John Marquand, the novelist, once said that "the only real qualification for leadership was mileage." I'll agree to the extent that mileage helps considerably but on the other hand we have all known officers with lots of experience who were rather indifferent leaders. In fact there is sometimes a danger that experience will impede a Commander rather than assist him, and this is what I want to point out to you. I have in mind the situation where the Commander finds it easier to fall back on old techniques which may be second nature to him, but which are obsolete, when instead he should throw himself into the search for new measures, or at least give his subordinates free rein to do so.

In a more positive vein, I would suggest that your experience will be invaluable to you in several specific ways. The first,

obviously, is the assistance given by experience to the making of correct decisions. Your own solid experience in any matter should count heavily against the arguments of officers (and civilians) without comparable experience who are arguing from the basis of theory or from logic that is built on presumed facts. In these situations you trust your own experience because it's constructed on realities.

Another great contribution your professional experience will make is in the way it will enhance your ability to instruct. Another is the way it will enhance your ability to recognize error. And still another is the way it will give you what I call foreknowledge of possibilities. Think for a moment what significant ~~gifts~~ ~~these~~ ~~three things~~ are to a man in command. In my opinion they stem from professional experience and from nowhere else.

PAUSE

The third outstanding quality of personal leadership ^{after every and} has been ^{not} the effective utilization of subordinates. Admiral Nimitz was supposed to have condensed this whole area of leadership into three words, "Organize, Deputize, and Supervise." I think these ^{other} ^{that} ^{also} may be one or two ^{ideas} ^{which} ^{might} ^{be} ^{added}.

To begin with, how many leaders have been brought down by defective subordinates, ^{some} of their own choosing! ^{And} On the other hand, ~~many~~ many have been assisted to success by effective subordinates.

← Therefore, I would like to pass on to you something which I call the "cardinal sins" of choosing subordinates. Now these apply to all

of us, ~~also again and again in the future~~, but for the moment, let us consider them in relation to our selecting subordinates for tasks within our own commands.

^{VU 7A}
The first cardinal sin is that experience is mistaken for intelligence. After all, a monkey who has learned a trick after 100 ~~attempts~~ should not therefore be considered intelligent. He is simply experienced! If one of your officers is going to be encountering new and unusual situations in his duties, be careful that you make this distinction between experience and intelligence before you decide on him for the job. Experience will qualify a man to perform a similar task. Only intelligence can qualify a man to cope with the new and different.

^{VU 9B}
The second sin is that personality and charm are mistaken for character. This is akin to judging a book by its cover. We can judge a book by reading it, but with a man we are only permitted glimpses from time to time of parts of his inner substance from which we have to generalize. I suggest that you be alert for these opportunities and when the time comes to assess the man's character in relation to the demands of new duties, don't forget what you saw.

^{VU 9C}
The last of the three cardinal sins, known to me at any rate, is that enthusiasm is mistaken for ability. Enthusiasm is an indicator of how hard a man will work, not how well he will work.

LAZY AND INTELLIGENT were given
Commands, because their
natural inclination was to
get others to work for them,
and were capable of deciding
the right thing to do.

LAZY AND STUPID

were made comparing officers
or sergeants, where they would
get others to carry out orders as
received from above.

ENERGETIC AND INTELLIGENT

were made General Staff Officers.

You have probably heard the story about the basic sorting procedures for officers in the old German army, how they were graded by energy and intelligence. They were either lazy or energetic, and either intelligent or stupid, and their assignment depended on which combination they possessed. ^{I'll tell you what happened to the others later if you're interested but the point here is that} The ones who were energetic and stupid could not be assigned anywhere because they were dangerous to the organization so they were taken out and shot, at least so goes the story. I think the best thing to be done is to attempt to channel the energy that, after all, is the basis of enthusiasm into a program of self-study and training. VU ! in

A few minutes ago when I said that military leadership is a combination of things to be accomplished and of the techniques for achieving them through subordinates, it probably would have been more accurate to say by subordinates. After all, it will be your subordinates who will actually do, or at least directly supervise, the undertakings which you direct. Well how do you obtain the best efforts of these men?

We would like to think that the best efforts of all of our subordinates are obtained by the inspiration of our leadership. No doubt in many cases this is true. But men being what they are, inspiration by itself is often not enough. Best efforts - even acceptable efforts - must sometimes be compelled. This fact is ~~is not~~ apparent to many

of our younger officers, so that an unfair share of the burden sometimes falls on the Captain. As Commanding Officers you might do worse than to keep in the back of your mind the old warning of Thomas Hobbes, who said that man was by nature "A selfishly individualistic creature" whose life was necessarily "nasty, brutish and short."

On the other hand, as we all know, the great majority of our men are every bit as well-intentioned and as anxious for success as we are, and ~~that~~ their best efforts only await a summons. For some in this group it is only necessary to indicate to them the value of the common effort, and the significance of their own part for success. Others will also need a glimpse of reward.

AS A STEP IN THIS DIRECTION

I have found it very helpful to take a personal interest in the assignment of a new task to a junior officer. It's very easy to allow the normal administration of the ship to suffice, and not take a part in this, but it's not good leadership. Subordinates need to know several things when they are assigned to new duties, things which are best received from the Commander himself. One thing they should know is the importance you attach to the job, and the related fact that in your mind the officer and that particular job are very very closely linked together. At such a talk, you can also touch on the scope of the job, the problems to be encountered and where to get help, and you can also give assurance of your

confidence and support. I think the result will be a subordinate who is keenly aware of your interest in his duties, And if he goes off with just a touch of burning sense of anxiety for success, so much the better.

In this

All this, of course, depends upon the Commander's ability to communicate with his subordinates. We all gain practice at this as we go along, with the result that we generally are far better communicators than our younger subordinates. The effect of this is often to make communications a one-way arrangement - we do the talking and they listen. This is very detrimental, because our subordinates are denied a chance to learn to communicate in the first place, and we are cutting ourselves off from knowledge and ideas that they need to impart to us. Give your subordinates a chance to talk to you. Encourage them to do so. Contrive the situations if necessary, but let them have enough of your time to keep good clear communications open in both directions.

3 >

also A Commander must recognize that his officers are different from himself, and therefore they will never do things exactly as he would have done them, and that their judgements and attitudes will always vary somewhat from his own. Too great an effort on your part to mold your subordinates in your own image will result in arresting their own growth. Every now and then, ^{it's advisable to} accept a compromise on techniques, and even willingly lose an argument

for the sake of giving an officer his head. But in doing so, you can still make your guidance and advice apparent. For example when the Duke of Wellington grudgingly granted an officer's request for leave in Lisbon, he granted him only two days, with the comment that "48 hours was as long as any reasonable man could want to stay in bed with the same woman."

When a touch of compulsion becomes necessary, I am always reminded of a distinguished senior officer who used to begin by saying "I think we should clarify one or two factors in your mind", and then he would deliver himself very deftly, and without raising his voice, of some of the more relevant facts of life. His first step was always to clarify the responsibilities of his subordinates with regard to his own requirements. If there had been honest confusion on this point, there was no need to go further. Otherwise, he would proceed to make clear his own determination for compliance and if the situation warranted, he would also clarify the punitive measures at his disposal. In rare instances where he was dealing with a singularly ignorant person, he would take pains to clarify his own authority. And I noticed that after disclosing the hand of ~~restitution~~, he always tried to disclose the helping hand of restitution also. Although I only saw this on a few occasions, I am

told that his technique was suitable in all situations from commanding a submarine to commanding a Fleet.

But this matter of inspiration is not so simple that a simple set of rules is enough. True, men need to be persuaded of the value of the common effort, and of the significance of their own parts, and some may also need a glimpse of reward. But what they all need, also, is an example to follow or at least to admire, in the personal behavior and character of the leader. Here again, I would warn you that we can be badly misled by attempting to visualize a standard pose to be imitated. I say this because insofar as behavior is concerned, it must ~~suit~~ suit the situation, which means it must change. Men who have been unable to change have often been failures. You might recall that it was written about General Joffre that the celebrated imperturbability which he displayed in the early disasters of 1914 later became indistinguishable from insensibility.

The conventional, rather euphorious view is that in his personal behavior, a leader must always exhibit self-control, tact, and patience in the face of exasperation, frustration, honest error, stupidity and the fickleness of chance. I will agree that he should be able to exhibit these qualities if the situation permits, but he should also be able to exhibit something very different if it is

warranted. If the situation calls for calmness, let's have self control and steadiness. But if a blast is what is required, let's not have a whisper.

As I say, behavior is necessarily variable. What seems to be constant is character. Forcefulness, Expressiveness, Resolution, and Honorableness, if these can be called elements of character, are probably the principal foundation stones on which successful conduct is built.

Forcefulness is the key to gaining and holding the alertness of your subordinates and of reducing any doubts in their minds as to your intent or resolve.

Without Expressiveness, you will be unable to direct and control, unable to instruct, unable to get across your opinions and ideas, unable to indicate your approval or disapproval.

Your own Resolution will sustain you and your commands in the face of persistent difficulties that cause discouragement or doubt. It will be the key to the inspirational aspects of your leadership. It will also be the factor that will hold your men to the standards that you have established.

And of course Honorableness is the factor which will make your subordinates trust you and not be afraid of you, regardless of your irascibility or forcefulness.

The self-confidence of your subordinates and their confidence in you, which many people consider a starting point for leadership

I put last because it is really an effect, or a product of leadership. When you have taken all the steps you can to enhance the chances of your men for success, and they succeed, then their self-confidence will develop and also their confidence in you. Confidence and leadership are seldom built on failures.

* * * * *

Well gentlemen, these are my thoughts on the exercise of authority over men so as to enhance their chances for success, inspiring some and perhaps compelling others. ~~I think~~ ^{ill} you will find that the tasks which are essential to your own leadership are the same tasks which have been undertaken by the Wellingtons, and the Pershings, and the Nimitzs, and by the Rickovers and the Lemays. No matter ^{what size} ~~how large~~ a command you hold you've got to be willing to exert yourselves strenuously at organization, and at training and testing, and at problems of equipment and towards psychological preparation. Remember that the object of your leadership is the success of your men and that preparing them for their tasks is your responsibility. It is expected that you will show a due regard for the feelings and rights of others, but the good opinion of your subordinates will follow mainly from your ability to enhance their chances of success. I think it will be unusual for you to receive tributes for your efforts but really it should be enough for you to perceive that the basis of tribute has been well laid.

Viewgraph I

"The capacity and the will to rally men and women to a common purpose, and the character which will inspire confidence. "

Field Marshall Montgomery

"The ability to exercise authority over men in such a way as to enhance their chances of success, inspiring those who would willingly support the common cause, and compelling those who would not. "

Viewgraph II

1. ORGANIZATION

"July 23---(Flew to York) and had both corps commanders meet me for a discussion on organization of defenses. "

"Sept 12---Had long talk with PM on organization of defenses on the narrows. "

"Jan 5-----Had a lecture on Armored Division organization, signal layout, and administrative organization. "

Viewgraph III

2. TRAINING

"July 27---visited 46th division found it in a lamentably backward state of training, barely fit to do platoon training. "

"Jan 5-----went to Staff College for the big exercise in armored forces that I am running there. Gave opening address. "

Viewgraph IV

3. TESTING

"Nov 1940---A very useful exercise judging from the number of mistakes I saw. It is lamentable how poor we are in Army and Corps Commanders. We ought to remove several. "

"May 1-----got up at 5:15 A. M. to watch 1st Armored Division exercise, based on one I had carried out theoretically during the winter. "

Viewgraph V

4. EQUIPMENT

"Jan 1941---I raised the lamentable lack of arms---(Which) did not please Winston at all. He considered it most ungrateful of me to complain---I considered that it was my duty to draw attention to the shortages that prevailed."

"Apr 29---Went to see demonstration of new ant-tank weapon-was very much impressed. Am going to press hard for their rapid development."

"May 13----Attended second "Tank Parliament" at 10 Downing Street. Discussed maintenance and spare parts."

Viewgraph VI

5. PSYCHOLOGICAL PREPARATION

"Jan 8---Finished up armored exercises and then made my final remarks. The latter gave me an opportunity of instilling a little more offensive spirit into the Army and also of expressing my views regarding the present stagnation of higher training."

Viewgraph VII

Picture of Eisenhower.

Viewgraph VIII

Picture of Winston Churchill.

Viewgraph IX

Experience is mistaken for intelligence.
Personality and charm are mistaken for character.
Enthusiasm is mistaken for ability.