

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

GIVEN AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

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BY

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Good morning, Gentlemen! As I promised you, the highlight of the year for my Intelligence Briefings is the speech by Mr. Shadrin. After he finishes, we'll go directly into a question period, and perhaps finish a little early.

Now without further ado, Mr. Shadrin.

Mr. Shadrin begins:

Well, thank you very much. I don't know if I will approve Commander Herrick's introduction or not, but I will try to do my best.

First of all, I would like to ask you to be ready to struggle with my English, because I still have great difficulty to speak this new language for me. But again I will try to do my best.

it was fated that I address you briefly after the following questions:

First, What are the major new ship types and other weapons systems in the Soviet Navy and their intended tactical employment in general war? Why doesn't the Soviet Navy build any aircraft carriers?

Second question: What are the general war mission and capabilities, the strength and weaknesses of the Soviet Navy? What changes can be anticipated in the foreseeable future?

And third, What effect does Army dominance in the Defense Ministry have on overall military strategy? On naval ship construction? On naval strategy?

And last one, What effect does Communist Party dominance over the Armed Forces have on the formulation of military strategy? Of the Commanding Officers of individual ships?

Well, so far as the first two and to a considerable degree, even third questions are concerned, I feel somewhat inferior in attempting to compete with two well-known agencies; namely, CIA and DIA. However, I shall try to answer them to the best of my ability and knowledge.

As you probably all well know, the Soviet Military for its book <u>Military Strategy</u>, edited by Marshal Pikolovsky, criticized the prewar--Soviet prewar--shipbuilding program as well as naval doctrine in the fullest manner. And they thought that the Navy was designed for independent aggression on the high seas. Serious errors were made in the evaluation of the significance of the various forces of the Navy. As a result of the preference given to the Surface Fleet the independent operation of surface ships was considered to be the main side of Naval Operations. This resulted in great attention being devoted to the construction of large, expensive surface ships. Then, finally,



by carrying out an extensive program of construction of surface ships, we aimed at achieving superiority over this fleet of our probable enemies. And of course in this time probable enemies were considered to be Germany as well as Britain

. And that time, of course, United States was not considered as a probable main enemy amongst those three countries.

Well, it's very difficult to imagine how did the planned defensive operation in open sea result in aircraft carrier? And I've got here a very logical question which always I am asked. Why did they build an aircraft carrier? This is long story-long story--but I will try to answer it in a few words.

They did plan to build an aircraft carrier in their two shipbuilding programs. First program of 1938 included in its last page 46-48 a construction of an aircraft carrier. After the war--War II program which was approved in 1947, also included construction of an aircraft carrier in the last stage of this program.

As late as 1951 Admiral , just being reappointed with recognition of Admiral ______ as a Soviet Hero, stated that in the near future we will have aircraft carriers and they will enable us to operate on the high, open sea. This speech he made in Riga and repeated the same statement in Baltiisk in 1951. However, in 1953 at Step of Stalingrad, shipbuilding program was revised considerably. And in 1954 decision was made to start construction of their biggest naval ship which they

started to build, battle cruisers--type STALINGRAD--and one of the ships, I should mention, was in 50% of readiness in the Nikolaev shipbuilding yard--[on] the Black Sea.


After that ship would be finished, next step was, according to that Program, building an aircraft carrier. Now why the decision was made to stop construction of this surface ship and to recognize as a major Navy force, a major strike at naval forces subhunting. This time progress in atomic weapons was obvious and their program in development, strategic as well as tactical; rocket forces--what they called missiles--were in good progress as well. More, they calculated they cannot in foreseeable future achieve--not superiority, but even to build more or less equal forces--with a potent , what we call--in other words, name-dropping.

They recognized, as I mentioned, submarines as the main forces of the Navy. However, it should be remembered that they never neglected submarines. This is very controversial question because from the open plan, we can see that they criticized Zhukov for his negative attitude toward submarines. On the contrary, Zhukov said that this attitude was toward surface ships. And I personally heard him to say this, not once but twice; and he made great issue, actually was very critical, toward building surface ships like cruisers, since in fact it was what--cruisers to operate in remote area off the shore.

Now if we remember the previous developments of submarines, we know that even before World War II they had over 200 submarines, which was the greatest number of submarines in service at the time. So to say that they neglected, they underestimated value of submarines is not correct. However,

Now reason for stopping this program, or revising this program was not only economical difficulties, cost involved, but mainly time. They concluded that not less than eight, and more probable, ten years would be needed in order to build an aircraft carrier, make necessary adjustments to the surface ships, ask the people to prepare special planes, to prepare pilots, and on account

of lack of pilots, even with available an aircraft carrier and planes, giving for them operation of task forces. So they ed consider, that in ten years (about'53, '54) value of aircraft carriers will not be as great as it was at that time. It is not correct to assume or state that they neglected completely the importance of aircraft carriers. No, up to this day, present time, they <u>do</u> recognize their value, though with certain limitations. They do recognize that if certain countries



need world sea communication lines, longer ocean communication lines, this country <u>has</u> to have an aircraft carrier devoted to protect this communication line.

However, as I mentioned, ten years was too long for them. And this should be combined with development of, as I mentioned previously, their rocket forces and atomic weapons. Well, analysis shows that submarine is the best use of ship for such would be called "atomic era." So, not only they dropped this idea to have an aircraft carrier, but they consider it as better to have <u>more</u> ships with less tonnage--let's say 5, 6, 7,000 lbs. In other words, to have four, than have 1 big ship and to put (I better put it the American expression) many eggs in one basket.

This probably actually is oversimplified; however largely, it was followed.

About the rest of the time--how this, the same Headquarters Military Strategy, considers the role of the Navy at the present time. Now let me quote again:

The main theme so stated of military operation of Naval theater will be defeat of the enemy fleet and disruption of his naval and sea communication lines. The task of delivering nuclear rocket strike against also addresses him. Support of the ground troops; [They included this again] The carrying out of naval figures; and protection of our own naval communications line.



The remark about role of submarine is rather significant, I would say, and I quote:

Submarines have become the main driving force of the sea, not only in our Navy, but in the Navies of the Anglo-American Bloc. Of course the will believe propaganda, we have to remember. Now, further, the nuclear submarine is formidable underwater vessel. Therefore, in the future, are complete in the Naval Theatre; in the future, Naval complete--or rather, are complete to the Naval Theatre, may acquire the major underwater operation.

And of course you remember Halsey's book saying that submarines can be combated by rockets and torpedoes, by submarines. There is no need to repeat. He states also that fleet will have the task of conducting raids on enemy coastal territory, assuring the closing of the Straits and large water obstacles, which we should put question mark about large water obstacles--by the ground troops.

Now he was in Soviet Union, in case of Admiral for example. Although, as to how the Soviet expects to counter amphibious attacks by an enemy; the Russians' maritime superiority is

And especially, how the Soviet could attempt to launch an amphibious operation of their own under such It seems essential to remember that speaking about their own amphibious operation, they usually mean tactical

for support of the ground forces. Or, a limited, very limited amphibious attack. What they call operational significance actually is tactical significance, that's all. In connection with this category, about amphibious operations, it seems for me beneficial to take a brief look at the one essential branch of the Armed Forces, the Soviet Marine Corps.

The Soviet Navy has continually devoted considerable attempts to this small-scale, tactical amphibious training. However, believe it or not, the Soviet Marine Corps does actually exist, there's been a controversial question-controversial question. And I believe brief historical outline will help us to clarify the above problem.

The National Marine Corps has existed off and on from the time of Peter the Great. That was in 1704 up to the end of World War II. Under the Soviet regime the first official Marine Corps unit was organized in the summer of 1939 in <u>Kronshtadt</u>, Baltic Fleet, as the First Official Marine Brigade. '(A possibility that actually is a similar campaign of 1939, 1940.)

Now, other Soviet Fleets organized similar units just prior to the World War II. Soviet Marine Brigades were approximately equal in-- to regiments, or three full battalions. How did ? They were to come into the Coastal Defense Command of each Fleet. However, during



World War II the total number of naval personnel participating in the

was close to half a million, but only a small part of this number was represented by actual Marines.

The others were units organized from the ships' personnel seamen, Coastal Defense Units and other naval establishments. They were formed into Naval Infantry Brigades, special regiments, battalions and detachments and were to to their respective Army Commanders, in the area of operations. More important to remember--that actually they were called Naval Rifle Units, as distinguished from Marines. And this probably was the reason why there was great belief that Soviets had big, large Marine Corps, because commonly they called Marine Corps, Naval Infantry, this Rifle Unit.

Soon after World War II Soviet Marine Brigade absorbed units of Naval Infantry. All Rifle Units were abolished. In the Fall of 1957 during the final Baltic Fleet exercises, supervised by Soviet and I took--I had participated in this effective exercise, in this exercise The largest Soviet amphibious training took place in the northeast part of the Baltic Sea, at Karima Island.

According to Soviet Military Directive at this time, effective amphibious operations should be and actually were, conducted by units of the Coastal Military District, Army Units.

Those Navy

were to support

operation from the sea and to provide transportation of Army units. Analysis of those exercises has shown that Army units could not successfully conduct such operation, and particular difficulty was observed with operation of the Advance Party, in the First Wave--what Patton called First Echelon.

From this time the Soviet Military began to consider establishment of Marine Corps, because analysis of these exercises

and all Commanding Boats of Fleets, from Bal--not there--from Black Sea north

is the Open Plan. The

Soviets have again organized a Marine Corps operative on July 24, 1954. Red Star.

of Marine Units are gone and they have, as you probably have seen, a special uniform and their organization is supposed to achieve their participation in Advance Landings, preparation for Beacheads and Tactical Reconnaissance for amphibious operations.

Last point I would like to make--role of their aviation in naval affairs and especially long-range aviation.

Your well-known overflight of United States aircraft carrier sometimes from very long distance and you know that Long-range Aviation is separate branch of the Soviet Armed Forces.

It is not suppositious to the Navy. However, since 1954 -- and I participated in that exercise as a target -- they started to train their long-range aviation for use at sea. We were working that summer with units, regiments from Ural. It was based on Ural. They made what they called and participated against ships. Well the result of this participation was miserable. They [were] confused, they didn't find us, they attacked different ships; and used their bombs on targets [be] that were--well, we think should not attacked. However, it was the first, as far as I know, first attempt to use long-range aviation for naval warfare. Since this time, little by little, sometimes small, sometimes bigger units of long-range aviation participated in naval exercises and training. Soviet aviation in general, and here I do not mean long-range aviation, but all aviation, general, in the Soviet Navy, the A could be summarized as follows: the protection of land targets from attacks of carrier-based aviation; protection of Soviet sea communication lines -- and when we speak about Soviet sea communication lines, we always can remember, close the source--communication lines; and as well as Navy units in the offshore zone; and so, action against enemy sea communication lines; against carrier Task Forces independently as well as in conjunction with submarines; and four, reconnaissance missions of offshore area and open in necessity this reconnaissance mission sea and ocean; combines with guidance for missile from the coastal missile

launcher station as well as from the surface ships.

As they do participate in such exercises, there's--I know, since approximately '57-'58--I mean guidance and reconnaissance for missile, from the shore as well as tactical guidance for the ship missile, surface-to-surface missile.

No doubt, new ship types and other weapons systems interest you. I do not think that it would be right to spend time on technical descriptions of them. I am sure you know all of them. And I am sure you know about KASHIN Class Destroyer or PEGAT, KYNDA Class Destroyers, PETYA Class, etc. However, I would like to remind you, you know, because I will base on these ships in my further discussion, I would like to show you some slides, just to remind you:

This is modified, as you've been advised, KOTLIN Class Destroyer. Main features here, of course, as we can see, surfaceto-air Missiles.

Next slide, please:

This is according to natives in the KRUPNYY Class--KRUPNYY Class--KRUPNYY Class--kRUPNYY

Next slide:

Here is a KYNDA Class. And I would like to have your attention for that new gas--automatic gas. I talked to some people that from what I knew about development of this automatic gas, I would believe that there are 76

And I have good reason to believe it, however no proof of this.

And here of course, is surface-to-air and surface-to-surface

Next please, KASHIN Class. This is KASHIN Class. As you notice, there is no surface-to-surface Missiles, only surface-to-air Missiles.

And last one is PETYA Class. Destroyer Escort, you call them here? Oh, PCE's. Yes, this is a mainly ASW ship.

Thank you.

I would like to spend a little bit time on discussion of the possible tactical employment of this new ship. It seems to me more important than to spend some time for technical detail, because that you know probably better than I do. Not only employment, but capability, the strength and weakness of the Soviet Navy, I wish you'd ask me, 'cause remember I was asking With some 'reservations and approximations, the possible operational activity of Soviet Navy can be divided into three major zones:

Zone Number One: Close offshore, or Precoastal Zone, approximately 150 miles from the shore;

Zone Number Two: What I call Remote Offshore Zone, spreading from 150 to 250-300 miles from the shore;

And Third Zone: Is Open Sea and Ocean, about 300 miles offshore. This zone includes activity of the enemy's force

and possible striking from coastal targets.

Such a division should be made because of the traditional habit-- and hence, the weakness of the Soviet Navy, lack of adequate protection from air; absence of aircraft carriers-we shall discuss a little--and his dependence on surface units, upon land-based aviation. However, such division of zones and presence of new type of ship, gives Soviet Navy quite different quality, which I would like to discuss further. And I believe that by having this surface ship which I asked to demonstrate to you on the slide, Soviet Navy receives different quality. In other words, it was not quantitative, but rather qualitative changes which occurred in Soviet Navy.

Well, First Zone, or Close Offshore Zone. Being well covered by their aviation, and especially Fighters, of Air Defense and Missiles from the shore, the Soviet considers this zone to be <u>their</u> zone, which they can control. Minefields, torpedo and missile boats such as KOMAR, or OSA, Subchasers, helicopters and hover planes all can be used here. It is the First Zone where the Soviet can or, if necessary, recede. It is very important . It is the First Zone, in other words, up to one hundred--not further than 115 miles.

It is the First Zone where their ASW could be considered the strongest. It is the First Zone where they, even along its remote edges--in other words, along 150 miles approximately,

can deal successfully with Aircraft Carrier Task Force. Later I will--well, maybe I will roll it now--in order to have this picture, let me--if we consider this is so, First Zone approximately 150 miles and Second Zone, 150 miles which make total approximately 300 miles. And of course, Third Zone which I mentioned, Open Sea or Ocean.

Now in the Second Zone, air power which is very important element for operation of Soviet Navy, can not be present in barrage-type, or permanent, more or less what I call permanent basis; though it can be called, especially in certain areas of this Second Zone, upon when needed, and to be--this air power be on hand at time when enemy aircraft approach target, Soviet surface units in that zone, providing, of course, a very well-organized reconnaissance, which would Third Zone in open sea.

Here in the Second Zone we find need for KASHIN, KYNDA Class destroyers. These have, however, limited self-protection as you saw, from the threat of high-performance aircraft surface-to-air missile systems. And there is low-flying aircraft off fast ships, such as torpedo boats; in case of their fully automatic gas, and more, they consider that they can use this gun against lowflying missiles, however limited use can be. All the surfaceto-surface missiles-- as in case of KYNDA or KRUPNYY-this ship holds back the brarea from which the carrier

Task Force can launch its planes for attack of the shore targets as well as surface units in the Second Zone, by 100-200 miles from the edge of the Second Zone. So we can see that area from which Carrier forces can operate is 400--no, 500 miles distant from the shore of the sea. I probably should explain here. If we consider, or assume, that KYNDA Class destroyer is able to operate here; and if--or even on edge, if he can use 100-200 mile stretch missile, it is very dangerous for aircraft carrier unit to approach this zone. And for the first time, for the first time in the history, or rather, modern history of the Russian Navy, they got Before they didn't have it, because this ship they have, however limited self-protection, help from the shore in certain cases can be provided, and they can use their weapons further from the edge of the zone. More, they're very needed for protection of ASW units in this zone. More, they do have ASW capability by themselves. More, they can provide good escort in case of ASW enemy forces located here, or even closer, to fight with them, together with long-range aviation, of course, and let submarines to go through this ASW barrage. Of course, it's not everything will go as well as it looks here; however, I should emphasize that for the first time, and this is very important, Soviet Navy does -- however limited this ability -- and this is importance of this ship.

And of course, as I mentioned before, KYNDA, KASHIN Class especially, are good protectors, if not major participants, in ASW war for this zone.

Which very important!

And finally, I would like to spend a little time on Third Zone, or Open Sea or Ocean, which includes the waters of the enemy coast. In the First Two Zones we are <u>clearly</u> defensive. The Third Zone is of a quite different nature. I deserve to call it offense, pure offense, I deserve. But it's certainly not purely defensive, when we consider it. The only forces which the Soviet can operate here are submarines and long-range aircraft, Naval as well as long-range aviation, or rather, in this order--long-range aviation and Naval. Here the main ______ on communication lines was a plan, should be spent on the missile and torpedo submarine, especially this atomic warhead. Mines, especially floating mines, laid by submarines, and missile attack by aircraft--long-range aircraft.

Here in the Third Zone the main activity of the Soviet antisubmarine submarine, and especially along the <u>forward</u> edge of the Second Zone, should be expected, together with their aircraft assigned for this purpose, for ASW purpose.

A little bit, a little thought about what is it-why all this. It seems to me that for the first time, the

theory of the determinative economic factor of seapower

does not apply to push observers because Communist Bloc does not have the tradition, nor apparent need for extensive ocean sea trade, especially in , and especially during wartime. The prospective war has a very, it seems to me, unique geographic, prodigious element. There is, on one side the capability and the strength to control the seas or command the seas; later, whereas the aggressor cannot tend to deny this control without the capability of pressing to do it. To face it they cannot keep command or sea control if they're (small. They cannot. However, for the first time they can deny this control.

look at a submarine, longrange aviation, armed with rockets.

Oh, I consider this very important and we have to--Personally, I hate to underestimate possible enemies. I believe we will do twice as well if we little bit overestimate. And I believe this is brief answer for resource to aggressors.

Now we will try to answer Questions No. 3 and 4 in very brief manner.

First of all, it seems to me that it is a basic concept of present Soviet military theory the Army, Navy, Air Force, Strategic Rocket Forces and Air Defense, their five major branches, are now no longer really autonomous Services. Each has its own separate, strategic mission. Their components

are no longer so much separated one from another by their mission as they are by special techniques they can bring to bear as their adaptation to a special environment; land, sea or air. Whether one likes it or not, but it seems to me that they are no longer anything but subdivisions of the same ensemble. It should be stated that in a World War there can be no maritime strategic maneuvers. By in the center of this overall maneuver, there's a place for all three major armed forces. Thus the war cannot be probably an exclusive ground maneuver now, nor a strategic Air Force maneuver. Each deciding to complete by itself secure force strategic missile--missile, low limit, especially in initial period of the war.

Second, I believe we should remember the Soviet Union continues to remain basically a <u>land</u> power. So it's quite natural--this is brief answer for the tough question--to accept Army dominance in the Defense Ministry, it's quite natural. However the overall military strategy, and I assume the question means grand strategy, is the product of General Staff, who in turn are dominated by politics, the latter being in the hands of the Communist Party leaders. Here again, they--the Soviet-are following well-known Klausewitz definition of war, which you all know, of course. And personally, I agree with this. I personally do not know better definition.

So, it's quite natural to answer this question positively-yes, Army dominance and Army dominance in Defense Ministry. However, at the same time when specific, I'm very careful to call Naval Strategy, because maybe we can call Naval Strategy distinct from Grand Strategy. Actually, in Soviet, it's called "Operational Art, Operational Art," which it

Well ; in other words Naval Strategy, or what they call Operational Art: Navy leaders, Admirals, play decided role, and their decisions, their recommendations, are crucial. Very brief about ship construction: Because there's a certain Party influence on the type of Navy--type of Navy; in other words, what type of Navy, balanced Navy or primarily submarines and so on; one can say that there <u>are</u> influences upon ship construction, from this point of view. However, after the , in other words, type of Navy, is so fund allocated, production compact is signed, the Navy has more or less a free hand, whatever

they decide to throw on ship construction. But through determination of type of Navy, of course Army this element.

I would like to spend a few minutes on role of Party Organ, or Party in the Navy, and what they call Political Executive Officers particularly. Name for this organization they call Institution of Political Executive Officer, which should be distinguished from Institution of Political Commissars which they used to have.

Though a Party Organ in the Armed Forces is unique in the Communists, of course; and what it is actually is a separate special line of communication which Central Committee of the Party has. This separate line of communication, Central Committee, starting with special War Department or Military Department of Central Committee can control all activities of the Armed Forces; can implant all activities of the Armed Forces. Moreover, Executive Political Officer, who is by the Navy, to Commanding Officer, and more, Commanding Officer he will have this diplomatic power above him; at the same time using this special channel of communication, campaigns

for Commanding Officers. And believe me, many of them do as a person, as an Officer-do not want to do this. He's <u>demanded</u> by their superiors to do this.

As far as last part of Question No. 4 is concerned--in other words, influence of Political Officers upon tactical decisions of Commanding Officers, I should answer the question negative. There isn't. When ship at sea, when Commanding Officer performs his Commanding Officer duty, no Political Officer can influence his decisions. He has no right and he never, as far as I know, does this; for two reasons: for official reason, because in Naval

and only Commanding Officer is responsible for such operations;



and second, which is not less important reason, quite often he is not educated to make decisions or try to influence; and they <u>do</u> know they consider this as a risk of their political apparatus. They tried to improve this weakness, they tried to educate their Political Officers, but not much was done and is done up to now. So, as a final---- I should say that Party influence upon armed forces is quite obvious, definitely very strong. Role of the Party, control by the Party of military forces are effective through this separate special line of communication which I mentioned. Role of Political Officer, Executive Political Officer, what he is called, upon tactical and operational decisions of any Commanding Officer of seaborne unit, are not important.

Well, thank you very much. I will be glad to answer any questions. #

End of Formal Lecture, or Briefing