

WYLIE, Joseph, RADM

"Historical and Contemporary Theories of Strategy"
ADMIRAL MELSON, GENTLEMEN.

WHEN YOUR ADMIRABLE CAPTAINS GERRY BOGART AND JERRY BALL WERE IN NORFOLK A MONTH AGO, THEY ARRANGED THAT I SPEAK TO YOU THIS AFTERNOON ON "HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF STRATEGY". FOLLOWING AN AMPLE AND DELICIOUS LUNCHEON, THIS COULD BE DEVASTATING. THE SOPORIFIC EFFECT OF THE TITLE ALONE IS JUST DREADFUL.

PERHAPS IT WILL HELP A LITTLE TO EXPLAIN THAT WHAT WE ARE REALLY TALKING ABOUT THIS AFTERNOON IS WHY WE THINK IN THE WAYS THAT WE DO --- WHY DOES A SAILOR THINK LIKE A SAILOR, WHY DOES A SOLDIER THINK LIKE A SOLDIER AND WHY DOES AN AIRMAN HAVE THOUGHT PATTERNS THAT DIFFER FROM THEM BOTH.

THIS PAST WEEK YOU HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED ON THE SUBJECTS OF CLAUSEWITZ, OF MAHAN AND SEA POWER, AND ON THE CONCEPTS OF AIR POWER. THIS AFTERNOON I SHALL REVIEW THESE THREE, PROBABLY STATING THEM IN A LITTLE DIFFERENT FASHION FROM THAT IN WHICH THEY WERE PRESENTED TO YOU, AND I SHALL ADD A FOURTH THEORY OF CONFLICT WHICH IS, I THINK, OF SUPREME IMPORTANCE IN THIS PARTICULAR STAGE OF HUMAN EVENTS.

FIRST, THE MARITIME CONCEPT, THE SAILOR'S THOUGHT PATTERN IN WHICH MOST OF US HERE HAVE BEEN BROUGHT UP.

IT CONSISTS OF TWO PARTS OR PHASES. THE FIRST IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOME WORKING DEGREE OF CONTROL OF THE SEA. THE SECOND IS THE EXTENSION OF THAT CONTROL AT SEA TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL OF PEOPLE AND EVENTS ON THE LAND.

THIS, GROSSLY OVERSIMPLIFIED, IS THE FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH WE THINK AND WHICH WE USE AS A POINT OF DEPARTURE IN DISCUSSING OUR PROFESSION, AND IN PERSUADING OUR CIVIL LORDS THAT OUR BUDGET PROPOSALS ARE WORTHWHILE.

WE EXPLOIT THE SEA TO EXTEND CONTROL ON TO THE LAND.

THE AIR THEORY, ON WHICH I AM TOLD YOU HAD AN EXCELLENT LECTURE ONLY YESTERDAY, IS VERY CLEAR CUT AND STRAIGHT FORWARD. IT POSTULATES THAT DESTRUCTION, DELIVERED BY AIR, CAN BE SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE TO BRING ABOUT THE DEFEAT OF THE ENEMY. OF ALL THE ABLE AND ARTICULATE PROPONENTS OF THIS CONCEPT, I WOULD SUGGEST THAT NONE HAS EXCELLED THE CLARITY OF DOUHET IN FOCUSSING ON THE ESSENTIAL ISSUE.

WHEN YOU READ DOUHET, KEEP IN MIND THESE TWO THINGS:

FIRST, THERE IS A TACIT ASSUMPTION BEHIND THIS THEORY: AN ASSUMPTION THAT DESTRUCTION CAN BE EQUATED TO CONTROL.

SECOND, WHERE DOUHET WROTE "POISON GAS" WE MUST TODAY READ "NUCLEAR WEAPONS".

I THINK ALL OF US CAN READILY AGREE THAT IN THE GENERAL WAR POSTULATION --- THE MASSIVE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS --- THERE WOULD BE A PRETTY GOOD CORRELATION BETWEEN DESTRUCTION AND CONTROL.

IN LESSER SITUATIONS, THERE IS ROOM FOR DISSENT.

THERE ARE THREE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE AIR THEORY TODAY.

ONE IS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL IN FACT BE USED. ANSWERS TO THIS ARE FAR BEYOND OUR MILITARY DETERMINATION; THE MILITARY PROBLEM IS TO BE PREPARED FOR BOTH CONTINGENCIES, USE AND NON-USE.

A SECOND PROBLEM IS THE EFFECT OF THE EXPLODING SPACE TECHNOLOGY. THE QUESTION IS WHETHER AIR THEORIES ARE EXTENSIBLE INTO AEROSPACE THEORIES. MANY ABLE MEN ARE WRESTLING TODAY WITH THIS PROBLEM, AND JUST WHAT THE MODIFIED THEORY OR THE SUCCESSOR THEORY WILL BE IS YET UNCLEAR. WHATEVER IT IS, IT WILL HAVE TO BE HINGED IN SOME WAY TO A CORRELATION BETWEEN DESTRUCTION AND CONTROL.

THE THIRD PROBLEM, NOT YET ADEQUATELY ANSWERED, CAN BE SET FORTH QUITE BRIEFLY. WHAT KIND OF CONTROL IS DESIRED, AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WILL DESTRUCTION OR THE THREAT OF DESTRUCTION BRING ABOUT THE DESIRED MEASURE OF CONTROL? JUDGMENTS OF THIS KIND ARE AMONG THE MOST DIFFICULT AND SPECULATIVE OF ALL THE PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY.

THE THIRD OF THE THREE ORTHODOX THEORIES OF WAR STEMS LARGELY FROM THE WRITINGS OF CLAUSEWITZ.

CLAUSEWITZ SAYS THAT "THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY'S MILITARY FORCE IS THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF WAR".

A MID-1950s VERSION OF THE ARMY FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS TOLD US "THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF ALL MILITARY OPERATIONS IS THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY'S ARMED FORCES...".

THE BASIC THEME OF THE CLAUSEWITZ OR CONTINENTAL CONCEPT IS BASED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT MASSIVE ARMIES WILL MEET AND THAT ONE WILL BE THE VICTOR. THE RESULT WILL BE DECISIVE. THIS HAS BEEN A VALID ASSUMPTION IN NEARLY EVERY EUROPEAN WAR OF THE LAST SEVERAL CENTURIES.

SO HERE, IN GROSS OVERSIMPLIFICATION, ARE THE DIFFERING POINTS OF VIEW FROM WHICH THE SOLDIER AND

THE SAILOR AND THE AIRMAN APPROACH THE PROBLEMS OF WHICH STRATEGIC CONCEPTS, AND BUDGETS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ARE BEST FOR THE NATION.

THE PROBLEM IS THAT OF DECIDING WHEN AND WHERE AND UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES WHOSE BASIC PATTERNS OF THOUGHT CAN MOST PROFITABLY BE PUT TO PRACTICE. THE PROBLEM IS HOW CAN THE COMPOSITE MILITARY MIND BEST MAKE UP ITS MIND.

AND THAT PROBLEM IS TODAY MADE APPRECIABLY MORE DIFFICULT BY THE EMERGENCE IN PRACTICE OF A NEW THEORY OF WAR. IT DOES NOT FIT ANY OF THE CLASSIC RULES, IT DOES NOT EVEN FUNCTION IN THE SAME RECOGNIZED ARENAS AS THE CLASSIC, ORGANIZED ARMIES AND NAVIES AND AIR FORCES. THIS NEW WARFARE IS THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION.

THE "WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION" IS A PHENOMENON NEW IN OUR GENERATION. IT IS USUALLY REFERRED TO AS GUERRILLA WARFARE, BUT THAT IS TOO RESTRICTIVE AND MISLEADING TO USE AS A DESCRIPTIVE TITLE.

GUERRILLA WARFARE IS NOT NEW. THE WORD "GUERRILLA" ITSELF CAME OUT OF SPAIN IN WELLINGTON'S DESPATCHES IN THE NAPOLEONIC WARS, BUT GUERRILLA ACTIONS ARE AS OLD AS HISTORY. THERE IS NO NOVELTY IN THIS.

BUT THE CURRENT THEORY AND THE CURRENT PRACTICE ,
ARE NEW. MAO TSE TUNG IS THE FATHER. HO CHI MINH AND
VO NGUYEN GIAP AND FIDEL CASTRO AND CHE GUEVARA
ARE THE ABLE DISCIPLES AND PROPAGATORS OF THE FAITH.

THE BIBLES (IN ENGLISH TRANSLATION) ARE MAO TSE-TUNG ON
GUERRILLA WARFARE BY BRIGADIER GENERAL SAMUEL B.
GRIFFITH, USMC (RETIRED) WHICH CONTAINS GENERAL GRIFFITH'S
EXCELLENT TRANSLATION OF MAO'S YU CHI CHAN OF 1937,
PEOPLE'S WAR PEOPLE'S ARMY BY VO NGUYEN GIAP, AND
CHE GUEVARA ON GUERRILLA WARFARE BY MAJOR HARRIES-
CLICHY PETERSON, USMCR, WHICH CONTAINS MAJOR PETERSON'S
TRANSLATION OF GUEVARA'S GUERRILLA WARFARE WRITTEN IN
1960 AS A PRIMER FOR LATIN-AMERICAN REVOLUTION.

THESE ARE, IN THE ORIGINALS, ALL COMMUNIST BOOKS
BY VERY ABLE COMMUNIST WRITERS, MAO, GIAP AND GUEVARA,
WHO HAD PUT THEIR COMMUNIST THEORY TO PRACTICE. AND
BECAUSE THE PRACTICE WAS SUCCESSFUL, THE BOOKS, AND
MORE IMPORTANTLY THE THEORY, ARE INESTIMABLY IMPORTANT
TO EVERY STRATEGIST, UNIFORMED OR CIVILIAN, IN THE
WESTERN WORLD TODAY. THESE BOOKS ARE NOT ONLY THEORY,
THEY REPRESENT A HARD REALITY OF CONTEMPORARY WARFARE.

BEFORE GOING FURTHER, ONE IMPORTANT POINT SHOULD BE NOTED. WHILE THIS THEORY IS COMMUNIST THEORY, IT IS NOT RUSSIAN COMMUNIST. IT IS CHINESE COMMUNIST. AND THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL AND CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE.

MARX AND LENIN AND STALIN AND KHRUSHCHEV ALL HAD A COMMUNIST THEORY BASED ON THE URBAN PROLETARIAT. MARX STARTED IT THAT WAY BY SINGLING OUT THE URBAN WORKERS WHO WERE CAUGHT UP IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION. LENIN USED THE URBAN PROLETARIAT THEORY AS THE BASIS OF HIS REVOLUTION WHICH WAS FOCUSED IN THE CITIES IN ORDER TO GAIN DIRECT CONTROL OF THE CENTERS OF GOVERNMENT. LENIN RAN A STREET-RIOT TYPE OF REVOLUTION. STALIN AND HIS LIEUTENANTS USED THE SAME THEORY WHEREVER FORCE WAS NEEDED IN ADDITION TO THE RUSSIAN ARMY TO ESTABLISH CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES.

MAO CHANGED MARX'S BASIC POINT OF DEPARTURE. INSTEAD OF USING THE URBAN PROLETARIAT AS HIS BASE, MAO USED THE RURAL PEASANT. RUSSIAN AND CHINESE COMMUNIST THEORIES HAVE MUCH IN COMMON, BUT THEY DO HAVE THIS FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE, AND THIS DIFFERENCE

ALONE IS SO IMPORTANT THAT IT COULD WELL BE A ROOT CAUSE OF THE CURRENT BITTER ARGUMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

BE THAT AS IT MAY, OUR INTEREST TODAY IS IN THE MAO THEORY OF THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. IT IS A NEW TYPE OF REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND IT INCLUDES BUT "IS NEVER CONFINED TO THE LIMITS OF MILITARY ACTION." THAT LAST CLAUSE IS GENERAL GRIFFITH'S. HE GOES ON, IN HIS INTRODUCTION TO HIS TRANSLATION, TO SAY: "ITS PURPOSE IS TO DESTROY AN EXISTING SOCIETY AND ITS INSTITUTIONS AND TO REPLACE THEM WITH A NEW STATE STRUCTURE ... FOR THIS REASON, IT IS ENDOWED WITH A DYNAMIC QUALITY AND A DIMENSION IN DEPTH THAT ORTHODOX WARS, WHATEVER THEIR SCALE, LACK."

THE THEORY IS REALLY VERY SIMPLE. ONE STARTS WITH A SMALL, PURITANICALLY FERVENT GROUP OF BELIEVERS. THE FIRST STEP IS THE POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION OF AN EXPANDING CORE OF BELIEVERS IN THE COUNTRY. THEN COMES AN EXPANDING GUERRILLA WARFARE COMBINED WITH POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC WARFARE WITH ALL OF THEM DIRECTED TOWARD CONTROL OF THE RURAL PEASANT POWER BASE. AS THIS GROWS WITH SUCCESS IT MAY OR MAY NOT BE EXPEDIENT TO USE THE ENLARGED GUERRILLA CADRES IN ORGANIZED AND

MORE ORTHODOX ARMIES. FINALLY THE WHOLE COUNTRYSIDE IS IN CONTROLLED AND ORGANIZED HOSTILITY TOWARD THE EXISTING NON-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT; THAT GOVERNMENT LOSES ITS POWER BASE AND IS BEATEN OR COLLAPSES; IT IS REPLACED BY THE COMMUNIST APPARATUS; AND THE WAR OF NATIONAL LIBERATION ENTERS ON ITS MORE ORTHODOX STAGE OF AN AUTOCRATIC AND DESPOTIC COMMUNISM.

THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE RURAL PEASANT IS THE BASE OF POWER. THIS IS A RURAL, NOT AN URBAN, REVOLUTION AND THE IMPORTANT ACTION TAKES PLACE OUT IN THE COUNTRY, NOT IN THE CITIES.

THERE IS NO POINT THIS AFTERNOON, EVEN IF THERE WERE TIME, IN ATTEMPTING TO SET FORTH THE DETAILS OF HOW TO CONDUCT GUERRILLA WARFARE. THESE TECHNIQUES ARE NOT THE SUBJECT OF OUR DISCUSSION. WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT IS THE TOTAL PATTERN OF ACTION AND TO ILLUSTRATE THIS LET ME JUST GIVE YOU A FEW PERTINENT SENTENCES FROM THE THREE BOOKS THAT I HAVE JUST MENTIONED.

FROM MAO BY WAY OF GRIFFITH: "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A DECISIVE BATTLE."

FROM GUEVARA BY WAY OF PETERSON: "THE GUERRILLA, ABOVE ALL ELSE, AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTIONARY --- HE IS A SOCIAL REFORMER."

AND FROM VO NGUYEN GIAP: 'IN A BACKWARD COLONIAL COUNTRY SUCH AS OURS WHERE THE PEASANTS MAKE UP THE MAJORITY OF THE POPULATION, A PEOPLE'S WAR IS ESSENTIALLY A PEASANT'S WAR.' 'THERE WAS NO CLEARLY DEFINED FRONT IN THIS WAR (REFERRING TO THE WAR AGAINST THE FRENCH IN NORTH VIET NAM). IT WAS THERE WHERE THE ENEMY WAS. THE FRONT WAS NOWHERE, IT WAS EVERYWHERE.' 'IT IS THE WAR OF THE BROAD MASSES OF AN ECONOMICALLY BACKWARD COUNTRY STANDING UP AGAINST A POWERFULLY EQUIPPED AND WELL TRAINED ARMY --- IS THE ENEMY STRONG? ONE AVOIDS HIM. IS HE WEAK? ONE ATTACKS HIM --- AND BY COMBINING MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH POLITICAL AND ECONOMICAL ACTION, THERE IS NO FIXED LINE OF DEMARCATION, THE FRONT BEING WHEREVER THE ENEMY IS FOUND.'

IT IS, OF COURSE, A TRICKY BUSINESS, THIS LIFTING OF QUOTATIONS OUT OF CONTEXT. BUT IN THIS CASE IT IS DONE TO SHOW SEVERAL THINGS, AND TO DO SO IN REASONABLE HONESTY.

THE FIRST IS THAT MAO'S THEORY OF WAR HAS ALREADY BEEN TESTED, AND IN CHINA, IN NORTH VIET NAM, IN CUBA AND IN ALGERIA IT WAS SUCCESSFUL. WE ARE NOT, IN THIS CASE, TALKING ABOUT AN IDEA IN VACUO; WE ARE TALKING ABOUT REALITY.

THE SECOND IS THAT THIS BASING OF THE THEORY ON THE RURAL PEASANT RATHER THAN THE URBAN PROLETARIAT IS CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT. AND IT IS IMPORTANT BECAUSE THE UNCOMMITTED AREAS OF THE WORLD ARE NOT URBAN, THEY ARE PEASANT SOCIETIES, IN ASIA, IN AFRICA AND IN LATIN AMERICA.

THE THIRD THING SHOWN BY THESE QUOTATIONS IS THE ALMOST COMPLETE OPPOSITENESS OF THE MAO THEORY AND THE CLAUSEWITZ OR CONTINENTAL THEORY OF ORGANIZED AND MECHANIZED MASSED ARMIES.

CLAUSEWITZ HAS STIPULATED "DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES ... ONLY BY MEANS OF THE ENGAGEMENT ... ONLY GREAT AND GENERAL ENGAGEMENTS WILL PRODUCE GREAT RESULTS --- RESULTS WILL BE GREATEST --- IN ONE GREAT BATTLE."

THE 1955 FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS: "THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE ... IS THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY'S ARMED FORCES."

MAO: "... SMALL UNITS ACTING INDEPENDENTLY PLAY THE PRINCIPLE ROLE," AND "NO SUCH THING AS A DECISIVE BATTLE."

GUEVERA: "RURAL AREAS ARE THE BEST BATTLEFIELD."

GIAP: "THE FRONT WAS NOWHERE, IT WAS EVERYWHERE."

FOR ANOTHER ILLUSTRATION, TAKE THE EISENHOWER QUOTATION "FOR THIS CONCERN (MR. CHURCHILL'S POLITICAL INTEREST) I HAD GREAT SYMPATHY, BUT ... I WAS PARTICULARLY CAREFUL TO EXCLUDE SUCH CONSIDERATIONS..." AND THEN CONTRAST THIS CLASSICAL ATTITUDE OF THE NON-POLITICAL SOLDIERY WITH THAT OF THE CHE GUEVARA SAYING "THE GUERRILLA IS --- ABOVE-ALL ELSE --- AN AGRARIAN REVOLUTIONARY ... HE IS A SOCIAL REFORMER."

AND GIAP SAYING: "BY COMBINING MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ACTIONS."

IT WOULD BE INTERESTING IF SOME SCHOLAR WERE TO TAKE THE TIME TO CONTRAST CLAUSEWITZ AND MAO IN THOROUGH INVESTIGATION, AND IT COULD BE PROFITABLE TO CONTRAST OUR OWN PREVAILING BELIEFS WITH THOSE OF MAO AND GUEVARA. WE MIGHT LEARN FROM THIS HOW BETTER TO COMBAT THEIR BRAND OF COMMUNISM. IT WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTING TO CONTRAST RUSSIAN MILITARY THOUGHT, WITH ITS CONTINENTAL OR CLAUSEWITZIAN GENESIS, WITH THAT OF MAO.

THE MAO THEORY DOES EXIST, ITS POSTULATES ARE DEEPLY ROOTED IN THE REALITY FOR WHICH IT WAS DESIGNED, AND IT IS IMPORTANT. WE MUST TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY INQUIRY INTO THEORIES OF STRATEGY.

AT THIS POINT, IN THE MIDDLE OF A DROWSY AUGUST AFTERNOON, I SUPPOSE IT WOULD BE PERFECTLY PROPER TO ASK, "SO WHAT?"

I THINK THE ANSWER TO THIS IS A RATHER SIMPLE ONE: I KNOW OF NO OTHER WAY THAT WE CAN OUT-THINK OUR OPPONENTS. UP IN THE LIBRARY YOU CAN, IF YOU SEARCH FOR IT, FIND A VERY SMALL VOLUME, WHICH I THINK HAS A BLUE COVER, BY LIDDELL HART AND IT CONTAINS A SERIES OF TWO OR THREE LECTURES THAT HE DELIVERED AT YALE ABOUT 1930. IN IT YOU MAY FIND THIS SENTENCE: "THE INFLUENCE OF THOUGHT ON THOUGHT IS THE MOST INFLUENTIAL FACTOR IN HISTORY." WHAT I AM REALLY TRYING TO SAY IS THAT IF YOU UNDERSTAND HOW YOUR OPPONENT THINKS YOU CAN OUT-THINK HIM.

I DO NOT BY ANY MEANS INTEND TO IMPLY THAT ALL FOUR OF THESE THEORIES ARE AUTOMATICALLY VALID SIMPLY BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT EACH HAS A LARGE AND DEVOTED BODY OF ADHERENTS, EVEN THOUGH MANY OF THESE ADHERENTS ARE LARGELY UNAWARE THAT THEY ARE FOLLOWING A SET PATTERN OF THOUGHT.

WHAT I DO INTEND TO IMPLY IS THAT, HAVING RECOGNIZED THESE THEORIES, OR PATTERNS OF THOUGHT, YOU ARE IN A POSITION TO LAY THEM OPEN, TO DISSECT THEM, AND TO IDENTIFY AND EXPLOIT THEIR WEAKNESSES. I WOULD SUGGEST TO YOU THAT IN ALL FOUR CASES THE WEAKNESSES LIE IN THE TACIT ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE POSTULATIONS.

THE MARITIME THEORY, FOR INSTANCE, HAS AS ONE TACIT ASSUMPTION THE SUPPOSITION THAT MARITIME ACCESS AND COMMUNICATIONS ARE RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT IN THE SITUATION AT ISSUE. FOR THE UNITED STATES THIS IS USUALLY A VALID ASSUMPTION. IT WAS TRUE IN BOTH WORLD WARS, IT WAS TRUE IN KOREA, AND IT IS TRUE (OFF) VIET NAM, THEREFORE LARGE ELEMENTS OF THE MARITIME CONCEPT ARE RELEVANT TO THE SITUATION, AND THE STRENGTH OF THE MARITIME PATTERN OF THOUGHT CAN PROFITABLY BE BROUGHT TO BEAR. THIS ASSUMPTION WAS NOT RELEVANT, FOR INSTANCE, IN THE INDIAN WARS ON OUR WESTERN PLAINS IN THE LAST CENTURY, AND IN THIS CONTEXT THE MARITIME PATTERN OF THOUGHT WAS WITHOUT MEANING. IT HAD NO RELATION TO THAT PARTICULAR REALITY.

A PRIMARY ASSUMPTION OF THE CLAUSEWITZ OR CONTINENTAL THEORY IS THAT OVERT, CONVENTIONAL ARMIES WILL MEET AND THAT THEIR ACTIONS WILL BE DECISIVE. THIS ASSUMPTION WAS A VALID ONE IN BOTH WORLD WARS AND THE CONTINENTAL PATTERNS OF THOUGHT WERE RELEVANT AND VALID. FOR THE FRENCH A DECADE AGO AND FOR US TODAY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA OUR OPPONENTS DO NOT HAVE A CLASSIC, MASSIVE, CONVENTIONAL, OVERT ARMY, AND THE CONTINENTAL CONCEPTS ARE DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO APPLY.

THE AIR THEORY HAS AS A BASIC TACIT ASSUMPTION THE BELIEF THAT CONTROL OVER A PEOPLE CAN BE EXERCISED BY DESTRUCTION. IN THE CONTEXT OF TODAY'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS THIS IS ALMOST SURELY TRUE. IN A LESSER SITUATION IT IS SUBJECT TO AT LEAST SOME QUESTION. THE USE OF THE B-52's IN SOUTH VIET NAM TODAY STARTS THE SAME ARGUMENTS WE HEARD WITH RESPECT TO WORLD WAR II AND KOREA.

IN ANOTHER ILLUSTRATION, THE MAO THEORY DEPENDS ON GETTING CONTROL OF THE RURAL PEASANTRY. ONE OF THE THINGS WE TRIED TO DO IN SOUTH VIET NAM A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO WAS TO INVALIDATE A BASIC ASSUMPTION OF THE MAO THEORY. THE "STRATEGIC HAMLET" PROGRAM WAS AIMED AT

PREVENTING COMMUNIST CONTROL OF THE PEASANTRY.
NO WATER (PEOPLE) FOR THE FISH (GUERRILLA) TO SWIM
IN. THIS ACTION, THE FORESTALLING OF COMMUNIST CONTROL
OF THE PEASANTRY, IS THE ONE THING THE FRENCH DID
NOT DO A DECADE AGO IN WHAT IS NOW NORTH VIET NAM.
FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER, OUR STRATEGIC HAMLET
PROGRAM DID NOT WORK, BUT ITS AIM WAS SOUND EVEN
IF ITS EXECUTION WAS NOT EFFECTIVE. IF AN APPRECIABLE
PORTION OF THE RURAL PEASANTRY CAN NOT BE BROUGHT
TO THE REVOLUTIONISTS' SIDE, THE 'WAR OF NATIONAL
LIBERATION' CANNOT GET OFF THE STARTING BLOCKS.

I BELIEVE THAT, AS A NATION, WE HAVE INTUITIVELY
RECOGNIZED THAT THE BASIC PROBLEM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IS
A SOCIO-POLITICAL ONE, BUT WE REALLY SEEM UNABLE TO
APPLY ANYTHING OTHER THAN OUR MILITARY STRENGTH,
AND THIS, I THINK, IS ONE OF THE REASONS WE ARE IN
SUCH DEEP TROUBLE. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE SAID
AS MUCH A WEEK AGO MONDAY ON CBS TELEVISION. HE DID
NOT SAY IT IN THESE WORDS, TO BE SURE, BUT IF YOU TAKE
HIS STATEMENTS AND REARRANGE THEM, THIS IS WHAT CLEARLY
EMERGES.

IN A QUITE DIFFERENT TYPE OF ILLUSTRATION, IN 1939 GREAT BRITAIN, THE MARITIME POWER, OFFERED A GUARANTEE TO SUPPORT POLAND IN THE FACE OF THREAT FROM GERMANY, THE CONTINENTAL POWER. POLAND WAS NOT ACCESSIBLE BY SEA IN THAT SITUATION AND, REGARDLESS OF THE MORAL OR POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH GUARANTEE, THE REALITY OF THE POLISH SITUATION DID NOT INCLUDE THE BASIC PREMISE WHICH WOULD HAVE LET BRITISH MARITIME STRENGTH PLAY A ROLE.

FROM THIS IT WOULD APPEAR THAT A FAIRLY CAREFUL SCRUTINY OF THE OPPONENT'S THOUGHT PATTERNS AND THEIR UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS SHOULD BE AN EARLY COMPONENT OF OUR OWN PLANNING PROCESS. IF WE COULD DELIBERATELY MAKE HIS THEORY INVALID, WE HAVE GONE A LONG WAY TOWARD MAKING HIS ACTIONS INEFFECTIVE. AN EXAMINATION OF THIS TYPE MIGHT UNCOVER SOMETHING CRUCIAL IN REACHING TOWARD ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL.

AND THIS BRINGS ME TO THE LAST POINT THAT I SHALL TRY TO MAKE THIS AFTERNOON. JUST WHAT IS IT THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT WHEN WE DISCUSS THEORIES OF STRATEGY? WHAT IS A STRATEGY? THERE MUST BE AT LEAST ONE HUNDRED DEFINITIONS AND ALL OF US HAVE OUR FAVORITES. ADMIRAL ECCLES HAS A GOOD ONE IN HIS RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOK.

THE ONE I LIKE IS VERY SIMILAR. IT IS A DEFINITION IN THE OXFORD DICTIONARY, NOT FOR THE WORD 'STRATEGY', BUT FOR THE WORD 'SCHEME'. "A PLAN OF ACTION DESIGNED IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE SOME END; A PURPOSE TOGETHER WITH A SYSTEM OF MEASURES FOR ITS ACCOMPLISHMENT." I OFFER THIS ONE TO YOU BECAUSE IT HAS TWO SALIENT FEATURES THAT MAY HELP TO CLARIFY ONE'S THOUGHTS.

ONE IS THAT IT IS A DEFINITION NOT LIMITED TO A WAR SITUATION OR EVEN LIMITED TO MILITARY APPLICATION. THIS QUALITY IS NECESSARY, FOR INSTANCE, IN ORDER FOR US TO ADDRESS THE MAO CONCEPT OF THE WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY IF WE ARE TO FUNCTION USEFULLY IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR OWN NATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL APPARATUS IN WASHINGTON TODAY.

THE SECOND SALIENT POINT OF A DEFINITION LIKE THE ONE I HAVE CHOSEN IS THAT IT ENFORCES A DICHOTOMOUS THINKING --- BOTH THE PURPOSE AND THE SYSTEM OF MEASURES TO ACHIEVE IT MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE THOUGHTS OF THE STRATEGIST. I THINK THAT THIS IS AS NECESSARY AS THE PRECEDING QUALIFICATION, THAT OF HAVING A CONCEPT BROADER THAN ONE LIMITED ONLY TO MILITARY APPLICATION.

WE CAN CONCEDE READILY THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO PREPARE ,
A PLAN FOR DOING SOMETHING WITH ONLY A VAGUE NOTION
OF WHAT THE RESULT WILL BE (TOO MANY MEN HAVE DONE
THAT TOO OFTEN FOR ANY OF US TO BELIEVE OTHERWISE), BUT
I DO CONTEND THAT IT WOULD BE A VERY DIFFICULT JOB INDEED
ADEQUATELY TO ASSESS THE VALIDITY OF ANY STRATEGY
WITHOUT A RATHER CLEAR APPRECIATION OF ITS PURPOSE.

TO ILLUSTRATE WHAT IS MEANT BY THIS I WOULD SUGGEST
THAT A PRIMARY FAULT IN THE LAST WAR IN EUROPE WAS THAT
WE BRILLIANTLY FOUGHT AND IMPLEMENTED WHAT TURNED
OUT TO BE AN OBSCURED, CONTRADICTIONARY, AND FINALLY
NON-EXISTENT STRATEGIC END. PEACE, IN AND OF ITSELF,
IS NOT NECESSARILY A PROPER OBJECTIVE AND I DO NOT
BELIEVE THAT SUCH REASONING CALLS FOR A MACHIAVELLIAN
APPROACH.

SOME OF YOU MAY BE INTRIGUED BY THE APPLICATION
OF THIS CONCEPT OF STRATEGY --- BY THE ASSERTION THAT
IT MUST HAVE A PURPOSE AS WELL AS A SYSTEM OF MEASURES.
LET US WALK ON A COUPLE OF EGGS AND LOOK AT THE FOUR
MAJOR MILITARY INVOLVEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING
THE LAST FIVE YEARS.

I SUGGEST TO YOU THAT A CLEAR DEFINITION AND RECOGNITION OF THE PURPOSE MIGHT HAVE ALTERED THE COURSES OF ACTION WHICH WERE CHOSEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE AFFAIR IN THE BAY OF PIGS.

A CLEAR AND CONSCIOUSLY ARRIVED AT PURPOSE MIGHT HAVE ALTERED THE COURSE OF AFFAIRS IN CONNECTION WITH THE CUBAN MISSILE AFFAIR --- AN AFFAIR IN WHICH WE FINISHED UP BY GUARANTEEING, IN EFFECT, THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF COMMUNIST CUBA AND ACQUIESCING IN THE SOVIET SUPPLY OF SOPHISTICATED MODERN ARMS.

IT MIGHT HAVE HELPED HAD THERE BEEN A CLEAR STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, OF THE GOAL TO BE ARRIVED AT, A COUPLE OF YEARS AGO IN SOUTH VIET NAM. AMONG THE THINGS WHICH I CAN RECALL QUITE CLEARLY ARE THE STATEMENTS TWO OR THREE OR FOUR YEARS AGO THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NEVER SEND LARGE NUMBERS OF TROOPS TO ASIA.

WHEN WE WENT INTO THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC A LITTLE OVER THREE MONTHS AGO, THE STATED PURPOSE WAS QUITE CLEAR. WE WERE TO PROTECT AMERICAN LIVES, WE WERE TO PROTECT THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY, AND WE WERE TO EVACUATE U.S. AND FRIENDLY NATIONALS. WE ACCOMPLISHED THAT PURPOSE IN ABOUT ONE WEEK. SINCE THEN, WITH AS MANY AS 20,000 TROOPS ON THE ISLAND AT ONE TIME, THE AIM HAS BEEN A LITTLE BIT FUZZY. THERE HAVE BEEN

SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN WHICH MEMBERS OF THE JOINT STAFF HAVE TELEPHONED MEMBERS OF OUR CONSULANT STAFF AND ASKED WHAT MISSION WE HAVE ASSIGNED TO THE FORCES IN SANTO DOMINGO. OUR REPLY HAS BEEN AN EASY ONE: "WHEN YOU LET US KNOW, WE WILL TELL YOU".

SO I WOULD SUMMARIZE THIS AFTERNON'S COMMENTS BY SAYING THAT, ALTHOUGH OUR PROFESSION HAS AVAILABLE THE RUDIMENTS OF SEVERAL FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL ORDER, OR THEORY, WE ARE, AS PRACTITIONERS, NOT A VERY ORDERLY LOT. THERE IS PLENTY OF ROOM FOR A GREAT DEAL OF RIGOROUS INTELLECTUAL DISCIPLINE. I THINK THAT WHEN MORE OF US HAVE LEARNED TO APPLY IT, THEN WE OURSELVES, OUR SERVICES, AND OUR COUNTRY WILL BE CONSIDERABLY BETTER OFF. THERE IS A GREAT DEAL UNEXPLORED IN THE INTELLECTUAL ORDERING OF THE APPLICATION OF POWER. I DO HOPE THAT SOME OF YOU, IN THIS COMING YEAR, WILL DO A LITTLE DIGGING. WE NEED ALL THE HELP THAT WE CAN GET.