

Naval War College.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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No.....

Author: Chadwick, F.E., Captain.....

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(To be filed with College Archives)

Resident's address. June 4, 1902

It is the natural tendency of man to accept the rut into which his life has run and plod along in it with as little deviation as possible. We generally call this conservatism. Of all professions navies are said to have this attribute more completely developed than any other. I think this is true, and it is so for several good reasons. On the sea, men formerly came face to face with the mighty forces of nature as part of their daily life in a way in which no others did. It was not a problem of higher mechanics, of manufacture or agriculture, it was a question of dominating the powers of nature as exhibited in the wind and waves by the crudest appliances. Their life was along certain very definite and simple lines, and thus naturally took on a stereotyped form. Guns came and existed for hundreds of years in the simple form which most of us remember well; steam followed, then the great change in material of all kinds until the whole structure of the ship today, its armament and motive power are as different almost as is conceivable from the ship of much less than a century since. But this change though decreasing to some degree our conservatism by removing ~~us~~ from us the intimate relation with Nature's forces which marked the old Navy, has left enough of its special influence of the sea to cause the naval man to be essentially differentiated from his fellows in his way of looking at life. No other classes of men unless it be the religious orders, are subjected to the attribution of a life of such close companionship, and by traditions which are even stronger than regulations. mild way is not an inventor.

The unquestioning obedience, the sense of duty, the methodical habits of an unvarying routine, the restriction when afloat to a society every member of which is cast in the same mould, necessarily sets an iron impress upon the character of the naval man, and makes him the pattern of conservatism which he is.

And one thing that marks our conservatism, is the very little that men of the sea have had to do with the changes I have just mentioned. They did not invent or bring forward the steam engine; in fact they opposed it; they did not invent screw propulsion; they had nothing to do with proposing iron and steel instead of wood. Our guns and gun mounts, our torpedoes, are all the products, as far as original invention goes, of the non-sea-faring man; of the Watts, the Fultons, the Armstrongs, the Vavasseurs, the Maxims, the Whiteheads. There have, of course, been inventors among sea-farers, but they have worked in the great lines which greater inventors have laid out for them.

It is just as well that this should be so. The officers of the navy have too much to do to invent. Their daily life is filled to overflowing with a pressure of duties such, as it seems to me, can fall to no other class of men. They are seamen, soldiers, steam engineers, ordnance experts, electricians, astronomers, drill masters, house keepers and international lawyers. This certainly is a multiplicity of duties, and one has to be a good deal of each to be a successful officer. I thus do not think we should wonder that the naval officer, except in a mild way is not an inventor.

But there is much more with which he is concerned, and this is the great field of administration, beginning with the Office of Naval Intelligence for the collection of information; bureaus of the Navy Department, and ending with ordnance factories, navy yards, and finally the administration of the ship and squadron.

Administration is a large subject and covers much of life, both national and personal. It means the formulation and exercise of such rules as will cause the official machine to work most successfully. It is, in fact, when applied to Government, the largest and most important of questions. The divisions of our national departmental system of administration are too well known for me to enter into detail, but it may not be recognized, even by many officers, how much this system has changed, and for the better, in the last few years. There has been a gradual convergence to basic logical principles, whereby we have separated personnel, materiel and finance, the three fundamental divisions into which every naval department should be divided, but the necessity for which it took us many years to recognize. With the word "personnel" should be linked the word "command". It has taken us more than a hundred years to arrive at the point of concentrating the supply of officers and men, their control ashore and their management when in ships afloat, under one bureau. This is now practically complete, but there is still a slight change necessary to make it entirely so, which must come in time. Logic must have its way in the long run.

Concurrent with this change has come certain growths,

The Office of Naval Intelligence supplied information covering the whole field of naval progress from tests of steel

unknown to the earlier navy; the establishment in 1882 of an Office of Naval Intelligence for the collection of information; in 1884 of the Naval War College for the study of war; and in 1900 of the General Board. Few changes, though it may not so appear on the surface, have been more important. The first was a necessity to the rebuilding of the navy. Without the information gathered by it, we should not have been in the position to build as we have built. Memory is short, and among the things forgotten is perhaps the fact that when the DOLPHIN was built in 1884 there was no establishment in this country which could make a steel shaft for even so small a ship. It had to be forged of iron. Tests were unknown then to us in general practice, and when Admiral ZSimpson who was on board during the Dolphin's trial asked regarding this, the builders said the name of the maker was a sufficient guaranty. As the shaft broke on the trial and the board spent thirty six hours at sea on bread and cheese as sole provender, it is to be presumed the members had another opinion of the firm that supplied the shaft from that held by the builders of the ship. At this same time the Bureau of Steam Engineering was supplying the engines of the ATLANTA and BOSTON, and the Advisory Board, the steam engines of the CHICAGO. This fact of itself is a measure of our backwardness at the time. Abroad, the triple expansion engine with less than half the weight per horse power developed per ton of machinery, was at this moment in use.

The Office of Naval Intelligence supplied information covering the whole field of naval progress from tests of steel

which it forms with the General Board and Office of Naval Intelligence. It is too late in the day to question the propriety of a General Staff in any military organization. Any one who reads the literature of his profession, however slightly, knows that it was the perfection of the General Staff organization of Germany under Moltke, which gave the deadly blow to the Austrian Empire in 1866, and four years later overwhelmed and dismembered France. Germany is today triumphant Germany through this work. We cannot ignore its effect. To do so would be to throw over every lesson of experience, of which this is one of the greatest. //

The War College thus exists to take part in this work as far as it concerns the navy. The Office of Naval Intelligence, as I remarked last year, is the collector of our information; the War College is the collator of this information in so far as it relates to military questions, and the General Board which we had in a crude form as the Strategic Board of the Spanish War, passes upon the results, and connects them with the service. //

*since anew.*  
We have, it seems to me, arrived at the desideratum advocated even so late as April of this year by a prominent English writer on military matters in the National Review, Mr. Spenser Wilkinson. In this article called "Preparation for War," he says that according to his conception the responsibility of the First Lord of the Admiralty covers three points. He is jointly responsible with his colleagues of the Cabinet on the whole policy of the government, and it is therefore his duty to agree to no act of

*I would quote here  
from my address of  
last year.*

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If study and experience are necessary in banking, in administering a governmental department, or a great system of railways, it is naturally the part of wisdom to suppose that they may be good, in fact, necessary, in this business of war, which is so much greater than any which can fall to our civilian brother. It would seem that the statement should be axiomatic, but the great mass of military men are unquestionably loth to accept it in practice. However willing they may be, if pinned down to the point to admit the truth of what is just said, their habit, at least in general, is to allow it no weight whatever. We usually go on in the routine of the service, doing what comes to our hands to do, hoping that when the time comes to beat an enemy, we shall be ready and able to do so by the gift of God which comes to us by steady advancement through the grades of the service.

But all experience is against this; there have been certain great masters in our profession, some half-dozen of the foremost rank; and though we do not know overmuch of the views and habits of study of most, we know very thoroughly those of Napoleon, the greatest of them all; and no one can be more emphatic in regard to the value of the study of the work of those who had preceded him; and there is no question that he himself was a most diligent student, genius as he was. If such a man thinks study necessary, how much more needful is it for those who are not geniuses, and who must, therefore, depend upon the principles which govern our business. For there are such principles. War is not a haphazard game any more than the great game of commerce. It requires the study of conditions, means, appliances, and, above all, that study of lines and bases of operation which is known as strategy. The first complete and methodic dealing with this great subject was the epoch-making work of Jomini, which has become a classic and which, though it has had many successors, still stands in the front rank.

When we look over the field covered by the art of war, as tabulated by Jomini, I think there is no one who will say that there is no place or need in our profession for a college for the particular study of war as an art. He divides this into six distinct parts:

1. Statesmanship in its relation to war.
2. Strategy, or the art of properly directing masses upon the theatre of war, either for defence or invasion.
3. Grand tactics.
4. Logistics, or the art of moving armies.
5. Engineering—the attack and defence of fortifications.
6. Minor tactics.

Though Jomini only touches upon maritime affairs, "to be taken," as he says, "in connection with maxims of descents," his treatment of his main subject applies to fleets as well as armies. The fleet is simply an army moving with much greater rapidity than land forces. Its supply and maintenance involve the same considerations, and it is extraordinary that so great and original a mind as that of Jomini should not have grasped the more essential facts connected with command of the sea. It is the great pride of this college that it was the instrument of bringing before the world the views now accepted by all, of the overpowering influence of the army of the sea as contrasted with that of the

army of the land. It was the great mind of Mahan which accomplished this revolution, giving sea power its logical supremacy in the minds of men which we can now all see it has always had in actuality. Had this college never had any further outcome; had it stopped with this result alone, its establishment would have been justified many times over. Mahan's work in giving naval power its just due has had a revolutionizing effect in international policies. It is not too much to say that no event in the latter half of the XIXth century did more to direct the world of statesmanship into new lines of thought than these great works of an officer of our navy, and I do not think the weight which this college had in directing his own thought, and in the production of his great works which were first produced as lectures before the college, and as the natural outcome of his duties here, should be lost sight of.

An important field of work for the college is always that of battle tactics, to which we cannot give too much thought and study. The development of the musket and of field artillery; the development of heavy guns and of the torpedo have caused both armies and navies to go about their ends in a very different manner from that of fifty and one hundred years ago. The principles remain the same but the methods must differ, and the land and sea forces of the whole world are now studying this vital question. That it may take some time to develop these to perfection is not improbable, but we may hope that it will not take the centuries that were needed for the development of tactics under sail.

~~not be generally known~~  
For a hundred years previous to the appearance of Clerk's work on Tactics in 1773, all actions between the French and the English were of a very indecisive character. Rodney made a first application of Clerk's principles in his action with de Grasse. The final and successful tactics under sail were thus worked out in the solitude of a student's study, though there were hundreds of officers at sea to develop views, and scores of battleships with which to test them. This is an extraordinary fact and one which should not be lost sight of when the value of a place of study such as this is discussed; and I thus believe it is here where the question of tactics will be finally solved, because it will probably be here that some active-minded genius will have the time and opportunity for thought and study which one so rarely gets at sea. England, at the period of the publication of Clerk's tactics, had few officers who made an independent study of either tactics or strategy, and to this fact is clearly due a failure which made certain the loss to her of the American colonies. Had Rodney not gone home on leave just at the time he did, it is beyond question that, with the opinion and views held by him, de Grasse would have failed to support Washington and Rochambeau; Cornwallis would have been relieved, the Yorktown expedition would have failed, and the consequences would probably have been fatal to the American cause. Rodney left orders covering the eventualities, but they were not obeyed. Admiral Graves, with faint conception of the enormous importance of his influence upon the situation, failed after his action with de Grasse to enter the Chesapeake which, if he had done, would have prevented de Grasse from re-entering and would have prevented the reception by the allied forces of the siege train sent with the squadron of Barras from Newport. The result was one of the great turning

points in the history of the world. This incident is mentioned merely as one of many to illustrate the fact that we cannot ignore preliminary study of strategic questions; that there must be a general study of these in order that we should not beat the mercy of chance as to whether the commander-in-chief has thought or not.

If we do not have this general study the chances are that he will not have thought, and even if he be a man such as Rodney, it is far better that he should have the aid of many minds instead of standing alone and unassisted. The united and long-continued study and thought of a large group of men are of more value than the off-hand thought of any one man of like mental calibre, and it is on this principle we have, in some countries at least, a general staff and places of study for such a staff akin in some degrees to this.

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*of course*

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From my address of  
last year

Last year

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In the face of the mighty results of the system it is vain to decry such studies. The other great military powers of Europe had, of course, some such organization, but none had the complete and flexible system of Germany. France began fair, but in 1832 the system of return of staff officers to the line was given up, and the staff naturally stiffened into the unwholesome and unprogressive routine inseparable from the continued occupancy of directive posts. There can be no surer road to inefficiency, not that it is down hill, but that it ceases to ascend, and we had the natural results when the two systems were pitted against each other in 1870.

Administrative reforms with us work slowly. I myself was on duty there with an officer (and it was only twenty-six years ago) who, when he took up the duty of superintendent, was an utter disbeliever in its utility. I had this from his own lips, when he assured me, however, that he had now seen enough of it to change his mind. We have been more than a hundred years in bringing about the establishment in the navy department of a bureau of personnel, thus gathering into one section of the department nearly, but not quite as yet, all things military, and we have been more than a hundred years in establishing a general staff, which I hope is now accomplished in the triune organization of the general board, the War College and the intelligence office. For the great province of this college is not so much in the work of the summer's course as its studies in general staff work, with which, of course, the summer's work on the general problem is in line.

*The Naval Academy had to be forced upon the Service.*

I should like to quote here some words of Admiral Taylor's taken from his "Memorandum on a General Staff for the Navy," which appeared in the Proceedings of the Institute of September last. After speaking of the real functions of the general staff of an army or navy, he says:

"The second element, though rarely recognized in a formal manner, is by far the more important of the two. It is the mental training of officers engaged in this plan-making, and their consequent readiness to confront warlike situations in general. It does not equal the school of actual war, but is only second to it—and there is no third method. This trained readiness of officers' minds, in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, constituted the essential value of the diligent staff work done by the Germans during fifty years of peace. What the world at large saw were the plans of work perfected in all minutiae, railroad cars numbered for special work, arriving near battlefields on schedule time, bringing guns or men, pontoons or hospital beds. This it was which, being so admitted, gave to the staff its reputation among non-professional people, as it was, in fact, a most valuable aid in the battle and campaign; but far greater, as a factor of efficiency, was the state of mind of German officers—from generals down to majors—that familiarity with war situations, acquired in the staff work of peace, which enabled them to confront all emergencies of the campaign with ready energy and composure of mind."

General staff covers covered by our intelligence office College. These three are thus closely interlaced, goes on they will become more so. The partial separation at all a disadvantageous one.

The intelligence office is our collector of information, very much of which does not apply to military study; the War College is the collator of such information on military subjects, whatever its origin, which has a bearing on questions of war. It is in nowise a teaching establishment in the ordinary sense of the term. It is a place for the study and discussion of military problems; for the study of war in all its phases, historical, strategical, tactical; of the events which lead up to war; of international situations, and of the probabilities or possibilities which might arise therefrom. Besides carrying on the study of such questions as continuously as its limited staff will allow, it prepares and lays before the general board such studies as may be particularly called for. The aim, however, is to prepare, in connection with the general board, studies for all eventualities, so that the department may be able to furnish a commander-in-chief in war with complete studies of the theatre of war; with thought made to hand, so to speak, and enable him to act unhampered by the necessity of forming a judgment off-hand regarding a great variety of questions on which hasty judgment cannot be safely made.

policy whatever which would cause annoyance to a possible enemy unless and until his department is fully prepared for all the possible consequences of such annoyance. This involves a second duty; to be always prepared with a plan of war, and a third which is to assure himself that everything needed for the execution of his plan is in fact at his disposal. He continues: "No minister will veto political action proposed by his colleagues on the basis of a strategical judgment of the soundness of which he is not absolutely convinced. Yet the organization of the navy makes very little provision for supplying the First Lord of the Admiralty with sound strategic advise. The First Sea Lord is supposed to fulfill this function, but as far as can be known to outsiders, there has never been arrangements for giving any strategical training to persons likely to become First Sea Lords, and there is no reason to suppose that any kind of test of strategical ability has ever been required to be fulfilled by any First Sea Lord as a condition of his appointment. Moreover the system lays upon the First Sea Lord so many other duties that he cannot possibly concentrate his energies upon strategical problems. A First ~~Sea~~ Lord of the Admiralty who was resolved to fulfill the three duties above mentioned could with sufficient determination, in a few <sup>would</sup> years provide himself with the means of fulfilling them. He ~~xxx~~ would begin by forming in the Admiralty, under the immediate supervision of his First Sea Lord, a Bureau of Naval Operations, sub-divided into a history division, an information division and a division for operations proper. To this bureau he would en-

trust the framing of all orders for the movements of ships and fleets, and he would take means to select for appointments to it all those officers who revealed special qualifications for the higher branches of naval warfare. In this way he would prepare the systematization of strategical knowledge. At the same time he would make competence in the general direction of operations the sole criterion of the choice of the First Sea Lord, and he would not rest until he had acquired in this bureau and in its chief a confidence sufficient to justify his staking his political existence by representing in the Cabinet the strategical conclusions at which they had arrived."

Change the words "First Lord" to Secretary of the Navy", and "First Sea Lord" to "Chief of Bureau of Navigation," and "Bureau of Operations" to "General Board", and we have described by this English writer exactly that at which we have arrived as far as war preparation is concerned. But the scope of the system he proposes should be extended. It should be arranged that in time no officer should go in command of a squadron and no officer should go on the staff of a commander of a squadron until he has had such connection with General Staff work as would make him fully conversant with such work and place him in sympathetic relations with it. This is not original with myself, I can say that it is the view long since expressed by the distin-

der of the navy who aims to take high rank in his profession. Referring to this war, it cannot be too often brought home to the Statesman and naval officer that it was the action of

guished officer who is now Chief of the Bureau under which all such work comes and who is so completely, by his training, the character which the author referred to as desirous to have as First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty.

The field of the College is a broad one and concerns, itself, besides the actual study of war problems, with all that goes to make of the officer a student in the great addenda of his profession, diplomacy and international law. // I entered so fully upon this in the explanation of the Course at the War College published in No. 98 of the Proceedings of the Naval Institute that I shall not attempt it again now. I will confine myself to saying that // no officer can afford to be without knowledge of the greater campaigns, both military and naval, and of what we may call world politics. The Wars of Carthage and Rome, as Mahan has shown, are full of lessons to the naval man. Napoleon's campaigns in Italy, though dealing with army events alone, are of the highest value to us from the point of view of strategy. Our own Revolutionary War is a great naval study in itself; and its diplomacy, the negotiation of the peace which followed, the attitude of the several powers concerned thereafter, our extension to the south and west, our relations for the next fifty years with European powers, are studies of the highest moment for every officer of the navy who aims to take high rank in his profession. //

Referring to this war, it cannot be too often brought home to the Statesman and naval officer that it was the action of

de Grasse in leaving the West Indies with his powerful fleet and his occupangy of the Chesapeake before the arrival of the British Squadron which caused the surrender of Cornwallis, and fixed the independence of the United States. Without de Grasse, the Yorktown campaign would have been but an abortive promenade, and his later defeat and the then assured supremacy of the British Navy in North American seas would have put a different complexion upon the French-American alliance and upon events in general. There was never, as I read history, a more thorough exemplification of the overwhelming influence of sea power.

But it is not only the past we ~~myxi~~ want to study. Such knowledge is chiefly valuable as a basis for action in the future; the one is the field of conetmplatation, the other and far more practical one, is of action. To know how to act we must, to the knowledge of how those have acted under given circumstances, add the knowledge of the world of the day in which we live, and study whither it is tending. The immensity of the subject is staggering, but it has to be faced. Man is developing his energies in ways and directions of which our fathers either knew nothing or had but faintest glimmerings. The alliance of coal and the steam engine gave him his first great impulse a century since, and through this he has been carried forward with an acceleration of movement which has surpassed the imagination of even forty years ago. It<sup>is</sup>/for us of this generation to consider whither this great human movement is to carry us, and how we shall pre-

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pare ourselves for the part we are to play in it.

First, we have all become neighbors. There is no more distance. The telegraph has brought the Emperor of China into the same room with the President of the United States; it is only that they talk through the curtain. Steam moves troops in weeks or even days over distances where it once took months. Napoleon took from June 14 to September 14 to go from the borders of Russia to Moscow, though in this time he met with no real check. Armies before the days of railroads could not be moved more than twelve miles a day. Fleets took many weeks to cross the Atlantic; whence d'Estaing's failure in 1778 to blockade the British fleet in the Delaware and to capture New York. We thus deal with much shorter intervals of time and with immensely greater forces of every kind. The whole question of war has become one of great complexity in which we must think more quickly and certainly. There is no time now, after war breaks out to make plans and other preparations. Other things equal, victory will be to the man who, to use the vernacular, "gets there first." Thus what is doing by the rest of the world; its preparations, its aspirations, its designs, are to us as naval men, subjects of the deepest importance.

And there is much in the word "Aspirations". There are two or three great aspiring nations which have still within passions which show so little sign of abatement; the fierce thirst of gain, the pushing of this race or that to the wall in the contest for commercial supremacy which has been at the bottom

of most wars in the past, and will be the chief, if not almost the only cause in the future. If history has taught anything it is that commerce is the 12. war producing factory; that

them a great deal of the primitive energy, such as that with which the barbarians over-ran the Roman Empire. The great races of the Mediterranean would appear, if reckoned by their productiveness, to have had their day. If they want to hold their own they must produce more men. It is not amiss to take as a fair measure of the future power of a race, its rate of increase, and so measured by taking the difference between births and deaths we find France stationary, and Spain increasing at the rate of only 4.3 per thousand. Italy 9.6. On the other hand the people of the United Kingdom are increasing at the rate of over 10 per thousand, while those of the German Empire are increasing at 13 per thousand, and of Russia at about 14. All the Slav states show this very high rate of increase or even greater. It thus becomes a mere question of time when by mere force of numbers the races of the west to be reckoned with as striving for supremacy will be the Slav, the Teuton and the great offshoot of the later, the Anglo-Saxon. Shall they expand as they please; can they expand without wars; shall one dominate the others, or shall Christianity become such a force that it shall make no difference to any man whether he lives under the administration of Russia, Germany, Great Britain, the United States or China? I venture to say that such altruism will not come in the days of most of us; that we must look forward to dealing still with those primitive passions which show so little sign of abatement; the fierce thirst of gain, the pushing of this race or that to the wall in the contest for commercial supremacy which has been at the bottom

of most wars in the past, and will be the chief, if not almost the only cause in the future. If history has taught anything it is that commerce is the great war producing factor; that nations fight that they may sell, and we are faced, as never before by this principle as applied to ourselves. Our commercial and manufacturing success carries with it a commensurate responsibility. Every phase of life has its compensation, and the nation which grows rich, which expands its trade, which undersells its neighbor, must prepare to defend its prosperity much as does the prosperous bank with its steel bars and armed watchmen. It is a law which none can evade.

While the Slav and the German are increasing faster than the Anglo Saxon the increase is offset by the absorption of so many of both of these races into the great branch of the latter in America which absorbs and stamps through its language, laws and literature, its own character upon the many thousands who migrate to us and who form so great a percentage of our own increase. The people possessing the United States are thus destined to form one of the great world powers in numbers alone. But it will not only have the influence of numbers, it will have the mighty influence of the coal it owns in greater quantity and in better quality than the rest of the world and it is this factory which must give it an unapproachable manufacturing supremacy and power. With unlimited coal at one-fifth the cost at the mine's mouth, of that of Germany for example, and with the constantly decreasing and more difficult supply in Europe, there can be no question as to whether we are tending as the great manufacturing power of the world.

work which is done by the coal in her boilers. But the fact of

To understand the importance, the immense importance of our coal fields we must recognize the fact that upon coal and the lesser fuel, oil, depends the whole of modern civilization. The use of coal bred the steam engine through the necessity of keeping ~~the~~ mines clear of water and it is the multiplication of energy by the use of the two which made human advance in the last century so wonderful and which carries on this advance with constantly quickening pace. 1800 may be taken as a dividing line, on one side of which lie untold thousands of years during which man slowly developed his mechanical ability and on the other, the wonderful one hundred just passed. The latter years have carried us into another world, all through the influence of coal, the importance of which has become such that even imagination cannot exaggerate it. If we take the combustion of 300 pounds of coal as equivalent to the labor of one man for a year, and allow but one fifth the coal produced to be used in motive power, it represents an addition to the labor of the United States of over 300,000,000 men who have neither to be clothed nor fed. This is about equal to the entire population of Europe, about four times our own population and about forty times the number of persons employed in manufactur~~es~~ in the United States. In other words our laboring capacity is at least forty times what it would have been had the conditions of the 18th century<sup>been</sup>/continued. But the real difference is infinitely greater. We must consider the results of the application of this energy. We can say that the power of the steamship Oceanic for instance represents the energy of 200,000 men, but as at least three shifts of men would be needed to exert the power continuously, it would take 750,000 men to do the

work which is done by the coal in her boilers. But the fact of course is that they could not do it at all any more than they would drag an express train 60 miles an hour. The ratio thus becomes infinite and we can truly say that no number of men could do the world's work of to-day!

Such thoughts lead us far. Linking them with the fact that we have an area of <sup>of 225,000 square miles of</sup> coal fields already discovered about five times those of Europe; that our coal is of much better quality than any European continental coal, that the cost of mining in Europe is constantly increasing through deepening mines, whilst ours at the pits mouth is absurdly cheap, we can easily see the mighty force with which we have to develop and control. ~~With~~ Whither it will carry us is beyond our ken, but that is the greater reason for study. Along with the immense fact that the Slav, <sup>and</sup> the Neuton and Anglo-Saxon are the great <sup>proliferic</sup> ~~procreative~~ races of the <sup>western</sup> world is <sup>the</sup> almost equally important one that they are the great coal owners. Italy has no coal whatever Spain has an area of but 2800 square miles and France and Belgium but 2500. Austria-Hungary but 1800, Southern Europe must thus of necessity fall behind as wealth producing powers in comparison with the races mentioned. ~~And without~~

The only coal fields which, from our present knowledge, can offer possible rivalry to the fields of the United States are those of Australia and China and we can venture to predict that it will be over these Chinese fields and the development of their potentialities that the future struggle for supremacy in eastern Asia will take place unless China herself shall show an unexpected ability to control and defend them.

It would seem a necessary corollary to what has been said that the countries of southern Europe unless they become more prolific and find an increased coal supply, must with time fall behind as wealth producing powers in comparison with the races mentioned. How can it be otherwise if the latter have the overpowering numbers and the principal basis of mechanical energy?

And as we have come to see that it is commercial interests which rule and not the mere dicta of governments, we can readily see that the greatest dangers to the worlds' peace lie in the conflicting interests of the great <sup>proliferic</sup> races, and coal owners mentioned. In these conflicts of interest there is a potentiality of antagonisms which ~~we~~ have within them the most momentous possibilities.

There are questions which deeply affect the navy. In saying this I do not mean to say that we must necessarily look forward to a certainty of future wars, but we must look forward to a great

probability approaching certainty.

I know that there are many ~~xxx~~ who will deride such a statement; But I venture to say that they are those of short memories and of little philosophy. To such I would recall the fact that a gentleman high in administration in 1897 stated publicly that the officers then in the navy would never see<sup>a</sup>/war; that another able administrator said the same in other words to myself shortly after leaving his post in the Navy Department. These were but the expressions of a very general feeling, the like of which I might multiply to any extent. We and they know how mistaken they were, and how these views were falsified in the one instance in a few years, and in the other in a few months. It is such shortsightedness which the broader minded statesman, which naval men, who are by their profession students of the history of wars, have to combat. And though taking<sup>the</sup>/views that war must come, the naval man is not their fomentor; he is, indeed, a pacificator, a maker for peace, and a powerful navy a conservator of the world's peace. It is in this view that the conservatism of the naval man shines with a noble lustre; and in this connection I may mention the high compliment to naval officers expressed in conversation with myself a few days since by the Secretary of State. He said he had been ~~(surprised at?)~~ ~~(greatly pleased)~~ *impressed with* the ability with which naval officers had handled the different ~~xxxx~~ international questions with which they had lately been ~~ex~~ charged in Central America: that they had made no mistake and that he personally, felt under much obligation for the manner in which they had conducted questions on that coast. As the Navy generally receives more cuffs than compliments, I thought it would be pleasant to the Service to make known these words from one who has ~~had~~ made

so great a reputation in the diplomatic world by his conduct of the Department of State. The compliment too adds to the interest of the diplomatic and international law studies with which so very considerable a proportion of our time is taken up. You know the results of those<sup>of</sup> last year, which have added a volume which will have a permanent place as an authority. As much may be hoped for the outcome of the work of the present summer, and the result must be in time, if continued with equal success, the establishment of the Naval War College as perhaps the foremost school of international law. With such men as Moore and Wilson as directors and expositors, and with men whose lives are spent in dealing with international law, as students, suggestors and critics, it is reasonable to hope and expect to reach the high place I have just mentioned.

But to return to the great question of war which faces us and must face us so long as man is what he is today. The mission of our country is, I hope, one of peace. I disdain the idea that the slaughter of war, the mere blood and thunder of our occupation should be a matter of pride either to the man engaged in it, or to his countrymen. I hold that he is the greatest commander who shall do by strategy what<sup>would</sup> otherwise have to be effected by brute force; and so in line with this, I hold that if we desire peace, the true strategy of the country is to assure this peace by commanding it, and we are great and rich enough and fortunately so strategically placed as to be able, if we desire, to do so. The old French proverb has it that "he who makes himself a sheep will be eaten by the wolves." The role of the sheep is not for us, nor is that of the wolf, but it is the dictum of the merest common sense that we should ~~maintain a position which will be sufficiently powerful and~~

see to it that our navy shall be sufficiently powerful both in material and in the morale which comes from thorough mental and physical training, to make sure that no one shall venture to "molest or make us afraid"; so long as we follow the way we believe to be right.

It is thus our business to look forward, to consider what is ~~lik~~ likely to happen, to judge what is necessary from a naval standpoint to meet these happenings and finally how to meet them. All this is done and can only be done through a General Staff of which this College is so important a part.

To epitomize, we may say that its duty is to study the past, make acquaintance with the present, and forecast and prepare for the future. This duty leads us into a world of study than which there is none more important in aim or result. The aim, if war has to come, is success; the result, if the aim be achieved, is the safeguarding of the nation; of its honor and well being.