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Vice Admiral Robert B. Carney, U.S.N.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R. I.
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AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND - 12 JULY 1947

This day marks the occasion of an important step forward in the training of our officers in the practical art of war. The convening of this class sets in motion the project to establish a Logistics Course on a parity with Strategy and Tactics, and it furnishes added evidence of the Navy's determination to prevent any relapse toward unrealistic thinking.

After World War I, the fascinating study of the battle of Jutland blinded many people to the importance of other facets of war. World War I had not produced many serious strategic problems for the United States Navy and, consequently, much of our subsequent thinking and study was channeled into tactical lines. The influence of this thinking was felt throughout the service, and throughout the years; tactical proficiency and service in the closely-knit tactical fleet became a prime requisite of qualification for promotion, and there was a tendency to brush aside, as too academic, such things as planning, studying amphibious warfare and the lowly business of supply and re-supply of overseas forces. Scarcity of funds compounded this deficiency because the Navy has traditionally sacrificed everything else in order to maintain some semblance of a combatant striking force.

We had a one-battle Navy, and in no sense of the word did we have a campaign-Navy or a major-war-Navy. Technically, we could have given a good account of ourselves in any single action. But we were wholly unprepared materially and spiritually for a long-drawn-out struggle.

The last war changed all that; as our arms gathered momentum and we mounted the final offensive, Naval Officers found themselves busily engaged with planning for and carrying out jungle-based air operations, surface operations, amphibious operations, operating freight lines, engaged in base construction, stockpiling, and doing dozens of other jobs that were foreign to the training we had hitherto undergone. We became acutely aware of such things as tons-of-supplies-per-man and usage rates of all manner of ammunition and equipment - in short, with the down-to-earth spade-work of what it takes to wage war.

With the end of hostilities and the attendant demobilization and stringency of funds, we may drift toward a renewed preference for the nice clean business of operating tactical forces and shy away from the less attractive jobs involved in Logistic support. If we are to retain a worthwhile know-how, this must not happen.

Logistics must be accorded its proper importance and there must be high prestige attached to ability in this field of endeavor. The Secretary of the Navy is in full accord with

this view and has lent strong support to the establishment of this Logistics Course on a parity with Strategy and Tactics.

Furthermore, it is important that the Logistics Course be an integral part of the Naval War College effort for the same reason that logistics and combat go hand in hand in time of war. A strategic concept unsupported by logistic feasibility is valueless, and therefore Admiral Spruance's plan to have the two courses working side by side, and interlocking, has a realism which augurs well for the product of the War College.

As a matter of interest, I commend to you the idea of interlocking logistical instruction throughout all of the instruction levels of the service, as well as joint colleges. As I will explain in a moment, there are levels of logistical planning and effort which concern people in the National Security Organization from the President of the United States down to the Junior Officers, and including both line and staff. For this reason, there must be instruction in the problems of the several separate services, there must be joint instruction, and there must be free and plentiful exchange of thought and information between the several institutions. This matter is now under study in the Navy Department, and it is my sincere hope that eventually there will be a controlled flow of personnel through the various schools and at the different levels which will insure working knowledge of the Navy's logistical problems and joint logistical problems among the officers of every level from the highest on down. Furthermore, I believe that before going to the joint colleges, that officers - and I refer more particularly now to Logistics - should be well trained or instructed in the planning techniques of their own service.

In all of the Department's studies and in organizational planning, Logistics is considered to be divided into three phases. The statement of requirements, procurement, and distribution. The first of these - the statement of requirements - is a military responsibility; procurement is a commercial matter, and in the Navy Department is coordinated by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy through the Chief of the Material Division, who supervises the Bureaus' efforts in this respect; the third phase, again, is primarily military in character and it involves the assembly, transportation, handling in the field, until the ultimate consumer - the enemy - feels its impact.

Insofar as the Navy is concerned, there is an inevitable general sequence of events. The joint Chiefs of Staff announce a desirable strategic objective and set a tentative target date; next, there is an inventory of men and material to see whether or not we have the means to undertake the task; any

deficiency in our human or material resources must be procured, and the answer as to whether or not it can be procured determines whether or not the task can be undertaken, whether greater risk must be accepted, and whether or not the target date is feasible. The strategic concept is then modified or not as the case may be and detailed planning is begun.

That is the picture concerning the Navy by itself. Obviously, the other services will translate their own tasks into terms of their own requirements and those requirements will be further translated into statements of end-products. At this point, there must be a review of the capabilities of industry to meet the sum-total demands of the various services. This is a task for the Munitions Board, and the Munitions Board's answer will determine whether or not the strategic plan can be undertaken as envisaged.

That was, in general, the procedure during the last war, but there are some new implications in the wind which deserve close attention here at the War College, at the Armed Forces Staff College, at the National War College, and throughout the entire National security structure. The resources of this nation and of our allies were greatly depleted by the last war; furthermore, there is reason to believe that speedy mobilization is of greater importance in our thinking today than ever before. These two factors - critical shortages and urgency - make it vitally important that the mobilization and employment of our human and material resources be accomplished with the utmost speed, efficiency, and economy. There you have the meat of the matter: Logistics actually control the nation's foreign policy by reason of the limiting effect of the nation's potential in resources. This fact alone is, in my mind, a compelling and irresistible reason for the proper unification of the national effort. I do not mean merger - God forbid - but I most emphatically do mean the integration of the planning and directing effort which will control the over-all use of our resources. I consider it to be inevitable and essential that some form of a National Security Resources Board and National Security Council be created. I consider it inevitable that there will be some form of National Security Organization which will properly coordinate the efforts of the military departments. Now all of this means that there will, in effect, be four great logistic levels - the Government level, the National Security Organization level, the Department level, and the Field level. The President himself will probably be the guiding spirit of the efforts of the Security Council and Resources Board at the Government level; the military efforts of the joint Chiefs, the Joint Research and Development Board, the Munitions Board, and the Departments will, if currently proposed legislation becomes law,

be coordinated by a Secretary at the Security Organization level. The current organizations and procedures for logistic planning and implementation in the Departments and in the Field level will undoubtedly continue as they are today.

It is important for you Gentlemen to understand that these four levels exist, and it is important for every incumbent in the Nation's Security Organization to realize it, for unless the procedures at each of the four levels are well worked out and unless a good two-way flow between the various levels is established, we can not achieve the speed, efficiency, and economy of effort which will be essential in any future great test of strength.

Aside from this vertical concept, any officer who is called upon to perform important tasks in the Logistical Organization will early come to realize that there are many points of tangency with other agencies, and if he is wise he will familiarize himself with the implications of these various interlocking activities. To cite a few: The Joint Logistics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Operational and Procurement Agencies within the Departments, the various Transportation Activities, the Army-Navy Munitions Board, the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, the Armed Forces Industrial College with its contacts with industry and its interests in world-wide raw materials. These are but a few, but they will serve to warn you that logistics is a vast and complex study and worthy of your best and prolonged efforts.

May I speak for a moment now on the subject of integration of Logistics. An overseas movement is carried by ships and planes; those ships and planes can carry just so much, and the programming and priorities for the various shipping echelons are of vital importance; unless properly programmed the planned fighting can not be sustained. Going back farther toward the source of supply, we have problems of assembly, storage, and continental transportation; going back still farther - to procurement - we find the necessity for reconciliations between the demands of the various services for the munitions they consider they need for the job at hand; and at the very top you have the need for reconciling the demands of the American Armed Forces with those of the civilian economy, and the needs of our allies. Time does not permit discussion of these matters here, but what I have just said will serve to point out the extensive and complex problems of logistical integration that are required from the top level right on out to the beach heads and battle fields. To effect this integration, there must be knowledge, cooperation, tolerance, and hard work. The military planners must understand the needs of our allies and of the civilian economy; as between themselves, the planners of the various services must work together; and, finally, there must be

intelligent over-all theater and field integration to insure the effective use of all of the combatant forces on the field of battle.

In my opening remarks, I noted how the events of World War I so shaped the post-war thinking that even some self-evident implications were side-tracked; in our Orange Plan of the 30's, we foresaw the sneak attack, we foresaw the long trek across the Pacific, we foresaw a vast building program, and we stated that it would be a long hard war; we estimated that great quantities of material would be used, and estimated what the requirements for the first twelve months would be; a few people grasped the logistical implications of the strategic concept, but in spite of that there was little effective preparation in the form of accumulations of material, nor, and this is most important, the establishment of real working planning agencies.

This must not happen again! Our two great former maritime enemies have been driven from the seas, but our institutions and our way of life are still threatened. I believe that we have matured greatly since the days of World War I, and I know that our thinking has been rapidly reoriented toward the situation that exists today. That reorientation is vital; we must not become lost in the contemplation of glorious victories in World War II - we must not rigidly pattern all of our thinking after the type of operations which characterized the long years between 1941 and 1945. We must think realistically in terms of today's world situation and in terms of the effectiveness of those who would be our friends. We must think realistically and make modern application of the axiomatic fact that there are only three reasons for taking a geographical objective: Because we need it, because we must deny it to the enemy, or because the products of fighting will contribute to the ultimate victory. We must think realistically in terms of vital geographic areas and essential raw materials. We must think realistically as to the ways and means of occupying and holding geographical areas that would be vital to our success. We must, of course, make use of the techniques that were so successful in 1945, but we must also be alert to the new developments that will alter those techniques or introduce new ones. In short, we must think objectively in terms of the men and materials, and supply and re-supply, of a contest in this new world of new and as yet unbalanced forces.

One of the Navy's great strength factors has been Navy-wide indoctrination on matters of prime importance; throughout the years, this has resulted in presenting a solid front supported by considered opinion, and has bred justified Navy-wide confidence in the action and reaction to be expected from various quarters within our organization. This thought is applicable to administrative policies as well as to matters of strategy and tactics. When we had a relatively small and compact officer body, we were very successful in accomplishing that indoctrination. World War II upset our neat little Navy

world and necessitated the inclusion of many specialized skills which could not be mastered by what we used to call the "well-rounded officer". So we are now confronted with a far greater problem with respect to indoctrination in our Navy; the most difficult element of that problem is pulling together the vastly greater number of policies, programs, and techniques which go to make up our present structure. The keystone of our indoctrination structure must be clear recognition of the fundamental concepts of modern Naval policy; if we understand the basic principles of modern organization and strategy, we can proceed from there to sound conclusions and can acquaint the officer body with those conclusions.

There are two groups of people who will contribute importantly in the evaluation of today's situation, and in the formulation of our thinking: The Top-Command Echelon, which is actually responsible for planning and operation, and for the success of our plans and operations; the other group comprises those fortunate people who are free from administrative chores and have the leisure to think and study. You Gentlemen belong to that second group, and to you is given the opportunity to contribute importantly to this job of crystallizing our thinking along sound lines and indoctrinating the bulk of the service. Here at the Naval War College you have the golden opportunity to attend priceless lectures, to indulge in free interchange of ideas, to put your pet theories to the test, and to participate in the crystallizing of service opinion as to what confronts us and how best to comport ourselves. Specifically, you can share in the codifying of the logistic know-how which was developed during the last war the hard way; and the spotlight is very definitely on you. If you show imagination and industry, the opinions and techniques which evolve from your work will take the form of invaluable documents which will be widely read, which will become the Bible of Naval examiners and the guide to aspirants for promotion, and which can have a profound and beneficial effect on the education of Naval Officers in the art of modern warfare. Conversely - and you must not lose sight of this - if your efforts are not realistic and worthy, this branch of Naval training will suffer, and, what is even more important, the product of your efforts, if not of outstanding excellence, will be reflected throughout the service.

Because of my own wartime experience, I am insistent on the point that logistic know-how must be maintained, that Logistics is second to nothing in importance in warfare, that Logistic training must be wide-spread and thorough, and that it is folly to waste time on mediocre talent. In order that instruction may not be disassociated from the operational efforts of the Navy, there should be the closest possible

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relationship between the Department and the various Service and Joint Educational institutions, and good liaison as between the Schools themselves. The Logistics Course of the Naval War College is an integral part of the logistics effort of the Navy, and I am most anxious that the Logistics Agencies in the Department assist the Naval War College in every possible way in developing realistic instruction; and, conversely, we can look to the Naval War College for the fresh viewpoint that germinates and thrives in an atmosphere which encourages imagination and detached and objective study.

In my opening remarks, I said that this day marks an important epoch in the Navy's system of education, and I want you Gentlemen to fully understand that that is no idle remark - it is voiced with conviction and satisfaction, and I feel assured that the vital techniques of logistics will be the better perpetuated and preserved.

In closing, I wish to stress one point. The first phase of Logistics is the statement of requirements, and only those who are responsible for the results of combat operations can state requirements. Therefore, the Line must be the fountain-head of the Logistics effort. The second phase, procurement, and many aspects of the third phase - distribution - are decentralized to the full control of various staff corps activities, and without their efficient support the Line planning and the Line statement of requirements would be without meaning. Logistics is an all-hands maneuver in which each component plays a vital and important part - but bear in mind, always, that those who bear the responsibility for operations must write the basic ticket and control this vital function.

I will be watching your progress and the work of this course with great interest. Under Admiral Spruance's guidance and leadership, its success is assured - and you Gentlemen will always have the satisfaction of having helped to lay the cornerstone of this new important structure.

