

BOOK I

This notebook specifically responds to Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) Memorandum of 7 Oct 1974 to Service Secretaries and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Basic Background Information on Senior Service Schools for DOD Committee on Excellence in Education.

For convenient reference, the questions posed in this ASD (M&RA) memo are attached opposite the answers.

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EXPLANATORY NOTE

The Naval War College, as a complex of four major resident colleges, two adjunct centers, and an evolving advanced research center served by a common faculty and staff, simply does not fit neatly into a format for ready comparison of its senior course (College of Naval Warfare) with other Senior Service Colleges. In these notebooks, every reasonable attempt has been made to display comparable statistical/informational material, but some compromises and footnotes have been necessary to insure understanding. Typical of the divergencies which required such special treatment are:


a. Partial (about 60%) integration of the Naval Command College (course for senior international officers) into the College of Naval Warfare (U.S. Navy/Marine Senior Service College).

b. A single faculty teaches core curriculum and electives to the College of Naval Warfare, College of Naval Command and Staff, and Naval Command College. The same faculty also prepares or assists in the preparation of correspondence and extension courses in the Center for Continuing Education, offers supplemental lectures in the Naval Staff Course, and assists in the teaching of 11 Reserve Officer courses each year.

c. The Center for War Gaming is 50% committed to curriculum support, with the other 50% of its capacity devoted to operational war gaming support to Fleet Commanders, preliminary testing of new tactical concepts, and research/analysis evaluations for the Chief of Naval Material and OpNav sponsors.

Accordingly, where essential to split out factors relating only to Senior Service Colleges, such elements as faculty/student relationships, staff/admin overhead, and costs have been pro-rated with descriptive notations.

**ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301**



**MANPOWER AND
RESERVE AFFAIRS**

7 OCT 1974

**MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Secretary of the Air Force
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**SUBJECT: Basic Background Information on Senior Service Schools
for DoD Committee on Excellence in Education**

As you are aware, the Committee on Excellence in Education has recently undertaken an executive examination and overview of the Senior Service Colleges. Certain basic information about each of these colleges is essential to our understanding. Therefore, I request that you have your staffs compile the information asked for in the following questions for your college(s):

A. Student Body

1. What is the usual student mixture, i.e. numbers of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine officers, civilians, foreign officers, etc.?
2. What are the ranks and age distribution of the students?
3. How many of this year's students earned masters degrees prior to attending the war college? How many earned Ph. D. s?
4. What percentage of your students are actively pursuing graduate degrees through a cooperative program or some other means?
5. Of those officers in this year's class in grade O-5 (or on a selection list to be promoted to O-5) and in grade O-6 (or on an O-6 selection list), how many fall in the following promotion categories?

	O-5		O-6	
	Secondary Zone	Primary Zone	Secondary Zone	Primary Zone
Army				
Navy				
Air Force				
Marine Corps				

6. How are the students evaluated while they are attending the war college?

7. By category and percentage of student body, what have been the assignments given to graduates of the last two classes? (Category here means a command or staff job and a general location such as OSD, JCS, Service staff, Command Headquarters, etc.)

8. How are the officers selected to attend a Senior Service College, and how is it determined which one of the colleges an officer should attend? (In answer to this question I would expect a brief, one page explanation from each of the Services.)

B. Faculty

1. What is the faculty size?

2. What is the faculty mixture: number of military, number of civilians?

3. What are the faculty academic credentials?

4. What is the normal tour length for faculty members: military and civilians?

5. List the publications (books, magazine articles, journal articles, etc.) published by members of the faculty during the last three years.

6. What assignments have been given to military faculty members who completed their faculty tours during the last three years?

7. How many former faculty members have been selected for general/flag rank?

C. Curriculum

1. Please provide an outline of your present curriculum.

2. How has the curriculum evolved over the years?

3. What is the procedure by which the curriculum is changed? (How are new courses added or old courses dropped?)

D. Associated Studies and Research

1. Is your college formally engaged in any research activity or studies for your Service staff, the JCS, or OSD?

2. Is there a research center associated with your college similar to the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College? If so, how is it related organizationally to the college? How is it manned?

3. What percentage of the faculty and students participate in such research/study activity? How much time is spent by faculty and students in these activities?

4. What specific contributions of significance have been made to your Service or DoD by studies and research conducted in conjunction with your programs.

This information should reach my office no later than 31 October 1974 so that my staff can compile it and distribute it to the members of the Committee on Excellence in Education prior to our visit to the Naval War College on 5-6 November. If your staffs have questions regarding this information, they should contact either Lt. Colonel P. M. Dawkins (ext. 50661) or Major D. H. Roe (ext. 73753).

William K. Brehm

William K. Brehm

A. Student Body

1. What is the usual student mixture, i. e. numbers of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine officers, civilians, foreign officers, etc.?

STUDENT BODY COMPOSITION BY SERVICE

SENIOR COURSES

A. College of Naval Warfare

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>Allow.</u>	<u>On Board</u>
Navy	105	90
Marine Corps	30	30
Army	22	22
Air Force	16	16
Coast Guard	1	1
Civilian	<u>15</u>	<u>17</u>
	189	176

B. For information:

The Naval Command College (International) comprises 38 Senior Naval Officer students, one from each of 38 Free World nations, including one from the U.S.

President's Note:

Current Navy policy is quality first; number of students secondary.

STUDENT BODY COMPOSITION BY SERVICE

JUNIOR COURSES

A. College of Naval Command & Staff

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>ALLOW.</u>	<u>ON BOARD</u>
Navy	144	141
Marine Corps	20	19
Army	24	24
Air Force	14	14
Coast Guard	4	4
Civilian	<u>5</u>	<u>9</u>
	211	211

B. For information:

The Naval Staff Course (International) comprises 17 Middle Grade Naval Officer students, one from each of 17 Free World nations, including one from the U.S.

STUDENT BODY COMPOSITION BY SERVICE
 SENIOR AND JUNIOR COURSES COMBINED
 (ALLOW/ON BOARD)

A. U.S. Schools

<u>Service</u>	<u>CNW</u>	<u>C&S</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Navy	105/90	144/141	249/231
Marine Corps	30/30	20/19	50/49
Army	22/22	24/24	46/46
Air Force	16/16	14/14	30/30
Coast Guard	1/1	4/4	5/5
Civilian	-/17	-/9	-/26
	-/176	-/211	-/387

B. International Schools

<u>NCC</u>	<u>NSC</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
38*	17*	55

*Includes one U.S. student in each course

2. What are the ranks and age distribution of the students?

RANK AND AGE DISTRIBUTION

SENIOR COURSE (ALLOW/ACTUAL)

COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>CAPT/COL</u>	<u>CDR/LCOL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Navy	20/1 *	85/89	105/90
Marine Corps	10/17	20/13	30/30
Army	7/7	15/15	22/22
Air Force	4/4	12/12	16/16
Coast Guard	-	1/1	1/1
Civilian	/16	/1	/17
Totals	/45	/131	/176

AGE (Actual)

	<u>YOUNGEST</u>	<u>OLDEST</u>	<u>MEAN</u>
Senior Course	36	51 (Civ- USIA)	42

Note: There is also one CDR, USN in Naval Command College (International) student body. He is 38 years old.

*Subsequent to their arrival at the War College, all 4 in zone commanders were selected for captain.

RANK AND AGE DISTRIBUTION

JUNIOR COURSE (Allowances/Actual)

College of Naval Command and Staff

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>RANK</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
	<u>LCDR/MAJ</u>	<u>Lt/CAPT</u>	
Navy	130/129*	14/12	144/141
Marine Corps	20/19	-/-	20/19
Army	23/22	1/2	24/24
Air Force	14/14	-/-	14/14
Coast Guard	4/4	-/-	4/4
<hr/>			
Total	191/188	15/14	206/202

AGE (Actual)

	<u>YOUNGEST</u>	<u>OLDEST</u>	<u>MEAN</u>
Junior Courses	26	43	34

NOTE: There is also one LCDR, USN in Naval Staff Course (International) student body. He is 36 years old.

*Subsequent to their arrival at the Naval War College, all 5 line in zone lieutenant commanders were selected for commander.

3. How many of this year's students earned masters degrees prior to attending the war college? How many earned Ph. D. s?

ADVANCED DEGREES

SENIOR COURSE

COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE

<u>Service</u>	<u>Masters</u>	<u>Ph.D.*</u>	<u>Totals</u>	<u>%</u>
NAVY	39	0	39	42.3
MARINE	14	2	16	53.4
ARMY	16	2	18	82.0
AIR FORCE	9	0	9	56.2
COAST GUARD	0	0	0	
CIVILIAN	4	1	5	31.2
Totals	82	5	87	49.1

* Includes LLB and JD

ADVANCED DEGREES

JUNIOR COURSES

<u>SERVICE</u>	<u>MASTERS</u>	<u>PH.D.*</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>	<u>%</u>
Navy	57	1	58	40.8
Marine Corps	3	0	3	15.8
Army	16	0	16	66.7
Air Force	8	1	9	64.3
Coast Guard	1	0	1	25.0
Civilian	5	0	5	55.6
Totals	90	2	92	43.4

*Includes LLB and JD

4. What percentage of your students are actively pursuing graduate degrees through a cooperative program or some other means?

STUDENTS CURRENTLY PURSUING ADVANCED DEGREES

There is no cooperative graduate program at the Naval War College. Notwithstanding this policy, we recognize the need to facilitate student efforts to acquire graduate level degrees and are pursuing efforts to this end in such ways as will not have an adverse impact on the intensive academic program provided by the core curriculum--a curriculum which has been assessed by the Office on Educational Credit of the American Council on Education as the equivalent of 18 credits of the 30 required for a master's degree.

Students are free to make their own arrangements for additional academic work from any of the several colleges in the Newport area which offer after hour graduate programs. However, the Naval War College does not in any way reduce the resident requirement to facilitate such an extra load.

Currently, there are four students (2.3%) enrolled in advanced degree programs. Three are in the University of Rhode Island Master of Marine Affairs program, a thirty-hour course of study which will be completed in July. The fourth officer is in the Providence College Master of Education (Guidance and Counseling) program, a thirty-six hour program in its final semester.

The Naval War College's previous association in a cooperative graduate degree program (MA/MS in International Relations) with George Washington University was terminated in 1972 for the senior course and in 1973 for the junior course. This action, admittedly disappointed some students who viewed such a degree as more tangible evidence of academic achievement than graduation from a War College and believed the MA/MS improved promotion and assignment opportunities. The decision to drop the GWU program was taken, however, because:

(1) Expanded student involvement in the Naval War College's own new curriculum, stemming from a decrease in outside lecturers and an increase in class preparation study requirements, reduced significantly the time available to pursue profitably a cooperative degree program.

(2) The GWU program had been in existence for many years and, as a result, the number of officers holding an advanced degree in international relations far exceeded validated requirements, thus reducing the utility of the program to the Navy.

5. Of those officers in this year's class in grade O-5 (or on a selection list to be promoted to O-5) and in grade O-6 (or on an O-6 selection list), how many fall in the following promotion categories?

	O-5		O-6	
	Secondary Zone	Primary Zone	Secondary Zone	Primary Zone
Army				
Navy				
Air Force				
Marine Corps				

STUDENT PROMOTION CATEGORY

<u>Service</u>	<u>0-5</u>		<u>0-6</u>	
	<u>Early (Secondary Zone)</u>	<u>Due Course (Primary Zone)</u>	<u>Early (Secondary Zone)</u>	<u>Due Course (Primary Zone)</u>
Navy	15	70	0	5*
Marine Corps	4	15	0	10
Army	4	11	1	7
Air Force	4	7	5	0
Coast Guard	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>
Totals	27	103	7	22

* Four students selected for Captain subsequent to arrival at the Naval War College

STUDENT PROMOTION CATEGORY - C&S

	<u>0-3</u>		<u>0-4</u>	
<u>Service</u>	<u>Early</u> <u>(Secondary Zone)</u>	<u>Due Course</u> <u>(Primary Zone)</u>	<u>Early</u> <u>(Secondary Zone)</u>	<u>Due Course</u> <u>(Primary Zone)</u>
Navy	0	12	33	97
Marine Corps	0	0	0	19
Army	0	2	6	16
Air Force	0	0	5	9
Coast Guard	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>4</u>
Totals	0	14	44	145

6

COMPARATIVE PROMOTION STATISTICS FOR NAVY SERVICE COLLEGE
ATTENDEES AND NON-ATTENDEES
FY-75

CDR to CAPT

Total URL in zone = 523

161 service college attendees
selected to CAPT = 31%

161 of 174 service college
attendees were selected = 92%

139 of 349 non-service
college attendees were
selected = 39%

COMPARATIVE PROMOTION STATISTICS FOR NAVY SERVICE COLLEGE
ATTENDEES AND NON-ATTENDEES - FY-75

LCDR to CDR

Total URL in zone	= 534
<u>92</u> service college attendees selected to CDR	= 17%
<u>92</u> of <u>121</u> service college attendees were selected	= 76%
<u>206</u> of <u>413</u> non-service college attendees were selected	= 49.9%

STUDENT FLAG SELECTEES BY GRADUATION YEAR (USN only)

<u>GRAD YR.</u>	<u>CNW</u>			<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>STUDENTS IN CLASS</u>
	<u>URL</u>	<u>3100</u>	<u>OTHER</u>		
55	15	3	0	18	158
56	2	0	2	4	103
57	6	2	1	9	104
58	18	0	3	21	115
59	8	0	2	10	118
60	9	1	1	11	115
61	11	2	2	15	111
62	3	1	0	4	102
63	4	0	1	5	97
64	5	0	1	6	104
65	2	0	0	2	98
66	4	1	0	5	91
67	1	2	0	3	85
68	0	0	0	0	38
69	0	0	0	0	72
70	0	0	0	0	93
71	0	0	0	0	95
72	0	0	0	0	121
73	0	0	0	0	92
<u>74</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>91</u>
	88	12	13	113	2003

NOTE: Six students included in above table are graduates of both CNW and C&S and are included in CNW totals only.

STUDENT FLAG SELECTEES BY GRADUATION YEAR (USN only)

<u>GRAD YR.</u>	<u>URL</u>	<u>C&S</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>STUDENTS IN CLASS</u>
		<u>3100</u>	<u>OTHER</u>		
55	4	0	0	4	104
56	1	0	0	1	110
57	3	0	0	3	108
58	11	0	0	11	107
59	7	2	0	9	115
60	12	0	1	13	152
61	9	1	1	11	154
62	7	1	1	9	154
63	1	0	1	2	150
64	1	0	1	2	143
65	0	0	1	1	151
66	1	0	0	1	155
67	0	0	0	0	109
68					84
69					114
70					146
71					175
72					181
73					154
74					157
	<u>57</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>2723</u>

6. How are the students evaluated while they are attending the war college?

EVALUATION PROCESS

Background. In the years prior to 1972, students were evaluated primarily on a thesis length research paper. Distinguished Graduates were determined by the quality of the research paper. Failure to participate in committee or group work would have been cause for an appearance before the Director of the College concerned.

Current Situation. Since 1972, there has been an active evaluation system conducted by the faculty, examinations are conducted, and students receive grades for each element of their work. These elements include seminar participation, written work (essays and term papers), and normally two examinations (mid-term and final). The final course mark is determined from all scoring factors and the student receives one final mark from each department.

During the 1972-73 and 73-74 years, students were graded on a Superior (S), Pass (P), or Inadequate (I) basis. This year, to provide more precise evaluation of academic performance, an A, B, C, F grading system has been instituted. This will aid those students who desire to apply for transfer of Naval War College courses to graduate school credits at a later date.

Distinguished Graduates under the previous S/P/I basis were determined from students receiving a minimum of two S's and a P in the three courses. This year there will be three categories of Distinguished Graduates; with highest distinction (3 A's), with high distinction (2 A's & 1 B), and with distinction (1 A & 2 B's or 2 A's & 1 C).

The current Naval War College Instruction on Examinations and Grading procedures is attached.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
02940

NAVWARCOL 1520.2A
HGN: 01:cm
11 September 1974

NAVWARCOL INSTRUCTION 1520.2A

From: President, Naval War College

Subj: Examinations and Grading

1. Discussion. Examinations and grading are an important part of the educational process. They serve a variety of purposes, the most important of which are to reinforce the learning process and encourage conscious faculty-student integration of all materials presented during a course. Secondly, they provide to the faculty an effective means of determining the degree to which course materials have been absorbed and understood. They provide to the Naval War College a measure of how well its educational objectives are being fulfilled in terms of teaching accomplishment and student performance. They provide to the student an indicator for appraising his own progress, and grades facilitate the transfer of credit to other institutions in which students may subsequently enroll.

2. Policy. It is the policy of the Naval War College that all regular resident students in the College of Naval Warfare and the College of Naval Command and Staff will be examined and graded in each of the three academic courses. Each such course is the responsibility of one of three academic departments--Strategy, Management, Tactics.

3. Grading. The student's final mark for each course will be a single letter grade (A, B, C, or F). Each academic department will publish in its syllabus or, as a supplement to its syllabus, the internal procedures employed to determine the final course grades in accordance with the following guidance:

a. Each course component (seminar performance, written assignments, examination(s), etc) shall be identified, along with the grading weight to be assigned to each such component. Letter grades, with pluses and minuses, shall be awarded for course components.

b. To facilitate the weighting and averaging of component grades for determination of final course marks, the following scale of letter/number equivalencies will be used:

<u>Letter Grade</u>	<u>Numerical Equivalent</u>
A	4.0
A-	3.7
B+	3.5
B	3.3
B-	3.1
C+	2.9
C	2.7
C-	2.5
F	0 - 2.4

c. In determining the final course grade, weighted and averaged component numerical values will be translated to letter grades as follows:

3.6 - 4.0	A
3.1 - 3.5	B
2.5 - 3.0	C
0 - 2.4	F

d. The use of numerical values to equate to the letter grade is purely for the purpose of computation for crediting the student in accordance with the weight assigned to each component of the grade. It is emphasized that the final grade for the course is only a single letter grade and there is no distinction between students receiving the same letter grade. At the end of the entire year, those students with the highest overall letter grades will have been deemed to be superior in performance to others.

4. Distinguished Graduates. Even though the three courses are not equal in length, each will have equal weight in determining whether or not the student will be designated a distinguished graduate. There will be three categories of distinguished graduates:


- "With Highest Distinction" (three A's). Equates to summa cum laude.
- "With High Distinction" (two A's, one B). Equates to magna cum laude.
- "With Distinction" (one A and two B's, or two A's and one C). Equates to cum laude.

5. Examinations. Examinations at the discretion of the respective academic departments may be closed book, administered in an exam room with a time limit, or open book, to be conducted in any location. Regardless of type, the work turned in by a student on any examination will be exclusively the product of his own efforts. Examinations will be evaluated by the faculty member(s) assigned to the seminar except that, all examinations graded either A or F will be given a second review in accordance with procedures established by each department. Examinations will be returned with significant written comments within seven calendar days. Students receiving a grade of F will make an appointment to see their seminar leader for additional oral comments. All other students are encouraged to do likewise. Each academic department shall establish its own internal consultation procedures for students who wish to reclaim an assigned examination grade.

6. Gradekeeping and Utilization. The appropriate College Dean of Students (CNW or CNC&S) and the Naval War College Registrar will be provided a record of all grades assigned by each Department for each of their students, and will compile the overall results for recommendation as "Distinguished Graduate" where the criteria have been met by the student concerned.

7. Special Grading Requirements. During the Academic Year a small number of students will participate in special activities that require separate grading considerations. As an example, certain students, because of their particular expertise, may participate as Assistant Seminar Leaders. Others, a small percentage of the total student body, will be active in the Advanced Research Program. Grading for these students will necessarily have to be administered on a case-by-case basis.

8. Academic Entries for Fitness Reports. Student fitness reports will contain positive comments on academic excellence for each course in which a student receives an "A" grade and, additionally, will contain appropriate, positive recognition of students designated distinguished graduates.


H. G. NOTT

Distribution
All Faculty/Students/Staff

7. By category and percentage of student body, what have been the assignments given to graduates of the last two classes? (Category here means a command or staff job and a general location such as OSD, JCS, Service staff, Command Headquarters, etc.)

STUDENT ASSIGNMENTS ON GRADUATION (Last Two Years)

(Percentage of Graduates by Service)

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USCG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>STAFF</u>						
Service Headquarters and Agencies	40%	23%	12%	16%	0%	19%
OSD	2%	2%	0%	0%	0%	1%
JCS Joint Staff	7%	2%	0%	0%	0%	5%
Other Joint/Combined Staffs	3%	15%	17%	3%	0%	7%
Educn/Trng	5%	15%	6%	3%	50%	7%
Major operational staff	10%	5%	8%	25%	0%	10%
Operational/Field	23%	18%	39%	25%	50%	26%
<u>COMMAND</u>						
Operational	7%	18%	18%	22%	0%	12%
Shore	3%	2%	0%	0%	0%	2%
Totals	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

8. How are the officers selected to attend a Senior Service College, and how is it determined which one of the colleges an officer should attend? (In answer to this question I would expect a brief, one page explanation from each of the Services.)

STUDENT SELECTION PROCESS

The Navy uses a formal board, headed by a Rear Admiral, to select officers for attendance at Senior Service Colleges (SSC). Once an officer has been selected, determination of which SSC he will attend is undertaken as part of the regular assignment process carried out by the Officer Distribution Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

The Navy's system begins with the selection board screening the entire promotion group which has just been selected for Commander (O-5). Only those officers who, at this point in their careers, show strong potential for continued assignment to positions of progressively greater responsibility are selected for attendance at a SSC. Selection is not based on availability and as a result some will not receive orders immediately. Officers are screened three times by selection boards at three year intervals, and may attend a SSC during any one of the three years following selection. It is expected that eighty-five percent of the selectees will attend a SSC within their period of eligibility.

U.S. MARINE CORPS SELECTION PROCESS FOR
ATTENDANCE AT SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGES

The Marine Corps senior service college attendees are selected by a board comprised of nine general officers. The board members are appointed by the Commandant of the Marine Corps who charges them with the responsibility to select those officers who have most demonstrated outstanding potential for future service and are considered to possess the greatest capacity for increased responsibilities. The basic criteria for selection are contained in individual school, DoD, and JCS directives which are applicable to all service branches. Specific supplementary guidance is provided each year by the Commandant in his precept to the board which includes administrative considerations for eligibility, such as minimum tour length requirements and utilization tours for formal schooling involving advanced degrees; and for distribution via numerical spread by rank and skill and school guidelines. This same board is likewise charged with the responsibility for determining which college those officers selected will attend. These determinations take into account assignment guidelines appropriate to individual schools, the backgrounds of the officers selected and their specific desires for senior service college attendance.

B. Faculty

1. What is the faculty size?
2. What is the faculty mixture: number of military, number of civilians?

FACULTY SIZE AND MIX

The current faculty size stands at seventy-two, about evenly divided among the three academic departments. However, the blend of civilian and military professors varies between departments as follows:

	<u>STRATEGY</u>	<u>MANAGEMENT</u>	<u>TACTICS</u>
Civilian	11	8	3
Military	<u>13</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>20</u>
Total	24	25	23

The Tactics Department is heavily military owing to the nature of the course. The curriculum in the other departments can be taught by either civilians or military professors, but the particular expertise of the civilian professors (professional educators) is especially necessary for development and presentation of the courses.

3. What are the faculty academic credentials?

SUMMARY OF FACULTY ACADEMIC CREDENTIALS

<u>Department</u>	<u>PhD</u>	<u>PhD (Cand)</u>	<u>MA/MS</u>	<u>BA/BS</u>
Strategy - Mil	2		7	4
- Civ	10		1	
Management - Mil	2	1	11	3
- Civ	5	1	2	
Tactics - Mil	1	1	11	7
- Civ	1	2		
Sub Totals - Mil	5	2	29	14
- Civ	<u>16</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	—
Total	21	5	32	14

36%

19%

Naval War College
STRATEGY DEPARTMENT FACULTY
1974-1975

(T) PROF P.A. Crowl	PhD	Johns Hopkins
* LCDR J.B. Bonds, USN	MS	George Washington
CAPT W.W. Erikson, USN	MA	Michigan State
PROF T. Etzold	PhD	Yale
PROF R. Ferrell	PhD	Yale
** PROF F. Flynn	LLM	McGill
LCOL D.L. Frederick, USAF	MPA	Auburn
COL J.A.R. Guertin, USA	PhD	George Washington
PROF R.A. Harrison	PhD	Princeton
LCOL F.A. Hart, Jr., USMC	BA	North Carolina
(T) PROF F.H. Hartmann	PhD	Princeton
CDR J.A. Hickey, USN	MS	Southern Conn. State College
ENS D.V. Hicks, USN	MA	Oxford
LCOL F.A. Mathews, USMC	BS	U.S. Naval Academy
(T) PROF R. Megargee	PhD	Northwestern
COL W.P.C. Morgenthaler, Jr., USMC	BS	U.S. Naval Academy
CAPT C.H. Nordhill, USN	MS	George Washington
PROF D.B. Ralston	PhD	Columbia
PROF S.T. Ross	PhD	Princeton
LCDR B.M. Simpson, III	PhD,	Fletcher School of L & D
CDR W.L. Stephens, USN	BS	Nebraska
PROF C.L. Symonds	MA	Florida
PROF D.F. Trask	PhD	Harvard
LCOL D.P. Whalen, USA	MSE	Purdue

(T) - Denotes Tenured

* - Attached to Center for Continuing Education - on exchange with LCOL Frederick for one trimester.

** - Attached to Center for Continuing Education - teaches part time when International Law is involved.

+ - On one year leave of absence without pay - Texas Tech.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Management Department Faculty
1974-1975

(T) PROF W.F. Rogers	PhD, Stanford University
COL J.T. Abell, USAF	BBA, Arizona State University
CAPT H.D. Barker, USN	MS, George Washington
(T) PROF G.F. Brown, Jr.	PhD, Carnegie-Mellon University
PROF R.F. Delaney	PhD, Catholic University
LCOL E.L. Gallup, USA	MMA, University of Rhode Island
LCDR M.W. Gavlak, USN	MS, U.S.N. Postgraduate School
CDR C.P. Hammon, USN	PhD(C) University of Rhode Island
CAPT R.V. Hansen, USN	MS, George Washington
LCOL J.H. Hogan, USA	MS, University of Arizona
PROF R.M. Lloyd	PhD, University of Rochester
COL C.I. McLain, USA	BS, N. C. State College of A&E
CDR D.J. Moss, USN	MS, George Washington
CDR W.A. Peters, USN, SC	MS, U.S.N. Postgraduate School
LCOL J.W. Richards, USAF	MAOM, Univ. of S. California
COL J.W.P. Robertson, USMC	Ed. D., University of Virginia
LCOL R. T. Robinson, USA	MS, U.S.N. Postgraduate School
PROF C. P. Shirkey	MA, Oxford University
CDR W.E. Turcotte, USN, SC	DBA, Harvard University
PROF J.A. Walgreen	PhD, Boston College
(T) PROF F.J. West	MA, Princeton University
CAPT D.W. Whelan, USN	MBA, Harvard University
CAPT J.E. Wilson, USN	MS, George Washington
PROF R. Winston	PhD(C) Harvard University
* LTjg F.F. York, USN	BA, University of Minnesota

(T) - Denotes Tenured

* - Woman Officer

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Tactics Department Faculty

1974-1975

CAPT C. Lewis, USN
CAPT R.H. Barker, USN
CAPT R.B. Bathurst, USN
PROF L. Brumbach

CAPT H. Cherrier, USN
CAPT R.B. Connelly, USN
CAPT T.R. Cotten, USN

CDR L.R. Edwards, USN

CDR M. Ellis, RN
CAPT T.W. Fitzgerald, USN
COL J.V. Higgins, USMC
CAPT R.L. Huth, USN
CDR H.B. Kuykendall
LCDR R.A. Maier

PROF W.T. Mallison
CDR J.F. McNulty
CDR Z.L. Newcomb

LCDR R.B. Newell

PROF H.A. Olender
CAPT W.E. Ramsey
COL C.C. Rhymes, USAF
LCDR G.C. Steiger, USN
CAPT M.Y. Suzich, USCG

DBA, George Washington
BS, UCLA
PhD(c), Brown University
MALD, Fletcher School of L&D
PhD(c)
BS, Northwestern State
BS, U.S. Naval Academy
MA, U.S.N. Postgraduate
School
MS, U.S.N. Postgraduate
School

BS, U.S. Naval Academy
MS, George Washington
MA, George Washington
MS, George Washington
MS, U.S.N. Postgraduate
School

JSD, Yale University
MS, George Washington
MS, U.S.N. Postgraduate
School
MS, U.S.N. Postgraduate
School

PhD(c) Stanford
BS, U.S. Naval Academy
MS, George Washington
BS, Bowling Green
MS, RPI

4. What is the normal tour length for faculty members: military and civilians?

FACULTY TOUR LENGTHS

Civilian Faculty. There are six tenured professors, three each in the Department of Strategy and Management. The other faculty members normally spend one or more years at the Naval War College with the average length being about two years. This has been found generally satisfactory because of the prior educational experience of those professors concerned. Obviously, somewhat longer tours would be beneficial, provided arrangements can be made for those professors to remain away from their parent institutions without prejudice to their long term situations.

Military Faculty. The normal tour for military officers at the Naval War College is three years. This may consist of three years in a faculty position or one year as a student followed by two years on the faculty. Longer tours are considered desirable and the Naval War College is working with the Bureau of Naval Personnel to this end, particularly in those cases of military faculty members who have had their senior command tours.

5. List the publications (books, magazine articles, journal articles, etc.) published by members of the faculty during the last three years.

Mc

LCOL J. Hogan, USA

"Translating National Objectives
into Specific Defense Programs,"
Military Review (1975)

COL J.W.P. ROBERTSON,
USMC

"Superordinate Goals: Challenges
for Leadership and Keys to Harmony,"
Marine Corps Gazette

Dr. W.T. Mallison

"The International Law Decision-
Making Process Applicable to
Antarctica." To be published
by the National Academy of Sciences

B. FACULTY WRITING NOW IN PREPARATION FOR PUBLICATIONS

Thomas H. Etzold

"Nixon Doctrine" and "Power
Politics" now being edited for
Scribner

Craig Symonds

The Civil War Journal of
Captain John B. Marchand

America's First Battle Fleet,
U.S. Naval Policy 1812-1824.

CDR W.E. Turcotte

"Organizational Structure,
Information Flow, and Managerial
Time"

LCOL G.A. Baker, USMC

"Learning and Testing for Mastery:
A Training Strategy for Professionals,
Strategy for Professionals,"
Marine Corps Gazette

G.F. Brown

"Fixed Shortage Costs and the
Classical Inventory Model,"
(with R.M. Lloyd) Naval Research
Logistics Quarterly, forthcoming.

"Comparison of Forecast Accuracy
When the Disturbances are Small:
Directly Estimated Reduced Forms vs
K-Class Induced Reduced Forms,"
Journal of the American Statistical
Association, forthcoming.

"The Moment Matrix of K-Class
Estimates of Parameters in Different
Equations of a Complete System
of Simultaneous Linear Equations,"
Annals of Statistical Mathematics,
forthcoming.

"The Asymptotic Bias and Mean-Squared
Error of Double K-Class Estimators
When the Disturbances are Small,"
(with J.B. Kadane and J.G. Ramage),
International Economic Review,
forthcoming

"Disturbance Variance Estimation in
Simultaneous-Equations Systems,"
(with J.G. Ramage and V.K. Strivastava)
Econometrica, forthcoming.

"A Class of Simultaneous-Equations
Estimators with Stochastic
Restrictions on the Parameters,"
(with J.G. Ramage), Journal of the
American Statistical Association,
forthcoming

"Report of Plaintiff's Expert on
Real Estate Commission Rates in
Prince George's County, Maryland,"
U.S. District Court for the
District of Maryland, 1973

PROF R.F. Delaney

Public Diplomacy: An Introduction,
Nelson Hall Co., 1975 (in process)

ADDITIONAL WORKS

A. FACULTY WRITING CURRENTLY ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION

Richard A. Harrison

Princetonians: A Biographical Dictionary (assoc. editor),
Princeton Univ Press late 1975

Thomas H. Etzold

"Protection or Politics?" Perdicaris Alive or Raisuli Dead," The Historian (1974)

"The (F)utility Factor: German Information Gathering in the United States 1933-1941," Military Affairs

Steven Ross

From Flintlock to Rifle: Infantry Tactics in the 18th and 19th Century., Greenwood Press

Robert H. Ferrell

American Diplomacy: A History
W.W. Norton & Co., 3rd ed (1975)

"Race, Ideology, and World Order: Albert Beveridge, Woodrow Wilson, William Borah," Men, Women and Issues in American History

LCDR B.M. Simpson, III

"Some Thoughts on the Military Profession" U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings

Name

Title and Publisher

Dr. W.T. Mallison (con't)

"Political Crimes in the International Law of War: Concepts and Consequences," presented to the American Society of Criminology (1971) and published in Politics, Crime, and the International Scene: An Inter-American Focus, Adler & Mueller (eds.) 1972

"An International Law Appraisal of the Juridical Characteristics of the Resistance of the People of Palestine" (with S.V. Mallison) 28 Revue Egyptienne de Droit International 1 (1972)

"Comment: Juridical Control of Terrorism" 7 Akron Law Review 376 (1974)

"The Diplomatic Methods to Achieve Minimum Order in the Middle East" 6 Journal of International Law & Economics 113 (1971)

"A 1970 Appraisal of Offensive Weapons, Sanctions and World Public Order" in A Treatise on International Criminal Law, Bassiouni & Nanda (eds.) (1972)

Name

Title and Publisher

Dr. W.T. Mallison

"The Juridical Characteristics of Belligerent Occupation and the Resort to Resistance by the Civilian Population: Doctrinal Development and Continuity" (with R.A. Jabri) 42 George Washington Law Review 185 1974

"The Concept of Public Purpose Terror in International Law: Doctrines and Sanctions to Reduce the Destruction of Human and Material Values" (with S.V. Mallison), (International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, Syracuse, Italy, 1973); also published in 18 Howard University Law Journal 12 (1974)

"The International Law Protection of Civilians in the Middle East Conflict" presented to the Sub-committee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (April 1974) and printed in Hearing Before the Sub-committee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives (93rd Congress, 2nd Session April 1974)

"The Role of International Law in Achieving Justice and Peace in Palestine-Israel" (with S.V. Mallison) 3 Journal of Palestine Studies 77 (Spring, 1974)

"International Law and Naval History: Change and Continuity in the Juridical Doctrines of Naval Blockade" (with S.V. Mallison) presented at the National Archives Conference on Naval History. Washington, DC, May 1974 and being printed in the Conference Proceedings.

The Balfour Declaration: An Appraisal in International Law (Northwestern University Press, 1973)

Name

Title and Publisher

Captain C. Lewis (con't)

"Economics of Scale Issues at the Local Government Level" New England Business & Economics Proceedings, Oct 1974

"A Methodology for Measuring Support Outputs in Relation to Inputs Productivity" Naval War College Review Sep-Oct 1974

Professor L.E. Brumbach

"Aircraft Industry Mobilization Study" Center for Naval Analyses, March 1973

"Navy Futures in the Pacific" - Guam and the Trust Territory (with J.M. Schick) Center for Naval Analyses, Sep 1973

"Energy Technology and National Security" Center for Naval Analyses, April 1973

"Reserve Missions, Force and Organization Study" (with R. Mason) Center for Naval Analyses, INS Study 35, Jan 1972

"An Analyses of Naval Airspace Usage" (with A.S. Devany) Center for Naval Analyses, Oct 1971

Commander M. Ellis, RN

"A Joint Service Study of Electronic Warfare" Jan 1974 (S)

"The Royal Navy Today" Revised, Jan 1973

"The Principles of Small Ship Tactical Data Exchange" 1971 (NATO, (C))

"The Philosophy of Processing Information Derived from Tactical ESM" Revised 1971 (NATO, (C))

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF TACTICS

PUBLICATION CREDITS
PAST THREE YEARS

Name

Title and Publisher

Captain R.B. Bathurst

"Crisis Mentality: A Problem in Cultural Relativity" Jan-Feb NWCR

"The Lemming Complex: Ritual Death in the Norwegian Sea" May-June NWCR

"The Poetics of Naval Analysis" Nov-Dec NWCR

Captain J.F. McNulty

"Soviet Sea Power--Ripple or Tidal Wave?" July 1970 USNIP

"Naval Presence" Sep-Oct 1974 NWCR

Captain Chantee Lewis

The Use of Simultaneous Equation Models for Decisions Pertaining to the Best Mix of Aircraft Inputs, RC 206 (CNA: Washington, DC) 1972

"Simultaneous Equation Production Functions (Cobb-Douglas type) for Decisions Pertaining to--Air (Airline) Resources" Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, Sep 1974.

"Measuring of Air Station Outputs in Relation to Inputs - Productivity," Military Operations Research Symposium Proceedings, June 1973

"Management Factors Relative to Defense Support Activities," American Institute for Decision Sciences (AIDS) Proceedings, May 1974

"Strategic Material: More Vulnerable Bottlenecks Ahead?" National War College Proceedings, July 1974.

TACTICS DEPARTMENT

Name

PROF F. J. West, Jr.

Title and Publisher

The Village, Harper & Row,
1972.

"The Military Organization,"
Naval War College Review,
1973.

"The Case For Amphibious
Capability," Marine Corps
Gazette, Oct 74.

CAPT J.E. Wilson, Jr., USN

"Human Goals: A Matter of
Organizational Development,"
Proceedings, Northeast
American Institute for
Decision Sciences, May 1974.
(Co-Author)

"Human Goals," Campus,
October 1974. (Co-Author)

"Human Goals: A New Approach,"
Naval War College Review,
Nov/Dec 1974.

PROF R. Winston, Jr.

"Role of Black MBA's," Contact
Magazine, 1973.

10 articles accepted but not yet published.

Name

CDR W. E. Turcotte, USN
(Cont'd)

Title and Publisher

"Control Systems, Performance, and Satisfaction in Two State Agencies," Administrative Science Quarterly: 60-73; March 1974.

"Effectiveness and Ineffectiveness in the State Agencies." Decision Sciences, Education and Applications (Aids), May 17, 1974.

"Planning and Control in the Naval Supply Systems Command," Naval Supply Corps Newsletter, June 1973.

"Some Characteristics of Effective and Ineffective Government Agencies." Inter-Collegiate Case Clearing House, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University. Boston: Sept 1972.

"Merchant Marine Affairs Background and History." U. S. Maritime Administration, Washington, D.C.: May 1973.

PROF J. A. Walgreen

"The Economics of the United States Supersonic Transport," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Vol. VII, No. 2, May 1973. (Co-Author with E. R. Rastatter and A. B. Moore).

"Cost Functions, Concentration and Barriers to Entry in Twenty-nine Manufacturing Industries of India: A Comment and Reinterpretation," The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. XX, No. 1, November 1971.

Name

PROF W. F. Rogers

Title and Publisher

"Asymptotic Expansions for the Wilcoxon Distributions," Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 1974.

"A Bayesian Approach to Demand Estimation and Inventory Provisioning," (with G.F. Brown) Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, December 1973.

"F-14 Provisioning, A Study of Spare Part Provisioning for a Complex Weapon System," Center for Naval Analyses Study, 1972.

"Exact Null Distributions of Rank Test Statistics," CNA Professional Paper 1972.

"On a Theorem of Weyl," CNA Professional Paper, 1971.

PROF C. P. Shirkey

"Decision-making for Asia: National Budgets and Major Choices," Remarks before the Institute for Policy Studies Conference on U.S. Policy in Asia, published in Peace with China?, Earl C. Ravenal, ed., Liveright, Washington, DC, 1971.

Written Statement and accompanying testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture and Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles, Naval Vessels, etc. (FY 1972 budget), Part I, GPO, Washington, DC, 1971.

CDR W. E. Turcotte, USN

Administration and Financial Management: The Inkeeping Institute of America. Parker House, Boston: 1971.

Name

Title and Publisher

PROF R. M. Lloyd
(Cont'd)

"Programmer's Guide to the NARF Workload Planning and Budgeting Model," (with J. B. Birch, et. al.) Center for Naval Analyses, CRC 213, 1973.

"Dynamic Programming Models of Short Term Bank Reserve Management," Center for Naval Analyses, Professional Paper No. 71, 1971.

"A Dynamic Inventory Model with a Type of Dependent Demand and Forecasting," (with George F. Brown and Timothy M. Corcoran) Management Science, Vol. 17, No. 7, 1971.

"Static Models of Bank Credit Expansion," (with George F. Brown) Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. VI, No. 3, June 1971.

COL J.W.P. Robertson, USMC

"Attitude Changes in Intercultural Education," University of Virginia Press, June 1972.

LCOL R.T. Robinson, USA

U.S. Army Official Test Plan & Test Report. Air Cavalry Attack Platoon. 1971.

U.S. Army Official Test Plan & Test Report. QUICK DRAW - Helicopters vs. Vulcan Air Defense Weapon System. 1971-72.

Proceedings of 1972 Army Science Conference. A Probabilistic Model for Structuring a Drainage Network, 1972. Paper presented at Conference and published in proceedings.

Name

PROF R. F. Delaney
(Cont'd)

Title and Publisher

"The Psychological Dimension
in National Security Planning,"
Naval War College Review, 1971.

"Reflections on Political
Communications & Insurgency,"
Naval War College Review, 1972.

"Latin American Opinion--Myth &
Reality," Columbia Journal of
World Business, 1971.

PROF R. M. Lloyd

"Aircraft Periodic Depot Level
Maintenance Study," (with W.
Lavalley, et. al.) Center for
Naval Analyses, Study No. 1025,
1974.

"Versatile Avionics Shop Tester/
Automated Test Equipment,"
(with R. Applemen, et. al.)
Center for Naval Analyses, Study
No. 1024, 1973.

"Resource Allocation for
Aircraft Support Facilities,"
Proceedings of Regional Business
and Economic Development:
The New England Experience,
College of Business, University
of Rhode Island, 1973.

"Naval Aircraft Rework Facility
Study: An Applied Model for
Workload Planning and Budgeting,"
Center for Naval Analyses, INS
Study No. 38, 1972.

"User's Guide to NARF Workload
Planning and Budgeting Model,"
(with I.B. Birch, et. al.)
Center for Naval Analyses,
CRC 212, 1973.

Name

PROF G. F. Brown, Jr.
(Cont'd)

Title and Publisher

"A Bayesian Approach to Demand Estimation and Inventory Management," (with W. F. Rogers) Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, December 1973.

"Analysis of the Neighborhood Youth Corps Program," (with A. Holen, S. Horowitz, L. Jacobson, and L. Silverman) Public Research Institute, Study 1953-72, Dec. 1972.

The Retail Price of Heroin: Estimation and Applications, (with L. P. Silverman) Drug Abuse Council Monograph, Wash., D. C., 1973 (shorter version from monograph in Journal of the American Statistical Association, Sept., 1974).

"The Impact of Labor Market Conditions on M.D.T.A. Completion Status," (with S. A. Horowitz) Public Research Institute, 1973.

"A Study of the Economic Impact of Environmental Demands on the Construction Industry," (with L. Jacobson), Environmental Protection Agency, 1974.

Quantitative Methods for Making Decisions, Naval War College, 1974.

PROF R. F. Delaney

American Public Diplomacy--The First 50 Years (ed.), Tufts University Press, 1971.

Psychological Warfare Casebook, Johns Hopkins Press, 1974. (contributor)

The Case for Reappraisal of U.S. Overseas Information Programs, Frederick Praeger, 1971. (contributor)

Name

LCOL G. A. Baker, USMC
(Cont'd)

PROF G.F. Brown, Jr.

Title and Publisher

Preparing Objectives to Support Educational Programs, National Laboratory for Higher Education, Durham, N.C., 1971.

"Accountability Accents Results," Marine Corps Gazette, Oct 1973.

"Static Models of Bank Credit Expansion." (with R. M. Lloyd) Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 6, June 1971.

"A Comment on a Paper by Goodwin and Giese," (with T.M. Corcoran) Operations Research 19, Nov/Dec 1971.

"Inventory Models with Dependent Demand and Forecasting," (with T. M. Corcoran and R. M. Lloyd) Management Science, Theory Section 17, March 1971.

"The Cost of Squadron Operations: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," (with A. N. Schwartz) Transactions of the American Association of Cost Engineers, June 1971.

"Optimal Management of Bank Reserves," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 7, Dec 1972.

A Study of Aviation Resources and Readiness Relationships, (with A. N. Schwartz) Center for Naval Analyses, Study No 32, Volume II, 1971.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT
PUBLICATION CREDITS
PAST THREE YEARS

Name

Title and Publisher

LCOL J. T. Abell, USAF

"Creativity in Junior Officers:
A Morphological Study in
Behavior," Air War College, 1972.

LCOL G. A. Baker, USMC

A Systems Approach to Instruction,
Barton Herrscher, George A.
Baker, III, National Laboratory
for Higher Education, Durham,
N.C., 1971.

"The Community College President
of the Board: Trustees of
Accountability," John E. Roueche,
George A. Baker, III, College
and University Business, 1971.

"Accountability in the Two-Year
College: Public Policy or
Private Profit," National
Laboratory for Higher Education,
Durham, N.C., 1971.

Accountability and the Community
College: Directions for the
70's, John E. Roueche, George A.
Baker, III, Richard L. Brownell,
American Association of Community-
Junior Colleges, January 1971.

"Toward Internal Locus of Control,"
Education Technology, Oct 1973.

Accountability in the Two-Year
College, John E. Roueche,
George A. Baker, III, Richard L.
Brownell, Instruction and
Curriculum, Durham: National
Laboratory for Higher Education,
1971.

MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT

Craig L. Symonds

"The American Naval Expedition to Penobscot, 1779," Naval War College Review, April, 1972.

David F. Trask

Captains & Cabinets: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1917-1918, University of Missouri Press, 1972.

"The Failure of Imperial Germany's Undersea Offensive Against World Shipping, February 1917-October 1918," The Historian, Sept. 1971, 611-636, (with Holger H. Herwig).

"Writings in American Foreign Relations: 1957 to the present," in John Braeman et al., eds., Twentieth-Century American Foreign Relations, Ohio State University Press, 1971, 58-118.

"The Imperial Republic: America in World Politics: 1945 to the Present," in William E. Leuchtenburg, ed., The Unfinished Century: America Since 1900, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1973, 575-673.

"Senator J. William Fulbright," in Frank Merli and Theodore Wilson, eds., Makers of American Foreign Policy, New York, Scribner's, 1973.

Robert H. Ferrell
(continued)

"Dean Acheson," Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson, eds., Makers of American Diplomacy, (2 vols., Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), II.

"Wilbur J. Carr," Dictionary of American Biography: Supplement Three, 1941-1945 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), pp. 138-139.

"Salmon O. Levinson," Dictionary of American Biography: Supplement Three, 1941-1945 (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), pp. 456-457.

"William E. Borah," "Dwight W. Morrow," "Frank B. Kellogg," "Edward M. House," "Hiram Johnson," John A. Garraty, ed., The American Biographical Encyclopedia (Harper and Row, 1974).

Frederick H. Hartmann

The Relations of Nations, 4th ed, Macmillan, 1973.

World in Crisis, 4th ed, Macmillan, 1973.

"Sailors as Scholars," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.

Richard Megargee

Realism in American Foreign Policy, accepted for publication by Greenwood Press, 1974.

Steven T. Ross

The French Revolution: Conflict or Continuity?, Holt, Rinehart, Winston, New York, 1971.

Quest for Victory French Military Strategy 1792-1799, A.S. Barnes, New York, 1973.

LCDR B.M. Simpson, III

"The Rearming of Germany 1950-1954," Naval War College Review, May 1971.

"Current Strategic Theories," Naval War College Review, May 1972.

Thomas H. Etzold
(continued)

"Gewalt und Diplomatie im nuklearen Zeitalter," Frankfurter Hefte, Feb. 1974, pp. 93-100.

"Riding the Tiger: Force and Diplomacy in a Nuclear Age," Army, Jan. 1974, pp. 10-15. Reprinted in The Alternative, March 1974.

"Myth, Man, and Statesman: John Foster Dulles," The Alternative, May 1974.

Robert H. Ferrell

America: A History of the People, Rand McNally & Company, 1971, with Richard B. Morris and William Greenleaf, published in two-volume and one-volume paperback editions.

"The Price of Isolation: American Diplomacy, 1921-1945," William E. Leuchtenburg, ed., The Unfinished Century, Little, Brown & Company, 1973, pp. 463-573.

"Truman Foreign Policy: A Traditionalist View," Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., The Truman Period as a Research Field, rev. ed., University of Missouri Press, 1974.

"Foreign Policy, 1929-1941," William H. Cartwright and Richard L. Watson, Jr., eds. The Reinterpretation of American History and Culture (National Council for the Social Studies, 1973), pp. 509-524.

"Disarmament Conferences: Ballets at the Brink," American Heritage, vol. 22 (1971), 5-7, 96-100.

"The Merchants of Death, Then and Now," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 26 (1972), 29-39.

"Three Generations of American Diplomatic Historians," SHAFR Newsletter, vol. 3 (May, 1972), 1-8.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGY

Publication Credits
Last Three Years'

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title and Publisher</u>
Philip A. Crowl	"Education versus Training at the Naval War College: 1884-1972," <u>Naval War College Review</u> , Nov-Dec 1973, Vol XXVI, No. 31, Sequence No. 246.
Thomas H. Etzold	"Der Amerikanische Abzug aus Vietnam und der Politik der Reaction," <u>Frankfurter Hefte</u> , Nov. 1972.
	"Tactical Implications of the Washington Naval Conference," <u>US Naval Institute Proceedings</u> (with S.M. Silver) Sept. 1973.
	"An American Jew in Germany: The Death of Helmut Hirsch," <u>Jewish Social Studies</u> , April 1973.
	<u>Illusionen des Krieges</u> ," <u>Frankfurter Hefte</u> , Feb. 1973.
	"Why America Fought Germany in World War II," Forum Press, 1973 (pamphlet, 16 pp.).
	"Illusion and Hope: Arms Limitation and Peace," <u>Peace and Change</u> , June 1973.
	"The Legacy of Asian Containment," <u>Korea Week</u> , Jan. 31, 1973.
	"Rüstungsbegrenzung und Friede," <u>Frankfurter Hefte</u> , July 1973; reprinted in <u>The German Tribune Political Affairs Review</u> , Oct. 18, 1973.
	"Crossing the Sahara: A Retrospective View of the Lilly Program," <u>The History Teacher</u> , published May 1974.
	"The Relevance of Faith: Christians and Public Policy," <u>Fedes et Historia</u> , Oct. 1973.

STRATEGY DEPARTMENT

6. What assignments have been given to military faculty members who completed their faculty tours during the last three years?

POST FACULTY ASSIGNMENTS FOR LAST THREE YEARS (By percent)

	<u>USN</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>USCG</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
			<u>STAFF</u>			
Headquarters	11	50	0	0	50	14
OSD	2	0	0	0	0	2
Joint/Combined	11	0	20	0	0	9
Type Command	15	0	0	50	0	15
Operational	38	33	20	33	0	35
			<u>COMMAND</u>			
Shore	0	0	0	0	50	2
Operational	23	17	60	17	0	24
Totals	100	100	100	100	100	100

Note: In addition to the above, 9 CAPT/CDR faculty members retired and 3 LTJG/LT faculty members were released from active duty upon completion of their Naval War College tours.

7. How many former faculty members have been selected for general/
flag rank?

FACULTY SELECTED FOR FLAG/GENERAL RANK

(Last 20 Years)

Navy	13
Marine Corps	1
Army	0
Air Force	1
Coast Guard	<u>2</u>
Total	17

NAVY LIST

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK ON FACULTY</u>
Chase, J.D.	CAPT
Hoffman, R.F.	CDR
Emerson, D.F.	LCDR
Matthews, H.D.	CDR
Bagley, D.H.	CDR
Bergner, A.A.	CAPT
* Wulzen, D.W.	CAPT
Colbert, R.G.	CAPT
Vannoy, F.W.	CDR
Plate, D.C.	CDR
Dybdal, V.A.	CDR
Miller, F.B.	CAPT
Van Arsdall, C.F.	CAPT
Welch, D.F.	CDR

*Not counted in above numbers as he was the Secretary and not faculty.

C. Curriculum

1. Please provide an outline of your present curriculum.

ACADEMIC YEAR 1974 - 1975

OVERALL SCHEDULE

	1st trimester		2nd trimester		3rd trimester		
	29 AUG	19 Dec	6 Jan	10 April	11 April	27 June	
COLLEGE OF NAVAL WARFARE	Strategy and Policy		Defense Economics and Decision Making		Tactics		
NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE	29 AUG	19 Dec	6 Jan	10 April	11 April	27 June	Field Study Trips 13 - 23 Dec 1974 4 - 14 April 1975 20 - 30 June 1975
COLLEGE OF NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF	Defense Economics and Decision Making		Tactics		Strategy and Policy		
NAVAL STAFF COURSE	5 August CLASS V 20 Dec		27 Jan CLASS VI 16 June				

↑
International
Students Only

STRATEGY DEPARTMENT

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF STRATEGY

Outline Of Strategy And Policy Course

The Department of Strategy offers a 15 week Strategy and Policy course to the combined College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College and a shortened version of only ten weeks to the College of Naval Command and Staff. This briefing paper concerns only the longer version of the course. The course is concerned with the interrelationships of military strategy and foreign policy, with the political uses of military power, and with the roles of both military and political leaders in policy planning, military planning, and war. The course establishes the conceptual framework in which maritime forces contribute to the achievement of national policy objectives.

Course Objectives

The Naval War College seeks to prepare the student to participate in the formulation and decision making process in the areas of strategy and policy. Subsidiary objectives are to broaden the student's view of the world and to sharpen his analytical skills. Finally, by familiarizing the student with a variety of historical

models, of alternative solutions to problems of strategy and policy, the Naval War College provides instructive guides to future action.

Course Content

The course is presented as a series of historical case studies arranged in chronological order. They are fifteen in number, as follows (each Roman numeral indicating a week of study):

- I. The Classical Prototype: Athens versus Sparta
- II. Strategic Theory: Clausewitz and Corbett
- III. Land Power versus Sea Power: The Age of Napoleon and Nelson
- IV. Balance of Power Diplomacy: Metternich and Bismarck
- V. The American Way of War: The U.S. Civil War
- VI. Economics and Strategy: Nineteenth Century Imperialism
- VII. From Multipolarity to Bipolarity: The Origins of World War I
- VIII. The Strategy of Total War: World War I
- IX. The Search for Peace and the Road to War: 1919-1941
- X. Disarmament and Rearmament: Strategic Developments Between the Wars
- XI. The Strategy of Coalition War: World War II
- XII. From Coalition to Bipolarity: The Cold War
- XIII. The Challenge to Imperialism: The French Experience in Southeast Asia

XIV. Nuclear Strategy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

XV. Perspectives on Arms Control and Disarmament

These case studies are conceptually interdependent in that they repeatedly touch on a number of recurring themes. The most important of these are as follows (the Roman numerals designating the weeks during which each recurring theme is covered):

War as an extension of politics by other means: war aims and war strategies
(I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, XI, XIII, XIV)

Civil-military relations: military influences on foreign policy; civilian influences on strategy
(II, IV, V, VII, VIII, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV)

Coalition strategies in wartime
(I, III, IV, VIII, XI)

Alliance systems in peacetime: multipolarity and bipolarity; collective security; balance of power
(I, IV, VII, IX, XII)

Total war and limited war
(I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VIII, XI, XIII, XIV)

Guerrilla warfare; civil war; insurgency and counter-insurgency
(I, II, III, V, VI, VIII, XI, XIII)

Maritime Strategy; sea power versus land power
(I, III, V, VI, VIII, X, XI, XIV, XV)

International law and maritime strategy
(III, V, VIII, XIV)

Strategy of air power
(VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV, XV)

Nuclear strategy and policy
(XI, XII, XIV, XV)

Domestic political and social influences on foreign policy and military strategy
(I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV)

Impact of ideology on strategy and policy
(I, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV)

Impact of strategic theory on conduct of war
(II, III, V, VIII, X, XI, XIII)

Economic roots of policy and strategy
(I, III, V, VI, VII, VIII, XI, XII, XIII)

Economic warfare: blockades, embargoes, etc.
(III, V, VIII, XI, XIV)

Logistics and strategy
(I, III, V, VIII, XI, XIII)

Crisis management
(V, VII, IX, XI, XIV)

Arms races, arms control, disarmament
(VII, X, XII, XIV, XV)

Impact of history on strategy and policy decision making
(IV, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV)

Lessons of history for current strategy and policy
(I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV)

Methodology

The students participate in the analysis of these case studies as follows:

1. Readings: Approximately 1,000 pages per week.
2. Lectures: One per week by a resident faculty member; one per week by a guest lecturer, usually from another campus, followed by 2-3 hours of questions and answers.
3. Papers: Four per term per student. These are short (ten-page papers) presented to and discussed in seminars. The student must defend his paper.

4. **Seminars:** One per week of three hours duration. They consist of two faculty (military and civilian) seminar leaders and twelve student members.
5. **Tutorials:** At the option of either student or faculty member.
6. **Examinations:** A midterm examination of one hour at end of sixth week; a final examination of three hours at end of fourteenth week. Students must relate principles learned to present and future.

Weekly Schedule.

The typical student work week begins on Thursday morning and ends the following Wednesday, as follows:

<u>Thursday</u>	A.M.	Resident Faculty Lecture
	P.M.	Tutorials
<u>Friday</u>	A.M.	Tutorials
	P.M.	Tutorials
<u>Monday</u>	A.M.	Guest Lecture
	P.M.	Post-Lecture Conference
		Guest Lecturer - Students Dinner
<u>Tuesday</u>	A.M.	Seminars
		Guest Lecturer - Students Lunch
	P.M.	Seminars
		Guest Lecturer - Students Dinner
<u>Wednesday</u>	A.M.	Seminars
		Guest Lecturer - Faculty Lunch
	P.M.	Tutorials

MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT
DEFENSE ECONOMICS AND DECISION MAKING

The Defense Economics and Decision Making course is designed to develop the students' skill in making high level decisions affecting the allocation of resources to defense programs. The problems of implementing those decisions are emphasized. The objectives of the course are:

- a. To acquaint the student with the analytic tools available to the decision maker, to provide insight into their strengths and limitations, and to develop the student's ability to interpret the work of the analyst.
- b. To develop an understanding of the environment in which defense decisions are made, the constraints, political, institutional and bureaucratic, which the environment imposes on decision making and the difficulties associated with implementing defense decisions.
- c. To exercise the students in complex decision making by addressing case studies based on major defense decisions.

The course lasts approximately fourteen weeks and consists of three courses which are taught concurrently.

The first course is titled Quantitative Factors in Defense Decisions. The course addresses the tools of Economic Analysis, Decision Theory and Operations Research which have found extensive application in defense planning. The mode of instruction combines seminar, lecture and case study. The class meets three times weekly. A point of theory is introduced at the first weekly meeting and the application of the theory in a defense analysis is then introduced by lecture and discussed in seminar.

The second is titled Non-Quantitative Factors in Defense Decisions. The course addresses defense issues from an organizational viewpoint and how policies have been adopted and why, rather than how they might have been were economic rationality the only driving factor. The class meets twice weekly in seminar. The methods of instruction resemble those in the quantitative course in that principles and points of theory are introduced and then illustrated by cases drawn from defense experience.

The third course, titled Decision Process, is structured almost totally around case study discussion. A distinction should be made between the cases addressed in Decision Process and those used in the other courses. In Quantitative and Non-Quantitative Factors, cases are used to illustrate points of theory and provide examples of their use in defense applications. Cases in Decision Process are deliberately open-ended and designed to exercise the students in making decisions in real world situations. The cases typically provide the student with the data which was available to a decision maker and the circumstances with which he was faced, to the extent that they are known, when a major defense decision was made. Thus, in many cases, the student will have only conflicting or insufficient information. The emphasis is on the students' ability to proceed rationally and arrive at a decision. The course meets once weekly for a lecture introducing the case and twice weekly in seminar.

In all, students receive fourteen hours of formal instruction weekly. Essays and oral presentations are required in all three courses and a final examination is given in each. In addition, each student is required to prepare a term paper which is researched and written during the trimester under the guidance of a faculty advisor.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT

DEFENSE ECONOMICS AND DECISION MAKING

TYPICAL WEEK

Monday:	Quantitative Factors Seminar	90 Min.
	Non-Quantitative Factors Seminar	90 Min.
	Decision Process Lecture	60 Min.
Tuesday:	Decision Process Seminar	3 Hrs.
	Quantitative Factors Lecture	60 Min.
Wednesday:	Decision Process Seminar	3 Hrs.
Thursday:	Quantitative Factors Seminar	90 Min.
	Non-Quantitative Factors Seminar	90 Min.
		<hr/>
	TOTAL	14 Hrs.
Friday:	Tutorials	

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT
DEFENSE ECONOMICS AND DECISION MAKING

COURSE OUTLINE

28 AUGUST 4 OCTOBER 12 DECEMBER

↓ 1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 ↓ 6 . 7 . 8 . 9 . 10 . 11 . 12 . 13 . 14 ↓
QUANTITATIVE FACTORS
NON-QUANTITATIVE FACTORS
DECISION PROCESS
TERM PAPER

Quantitative Factors

Week 1

Introduction
Uses of Quantitative Methods
Model Building

Week 2

Demand and Supply
The All Volunteer Force

Week 3

Consumer Theory
Public Goods

Week 4

Theory of Production and Resource Allocation
The Cost of Squadron Operations
The Far Reaching Consequences of High Priced Oil

Week 5

Cost Analysis
Present Value
Build and Charter Program for Ships

Week 6

**Theory of the Firm
Economic Analysis of Trade-offs
Aircraft Pipeline Factors**

Week 7

**Summary of Economic Decision Models
Introduction to Decisions Under Uncertainty
Probability Theory
Simulation**

Week 8

**Bayes Decisions
Sequential Decisions**

Week 9

**Utility Theory
Regression Analysis
Incentive Contracting**

Week 10

**Forecasting
Optimization
Linear Programming
Procurement of Airlift and Sealift Forces**

Week 11

**Dynamic Programming
Optimization of Aircraft Rework and Replacement Policies**

Week 12

**Inventory Theory
Demand Estimation
Spare Part Provisioning**

Week 13

**Analyst as Advocate
The ABM Debate**

Week 14

Final Examination

Non-Quantitative Factors

Week 1

Introduction
Social Perceptions
Marshall on Expanding the Viewpoint of the Analyst
President Kennedy and the Joint Chiefs

Week 2

Interaction of Individuals and Groups
Psychological Contracts
The Brake Shoe Scandal
The A-7 Decision

Week 3

Communication
Power and Authority
Development of capability to deliver nuclear weapons
by carrier based aircraft

Week 4

Motivation and Motives
The Kittyhawk Incident
The Officer as a Warfighter

Week 5

The Officer as a Professional
Civilian Military Relations
The President and the Military

Week 6

The Officer as a Manager
Characteristics of Bureaucratic Organizations
Control Systems
Uses and Abuses of Analysis
PPBS

Week 7

Control of the Process
Management by Objectives

Week 8

**Limits on Rational Decisions
Political Limitations on Rationality
The Kennedys and the Missile Crisis**

Week 9

**Rational and Organizational Models
Bureaucratic Politics
The Cuban Missile Crisis**

Week 10

**Influencing Other Nations
The Indo-Pakistani Crisis
Influencing Other Bureaucracies
Manned Bombers versus Missiles**

Week 11

**Making Decisions
DOD Program Issue Papers**

Week 12

Implementing Decisions

Week 13

**Affecting Change and Planning for the Future
The Long Range Future of the Navy**

Week 14

**Review
Final Examination**

Decision Process

Week 1

**Modern Management and Decision Theory
TEMPO Military Planning Game**

Week 2

**Decision Making as a Process
Conceptual Models for Decision Making
Introduction to the Case Method**

Week 3

System Definition
Translating Strategic Mobility to a Systems View
Depot Maintenance Case Study

Week 4

Problem Formulation
Objectives and Assumptions
German Navy Case Study

Week 5

Cost and Measures of Cost
Economic Cost
Measures of Effectiveness and Criteria
ASW Commander Case Study

Week 6

Data Collection and Formulation of Alternatives
Discounting

Week 7

Models
The Role of the Computer
Structuring Problems for Model Solution
Bomb Racks Case Study

Week 8

Evaluation of Models
Sensitivity Analysis
Pioneer Freighter Case Study

Week 9

Computerized Cost Model Exercise

Week 10

Interpretation of Results
Overview of the Energy Problem
Deepwater Ports Case Study

Week 11

**Limitations of Analysis
The Sea Control Ship Case Study**

Week 12

**Systems Acquisition Process
Program Management
The Improved Lift Helicopter Case**

Week 13

**Military/Media Conference
Federal Budget Projection Exercise**

Week 14

**The Navy Planning Process
Final Examination**

TACTICS DEPARTMENT

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF TACTICS

OUTLINE OF TACTICS COURSE

A. OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

The objective of the Tactics trimester is to improve the students' ability to make sound tactical decisions in an operational environment of increasing complexity. The focus is on understanding the nature and inter-relation of naval missions, the characteristics of weapons system, categories, performance and constraint factors in employment of naval forces, and those engagement analysis and operations research techniques useful in deriving/developing tactics.

To permit adaptation of the Tactics course to individual student experience and need, the core curriculum is supplemented by a range of options which students may elect in various combinations, with the concurrence of their faculty advisors:

1. Core alternatives
 - a. Engineering techniques for weapons systems
 - b. Operations analysis in tactical decision-making
2. Individual or group research projects
3. Term paper(s) based on individual expertise

B. METHODOLOGY

Teaching techniques in the core curriculum range from large group lectures, employed for factual material such as technological factors, to case method seminars dealing with such material as mission analysis. The teaching technique in the curriculum starts with a reasonable reliance on the lecture system (because factual issues such as technology factors and engagement analysis are far more suitable for this method) where we have a good deal of information to impart. About 40% of the time is lecture and 60% is seminar. Then, when we get into the application area or the four Naval Mission areas, the lecture time is decreased and we build on the teaching strength of the case method. At this point about

85% of the time is in seminars. The complex case studies employed are developed around the four Navy mission areas, as follows:

1. The Strategic Deterrence Study is concerned with the principles and concepts of nuclear deterrence and the advantages and limitations of all elements of the TRIAD. Arms limitations issues are also examined.

2. The Naval Presence Study is concerned with peacetime, and up to the leading edge of war, employment of naval forces in support of national policy. Alternatives with limited resource as well as international legal restrictions are considered.

3. The Sea Control Study analyzes the factors involved in commanding a task force operation including the tactical considerations in sortie, choke point, open area, and local engagement operations. The high-low-mix issue and task force defense against multiple threats are key elements of this study.

4. The Projection Study deals with alternative concepts for the tactical employment of naval forces assigned to projection missions. Included within the scope of the projection study are: analytical models for interdiction, close air support, air superiority, amphibious operations, and the role of carriers in projection missions.

C. TACTICS INTERFACE WITH WAR GAMING

The Tactics Department and the Center for War Gaming work closely together in support of the tactical concepts. Specifically, War Gaming provides:

1. Demonstrations to support various curriculum areas of study.

2. Facilities for play by students of an integrated Sea Control Decision Game.

3. Facilities and moderator assistance for play of Table Top Decision games by selected seminar groups during the Engagement Analyses phase.

4. A controlled tactical environment in which one variable at a time can be changed and the output observed and measured; this is most valuable for testing future tactical concepts.

D. CORE CURRICULUM TOPIC OUTLINE

1. Introduction to Tactics and Naval Missions
2. Military Planning Process and the Basic Tactical Game
 - a. Elements of Tactical Decision-Making
 - b. Commander's Estimate of the Situation
 - c. Logistics Considerations
3. Technological Factors and Constraints in System Performance
 - a. Radar
 - b. Electronic Warfare and Electro-Optics
 - c. Sonar and Magnetic Anomaly Detection
 - d. Guns, Missiles, and Bombs
 - e. Lasers, Torpedoes, and Mines
 - f. Aircraft Platforms
 - g. Ship and Submarine Platforms
 - h. Satellites
 - i. Communications, Command, and Control
4. Engagement Analysis Study
 - a. Nuclear attack submarine vs nuclear attack submarine (SSN vs SSN)
 - b. ASW surface ship in escort role vs nuclear attack submarine (DE vs SSN)
 - c. ASW patrol aircraft vs nuclear attack submarine (VP vs SSN)
 - d. Nuclear attack submarine vs Naval Task Group
 - e. Guided missile surface ship vs submarine launched cruise missile (CLG vs SLCM)

f. Attack aircraft vs surface ship with surface-to-air missiles and conventional guns (VA vs CLGM)

g. Fighter aircraft in fleet air defense role vs attack aircraft with anti-ship cruise missile (VP vs VA)

h. Fighter aircraft escorting attack aircraft vs interceptor aircraft (VF vs VF)

5. Naval Mission Areas

a. Overview/relationship/concept

b. Naval Deterrence Study

(1) Triad

c. Naval Presence Study

(1) As instrument of national policy

(2) International Law

(3) The Soviet View

d. Sea Control Study

(1) The Soviet Navy

(2) International Law

(3) Strategy of Sea Control

(4) Elements of Mission

(5) Case Study samples

(6) "Crescent Star" game

e. Projection Study

(1) Tactical aviation in projection

(2) International Law

(3) Carrier Employment

(4) Air Superiority

- (5) Close Air Support
- (6) Interdiction
- (7) Amphibious Operations

2. How has the curriculum evolved over the years?

EVOLUTION OF CURRICULUM

Essential to an understanding of the "new" Naval War College curriculum is a brief explanation of what it was before and how it evolved into its present configuration.

A. Old Curriculum

The pre-1972 senior course was a series of "studies," largely oriented toward the international, domestic, and military implications of national strategy. The teaching methodology employed was: a mix of some in-house lectures, a large number of lectures by outside visitors, seminars for group discussion of course readings and lectures, and individual preparation of a thesis-type term paper. In terms of packaging, the course comprised sequential time-blocks in the fields of international relations and regional political/economic studies. To some extent, course content and student time available were constrained by credit and curriculum requirements of the Naval War College's cooperative degree program with George Washington University.

✓
+65+66 2AP


B. New Curriculum

Beginning in 1972 and continuing through 1973-74, the senior course curriculum content, teaching methodology, overall style, and student workload have changed significantly. The course is now a structure of three independent trimesters of concentration -- Strategy and Policy, Defense Economics and Decision-Making, and Tactics -- each directed by its own faculty. All three teaching departments employ case-study instructional seminars and rely largely on in-house lectures tailored to supplement the curriculum directly. Outside lecturers, therefore have sharply declined, while required student reading and writing in preparation for seminars have increased substantially. Elimination of the GWU program and cancellation of field trips have made more time available for the curriculum, as well as removing the frictional study imbalance between students enrolled in, or not enrolled in, the GWU program.

C. Immediately following this section are bar graphs comparing the old and new curricula in terms of teaching methodology, subject coverage, and student workloads.








COMPARISON OF OLD & NEW CURRICULUM
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

CURRICULUM CONTENT (% OF STUDENT TIME)



NOTE: OLD = PRE 1972
NEW = POST 1972

COMPARISON OF OLD & NEW TEACHING METHODOLOGY



SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN/ADDITIONS TO CURRICULUM

1947

Mission: "To further an understanding of the fundamental considerations involved in the science & art of naval warfare in order that officers may be better qualified for higher command."

Courses:

1. Senior Strategy & Tactics
2. Junior Strategy & Tactics
3. Strategy & Logistics

1951

Additions:

1. Flag Officer Refresher Course
2. Research & Analysis Dept*
3. Advanced Studies in Strategy & Seapower

1954

New Mission Statement: "To further an understanding of the fundamentals of warfare, international relations, & interservice operations, with emphasis on their application to future naval warfare, in order to prepare officers for higher command."

*Dropped in 1954. This Dept was not engaged in research but acted as supervisor/liason center for research conducted by other depts. Research in Strategy conducted mainly by Adv Studies in Strategy & Seapow (#3) which was terminated in 1957.

1956

Change: Two Year Senior Course



1959

Change: Return to one yr Senior course (Logistics integrated)

1965

New Mission Statement: "To provide naval officers advanced education in the science of naval warfare & related subjects in order to improve their professional competence for higher responsibilities."

1967

Change: Junior & Senior Courses begin yr with Fundamentals of Strategy Study

Additions:

1. Electives Program
2. Group Study Program
(Replaced required thesis for selected students)
3. Research Papers Program
(Required of all students who had never written thesis)
4. Command & Staff Interim Course

1972

New Mission Statement: "To enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in both command & management positions."

Changes/Additions:

1. Three Depts/Curricula (Junior & Senior)
Strategy
Management
Tactics
2. Reduce lectures/increase academic quality & time spent in seminars & reading/writing
3. Grades & examinations
4. Advanced Research Program
5. NCC (Senior Internat'l Students) integrated with CIW

1973

Changes/Additions:

1. Expand role of Center for Continuing Education (pilot extension program in Wash., DC)
2. Discontinue GWU Coop Degree Program

1974-75

1. Review policies & curriculum
2. Stabilize, consolidate, refine
3. Sharpen focus on issues & problems of the future
4. Formalize study effort leading to development of long-range strategic & tactical concepts (Center for Advanced Research)
5. Improve faculty quality & stability
6. Improve status of the NWC in the Navy

3. What is the procedure by which the curriculum is changed? (How are new courses added or old courses dropped?)

PROCEDURES FOR CHANGING CURRICULUM

Initiatives for changing the Naval War College curriculum stem from many sources--policy guidance of the Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Navy; directives of the Chief of Naval Operations; or suggestions of Fleet Commanders-in-Chief, the Chief of Naval Personnel, the Chief of Naval Material, and the Chief of Naval Education and Training. Certain recommendations, usually of an incremental improvement or refinement nature, also are generated from within the Naval War College itself or through informal consultative processes with other elements of the Navy or the Board of Advisors.

The actual procedures for reviewing, approving, and implementing proposals for curriculum changes, arranged in step-by-step sequence, are:

a. Dean of Academics, assisted by academic departmental chairmen, prepares outline concept plan based on change proposal. The depth of this plan is determined by nature and scope of proposal.

b. The Academic Policy Council (membership/description appended) reviews concept plan and recommends to the President whether or not the change should be adopted, adopted with modifications, or not adopted. Because of the tight curriculum schedule, the Council may also recommend at this time what course elements should be compressed or dropped to make room for the proposed additions or expansions.

c. The President then reviews the curriculum change proposal and approves, approves with his own modifications, returns the proposal for further study, or disapproves.

d. The Dean of Academics, in coordination with the Council and appropriate academic departments, undertakes the action directed by the President. If the President has approved or approved with his own modifications, the academic departments concerned will prepare or revise syllabi in accordance with the President's guidance. Depending on the magnitude of the change(s), one or several successive drafts will be presented to the President for his review and guidance during this process.

e. In each case of change, the new or revised syllabus in final form, is formally approved by the President prior to printing and distribution.

During the annual updating of each course--by substituting improved case studies, introducing new textbooks and supplemental readings, and methodology refinements--such minor adjustments are initially coordinated among the teaching departments concerned and incorporated into the draft syllabi submitted to the President who, as in all other cases of curriculum change, personally reviews and formally approves all course syllabi for the forthcoming year.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R. I.

NAVWARCOL 5420.10C

01:12:cm

27 August-1974

NAVWARCOL INSTRUCTION 5420.10C

From: President, Naval War College

Subj: Academic Policy Council

1. Purpose. To establish an Academic Policy Council and to define its membership and function.
2. Cancellation. This Instruction cancels and supersedes NAVWARCOLINST 5420.10B of 14 September 1973.
3. Background. In the summer of 1972, the Academic Policy Council was established to provide a high level discussion/decision forum for handling academic policy and planning matters. Membership, functions, procedures, and effectiveness have varied over the past two years but, on balance, the Council has been useful to the President and the Naval War College during a period of change.
4. Functions. The Academic Policy Council:
 - a. Provides a forum for the enunciation of Presidential guidance.
 - b. Discusses, develops, and establishes the procedural and policy guidance required to give short, mid- and long-range direction to the academic activities of the college.
 - c. Receives and acts on the recommendations of other Boards and Committees.
5. Membership. The Academic Policy Council consists of the following membership:
 - a. Principals: Attend all meetings or be represented by an individual authorized to make decisions:
 - President
 - Deputy/Dean of Academics
 - Chairman, Department of Strategy
 - Chairman, Department of Management
 - Chairman, Department of Tactics
 - Dean of Administration

NAVWARCOLINST 5420.10C
27 August 1974

b. Members: Encouraged to attend all meetings and, if unable to do so, should be represented for continuity:

Director, Center for War Gaming
Director, Center for Continuing Education
Director, Department of Advanced Research
Director, Naval Command College
Director, Naval Staff Course
Professor of Libraries
State Department Advisor
Senior Army Advisor
Senior Air Force Advisor
Senior Coast Guard Advisor
Secretary
Dean of Students, CNW
Dean of Students, CNC&S

c. Associates: Need not attend unless specifically requested to do so in announcement of meetings:

Director of Special Events
Director of Finance
Director of Facilities
Director of HRM Division
Director, International Conference Secretariat


d. Observers. The following will attend all Council meetings as observers:

Director, Faculty Support Office
Executive Assistant to President
Executive Assistant to Deputy (Recorder)

6. Meetings and Agenda. The Academic Policy Council will meet at least monthly, normally on a Friday morning early in the month. Every effort will be made to announce meetings and circulate agendas at least one week in advance. Agenda items will be identified as "discussion" or "decision" in character. Certain short-notice meetings, involving only Principals, may be called by the President to deal with specific items of a short-fuze nature. The President may also appoint ad hoc Council committees to research and report on complex items.

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7. Conduct of Meetings. Normally, the Dean of Academics will serve as "Executive Secretary" and chair Council meetings. Principals, Members, and Associates may submit proposed agenda items to the Dean of Academics at any time and will be prepared to present such items to the Council when introduced. The Recorder (Executive Assistant to Deputy) will circulate the minutes to all principals, members, associates and observers following each full meeting.



H.G. NOTT

Deputy to the President

Distribution

3

D. Associated Studies and Research

1. Is your college formally engaged in any research activity or studies for your Service staff, the JCS, or OSD?

5

Formal Research Activity

At this time, the Naval War College is not formally engaged in any research activity or studies specifically requested by the Navy Staff, the JCS or OSD.

Since its inception, the Department of Advanced Research has sponsored studies voluntarily initiated by members of the student bodies of the two (U.S.) colleges, the faculty, or received as unsolicited proposals from outsiders, mainly from the academic community. The products of these studies, when appropriate, have been circulated to interested agencies of the Department of Defense.

Some student and faculty initiated research proposals stem from known DoD or Navy issues and problems identified by the various "suggested topics" lists promulgated within the Defense establishment.

President's Note: The criteria for selection of projects has produced an unsatisfactory level of pertinence and usefulness of the approved projects--particularly those undertaken by academicians--to the resolution of defense problems. This activity is being entirely overhauled in connection with a mission change designed to place formal responsibility on the Naval War College for research leading to the development of strategic and tactical concepts.

2. Is there a research center associated with your college similar to the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College? If so, how is it related organizationally to the college? How is it manned?

SBI-Type Research Center

The Naval War College does not have associated with it a research center similar to the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College. However, the Department of Advanced Research, which was organized during academic year 1972-73, can and will be restructured for research such as the Army War College Institute undertakes, and expansion of the present limited Department of Advanced Research is currently underway in conjunction with a Naval War College Mission change.

Organization:

(1) The Department of Advanced Research is one of the regular departments of the Naval War College which reports to the President through the Dean of Academics. Its director is a civilian professor with extensive experience in research administration. He is assisted by a regular naval officer (Commander).

(2) All proposed research projects are thoroughly reviewed by an Advanced Research Council and then are recommended for approval or disapproval to the President, who makes all final decisions. The Council is chaired by the Deputy/Dean of Academics, with the Director of Advanced Research as Vice Chairman & senior civilian & military faculty as regular members. Often, other faculty members are consulted on projects in their particular field of expertise.

President's Note: The Department for Advanced Research will very shortly be restructured and renamed the Center for Advanced Research. It will be properly staffed from within existing assets and will undertake research leading to the development of both strategic and tactical concepts.

3. What percentage of the faculty and students participate in such research/study activity? How much time is spent by faculty and students in these activities?

Faculty/Student Participation in Advanced Research

The Department of Advanced Research is necessarily heavily dependent upon the faculty and staff of the Naval War College. The following are the principal faculty and staff contributions, in addition to their participation in the Advanced Research Council:

Every student applicant/participant has a faculty advisor. The faculty advisor supervises the student's research and writing, advising him regarding sources, methods of research and analysis, and organization and presentation of his discussion and conclusions. Finally, the faculty advisor shares in the grading of the student's research product.

Faculty and staff members may also be called upon to advise and consult with outside participants in the program. In particular, competent and interested faculty and staff members are normally asked to read and critique products submitted by the outside research associates, particularly if their subjects are highly specialized.

During the past two years nearly all the faculty members, and a substantial number of the staff, have assisted to some degree in the conduct of the Advanced Research Program. Those involved in advising student research have, on occasion, found themselves devoting substantial time to guiding their students. In a few cases, some faculty advisors may have found themselves devoting as much as 20 to 25% of their time to this work, though usually for only a few weeks at a time.

Twelve students during 1972-1973 and twenty during 1973-1974 participated in the Advanced Research Program. The majority devoted two trimesters, or roughly 6 months, to their projects. Therefore, the percentage of student participation in 1972-73 was roughly 3% and in 1973-74 was 5%. These figures will increase substantially during the Academic Year 1975-1976.

4. What specific contributions of significance have been made to your Service or DoD by studies and research conducted in conjunction with your programs.

ADVANCED RESEARCH PROGRAM
STUDENTS
1972 - 1973

TITLE	NAME	DURATION	DISTRIBUTION
The Implications of Naval Disarmament	CDR Christos Zirps, USN CNW	6 months	NWC
The Armed Forces Code of Conduct	LtCol Michael P. Murray, USMC CNW	6 months	Navy JAG Hq USMC Def. Doc. Center
National Security Implications of the United States Efforts to Redress the Imbalance of (International) Payments	Mr. Brewster Hemenway State Dept. CNW	3 months	Sec. State (Attn: Dir., Bureau of Intel & Research) Defense Documentation Center. (DDC)
A Theory of Conflict: Towards a Comprehensive Military Theory	LtCol George Goodson, USMC CNW	6 months	NWC
Prevention of Alcoholism and Other Drinking Problems in the U.S. Navy	CDR Jeremy Tappan, USN CNW	6 months	Deposited in DDC and BUPERS for further distribution. Abstract published in <u>NWCR</u> .
The Nature of Military Advice and Its Role in Formulation of U.S. Military Policy.	LCol Richard Masson, USAF CNW	6 months	NWC

STUDENTS 1972 - 1973 (cont.)

TITLE	NAME	DURATION	DISTRIBUTION	
The Influence of Maritime Strategy on General Purpose Force Planning	Col Jack Grace, USMC Capt George Thompson, USN LCOL Dick Kattar, USA LCOL Ralf Miller, USAF CDR Doug Scott, USN LCOL Paul German, USMC Mr. Ed Thibault, CIA CNW	6 months	NWC	
After the Cold War: The USIA Role	Mr. Dino Caterini, USIA CNW	3 months	Director, USIA for Distribution	
The Rise of Defense Agencies	Mr. John M. Komos DSA	3 months	NWC	

ADVANCED RESEARCH PROGRAM
STUDENTS

1973 - 1974

TITLE	NAME	DURATION	DISTRIBUTION
Prejudice in Management and Decision Making	LCDR Peter H. Cressy, USN CNC&S student who extended his tour one year.	15 months	Articles have appeared in <u>NWCR</u> , <u>Navy Times</u> , and other journals. USNI has requested a book.
The Laws of War and Amphibious Operations	Col Charles Keever, USMC CNW	12 months	NWC. Larger, comprehensive paper is being prepared.
Historical Analysis of the Organizational Success of the Naval War College During the Twenty-Five Years Following the Second World War.	CDR Nepier V. Smith, USN CNW	6 months	NWC
The U.S. - U.S.S.R. Maritime Agreement.	Mr. Reginald Bourdon MARAD CNW	6 months	Being reviewed. Executive Summary in <u>NWCR</u>
Evaluation of the Code of Conduct	Col Robert Oaks, USAF LCol Robert Kjar, USAF LtCol William Tiernan, USMC LCol Kenneth North, USAF CNW	6 months	
Iceland, Troubled Ally	CDR Neil O'Conner, USN	3 months	<u>Naval Aviation News</u>

STUDENTS 1973 - 1974 (cont.)

TITLE	NAME	DURATION	DISTRIBUTION
Strategy and Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War Reconsidered	CDR Jack Tomion, USN CNW	3 months	Being reviewed.
Deep Ocean Mining	CDR Paul Dillingham, USN CNW	6 months	Being reviewed.
Senior Officer Education in the Navy and Marine Corps.	LtCol Harvey Bradshaw, USMC CNW	6 months	NWC. Modest distribution in response to requests.
Communist Aid to North Vietnam 1964-1973: Types, Quantity, Application, and Effectiveness.	Mr. Robert Guenther, DIA CNW	6 months	NWC DIA
Command and Control: A Contemporary Perspective	LT Christopher Maillefert, USN CNC&S	6 months	NWC OPNAV
The Threat of Mine Warfare to Sea Control	CDR Herbert Kuykendall, CNW USN	5 months	NWC
Ocean Surveillance Primer	Mr. Janko Jackson CNW NRL	6 months	NWC Tactics Dept.
Conventional Warfare in Europe -- A Shift in Soviet Thinking	LTC Dallas Brown, USA CNW	3 months	Published in <u>Military Review</u>
Military Middle Management Motivation	CDR Jack Gladin, USN CNW	3 months	Under review

STUDENTS 1973 - 1974

TITLE	NAME	DURATION	DISTRIBUTION	
Tactical Intelligence Collection in an Insurgency Environment.	LTC Seth Burkett, USA CNW	3 months	NWC	
Conceptual Strategies for Naval Planning	LT Kenneth McGruther, USN	3 months	NWC. Being considered for <u>NWCR</u>	

ADVANCED SEARCH PROGRAM
 "OUTSIDE ASSOCIATES"
 Status as of 1 November 1974

TITLE	NAME	DURATION	STATUS	DISTRIBUTION
American Naval Power in the Mediterranean. Part I - The Political Application of Naval Force. Part II - Mediterranean Undercurrents	Edward Luttwak [Independent researcher]	18 months	Parts I and II completed. Part III expected by year's end.	Wide distribution of completed parts in USN; modest distribution (requested) in other services. Part I is being published as book by a university press.
Neo-Mercantilism: Its Embryonic Development in the United States Navy, 1865 - 1881	John M. Allen, Jr. [Graduate student, Syracuse University]	24 months	Introduction and 2 of 6 Chapters complete	
Origin of a Military-Industrial Complex? The U.S. Navy's Search for Armor and Armament 1881-1917.	Dr. Benjamin F. Cooling [U.S. Army Military History Research Collection]	12 months	Nearing completion	
Capabilities, Threats, and American Decisions to Declare War.	Peter G. Schoettle [Graduate student, Columbia University]	6 months	Completed. Being reviewed.	
Naval Secretaries John Connally, Fred Korth, and Paul Nitze. (One chapter of book)	Paul R. Schratz [Independent researcher]	7 months	Completed. Being reviewed.	

OUTSIDE ASSOCIATES (cont.)

TITLE	NAME	DURATION	STATUS	DISTRIBUTION
Theory of Optimal Search	Dr. Lawrence D. Stone [Daniel H. Wagner, Assoc]	14 months	Completed.	Being published as book.
Military and Civilian Leaders' Attitudes on Foreign and Defense Policy,	Bruce M. Russett [Prof. of Political Science, Yale University]	12 months	Nearing completion. Manuscript expected in December.	
U.S.-Soviet Arms Interaction, 1946-1970, and a Comparison with Pre-Nuclear Arms Races.	Richard H. Cady [Grad. Student, U. Michigan Asst. Prof., Northern Illinois University]	21 months	Project recently extended from 6 to 21 months. No funds expended.	
U.S. Arms Control Policy-Making: The 1972 Bacteriological Treaty Case.	Forrest R. Frank [Graduate Student, Stanford University]	12 months	First draft manuscript completed. First half final draft completed and second half due November.	
U.S. Naval War College, 1919-1939, An Institutional Response.	Gerald J. Kennedy [Graduate Student, University of Maryland]	6 months	This part-time project by civil service employee is nearing completion.	
Strategic Arms Limitation and Naval Force Planning: A Strategic and Bureaucratic Perspective,	Richard R. Burt [Graduate student, The Fletcher School, Tufts University]	9 months	Project delayed by Associate taking appointment with IISS. Preliminary draft of first third of paper received.	

OUTSIDE ASSOCIATES (cont.)

TITLE	NAME	DURATION	STATUS	DISTRIBUTION
The Shift in the Military Balance of Power, 1937-1939.	Williamson Murray [Graduate Student, Yale University]	9 months	First draft received and being reviewed. Final draft due December.	
Formation of the Soviet Officer Corps: A Study in Professional and Social Attitudes.	David R. Jones [Lecturer, Acadia Univ., Nova Scotia]	22 months	Introduction and 2 chapters of book received. This is approx. one-third of project.	
Changing American Views of the Security Pact with Japan.	Catherine R. Edwards [Graduate student, UCLA]	12 months	Research in progress.	
Actual and Potential Conflicts Over Ocean Resources within Areas of National and Limited National Jurisdiction as Proposed for the Third Law of the Sea Conference.	Herman T. Franssen [Research Associate, Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute]	4 months	Complete. Being reviewed.	To interested persons at NW
Alliance Politics: A Study of NATO Burden-Sharing, 1950-1970.	Stephen M. Shaffer [Graduate student, University of Michigan]	6 months	Research in progress.	
Mahan in the Modern World: A Reassessment of his Model...and Interpretation.	Paul R. Schratz [Independent Researcher]	24 months	Project delayed. No funds expended.	

OUTSIDE ASSOCIATES (cont.)

TITLE	NAME	DURATION	STATUS	DISTRIBUTION
Between Peace and War: The Anatomy of International Crisis.	Richard Ned Lebow [Asst. Prof., The City College of New York]	6 months	Nearing completion. Most chapters have been received.	Available chapters have been distributed to interested NWC faculty/s
Patterns, Purposes, and Effects of Conventional Arms Transfers to Lesser Developed Countries.	Edward John Laurance [Asst. Prof., Naval Postgraduate School]	2 months	Research complete. First of two papers has been received. Other expected in December.	Draft circulated to interested NWC faculty.
The Contributions of Manley O. Hudson to American Thought on International Law.	James T. Kenny [Graduate student, University of Denver]	6 months	Nearing completion. First half of manuscript received and being reviewed.	
Global and Local Conflicts in the Indian Ocean Region	Ferenc Albert Vali [Prof., University of Massachusetts]	7 months	Research completed. Resulting book manuscript expected in Spring 75.	
Regional Maritime Cooperation.	Mark W. Janis (LT.USNR) [Instructor, Naval Postgraduate School]	3 months	Completed. Five research papers have been received and are being reviewed.	
Global Inputs to Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1972: The Unintended Effects of Strategic Interaction.	Lewis W. Snider [Graduate student, University of Mich.]	6 months	Research problems and underestimate of costs have delayed this project. It is under reconsideration.	

OUTSIDE ASSOCIATES (cont.)

TITLE	NAME	DURATION	STATUS	DISTRIBUTION
<p>Relating Current Assumptions, Values, and Objectives of American Foreign Policy and Projected Milieu Changes to Naval Missions and Force Structure.</p>	<p>James A. Nathan & James K. Oliver [Assistant Professors, University of Delaware]</p>	<p>15 months</p>	<p>Research in progress. Draft of first half of project received and being reviewed.</p>	
<p>From Precision to Area Bombardment in World War II.</p>	<p>Marilyn Zoeller Wellons [Graduate student, Columbia University]</p>	<p>18 months</p>	<p>Research in progress. Preliminary conclusions due late November.</p>	
<p>The Navy Versus the B-36; Nuclear Weapons and National Security Strategy, 1947 - 1950.</p>	<p>David A. Rosenberg [Graduate student, The University of Chicago]</p>	<p>12 months</p>	<p>Contract has just been signed.</p>	
<p>The Creation of the Trust Territories of the Pacific.</p>	<p>William Roger Louis Professor of History, University of Texas</p>	<p>3 months</p>	<p>Research completed. Book in progress.</p>	
<p>Political and Institutional Aspects of Soviet Naval Development</p>	<p>Thomas B. Trout [Asst. Prof., University of New Hampshire]</p>	<p>10 months</p>	<p>Research in progress (early)</p>	
<p>Crisis Bargaining</p>	<p>Glenn H. Snyder [Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Buffalo]</p>	<p>6 months</p>	<p>Nearing completion. First half of Ms received.</p>	

TITLE	NAME	DURATION	STATUS	DISTRIBUTION
War of the Spanish Succession	John Brewster Hattendorf [Graduate student, Pembroke College, Oxford]	2 years	In progress	
Hierarchical Analysis of Naval Operations	Henry Arthur Young [Graduate student, University of Rochester]	100 days	In progress	
From Disarmament to Re-armament: A Comparative Study of American and British Naval Policy in the Origins of World War II in the Pacific	James Kenneth McDonald [Independent researcher on NWC campus]	14 months	In progress	
Content Analysis of Soviet Naval Writings	John Adrian McDonnell [Research Fellow, Centre for Foreign Policy Studies]	12 months	Contract being negotiated.	

BOOK II

This notebook has been prepared for the DOD Committee on Excellence in Education to provide concise background information for the Committee's visit to the Naval War College on 5-6 November 1974.

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MISSION:

The mission of the Naval War College is to enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in both command and management positions.

(OPNAVNOTE 5450 of 31 Oct 73)

Anticipated additive change:

The mission of the Naval War College is to enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in both command and management positions, and to conduct research leading to the development of advanced strategic and tactical concepts for the employment of naval forces.

Overview of Current Naval War College Program

Key Questions:

- A. What to Teach?
- B. How to Teach?
- C. Return on Investment?
- D. Why a War College At All?

A. What to Teach

Naval War College Mission Prior to 1972

To provide naval officers advanced education in the science of naval warfare and related subjects in order to improve their professional competence for higher responsibilities.

1972 Mission Change

The mission of the Naval War College is to enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in both command and management positions.

Difference

Previous broad mission permits College to focus on only broad strategic issues of naval warfare.

New mission forces attention to managerial and tactical decision making.

B. How to Teach

There are Two Choices:

1. A course that concentrates on updating officers on current factual data.
2. A course that improves an officer's ability to handle a wide range of complex future problems.

The real question, of course, is whether to prepare an officer for his next assignment or to prepare him for the rest of his career. Recognizing the temporal nature of the rapidly expanding bank of factual knowledge, the Naval War College program is designed to fulfill choice 2 as effectively as possible in a 10-month course.

C. Return on Investment

1. The short term return on any form of education is difficult to measure at best, but

2. Some of the payoffs of a War College education should be:

a. Assists officers to make the transition from an environment of detailed operational decision making to one of broad managerial responsibilities:

e.g., to become a project manager dealing with trade offs rather than an operator working with prescribed limits.

e.g., to become a staff officer for a high level operational commander who must choose among weapons and tactics rather than simply execute a prescribed tactic well.

b. Exposes officers while in an academic environment to widely differing views on their profession.

e.g., often an officers first rub with such views is when he is before the public - project manager before Congress; flag officer on TV.

c. Stimulates officers to gain a finer sense of the breadth of their profession - its long range objectives and the need for interservice and allied coordination:

- where else are they being prepared to cope with other than short term solutions?

d. Identification of thinking skills:

- the best qualified strategists, managers, and tacticians are identified to the Navy by Fitness Reports and letters thus helping to place square pegs in square holes.

e. Promotions:

- Naval War College has not been a highly sought assignment for about 20 years which was the very reason for major reform in 1972.

- former "sabbatical" concept did not attract best officers.

- new program is generating considerable interest.

- Navy is now selecting better officers - have purposely held numbers down to keep quality up.

e.g., Navy selection for Captain:

All Navy	- 468
All NWC Grads	- 518
Class of 1973	- 828
All Navy	- 458
All NWC Grads	- 528
Class of 1974	- 888
All Navy	- 478
All NWC Grads	- 558
Class of 1975	- 1008

FY 1973

FY 1974

FY 1975

D. Why a War College at All?

Why Mid-Career Military Education?

An officer reaches a point about mid-career when the nature of his duties begins to change significantly. At about the O-5 (LCOL/CDR) level, he is called on more and more to make decisions which affect not just his specialty or organization, but his whole Service or the entire Military Establishment. Often these decisions impact on the national budget in major terms. The experiences of his early career years, which are largely devoted to perfecting skills in a specialized area of military warfare, do not adequately prepare him for these new responsibilities.

How then does the military officer broaden his perspectives to encompass the frequently uncertain issues of policy? Where does he acquire the skills to deal with these issues rationally and effectively?

While civilian schools of business, recognizing similar needs in middle management, can provide answers in general terms, the professions, such as law, medicine, engineering, and the military, cannot be served adequately in general terms. The unique nature of their skills and the importance of their service to the fabric of society as a whole demand institutions dedicated to dealing with the peculiar problems of the profession, promoting the development of new concepts and ideas, and acting as a repository of accumulated professional knowledge. In this respect, the Senior Service Colleges, for the military, meet the special and changing demands of the military profession. Some of these special demands include:

Reducing parochialism: Cumulative technological progress forces specialization which in turn encourages parochialism. Parochialism, if permitted at the policy making level, discourages the honest search for the best alternative solutions to any given problem.

Dealing with uncertainty: Junior military officers must develop the ability to make rapid, accurate decisions in operational situations. However, the answers to broader issues are not always absolute - yes or no - they are often somewhere in between. Officers must understand how to deal with uncertainty and how to make the best decision from among imperfect alternatives.

Encouraging innovative thinking: Organizations, especially large ones, demand a certain amount of conformity by their

members. While this is useful at lower levels because it promotes order, it can be harmful at the policy making level. It can inhibit the flexibility every organization needs to adjust to changes. Individuals do not easily break out of established rigid or narrow thinking patterns unless they can be challenged personally and in areas relating directly to their profession.

Broadening professional knowledge: The military places an extremely wide range of demands on its members, often under difficult conditions: leadership; resource management; technical currency; appreciation of the principles of government, foreign policy and diplomacy; and capacity to formulate military strategy. Frequently military leaders are required to operate in arenas where they have had no previous direct experience. Seldom can the military officer, unlike other professionals, refresh his knowledge through practice of his profession for he spends most of his time not engaged in his profession's primary function; warfighting.

What Should a Senior Service College Teach?

Senior Service Colleges should:

As the curriculum core, identify and study alternative methods of solving problems in three basic areas unique to the military profession:

- formulation of strategy and policy
- allocation and management of resources
- development of tactics to utilize available resources in support of strategy.

Avoid undue concentration on updates of current affairs or technical data which the student can, and should, do on his own and the usefulness of which perishes quickly over time.

Deal with fundamental professional issues involving civil-military relations such as subordination to civilian control and responsibility for providing advice to civilian leaders, etc.

Provide a forum for differing points of view both within and outside of the profession.

Encourage critical thinking.

Other Roles That the Senior Service College Should Play.

The military profession needs an institution to encourage thinking, a place of directed reflection and research. This cannot be found in the high pressure of Washington. The bureaucracy must deal with contemporary problems and within deadlines. An institution must be available to provide an atmosphere for exploration of the frontiers of the profession. It must be based on the principles of intellectual freedom, encourage dissent, and stimulate new ideas which will provide the yeast for continued modernization and development of the profession.

There is a need for improved communication among military professionals, civilian defense officials, the bureaucracy and the rest of society. There has been too little communication and interaction among these elements in the past. The military, because of its concern with immediate crisis, has relinquished too much to the "think tanks." It has been too concerned with operational matters. Senior Service Colleges can help develop a collaborative effort between civilians and the military of the broader issues of policy and resultant force planning.

Who Should Attend A Senior Service College?

Not all mid-career level officers need attend a Senior Service College. Many should remain in their technical areas. However, it is difficult to draw a precise line as to who should attend. Opportunity should not be limited to just those officers who are certain candidates for flag or general rank. This would be too restrictive because they are not the only officers providing substantial input and direction to important decisions and policies. All officers should attend a Senior Service College who could benefit from the experience and who can be identified as needing it for future service productivity.

Evaluation of the Naval War College Curriculum

A. Pre-1972 Curriculum

In the years immediately preceding 1972, the curriculum of the Naval War College was heavily oriented toward International Relations and supportive of the George Washington University's Master of International Affairs cooperative program at the Naval War College. In April 1970, the Commission on Accreditation of Service Experience (CASE) of the American Council on Education conducted an evaluation of the Naval War College Program. Its recommendations were:

<u>Course Description</u>	<u>Recommended Graduate Credit Hrs</u>
International Relations and Law	6
Evolution of Strategic Theory (advanced Military history)	2
Economics	2
Management	2
	<u>12</u>

In addition, students enrolled in the GWU cooperative program could acquire up to 6 graduate credits, at GWU only, for their thesis.

B. New Curriculum

After a year and a half experience with the new curriculum, the Naval War College requested a new evaluation. In March 1974, the Office on Educational Credit (formerly CASE) made such an evaluation. Its recommendations are:

<u>Course Description</u>	<u>Recommended Graduate Credit Hrs</u>
Economics, 19th & 20th Century Diplomatic History, Political Science, and International Relations (combined)	6
Management & Business Administration	12
	<u>18</u>

The evaluators made the following specific comments:



With regard to the faculty, the consultants were favorably impressed with the quality of the staff members with whom they had an opportunity to meet. They were judged to be qualified for the job they are doing and to be comparable with the better faculties teaching similar work in civilian institutions.

The material in the programs of instruction in the areas of strategy and management were judged as sophisticated, challenging, and the equal in rigor, difficulty, and quantity to materials used for similar instruction in civilian institutions. In addition, the consultants noticed an active involvement on the part of both students and faculty. The consultants agreed that the academic content of the tactics course is not appropriate for the assignment of transfer credit.

The newly instituted examination program was judged as an excellent system which forces the students to study and organize their material. It was valued as an appropriate, stimulating, and fruitful system.

The consultants concluded that changes now in the second year at the College show substantive progress toward academic excellence.

President's Note: There is still substantial work to be done to improve the focus of the curriculum on future maritime/defense problems of the U.S.



1. Sims Hall - Houses the Center for War Gaming; the staff, faculty and students of the Naval Staff Course, the Dean of students and students of the College of Naval Command and Staff. Additionally, it is the future location of Communications Station, Newport.
2. Hewitt Hall - Under construction. Will provide new Library facilities, additional seminar rooms and spaces for students to be moved from Sims Hall.
3. Conolly Hall - Houses command and administrative offices, the Chairmen of the Academic Departments, seminar rooms and faculty offices.
4. Spruance Hall - Contains the main auditorium of 720 seats. Four adjacent seminar rooms permit expansion to 1,000 seats. Also contains a small number of support and faculty offices.
5. Mahan Hall - Houses the present Library collection, much of which is not readily accessible due to space constraints. Upon completion of the initial Hewitt Hall Library facilities, Mahan Hall will house the Archives and Historical Collection.
6. Pringle Hall - Houses student spaces for the College of Naval Warfare, the Human Resources Department, a small auditorium, Photo Laboratory and the Graphic Arts support department.
7. Luce Hall - Houses the Deans of Students of the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College plus student spaces for those Colleges.
8. Building 87/87A - Temporary structures housing Communications Station, Newport. This activity is slated to move to Sims Hall at which time 87/87A will be demolished.
9. Founders Hall - Site of original Naval War College in 1884. Houses the Center for Continuing Education, the Naval War College Review and the Naval War College Foundation.

NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE

The Naval Command College is a ten-month course of instruction for Captains and Commanders of Free World Navies. It began in 1956 with a class of 23 officers -- only one officer per country in any class -- and now has 484 alumni from 49 countries. This year we have our largest class ever -- 38 -- with four countries represented for the first time: Ghana, Guatemala, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The Naval Command College has 484 alumni; of these, 342 have become senior enough to be considered for flag rank. 197 alumni have attained flag rank (58% of those eligible), and 31 alumni have become Chiefs of Navy.

The curriculum of the Naval Command College is essentially the same (except for Tactics) as that of the College of Naval Warfare, our senior college for U.S. students, and the two colleges are located in the Luce/Pringle/Mahan complex with international and U.S. students sharing study rooms and coffee messes.

The unstated mission of the Naval Command College is to influence and observe future leaders of foreign navies, to build an international community of friendly foreign naval leaders (with the U.S. as the core of this community), to educate select senior foreign naval officers, to broaden the educational experience and horizons of U.S. students and faculty at the Naval War College, and to facilitate future coordination in operating together.

The following figures indicate the Naval Command College has been notably successful in attracting select foreign officers. We have therefore had ample opportunity to fulfill all facets of our mission.

COUNTRY	57	8	9	60	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	70	1	2	3	4	5
ARGENTINA	X		X	X		X				X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X
BELGIUM	X									X					X				
BRAZIL					X		X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CHILE		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X		X					X
CHINA			X					X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X
COLOMBIA			X	X	X			X					X	X	X	X		X	X
CUBA	X	X	X																
ECUADOR	X						X								X				
FRANCE			X					X		X		X		X		X		X	X
GERMANY		X		X		X	X	X				X	X		X		X	X	X
GREECE				X				X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
ITALY										X				X	X	X	X	X	X
JAPAN														X	X	X	X	X	X
KOREA																X	X	X	X
NETHERLANDS					X	X	X	X	X		X				X		X		X
NORWAY		X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
PERU		X	X					X					X	X	X	X	X	X	X
PHILIPPINES					X	X	X						X	X	X	X	X	X	X
SPAIN	X		X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
THAILAND				X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
TURKEY	X	X							X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X
URUGUAY	X		X	X		X	X												
VENEZUELA				X						X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

FIGURE 1

THE ABOVE COUNTRIES ARE CHARTER MEMBERS IN NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE.

X INDICATES STUDENT FROM GIVEN COUNTRY IN GIVEN YEAR

BAR UNDERLAY INDICATES STUDENT ACHIEVED FLAG RANK IN HIS NAVY.

O OVAL OVERLAY INDICATES STUDENT BECAME CHIEF OF HIS NAVY

NOTE THAT 7 COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS BEEN REPRESENTED.

COUNTRY	57	8	9	60	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	70	1	2	3	4	5
DENMARK			X	X	X	X		X		X		X				X	X	X	X
DOM. REPUBLIC		X									X	X					X		
IRAN														X	X	X	X	X	X
PAKISTAN								X						X	X	X	X	X	X
PORTUGAL																	X		
SWEDEN						X								X			X		X
U.K.		X			X							X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
AUSTRALIA			X	X					X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X
CANADA				X	X							X	X				X	X	X
BURMA				X		X	X	X											
MEXICO											X	X	X		X			X	X
VIETNAM											X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
INDONESIA												X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
NEW ZEALAND																			
INDIA												X		X	X	X		X	
MOROCCO																			
ETHIOPIA													X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FINLAND														X		X			X
PARAGUAY															X				
PHILIPPINES																			
MALAYSIA																		X	
NIGERIA																		X	X
U.S.																		X	X
ISRAEL																			X
KHMER REPUBLIC																			X
LEBANON																			X
EGYPT																			X
GHANA																			X
GUATEMALA																			X
SAUDI ARABIA																			X

FIGURE 2

THE ABOVE COUNTRIES SENT INITIAL STUDENTS TO NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE CLASSES 1958-1975

X INDICATES STUDENT FROM GIVEN COUNTRY IN GIVEN YEAR.

BAR UNDERLAY INDICATES STUDENT ACHIEVED FLAG RANK IN HIS NAVY.

OVAL OVERLAY INDICATES STUDENT BECAME CHIEF OF HIS NAVY

NAVAL STAFF COURSE

The Naval Staff Course was established in 1972 with students from fourteen countries represented. Since that time, this number has increased to 32 countries participating in a program which is designed for lieutenants and lieutenant commanders from free world navies, with one student from the United States in each class. The course is five months long, making it possible to conduct two classes during the regular academic year of the Naval War College. The fifth class, which convened in August, includes Guatemala, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Morocco for the first time.

The objectives of the course are to prepare middle grade officers for increased responsibility and to provide them with the skills necessary for assignment to high level staffs within their own navies. The syllabus supports this objective and has been aligned with the senior resident program to include Strategy, Defense Decision Making, and Tactics. Special emphasis on such areas as International Law, Ocean Affairs, Internal War, Riverine Warfare, Logistics and Public Diplomacy round out the curriculum. The Tactics course incorporates war games and table top decision games, together with studies of Naval Presence and Deterrence. The Defense Economics course has incorporated a more thorough study of economics and introduced a number of new case studies to improve the student's understanding of analysis.

Free world navies represented in the present (Aug-Dec 1974) class are:

- Royal Danish Navy
- Nigerian Navy
- Guatemalan Navy
- Liberian National Coast Guard
- Imperial Iranian Navy
- Federal German Navy
- Lebanese Navy
- Imperial Ethiopian Navy
- Vietnamese Navy
- Turkish Navy
- Ghana Navy
- Royal Malaysian Navy
- Dominican Republic Navy
- United States Navy
- Indonesian Navy
- Royal Moroccan Navy
- Philippine Navy
- Royal Thai Navy

CENTER FOR WAR GAMING

The Center for War Gaming provides:

- Gaming support for the three Naval War College academic departments, such as engagement analyses for Tactics, decision games for Management, and illustrative case study demonstrations for Strategy, to demonstrate principles.

- Evaluation/testing of contingency plans and operational concepts of fleet commanders.

- Simulation games for Naval Material Command and Systems Command laboratories to examine impact of new technology on future naval force structure and capabilities.

- ADP support for local users, including an elective course for resident students.

- Gaming support and instruction for reserve officers (eight two-week courses per year).

- (Anticipated) Direct gaming/simulation support for an expanded Center for Advanced Research engaged in the development of strategic/tactical concepts.

The Center for War Gaming has maintained and operated an analog gaming system known as the Naval Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS). In view of the constraints and increasing maintenance difficulties of this analog device, the Center is developing a more modern digital system called the Warfare Analysis and Research System (WARS). Scheduled for completion in 1979, WARS will allow more forces to be played with instant assessment of detections and interactions.

In addition to large scale games, manual games have been developed in support of the Tactics course at the War College. These games provide individual students with the opportunity to employ tactics and make decisions as commanders of various platforms, surface, air and subsurface.

Fleet games vary in purpose from education of staff officers to analysis of an operation plan. Scheduled major fleet exercises may be gamed prior to the event to optimize planning. As funding and assets available for at-sea operations are reduced, these games gain importance since they can enable the fleets to make more efficient use of limited operating time.

ADP support for the War College includes services for administrative and educational support to the extent that resources permit.

The Naval Reserve Affairs Department administers various two week courses, among them the Senior Reserve Officers Course in which up to 125 reserve captains and commanders are provided instruction paralleling that given in the resident Naval Warfare course. Other courses provide instruction to keep reserve officers abreast of developments in the active service and in war gaming, to enable them to prepare and conduct games at their units.

CENTER FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION

The function of the Center for Continuing Education is "to extend the educational facilities of the resident colleges to nonresident military officers and selected government employees." The Center offers correspondence courses which closely parallel the resident curriculum and which are constructed with the assistance of the resident faculty.

LEVEL OF STUDY. Courses are graduate level, subjective in nature and require creative work. Students must plan to spend at least 5 hours a week in study and must press forward consistently to sustain the benefit of each study lesson.

COURSE DESCRIPTIONS. The Center for Continuing Education offers a one-diploma Naval War College correspondence curriculum of approximately 1,000 hours of study. The program is organized as follows:

- (1) 300 Hours Strategy and Policy
- (2) 300 Hours Defense Economics and Decision Making (Management)
- (3) 300 Hours Naval Tactics
- (4) 100 Hours Discretionary--to be creditable from International Law courses, previous NWC correspondence course work completed or as chosen from other NWC correspondence courses that may be available in the future.

A. STRATEGY AND POLICY

Seven courses are offered

<u>Courses</u>	<u>Titles</u>	<u>Est. Study Hours</u>	<u>Points</u>
S 11	The Sovereign State	36	12
S 12	The Strategy of Total War	42	14
S 13	The Strategy of Limited War and Alliance Politics	42	14
S 14	The Origins of World War I	42	14
S 15	The Origins and Strategy of World War II	54	18
S 16	Containment and the Cold War	42	14
S 17	The Military Profession	42	14
Totals		300	100

B. DEFENSE ECONOMICS AND DECISION MAKING

Five courses are offered

<u>Courses</u>	<u>Titles</u>	<u>Est. Study Hours</u>	<u>Points</u>
M 21	National Resource Allocation	60	20
M 22	Decision Making in Organization	60	20
M 23	Analytic Methods	60	20
M 24	Analysis of Defense Decisions--I	60	20
M 25	Analysis of Defense Decisions--II	60	20
Totals		300	100

C. NAVAL TACTICS

Five courses are offered

<u>Courses</u>	<u>Titles</u>	<u>Est. Study Hours</u>	<u>Points</u>
T 31	Fundamentals and Engagement Analysis	60	20
T 32	Military Planning Process	60	20
T 33	Sea Control	60	20
T 34	Projection	60	20
T 35	Presence and Nuclear Deterrence	60	20
	Totals	300	100

D. INTERNATIONAL LAW

Three courses are offered

<u>Courses</u>	<u>Titles</u>	<u>Est. Study Hours</u>	<u>Points</u>
L 51	Fundamental Concepts in International Law	60	20
L 52	Jurisdictional Concepts in International Law	42	14
L 53	Laws of War	42	14

During the 1973-74 Academic Year, enrollment was as follows:

Average Student Enrollment	914 **
Percentage active duty officers	51
Percentage inactive Reserve officers	49

***President's Note:**

This represents an unsatisfactory utilization rate which must be improved.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE FOUNDATION

Background: The Naval War College Foundation, Inc. is a self-supporting charitable, non-business corporation organized in November 1969 under the General Laws of the State of Rhode Island to be a private source of aid to the Naval War College in the fulfillment of its educational mission.

Discussion: The Chief of Naval Personnel authorized the President, Naval War College to cooperate in the establishment of the Foundation on the basis that:

- a. The foundation would be a non-profit corporation organized under the leadership of persons not attached to the Naval War College or otherwise on active duty.
- b. The foundation would be self-supporting as to all requirements, except that two naval officers on active duty at the Naval War College could be duly elected to its Board of Trustees to assure that only suitable gifts are accepted.
- c. Any donations or other gifts proffered to the Naval War College by the Foundation would be received under current procedures for gift acceptance by the Department of the Navy.

Each of these conditions were fulfilled and the incumbent President of the War College and one staff officer have traditionally been elected to serve as Trustees by the Foundation.

VADM LeBourgeois, for example, was recently elected as a Trustee to fulfill the unexpired term of VADM Turner.

Mr. John Monsarrat of Sharon, Connecticut, a retired advertising executive with a long Navy association, is the President of the Foundation. The following twelve additional Trustees are, for the most part, prominent business or financial leaders with a highly motivated defense orientation: Robert M. Akin, Jr., RADM John J. Bergen, USNR (Ret.), The Honorable John Nicholas Brown, Mr. Sylvan C Coleman, CDR Leo J. Coughlin, JAGC USN, Mr. Felix W. deWeldon, Mr. W. Clarke S. Mays, Jr., Mr. Noel B. McLean, Mr. John A. Mulcahy, Mrs. Mary G. Roebing, Mr. Richard B. Sheffield, and Mr. John J. Slocum. The Executive Director is a recently retired Navy Captain, Walter B. Woodson, Jr., who has an intimate knowledge of the War College through his tours here as both a student and staff member, most recently as

Director of the College of Naval Command and Staff.

Salient facts pertaining to the Foundation are

a. Donations of \$1,000 or more were made by each of 176 Founder Members. The 43 Corporate Members donate \$500 each annually. Founder Membership has been closed but Corporate Membership remains open. Associate Membership has recently been initiated and requires \$100 annual donation.

b. The total assets of the Foundation amounted to \$273,000 as of 1 June 1974.

c. The Foundation provides financial support for a growing number of academic programs at the College that would otherwise not be feasible through appropriated funds. Some of these programs are as follows: Military-Media Conference, the International Lecture Series, the Admiral Raymond A. Spruance Memorial Lecture Series, the Admiral Richard G. Colbert Memorial Prize, the Professional Studies Conferences, the Rear Admiral Richard W. Bates Lectureship and Fellowship Series, the Oral History Program, and the Historical Monograph Series. Items of historical, educational or artistic value received by the Foundation have been placed on deposit with the Naval War College Historical Collection.

d. The Foundation employs its own clerical help and provides a minimal salary for its Executive Director. No Trustee or Officer receives compensation for his services.

The current Strategy and Policy course of historical case studies was the initial development of the 1972 Naval War College's new curriculum. As the successor to a pre-1972 curriculum largely focused on international relations and regional studies, the Strategy and Policy course's content and methodology have occasionally been questioned. The following paper, therefore, has been included in this notebook as a straightforward exposition of why the shift was made:

The Uses of History

(From a lecture delivered at the Naval War College, 28 August 1974, by Philip A. Crowl, Chairman, Department of Strategy)

Tomorrow those of you who are students in the College of Naval Warfare and the Naval Command College will officially begin your study of Strategy and Policy. The course commences with the Peloponnesian Wars of the 5th Century B.C. and from there marches down almost to the present in a series of historical case studies. And the question that must have occurred to you is: "Why?" Why a historical approach to the urgent problems of strategy and policy that face you and your nations today? What is the relevance of history to you as military officers, or to the military and political leaders whom you may someday be called upon to advise? What, in short, are the uses of history?

A hundred years ago--or even seventy-five--few, if any, military men doubted the practical professional advantages of the study of history. The "defense intellectuals" of the 19th Century were almost to a man historians. The names of some of them are well known: Antoine Henri Jomini, Karl von Clausewitz, Emory Upton, and, most of all, Alfred Thayer Mahan. When, in the year 1884, Captain Mahan was invited by Commodore Luce to lecture on naval history and tactics at the Naval War College, he too addressed himself to the question of the uses of history. In three fat tomes he traced in detail the history of British naval operations from 1660 through 1815. And on the basis of this mass of historical data he postulated the theory that Britain's national greatness, her wealth and her strength rested primarily upon her predominant sea power; and that her sea power in turn was a product of a combination of factors, including her geography, the character of her population, the character of her government and the naval, maritime, and colonial policies it has pursued. From this general theory,

arrived at inductively, he deduced that other nations similarly situated, might by the pursuit of similar policies, arrive at like results. The other nation he had particularly in mind, of course, was the United States.¹

Now here was a general theory of history, a general principle of strategy and policy. But Mahan was careful not to push it too far. Although he believed that there were "certain teachings in the school of history which remain constant," he also warned that because of rapid technological change, "theories about the naval warfare of the future are almost thoroughly presumptive." He warned of the tendency to overlook points of difference and to exaggerate points of likeness between the past and the present. And he concluded that, at least in the field of naval tactics, history provided few if any precedents which could be safely followed by modern navies.² In short, Mahan acknowledged, in principle at least, though not always in practice, the very grave danger inherent in simple historical analogy.

What do I mean by "simple historical analogy?" It consists, in the words of the historian David Hackett Fisher "in reasoning from a partial resemblance between two entities to an entire and exact correspondence. It is an erroneous inference from the fact that A and B are similar in some respects to the false conclusion that they are the same in all respects."³ And historic analogies are especially dangerous. To predict any course of events by extrapolation from a single, simple historical model is a very risky exercise. Yet it is always being done. The record of history is replete with examples of the misuses of history, and nowhere more so than in the areas of military strategy and tactics and of international affairs.

Let us examine this record in some detail. False historical analogies abound. Let us look first at the French Army in 1914-1915. Dazzled by the quick success that had attended German operations in the Franco-Prussian War and recalling the splendid victories of Napoleon's dashing columns of infantrymen, the French General Staff had become infatuated with the "principle" of the offensive. Relying too heavily on these two historical models, the French developed a theory of combat which equated the will to win with victory and which would guarantee both by the simple formula of "Attack, attack; attack." The words, of course, are those of Marshall Foch, and it was he, more than anyone else, who was responsible for the doctrine that lay behind the words. Battles were to be won by attacking waves of infantrymen, marching, as Foch put it, "straight on to the goal, each aiming at its own objective, speeding up their pace in proportion as they come nearer, preceded by violent fire,

using also the bayonet, so as to close on the enemy, to be the first to assault the position, to throw themselves into the midst of enemy ranks and finish the contest by means of cold steel and superior courage and will."⁴

What this doctrine overlooked of course was the machine gun. And thousands and thousands of French poilu went to their deaths in the first two years of the war because of this oversight. The machine gun plus improvements in the art of entrenchment, unknown to Napoleon or even to the Prussian troops of 1870, had vastly enhanced the advantage of the tactical defense over the offense.

By the end of the war, of course, the French, like everyone else involved, had learned that lesson. But perhaps, with the usual complaisance of victors, they learned it too well. Underestimating the great new offensive power of tanks and planes, they concentrated too much of their energies and resources on the Maginot line and relied too heavily on the defensive strategy that ended in their defeat in 1940.

Yet if soldiers are sometimes guilty of being at least one war behind the times, the record of politicians and statesmen is no better. Disillusioned by World War I and now convinced that the U.S. had been misled into entering that war, the U.S. Congress in the 1930s, labored mightily to prevent a repetition of the events of 1916-1917. Convinced that the U.S. had been dragged into that war as a result of loans and arms shipments to the allies plus shipping losses to German submarines, Congress passed the Neutrality laws which would prevent such loans in the future, curb the activities of American munitions makers and keep Americans and American merchant ships off the high seas. The ultimate futility of this legislation is, of course, too well known to merit further comment.

Yet the same backward looking philosophy pervaded American strategic thinking in the conduct of World War II and especially in trying to reach a post-war settlement. Statesmanship, in the words of Harvard Professor Ernest May, was defined "as doing those things which might have been done to prevent World War II from occurring."⁵ In 1945 most Americans in high office assumed that the major task of the future was to restrain Germany and to put a permanent check on her historic ambitions for aggrandizement. In his dealings with the Soviet Union, President Roosevelt consistently assumed that the future would be like the past. As Professor May puts it, "Expecting the German problem to be as central after this war as after the last, Roosevelt deemed it imperative for future peace that the United States and the Soviet Union stay together."⁶

Finally, let me cite one more example of the misuse of history drawn from the still incomplete record of our involvement in Vietnam. Under the Kennedy administration the conflict between Hanoi and Saigon was perceived largely as a war of national liberation in the Maoist model and a testing ground for Chinese Communist doctrines of guerrilla warfare. Unconventional warfare seemed to call for unconventional responses and in U.S. government circles the doctrine of counter-insurgency became the order of the day. Here another historical precedent, and of recent vintage too, seemed to offer sufficient guidance--the experience of the British in Malaya. The U.S. Army was advised to forget about Korea and start thinking about Malaya. To this the Army Chief of Staff in 1961 replied that the analogy was false, that the situations in the two regions were not comparable, and furthermore that it had taken the British twelve years to defeat insurgent forces weaker than those of the Viet Minh. But President Kennedy, suspicious of the Chiefs of Staff since the Bay of Pigs, disregarded the warning.⁷

What then are we to make of all this? Does history teach nothing, except perhaps the wrong lessons. The Harvard philosopher, George Santayana once coined the aphorism: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." Must we, in the light of the above, turn this saying on end and conclude that those who can remember the past are condemned to repeat it. Not at all. There are occasions when the lessons of history have been properly applied. In the early 1930s the U.S. Marine Corps, relying largely on the negative model of the Gallipoli campaign of 1915-1916, developed a detailed doctrine of amphibious warfare that successfully withstood the test of countless landings in World War II.⁸ Unlike the French, the Germans in the 1930s freed themselves from the defensive myopia generated by the experience of World War I and in 1939-40 were able to exploit the new technologies of armored and aerial warfare to restore offensive tactics to their traditional advantage.⁹ Later in the Second World War, General Eisenhower, often against British opposition, insisted on a strategy of annihilation according to the doctrine which the U.S. Army had adhered to since it was so successfully carried out by U.S. Grant.¹⁰ At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy pondered the outbreak of war in 1914 and resolved to avoid the mistakes of miscalculation and inflexibility that had marked that notorious case of crisis mismanagement.¹¹

If statesman and generals have been misguided by history, it is because they have misused it. Their analogies between past and present have been too simple. They have failed to follow the advice of Mahan and have overlooked points of difference and exaggerated points of likeness between the past and

the present. They have not looked deeply enough or widely enough into the past in their search for appropriate models. They have often therefore chosen the wrong models. And most dangerous of all, they have tended to neglect all models except those constructed out of their own most recent experience. They have been shackled by, and even traumatized by, their own immediate past, and have too often assumed that the future would be a simple linear projection from that immediate past.

Might not things have been better for them, and for their nations, had they looked more deeply into the past and had sampled more generously from the vast store of human experience in the field of strategy and policy? Had the French General Staff in 1914 looked not to the Franco-Prussian and the Napoleonic Wars but to the American Civil War as well, they might have become aware that changes in weaponry now give the tactical advantage to the defense. If Congressmen in the 1930s had given more thought to the history of Thomas Jefferson's administration and less to that of Woodrow Wilson, they might have realized that embargoes and nonintercourse acts do not necessarily prevent wars. Had Franklin Roosevelt looked to 1815 instead of 1918 he might have noted that war-time coalitions can quickly break apart, and that defeated enemies are sometimes to be found less dangerous than former friends. Finally, if President Kennedy had paid closer attention to the French experience in Vietnam, or looked even farther back to the experience of Napoleon's troops in the Iberian Peninsula his enthusiasm for counter-insurgency might have been somewhat tempered.

Of course, it is possible that greater insight into the past would have made no difference in the event. Certainly reasons other than mere historical precedent had their effect on these decisions. But for better or for worse the men who made these decisions did look to the past for guidelines. And men still do and always will. So to the question: What are the uses of history?, the answer is obvious. It is used, and therefore it is useful. But of course the real question should be: not "Is it used?", but "How is it used?" And the answer to that is: "Often very badly." Often, but not always.

History, to be sure, does not ever repeat itself exactly. There are no simple analogies between past and present. But there are connections and discernible patterns of behavior, recurrent themes, similarities as well as differences, continuity as well as change. In the field of strategy and policy, war and statecraft, there are few, if any, of today's problems that have not in essence been faced by men before -

including the problem of the possible extinction of whole civilizations. All the important questions have already been asked. All the answers good and bad have already been suggested. The human predicament remains the same.

And so, in conclusion, to come back to the question: "What are the uses of history?", let us look for the answer to Thucydides, the historian of the Peloponnesian War. "It will be enough for me...", he wrote in the 5th Century B.C., "if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future."¹² Statesmen and strategists do in fact act, in part at least, on the basis of their perceptions of the past. Wise statesmen and strategists "understand clearly the events which happened in the past,"--at least clearly enough to distinguish those of its lessons which are applicable from those which are not.

FOOTNOTES

1. Margaret T. Sprout, "Mahan," E.M. Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy, Ch 17.
2. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, p. 4; VADM Edwin B. Hooper, USN (Ret.), "The Spectrum of Naval History," p. 2.
3. David Hackett Fischer, Historians' Fallacies, p. 274.
4. Stefan T. Possony and Etienne Mantoux, "Du Picq and Foch: The French School," E.M. Earle, op. cit. Ch. 9.
5. Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past, p. 7.
6. Ibid., p. 14.
7. Ernest R. May, op. cit., pp. 98-99.
8. Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War, Ch. II.
9. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, Ch. 2.
10. Russell Weigley, The American Way of War, Ch. 14.
11. Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, p. 40.
12. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Book I, Ch. 22.

Naval War College
 Authorized Operating Funds, Fiscal Year 1975

<u>Description</u>	<u>O&MN</u>	<u>MPN</u>	<u>Principal Elements</u>
Professorial Salaries	\$ 768,013		Civilian Faculty only
Civil Service Personnel Salaries	2,406,983		Not adjusted for FY75 raise
Military Faculty and Staff Salaries		3,872,750	Not adjusted for FY75 raise
Three Academic Departments	190,100		Books, printing, honoraria, etc
Human Goals Program	84,000		Books, printing, honoraria, etc
Center for War Gaming	19,500		NEWS/WARS maintenance, admin
Center for Continuing Education	37,237		Books, printing, training aids
Naval Command College and Naval Staff Course	10,443		Books, printing, honoraria, etc
Faculty Support	28,302		Travel, honoraria, consultants
Student and Staff Support	26,446		General admin
Naval War College Review	30,000		Printing, research, distribution
Automatic Data Processing	75,000		Salaries, terminals, time
Special Programs and Events	59,385		Symposia, Conference
Facilities	400,000		Maintenance and Utilities
Library	98,100		Accessions, maintenance
General Administration and command	136,585		Equipment rentals, communications consumables, graphic arts
Public Affairs Office	33,370		Salary, communications, admin
Contingency Fund	1,000		
Official Representation Funds	3,670		
Tuition Aid Program	1,400		Tuition assistance, staff/faculty
Professional Development	100,000		Navy Studies & Analyses Program
Electronic Simulation	7,000		WARS, Phase II, Techrep travel
Naval Research Program	100,000		Advanced Research Projects
Naval Reserve War Gaming	20,000		Naval Reserve Student Programs
Totals	\$4,636,534	\$3,872,750	
Grand Total		\$8,509,284	

Naval War College

Computation of Average Cost Per Student, College of Naval Warfare, Fiscal Year 1974

Introduction:

1. The evolution of this data followed a basic ratio of time and cost: 4-4-1-1; that is, 40% of centralized cost and time of faculty and administration to CNW, 40% of cost and time to C&S, 10% of cost and time to other academic programs and schools, and 10% of cost and time to administrative efforts. Specific costs were applied where distinguishable, such as student compensation and dedicated staff compensation. All other centralized costs were allocated on the basis of 4-4-1-1.

2. Indirect costs, that is, costs assumed by another Department or Command in support of the College are limited to "school house costs."

3. Military student salary costs include "fringe benefits," i.e., retirement, and the average cost of one Permanent Change of Station move. All other DoD and non-DoD student compensation costs exclude a "PCS" cost factor. This cost was excluded basically because of the inability to determine a reasonable cost factor, and the grounds for the application of that cost factor.

4. Medical support costs for students and military dependents; base security and operating costs, and government housing costs above BAQ contributions have been excluded under the "school house cost" concept.

Glossary of Terms Not Readily Identifiable:

- Operations and Maintenance - includes support compensation as well as materials and services.
- Other Funding Support - Funds granted by other activities for specific purposes such as PAO, Advanced Research, WARS.
- Indirect Support, MILREPS - Annual compensation for military staff personnel.
- Indirect Support, All Other - All other non-military staff support personnel compensation (clerical, maintenance men), as well as non-academic materials and services.

Naval War College

Computation of Average Cost Per Student, College of Naval Warfare, Fiscal Year 1974

Format and data elements in conformity with the MECC ad hoc fiscal comparability study group

Part A: Students

1. Education Load

	<u>Entrants</u>	<u>Graduates</u>	<u>Manyears</u>
a. Active U.S. military	160	159	131.85
b. All other DoD students	18	18	14.88
c. All non-DoD students	6	6	5.00
	<u>184</u>	<u>183</u>	<u>151.73</u>

Part B: Education/Support Manpower in Manyears

	<u>Officer</u>	<u>Enlisted</u>	<u>Civilian</u>
1. Faculty	19.6	0	7.6
2. Direct student support	9.5	18.9	9.2
3. Indirect support	7.35	12.75	60.8
	<u>36.45</u>	<u>31.15</u>	<u>77.6</u>

Part C: Summary of Total Funding, College of Naval Warfare

1. Summary by source

a. U.S. military personnel, including PCS	\$4,887,118
b. Other DoD student salaries	289,603
c. Non-DoD student salaries	129,123
d. Operations and maintenance	1,508,988
e. Other funding support	83,777
	<u>\$6,898,609</u>

2. Summary by purpose and use

a. Student compensation, military, DoD, non-DoD	\$3,704,912
b. Direct student support, military personnel	907,124
c. Direct student support, other personnel	769,555
d. Indirect support, military personnel	300,252
e. Indirect support, all other	1,216,766
	<u>\$6,898,609</u>

Naval War College

Computation of Average Cost Per Student, College of Naval Warfare, Fiscal Year 1974

Part D: Training Cost Recapitulation and Analysis

1. Total funding, U.S. government		\$6,898,609
2. Total funding, Department of Defense		6,742,616
3. Total graduates	183	
4. Total DoD graduates	177	
5. Average cost per graduate, U.S. government, (Line number 1 divided by line number 3)		37,697
6. Average cost per graduate, DoD, (Line number 2 divided by line number 3)		36,845
7. Average DoD cost per Department of Defense graduate, (Line 2 divided by line 4)		38,094

D R A F T

Canc frp:

NAVWARCOL NOTE 1550
122/cec

NAVWARCOL NOTICE 1550

From: President, Naval War College

Subj: Naval War College Electives Program

Encl: (1) Electives Course Catalogue, first trimester
(2) Application form

1. Background. Continuing a program established in AY 73-74, the Naval War College again will offer a program of Elective Courses during the second and third trimester. These courses are designed as professional and academic supplements to the prescribed Naval War College courses. As such, the electives augment rather than compete with the core curriculum. The electives are optional, no credits are awarded, students are not graded, and the program will not be highly structured. Faculty members teaching an elective are afforded considerable latitude in organization and methodology and are encouraged to foster an informal atmosphere in their sessions.

2. Entrance Requirements.

a. Students desiring to participate in the Electives Program are encouraged to discuss the course(s) of their choice with the teacher(s) or sponsor(s) of the courses, then submit the application form (enclosure (2)) to the Electives Program.

Officer in Conolly Hall, Room 126, not later than 1 December 1974. Every effort will be made to assign students to the elective of his first choice, but it may be necessary, because of over subscription, to go to the second or third choice. Assignments will be made on a "first come, first served" basis. Class rosters and room numbers will be promulgated by 15 December 1974.

b. The program is open to all CNW, CNC&S, and NCC students. Disenrollment from an Electives Course may occur only with the approval of the Dean of Academics.

3. In order to make student records complete, faculty members offering an elective are requested to maintain a class roster which will be submitted to the registrar at the end of the course for notation on transcripts.

H.G. NOTT
Captain, U.S. Navy
By direction

TITLE: Operations Analysis for Tactical Decision Making

TEACHER/SPONSOR: Tactics Department

DESCRIPTION:

The course will examine basic methodology and fundamental techniques of Operations Analysis as it applies to tactical situations. Probability, Decicision, and Detection Theory will be developed to provide the student with a greater insight into the quantitative aspects of naval operations. Theoretical and actual case studies will be used to illustrate the principles. These examples will include screening and barrier operations, the anlysis used during the search for the lost submarine Scorpion, and ship vulnerability models.

Note: This elective is a Core Alternative of the Tactics curriculum. Participating students will be exempted from the basic essay requirements of the Tactics course, and will recieve a grade having a weight equivalent to that of the essays based on written assignments and an examination given during the elective course.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM:

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: Applied Engineering Techniques for Weapon Systems

TEACHER/SPONSOR: Tactics Department

DESCRIPTION:

The course will examine current state-of-the-art, and possible near future advances in offensive and defensive weapon systems technology. Technology areas will include sensors, platforms, and weapons for air, surface, and sub surface operations. The primary means of accomplishing this will be through student research and presentations in their areas of experience and expertise. Thus, this course will be designed for students with appropriate technical backgrounds who have a good grasp of systems engineering fundamentals.

Following each presentation, the students, in seminar discussion, will assess the expected effect of the technology research on improving present systems capabilities and/or mitigating present constraints, and the tactical implications of these advances.

Note: This elective is a Core Alternative of the Tactics curriculum. Participating students will be exempted from the basic essay requirements of the Tactics course, and will receive a grade having a weight equivalent to that of the essays based on written assignments and oral presentations given during the course.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM:

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: Education Management

TEACHER/SPONSOR: LCOL G.A. BAKER, USMC

DESCRIPTION:

This course will examine a structure for applying systematic management procedures to the education and training programs of the Armed Forces. The instructional systems development concepts presented in this course are currently under development at Florida State University in connection with the Interservice Training Review Board (ITRB) and will be standard for all Armed Forces commencing in FY 76.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM: 10/30

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: Public Diplomacy

TEACHER/SPONSOR: PROF R.F. DELANEY

DESCRIPTION:

An analysis of the impact of the media, communications technology, and public opinion on national security affairs.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM: 5/30

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: C3 Research Seminar

TEACHER/SPONSOR: CDR Z.L. NEWCOMB

DESCRIPTION:

The course will explore all aspects of Command, Control and Communications; both the theory and concepts as well as the current systems and actual applications will be examined. The Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) will be used as a model for discussions of theory, and also scrutinized to highlight strengths, weaknesses and potential obstacles to optimum execution. The functioning of the WWMCCS with regard to Sixth Fleet operations during the Mideast War of October 1973 will be used as a case study of practical applications.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM: 6/15

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: Oceans Management

Teacher: LCDR P.A. JOSEPH, USCG

DESCRIPTION:

Oceans Management: "The judicious use of the oceans and their resources--the surface, the water column, the seabed and subsoil--within a legal framework, while maintaining the integrity of the environment in attempting to meet man's needs and desires."

Third International Seapower Symposium
Newport, R.I., 19 October 1973

A survey of the present and future uses of the seas and the varying degrees of compatibility between historic uses and introduced activities. Among the areas covered will be ocean resources, marine geography, law of the sea, marine pollution, and the hazards of ocean transportation. Seminars will be oriented toward what type of system might best accommodate these interrelationships within the framework of predictive and reactive international law and regulation.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM: 10/

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: Ground Combat: Its Nature & Relationship to
Policy Decisions

TEACHER/SPONSOR: PROF F.J. WEST AND COL JAMES HIGGINS, USMC

Both the threat and the use of land forces to attain political objectives are real factors in national security and international affairs, e.g., Vietnam, the October War, the Cyprus crisis. Land forces are not "out of vogue," empirically speaking; yet analyses of the use of land forces, tactics, if you will, are rare.

The purpose of the elective would be to investigate the means whereby certain ground tactics are selected and applied; how results are measured and how tactics relate to strategic and grand strategic objectives. Special attention will be given to the MOE factor and to hypotheses relating tactics to policy decisions; e.g., what should a policy maker expect and not expect his infantry to do and how is he to know these parameters in advance?

The U.S. participation in Vietnam and the October War will be used and extended case studies from which to draw lessons concerning the nature of ground combat and the factors which both commanders and policy decision makers should consider.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM: 5/

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: Marine Acoustics

TEACHER/SPONSOR: LCDR SIGMUND

DESCRIPTION:

An in-depth study of sonar criterion, acoustic phenomenon and new sonar considerations (parametric sonars, holography and energy medium transfer).

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM: 5/15

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: The Economic, Political and Military Implications of
Scarce Resources

TEACHER/SPONSOR: PROF L. BRUMBACH AND PROF R. LLOYD

DESCRIPTION:

The increasing scarcity of energy and other vital resources will continue to be one of the dominant issues in the formulation of national policies for at least the next decade. The course will be multidisciplinary in character, and will consider this problem from the social, economic, political, and defense points of view. Since little has been written on the military aspects of the problem, it is hoped that by jointly working together the seminar will be able to further its understanding of the defense implications of scarce resources.

The course will be conducted using both the lecture and seminar methods. Each major topic will be introduced with a faculty lecture followed by student presentations and discussions of selected readings.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM: 6/15

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: International Law Situations and Problems

TEACHER/SPONSOR: PROF W.T. MALLISON AND PROF F.J. FLYNN

DESCRIPTION:

An examination of the international law decision making process with emphasis upon historical, current, and prospective practical problems.

This course will be organized to include factual situations with international law elements which have been or are likely to be encountered by military commanders as well as some problem areas.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM: 5/15

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: Soviet Political and Military Strategy and Tactics

TEACHER/SPONSOR: CAPT R.B. BATHURST

DESCRIPTION:

Since the continuity between Imperial and Soviet culture and government will be stressed, the course will begin with readings and discussions of the ideological and political patterns of Russia. The events leading up to the October Revolution will be examined in detail. Considerable attention will be paid to ideological and philosophical movements, literary and artistic schools and Marxist interpretations. The second half of the elective will begin with the Revolution and deal with the transformation of the Czarist Russian culture into the Soviet model. Considerable attention will be paid to the influence of the Orthodox Church and Marxist-Leninist teachings on the policies of the Soviet government. Finally, the role of the Soviet military will be analyzed.

STUDENT PARTICIPATION:

Only students who have read or agree to read a history of Russia in the first week should apply. Toward the end of the elective, students will be expected to deliver orally, or in writing, a comparison of some cultural, political, or military institution before and after the Revolution.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM: 15

TIME: 1330/Tuesday

CLASSROOM: Conolly 217

TITLE: U.S. Foreign Policy in the 20th Century

TEACHER/SPONSOR: PROF R. MEGARGEE

DESCRIPTION:

A review of the Ideological and experiential foundations of American foreign policy, followed by an analysis of the impact of the events of the twentieth century on those foundations as the United States moved from continentalism to global responsibility.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM: 5/

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: Supply Management

TEACHER/SPONSOR: COL R.T. ROBINSON, USA AND PROF G.F. BROWN, JR.

DESCRIPTION:

The course will focus on developing an understanding of various tools useful in logistics and support management. Among the topics covered will be inventory management, maintenance theory, and reliability theory. Both the theoretical bases for these topics and their application in military logistics systems will be stressed. Related problems (e.g., demand estimation) will also be covered in the course.

PREREQUISITE:

Quantitative Factors Course (no further math background required)

TEXTS:

Hillier & Lieberman, Introduction to Operations Research
Selected Readings

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM:

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: Foundations of Modern China

TEACHER/SPONSOR: PROF C.B. SARGENT

DESCRIPTION:

The objective of this seminar is to create perceptions for understanding, interpreting and performing analyses relating to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The PRC will be viewed in the context of the cultural, historical and experiential forces that created it and condition its behavior. A significant aim will be to develop tools of perception for interpreting Chinese behavior in the context of Chinese values, perceptions and objectives.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM: 5/30

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: Practical Problems of Operational Commanders

TEACHER/SPONSOR: RADM ECCLES, CAPT FISKE, CAPT H. BARKER

DESCRIPTION:

To develop an understanding of military command as it relates to the theory and practice of fundamental military knowledge.

From a base of military philosophy, command theory and planning processes, study how force structures and broad plans developed by the SECDEF, JCS and service chiefs both direct and limit operations by the theater and fleet commanders. To examine how these operational commanders there-after plan and supervise the ensuing combat and support operations.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM: 8/32

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

TITLE: Financial Management in the Private Sector

TEACHER/SPONSOR: CAPT D.W. WHALEN

DESCRIPTION:

To raise the awareness of the military manager in matters pertaining to the financial management of the firm. Particular emphasis will be placed on those areas wherein the selection among alternative financial strategies may influence the short run cost of the goods and services being provided or the long run financial health of the firm.

The course will be specifically designed to meet the needs of those officers who contemplate assignment to project management positions.

MINIMUM/MAXIMUM:

TIME: 1330

CLASSROOM: TBA

From: _____
(Please Print)

To: Dean of Academics (Elective Programs C-126)

Subj: Naval War College Electives Program

1. I want to participate in the following Electives course during the third trimester:

TITLE (1st choice) _____
(2nd choice) _____
(3rd choice) _____

(Signature)