
TWENTY - SECOND ANNUAL



GLOBAL
STRATEGY
DISCUSSIONS

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UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, Rhode Island

15-19 JUNE 1970

GUIDE TO COMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS


FOREWORD

This volume replaces an earlier, interim pamphlet published prior to the completion of the student study of the spectrum of alternative military strategies open to the United States. Printed a month ago, it necessarily could take the analysis only part-way. In this edition the whole pattern of approach to analysis of major world areas is given: from consideration of interests and objectives through to their potential military and naval implications in the light of the Nixon Doctrine.

As in the earlier pamphlet, the major portion of the body of the text is derived from papers prepared by students in the School of Naval Warfare rather than from published sources. Edited and adapted to meet the needs of the Global Strategy Discussions, these lengthy and detailed committee papers are represented here only by brief extracts. Each such extract attempts to retain the essence of the original student group analysis as presented to fellow students for comment and reaction during the regular academic year. The student papers outlining U.S. national objectives and strategies were prepared subsequent to the President's July 25, 1969 press conference on Guam (which laid down the essentials of the new approach) and his Asian policy statement in Bangkok on July 28, 1969, but prior to the major statements of the President and the Secretary of State on United States policy in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. Nor was the President's major address before Congress, "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: a New Strategy for Peace," then available. On the other hand, the student papers outlining alternative military strategies for the future, just completed, took all of these major policy statements into account. Because many civilian guests at these Discussions are less familiar with the military strategy aspects of national policy, larger extracts from the student papers on these subjects are given even though the curriculum balance between the political and the military aspects is more equal than this division of space implies.

To facilitate informed comparison of the student views with the policies expressed by the President and the Secretary of State, pertinent official policy statements have been incorporated into this volume. Excerpts from the President's major foreign policy address are to be found in the section for the first day's group discussions; the other statements are included as appendices.

The thoughts and opinions expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College. The term "Official Use Only" has been applied to this volume in order that the distribution of this material will be limited to those engaged in study at the Naval War College.



R.G. COLBERT
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy

GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS

SCHEDULE OF EVENTS

SUNDAY, 14 JUNE

1730-1930 Quarters "AA"
Reception - Committees 1-20

MONDAY, 15 JUNE

0715-0815 Commissioned Officers' Mess (Closed)
Breakfast for Guests (Optional)

0830-0915 Pringle Coffee Mess
Registration of Guests

0930-1115 Naval Station Theatre
WELCOMING REMARKS
Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, USN
President, Naval War College
ADDRESS: 'THE CHALLENGE OF THE SEVENTIES'
Honorable John W. Warner
Under Secretary of the Navy

1130-1200 Committee Rooms
Organizational Committee Meetings

1200-1330 As Scheduled
Luncheons (Informal)

1345-1545 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "The Nixon Doctrine in Perspective"

1600-1700 Sims Hall - Committees 1-20
War Gaming Demonstration: Battle of Midway and
Tour of Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator
(Optional)

1730-1930 Quarters "AA"
Reception - Committees 21-39

TUESDAY, 16 JUNE

0715-0800 Commissioned Officers' Mess (Closed)
Breakfast for Guests (Optional)

0815-0830 Pringle Auditorium and Sims Auditorium
NEWS AND INTELLIGENCE BRIEF (Optional)

0900-1030 Pringle Auditorium - Civilian Guests, Observers,
and Flag Officers
BRIEFING: SOVIET MARITIME THREAT

1100-1230 Naval Station Theatre
ADDRESS: THE FORMULATION OF GLOBAL STRATEGY
Honorable U. Alexis Johnson
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

1245-1430 Commissioned Officers' Mess (Open)
President's Luncheon - Committees 1-20

1245-1430 As Scheduled - Committees 21-39
Luncheons (Informal)

1445-1615 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "USSR and Eastern Europe"

1630-1730 Sims Hall - Committees 21-39
War Gaming Demonstration: Battle of Midway and
Tour of Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator
(Optional)

WEDNESDAY, 17 JUNE

0715-0800 Commissioned Officers' Mess (Closed)
Breakfast for Guests (Optional)

0815-0830 Pringle Auditorium and Sims Auditorium
NEWS AND INTELLIGENCE BRIEF (Optional)

0830-1030 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "Western Europe"

1100-1230 Naval Station Theatre
ADDRESS: THE OUTLOOK IN THE SENATE FOR ADVICE
AND CONSENT
Honorable Harry F. Byrd, Jr.
U.S. Senator (Virginia)

1245-1430 Commissioned Officers' Mess (Open)
President's Luncheon - Committees 21-39

1245-1430 As Scheduled - Committees 1-20
Luncheons (Informal)

AFTERNOON FREE

THURSDAY, 18 JUNE

0715-0800 Commissioned Officers' Mess (Closed)
Breakfast for Guests (Optional)

0815-0830 Pringle Auditorium and Sims Auditorium
NEWS AND INTELLIGENCE BRIEF (Optional)

0830-0930 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "Africa, South of the Sahara"

0940-1040 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "Latin America and the Caribbean"

1100-1230 Naval Station Theatre
ADDRESS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY
IN NATIONAL STRATEGY
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN
Chief of Naval Operations

1230-1415 As Scheduled
Luncheons (Informal)

1430-1615 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "Middle East"

1900- Commissioned Officers' Mess (Open)
Formal Dinner Dance

FRIDAY, 19 JUNE

0715-0800 Commissioned Officers' Mess (Closed)
Breakfast for Guests (Optional)

0815-0830 Pringle Auditorium and Sims Auditorium
NEWS AND INTELLIGENCE BRIEF (Optional)

0900-1030 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "The Pacific and Asia"

1100-1230 Naval Station Theatre
ADDRESS: DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY
Dr. Walt W. Rostow
Professor of Economics and History
University of Texas

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
Foreword	i
Schedule of Events	iii
Introduction	1
Definition of Terms	3
United States Interests, Objectives, and Capabilities	4
A. National Interests and Objectives	4
B. National Capabilities	4
C. United States Military Capabilities	5
D. The Strategic Problem	5
United States Worldwide Maritime Interests	7
United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's (Excerpts from the Nixon Doctrine)	12
A. Suggested Issues for Discussion	20
The World Areas	
I. USSR and Eastern Europe	21
A. United States National Objectives	21
B. Alternative Future Military Strategies	23
C. Suggested Issues for Discussion	27
II. Western Europe, Atlantic and Mediterranean	28
A. United States National Objectives	28
B. Alternative Future Military Strategies	30
(1) Western Europe	31
(2) Atlantic and Mediterranean	36
C. Suggested Issues for Discussion	39

	PAGE
III. Africa South of the Sahara	40
A. United States National Objectives	40
B. Alternative Future Military Strategies	42
C. Suggested Issues for Discussion	46
IV. Latin America and the Caribbean	47
A. United States National Objectives	47
B. Alternative Future Military Strategies	49
(1) Internal Threat	50
(2) External Threat	53
C. Suggested Issues for Discussion	56
V. The Middle East	57
A. United States National Objectives	57
B. Alternative Future Military Strategies	60
C. Suggested Issues for Discussion	66
VI. The Pacific and Asia	67
A. United States National Objectives	67
B. Alternative Future Military Strategies	69
(1) South Asia and the Indian Ocean	70
(2) East Asia and the Pacific	73
C. Suggested Issues for Discussion	76
Appendices	77
I. President Nixon's Guam Press Conference as reported in his Address to the Nation of November 3, 1969	78
II. Secretary Rogers' Middle East Statement of December 9, 1969	80
III. President Nixon's Policy Statement on Latin America of October 31, 1969	82
IV. Secretary Rogers' Policy Statement on Africa of March 1970, and Presidential approval thereof	84

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this volume is to provide a common point of departure for discussion of strategic and policy issues confronting the United States in the 1970's. As in all Global Strategy Discussions, the value of the deliberations is primarily educational. No effort is made to establish any particular consensus, and the fullest range of views is encouraged. The success of our discussions is to be judged by how well and how clearly we are able to delineate the major issues.

To facilitate and set the stage for our discussions, a set of definitions of major terms is included immediately following this Introduction. The definitions given are those used at the Naval War College. They are included so that we may begin with a common frame of reference. As with everything else on our agenda, they too are open to discussion.

Following the definitions is a short statement, also derived from student efforts, using the definitions to define in broad terms the national interests of the United States, the national capabilities and resources available to us as a nation to satisfy those interests, and the military capabilities available to us in the event of conflict.

The introductory sections conclude with a brief student paper on U.S. worldwide maritime interests--a theme basic to this conference.

Since the United States is now embarked upon a comprehensive review and reevaluation of its interests, objectives, military capabilities, and overall strategy, it is appropriate to begin our first committee discussions with the Nixon Doctrine. In the major excerpts from the comprehensive foreign policy address of President Nixon to the Congress (February 18, 1970), the central theme of the Administration's foreign and defense policy is succinctly stated:

This is the message of the doctrine I announced at Guam--the "Nixon Doctrine." Its central thesis is that the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot--and will not--conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.

The excerpts from the Nixon Doctrine are in turn followed by the statements drawn from the student efforts mentioned in the Foreword. Each of these six statements, covering the major geographical areas of the world, is arranged in similar format, proceeding from each United States objective in that area to the overall strategies by which it can be attained, then to alternative future military strategies, and finally to the suggested issues for discussion. As we discuss each area, we shall be asking what maritime and naval strategy is appropriate for the United States in the light of the Nixon Doctrine, how we are to ensure that we remain sufficiently strong as a nation to carry out our commitments, and what possibilities exist for partnership with other nations on a new basis.

Our discussions are taking place in a time of great stress and domestic uneasiness involving substantial Constitutional issues. In the conduct of foreign affairs the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief confronts the power of the Congress to declare war and appropriate funds for its waging. Of particular concern to critics of present policies are Presidential commitments to other nations, especially the commitment of armed forces to combat in situations not characterized by direct military attack on the United States or accompanied by a formal declaration of war. The voice of youth is heard especially today, although all segments of the nation are vocal in the discussion of these issues.

The crisis over our public affairs is not a new experience for the United States, even if the complexity of achieving adequate defensive capability is today made more difficult by technological change and rising costs. The American method of government rests traditionally on a solid basis of systematic and free debate. As we, as a people, attempt to chart new approaches to both old and new problems, we can draw comfort from the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt:

Our constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible to meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form. That is why our constitutional system has proved itself the most superbly enduring political mechanism the modern world has produced. It has met every stress of vast expansion of territory, of foreign wars, of bitter internal strife, of world relations.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

- National Interests:** Those interests that the national decision-making group determines are important to the maintenance of the state. These offer broad guidance to national leaders charged with the formulation of objectives, policies, and commitments. Some interests are vital interests, that is, interests for which we will likely go to war. All other national interests, however important, are termed secondary interests.
- National Objectives:** Those specific goals designed to support or secure the national interests. These are either "long-term objectives" (fifteen years or more) which may also be called national goals, or "short-term objectives" usually referred to merely as objectives.
- National Policies:** These are specific courses of action which are designed to achieve objectives. They are the means (policy) to the end (objective). Several alternative policies may be available to achieve an objective.
- National Strategy:** This is "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war to secure national objectives."
- Power:** The strength or capacity that a sovereign state can use to achieve its national interests. The elements of power (demography, geography, economics, history, psychology, sociology, military, and government) may be used as a basis to assess and compare power. An assessment of power may be expressed in potential or actual terms.

UNITED STATES INTERESTS, OBJECTIVES,
AND CAPABILITIES

A. National Interests and Objectives. The vital national interest of the United States is, most fundamentally, to safeguard the physical security of the nation against all enemies, through measures up to and including the use of force. As a means to this end the United States has made a variety of commitments to other nations. Where such commitments involve obligations for mutual defense in the event of aggression, such commitments themselves become part of United States vital interests for the period of the commitment. The objective, in creating these alliances, is to achieve United States national security by maintaining, in concert with other free nations, a stable balance of power throughout the world.

Secondary interests involve the achievement of important objectives whose frustration would not automatically be highly dangerous to United States national security. In the broadest sense such secondary interests include: achieving world economic and social progress; encouraging self-determination of independent nations on a worldwide basis; participating freely and cooperating fully with other nations in international accords, treaties, and organizations which create a peaceful international environment; opposing by moral suasion, diplomatic maneuver, economic sanctions, and other collective measures short of force, such nations as oppose these interests.

B. National Capabilities. Basic U.S. capabilities affecting foreign policy implementation include: a large, highly skilled population; immense natural resources within a favorable climatic and geographic setting; the most highly developed economy in the world; substantial, trained armed forces, with both nuclear and conventional military capability. To this inventory we can add a highly successful space program which significantly enhances the U.S. power image and a superior ability to develop and utilize modern industrial and defense technology. However, there are important limitations which the policy-maker must take into consideration: a decreased willingness on the part of the American people to pay the price of supporting the present global strategy of containing communism, the currently depressed conventional forces' capability to respond to new challenges due to recent reductions and heavy involvement in Vietnam, and the economic constraints imposed by inflation and the balance of payments deficit. Of these, public opinion is perhaps the most important. Current manifestations of public opinion which are of particular relevance to foreign

policy include student and black unrest, anti-Vietnam sentiment, a reaction against the "military-industrial complex," and pressures to shift expenditures from defense to the solution of domestic problems. These pressures come at a time when the need for replacement of aging U.S. Navy ships is particularly acute--especially in view of the unabated Soviet naval and maritime expansion.

C. U.S. Military Capabilities. Military capabilities must be considered in the light of three different types of military confrontation between the U.S. with her allies, and the U.S.S.R. and the nations favoring her. The first is a general thermonuclear war. The second is limited war, where conflict is confined to a specific region, and political goals are limited. The third is in opposition to insurgent actions of the type which the Soviets call "Wars of National Liberation." There is no clear line of demarcation between these two latter types. The situation in South Vietnam, originally an insurgent war aided and abetted by the Communist powers, is now clearly a limited war. By contrast, the Korean War was obviously a limited war from the beginning.

In preparing for these three types of war, the U.S. maintains the military capability for general nuclear war under the title of "Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces," while the capability for the remaining two categories is contained in "General Purpose Forces."

Within this framework, it has been U.S. policy to provide capability for fighting two "major" wars and one "minor" contingency. A recent change under the Nixon Doctrine is designed to produce what is called a "1 1/2 war" capability. In the words of President Nixon, "we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere."

D. The Strategic Problem. Given these capability guidelines, the emphasis in the Nixon Doctrine on three cornerstones of approach (partnership, strength, and willingness to negotiate) must be translated into a military effort in which U.S. strength is combined in partnership arrangements with friendly nations on a basis of sharing both obligations and benefits more equitably.

In view of the rising importance of Soviet maritime power and the progressive cut-back in U.S. overseas bases, honoring the commitments reaffirmed by the Nixon Doctrine will require

a thorough rethinking of U.S. maritime strategy as a part of the new overall U.S. strategy. Of prime concern is the question whether the interaction of all of these factors will lead the U.S. to depend more heavily on a forward naval strategy. To provide an analytical stimulus to such rethinking, the nature and setting of United States worldwide maritime interests will be indicated next.

UNITED STATES WORLDWIDE MARITIME INTERESTS

INTRODUCTION

The maritime interests of the United States derive from the overall United States national interests indicated previously. The United States has a vital need to maintain freedom of access to the world's oceans while denying access to any enemy in wartime. This is essential to the support of deployed forces. Other maritime interests include:

- a. Maintaining open sea lines of communications as a necessary element in promoting the commercial interests of the U.S. and in maintaining the capability to import vital raw materials. This includes the right of innocent passage through international straits and narrow seas.
- b. Promoting and encouraging intelligent development of the oceans and seabeds.
- c. Discouraging the use of seabeds beyond the continental shelf for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction.
- d. Encouraging the development of an economically competitive merchant marine.

MAJOR OCEAN AREAS

The major ocean areas are discussed below in relation to their importance to United States maritime interests.

a. Indian Ocean: The pending withdrawal of all United Kingdom forces from "east of Suez" by 1971, coupled with increased Soviet naval activity and presence are the most significant factors affecting United States maritime interests in the area. Indigenous naval forces individually or collectively are not capable of preventing a major power from dominating the Indian Ocean area.

1. Trade Routes and Strategic Points. The three major Indian Ocean trade routes generate from the Middle East oil fields, proceeding east through the Indonesian archipelago, southeast to Australia, or southwest around the Cape of Good Hope. Although these routes provide only 4% of United States oil imports, they provide 95% of Japan's oil, 50% of West Europe's, 60% of Australia's and 83% of East Africa's.

Strategic points along these trade routes are: The Malacca Strait, bordered by Indonesia and Malaysia, and controllable from the port of Singapore; the Indonesian Straits (Sunda and Lombok), completely under Indonesian control; the Gulfs of Aden and Oman, respective entrances to the Red Sea (and Suez Canal) and the Persian Gulf, all of which are capable of being controlled by the bordering states; and the Cape of Good Hope, which, while not restricted, is subject to some control from the Republic of South Africa.

2. Strategic Imports. Imports from the Indian Ocean area, although of strategic importance to the United States, can be obtained in sufficient quantities from other parts of the world. However, most of the oil supply for our NATO Allies and Japan transits the Indian Ocean.

3. Access to Markets. The sub-continent of South Asia and other countries of the Indian Ocean littoral comprise one-third of the world's population. While the area is not now a major United States market (about 10% of United States' trade), the potential is vast.

4. Interests and Alliances. In order to fulfill multilateral alliances (SEATO and CENTO), the United States requires access to and freedom of movement in the Indian Ocean. From a security standpoint, the area provides an intelligence collection vantage point against Soviet naval, merchant, space and missile activity.

b. Mediterranean Sea.

1. Trade Routes and Strategic Points. The Suez Canal closure has reoriented the major trade routes through this area. All trade entering through Gibraltar now terminates in the Mediterranean, except for a small portion which enters the Black Sea.

Four primary strategic points control access to and transit of the Mediterranean; the Bosphorus/Dardanelles, Strait of Gibraltar, Strait of Sicily, and the Suez Canal. All of these passages are bounded, at least on one side, by countries friendly to the United States. Since Gibraltar provides the only entrance for Atlantic powers, it is of special significance. So is the Bosphorus/Dardanelles, which provides the Soviets with their only entrance to warm water ports. The Strait of Sicily is central to all east-west passages within the sea, thereby giving Malta, which lies athwart the passage, a strategic importance. The closure of the Suez Canal since 1967 has not been critical with regard

to the movement of Mid-East oil, primarily because of the development of the super-tanker and pipelines with Mediterranean terminals. However, it has had a detrimental economic effect on trade which we and our NATO partners have conducted with Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean nations. This effect has been offset by the denial of easy access to these areas by Soviet maritime forces. If the canal were reopened, the economic/military advantages which would accrue to the United States and her allies would have to be weighed against those which the USSR would receive.

2. Strategic Imports. Although only 3% of United States strategic imports come from countries in the Mediterranean area, our allies receive important amounts of strategic materials, such as oil, from this area.

3. Access to Markets. United States markets in the southern Mediterranean area have shrunk, primarily because of United States' relations with Israel. At the same time, the economic influence of the USSR has grown in North Africa and the Mid-East. Only by reasserting our political influence in the area could we expect to see a reversal. Such a change is not anticipated in the near future.

4. Interests and Alliances. The United States oil industry provides the most important economic tie to the area. Of special interest are the Libyan oil fields, which are controlled by United States' companies.

Since World War II, the United States has required continuing access to the Mediterranean in order to support its NATO commitments. The Sixth Fleet and the Polaris submarine force are a stabilizing force retarding Soviet expansion. Without a United States naval presence, the USSR would find it increasingly easy to exert pressures on the free countries of the area. In addition to NATO, United States' commitments to CENTO and special relationships with Israel reaffirm the need for a long-term United States maritime presence in the Mediterranean.

c. Pacific Ocean. The Pacific Ocean has increased significantly in maritime importance to the United States in recent decades.

1. Trade Routes and Strategic Points. Two of the eight major United States ocean trade routes traverse the Pacific: the northern route links the United States to Japan and Southeast Asia; the southern route to Australia and New Zealand. The principal external access routes to the Pacific

are the strategic waterways of the Panama Canal and the Strait of Malacca.

2. Strategic Imports. The nations bordering the Pacific provide, in varying amounts, 21 of the 24 defense materials deemed essential to the United States. Four of these countries, Australia, Malaysia, Peru, and Chile, supply the United States with essential materials in such quantity as to be strategically important to the United States.

3. Access to Markets. Developing countries in the Western Pacific area provide an important consumer outlet for United States' exports. While Japan already is a prime importer of United States' goods, the growing affluence of other Asian countries will increase further the importance of Western Pacific markets to the United States.

4. Interests and Alliances. The realization of statehood for Alaska and Hawaii, as well as the potential statehood of Guam and the Trust Territories, have entrenched the United States even further as a Pacific power. In addition, military and economic alliances which were formed with several Western Pacific nations in order to contain communism have required an ever increasing presence of United States' military forces in the area. The requirement for Western Pacific bases to sustain this presence relies on substantial maritime support which is expected to remain in spite of lessening United States' involvement in Vietnam.

5. Ocean Resources. Turning to the Pacific Ocean itself, fisheries production therein represented 53% of the 1965 world production. Extraction of mineral resources from the Pacific has been less important than in several other ocean areas. However, recent oil discoveries in the Arctic and East China Sea are indicative of the potential of the Pacific area.

d. Atlantic Ocean. For the United States, this is the most important ocean. It is the direct ocean link to our major allies in Europe and carries the major part of our commerce.

1. Trade Routes and Strategic Points. The importance of the Atlantic trade routes is reflected in the fact that virtually every strategic material imported enters this country through East or Gulf coast ports. Twenty-eight of 34 United States' foreign trade routes originate, terminate, or pass through the Atlantic. Eighty-seven percent of all United States' imports/exports pass through Atlantic

ports (includes Great Lakes and Gulf). Less than six percent of this trade is carried in United States' flag ships. The most strategic point of the Atlantic trade routes is the Panama Canal, through which approximately 70 million gross tons of United States' trade flow annually.

2. Strategic Materials. The United States is dependent on Latin America and Africa for many strategic materials which arrive by sea.

3. Access to Expanding Markets. The United States is primarily an island nation separated from foreign markets by two great oceans. National policy is to encourage the economies of the newly emerged nations. As these economies reach self-sustaining levels, newer and larger markets will exist for American products.

4. Interests and Alliances. The Atlantic is a hurdle that must be bridged before a foreign power can invade this country. Among the several treaties which establish mutual security pacts between the U.S. and other Atlantic nations are the Atlantic Alliance and the Organization of American States. In particular, the NATO Atlantic Command provides the organization for multinational naval coordination in wartime against a common enemy.

5. Ocean Resources. Both the ocean and the continental shelf hold great promise as sources of living and non-living resources. The shelf, as well as sea water, may supply some of the strategic materials in which we are deficient. The ocean is a promising source of protein for the expanding populations of this nation and the world.

PRIORITY OF EFFORT

While the maritime interests of the United States transcend geographical ocean boundaries, the importance of the Atlantic with respect to national economic development and security dictates that this body of water receive priority consideration in terms of maritime effort. Next in importance is the Pacific, then the Mediterranean, and last, the Indian Ocean.

COMMANDERS DIGEST



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • WASHINGTON, D.C.

Vol. 7, No. 22

February 28, 1970

— UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S —

A New Strategy for Peace



"A nation needs many qualities, but it needs faith and confidence above all. Skeptics do not build societies; the idealists are the builders. Only societies that believe in themselves can rise to their challenges. Let us not, then, pose a false choice between meeting our responsibilities abroad and meeting the needs of our people at home. We shall meet both or we shall meet neither."

The President's Remarks
at the Air Force Academy
Commencement, June 4, 1969.

President Nixon has defined and outlined "United States Foreign Policy For The 1970's."

The President termed his policy "A New Strategy for Peace." And he said, "The postwar period in international relations has ended."

"When I took office," the President said, "the most immediate problem facing our nation was the war in Vietnam. No question has more occupied our thoughts and energies during this past year.

"Yet the fundamental task confronting us was more profound. We could see that the whole pattern of international politics was changing. Our challenge was to understand that change, to define America's goals for the next period, and to set in motion policies to achieve them. For all Americans must understand that because of its strength, its history and its concern for human dignity, this nation occupies a special place in the world. Peace and progress are impossible without a major American role.

"This first annual report on U.S. foreign policy is more than a record of one year. It is this Administration's statement of a new approach to foreign policy, to match a new era of international relations.

"The postwar period in international relations has ended."

In the 119-page report to Congress Feb. 18 the President explained "A New Strategy for Peace," based on three key points: Partnership, Strength and The Willingness To Negotiate.

President Nixon said:

"Peace requires partnership. Its obligations, like its benefits, must be shared. This concept of partnership guides our relations with all friendly nations.

"Peace requires strength. So long as there are those who would threaten our vital interests and those of our allies with military force, we must be strong. American weakness could tempt would-be aggressors to make dangerous miscalculations.

"At the same time, our own strength is important only in relation to the strength of others. We—like others—must place high priority on enhancing our security through cooperative arms control.

"Peace requires a willingness to negotiate. All nations—and we are no exception—have important national interests to protect. But the most fundamental interest of all nations lies in building the structure of peace. In partnership with our allies, secure in our own strength, we will seek those areas in which we can agree among ourselves and with others to accommodate conflicts and overcome rivalries. We are working toward the day when all nations will have a stake in peace, and will therefore be partners in its maintenance.

"Within such a structure, international disputes can be settled and clashes contained. The insecurity of nations, out of which so much conflict arises, will be eased, and the habits of moderation and compromise will be nurtured. Most important,

a durable peace will give full opportunity to the powerful forces driving toward economic change and social justice.

"This vision of a peace built on partnership, strength and willingness to negotiate is the unifying theme of this report. In the sections that follow, the first steps we have taken during this past year—the policies we have devised and the programs we have initiated to realize this vision—are placed in the context of these three principles."

In the introduction to his report, the President referred to the first of the three key points, terming it: "Peace Through Partnership—The Nixon Doctrine." He described how much the world—and international relationships—had changed since 1947, especially through efforts of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

The central thesis of the Nixon Doctrine, the President said, is that "the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot—and will not—conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest."

"America cannot live in isolation if it expects to live in peace. We have no intention of withdrawing from the world. The only issue before us is how we can be most effective in meeting our responsibilities, protecting our interests, and thereby building peace."

"A more responsible participation by our foreign friends in their own defense and progress means a more effective common effort toward the goals we all seek. Peace in the world will continue to require us to maintain our commitments—and we will. As I said at the United Nations, 'It is not my belief that the way to peace is by giving up our friends or letting down our allies.' But a more balanced and realistic American role in the world is essential if American commitments are to be sustained over the long pull. In my State of the Union Address, I affirmed that 'to insist that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility; it is a sharing of responsibility.' This is not a way for America to withdraw from its indispensable role in the world. It is a way—the only way—we can carry out our responsibilities."

"It is misleading, moreover, to pose the fundamental question so largely in terms of commitments. Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests over the long run with a sound foreign policy. The more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and others' interests the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."

Part III of the report is "America's Strength," divided into four sections: Shaping Our Military Posture, The Process of Defense Planning, Strategic Policy, and General Purpose Forces. Following is Part III:

SHAPING OUR MILITARY POSTURE

America's strength is the second pillar of the structure of a durable peace.

We aim for a world in which the importance of power is reduced; where peace is secure because the principal countries wish to maintain it. But this era is not yet here. We cannot



Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird

entrust our future entirely to the self-restraint of countries that have not hesitated to use their power even against their allies. With respect to national defense, any President has two principal obligations: to be certain that our military preparations do not provide an incentive for aggression, but in such a way that they do not provoke an arms race which might threaten the very security we seek to protect.

A basic review of our defense policy was essential.

In January 1969 the need for such a review was compelling. Profound changes in the world called for a fresh approach to defense policy just as they required a new approach to foreign policy. In the past, technology was relatively stable; in the contemporary world a constantly changing technology produces a new element of insecurity. Formerly, any additional strength was strategically significant; today, available power threatens to outstrip rational objectives.

We had to examine the basic premises underlying our military planning and begin shaping a military posture appropriate to the environment of the 1970's.

We launched a thorough re-examination of past concepts and programs and the alternatives we should consider for the future. The review, which is continuing, produced a reform of both national security policies and decision-making processes which was the most far-reaching in almost two decades.

For the first time, the National Security Council has had the opportunity to review a broad and complete range of national strategies for both conventional and strategic forces. This review was undertaken in terms of security and budgetary implications five years into the future. Also for the first time, the relationship of various levels of defense spending to domestic priorities was spelled out in detail for a five-year period.

As a result of this review, our interests, our foreign policy objectives, our strategies and our defense budgets are being brought into balance—with each other and with our overall national priorities.

Four factors have a special relevance to our continuing reappraisal.

Military and Arms Control Issues: First, we need to ask some

fundamental questions to establish the premises for our military posture. For example:

- In shaping our strategic nuclear posture, to what extent should we seek to maintain our security through the development of our strength? To what extent should we adopt unilateral measures of restraint? The judgment is delicate: the former course runs the risk of an arms race, the latter involves the danger of an unfavorable shift in the balance of power.
- How would either course affect the prospects for a meaningful strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union in the years ahead?
- What spectrum of threats can the United States responsibly deal with? Is it reasonable to seek to protect against every contingency from nuclear conflict to guerrilla wars?

Forward planning: *Second*, we have to plan ahead. Today's national security decisions must flow from an analysis of their implications well into the future. Many decisions on defense

'Virtually every major defense issue has complex diplomatic, political, strategic and economic implications. To insure balanced decisions, we see to it that every agency has a full opportunity to contribute.'

policies and programs will not have operational consequences for several years, in some cases for as much as a decade. Because planning mistakes may not show up for several years, deferral of hard choices is often tempting. But the ultimate penalty may be disastrous. The only responsible course is to face up to our problems and to make decisions in a long-term framework.

National Priorities: *Third*, we have to weigh our national priorities. We will almost certainly not have the funds to finance the full range of necessary domestic programs in the years ahead if we are to maintain our commitment to non-infla-

tionary economic growth. Defense spending is of course in a special category. It must never fall short of the minimum needed for security. If it does, the problem of domestic programs may become moot. But neither must we let defense spending grow beyond that justified by the defense of our vital interests while domestic needs go unmet.

Integrated Planning: *Finally*, planning our national security policies and programs in given countries and regions has often been fragmented among agencies. For example, our intelligence analysts, defense planners, economists, and political analysts dealing with a given country may have been using different assumptions about our policy objectives, our expectations about the future, and even the basic facts about our policy choices. There was a need for analyses which would provide a commonly understood set of facts, evaluations and policy and program choices. These would serve as a basis for consideration by the National Security Council of what we should be doing in given countries and regions.

In summary, we asked the central doctrinal questions; we looked as much as a decade ahead; we weighed our national priorities; and we sought ways of integrating the diverse aspects of our planning. In this fashion, we have reviewed the premises of our military policies, discarded those that no longer serve our interests, and adopted new ones suited to the 1970's. The 1971 defense budget reflects the results of our re-examination, the transition from the old strategies and policies to the new.


THE PROCESS OF DEFENSE PLANNING

This Administration found a defense planning process which left vague the impact of foreign policy on our military posture and provided an inadequate role for other agencies with a major stake in military issues. And it did little to relate defense and domestic priorities.

We set out to correct these deficiencies.

Insuring Balanced Decisions

Virtually every major defense issue has complex diplomatic, political, strategic and economic implications. To insure balanced decisions, we see to it that every agency has a full opportunity to contribute. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency participates in deliberations on de-



JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF—Left to right are General John D. Ryan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations; General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;

General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; and General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. Members of the JCS participate directly in evaluation of arms control proposals.

defense policy decisions that affect arms control prospects. In turn, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff participate directly in the evaluation of arms control proposals. The Departments of State and Defense review with the Bureau of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers economic conditions that influence the magnitude of defense spending. The Department of State examines with Defense officials issues that affect our relationships with allies.

These interagency exchanges insure that I receive all views on key national security issues. Disagreements are identified and explored, not suppressed or papered over. The full range of choices is presented.

Setting Rational Priorities

Our great wealth and productive capacity still do not enable us to pursue every worthwhile national objective with unlimited means. Choices among defense strategies and budgets have a great impact on the extent to which we can pursue other national goals.

We have no precise way of measuring whether extra dollars spent for defense are more important than extra dollars spent for other needs. But we can and have described the domestic programs that are consistent with various levels of defense expenditures. The National Security Council thus has a basis for making intelligent choices concerning the allocation of available revenue among priority federal programs. I do not believe any previous President has had the benefit of such a comprehensive picture of the interrelationships among the goals he can pursue within the limits of the federal budget.

As a result, I have decided on defense strategy and budget guidelines for the next five years that are consistent not only with our national security and the maintenance of our commitments but with our national priorities as well. This Administration is now in a position to weigh the impact of future changes in defense policies and programs on the whole fabric of government objectives.

Controlling the Defense Posture— The Defense Program Review Committee

To meet the objectives of balanced decisions and rational priorities, we made a basic addition to the National Security Council system. I directed the formation of the Defense Program Review Committee, consisting of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman), the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the President's Science Advisor, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission participate as appropriate.

This permanent Committee reviews major defense, fiscal, policy and program issues in terms of their strategic, diplomatic, political and economic implications and advises me and the National Security Council on its findings. For example, the Committee analyzed our options for proceeding with ballistic missile defenses on four separate occasions. This year, it will analyze our major strategic and fiscal choices over the next five years, together with the doctrinal, diplomatic and strategic implications of key weapons programs. It will do so while the defense budget for Fiscal Year 1972 is still in the earliest stages of formulation. The participation in this review by the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Council of Economic Advisers, and other agencies insures that careful analysis and balanced evaluations will be available when the National Security Council next fall reviews our choices for 1972 and beyond.

Country and Regional Analysis and Program Budgeting

A major obstacle to the implementation of a consistent and coherent foreign policy is the multitude of U.S. agencies and programs involved in activities in any one country or region.

In the past it has been difficult for the President or the National Security Council to obtain a picture of the totality of our effort in any one country. Yet a rational foreign policy must start with such a comprehensive view.

To overcome this difficulty we have begun a series of country program analyses which will examine all U.S. programs in key countries and regions and their interrelationships.

The studies for the first time put every U.S. program into one budget framework. The basic tool for this analysis is the program budget, which allocates all of our expenditures in a country on the basis of the purposes served. It permits us to make decisions or set guidelines for all of our programs simultaneously; in the past, they were examined largely agency by agency in isolation from one another.

The results of the country analysis studies are presented to the NSC in the form of integrated policy and program options based on alternative statements of interests, threats, and U.S. foreign policy objectives. After the NSC has considered these options, a decision can be made about the course of action to follow over the next several years.

Of course, our efforts start from the clearly understood, fundamental premise that U.S. policies and programs must relate in a logical and meaningful fashion to what our friends and allies wish to do for themselves. We are dealing with sovereign nations each of which has its own interests, its own priorities and its own capabilities. All our country programming is designed to do is to make our actions as effective as they can be consistent with our mutual interests.

I am convinced that such a comprehensive approach to country programs will lead to a decidedly improved foreign policy. We are conscious of the need not only to make sound policy decisions but also to execute them. The country analysis studies will result in both a decision document for all government agencies and firm five-year program guidelines, presented in the form of a program budget. The members of the NSC, as well as the country director in every agency and our ambassadors in the field, then have a means of making sure that our decisions are followed up.

STRATEGIC POLICY

The Changing Strategic Balance

Following World War II, the U.S. had a monopoly of strategic nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the 1950's, our virtual monopoly of intercontinental nuclear delivery capability, in the form of a large force of Strategic Air Command bombers, gave us an overwhelming deterrent.

This assessment was unchallenged until it became apparent in the late 1950's that the Soviet Union possessed the potential for developing and deploying a force of intercontinental ballistic missiles that could destroy a large part of our strategic bomber force on the ground. The fear that our deterrent to nuclear war was in grave jeopardy, though it later proved exaggerated, focused our attention on maintaining our nuclear superiority.

In 1961, the new Administration accelerated our Polaris submarine and Minuteman ICBM programs and put more of our strategic bombers on alert. These measures provided a clear margin of U.S. nuclear superiority for several years. They restored our confidence in our deterrent; we now had two forces, our Polaris submarines and our Minuteman ICBM's, deployed in hardened underground silos, that were virtually invulnerable to attack by the Soviet Union with the then-existing technology.

However, after 1965, the Soviets stepped up their ICBM deployments and began to construct their own force of Polaris-type submarines. And they began to test multiple warheads for their SS-9 ICBM, a weapon which can carry roughly ten times as much as our Minuteman missile.

Once again, U.S. strategic superiority was being challenged. However, this time, the Johnson Administration decided not to step up deployments. This restraint was based on two judg-

ments. First, it was believed that there was relatively little we could do to keep the Soviets from developing over a period of time a strategic posture comparable in capability to our own. Second, it was thought that nuclear superiority of the kind we had previously enjoyed would have little military or political significance because our retaliatory capability was not seriously jeopardized by larger Soviet forces and because their goal was in all likelihood a retaliatory capability similar to ours.

As a result of these developments, an inescapable reality of

the 1970's is the Soviet Union's possession of powerful and sophisticated strategic forces approaching, and in some categories, exceeding ours in numbers and capability.

Recent Soviet programs have emphasized both quantitative increases in offensive and defensive forces and qualitative improvements in the capabilities of these forces—such as a new, more accurate warhead and perhaps penetration aids for their Minuteman-type SS-11 missile, continued testing of the multiple warhead for the SS-9, and research and development on improved components for their ABM system, together with



Map courtesy of Department of State. Reprinted from Issues in United States Foreign Policy series—No. 2—Commitments of U.S. Power Abroad.

improved coverage by their ABM radars. The following table shows the growth in Soviet land- and submarine-based missile forces in the last five years.

OPERATIONAL U.S. AND SOVIET MISSILES

	1965 (Mid-Year)	1970 (Projected) (For Year End)
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles		
U.S.	934	1,054
Soviet	224	1,290
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles		
U.S.	464	656
Soviet	107	300

The Soviet missile deployments are continuing, whereas ours have leveled off. In the 1970's we must also expect to see Communist China deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles, seriously complicating strategic planning and diplomacy.

The evolution of U.S. and Soviet strategic capabilities during the past two decades was accompanied by intense doctrinal debates over the political and military roles of strategic forces and the appropriate criteria for choosing them.

The strategic doctrine that had gained the greatest acceptance by the time my Administration took office was this: According to the theory of "assured destruction," deterrence was guaranteed if we were sure we could destroy a significant percentage of Soviet population and industry after the worst conceivable Soviet attack on our strategic forces. The previous Administration reasoned that since we had more than enough forces for this purpose, restraint in the build-up of strategic weapons was indicated regardless of Soviet actions. Further, it hoped that U.S. restraint in strategic weapons developments and deployments would provide a strong incentive for similar restraint by the Soviet Union, thus enhancing the likelihood of a stable strategic relationship between the two nuclear superpowers.

A Policy for the 1970's

Once in office, I concluded that this strategic doctrine should be carefully reviewed in the light of the continued growth of Soviet strategic capabilities. Since the Soviets were continuing their ambitious strategic weapons program, we had to ask some basic questions. Why might a nuclear war start or be threatened? In this light, what U.S. strategic capabilities are needed for deterrence?

We sought, in short, a strategic goal that can best be termed "sufficiency."

Our review took full account of two factors that have not existed in the past.

First, the Soviets' present build-up of strategic forces, together with what we know about their development and test programs, raises serious questions about where they are headed and the potential threats we and our allies face. These questions must be faced soberly and realistically.

Second, the growing strategic forces on both sides pose new and disturbing problems. Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?

Our review produced general agreement that the overriding purpose of our strategic posture is political and defensive: to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority. We must insure that all potential aggressors see unacceptable risks in contemplating a nuclear attack, or nuclear blackmail, or acts which could escalate to strategic nuclear war, such as a Soviet conventional attack on Europe.

Beyond this general statement, our primary task was to decide on the yardsticks that should be used in evaluating the adequacy of our strategic forces against the projected threats. This issue took on added importance because such yardsticks would be needed for assessing the desirability of possible strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union.

We reached general agreement within the government on four specific criteria for strategic sufficiency. These represent a significant intellectual advance. They provide for both adequacy and flexibility. They will be constantly reviewed in the light of a changing technology.

Designing Strategic Forces

Having settled on a statement of strategic purposes and criteria, we analyzed possible U.S. strategic force postures for the 1970's and beyond. We reviewed alternatives ranging from "minimum deterrence"—a posture built around ballistic missile submarines and the assured destruction doctrine narrowly interpreted—to attempts at recapturing numerical superiority through accelerated U.S. strategic deployments across the board.

There was general agreement that postures which significantly reduced or increased our strategic programs and deployments involved undesirable risks:

—*Sharp cutbacks would not permit us to satisfy our sufficiency criteria, and might provoke the opposite Soviet reaction.* If the U.S. unilaterally dropped out of the strategic arms competition, the Soviets might well seize the opportunity to step up their programs and achieve a significant margin of strategic superiority. The vigor and breadth of their current strategic weapons programs and deployments, which clearly exceed the requirements of minimum deterrence, make such a possibility seem far from remote. They might also—paradoxically—eliminate any Soviet incentives for an agreement to limit strategic arms, and would raise serious concerns among our allies. This is particularly true for our NATO allies who view the U.S. commitment to deter Soviet aggression as being based mainly on our maintenance of a powerful strategic posture.

—*Sharp increases, on the other hand, might not have any significant political or military benefits.* Many believe that the Soviets would seek to offset our actions, at least in part, and that Soviet political positions would harden, tensions would increase, and the prospect for reaching agreements to limit strategic arms might be irreparably damaged.

What ultimately we must do in between these extremes will depend, of course, on many factors. Will the Soviets continue to expand their strategic forces? What will be their configuration? What understanding might we reach on strategic arms limitations? What weapons systems might be covered by agreements?

I recognize that decisions on shaping our strategic posture are perhaps the most complex and fateful we face. The answers to these questions will largely determine whether we will be forced into increased deployments to offset the Soviet threat to the sufficiency of our deterrent, or whether we and the Soviet Union can together move from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation, whether jointly we can pursue responsible, non-provocative strategic arms policies based on sufficiency as a mutually shared goal or whether there will be another round of the arms race.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS OFFICIAL INFORMATION, NEWS AND POLICY, DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED SOURCES.

Published weekly by American Forces Press Service, 1117 N. 19th St., Arlington, Va. 22209, a unified activity of the Office of Information for the Armed Forces, OASD (M&EA). Reproduction of content is authorized. Suggested dateline for materials used is WASHINGTON (AFPS).

The Role of Ballistic Missile Defense

My decision to continue with the construction of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system is fully consistent with our criteria and with our goal of effective arms limitation.

I would like to recall what I said last March about the problem that led us to seek approval of the first phase of the Safeguard program:

"The gravest responsibility which I bear as President of the United States is for the security of the Nation. Our nuclear forces defend not only ourselves but our allies as well. The imperative that our nuclear deterrent remain secure beyond any possible doubt requires that the U.S. must take steps now to insure that our strategic retaliatory forces will not become vulnerable to a Soviet attack."

I believed then, and I am even more convinced today, that there is a serious threat to our retaliatory capability in the form of the growing Soviet forces of ICBM's and ballistic missile submarines, their multiple warhead program for the SS-9 missile, their apparent interest in improving the accuracy of their ICBM warheads, and their development of a semi-orbital nuclear weapon system. That this threat continues to be serious was confirmed by my Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board—an independent, bipartisan group of senior outside advisors—which recently completed its own review of the strategic threats we face.

I pointed out in the same statement that we cannot ignore the potential Chinese threat against the U.S. population, as well as the danger of an accidental or unauthorized attack from any source. Nor can we dismiss the possibility that other countries may in the future acquire the capability to attack

'The United States has interests in defending certain land areas abroad as well as essential air and sea lines of communication.'

the U.S. with nuclear weapons. Today, any nuclear attack—no matter how small; whether accidental, unauthorized or by design; by a superpower or by a country with only a primitive nuclear delivery capability—would be a catastrophe for the U.S., no matter how devastating our ability to retaliate.

No Administration with the responsibility for the lives and security of the American people could fail to provide every possible protection against such eventualities.

Thus on March 14, 1969, I stated the objectives of the Safeguard program:

"This measured deployment is designed to fulfill three objectives:

"1. Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union.

"2. Defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.

"3. Protection against the possibility of accidental attacks."

I further described the system as follows:

"We will provide for local defense of selected Minuteman missile sites and an area defense designed to protect our bomber bases and our command and control authorities. In addition, this system will provide a defense of the Continental United States against an accidental attack and will provide substantial protection against the kind of attack which the Chinese Communists may be capable of launching throughout the 1970's. This deployment will not require us to place missile and radar sites close to our major cities."

Last year, I promised that "each phase of the deployment will be reviewed to insure that we are doing as much as necessary but not more than that required by the threat existing at that time." I further indicated that in strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union, the United States will be fully prepared to discuss limitations on defensive as well as offensive weapons systems.

The further steps I shall propose will be consistent with these pledges. The Secretary of Defense will put forward a minimum program essential for our security. It fully protects our flexibility in discussing limitations on defensive weapons with the Soviet Union. It is my duty as President to make certain that we do no less.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Premises

When I examined the objectives established for our general purpose forces, I concluded that we must emphasize three fundamental premises of a sound defense policy:

First, while strategic forces must deter all threats of general war no matter what the cost, our general purpose forces must be more sensitively related to local situations and particular interests.

Second, while the possession of 95 per cent of the nuclear power of the non-Communist world gives us the primary responsibility for nuclear defense, the planning of general purpose forces must take into account the fact that the manpower of our friends greatly exceeds our own, as well as our heavy expenditures for strategic forces.

Third, we cannot expect U.S. military forces to cope with the entire spectrum of threats facing allies or potential allies throughout the world. This is particularly true of subversion and guerrilla warfare, or "wars of national liberation." Experience has shown that the best means of dealing with insurgencies is to preempt them through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, paramilitary and military action by the threatened government.

We may be able to supplement local efforts with economic and military assistance. However, a direct combat role for U.S. general purpose forces arises primarily when insurgency has shaded into external aggression or when there is an overt conventional attack. In such cases, we shall weigh our interests and our commitments, and we shall consider the efforts of our allies, in determining our response.

The United States has interests in defending certain land areas abroad as well as essential air and sea lines of communication. These derive from:

- the political and economic importance of our alliances;
- our desire to prevent or contain hostilities which could lead to major conflicts and thereby endanger world peace; and
- the strategic value of the threatened area as well as its line of communications.

The military posture review I initiated the day I took office included a thorough examination of our general purpose forces. This study explored in turn our interests, the potential threats to those interests, the capabilities of our allies both with and without our assistance, and the relationship of various strategies to domestic priorities.

The National Security Council examined five different strategies for general purpose forces and related each one to the domestic programs which could be supported simultaneously. Thus, for the first time, national security and domestic priorities were considered together. In fact, two strategies were rejected because they were not considered essential to our security and because they would have thwarted vital domestic programs.

We finally decided on a strategy which represented a significant modification of the doctrine that characterized the 1960's.

The stated basis of our conventional posture in the 1960's was the so-called "2-½ war" principle. According to it, U.S. forces would be maintained for a three-month conventional forward defense of NATO, a defense of Korea or Southeast Asia against a full-scale Chinese attack, and a minor contingency—all simultaneously. These force levels were never reached.

In the effort to harmonize doctrine and capability, we chose what is best described as the "1-½ war" strategy. Under it we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese

threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere. The choice of this strategy was based on the following considerations:

- the nuclear capability of our strategic and theater nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or Chinese attack on our Asian allies;
- the prospects for a coordinated two-front attack on our allies by Russia and China are low both because of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation. In any event, we do not believe that such a coordinated attack should be met primarily by U.S. conventional forces;
- the desirability of insuring against greater than expected threats by maintaining more than the forces required to

meet conventional threats in one theater—such as NATO Europe;

—weakness on our part would be more provocative than continued U.S. strength, for it might encourage others to take dangerous risks, to resort to the illusion that military adventurism could succeed.

To meet the requirements for the strategy we adopted, we will maintain the required ground and supporting tactical air forces in Europe and Asia, together with naval and air forces. At the same time, we will retain adequate active forces in addition to a full complement of reserve forces based in the United States. These force levels will be spelled out in greater detail in the program and budget statement of the Secretary of Defense.



Map courtesy of Department of State. Reprinted from Issues in United States Foreign Policy series—No. 3—Commitments of U.S. Power Abroad.

THE NIXON DOCTRINE: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970's--

A NEW STRATEGY FOR PEACE

A. Suggested Issues for Discussion.

1. In his major foreign policy address of February 18, 1970, the President criticized the carryover into foreign policy of the otherwise admirable American trait of "do-it-yourself." The emphasis in foreign policy now presumably will shift to a basis of helping others to help themselves. What will this new approach likely mean in terms of specific national and military strategies with respect to Asia, Africa, and Latin America?

2. Will implementation of the Nixon Doctrine place primary emphasis on "commitments" as they presently exist, or on a narrower reinterpretation of American national interests? Will the answer be the same for Asia and the Pacific as for Europe?

3. In his address President Nixon expanded on the partnership aspects of the Nixon Doctrine, placing heavy emphasis on Europe. What are the strategic military implications of this emphasis? Does it imply major realignments of the force structure in Europe? If so, what are these likely to be?

4. While the address gave detailed comment on the problems of Asia and the Middle East, it did not stress the SEATO or CENTO treaties. Is this significant?

5. The Nixon Doctrine rests on three "pillars": peace through partnership, America's continued military strength, and willingness to negotiate international issues. With respect to the third pillar, what are the prospects for a successful outcome to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)? How can "successful" be measured? What strategic advantages can the United States expect to attain from these talks?

6. In his address the President gave a summary review of United States' military strength, discussing the changing strategic balance. He stated that the United States seeks "sufficiency," as a strategic goal. What does this term imply?

I. USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE:

A. UNITED STATES' NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

National Objective Number One. Deter the Soviet threat against the physical security of the U.S. and her allies in accordance with international commitments.

Strategy.

- a. Maintain a strong Western Europe to thwart any possible Soviet move in this area.
- b. Continue present contribution of forces with back-up of U.S. strategic and tactical weapons.
- c. Continue to work for strategic arms limitations.

National Objective Number Two. Maintain capability for flexible response to aggression against the U.S. or her allies.

Strategy.

- a. Retain credible military strength, capable of fighting one major and one minor war concurrently.
- b. Ensure that any net reductions in NATO forces are balanced by equivalent Warsaw reductions.

National Objective Number Three. Frustrate Communist attempts to subvert the political institutions of friendly, free European nations.

Strategy.

- a. Honor international commitments with support appropriate to the situation.
- b. Maintain the territorial status quo in Western Europe.
- c. Remain disengaged in the China-USSR confrontation, to permit intervention if outbreak of general war is threatened.

National Objective Number Four. Encourage international efforts in peacemaking and peacekeeping.

Strategy.

a. Continue efforts to work through United Nations and regional organizations.

b. If possible, work closely with the USSR to achieve peace when war breaks out in the "third world."

c. Work multilaterally and openly with concerned nations to solve conflict problems.

National Objective Number Five. Promote and support the efforts of independent nations toward self-determination; improve international exchanges in cultural and economic areas; and participate in worldwide efforts to maintain the ecological balance of the world.

Strategy.

a. Continue attempts to improve economic, sociological and cultural relationships with the USSR and Eastern Europe unilaterally and multilaterally.

b. Encourage Western Europe to improve relations with Eastern Europe and reach a European solution to Europe's problems.

c. Encourage self-determination without implying assistance which is not intended to be forthcoming.

National Objective Number Six. Preserve freedom of the seas.

Strategy.

a. Maintain credible and effective seapower, both naval and non-naval, and project it worldwide.

I. USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE:

B. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE MILITARY STRATEGIES

Introduction

President Nixon included America's strength in the "three-pillar" approach of the Nixon Doctrine. A major share of our military strength, relative to the Soviet Union, is represented by our strategic forces. These forces are charged primarily with the task of providing for successful nuclear deterrence. Should this fail, these forces are prepared to destroy the enemy's capability to continue the conflict.

The vital importance of the strategic balance between the U.S. and the USSR is, therefore, readily apparent and of grave concern for our strategic planners. The choice of an effective nuclear strategy becomes one on which national survival may well rest. This discussion area will focus on alternative U.S. nuclear strategies relative to the Soviet Union. Military strategies involving general purpose forces, NATO, the Mediterranean, etc.--all of which are linked to the Soviet Union--are addressed in other discussion areas as appropriate.

Strategic Alternative Number One: Absolute nuclear superiority.

This strategy envisions:

1. Attaining an overwhelming deterrent by achieving absolute nuclear superiority, to include a clearly credible first strike capability.
2. Major expansion in development and production of offensive and defensive strategic weapon systems to include MIRV and Poseidon missile warhead deployments, ULMS, the B-1 strategic bomber, advanced ICBM, and extended ABM.
3. Hardening of weapon systems.
4. Dispersal of missile/bomber bases.
5. Continuous airborne bomber alert.
6. An effective civil defense program.

Advantages

1. Demonstrates U.S. willingness to bear the costs for these programs and impresses upon the USSR the U.S. resolve to use its weapons if required.
2. Helps guarantee successful nuclear deterrence.
3. Improves probability of a successful outcome to SALT.
4. Reduces Soviet incentive to engage in operations which could conceivably escalate into nuclear war.

Disadvantages

1. Contributes to domestic unrest, since it is financially and politically infeasible and unacceptable to large segments of the U.S. public.
2. Contributes to international instability, especially with respect to the Soviet Union.
3. Contributes uncertainty in SALT, and may start major arms race.
4. Presupposes return to the strategy of "massive retaliation," a concept which is not considered militarily and technologically feasible today.

Strategic Alternative Number Two: Assured Destruction and Damage-Limiting.

This strategy envisions:

1. The ability to deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining a clearly credible capability to inflict unacceptable damage on an attacker, even were that attacker to strike first.
2. Maintenance of a balanced force of sea-based and land-based strategic missiles.
3. Continuance of selected hardening and dispersal of missile sites and bombers.
4. Continued development and deployment of Poseidon/MIRV warheads and penetration aids.

5. Withholding a decision to produce (but continuing R&D on) an advanced bomber, ICBM's and ULM's pending outcome of SALT and Soviet actions.

6. Limited ABM and Civil Defense Programs.

Advantages

1. Offers some assurance that deterrence will work without straining our economic resources.

2. Offers a politically feasible course.

3. Presents, in a military sense, a rational strategy which is credible to the Soviets.

4. Retains the option of SALT.

5. Offers a technologically feasible strategy.

Disadvantages

1. Risks the possibility that our assured destruction and damage-limiting capabilities could become--in the estimate of Soviet planners--ineffective, and, hence, invite a Soviet confrontation, or even first strike.

2. Risks increased vulnerability to technological surprise.

3. Narrows our basis for negotiation in SALT.

4. Bases our strategic force structure (to a certain extent) on Soviet actions which may not always be discernible until too late.

Strategic Alternative Number Three: Unilateral Arms Limitation.

This strategy envisions:

1. Acceptance of the present level of U.S. nuclear deterrence as adequate, regardless of future force changes by a potential attacker.

2. Maintenance of U.S. strategic systems as they exist today, neither modernizing nor increasing them in numbers.

Advantages

1. Presents financially attractive solution.
2. Provides a slim possibility that Soviets would be encouraged in similar actions.

Disadvantages

1. Amounts to unilateral nuclear disarmament; hence is politically infeasible and militarily impractical.

I. USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE:

C. SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. A favorite thesis of some Western observers is that the Soviet economy is inefficient. How does this fit in with the Soviet ability to produce and maintain advanced weaponry, as well as their space, maritime, and other achievements?

2. Should the United States actively pursue a policy of "detente" and "bridge-building" with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact nations? If so, what should be the scope and limits of such a policy? If not, what alternative policies should the United States pursue in East-West relations?

3. Almost two years have passed since the 1968 Czechoslovakian occupation. Can this Soviet action be considered to have been a success or failure for the Soviet Union?

4. Does the Soviet Union still maintain its objective of world revolution? Discuss in terms of specific policies and examples.

5. The Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty holds that the Soviet Union has the right to use military force to subdue any Communist nation whose current policies are contrary to Soviet interests. Has this policy brought about any fundamental changes in the relations between Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies?

6. Does the rapid expansion of the Soviet Navy imply an intention to enforce the Brezhnev Doctrine in overseas socialist nations (e.g., Cuba)?

7. What roles do the rapidly expanding Soviet maritime forces play in advancing Soviet ideological and nationalistic goals worldwide? What threat do they pose to U.S. national security? To the security of U.S. allies?

8. Within the framework of the Nixon Doctrine, what U.S. maritime strategy is most appropriate in response to the Soviet maritime challenge?

9. What new strategic system should receive our number one priority for development and production in light of the changing strategic balance between the U.S. and the USSR?

II. WESTERN EUROPE, ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN:

A. UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

National Objective Number One. Develop and implement policies and programs to encourage a politically stable Western Europe, friendly to the interests of the United States.

Strategy.

- a. Germany: Support a strong West Germany.
- b. Portugal: Support UN resolutions for reforms in Portuguese Africa directed toward ultimate self-determination.
- c. Spain: Maintain U.S. neutrality regarding Gibraltar, while continuing Spanish base rights negotiations.
- d. Mid-East: Maintain neutrality and attempt by measures short of war to prevent resumption of hostilities, while seeking permanent political settlement.
- e. Malta, Cyprus, Greece: Maintain U.S. Sixth Fleet presence in the Mediterranean and encourage economic and political development and stability in each country.
- f. Western Europe: Support these countries in the establishment of independent, peaceful relations with the USSR and the Eastern European countries.

National Objective Number Two. Develop policies and programs to encourage and support a strong West European economy, with an environment favorable to trade and investment interests of the United States.

Strategy.

- a. European Integration: Continue to encourage progress toward economic integration by the European Economic Community (EEC), and, particularly, the broadening of EEC's membership.

b. U.S. Trade: Seek to lower trade barriers between the United States and the EEC and European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries, and to ameliorate the EEC's restrictive barriers to U.S. agricultural products.

c. U.S. Investment: Shift policy to one of consistent encouragement of long-term U.S. investment, and discourage short-term speculation in Western Europe.

d. Monetary Policy: Continue efforts in the International Monetary Fund to encourage more flexible monetary exchange rates.

e. Economic Aid: Continue to urge West European countries to increase aid to less developed countries, channeling their assistance through international agencies.

National Objective Number Three. Encourage and support an individual and collective capacity on the part of West European countries to resist armed attack.

Strategy.

a. NATO: Continue support of NATO as a principal vehicle for containment of Communist military pressures in the North Atlantic, Western Europe and the Mediterranean.

b. Nuclear Weapons: Continue to guarantee the defense of Western Europe (within treaty obligations) by deployment of tactical weapons as well as strategic forces.

c. Military Bases: Maintain dispersed bases in depth as an important part of the U.S. presence in Western Europe, weighing costs against tactical and strategic planning for employment of forces.

d. Soviet Naval Threat: Continue to maintain a strong naval presence, base rights and capability for rapid response with modern, effective forces. Encourage integrated naval forces of the member NATO countries as a desirable avenue for achieving additional effectiveness and shared costs.

II. WESTERN EUROPE, ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN:

B. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE MILITARY STRATEGIES

Introduction. In his address to Congress on United States foreign policy for the 1970's, President Nixon affirmed that, "The peace of Europe is crucial to the peace of the world. This truth . . . is a central principle of United States foreign policy. For the foreseeable future, Europe must be the cornerstone of the structure of a durable peace." He went on to say, "As we move from dominance to partnership, there is the possibility that some will see this as a step toward disengagement. But in the third decade of our commitment to Europe, the depth of our relationship is a fact of life. We can no more disengage from Europe than from Alaska."

U.S. strategy in the area of Western Europe will be shaped within the three-cornered framework of the stated commitment, the concept of partnership advanced in the Nixon Doctrine, and the growing domestic opposition to forward basing of U.S. forces in Europe. This latter position is typified by Senate Majority Leader Mansfield's statement that, "substantial reduction of United States forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our resolve or ability to meet our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty."

The implications for maritime strategy inherent in all three of these positions are so significant that alternative naval strategies for the Atlantic and the Mediterranean are addressed separately in this paper.

II. B. (1). STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR WESTERN EUROPE

Strategic Alternative Number One: Increase the Overall United States' Commitment to NATO.

This strategy is:

1. Essentially a continuation of the current strategy of flexible response, but provides for
2. Greater continuing commitment of U.S. forces to Europe in order to ensure ability to meet Warsaw Pact aggression and defer resort to nuclear weapons.

Advantages

1. Increases deterrent effect.
2. Increases capability of countering conventional attack with conventional forces.
3. Decreases probability of escalation to nuclear weapons.
4. Increases time available after attack to augment NATO with conventional forces from the U.S.

Disadvantages

1. Increases overall U.S. defense costs.
2. Aggravates balance of payments difficulties.
3. Antagonizes large portion of U.S. population.
4. Becomes feasible only if direct threat to Western Europe increases sharply.
5. May induce allies to believe European force contributions can be safely reduced.

Strategic Alternative Number Two: Continue Present Strategy: Flexible Response.

This strategy contemplates:

1. Maintenance of current force levels in Europe.

2. Emphasis on mobile, conventional forces drawn from all NATO nations.

3. Conventional response with augmentation of forces as required when threat increases or fighting begins.

4. Escalation to tactical/strategic nuclear weapons if required.

Advantages

1. Offers a politically and economically feasible solution.
2. Maintains deterrent effect.
3. Provides marginally adequate time for reinforcement of conventional forces.
4. Does not aggravate domestic strife, as would an increased commitment.
5. Maintains European credence in U.S. commitment.

Disadvantages

1. Risks early escalation to nuclear warfare, due to inadequate conventional defense.
2. Continues inequitable U.S. share of burden of European defense.
3. Fails to improve U.S. budgetary and balance of payments problems.
4. Fails to satisfy large segment of U.S. population which favors reduced defense effort.

Strategic Alternative Number Three: Reduced Commitment.

This strategy envisions:

1. Withdrawal of U.S. forces partially and gradually from Europe, as other NATO forces demonstrate capability of meeting Soviet threat.
2. Continuation of the U.S. commitment to Europe.
3. Reliance increasingly upon European conventional forces for initial defense.

4. Retention in the U.S. of forces in-being committed to NATO.

5. Development of adequate airlift, naval attack and sealift forces to insure initial defense and subsequent reinforcement of Europe.

Advantages

1. Partially placates segment of U.S. population opposed to defense spending.

2. Gradually improves U.S. balance of payments position.

3. Maintains some European credence in U.S. commitment to Europe.

4. Hopefully, provides incentive to greater European effort.

Disadvantages

1. Foregoes the option of trade-off reduction of forces with Warsaw Pact nations (Alternative Five).

2. Risks that reduced U.S. presence will reduce deterrent effect.

3. Causes some loss of European credence in U.S. commitment.

4. Encourages European nations to develop national nuclear forces.

5. Increases probability of escalation to nuclear warfare.

6. Reduces time available for reinforcement from CONUS.

Strategic Alternative Number Four: Withdrawal.

This strategy envisions:

1. Continued U.S. membership in NATO, but unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe.

2. Continued U.S. commitment to Europe, but with greatly reduced capability.

3. Reliance upon greater European contribution to conventional forces.

Advantages

1. Placates segment of U.S. population opposed to defense spending.

2. Reduces U.S. balance of payments difficulties.

3. Reduces overall U.S. defense expenditures.

Disadvantages

1. Reduces deterrent effect. Increased probability of success invites Soviet aggression.

2. Reduces European confidence in U.S. commitment.

3. Encourages European nations to develop national nuclear forces.

4. Ultimately, forces a return to strategy of massive retaliation.

5. Invites collapse of NATO.

6. Requires massive expansion of U.S. sealift and airlift capability in order to reinforce NATO when required.

Strategic Alternative Number Five: Force Level Negotiation.

This strategy contemplates that the U.S. and NATO allies would enter into direct NATO/Warsaw Pact negotiations for mutual reductions in European force levels.

Advantages

1. Reduces defense burden for U.S. and NATO allies.

2. Increases opportunity for improved East/West relations.

3. Complements and enhances probability of success of SALT.

4. Reduces threats of accidental confrontation.

Disadvantages

1. Ignores Soviet covert mobilization and deployment capability inherent in closed society.
2. Establishes situation in which Soviets, by virtue of geographic advantage, could reinforce European garrisons more rapidly than could the U.S.
3. Increases risk of surprise Soviet attack in Europe, to which West could respond adequately only with nuclear weapons.

II. B. (2). STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR THE
ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN

Strategic Alternative Number One: Absolute U.S. Naval Superiority.

This strategy entails:

1. U.S. naval forces adequate to insure open sealanes of communication to Western Europe and the Mediterranean.
2. Naval surface and air forces capable of neutralizing and/or decisively defeating Soviet surface naval forces.
3. Naval antisubmarine forces capable of neutralizing and/or decisively defeating Soviet attack and ballistic missile submarines.

Advantages

1. Insures U.S. ability to protect its interests worldwide, particularly in Europe and the Mediterranean littoral, without undue reliance upon allies whose support may be questionable in particular circumstances.

Disadvantages

1. Would be extremely costly in terms of both money and manpower.
2. Would be politically and economically infeasible.
3. Places inequitable share of burden of European defense on United States.

Strategic Alternative Number Two: Absolute NATO Naval Superiority.

This strategy envisions:

1. Integrated NATO naval forces in which the collective contribution of other nations equals or exceeds that of the United States.
2. A combined naval force adequate to insure open sealanes of communication to Western Europe and the Mediterranean.

3. Combined naval surface and air forces capable of neutralizing and/or decisively defeating Soviet surface naval forces.

4. Combined naval antisubmarine forces capable of neutralizing and/or decisively defeating Soviet attack and ballistic missile submarines.

Advantages

1. The same as for Strategic Alternative Number One, except that the legitimate interests of allies are recognized and reliance is placed upon them.

Disadvantages

1. Risks inadequate U.S. naval force in situations where European interests are minimal or nonexistent.

Strategic Alternative Number Three: Fortress America.

This strategy contemplates:

1. Substantial or total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, and a general strategy stressing defense of the United States proper.

2. Naval forces adequate to protect the United States against attack from the sea, but not adequate to project U.S. seapower worldwide or to defeat decisively enemy naval forces wherever they may be.

Advantages

1. Permits reductions in naval force levels and budgets.

2. Reduces the risk of accidental U.S./USSR naval confrontation.

Disadvantages

1. Precludes possibility of reinforcing Europe.

2. Permits and encourages Soviet naval visits and shows-of-force in other nations without countering actions by U.S.

3. Permits unhindered Soviet intervention in other nations.
4. Permits Soviet instigation and unhindered support of "Wars of National Liberation."
5. Ultimately risks total isolation of the United States from allies and sources of essential materials.

II. WESTERN EUROPE, ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN:

C. SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. What should or can NATO's planning and strategy be if the Brezhnev Doctrine is invoked by the Soviets in some future crisis similar to the 1968 Czechoslovakian affair?

2. The move toward Western European political integration seems to have stalled. Economic integration appears to have advanced about as far as can reasonably be expected, even assuming entry of Britain into the Common Market. Are there any other routes through which Western Europe can assume an independent and effective third force role in world politics?

3. The "German question" seems to be at the head of the list of European political problems. How far should the United States go in active support of Chancellor Brandt's policies of rapprochement with East Germany? What kinds of support can the United States give to the process of normalized East-West German relations? Will closer relations between the German states weaken NATO?

4. One of the major issues between the United States and its NATO allies has been the size of the individual nations' conventional force contribution for the implementation of NATO's flexible response strategy. Given the U.S. domestic pressure for reducing our conventional forces in Europe, what security alternatives are available to Western Europe if the United States does in fact drastically reduce the size of its ground forces in Europe? Can we realistically expect our NATO partners (outside of West Germany) to assume more of the conventional defense of Europe? What are the naval implications of reduced forward basing of U.S. ground or air forces?

5. In his February 1970 report to the Congress on U.S. foreign policy, President Nixon spoke of a "more balanced association and a more genuine partnership" with Western Europe as being in America's interest. What policies can this country pursue to further this interest? In turn, what can the Europeans themselves do to enhance this partnership? What more might be achieved in partnership terms in the area of naval strategy, particularly in view of the increased Soviet naval presence in both the Atlantic and Mediterranean?

III. AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA:

A. UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

National Objective Number One. Support the development of independent African nations capable of resisting Communist subversion and oriented toward the Free World.

Strategy.

- a. Encourage full use of regional arrangements for pursuing national development objectives and settling intra-regional disputes.
- b. Recognize rapid change as an African characteristic and seek to accelerate constructive change at a rate sufficient to overcome disintegrative tendencies.
- c. Seek the development of responsible political leadership.
- d. Encourage other Free World developed nations and appropriate international organizations to maintain or increase their support of African development.

National Objective Number Two. Maintain U.S. and West European access to African raw materials of critical importance.

Strategy.

- a. Encourage other Free World developed nations and appropriate international organizations to support development of African resources.
- b. Focus available U.S. resources on specific countries in which the U.S. has a significant interest and on problems most critical to the development of African nations.

National Objective Number Three. Maintain U.S. access to African territory strategically important for transit and communications purposes.

Strategy.

- a. Recognize that U.S. strategic interests are limited in most African nations south of the Sahara, and, because of the potential for extensive conflict within the region, follow a strategy of maximum flexibility and minimum direct commitment--a strategy of "selective involvement."

b. Recognize military and radical governments that come to power through nonstatutory means on a case-by-case basis and then only after consideration of a broad range of factors, from U.S. national interests and prestige to internal conditions of the subject country.

III. AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA:

B. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE MILITARY STRATEGIES

Introduction. The United States has no vital security objectives in Africa South of Sahara but it is in our long range national interest to cooperate with the African countries in their endeavors to improve conditions of life and to help in their efforts to build an equitable political and economic order in which all can share. In furtherance of these interests, the United States should:

1. persist in its support of the principal of self-determination for all peoples.
2. continue its stand for racial equality and self-determination, looking for peaceful and evolutionary solutions to advance these goals.
3. respect the political institutions that Africans themselves create, even though they may not meet our own democratic standards.
4. continue to support wider cooperation on a regional and continental basis among African countries.
5. avoid the spread of the Cold War into the continent of Africa, recognizing the individual sovereignty of the nations.
6. not seek military alliances or spheres of influence on the continent.
7. cooperate with African governments on a basis of mutual respect.

Based on these national interests, and recognizing the possibility of Soviet and Chinese political, economic and military expansionism in the area, the following military strategies are possibilities:

Strategic Alternative Number One. Forceful Presence:

This strategy implies that:

1. The United States will permanently establish operating bases on the continent.

2. Forces tailored to meet any contingency would be strategically located at or near African bases.

3. The United States would oppose any external force in Africa which is against U.S. national interests.

Advantages

1. Provides visible proof to the Soviet and Chinese bloc powers that Africa is of significant concern to the United States.

2. Provides for prompt military reaction.

3. Gains strategic footholds on the continent in furtherance of a global military strategy.

Disadvantages

1. Is economically and politically infeasible.

2. Confirms charge of "neo-colonialism" in the minds of Africans.

3. Alienates either Black or White Africans. (A policy of commitment cannot satisfy both groups.)

4. Exposes the African continent to the Cold War in a scramble similar to that of the late nineteenth century.

5. Does not support stated United States interests.

Strategic Alternative Number Two. Limited and Selective Involvement:

This strategy recognizes that:

1. The United States will maintain some sort of military presence in and assistance to selected African countries.

2. The United States would provide military aid if asked, and if it considered assistance to be necessary and in the U.S. interest.

3. The United States would support militarily multi-lateral organizations in their efforts to assist nations which request help when it is in the United States' interests to do so.

4. The United States will plan for and maintain a military contingency force based in the CONUS which could be tailored to meet specific circumstances, and which would be prepared to act unilaterally in this area if so directed.

Advantages

1. Offers maximum flexibility for the United States.
2. Provides Africans with a United States minimal presence, giving the psychological impression that the United States is deeply interested in Africa.
3. Offers no visible change to existing strategy and is in agreement with stated interests.

Disadvantages

1. Meets with resistance in both Black and White Africa because the United States remains interested in African problems but uncommitted to either side.
2. Does not guarantee a reliable United States commitment.
3. Involves a measure of financial drain on limited resources.

Strategic Alternative Number Three. Basic Non-Involvement:

Implicit in this strategy are:

1. That the United States would not commit any forces to combat internal or external aggression on the continent of Africa.
2. That all U.S. military missions and/or military assistance advisory groups would be withdrawn.
3. That existing military assistance programs would be cancelled.
4. That the only United States military presence in Africa would be attachés on embassy staffs.

Advantages

1. Relieves pressure on finite military resources by large savings of MAP funds.

2. Is consistent with growing internal pressures for non-involvement in foreign areas.

3. Is consistent with African desires for non-intervention of outside powers in internal situations, and removes the United States from the role of "neo-colonialist" power.

Disadvantages

1. Severely limits any future options in the continent.

2. Creates a vacuum which could possibly be filled by powers opposed to United States' interests.

3. Handicaps capability of African nations to resist internal subversion by outside powers.

III. AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA:

C. SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. During the next decade, the situation in Africa will be undergoing rapid change. What effect will these developments have on our national interests?
2. The tension prevalent in Southern Africa because of the race issue is likely to deepen. What can and should the United States do to help lessen this tension, keeping our strategic interest (e.g., fueling and repair facilities in South Africa, Angola and Mozambique) in the area in mind?
3. How extensive is the influence which French culture, trade and aid exerts in the former French colonial areas of Africa? How can this influence assist in solving the modernization problems faced by the nations which were formed from these areas?
4. Portugal's African overseas provinces are a heavy drain on her resources, largely because of defense expenditures for the areas. How much is United States' policy toward Africa and toward Portugal, a NATO partner, affected by Portugal's African problems and policies? Can an effective solution for this problem be found?
5. What aspects of Communist China's ideology or policies are responsible for the apparent reverses of China's policies in Africa? How could renewed Chinese efforts in Africa best be countered?
6. Have the African regional organizations and the Organization of African Unity provided any cause for optimism with respect to their effectiveness for African economic and political cooperation?
7. How will developments in Africa South of the Sahara affect the security of the Indian Ocean area? What U.S. naval strategy is appropriate for that area? In view of the minimal U.S. interests in Africa, is the Nixon Doctrine concept of partnership applicable? If so, in what ways could it be expressed? Are African states likely to cooperate with one another for security purposes?

IV. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:

A. UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

National Objective Number One. Maintain the United States as the major political influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Strategy.

a. Work to exclude non-hemispheric, totalitarian influence from Latin America, most particularly the influence of international communism.

b. Continue to isolate Cuba.

c. Improve the United States image by making credible the U.S. policy of strict non-intervention and partnership.

National Objective Number Two. Support establishment of stable, representative governments in all Latin American states.

Strategy.

a. Encourage participation by greater percentages of the populations in the political life of their countries.

b. Be prepared to deal realistically with interim authoritative governments which actively and effectively pursue the economic, social, and political development of their countries.

National Objective Number Three. Encourage and aid in the development of political, social, and economic stability through measures providing for overall national development, more equitable sharing of the benefits of the modern world, and an increased standard of living for the masses.

Strategy.

a. Encourage and aid in the reduction of illiteracy as a principal requisite for all other development.

b. Encourage a general concern in Latin American governments for the need of population growth controls; be prepared to aid in establishing realistic and effective programs.

c. Encourage a political climate that will both retain domestic investment capital and attract foreign investors.

d. Administer aid through multinational organizations, rather than through bilateral arrangements.

e. Promote mutually beneficial trade and investment between the United States and Latin America.

f. Encourage investment of private U.S. capital in Latin America.

National Objective Number Four. Promote the United States' concept for hemispheric defense.

Strategy.

a. Discourage excessive or unrealistic military expenditures.

b. Promote the retention of U.S. rights in the Panama Canal.

c. Promote the concern that military requirements should focus primarily on internal security and limited defense needs, including antisubmarine warfare and coastal patrol, since the U.S. will play the primary role in the defense of Latin America from Communist external aggression.

d. Establish a military aid program which will encourage dependence on U.S. support and guidance.

National Objective Number Five. Promote mutual trust and meaningful area development by encouraging the formation of regional political and economic alliances.

Strategy

a. Maintain U.S. influence in regional organizations at the lowest possible visible level in order to minimize the feeling of U.S. dominance.

b. Encourage and, where possible, aid in the further development of such regional organizations as LAFTA and CACM.

IV. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:

B. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE MILITARY STRATEGIES

Introduction. In addressing Latin America in the Nixon Doctrine, the President stated that "we share a concept of hemispheric community as well as a web of treaties, commitments, and organizations that deserves the name of an inter-American system." Integral parts of this system are the concepts of partnership with shared responsibilities and actions.

A major share of the problems that face the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean belong in the areas of economic, social, and political development. United States military strategy toward this part of the Western Hemisphere will be concerned with these problems, which are directly related to internal security, as well as with problems of external security. The alternative strategies considered here are listed therefore under two broad categories:

1. the internal threat, and
2. the external threat.

IV. B. (1) INTERNAL THREAT

Strategic Alternative Number One: Deep Involvement.

This strategy involves:

1. U.S. striking force designed for rapid intervention in any Latin American country requesting such assistance in response to a Communist insurgency threat.
2. Redefinition of the USCINCSOUTH mission for this objective, with forces being provided to CINCSOUTH, including air mobile strike forces.
3. Increase in numbers of U.S. military advisors in Latin American countries, with mission of supporting U.S. strike forces as required.
4. Base support facilities in Latin America as appropriate for mission support of U.S. strike force.

Advantages

1. Provides threatened host country with readily available military means for countering internal threat.
2. Provides U.S. greater degree of control over events.

Disadvantages

1. Runs completely counter to Nixon Doctrine, and is unacceptable politically, economically and morally.
2. Intensifies anti-U.S. feelings in Latin America; a return to "big stick" diplomacy.
3. Provides strong possibility of U.S. becoming involved militarily where we do not want to, or where we should not be.

Strategic Alternative Number Two: Moderate Involvement and Partnership.

This strategy provides:

1. Assistance to countries threatened with Communist insurgencies in development of forces for handling the threat.

2. U.S. actions ranging from providing military hardware to training Latin American military in U.S. military schools.

3. U.S. military advisor/training personnel on a selective basis.

Advantages

1. Is acceptable to most Latin American countries and is in line with Nixon Doctrine.

2. Retains U.S. flexibility with minimum risk of direct involvement.

Disadvantages

1. Fails to provide complete timeliness and responsiveness to all potential internal threats.

2. Reduces U.S. military presence, which may encourage opportunities for military influences from unfriendly nations.

Strategic Alternative Number Three: Minimum Involvement.

This strategy provides:

1. Complete withdrawal of U.S. from involvement in all phases of internal security activities.

2. Elimination of U.S. MAP and all U.S. counter-insurgency assistance.

3. Reduction of U.S. military presence to lowest possible level.

4. Drastic reduction of military sales program.

5. Reduction of all military cooperation to lowest level practicable.

Advantages

1. Removes basis for a major Latin American grievance against U.S.

2. Contributes to favorable U.S.-Latin American relations.

3. Placates elements in Congress and U.S. public.

Disadvantages

1. Risks offending those Latin American countries desiring U.S. military assistance.

2. Drastically retards ability of many Latin American nations to handle internal security problems.

3. Results in loss of certain amount of U.S. control, as well as flexibility, in Latin American affairs.

IV. B. (2) EXTERNAL THREAT

Strategic Alternative Number One: Dominance.

This strategy involves:

1. Assumption by U.S. of complete responsibility for providing external security for Latin America.
2. Provision of U.S. nuclear shield for all countries.
3. Provision of U.S. security guarantee against all types of external aggression.
4. No active effort to obtain assistance and cooperation from OAS.
5. Provision of arms and military assistance for internal threat suppression only.

Advantages

1. Provides security against existing external threat economically and efficiently.
2. Eliminates all dependence on Latin American support.
3. Removes major incentive for Latin American countries to develop nuclear weapons.

Disadvantages

1. Runs counter to Nixon Doctrine; weakens support for Latin American unity.
2. Increases Latin-American fears of U.S. dominance.

Strategic Alternative Number Two: Responsible Partnership.

This strategy involves:

1. Assumption by U.S. of unilateral responsibility for nuclear defense of Latin America.
2. Assumption of responsibility by U.S. for defense of Latin America against Communist non-nuclear external aggression on a regional partnership basis, as much within the framework of the OAS as possible.

3. Provision of selective military sales and assistance programs with emphasis on antisubmarine warfare because of limited capacity of U.S. Navy to meet this vital requirement.

4. Continuation of active military staff cooperation with OAS.

5. Maintenance of current levels of U.S. forces in Panama and the Caribbean.

6. Expansion of multinational naval training exercises.

7. Provision of military training facilities in U.S.

Advantages

1. Provides for security of Western Hemisphere without U.S. dominance.

2. Is consistent with Nixon Doctrine.

Disadvantages

1. Tends to inhibit or delay U.S. actions vital for hemispheric security.

2. Possibly antagonizes certain nations looking for "prestige" weapons, as opposed to limited range of weapons contemplated.

Strategic Alternative Number Three: Minimal Involvement.

This strategy involves:

1. Assumption by Latin nations of responsibility for providing for external security of Latin America (except for Panama Canal and Caribbean area).

2. No absolute U.S. guarantee of nuclear shield for all circumstances.

3. Minimum amount of military cooperation in all spheres.

4. Passive U.S. cooperation in OAS.

Advantages

1. Is attractive from low-risk, low-cost strategy viewpoint.

Disadvantages

1. Fosters arms race in Latin America.
2. Restricts U.S. flexibility and influence in hemispheric defense.
3. Reduces U.S. leadership position in Latin America.
4. Neglects security of U.S. commercial interests in Latin America.
5. Runs counter to Nixon Doctrine policy of responsible partnership.

IV. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:

C. SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. What are the cultural, social, and political obstacles which inhibit the modernization process in Latin America?

2. A new type of militarism has arisen in Latin America. Sometimes called "Nasserism," it is advocated primarily by younger officers who believe that democracy has failed in Latin America, yet who realize that social change is urgently needed. These "change agents," motivated by increasing impatience with corruption, inefficiency and a stagnant political order, seek to establish paternalistic dictatorships of extreme nationalistic character. Should the U.S. assume that their roles in economic, political, and social development will be negative? That they will be contrary to U.S. interests?

3. What are the strategic interests of the United States in Latin America? What U.S. naval strategy is appropriate for the area? How does the Nixon Doctrine concept of partnership apply? Can regional arrangements, with or without U.S. participation, be encouraged? Should they be?

4. Mexico presents a rather unique situation in Latin America in terms of its successful revolution and its one-party democratic form of government. What analogies, if any, can be drawn from this Mexican case to other Latin American countries?

5. To what extent does Communist subversion and "Castroism" pose a threat to the political stability of Latin American countries?

6. Should U.S. aid to Latin American countries be given or denied purely on the basis of the type of government currently in power in each country?

V. THE MIDDLE EAST:

A. UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

National Objective Number One: Establish a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Strategy.

- a. Reemphasize support of the UN Resolution of 22 Nov 67.
- b. Maintain continuing contact with the USSR in an effort to further substantive negotiations between the conflicting states.
- c. Attempt to curb the continuing arms race, while maintaining the military balance between Israel and the Arab States.
- d. Employ the leverage derived from the U.S. position as Israel's principal supporter to induce Israel to negotiate realistically on the basis of the 22 Nov 67 UN Resolution.
- e. Support a UN peacekeeping role.
- f. Expand "Big Four" talks to include other nations, as appropriate, leading to multilateral solutions reflecting the interests of the community of nations.

National Objective Number Two: Maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of the several states of the area.

Strategy.

- a. Support the principle of non-interference in the affairs of states, in accordance with the UN Charter.
- b. Maintain cordial relations where existing, and seek to establish a basis for relations where they are now non-existent.
- c. Concentrate any diplomatic, financial, and other assistance to Arab nations on the more moderate Arab states.

National Objective Number Three: Maintain Free World access to the oil of the area.

Strategy.

a. Continue to provide necessary economic, technical, and other assistance to the oil-producing states to enhance their internal development.

b. Maintain a balanced policy between the commercial oil interests and the interests of the producing states.

National Objective Number Four: Limit USSR expansion into the area.

Strategy.

a. Maintain existing alliance and alliance relationships (NATO, CENTO).

b. Maintain a credible military presence in the area, encouraging maximum participation by other Free World countries.

c. Concentrate economic, technical, and other assistance to friendly or neutral countries in the area.

d. Encourage Free World economic, technical, and cultural activities in the area.

e. Seek a lasting resolution of the Arab-Israeli hostility, thereby minimizing Arab reliance upon the USSR military assistance (which serves as a primary source of Russian influence).

National Objective Number Five: Secure the right of innocent passage through the critical waterways of the area.

Strategy.

a. Support the UN Resolution of 22 Nov 67 which guarantees the right of Israel, as of all other states, to transit these waterways.

National Objective Number Six: Avoid a military confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Strategy.

a. Continue cooperation with the USSR in seeking a peace formula.

b. Avoid giving Israel unconditional support which might encourage a precipitous Israeli military adventure.

c. Maintain a credible military presence to deter Russia and her Arab clients from a similar military action.

V. THE MIDDLE EAST:

B. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE MILITARY STRATEGIES

Introduction. United States security objectives in the Middle East are:

1. To support Turkey and Iran against Soviet military and political intervention.
2. To maintain some influence in the Arab World as a counter to Soviet-supported Arab radicals.
3. To prevent a unified Arab attempt to destroy Israel.
4. To encourage France and the United Kingdom to maintain an active role, particularly in North Africa and the Persian Gulf.

During the 1970's, the U.S. Sixth Fleet will remain a major politico-military asset for the United States in promoting its Middle East military strategy. The precarious nature of American base agreements and overflight, transit and access arrangements suggests that, in a crisis, the Sixth Fleet will be the main initial resource for an American military intervention in the Mediterranean littoral. Since the fleet is mobile, it could also be deployed to support operations from the Indian Ocean.

Based on these security objectives, and in light of the continuing threat of Soviet political, economic and military expansionism in the area, the following alternative military strategies are considered:

Strategic Alternative Number One: Expanded Involvement.

This strategy contemplates:

1. Formal commitment to support the territorial integrity of Israel.
2. Strengthened obligation to assist Iran and the moderate Arab States.
3. Supplemental pledge (beyond NATO obligations) to Turkey.
4. Increased military assistance to Ethiopia in exchange for base rights.

5. Military and economic assistance for other potentially Western-oriented African states in order to enhance United States access options.

6. Augmentation of the Sixth Fleet and the Middle East Force.

7. Possible development of bases on Malta and Bahrein.

8. Strong initiatives in seeking solutions to regional disputes.

9. Additional base entry rights in the Red Sea and, perhaps, in North Africa.

Advantages

1. Encourages pro-Western elements in the region to assert themselves.

2. Discourages aggression against friendly states in the foreknowledge of likely United States military reaction.

3. Puts the USSR on notice that the United States will not permit Soviet power to move into the area unchallenged.

4. Facilitates entry rights should the United States wish to respond to a contingency.

Disadvantages

1. Reduces United States options to avoid involvement by extending the range of binding commitments.

2. Possibly jeopardizes American relations in one or more of the other countries in the region, due to Arab, non-Arab and Israeli interplay.

3. Raises doubts that Turkish, Spanish, or North African bases would be available for unilateral United States action in an Arab-Israeli war.

4. Increases possibility that the USSR would strengthen its military presence in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans as a counter to a more active American strategy.

5. Increases risk of stimulating the arms race in the area.
6. Increases the risk of a direct U.S.-USSR confrontation in the region.
7. Increases domestic conflict over national priorities.

Strategic Alternative Number Two: Limited and Selected Involvement.

This strategy contemplates :

1. Support of allies, politically and militarily, while pursuing a policy of non-involvement in regard to regional issues and working through the UN in seeking solutions.
2. Maintenance of some degree of equilibrium in the arms balance between Israel and the Arab states by supporting Israel with military assistance on a selective basis.
3. Continued military assistance to Turkey and continued arms sales to Iran.
4. Continued denial of military assistance to most African states.
5. Modernization of the Sixth Fleet and the Middle East Force, but with no increase in size.
6. Reliance on reinforcements from Europe, CONUS and the Pacific for any major U.S. operations.
7. Limited naval base rights at Malta and Bahrein.

Advantages

1. Preserves opportunities for leverage with friendly countries, without formally committing the United States to military action in all cases.
2. Provides greater opportunities for support from the United Nations.
3. Offers greater opportunities for reaching an understanding with the USSR, and reduces the likelihood of a direct confrontation.

4. Avoids the association of the United States with particular regimes in a region where sudden changes in government are endemic.

5. Offers a fiscally feasible approach within current constraints of national priorities.

6. Is in accord with the Nixon Doctrine.

Disadvantages

1. Continues to arouse Arab feelings against the United States as a result of supporting Israel.

2. Risks trade and investment reprisals and loss of military base rights and access in areas not selected for support.

Strategic Alternative Number Three: Involvement only with European Allies.

This strategy contemplates:

1. United States promotion of much greater interest on the part of Western Europe in the Middle East and North Africa.

2. Multilateral relationships, with certain European countries sharing responsibilities with the United States, especially in the field of economic development.

3. Continued U.S. military assistance to certain key countries, such as Turkey and Ethiopia.

4. Maintenance of the Sixth Fleet and the Middle East Force at approximately present strengths.

5. No United States military intervention in the area except as a part of an undertaking involving a significant number of European allies.

Advantages

1. Encompasses all the advantages of Strategy Two.

2. Reduces U.S. visibility through multilateral involvement.

Disadvantages

1. Raises doubts that Western European countries would be prepared to join the United States in a confrontation with the USSR over Israel or Iran.
2. Reduces the credibility of United States commitments if possible involvement was jeopardized by veto action by one or more Western European partners.
3. Limits the spectrum of options open to the United States and its Western European allies.
4. Risks similar alignment on the part of the USSR and Eastern European countries with radical Arab states.

Strategic Alternative Number Four: Withdrawal of combat forces, except those in NATO.

This strategy contemplates that:

1. The Sixth Fleet would be maintained at the strength required to fulfill its essential NATO commitments, but the Middle East Force would be withdrawn.
2. The United States would maintain necessary intelligence and communications installations.
3. Military assistance would continue at a minimum level in Turkey to help meet NATO force goals, but greater reliance would be placed on friendly countries to meet their defense requirements unassisted.
4. United States policy would be based on non-involvement in regional conflicts.

Advantages

1. Improves United States' relations with the radical Arab states by reducing support for Israel.

Disadvantages

1. Frees radical Arab states to pursue their goals relative to Israel and moderate Arab states.
2. Opens the area to Soviet exploitation.

3. Increases risk that Soviet political pressure and military presence in the Mediterranean may cause Turkey and Iran to opt for a neutralist policy.

4. Reduces U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, and risks Soviet predominance.

5. Removes access privileges now enjoyed by the Middle East Force.

V. THE MIDDLE EAST:

C. SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. What are the United States' interests and objectives in the Middle East and the Arab world? In what priority would you rank them? How consistent are they with one another?

2. The Soviet Union's activity in the Middle East and the Mediterranean has increased in recent years. What are the consequences of this activity with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the United States' role in the dispute?

3. The Suez Canal has been closed since the Six Day War in 1967. Has this closing worked to the advantage or disadvantage of the Soviets relative to the West?

4. What steps can or should the United States take to attempt to regain better relations and influence with the Arab countries?

5. What are the major points of difference between the so-called "hard-line" and the "moderate" Arab states? Are there indications of fundamental shifts in this make-up? If so, what are the implications for the United States?

6. What U.S. naval strategy is most viable in the Red Sea-Persian Gulf area? What arrangements might be viable and feasible in this respect to encourage partnership, either with or without direct U.S. participation? Could the U.S. Mid-East Force be combined with indigenous forces, plus possibly U.K. representation, to form a regional, multinational force?

VI. THE PACIFIC AND ASIA:

A. UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

National Objective Number One. Achieve and maintain stable, popularly-supported, independent governments which are not hostile to the U.S.

Strategy.

- a. Provide military aid to those countries which indicate a determination to use it effectively.
- b. Promote economic development through capital investments, aid, and technical assistance.
- c. Encourage Japan to take a leading role in economic development of the region.

National Objective Number Two. Develop and maintain a balance of power which will prevent one-power domination in the area.

Strategy.

- a. Honorably fulfill present treaty obligations.
- b. Promote regional responsibility for security.

National Objective Number Three. Maintain a sufficient military presence to protect U.S. national interests while encouraging Asian efforts at self-defense.

Strategy.

- a. Gradually reduce U.S. commitments to the defense of countries other than Japan and Australia, while emphasizing regional responsibility, as outlined in the Nixon Doctrine for Asia.
- b. Encourage Japan and Australia to assume a military responsibility for defense of the region in conjunction with other countries and the U.S.
- c. Accept a minimal modification to base agreements in Japan, Okinawa, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines.

National Objective Number Four. Prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Strategy.

a. Guarantee a counter to possible CPR and USSR nuclear blackmail.

National Objective Number Five. Prevent the spread of Communism.

Strategy.

a. Work toward an accommodation of China's legitimate interests in the area, while continuing to resist Chinese Communist expansion.

VI. THE PACIFIC AND ASIA:

B. ALTERNATIVE FUTURE MILITARY STRATEGIES

Introduction. President Nixon has declared that we are a Pacific power and that "peace for us is much less likely if there is no peace in Asia." To realize our national objectives in this vast area of the world--which stretches from the Indian Ocean and South Asia north and east through the Pacific area--requires the most effective, comprehensive, and flexible military strategy that can be devised. Such a strategy cannot help but place major emphasis on all elements of naval power.

The strategies listed herein are broad ones and are not to be considered exclusive in any sense. Also, because the interests of the United States continue to be concentrated more on East Asia and the Western Pacific rather than in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, the alternative strategies are listed separately for these two areas.

VI. B. (1) STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR SOUTH ASIA

AND THE INDIAN OCEAN

Alternative Strategy Number One: Increased Involvement.

This strategy envisions:

1. Major increases in U.S. military presence in area.
2. Modest but visible buildup and modernization of U.S. naval forces in the area.
3. Expanded base facilities, with a permanent air and naval base in the central Indian Ocean area, and a permanent naval facility in the eastern Indian Ocean area.
4. Periodic joint and combined military exercises with friendly states in area.
5. Increased frequency of port visits.
6. Periodic U.S. naval task force transits of the Indian Ocean.
7. Increased military assistance/training/and staff cooperation with countries amenable to same.

Advantages

1. Provides high assurance that U.S. interests in the area will be protected.
2. Provides some counter to Soviet maritime/political/economic expansion in the area.
3. Provides for ready "show-the-flag" or "show-of-force" operations.

Disadvantages

1. Is not feasible economically at this time.
2. Is politically infeasible from U.S. domestic standpoint.
3. Does not ensure that Soviet/CPR incursions in area (political, economic or subversive) will be deterred.

4. Runs directly counter to Nixon Doctrine.
5. Contains high risk of U.S. involvement in area disputes.

Alternative Strategy Number Two: Moderate Involvement.

This strategy involves:

1. A moderately increased permanent U.S. military presence in the area.
2. A maximum reliance on facilities and navies of friendly area countries.
3. A permanent, austere naval base/airfield facility in Indian Ocean.
4. A minimum reliance on standing U.S. naval forces in the area.
5. An increased bilateral cooperation.
6. U.S. military assistance/training teams for selected littoral countries for internal security assistance.

Advantages

1. Continues low U.S. profile in the area, while providing increased flexibility and capability for meeting future possible USSR/CPR threats in area.
2. Provides necessary minimum capability for reaction to minor contingencies.
3. Provides permanent U.S. presence in area.
4. Supports partnership aspects of Nixon Doctrine.

Disadvantages

1. Runs risk that cooperating countries may prove unreliable or unable to provide support.
2. Runs modest risk that moderately increased U.S. presence may be interpreted by littoral nations as "colonialism."

3. Involves some cost increases, which may be politically infeasible.

Alternative Strategy Number Three: Minimum Involvement.

This strategy contemplates:

1. Reduced permanent military presence in the area.
2. Primary reliance on non-permanent U.S. naval forces from outside the area.
3. Maximum use of regional naval capabilities, with joint training exercises encouraged where practicable.
4. Maximum use of afloat replenishment and support facilities for U.S. naval elements in the area.
5. No U.S. military bases in area.
6. Where required, reliance on shore facilities of friendly nations.
7. Frequent transit of Indian Ocean by U.S. naval units, and selective port calls.

Advantages

1. Maintains low cost, low profile.
2. Reduces U.S. commitments and potential for involvement.
3. Maintains some U.S. presence.

Disadvantages

1. Reduces the assurance of effective U.S. response to minor contingencies.
2. Prevents future rapid buildup if required.
3. Reduces U.S. options in area.

VI. B. (2) STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES

FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Alternative Strategy Number One: Forward Defense.

This strategy envisions:

1. Large, mobile Army and Air Force units in high state of readiness for deployment to the Asian mainland.
2. Strong naval task forces in South China Sea/Gulf of Siam area.
3. Selective retention of U.S. bases in Southeast Asia.
4. Division-size ground forces in Thailand.
5. Two divisions in S. Korea, with backup forces in Okinawa/Hawaii.
6. Bases in Japan/Korea/Okinawa/Philippines/Taiwan actively maintained.

Advantages

1. Provides maximum deterrence to Communist aggression in area.
2. Provides maximum military flexibility and capability for meeting U.S. commitments.

Disadvantages

1. Places unacceptable burden on U.S. resources.
2. Continues to foster dependent status of South East Asian countries.
3. Reduces possibilities for new China policy (rapprochement).
4. Contributes to continued instability in Asia.

Alternative Strategy Number Two: "Rimlands Strategy".

This strategy envisions:

1. Use of strong, modern naval and air forces for defense of Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.
2. Maintenance of the Seventh Fleet in forward area.
3. Committed but reduced ground forces in Korea.
4. Gradual phase-down of U.S. presence as Vietnami-
zation completes.
5. Reduction of military advisory efforts through-
out the area as the area stabilizes after Vietnam settlement.
6. Retention of bases in Japan, S. Korea, Okinawa,
Taiwan, and Philippines.
7. Commitment of U.S. ground forces only in the
event of large scale CPR aggression against U.S. allies.

Advantages

1. Reduces U.S. presence in Asian mainland but
retains option of selective involvement.
2. Reduces costs and is politically feasible.
3. Makes more feasible any rapprochement efforts
with CPR.
4. Supports Nixon Doctrine.

Disadvantages

1. Makes less credible assurances that U.S. will
honor treaty commitments in Asia.
2. Reduces U.S. flexibility and capability to meet
aggression in Asia and Western Pacific.
3. Provides Communists with encouragement to test
U.S. resolve by fostering crises and instability in Southeast
Asia.

Alternative Strategy Number Three: Minimum Commitment.

This strategy involves:

1. Withdrawal of U.S. forces to Central Pacific bases.
2. Limitation of U.S. commitments to South Korea, Japan and Philippines only. Taiwan and Thailand not included in defense line.
3. Basing of U.S. forces in U.S. territory only, except token force in South Korea.
4. Maintenance of U.S. naval and air forces at high levels.
5. Continuation of major military assistance program for Southeast Asian countries (SVN and Thailand).

Advantages

1. Permits greatly reduced defense costs.
2. Is politically very attractive to U.S. domestic opinion.
3. Allows increased forces for NATO reinforcement.

Disadvantages

1. Allows Communist forces relatively free hand in Southeast Asia.
2. May force non-Communist countries in area to look elsewhere for security options.
3. Reduces credibility in U.S. commitments.

VI. THE PACIFIC AND ASIA:

C. SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. The containment of Communist China and the control of Communist encroachment has been considered central to American interests in East Asia. Do other considerations suggest the need for a new look at this problem? Should there be any fundamental changes in U.S. policy toward Communist China?

2. One of the suggested strategies for the United States to adopt in the Western Pacific after the settlement of Vietnam is the so-called "off-shore" strategy, which provides for withdrawal to U.S.-owned or controlled islands. What are the pros and cons of such a strategy? Does this fit in with President Nixon's Asian policy for the 70's?

3. The emergence of Japan as a post-war economic power has great significance for the United States. Should the United States encourage Japan to develop greater military power and play a leading role in regional security arrangements in the Far East? What are the implications of such a Japanese role? Would Japan's growing power be reminiscent of her World War II Greater East Asia "Co-prosperity Sphere"? Can and should the U.S. urge Japan to assume greater responsibility for the defense of our interests in Korea?

4. Can the Sino-Soviet split be considered as being in the interest of the United States? If so, how? Can we and should we do anything to intensify this split?

5. What are the dilemmas surrounding U.S. policy toward Pakistan and India?

6. As a predominantly white nation, how realistic is it to expect Australia to assume a future major role in Southeast Asia and to have the nations of the area accept it? Discuss Australia's potential for bringing about more effective coordination and increased cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia and with the United States.

7. What U.S. naval strategy is appropriate for the area, including the Indian Ocean? How is the Nixon Doctrine concept of partnership applicable? Are regional arrangements there best fostered with or without direct U.S. participation? Would a multinational Indian Ocean peacekeeping naval force with indigenous (Iranian, Pakistani, Indonesian, Australian) participation, combined with non-indigenous (U.S., U.K., Dutch, French) membership, be feasible as a counter to the now permanent Russian naval force in that area? What of a U.S., U.K. and Australian force?

APPENDICES

U.S. Policy Statements (Extracts)

- I. President Nixon's Guam Statement
(Genesis of Nixon Doctrine)
- II. Middle East (Secretary of State Rogers)
- III. Latin America (President Nixon)
- IV. Africa (President Nixon/Secretary
of State Rogers)

APPENDIX I

President Nixon's July 25, 1969 Guam Press Conference

Introduction and Explanatory Note

During the course of President Nixon's round-the-world trip last summer, he made an overnight stop at Guam. While there he held an informal news conference on July 25, 1969. The particular importance of several statements made by the President at the conference has been attested to by Mr. Nixon himself by referring to them several times since then. At Guam the President spoke for publication, but stipulated that he not be quoted directly. Hence, there are no official public transcripts of this conference. However, in a major address, on November 3, 1969, concerning Vietnam the President--in explaining the policy which has come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine--specifically made reference to the three guiding principles for future American policy toward Asia as he had laid them down at Guam.

The following extract from the November 3, 1969 address contains these principles. For those desiring a fuller account of the Guam conference, excerpts from an unofficial account of the news meeting can be found in The New York Times, July 26, 1969.

(Extract from President Nixon's Address to the Nation, November 3, 1969, as published in the Weekly Compilation of PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, November 8, 1969, p. 1546-1554.)

What is proposed is in line with a major shift in U.S. foreign policy which I described in my press conference at Guam on July 25. Let me briefly explain what has been described as the Nixon Doctrine--a policy which not only will help end the war in Vietnam, but which is an essential element of our program to prevent future Vietnams.

We Americans are a do-it-yourself people. We are an impatient people. Instead of teaching someone else to do a job, we like to do it ourselves. And this trait has been carried over into our foreign policy.

In Korea and again in Vietnam, the United States furnished most of the money, most of the arms, and most of the men to help the people of those countries defend their freedom against Communist aggression.

Before any American troops were committed to Vietnam, a leader of another Asian country expressed this opinion to me when I was traveling in Asia as a private citizen. He said, "When you are trying to assist another nation defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not to fight the war for them."

Well, in accordance with this wise counsel, I laid down in Guam three principles as guidelines for future American policy toward Asia:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

After I announced this policy, I found that the leaders of the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea, and other nations which might be threatened by Communist aggression, welcomed this new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's business--not just America's business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened. In the previous administration, we Americanized the war in Vietnam. In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace.

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Statement by Secretary Rogers

U.S. POLICY ON THE MIDDLE EAST

The most comprehensive statement of U.S. policy on the Middle East issued by this Administration was recently delivered by Secretary of State William P. Rogers.

No area of the world today is more important because it "could easily again become the source of another serious conflagration," Mr. Rogers said. Since it was obvious that Israel and the Arab countries alone "could not overcome their legacy of suspicion to achieve a political settlement," he pointed out, the U.S. decided it had a responsibility to play a direct role in international efforts to help in seeking a solution. Participating in Four Power talks at the U.N. and in bilateral talks with the USSR, the U.S. has recently submitted detailed proposals on specific aspects of the Middle East problem.

"A durable peace must meet the legitimate concerns of both sides," Secretary Rogers emphasized in his policy speech of Dec. 9, pointing out that "necessary compromises" advocated by the U.S. "may and probably will be unpalatable to both sides." Following are excerpts from his statement.

When this Administration took office, one of our first actions in foreign affairs was to examine carefully the entire situation in the Middle East.

We accepted a suggestion put forward both by the French Government and the secretary general of the United Nations. We agreed that the major powers—the U.S., the USSR, the United Kingdom, and France—should cooperate to assist the secretary general's representative, Ambassador Jarring, in working out a settlement in accordance with the resolution of the U.N. Security Council of November 1967. We also decided to consult directly with the Soviet Union, hoping to achieve as wide an area of agreement as possible between us.

We knew that nations not directly involved could not make a durable peace for the people and governments involved. Peace rests with the parties to the conflict. [But] the efforts of major powers can help.

Our policy is and will continue to be a *balanced* one. We have friendly ties with both Arabs and Israelis. To call for Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the U.N. resolution without achieving agreement on peace would be partisan toward the Arabs. To call on the Arabs to accept peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan toward Israel. Therefore, our policy is to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured as envisaged by the Security Council Resolution.

The Security Council Resolution

Let me outline our policy on various elements of the Security Council Resolution. The basic and related issues might be described as peace, security, withdrawal and territory.

• *Peace between the Parties:* The Resolution of the Security Council makes clear that the goal is the establishment of a state of peace between the parties instead of the state of belligerency which has characterized relations for over 20 years.

We believe the conditions and obligations of peace must be defined in specific terms. For example, navigation rights in the Suez Canal and the Straights of Tiran should be spelled out. Respect for sovereignty and obligations of the parties to each other must be made specific.

• *Security.* A lasting peace must be sustained by a sense of security on both sides. To this end, as envisaged in the

'A durable peace must meet the legitimate concerns of both sides.'

Security Council Resolution, there should be demilitarized zones and related security arrangements more reliable than those which existed in the area in the past. The parties themselves, with Ambassador Jarring's help, are in the best position to work out the nature and the details of such security arrangements.

• *Withdrawal and Territory.* The Security Council Resolution endorses the principle of the non-acquisition of territory by war and calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war. We support this part of the Resolution, including withdrawal, just as we do its other elements.

The boundaries from which the 1967 war began were established in the 1949 Armistice Agreements and have defined the areas of national jurisdiction in the Middle East for 20 years. Those boundaries were armistice lines, not final political borders. The rights, claims and positions of the parties in an ultimate peaceful settlement were reserved by the Armistice Agreements.

The Security Council Resolution neither endorses nor precludes these armistice lines as the definitive political boundaries. However, it calls for withdrawal from occupied terri-

ories, the non-acquisition of territory by war, and for the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries.

We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established, and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security. We do not support expansionism. We believe troops must be withdrawn as the Resolution provides. We support Israel's security and the security of the Arab states as well. We are for a lasting peace that requires security for both.

Refugees and Jerusalem

By emphasizing the key issues of peace, security, withdrawal and territory, I do not want to leave the impression that other issues are not equally important. Two in particular deserve special mention—the questions of refugees and of Jerusalem.

There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 1967 have made homeless. This human dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been of special concern to the U.S. for over 20 years. During this period the U.S. has contributed about \$500 million for the support and education of the Palestine refugees. We are prepared to contribute generously along with others to solve this problem. We believe its just settlement must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area.

The question of the future status of Jerusalem, because it touches deep emotional, historical and religious well-springs, is particularly complicated. We have made clear repeatedly in the past two and one-half years that we cannot accept unilateral actions by any party to decide the final status of the city. We believe its status can be determined only through the agreement of the parties concerned, which in practical terms means primarily the Governments of Israel and Jordan, taking into account the interests of other countries in the area and the international community. We do, however, support certain principles which we believe would provide an acceptable framework for a Jerusalem settlement.

Specifically, we believe Jerusalem should be a unified city within which there would no longer be restrictions on the movement of persons and goods. There should be open access to the unified city for persons of all faiths and nationalities. Arrangements for the administration of the unified city should take into account the interests of all its inhabitants and of the Jewish, Islamic and Christian communities, and there should be roles for both Israel and Jordan in the civic, economic and religious life of the city.

I have already referred to our talks with the Soviet Union. In connection with those talks there have been allegations that we have been seeking to divide the Arab states by urging the UAR to make a separate peace. These allegations are false. It is a fact that we and the Soviets have been concentrating on the questions of a settlement between Israel and the UAR. We have been doing this in the full understanding on both our parts that, before there can be a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there must be agreement between the parties on other aspects of the settlement—not only those related to the UAR but also those related to Jordan and other states which accept the Security Council Resolution of November 1967.

We started with the Israeli-UAR aspect because of its inherent importance for future stability in the area and because one must start somewhere.

We are also ready to pursue the Jordanian aspects of a settlement—in fact the Four Powers in New York have begun such discussions. Let me make it perfectly clear that the U.S. position is that implementation of the overall settlement would

'We will not shrink from advocating necessary compromises, even though they may and probably will be unpalatable to both sides.'

begin only after complete agreement had been reached on related aspects of the problem.

In our recent meetings with the Soviets, we have discussed some new formulas in an attempt to find common positions. They consist of three principal elements:

First, there should be a binding commitment by Israel and the UAR to peace with each other, with all the specific obligations of peace spelled out, including the obligation to prevent hostile acts originating from their respective territories.

Second, the detailed provisions of peace relating to security safeguards on the ground should be worked out between the parties, under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, utilizing the procedures followed in negotiating the Armistice Agreements under Ralph Bunche in 1949 at Rhodes. This formula has been previously used with success in negotiations between the parties on Middle Eastern problems. A principal objective of the Four Power talks, we believe, should be to help Ambassador Jarring engage the parties in a negotiating process under the Rhodes formula.

So far as a settlement between Israel and the United Arab Republic goes, these safeguards relate primarily to the area of Sharm el-Sheikh controlling access to the Gulf of Aqaba, the need for demilitarized zones as foreseen in the Security Council Resolution, and final arrangements in the Gaza Strip.

In the context of peace and agreement on specific security safeguards, withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory would be required.

Such an approach directly addresses the principal national concerns of both Israel and the UAR. It would require the UAR to agree to a binding and specific commitment to peace. It would require withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from UAR territory to the international border between Israel and Egypt which has been in existence for over a half century. It would also require the parties themselves to negotiate the practical security arrangements to safeguard the peace.

We believe that this approach is *balanced* and fair. We remain interested in good relations with all states in the area. . . . We will not shrink from advocating necessary compromises, even though they may and probably will be unpalatable to both sides. We remain prepared to work with others—in the area and throughout the world—so long as they sincerely seek the end we seek: a just and lasting peace.

U. S. Policy in Latin America - II

ACTION FOR PROGRESS

In a major policy statement on Oct. 31, President Nixon announced the new administration's Latin American policy and described its goal as a decade of "Action for Progress."

The President pointed out that his suggestions for new directions in U.S. policy were shaped by his own trips to Latin countries, by Governor Nelson Rockefeller's report on his recent tour, and by some of the views expressed in the Consensus of Viña del Mar. This document, listing requests for cooperation agreed to by 19 Latin governments at a meeting in May in Viña del Mar, Chile, was delivered to Mr. Nixon last June.

The views expressed in the Consensus were reflected in a recent speech by Señor Galo Plaza of Ecuador, Secretary General of the Organization of American States. Excerpts from his address were published in COMMANDERS DIGEST on Nov. 15 as Part I of "U.S. Policy in Latin America." Below is Part II: excerpts from the President's statement of Oct. 31.

For years, we in the United States have pursued the illusion that we alone could re-make continents. Conscious of our wealth and technology, seized by the force of good intentions, driven by habitual impatience, remembering the dramatic success of the Marshall Plan in postwar Europe, we have sometimes imagined that we knew what was best for everyone else and that we could and should make it happen. Well, experience has taught us better.

What I hope we can achieve, therefore, is a more mature partnership in which all voices are heard and none is predominant.

A New Approach

Tonight, I offer no grandiose promises and no panaceas. I do offer action. The actions I propose represent a new approach. They are based on five principles:

- First, a firm commitment to the Inter-American system, to the compacts which bind us in that system—as exemplified by the Organization of American States and by the principles so nobly set forth in its charter.
- Second, respect for national identity and national dignity, in a partnership in which rights and responsibilities are shared by a community of independent states.
- Third, a firm commitment to continued U.S. assistance for Hemispheric development.
- Fourth, a belief that the principal future pattern of this

assistance must be U.S. support for Latin American initiatives, and that this can best be achieved on a multilateral basis within the inter-American system.

• Finally, a dedication to improving the quality of life in this new world of ours—to making people the center of our concerns, and to helping meet their economic, social and human needs.

Many voices from the Americas in these first months of our

'Our goal for the 70's should be a decade of Action for Progress for the Americas.'

new Administration . . . have told us they wanted fewer promises and more action. They have told us that the U.S. aid programs seemed to have helped the United States more than Latin America. They have told us that our trade policies were insensitive to the needs of other American nations.

Intended As Examples

In proposing specific changes tonight, I mean these as examples of the actions I believe are possible in a new kind of partnership in the Americas.

I propose that a multilateral inter-American agency be given an increasing share of responsibility for development assistance decisions. CIAP—the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress—could be given this new function. Or an entirely new agency could be created within the system.

One of the areas most urgently in need of new policies is the area of trade . . . In order to finance their import needs and to achieve self-sustaining growth, the other American nations must expand their exports.

Most Latin American exports now are raw material and foodstuffs. We are attempting to help the other countries of the Hemisphere to stabilize their earnings from these exports, to increase them as time goes on.

Increasingly, however, those countries will have to turn more toward manufactured and semi-manufactured products for balanced development and major export growth. Thus they need to be assured of access to the expanding markets of the industrialized world . . .

For several years now, virtually all loans made under U.S. aid programs have been "tied"—that is, as you know, they have been encumbered with restrictions designed to maintain

U.S. exports, including a requirement that the money be spent on purchases in the U.S.

In June, I ordered the most cumbersome restrictions removed. In addition, I announce tonight that I am now ordering that effective Nov. 1, loan dollars sent to Latin America under AID be freed to allow purchases not only here, but anywhere in Latin America.

U. S. Private Investment

For a developing country, constructive foreign private investment has the special advantage of being a prime vehicle for the transfer of technology. And certainly, from no other source is so much investment capital available.

As we have seen, however, . . . a capital-importing country [must] expect a serious impairment of its ability to attract investment funds when it acts against existing investments in a way which runs counter to commonly accepted norms of international law and behavior. Unfortunately, and perhaps unfairly, such acts in one of the Americas affect investors in the entire region.

We will not encourage U.S. private investment where it is not wanted or where local conditions face it with unwarranted risks. But I must state my own strong belief, and it is this: I think that properly motivated private enterprise has a vitally important role to play in social as well as economic development in all of the nations. We have seen it work in our own country. We have seen it work in other countries, whether they

'For years we in the United States have pursued the illusion that we alone could re-make continents.'

are developing or developed, other countries that lately have been recording the world's most spectacular rates of economic growth.

In the Consensus of Viña del Mar, we were asked for an unprecedented effort to share our scientific and technical capabilities.

This, I pledge to you tonight: The nation that went to the moon in peace for all mankind is ready, ready to share its technology in peace with its nearest neighbors.

Explosive Forces

And now, my friends in the American family, I turn to a sensitive subject. Debates have long raged, raged in the U.S. and elsewhere, as to what our attitude should be toward the various forms of government within the Inter-American system.

My own country lives by a democratic system which has preserved its form for nearly two centuries. It has its problems. But we are proud of our system. We are jealous of our liberties. We hope that eventually most, perhaps all, of the world's people will share what we believe to be the blessings of a genuine democracy.

We are aware that most people today in most countries of



'A firm commitment to continued U. S. assistance for Hemispheric development.'

the world do not share those blessings. I would be less than honest if I did not express my concern over examples of liberty compromised, of justice denied or of rights infringed.

Nevertheless, we recognize that enormous, sometimes explosive, forces for change are operating in Latin America. These create instabilities, and bring changes in governments. On the diplomatic level, we must deal realistically with governments in the Inter-American system as they are.

However, I would stress one other point. We cannot have a peaceful community of nations if one nation sponsors armed subversion in another's territory. The Ninth Meeting of American Foreign Ministers clearly enunciated this principal. The "export" of revolution is an intervention which our system cannot condone, and a nation like Cuba which seeks to practice it can hardly expect to share in the benefits of this community.

For three-quarters of a century, many of us have been linked together . . . in a joint quest for a better future . . . We have joined in a noble Alliance for Progress, whose principles still guide us. Now I suggest our goal for the 70's should be a decade of Action for Progress for the Americas.

As we seek to forge a new partnership, we must recognize that we are a community of widely diverse peoples. Our cultures are different. Our perceptions are often different. Our emotional reactions are often different. May it always be that way. What a dull world it would be if we were all alike. Partnership—mutuality—these do not flow naturally. We have to work at them.

As we look together down the closing decades of the century, we see tasks that summon the very best that is in us. But those tasks are difficult, precisely because they do mean the difference between despair and fulfillment for most of the 600 million people who will live in Latin America in the year 2000. Those lives are our challenge.

APPENDIX IV

U.S. POLICY STATEMENT ON AFRICA

The following extracts are taken from an exchange of letters between Secretary Rogers and President Nixon on March 26, 1970, together with a policy statement on Africa which was submitted to the President with Secretary Rogers's letter.

(Published in The Department of State Bulletin,
April 20, 1970)

PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER

The White House
Washington, March 26, 1970

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Your thoughtfully prepared policy statement on Africa is wholeheartedly approved.

You know of my keen personal interest in relations with the African countries. We have both felt the spirit and dynamism of this continent and its people. I believe we now have a special opportunity to maintain and to expand our present relationships and am pleased that you and your staff have made so complete and positive an examination of the paths that are available to us.

You may count on my full support in the fulfillment of this program. It establishes a good foundation upon which we can respond to African needs and build that relationship of cooperation and understanding which we desire.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON

The Honorable William P. Rogers
The Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

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U.S. AND AFRICA IN THE 70's

A. AFRICA AND THE U.S.

Africa, for many reasons, deserves the active attention and support of the United States. It is in our national interest to cooperate with African countries in their endeavors to improve conditions of life and to help in their efforts to build an equitable political and economic order in which all can effectively share.

* * * * *

Africa is growing closer to the United States. Communications with Africa are rapidly developing, and communication links with other continents through Intelsat are now in operation and more African earth stations are being constructed. Two major American airlines serve the continent. Overflight rights are important to our commerce and to our scientific efforts. We have important communications facilities in both West and East Africa. Our space and scientific programs rely on the cooperation of the peoples and governments of Africa.

The resources of Africa are products which we purchase substantially in international trade: rubber, petroleum, bauxite, timber, coffee, cocoa, minerals and precious stones, to name a few. They are important to the Africans as a primary source of their wealth.

America's links with the peoples of Africa have been extensive. Missionaries have established schools and hospitals throughout the continent and have lived and worked in Africa many years before official relations were established. We have demonstrated humanitarian concern for the people of the continent in our provision of help and relief in countless ways.

And, finally, we are linked by the cultural fact that one out of every ten Americans has his origins in Africa.

B. WHAT WE SEEK

We seek a relationship of constructive cooperation with the nations of Africa--a cooperative and equal relationship with all who wish it. We are prepared to have diplomatic relations under conditions of mutual respect with all the nations of the continent. We want no military allies, no

spheres of influence, no big power competition in Africa. Our policy is a policy related to African countries and not a policy based upon our relations with non-African countries.

* * * * *

But in this participation we do not seek any kind of domination. We seek with all nations the closest relationship which is mutually acceptable and beneficial, but seek it with full respect for diversity among nations.

* * * * *

C. WHAT AFRICANS SEEK

An effective relationship with Africa depends on an understanding of Africa and its needs. We have sought in our discussions and visits with African leaders and African peoples to determine how they define these needs.

They have spoken to us first of their strong desire to satisfy the aspirations of their people for a better life. They want to do this through economic cooperation. They want economic assistance now to make themselves less dependent later on foreign resources. They look to trade as a more equitable relationship than aid. They want investment in which they are partners.

After decades of being governed from afar, they want respect for human dignity. They want to abolish discrimination. They want equality throughout the continent.

They want self-determination throughout the continent. They want respect for the independence of the new nations and for their sovereignty. They welcome cooperation with other nations but they do not want intervention.

They want to build political and social institutions based on their own cultural patterns. They want to adapt ideas from abroad to their own psychology and spirit.

They want respect for the boundaries of Africa and security for each nation within these boundaries. They want recognition that, within its infinite diversity, Africa has a cohesion and a unity of its own, such as represented by the Organization of African Unity.

D. THE U.S. RESPONSE

The United States desires to be responsive to Africa, even though there are limitations on our capacities and our resources.

We desire economic relations on a basis of mutual benefit and respect. Recognizing the need for capital and technical assistance, the United States directly and in cooperation with others will continue to help. The U.S. will pursue more active programs of trade and private investment, with full recognition of African sovereignty.

We will continue to support wider cooperation on a regional and continental basis among African countries.

The United States will continue to stand for racial equality and self-determination looking for peaceful and evolutionary solutions to advance these goals. We will help to provide economic alternatives for the small independent states in southern Africa.

We will avoid supplying arms in southern Africa, and we will persist in our support for self-determination.

We will respect the institutions which the Africans themselves create. While we in this country have a preference for democratic procedures, we recognize that the forces for change and nation-building which operate in Africa may create governmental patterns not necessarily consistent with such procedures.

E. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE POLICY

An American economic assistance program in Africa is in United States national interests. We wish to see African countries develop and take their rightful place in cooperative international efforts to resolve worldwide problems. The drive and determination to develop must come from the African countries themselves. But at this point in their development, when per capita annual incomes average about \$135, most of these countries need substantial external assistance to achieve rates of progress responsive to the minimum aspirations of their more than 300 million people for a better life. Our principal concern, therefore, is how most effectively to make capital assistance and technical knowledge from the developed nations available to these developing nations.

Ever since the wave of independence swept through Africa in the late '50's and early '60's, Western European nations and multidonor organizations have provided 60 to 70 percent of economic assistance to Africa. Because of their strong traditional and historic links to Africa, we hope the European nations will continue to provide the bulk of foreign assistance to Africa. But the United States also has deep and special ties to Africa. We should do our fair share in support of the independence and growth of African nations.

F. U.S. ASSISTANCE

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We intend to provide more assistance to Africa through international institutions and multidonor arrangements.

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G. JOINT PUBLIC-PRIVATE TECHNICAL COOPERATION

We shall encourage the greater utilization of American citizens from the private sector to meet development needs in Africa.

* * * * *

H. PRIVATE INVESTMENT

There has been a steady growth in U.S. private investment in Africa since most of the African nations achieved their independence.

* * * * *

We believe that private investment can and should play a growing role, above and beyond public assistance, in African development.

J. THE PROBLEM OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

One of the most critical political problems of continental concern relates to southern Africa. The problems of southern Africa are extremely stubborn. Passions are strong on both sides. We see no easy solutions.

Yet the modern world demands a community of nations based on respect for fundamental human rights. These are not only moral and legal principles; they are powerful and ultimately irresistible political and historical forces. We take our

stand on the side of those forces of fundamental human rights in southern Africa as we do at home and elsewhere.

* * * * *

Our relations with the Republic of South Africa have been a matter of particular attention. We do not believe cutting our ties with this rich, troubled land would advance the cause we pursue or help the majority of the people of that country.

* * * * *

As for the Portuguese Territories, we shall continue to believe that their peoples should have the right of self-determination. We will encourage peaceful progress toward that goal.

* * * * *

CONCLUSION

As the President said in his Report to the Congress on Foreign Policy: "We want the Africans to build a better life for themselves and their children. We want to see an Africa free of poverty and disease, and free too of economic or political dependence on any outside power. And we want Africans to build this future as they think best, because in that way both our help and their efforts will be most relevant to their needs."

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that this is essential for ensuring the integrity of the financial statements and for providing a clear audit trail. The document also highlights the need for transparency and accountability in all financial dealings.

The second part of the document outlines the various methods used to collect and analyze financial data. It describes the process of gathering information from different sources and how this data is then processed and analyzed to identify trends and patterns. The document also discusses the importance of using reliable and accurate data sources.

The third part of the document focuses on the interpretation of the financial data. It explains how the data is used to assess the financial health of the organization and to identify areas for improvement. The document also discusses the role of management in interpreting the data and making informed decisions based on the findings.

TWENTY - SECOND ANNUAL



GLOBAL
STRATEGY
DISCUSSIONS

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UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, Rhode Island

15-19 JUNE 1970

DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTS

FOREWORD


To all of you who participated so enthusiastically in the Naval War College's Twenty-second Annual Global Strategy Discussions, may I express my appreciation as well as the appreciation of Secretary Chafee and Under Secretary Warner.

As I indicated to you in my opening remarks, the Discussions were not designed to find finite solutions to the political and strategic problems facing the United States today. Rather, the objective was, as in previous annual Discussions, to expand our individual awareness of these problems and to analyze the means by which our nation can best achieve its goals in the years ahead. I believe that I can state with confidence that this objective was fully achieved.

This year's Discussions were characterized, as they have been every year since they began in 1949, by the complete and free exchange of ideas and views which is the principal characteristic of the environment of academic freedom of the Naval War College. This complete freedom of expression, of course, resulted in a wide range of views, with the extremes being directly opposed in most instances. That the Discussions were so stimulating and enlightening is due as much to our differences as to any other aspect of the week's activities.

It is precisely because our major goal was so well achieved that it would be difficult if not impossible to determine or summarize any consensus of participant's views. For this reason the views expressed in this brochure are not represented as consensus views; nor are they necessarily intended to represent the views of the Naval War College or of the Department of the Navy. In fact, while some opinions were very widely held, other views expressed herein are in many cases controversial. The only criterion for their selection from the daily committee summaries is that they were typical of the thoughtful and thought-provoking ideas which emerged in committee sessions.

Our hope is that these summaries, used in conjunction with the War College student's views on national objectives and strategies--our "Blue Book," Guide to Committee Discussions--will prove to be stimulating and valuable as you individually pursue your interest in problems of global strategy in the months ahead.


RICHARD G. COLBERT
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

I. THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN PERSPECTIVE

15 JUNE 1970

The discussion of the Nixon Doctrine, which was the unifying theme of this year's Global Strategy Discussions, covered a wide range of viewpoints and perspectives.

The debate on the "partnership" concept of the Doctrine was particularly interesting. Participants readily perceived not only the advantages but also the dilemmas and anomalies posed by the partnership theory. For example, some wondered--in relationship to the less developed nations in particular--if true partnership is a viable concept when one nation (the United States) is so much stronger, richer, etc., than its "partners." In any event, the realities which force the United States to shoulder major burdens in support of its partners were recognized.

Of special interest were the views expressed concerning the relatively slight impact the Doctrine seems to have had on the civilian community compared with the importance attached to it by the military. This would appear to support the view that, if the public were better educated regarding the nature of the external threat to U.S. national security, they would be more alert to the requirement for an adequate U.S. and allied defense posture.

As in most of the week's discussions, the principal benefits were derived from identification and clarification of problems rather than from arriving at general consensus on strategies and courses of action with respect to the Nixon Doctrine. But, as this was the primary aim of the Discussions, we can feel some satisfaction with our endeavors.

If one had to agree on a single general concept shared by many of the participants, it would be that the Nixon Doctrine represents a broad policy approach for American foreign and defense policy and not an explicit guide for action. But even here there was disagreement on the extent to which the Doctrine was perceived as being a fundamentally new policy.

In the final analysis, the Nixon Doctrine provided an effective framework for the stimulating discussions which carried on through the rest of the week.

Just a few of the many other interesting ideas and views expressed during the discussion period devoted to this topic are listed below:

(1) The threat is not perceived equally by our major allies.

(2) Some of our allies doubt the will of the United States to come to their aid in a crisis.

(3) United States' vital interests are tied to continuing alliances with Western Europe and Japan, both of which can afford, and should be encouraged, to contribute to regional defense organizations.

(4) The President is bound by long-term decisions of past administrations; therefore, he has little room for maneuver.

(5) The Soviet Union may view the United States' willingness to negotiate as a weakness.

(6) The Nixon Doctrine contemplates negotiations from a position of strength, but fiscal constraints limit force levels, undermining this negotiating position.

(7) The ambiguous nature of the Doctrine is perhaps its most significant strength. It leaves United States' responses to world crisis situations deliberately unpredictable.

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II. USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

16 JUNE 1970

One of the more frequently discussed issues during this discussion period revolved around the strategic balance between the U.S. and the USSR, with particular attention being given to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). In this context, the term "sufficiency," as used by President Nixon, was interpreted by some participants in the Discussions as implying nuclear "parity" with the Soviets. The view was expressed by them that this "parity" was a prerequisite to SALT.

There was considerable support for the idea that the USSR may have agreed to SALT only in order to relieve the tension on their domestic programs caused by a costly, continuing arms race. An opinion was also expressed that, should SALT prove successful in limiting the strategic arms race, "wars of national liberation" would then become the principal outlet for Soviet expansionist energies.

During this and other discussion periods, the subject of the Soviet naval threat was pursued at length. Particular importance was attached to the momentum of the Soviet naval building program and the quality of the ships, weapons and equipment they are producing. The scope of future Soviet naval power this momentum will produce was viewed as a much greater threat than anything we face today. Regarding the Soviet Merchant Marine, opinions varied, ranging from those of the overwhelming majority who felt that the Soviet Merchant Marine should be considered an integral part of the USSR's military capability, to those few who regarded the Soviet merchant fleet as simply a competitive economic threat. This latter view appeared to downgrade the significance so many saw in the direct, central, computerized control exercised by the Soviet government over its merchant fleet.

In analyzing the Soviet Union's Eastern European allies, the view was advanced that these allies may not perceive the need for defense against the West in the same light as does the USSR. Some felt that the United States' own problem with its allies in this respect is one shared by the Soviet Union, except that the Soviet problem is much greater. Regarding the Soviet invasion of one of its own allies--Czechoslovakia--in 1968, one judgment considered this as a short-term success but a long-term failure for the Soviets. Another estimate held that the action was not a failure for the Soviets, because the United States and NATO failed to take any counteraction.

This topic was understandably of intense interest to all who participated. It might also be added that the discussions could have continued all week on this subject alone. Several other viewpoints expressed during this period, which are listed below, represent only a small portion of the issues debated:

(1) Every U.S./USSR confrontation has resulted from Soviet miscalculation of U.S. response.

(2) Even if the American and Western European public knew about the military capabilities of the Soviets, it is debatable whether they would believe that a need exists to strengthen our defense structure to counter them.

(3) The Sino-Soviet dispute works to the advantage of the United States, but the United States should refrain from involvement in the dispute.

(4) U.S. business initiatives hold potential for improving relations with the USSR.

(5) In crisis situations, the Russians have behaved as Russians first, bureaucrats second, and communists third.

(6) The USSR remains dedicated to a long-term goal of a Soviet-dominated world.

III. WESTERN EUROPE, ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN

17 JUNE 1970

As the President explicitly stated in his major foreign policy address in February 1970, ". . . in the third decade of our commitment to Europe, the depth of our relationship is a fact of life. We can no more disengage from Europe than from Alaska." The discussions in all committees generally echoed and approved this view. It was also the general consensus that the collective industrial, political and military strength of Western Europe enables it to be the only area of the world which could in fact become a full and equal "partner" of the United States, as contemplated by the Nixon Doctrine. In other areas of the world, the reality of power will tend to unbalance "partnership" in one or more aspects.

The major points which emerged in committee summaries reflected a general awareness of both the advantages and the difficulties inherent in employing the "three-pillared" policy of the Nixon Doctrine in Europe. First, Western Europeans are anxious that the United States continue to maintain its military strength (particularly in Europe) and its commitment to the security of Europe. Conversely, the European view of the U.S. commitment to Asia is ambivalent: while a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Asia would lessen European credence in the U.S. commitment to Europe; continued U.S. involvement in Asia antagonizes many Europeans. Similarly, U.S. willingness to negotiate is both applauded and feared. Perception of the Soviet threat in certain European nations differs from the American view. Further, the European looks at improved relations with the USSR as being not only desirable, but inevitable. At the same time however, Europeans have serious reservations concerning bilateral U.S./USSR negotiations. Finally, partnership is viewed as a natural and inevitable European right; but at the same time, U.S. efforts to encourage a greater European contribution to mutual defense are viewed as an attempt to reduce the U.S. commitment to Europe. Thus, effective implementation of the three major features of the Nixon Doctrine will prove a difficult and complex undertaking, even in this one area of the world where it should be a totally viable and realistic policy.

As might have been anticipated, committee discussions tended to focus on NATO. A few of the significant points which emerged were:

- (1) U.S. economic and domestic issues are driving our national military strategy, rather than the assessment of Soviet military capabilities.

(2) The strategy of maintaining "quick reaction" forces in the United States is politically attractive; however, military experience shows that prepositioned equipment is difficult to maintain, and that any sustained effort must rely on a secure sealift to the area of operations.

(3) Withdrawal of the U.S. SIXTH FLEET from the Mediterranean would be a devastating psychological blow to Europe.

(4) The United States must retain a military presence in Europe sufficient to indicate U.S. determination and commitment.

(5) The credibility of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe may have been enhanced by the move into Cambodia.

(6) A continued Allied presence in West Berlin is vital to NATO cohesion and effectiveness.

(7) Increased European contributions to NATO will be a function of European willingness to bear the costs, based on the European perception of the threat.

(8) NATO naval strength could be increased by the development of specialized forces by certain navies which could be combined as multinational forces in being or as "call-up" forces.

(9) Unilateral reduction of forces by the NATO countries will not influence similar Warsaw Pact reductions.

(10) Although the Soviet Union seeks to project a liberal image, Soviet objectives have not changed, as evidenced by events in Czechoslovakia.

(11) NATO would not react if the Brezhnev Doctrine were exercised only in Eastern Bloc countries.

(12) Western Europe's efforts to break the solidarity of the Eastern Bloc satellites should be in the nature of economic and cultural overtures, rather than military.

(13) The future of Western Europe depends, for the most part, on the future role of Germany.

(14) U.S. policy should allow and support West German rapprochement with East Germany so long as U.S. interests are protected.

IV. AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

18 JUNE 1970

One of the more commonly held views expressed in the discussion period on Africa, South of the Sahara, was that this area did not represent, in economic, political, or strategic terms, an area of "vital" interests for the United States. This does not mean, however, that the United States has no interest in Africa. Committee discussions of many aspects of U.S. policy toward this area indicate that we do in fact have strong secondary interests in Africa, some of which could adversely affect the domestic situation in our country.

Some participants expressed the general judgment that our policy for Africa is founded on almost total ignorance of the continent and its people, customs and views. Another view held that African development is better left to private enterprise, which can achieve objectives which the United States Government is not able to realize. Another opinion on this subject pointed to the unwillingness of private U.S. enterprise to invest in Africa because of the political instability of many of the countries there as well as the generally poor state of economic development.

Some participants felt that increased interest of Black Americans in Africa may force our national leaders to allot greater United States resources to that area. This seemed to coincide with another expressed judgment that our country has a moral responsibility to become involved in the region. A more limited view held that the United States should concentrate its efforts on educating selected potential African leaders, relying on them to combat the chronic sociological ills of the area. This could possibly lend truth to charges by Africans of American neocolonialism. Allied with this feeling was the opinion that the United States should not attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of African nations, but should make a strong effort to get its own house in order.

Widely divergent views were expressed on our policy toward apartheid in Southern Africa, with some holding that the United States should be strongly against apartheid, and others believing we should abandon our altruistic policy in this regard and take a more practical stance.

Some other noteworthy points which emerged during this discussion period were:

(1) U.S. strategic interests in South Africa, Mozambique, and Angola as well as in the Azores, may be compromised by a U.S. policy which is overly concerned with Portugal's colonial policies and South Africa's apartheid policies.

(2) The U.S. Navy should play a more active role in Africa and the Indian Ocean, with more frequent port calls and exercises.

V. LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

18 JUNE 1970

The committee discussions on U.S. policy toward this region tended to revolve around Latin American domestic political, economic, and sociological problems. There was no difficulty in agreeing that these problems are numerous and long standing. Those of more recent vintage have to do with the rising intensity of nationalism, the growing youth unrest, and the desire for military strength and prestige. Allied with the increasingly nationalistic spirit, in the estimate of some participants, is the perennial Latin American antagonism toward what they consider U.S. domination.

One of the criticisms which emerged in discussions was the charge that U.S. Latin American policy is inadequate because it is reactionary in nature and does not anticipate problems in this part of the world. There were those who tended to believe that a contributory factor in the inadequacy of U.S. policy was our tendency to regard Latin America as a homogeneous entity. The idea was expressed that U.S. programs should recognize the vast individual differences between Latin American states, and should be tailored to reflect these differences.

There was a significant amount of discussion concerning hemispheric security and the U.S. commitment to that security. Some committees thought the U.S. concern for security would cause this country to act unilaterally, if required, to prevent a Communist takeover of another Latin American nation. One expressed judgment was that the member states of the Organization of American States (OAS) are not in agreement as to the extent of the threat posed to Latin America by international communism, but that the Latin Americans do agree that the United States exaggerates this threat.

Included in some of the estimates and judgments which emerged in committee discussions--and which are related to the foregoing--are the following ideas:

(1) The OAS is a viable, though somewhat limited organization. Though the United States has shown an increasing tendency to consult the OAS rather than to act unilaterally, the effects have been minimized by the belief of some Latin American states that the OAS serves as an instrument for the implementation of U.S. foreign policy.

(2) The Latin American military is the major stabilizing factor in the area. U.S. policy has neglected and often deliberately affronted this group, with predictable results. This is especially true with respect to the rising young officer corps who have sought to force social and economic reform.

(3) U.S. interests in Latin America are primarily economic. However, the marked growth in nationalism and political instability are becoming direct concerns to U.S. foreign policy.

(4) U.S. efforts in Latin America are diluted by the image of the United States conveyed by its own domestic news media.

(5) Congressional actions to inhibit expropriations, such as the Hickenlooper Amendment, are in fact, counter-productive.

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VI. MIDDLE EAST

18 JUNE 1970

The complex and frustrating issues in the Middle East, principally the Arab-Israeli dispute, were particularly interesting topics for discussion. Naturally, the prevalent view held by participants was that the Middle East is a highly explosive area which poses the highest potential risk for U.S./USSR confrontation. A thoughtful judgment was made that time is not on the side of the Israelis because of the tremendous demands the conflict places on their economy and population. However, no clear and feasible recommendations for solutions to the problem evolved from the discussion.

One of the more controversial aspects of this issue concerned the probability of direct U.S. involvement in the conflict if it became a matter of survival for Israel. Some committees conjectured that the United States would probably commit forces to insure Israel's survival within her pre-1967 borders. Needless to say, there was no consensus on this issue.

The importance of Middle East oil was frequently discussed, with some holding to the view that United States' interest in the Middle East is primarily economic, and that our strategic interest stems only from our allies' dependence on the area for most of their oil. On the same issue, an interesting observation was made that it is the economic power which control of Middle East oil carries with it that is the true objective of both the Western and Communist states.

With respect to the Soviet buildup in the Mediterranean area, the opinion of most participants was that this limits U.S. options in the area, including the option to employ freely the U.S. SIXTH FLEET in the Eastern Mediterranean. One view on the Soviet fleet buildup, which might appear rather startling to some, holds that the Soviet move seaward is a major step toward their ultimate goal of gaining control of the strategic Iranian/Afganistani land bridge to the Indian Ocean.

The broad scope as well as the varied and thoughtful quality of these committee discussions and analyses reflect the concern and interest with which this region of the world is regarded by Americans. Indicative of this are the following additional comments made in discussion sessions:

(1) Israel has the potential for nuclear weapons and may well be driven to developing and using them.

(2) U.S. domestic opinion, which now generally favors Israel, may be diminishing due to Israeli retaliatory acts against the Arabs.

(3) The ambivalent attitude of some U.S. legislators who abhor U.S. involvement in Vietnam, but urge U.S. involvement in the Middle East, may be derived from a general empathy for Israeli efficiency and motivation.

(4) Continued U.S. support of Israel jeopardizes the existence of the moderate Arab regimes.

(5) Soviet interests would be served by reopening the Suez Canal.

(6) Western Europe regards "Arab oil" as a vital national interest and would compromise Israel's existence to preserve access to that oil.

VII. THE PACIFIC AND ASIA

19 JUNE 1970

The discussions on the Pacific and Asia tended quite naturally to concentrate on the two most powerful nations of the area, Communist China and Japan.

The generally held American view of China as a great mystery seemed to be supported in the committee discussions. First and foremost, it was generally concluded that the United States must work toward understanding Chinese culture, character and national aspirations in order to build a base for improved relations. However, even while conceding a general inadequacy of knowledge of China, many committees arrived at several reasonably specific views of China. Included among these were:

(1) Eventually, the two Chinas may be reunited politically, as the result of a peaceful settlement.

(2) Chinese communism, while apparently very aggressive and expansionist, is actually conservative, inward-looking, and pragmatic.

However, even among those who held to these views of China, concern was expressed that China's domestic problems of food production and rapidly expanding population may force her leaders to adopt a more irrational foreign policy which could lead to a major war in Asia.

Japan was the second major focus of the discussion period on Asia and the Pacific. There was widespread agreement that Japan is the key to the future of this area and the logical major partner of the United States in Asia as contemplated by the Nixon Doctrine. Some participants, however, expressed reservations concerning the future of U.S./Japanese relations and the directions of Japanese influence and ambitions in the area. Among these was serious concern for the reliability of a militarily and economically strong Japan as an ally in the future. Related to this concern, but on a different tack, was a general question of Japan's ability effectively to relieve the United States of its Asian responsibilities in view of the general fear of Japan prevalent in the area, and of the widespread Asian anxiety toward increased Japanese influence in the area. A final limitation on American credence in Japan as an ally concerns Japanese relations with China. Japan tends to view China as both a commercial market and a potential commercial rival, but not as a military threat.

Some other specific viewpoints which emerged from the discussions were:

(1) Conflict in Korea is unlikely, because it might precipitate war between China and Russia.

(2) The United States has a vital interest in ensuring that a balance of power is maintained in the Pacific and Asia generally.

(3) The United States has decided in principle to leave Vietnam even though detailed plans for final withdrawal are still uncertain.

(4) Okinawa, though a key military base for the United States, should not dominate our strategy if it hurts our relations with Japan.

(5) Singapore remains a vital issue for U.S. forward strategy. Australian influence could be a means of maintaining Western use of the port.

(6) If the United States is to continue to maintain a forward defense posture in Asia under the Nixon Doctrine, the most logical and feasible means will be through seapower.

TWENTY - SECOND ANNUAL



GLOBAL
STRATEGY
DISCUSSIONS

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UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, Rhode Island

15-19 JUNE 1970

DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTS

FOREWORD


To all of you who participated so enthusiastically in the Naval War College's Twenty-second Annual Global Strategy Discussions, may I express my appreciation as well as the appreciation of Secretary Chafee and Under Secretary Warner.

As I indicated to you in my opening remarks, the Discussions were not designed to find finite solutions to the political and strategic problems facing the United States today. Rather, the objective was, as in previous annual Discussions, to expand our individual awareness of these problems and to analyze the means by which our nation can best achieve its goals in the years ahead. I believe that I can state with confidence that this objective was fully achieved.

This year's Discussions were characterized, as they have been every year since they began in 1949, by the complete and free exchange of ideas and views which is the principal characteristic of the environment of academic freedom of the Naval War College. This complete freedom of expression, of course, resulted in a wide range of views, with the extremes being directly opposed in most instances. That the Discussions were so stimulating and enlightening is due as much to our differences as to any other aspect of the week's activities.

It is precisely because our major goal was so well achieved that it would be difficult if not impossible to determine or summarize any consensus of participant's views. For this reason the views expressed in this brochure are not represented as consensus views; nor are they necessarily intended to represent the views of the Naval War College or of the Department of the Navy. In fact, while some opinions were very widely held, other views expressed herein are in many cases controversial. The only criterion for their selection from the daily committee summaries is that they were typical of the thoughtful and thought-provoking ideas which emerged in committee sessions.

Our hope is that these summaries, used in conjunction with the War College student's views on national objectives and strategies--our "Blue Book," Guide to Committee Discussions--will prove to be stimulating and valuable as you individually pursue your interest in problems of global strategy in the months ahead.


RICHARD G. COLBERT
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

I. THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN PERSPECTIVE

15 JUNE 1970

The discussion of the Nixon Doctrine, which was the unifying theme of this year's Global Strategy Discussions, covered a wide range of viewpoints and perspectives.

The debate on the "partnership" concept of the Doctrine was particularly interesting. Participants readily perceived not only the advantages but also the dilemmas and anomalies posed by the partnership theory. For example, some wondered--in relationship to the less developed nations in particular--if true partnership is a viable concept when one nation (the United States) is so much stronger, richer, etc., than its "partners." In any event, the realities which force the United States to shoulder major burdens in support of its partners were recognized.

Of special interest were the views expressed concerning the relatively slight impact the Doctrine seems to have had on the civilian community compared with the importance attached to it by the military. This would appear to support the view that, if the public were better educated regarding the nature of the external threat to U.S. national security, they would be more alert to the requirement for an adequate U.S. and allied defense posture.

As in most of the week's discussions, the principal benefits were derived from identification and clarification of problems rather than from arriving at general consensus on strategies and courses of action with respect to the Nixon Doctrine. But, as this was the primary aim of the Discussions, we can feel some satisfaction with our endeavors.

If one had to agree on a single general concept shared by many of the participants, it would be that the Nixon Doctrine represents a broad policy approach for American foreign and defense policy and not an explicit guide for action. But even here there was disagreement on the extent to which the Doctrine was perceived as being a fundamentally new policy.

In the final analysis, the Nixon Doctrine provided an effective framework for the stimulating discussions which carried on through the rest of the week.

Just a few of the many other interesting ideas and views expressed during the discussion period devoted to this topic are listed below:

(1) The threat is not perceived equally by our major allies.

(2) Some of our allies doubt the will of the United States to come to their aid in a crisis.

(3) United States' vital interests are tied to continuing alliances with Western Europe and Japan, both of which can afford, and should be encouraged, to contribute to regional defense organizations.

(4) The President is bound by long-term decisions of past administrations; therefore, he has little room for maneuver.

(5) The Soviet Union may view the United States' willingness to negotiate as a weakness.

(6) The Nixon Doctrine contemplates negotiations from a position of strength, but fiscal constraints limit force levels, undermining this negotiating position.

(7) The ambiguous nature of the Doctrine is perhaps its most significant strength. It leaves United States' responses to world crisis situations deliberately unpredictable.

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II. USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

16 JUNE 1970

One of the more frequently discussed issues during this discussion period revolved around the strategic balance between the U.S. and the USSR, with particular attention being given to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). In this context, the term "sufficiency," as used by President Nixon, was interpreted by some participants in the Discussions as implying nuclear "parity" with the Soviets. The view was expressed by them that this "parity" was a prerequisite to SALT.

There was considerable support for the idea that the USSR may have agreed to SALT only in order to relieve the tension on their domestic programs caused by a costly, continuing arms race. An opinion was also expressed that, should SALT prove successful in limiting the strategic arms race, "wars of national liberation" would then become the principal outlet for Soviet expansionist energies.

During this and other discussion periods, the subject of the Soviet naval threat was pursued at length. Particular importance was attached to the momentum of the Soviet naval building program and the quality of the ships, weapons and equipment they are producing. The scope of future Soviet naval power this momentum will produce was viewed as a much greater threat than anything we face today. Regarding the Soviet Merchant Marine, opinions varied, ranging from those of the overwhelming majority who felt that the Soviet Merchant Marine should be considered an integral part of the USSR's military capability, to those few who regarded the Soviet merchant fleet as simply a competitive economic threat. This latter view appeared to downgrade the significance so many saw in the direct, central, computerized control exercised by the Soviet government over its merchant fleet.

In analyzing the Soviet Union's Eastern European allies, the view was advanced that these allies may not perceive the need for defense against the West in the same light as does the USSR. Some felt that the United States' own problem with its allies in this respect is one shared by the Soviet Union, except that the Soviet problem is much greater. Regarding the Soviet invasion of one of its own allies--Czechoslovakia--in 1968, one judgment considered this as a short-term success but a long-term failure for the Soviets. Another estimate held that the action was not a failure for the Soviets, because the United States and NATO failed to take any counteraction.

This topic was understandably of intense interest to all who participated. It might also be added that the discussions could have continued all week on this subject alone. Several other viewpoints expressed during this period, which are listed below, represent only a small portion of the issues debated:

(1) Every U.S./USSR confrontation has resulted from Soviet miscalculation of U.S. response.

(2) Even if the American and Western European public knew about the military capabilities of the Soviets, it is debatable whether they would believe that a need exists to strengthen our defense structure to counter them.

(3) The Sino-Soviet dispute works to the advantage of the United States, but the United States should refrain from involvement in the dispute.

(4) U.S. business initiatives hold potential for improving relations with the USSR.

(5) In crisis situations, the Russians have behaved as Russians first, bureaucrats second, and communists third.

(6) The USSR remains dedicated to a long-term goal of a Soviet-dominated world.

III. WESTERN EUROPE, ATLANTIC AND MEDITERRANEAN

17 JUNE 1970

As the President explicitly stated in his major foreign policy address in February 1970, ". . . in the third decade of our commitment to Europe, the depth of our relationship is a fact of life. We can no more disengage from Europe than from Alaska." The discussions in all committees generally echoed and approved this view. It was also the general consensus that the collective industrial, political and military strength of Western Europe enables it to be the only area of the world which could in fact become a full and equal "partner" of the United States, as contemplated by the Nixon Doctrine. In other areas of the world, the reality of power will tend to unbalance "partnership" in one or more aspects.

The major points which emerged in committee summaries reflected a general awareness of both the advantages and the difficulties inherent in employing the "three-pillared" policy of the Nixon Doctrine in Europe. First, Western Europeans are anxious that the United States continue to maintain its military strength (particularly in Europe) and its commitment to the security of Europe. Conversely, the European view of the U.S. commitment to Asia is ambivalent: while a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Asia would lessen European credence in the U.S. commitment to Europe; continued U.S. involvement in Asia antagonizes many Europeans. Similarly, U.S. willingness to negotiate is both applauded and feared. Perception of the Soviet threat in certain European nations differs from the American view. Further, the European looks at improved relations with the USSR as being not only desirable, but inevitable. At the same time however, Europeans have serious reservations concerning bilateral U.S./USSR negotiations. Finally, partnership is viewed as a natural and inevitable European right; but at the same time, U.S. efforts to encourage a greater European contribution to mutual defense are viewed as an attempt to reduce the U.S. commitment to Europe. Thus, effective implementation of the three major features of the Nixon Doctrine will prove a difficult and complex undertaking, even in this one area of the world where it should be a totally viable and realistic policy.

As might have been anticipated, committee discussions tended to focus on NATO. A few of the significant points which emerged were:

- (1) U.S. economic and domestic issues are driving our national military strategy, rather than the assessment of Soviet military capabilities.

(2) The strategy of maintaining "quick reaction" forces in the United States is politically attractive; however, military experience shows that prepositioned equipment is difficult to maintain, and that any sustained effort must rely on a secure sealift to the area of operations.

(3) Withdrawal of the U.S. SIXTH FLEET from the Mediterranean would be a devastating psychological blow to Europe.

(4) The United States must retain a military presence in Europe sufficient to indicate U.S. determination and commitment.

(5) The credibility of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe may have been enhanced by the move into Cambodia.

(6) A continued Allied presence in West Berlin is vital to NATO cohesion and effectiveness.

(7) Increased European contributions to NATO will be a function of European willingness to bear the costs, based on the European perception of the threat.

(8) NATO naval strength could be increased by the development of specialized forces by certain navies which could be combined as multinational forces in being or as "call-up" forces.

(9) Unilateral reduction of forces by the NATO countries will not influence similar Warsaw Pact reductions.

(10) Although the Soviet Union seeks to project a liberal image, Soviet objectives have not changed, as evidenced by events in Czechoslovakia.

(11) NATO would not react if the Brezhnev Doctrine were exercised only in Eastern Bloc countries.

(12) Western Europe's efforts to break the solidarity of the Eastern Bloc satellites should be in the nature of economic and cultural overtures, rather than military.

(13) The future of Western Europe depends, for the most part, on the future role of Germany.

(14) U.S. policy should allow and support West German rapprochement with East Germany so long as U.S. interests are protected.

IV. AFRICA, SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

18 JUNE 1970

One of the more commonly held views expressed in the discussion period on Africa, South of the Sahara, was that this area did not represent, in economic, political, or strategic terms, an area of "vital" interests for the United States. This does not mean, however, that the United States has no interest in Africa. Committee discussions of many aspects of U.S. policy toward this area indicate that we do in fact have strong secondary interests in Africa, some of which could adversely affect the domestic situation in our country.

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LCDR. Hill

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MODERATOR'S HANDBOOK

GSD MODERATOR'S HANDBOOK

The purpose of this handbook is to provide Committee Moderators and Assistant Moderators with information pertinent to their responsibilities during GSD week. The success of GSD week is directly dependent upon the initiative of the Committee Moderator and the student members of his committee. This handbook has been given limited distribution and is intended for use in conjunction with the General Syllabus for GSD as an aid in planning for the functions prescribed in that directive. It is not intended, however, that this handbook limit the initiative or prerogatives of the Committee members or the Moderator.

	<u>SECTION</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
I	- COMMITTEE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION	1
II	- CONTENTS OF GSD COMMITTEE PACKET	8
III	- SUMMARIES OF GROUP DISCUSSIONS	9
IV	- ENTERTAINMENT	10
V	- HELPFUL HINTS FOR MODERATORS	14
VI	- CHRONOLOGICAL CHECK LIST FOR MODERATORS	20


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Discussions

SECTION I

COMMITTEE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION

Ref. (a): Syllabus for Twenty-second Annual Global Strategy Discussions, 15-19 June 1970.

The guidelines set forth in this section are provided as suggestions to Moderators and Assistant Moderators in preparing for GSD week activities. They are based on procedures found acceptable in previous years and on recommendations by past GSD participants.

A. PRELIMINARY TO GSD WEEK.

1. Committee Organization. One of the first tasks for the Moderator is to organize the committee as indicated below. The importance of completing these arrangements and making assignments early cannot be overemphasized. Naval Warfare and Command and Staff students will be available for the initial briefing and the planning and organization meeting on 8 May. Time is also being made available for a second committee organizational meeting on 12 June, the Friday prior to GSD week. During this meeting, which will include the Senior Reserve Officers, all committee members should be briefed on committee plans and any remaining final details worked out. The necessary planning should be completed and tentative assignments firmed at any time between these two dates. It is emphasized that these designated times should be utilized to the fullest extent since there will be little time for planning once GSD week has begun. The following assignments are recommended:

- a. Assistant Moderator. Designated in Annex F to reference (a). The Assistant Moderator is to assist the Moderator in his numerous tasks in the administration of the committee. He will also serve as the recorder for the committee. (See Section III.)
- b. Entertainment Chairman. See paragraph 2 below and Section IV.
- c. Transportation Chairman. See Section IV.
- d. Finance Chairman. See Section IV.
- e. Escorts. The Committee Moderator shall designate an escort for each visiting Flag or General Officer and each civilian guest assigned to the committee. The list of assignments of guests to committees will be available by 6 June in

the GSD Command Post (Room 241, Pringle Hall), together with information about each guest. The Moderator shall provide to the Command Post the name and telephone number of each of his designated escorts. Because of last minute cancellations and late acceptances, the assignment of guests to committees may change. For that reason, the Moderator must check daily with the GSD Command Post and make such changes in escort assignments as may be required. Each escort must be thoroughly familiar with the provisions of Appendix I to Annex B to reference (a), which set forth special requirements for escorts during GSD week.

NOTE: As of noon, Friday, 12 June, the responsibilities of the GSD Command Post and its facilities will be transferred to the Global Strategy Discussions Duty Office in Pringle Coffee Mess.

f. Student Speakers. The Moderator shall designate students to prepare a short oral presentation for each of the six Group Discussions for which topics have been assigned. See paragraph 5 below.

g. Room preparation. See paragraph 4 below.

h. Naval Institute Briefing. See paragraph 10 below.

i. Naval War College Review Briefing. See paragraph 10 below.

2. Entertainment Planning. The entertainment of guests, which includes luncheon arrangements, is a committee function. Early designation of a Committee Entertainment Chairman by the Moderator and early preparation of a proposed entertainment program for the committee are strongly recommended. In this regard, attention is invited to the Schedule of Official Entertainment contained in Annex D to reference (a) which must be considered in outlining the Committee Entertainment Program. Additional information on entertainment planning is included in Section IV of this handbook. The Entertainment Office (Room 208, Luce Hall, telephone 841-4470) should be kept informed of all entertainment plans.

3. Senior Reserve Officers. The Senior Reserve Officers (SRO) will be on board the entire week preceding GSD. They will receive a GSD Briefing on 10 June and will meet on 12 June with their GSD Committees. They can be contacted prior to daily classes, at lunch time, after classes, or by leaving a note in their mail boxes which will be located in Sims Hall. They are to be considered as a part of the War College family and will share with the resident students the role of hosts to the GSD week guests; however, they are not eligible to perform escort duties or to make the keynote committee presentations.

4. Preparation of Committee Rooms. It is the responsibility of each Moderator to ensure that the assigned committee room (see Annex F, to reference (a)) is prepared properly for use during GSD week. A member of each committee should be assigned this responsibility. It is suggested that the following tasks be accomplished Saturday afternoon, 13 June, prior to committee meeting. Most of the rooms will not be available prior to that date. Some rooms will be utilized until late Friday in the Applications Study and on Saturday for comprehensive examinations. For this reason, a final room check should be made Saturday afternoon.

a. Check walls and bulletin boards to see that extraneous materials left over from previous studies have been removed.

b. Verify cleanliness and check furniture arrangement. Notify the maintenance man if corrective action is required. Committee rooms should present a pleasing appearance upon arrival of guest participants.

c. Verify the presence of a world map.

d. Draw the following publications from Mahan Library (Committees 1-15) or Sims Library (Committees 16-39) and place them in the Committee Room:

English Dictionary
Joint Dictionary (JCS Pub. 1)

e. Draw the Committee Packet from the Publications Branch, Room 005, Luce Hall. The contents of the Committee Packet are listed on page 9 of the handbook. Post or display the items in accordance with instructions contained in the list.

f. Post schedules and other material deemed appropriate.

5. Reading Materials and Presentation Topics.

a. The pamphlet, Global Strategy Discussions Topics and Selected Readings, has been distributed to all participants. The basic readings are edited versions of the U.S. national objectives in specified areas of the world which were developed by student committees in the School of Naval Warfare. The pamphlet is required reading for resident students and is strongly recommended for others. Familiarity with the contents of this pamphlet should afford a common ground for discussions between guests and resident students during GSD week.

b. A well qualified student will be designated by the Moderator to give a 10 minute oral presentation as an introduction to each discussion session. The pamphlet, Global Strategy Discussions Topics and Selected Readings, will serve as a discussion guide.

B. DURING GSD WEEK.

1. Administrative Details. It is advisable to allocate a few minutes at the beginning and end of each day for administrative announcements and verification of social plans.

2. GSD Guest Briefcase. Since the faculty, student and SRO members of the committee have a collective responsibility to act as hosts for the Flag and General Officers and civilian guests, they all should be aware (particularly the escorts) that each guest is provided a briefcase containing the following: (Copies of most of these are included in the Moderator's Packet.)

a. Name tags for the guest (and wife, if accompanying).

b. (Civilian guests only.) A courtesy card authorizing specific privileges on the Naval Base, as listed in Annex B to reference (a).

c. Invitations to the President's Luncheon, the President's Reception, and the ~~GSD Dinner-Dance~~. (As the President's Reception will be held Sunday evening, the invitation will be meaningful only to those guests who arrive and register prior to Sunday evening.)

d. Invitations to use the facilities of the Newport Clambake Club and the Newport Reading Room.

e. GSD Key Telephone Numbers. (The Escort Officer should fill in his and the Moderator's office and home telephone numbers.)

f. GSD Bus Schedule.

g. GSD Schedule.

h. Roster of Participants and Biographical Data.

i. Biographical Data on Distinguished Speakers.

j. GSD Evaluation Form.

k. Nomination Form for Prospective GSD Participants.

~~l. Newport Information Brochures.~~

3. Informality. Early emphasis should be placed on creating an appropriate, informal atmosphere for the discussion periods; i.e., smoking, removal of coats, etc. The sooner the "ice" is broken, the quicker the guests and SROs can be drawn into the discussions. Experience indicates that Naval War College students will have to "carry the ball" during the initial discussion periods.

4. Schedule. Adherence to scheduled starting times for discussion periods is emphasized. Extended lunch periods detract from the overall purpose of the week.

5. Coffee Breaks. Coffee is available in both Pringle and Sims messes. Because of the number of persons involved and the limited facilities in the messes, it may be found desirable to take coffee cups back to Committee Rooms during breaks.

6. Library Visit. An early visit to the Sims or Mahan libraries to familiarize guests with materials available is recommended. This may be accomplished by the escort officers prior to the commencement of the discussions, or at other convenient times.

7. Security. The Moderator should explain and enforce the level of security classification of the discussion periods. (SECRET or below.) All participants will have SECRET clearance. They should, however, be reminded not to discuss classified material during social functions. No classified documents shall be released to the custody of guest participants. A more detailed statement regarding security is contained in Annex C to reference (a).

8. Mail.

a. Routine notices that affect guest participants, schedules, and other committee affairs will be placed in the Moderators' mail boxes in Luce Hall. Moderators should check these mail boxes at least twice daily (AM and PM).

b. Incoming mail for guests will be delivered to committee rooms by mailroom messengers.

9. Photographs. All GSD Committees will be photographed on Tuesday, 16 June or Wednesday, 17 June, under a tight schedule. Appendix II to Annex B to reference (a) schedules the time and place for these photographs. The need for punctuality is stressed. If distribution of prints to all participants by the final day of the Discussions is not possible, they will be forwarded by mail.

10. Special Handout Materials.

a. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. In order to acquaint the civilian GSD participants with the Institute and to interest them in possible future associate memberships, copies of the Proceedings will be provided for issue in Committee on 15 June. A naval officer, preferably a member of the Institute, should be designated to give a short briefing on the purposes of the Institute and the character of the Proceedings at that time. The following information should be included:

The U.S. Naval Institute was established for the advancement of professional, literary, and scientific knowledge in the Navy. It is a private, professional society for those who are interested in naval and maritime affairs, and is a non-profit, self-supporting organization. Regular membership is available to officers of the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Coast Guard. Other U.S. citizens are eligible for associate memberships. The journal of the Institute, the Proceedings, is distributed to all members.

Soon after GSD is over, the Institute plans to send a personal invitation to each civilian guest to join as an associate member. Information as to dues need not be provided unless requested, since the individual invitation will contain this information. Associate membership dues currently are \$8.00 per year.

b. Naval War College Review. In order to provide some further insight into the continuing naval officer education program, the June edition of the Naval War College Review will be distributed to all guests and SROs at the same time the Proceedings are distributed. A very short briefing on the content and distribution of the Review is appropriate. The following points concerning the Review should be tactfully stressed:

(1) The Review is a monthly publication containing generally noteworthy lectures heard at the Naval War College during each academic year; in addition, selected outstanding student research papers are included.

(2) The purpose of the Review is to contribute to the professional education of the officers of the Navy by providing them with some of the educational material available to resident students.

(3) In view of the privilege of privacy accorded to lecturers at the War College, material in the Review may not be republished or publicly quoted without specific clearance from both the author and the President, Naval War College.

Distribution is normally limited to the staff and students of the War College, officers enrolled in War College extension education courses, and other officers of the rank of Lieutenant Commander and above upon specific application.

(4) The thoughts and opinions expressed in the Review are those of the individual authors and lecturers and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or the Naval War College.

(5) Civilian participants in GSD, 1970 will be placed automatically on the Review distribution list for one year.

c. Other articles may be selected for distribution to participants. The criteria for selection will include news coverage of the GSD and/or inclusion of topical material particularly appropriate to the GSD discussions. Moderators will be informed by separate memo of any additional items selected for distribution.

11. Demonstration at the NEWS. A demonstration on the Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator (NEWS) is scheduled for 1600, Monday and 1630, Tuesday at the NEWS in Sims Hall. Attendance is optional. The NEWS is a multimillion dollar war gaming device used by all of the Naval War College students and (for six months each year) by various Fleet Commanders. War plans, contingency plans and experimental concepts can be realistically simulated and war gamed on this highly automated, one-of-a-kind installation. Each demonstration will include a short lecture and a dynamic presentation of the Battle of Midway which highlights the capabilities of the Simulator. Following this, there will be a tour of the NEWS computer spaces, command centers and control rooms. The total time involved is a maximum of one hour. The ladies of all GSD guests are also invited to attend.

12. Evaluation Sheets. Moderators are requested to ensure that the 1970 GSD Evaluation Sheets are completed and turned in as soon as possible at the end of the week. An Evaluation Sheet is included in each copy of the Syllabus. Evaluation Sheets for GSD guests are included in their kits and may be submitted by mail.

13. GSD Nomination Forms. Moderators are requested to remind all participants of the nomination forms for prospective GSD participants (NAVWARCOLNOTE 5723) which have been included in the briefcases of all GSD guests and distributed to students and Senior Reserve Officers through their distribution boxes. The Naval War College places considerable reliance on these nominations when preparing invitations for GSD participation.

SECTION II

CONTENTS OF GSD COMMITTEE PACKET

A. The following is a list of the items included in the committee packet which should be picked up from the Publications Branch, Luce Hall, by 12 June 1970.

1. Committee Number Sign (to be posted on door).
2. Desk name plates for all committee members and guests.
3. Pictures of the Naval War College Staff and Students (to be posted).
4. The following items which should be displayed for the use of all committee members and guests:
 - a. Map of Newport.
 - b. Local road map.
 - c. ~~A Global Strategy Discussions Brochure.~~
 - d. A Naval War College Brochure.
5. The following items which should be issued at the initial committee meeting and briefing, 1130, Monday, 15 June:
 - a. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings for each guest.
 - b. Naval War College Review for each guest (flag or general officer and civilian).
 - c. Other articles which might be selected subsequent to the cut-off date for inclusion of information in this handbook.

SECTION III

SUMMARIES OF GROUP DISCUSSIONS

A. The Assistant Moderator of each committee will serve as recorder for group discussions. In this capacity, he will:

1. Determine and briefly (200-250 words) summarize the major significant points of the group's discussions for each subject area. Consensus views are not being sought. Ideas that surface during the discussion are.
2. At the conclusion of each seminar, discuss with and obtain the concurrence of the Committee Moderator and Faculty Advisor on the elements to be included in the summary.
3. Deliver by hand to Room 241 Pringle, one type-written or legibly handwritten copy of the summary. Summaries should be delivered not later than 1715 of the same day.

B. Following receipt of all committee summaries, an Editorial Board (membership to be promulgated by separate notice) will review them and develop a GSD Paper, incorporating the most significant elements of the committees' summaries. These papers will be placed in the Moderator's mail boxes by 0800 on the following day. With respect to these papers, each Moderator will:

1. Daily, pick up copies of the GSD Paper for his committee prior to the first discussion period scheduled for the day.
2. Open the morning discussion period by reading the GSD Paper to the committee, after which the committee will discuss the paper briefly. Not more than 15 minutes of the discussion period should be devoted to the presentation and discussion of the paper summarizing the previous day's activities.

SECTION IV

ENTERTAINMENT

A. GENERAL. Annex D to reference (a) contains guidelines for official and semi-official entertainment during Global Strategy Discussions, 1970. Committee Moderators and Entertainment Chairmen should be familiar with these guidelines and with the schedule of events.

B. COMMITTEE ASSISTANTS. As indicated in Section I of this handbook, each Committee Moderator should appoint certain assistants to help with entertainment. Past experience has shown that three assistants are desirable: one in overall charge, one to handle finances, and one to coordinate transportation:

1. The Entertainment Chairman conducts the planning for all semi-official entertainment, coordinates with the GSD Entertainment Office and makes all necessary reservations.

2. The Finance Chairman establishes an Entertainment Fund to which all members of the committee contribute. He then handles the payment of all bills for entertainment. This procedure is especially applicable for luncheons since the limited time available for lunch precludes the time-consuming process of individual payment.

3. The Committee Transportation Chairman assists by making car pool arrangements from among the participants' vehicles, or by arranging for the use of official transportation. (See Annex B to reference (a), paragraph 5.)

C. ENTERTAINMENT SCHEDULING. Entertainment to be scheduled by committees is, as indicated in Annex D to reference (a), of a semi-official nature and is intended primarily to afford GSD guests the opportunity to mix socially with the Naval War College students and staff. Committees should plan for the following as a minimum:

Sunday 14 June:

President's Reception and Buffet Afterwards	- After the President's Reception, 1730-1930, a Dutch-Treat Buffet at the COM(Open) is recommended. (Refer to paragraph F for making reservations.)
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- Monday 15 June: Luncheon - All committees should schedule as desired. COM(Closed) is open until 1345. General Mess is closed. Ship luncheons are available.
- Evening - Committees should schedule some function, preferably informal. The Shrimp-a-Peel at the COM (Open) is recommended.
- Tuesday 16 June: Luncheon - Committees 21-39 should schedule (Guests of committees 1-20 will attend President's Luncheon.) COM(Closed) is open until 1345. General Mess is closed. Ship luncheons are available.
- Evening - Committees 1-20 may attend a clam-bake in Bristol, and Committees 21-39 a Beefeaters at the COM(Open). Other arrangements for an evening function may be made if desired.
- Wednesday 17 June: Luncheon - Committees 1-20 should schedule (Guests of committees 21-39 will attend President's Luncheon.) COM(Closed) is open until 1345. General Mess is closed. Ship luncheons are available.
- Evening - Committees 21-39 may attend a clam-bake in Bristol, and Committees 1-20 a Beefeaters at the COM(Open). Other arrangements for an evening function may be made if desired.
- Thursday 18 June: Luncheon - All committees should schedule as desired. COM(Closed) is open until 1345. General Mess is closed. Ship luncheons are available.
- Evening - GSD Formal Dinner Dance. (Refer to paragraph G.)

D. GSD ENTERTAINMENT OFFICE. The GSD Entertainment Office which will be established in Room 208, Luce Hall, (telephone 841-4470) on 20 May, coordinates all entertainment, makes reservations at Naval Base facilities and aboard ships as requested by Committee

Entertainment Chairmen, and provides information regarding public facilities. It is essential that Entertainment Chairmen keep this office advised of all committee plans and changes as they develop. Specifically, this office:

1. Makes reservations for Ship Luncheons and luncheons in the Closed Mess.

2. Makes reservations for and issues tickets to the Clambake.

3. Makes reservations and collects payments for the GSD Formal Dinner Dance.

4. Entertainment Chairmen make reservations directly with the COM(Open) for the Shrimp-a-Peel and Beefeaters, but chairmen must inform the GSD Entertainment Office of such dinners.

5. Maintains a chart showing the entertainment plans of all committees to assist in locating guests in case of emergency.

E. ENTERTAINMENT FUND. During the organizational committee meeting on 15 June, the Moderator should cover the planned entertainment, to include the entertainment fund and transportation arrangements. He should point out that, in the past, members of GSD committees have found it pleasant to lunch and dine together during the week and that, in general, expenses are shared. He should explain that a Finance Chairman has been appointed for convenience of purchasing tickets to functions and paying bills. The nominal costs for the planned entertainment should be covered and arrangements made for collecting by the Finance Chairman.

F. BUFFET AFTER PRESIDENT'S RECEPTION. There will be a Dutch-Treat Buffet at the COM(Open) between 1800-2100 for committee guests and escorts attending the President's Reception on Sunday, 14 June. Price is \$3.40 per person. Committee Entertainment Chairmen will have escorts determine if guests wish to attend the buffet; then either the Entertainment Chairmen or escorts will make reservations at the Open Mess. Realizing that reservations may not be possible in some cases, the Mess will make every effort to accept walk-ins.

G. GSD FORMAL DINNER DANCE.

1. The schedule for the GSD Formal Dinner Dance at the COM(Open) on 18 June will be as follows:

1900 Cocktails, open bar
2000 Dinner

2. Some questions may come up concerning dress for the Dinner Dance. To assist in answering these questions, the following is provided:

Civilian - Dinner Dress (Black Tie) may be worn, but it is not mandatory.

Military - Uniform for Naval Officers will be Dinner Dress White Jacket. Other services will wear an appropriate corresponding uniform. Senior Reserve Officers who did not bring their Dinner Dress White Jacket may wear appropriate civilian attire.

3. To provide the COM(Open) with reservations at the earliest possible time, the following procedures will be used.

a. During the organizational committee meeting on 15 June, the Moderator will determine the number of members who expect to attend, and turn in a tentative count of attendees to the GSD Entertainment Office by 1630.

b. On Tuesday, 16 June, firm reservation requirements for the committee are made. The final attendance count and payment are submitted to the GSD Entertainment Office by 1630. No refunds are given after that time.

c. The GSD Dinner Dance will cost about \$8.00 per person.

H. GUESTS' WIVES. A number of Flag and General Officers and civilian guests are accompanied by their wives during GSD Week. A reception and coffee for guest wives is scheduled for Monday morning 15 June, to be hosted by the wife of the President. Since there will be ship visits arranged for the wives, they should not be included in the ship luncheons. They are, of course, included in all evening entertainment. Other day activities, such as barge cruises and historic tours, are planned. Due to the social program being arranged, student and faculty wives in each committee should not feel obligated to arrange additional entertainment for guest wives. This does not preclude informal get-togethers for luncheons, shopping, etc. if desired. The GSD Command Post's information about each guest includes whether or not he will be accompanied by his wife. More information will be promulgated separately on planned tours and other activities for wives.

SECTION V

HELPFUL HINTS FOR MODERATORS

A. PURPOSE OF GSD. An exchange of views between the civilian community and the military concerning the problems confronting the U.S. in formulating global strategy to attain national objectives.

B. PARTICIPANTS.

1. Consist of:

- a. Approximately 160 prominent civilians.
- b. Approximately 39 Flag and General Officers of all the services.
- c. Approximately 125 Senior Reserve Officers.
- d. Entire Naval Warfare and Command and Staff student bodies and most of the staff.
- e. Approximately ten members of the Naval War College Board of Advisers.

2. Organized for group discussion purposes into 39 committees, each with a cross section of all participants.

a. The Moderator, a Naval Warfare student, runs the committee.

b. The Committee Adviser is assigned to represent the staff. (Other staff members are assigned as members on a full-time or as-available basis.)

3. Civilian guests.

a. Attend at own expense, often entailing personal sacrifice.

b. Expect serious study. Entertainment should not overshadow purpose of Discussions.

c. Cross section of the nation geographically and professionally.

d. Some last minute adjustments of assignments will be unavoidable. STAY LOOSE. Up-to-date information on

these assignments will be available in the GSD Command Post, Room 241, Pringle Hall.

4. Flag and General Officers. They may be too few in number to permit assignment of one active duty officer to each committee. Some committees may have retired or reserve officers.

5. Senior Reserve Officers.

- a. On board previous week.
- b. Almost all are eminent in their own right.
- c. To be considered part of the War College family.

6. Observers. (Certain War College personnel (such as the Chairs), Newport Naval Base personnel, Ship's officers (normally COs), and representatives of other War Colleges may participate in GSD as observers. These are not guests. They normally will not participate in committee meetings or in committee entertainment. *my*)

C. PREPARATION FOR GSD WEEK.

1. Moderator's Packet. In addition to the GSD material issued to all students (syllabus, selected readings, etc.) the Moderator will receive a packet on 11 June containing copies of most of the items that have been included in the GSD briefcases of guests.

2. Committee Room Preparation.

a. A Committee Packet can be drawn 12 June with all the materials for preparation of committee rooms.

D. GUEST PROCEDURES.

1. Reception of Guests.

a. ^{Post} ~~Turn~~ in list of escort assignments for guests and Flag/General Officers to GSD Command Post not later than ~~12~~ June.

b. Guests will be registered with GSD Duty Officer on arrival, or not later than registration period 0815-1915, Monday 15 June.

c. Moderators or committee representatives will meet guests at numbered tables in Pringle Coffee Mess 0830-0915, 15 June. Escorts conduct guests to assigned

tables, thence promptly to committee rooms. Don't linger over coffee at Pringle. Guests who have registered prior to Monday morning may be escorted directly to committee rooms by 0845.

d. At initial Group Discussion on Monday, brief on procedures, etc., see Section I.

2. Guest Material.

a. Guests do not receive the Syllabus. They receive the needed information in other printed schedules, etc. Individual committee schedules for entertainment should be provided to guests at the initial committee meeting.

b. Guest briefcase with administrative material such as passes, schedules, invitations, etc., see list in Section I. *pp 2-3.*

c. Civilian guests receive a courtesy card providing privilege of using the Navy Exchange, Coasters Harbor Island. Avoid embarrassment--do not take them to main exchange.

3. Selected reading for GSD--most guests will be prepared to talk about these statements of national objectives.

4. Coffee Mess.

a. Do not congest Pringle Coffee Mess 15 June while receiving guests.

b. Recommend taking coffee to committee rooms.

c. No coffee charge for guests.

E. ACADEMIC PROCEDURES.

1. General.

a. Time available is short--make the most of it.

b. No "School Solutions."

c. Avoid excessive parochial Service approach.

d. Attempt to keep discussion focused on international issues.

e. Committee Moderator assign briefers to kick off each meeting.

2. Lecture Procedures.

a. Bell Signals (Advise Guests) - Preceding lectures and panels in the Family Theatre, recall and warning bells will be sounded, as follows:

Luce/Pringle/Mahan Halls - Twenty minute warning bell--
two long rings.

Sims Hall - Ten minute assembly bell--
one long ring.

b. Microphone Procedure - Advise guests that during question and answer periods in the Family Theatre, after being recognized by the Moderator, the questioner should wait until he has been handed a portable microphone before asking his question.

F. ENTERTAINMENT.

1. General.

a. Scheduled to permit guests to become familiar with military way of life in an informal manner.

b. Experience shows guests more interested in doing things normally not available to them such as lunch on board ships and informal gatherings with military groups. The Clambake, which is new to most non-New Englanders, is also very popular and successful.

c. All hands effort.

d. Entertainment Office--208 Luce. Keep this office advised of all plans. Go through this office for reservations on ships, and the COM(Closed).

2. Official Entertainment.

a. Attention invited to schedule for official entertainment in Annex D of reference (a).

b. Invitations to guests for President's luncheon will probably call for regrets only answer--escort notify President's aide of such regrets.

c. Global Strategy Formal Dinner Dance Reservations. Initial number (students) due 8 June. After commencement of GSD, Moderators determine number of SROs, Flag Officers, and civilian guests who will attend and submit a final total for the committee to the Entertainment Office by 1630, 15 June.

3. Committee (Semi-official) Entertainment.

a. Monday night get-together of the full committee important for getting acquainted. Some type of entertainment for the guests should be planned for Tuesday and Wednesday, as desired by committee members.

b. Stay flexible on individual guest desires for golf, etc. Wednesday afternoon is free, and may be used as desired by guests.

c. Pitfalls--(1) do not drink lunch, (2) ensure luncheon groups return on time, and (3) maintain transportation schedule.

G. ADMINISTRATION.

1. Organization.

a. GSD Duty Office in Pringle Lecture Room as of noon, Friday 12 June.

b. GSD Duty Desk in Sims.

c. Terminal Duty Office.

(1) Green Airport, Hillsgrove.

(2) Union Station, Providence (if needed).

d. Escorts to be assigned by Moderator and to be briefed separately. They must be available 13-14 June. All hands help with problems when observed.

e. GSD Command Post, Room 241, Pringle/GSD Duty Office, Pringle Coffee Mess will have details on all guests.

2. Security.

a. Guests cleared for SECRET on a need-to-know basis.

b. Do not give classified documents to guests. Do not table classified documents.

c. Participants must wear name tags within the Naval War College complex and Family Theatre. Moderator or escort report lost badges promptly to the Security Officer.

d. Global Strategy Discussions identification cards (guests) and Naval War College identification cards (students and faculty) required for Family Theatre classified lectures.

e. Moderators caution guests against using unguarded, sealed or locked exits except in an emergency.

3. Transportation.

a. Government.

- (1) Meet schedules.
- (2) Keep dispatcher advised.

b. Personal.

(1) Parking critical--use only designated spaces. See forthcoming notice.

(2) Forward GSD guest minor traffic violation citations received within the Naval Base to the Naval War College Security Officer. If injury or property damage occurs, the Naval Station Security Investigators will handle.

4. Uniforms will be worn by students during working hours. Uniform will be tropical white long for naval officers, summer service dress for Army and Air Force and summer service "C" with short sleeves for Marine officers.

5. Committee Photo schedule--be prompt.

6. Evaluation Sheets.

a. Moderator collect from Senior Reserve Officers, students, and staff at the last committee meeting.

b. Collect from civilian guests, if ready; otherwise, recommend they return them by mail to Naval War College.

c. Evaluation forms for guests in briefcases; SROs in the SRO Directive; staff and students in GSD Syllabus.

7. Nominations for next Global Strategy Discussions.

a. All hands eligible to nominate.

b. Do not indicate to persons nominated that they will be invited--the list of potential guests is quite extensive in comparison to the few that are invited.

c. Fill out as much detail as possible. Birth date and place quite important.

d. SRO nominations for other SROs to attend 2-week period next year should be made to their District Commandant, not NWC.

SECTION VI

CHRONOLOGICAL CHECK LIST FOR MODERATORS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Item</u>
8 May	See Weekly Schedule	Initial briefing on GSD Week (NW & C&S)
	See Weekly Schedule	Committee Organization Meeting. Organize and assign duties. Assign presentation topics. Survey attendees, GSD Formal Dinner Dance. Plan entertainment.
11 May	- - - - -	GSD Entertainment Office opens, Room 208, Luce. Turn in tentative list of NW and NC&S attendees, GSD Dinner Dance.
6 June	- - - - -	Committee Guest Assignments posted, 241, Pringle.
8 June	- - - - -	GSD Command Post opens, Room 241, Pringle. Committee assignments and information on all guests available. Turn in escort assignments here. Moderator should check here daily for additions or changes.
10 June	1545-1615	GSD briefing for Senior Reserve Officers only.
12 June	- - - - -	Draw Moderator's Packet.
12 June	1200	Names and telephone numbers of Moderators and escorts to Command Post by this time. Last minute changes on civilian guest itineraries are still possible, escorts should check GSD Duty Office at 1630, and on Saturday and Sunday.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Item</u>
12 June	1200	GSD Duty Office opens, Pringle Coffee Mess-- responsibilities of GSD Command Post with respect to guests and escorts transferred thereto.
	Prior to scheduled meeting	Draw dictionaries from Library. (See Section I.)
	Prior to scheduled meeting	Draw Committee Packet from Publications.
	1615-1645	Final Committee Meeting prior to GSD Week. (NW, NC&S, SROs) Complete Organization; brief on plans. Obtain SRO attendees, GSD Dinner Dance.
13 June		Inspect and complete preparation of Committee Room.
15 June	0830-0915	Moderator or representative meet guests; guests escorted to Committee Room.
	1130-1200	First Committee Meeting. Brief all on: Entertainment Plans and Schedule. Entertainment Fund. Transportation Schedule. Photograph Schedule. Distribute Special Handout Material and brief guests on same. Determine total attendees, GSD Dinner Dance.
	1200-1330	Luncheon.
	1630	Final list attendees, GSD Dinner Dance to GSD Entertainment Office.
	1715	Committee Summary due in Command Post.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Item</u>
15 June	Evening	Committee Dinners.
16 June	Schedule	Committee Photographs (1-27).
	1245-1430	Luncheon (Committees 21-39).
	1700	Committee Summary due in Command Post.
	Evening	Committee Entertainment.
17 June	Schedule	Committee Photographs (28-39).
	1245-1430	Luncheon (Committees 1-20).
	1400	Committee Summary due in Command Post.
	Evening	Committee Entertainment.
18 June	1230-1415	Luncheon.
	1700	Committee Summary due in Command Post.
	Evening	GSD Formal Dinner Dance.
19 June	- - - - -	Collect and turn in GSD Evaluation (except for guests).
	- - - - -	Remind all participants of Nominations, next GSD.

TWENTY - SECOND ANNUAL



GLOBAL
STRATEGY
DISCUSSIONS

— ψ —

UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, Rhode Island

15-19 JUNE 1970

SELECTED READINGS AND DISCUSSION TOPICS

For Official Use Only

U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND NATIONAL CAPABILITIES

A. National Interests. The vital national interest—determined to be essential to the maintenance of the U.S. as a nation—is:

to safeguard the physical security of the U.S. against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

Within this vital interest there are commitments (including all treaty commitments for the mutual defense and support of other nations) which may vary from time to time in order of priority, but the vital interest itself is basic and unchanging.

Secondary interests are more transitory and are of lesser import to the extent that if they should conflict with the "vital" interest, the "vital" interest shall override. The secondary national interests are:

to achieve economic and social progress and to safeguard and promote those political institutions and ideals on which the U.S. was founded.

to participate freely and cooperate fully with other nations in international accords, treaties, and organizations which create a peaceful international environment.

to oppose by appropriate means including moral suasion, diplomatic maneuver, economic sanctions, and military force, other nations that act in opposition to our vital and secondary national interests.

B. National Capabilities. Basic U.S. capabilities affecting foreign policy implementation are impressive: a large, highly skilled population; immense natural resources within a favorable climatic and geographic setting; the most highly developed economy in the world; armed forces second to none, with both nuclear and conventional military capability. To this inventory must be added a highly successful space program which significantly enhances the U.S. power image and a superior ability to develop and utilize modern industrial and defense technology. However, there are important limitations which the policy-maker must take into consideration: a decreased willingness on the part of the American people to pay the price of supporting the present global strategy of containing communism, the currently depressed conventional forces' capability to respond to new challenges due to recent reductions and heavy involvement in Vietnam, and the economic constraints imposed by inflation and the balance of payments deficit. Of these, public opinion is perhaps the most important. Current manifestations of public opinion which are of particular relevance to foreign policy include student and black unrest, anti-Vietnam sentiment, a reaction against the "military-industrial complex," and pressures to shift expenditures from defense to the solution of domestic problems.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

National Interests: Those interests that the National decision making group determines are important to the maintenance of the state. These offer broad guidance to national leaders who are charged with the formulation of objectives, policies, and commitments. Some interests may be called *vital interests*, that is, those interests for which we may go to war. All other national interests may be termed *secondary interests*.

National Objectives: Those specific goals which are designed to support or secure the national interests. These may be further categorized as "long-term objectives" (fifteen years or more) which may also be called national goals, or "short-term objectives" usually referred to merely as objectives.

National Policies: These are specific courses of action which are designed to achieve objectives. They are the means (policy) to the end (objective). Several alternative policies may be available to achieve an objective.

National Strategy: This is "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war to secure national objectives."

Power: The strength or capacity that a sovereign state can use to achieve its national interests. The elements of power (demography, geography, economics, history, psychology, sociology, military, and government) may be used as a basis to assess power. An assessment of power may be expressed in potential or actual terms.

INTRODUCTION

CONSTITUTIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY

Much of the current debate surrounding United States' foreign policy and global involvement is expressed in terms of material limitations, the priority of domestic versus international requirements, moral obligations to intervene (or not) in the affairs of other nations, and even in the true nature and extent of the threat to the nation's security. While all of these are valid and important considerations in formulating a global strategy for the United States in the decade of the 1970's, it is perhaps more important to consider and understand both the capabilities and the limitations imposed by our constitutional system of government. Underlying much of the substance of the debate on related issues is the fundamental question of the maintenance of constitutional government in the United States, and the basis of this question is perhaps the least understood of all aspects of our foreign policy.

The original Constitution of 1787 and its twenty-five amendments are central to the U.S. constitutional system. In its entirety however, the constitutional system extends beyond the formal document. It encompasses also judicial decisions and historical precedents—in fact, all of the dynamic factors which both govern and limit public decision-making. The constitutional system is vitally relevant to the politics and the public policy of the United States. Policy questions are ultimately Constitutional questions, and, in a sense, Constitutional questions are ultimately policy questions.

Thus, though the Constitution and its interpretation are the essential components, the actual working policies of the governing institutions are also vitally important to the constitutional system. Generally, the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court and the behavior of the governing institutions coincide closely. For example, the Court's rulings that the commerce clause gives Congress virtually limitless power to regulate the nation's economy is reflected in the actual exercise of this power by the Congress. In other areas, particularly in the conduct of foreign affairs and in the exercise of emergency powers, the harmony between the governing institutions and the Constitution is less obvious. Historically, these have been among the most frequently challenged on constitutional grounds, and they remain so today.

A principal concern today of many informed Americans lies not in the threat to Constitutionalism which might arise from a sudden, severe crisis, but from the prolonged, semi-crisis environment which has endured since World War II and which shows no sign of abatement. In the conduct of foreign affairs, the most notable of the effects of the permanent semi-crisis has been the undeniable growth of Presidential power. Of particular concern are Presidential commitments to other nations and, most importantly, the commitment of armed forces to combat in situations that are not characterized as direct military attack on the United States.

Many of those who are concerned with the conduct of foreign affairs believe that the dangers to the American constitutional system inherent in prolonged international tension are even more severe in their domestic manifestations. The excesses of the 1950's, when political non-conformists were sometimes recklessly branded as Communists, and the deep and emotional divisions caused in the 1960's by the Vietnamese War are illustrative of domestic reactions to international tensions and of their ultimate impact on the constitutional system.

In their broadest sense, the issues today are not essentially new. Though the circumstances and context were different, the dilemma posed by President Lincoln in his first address to Congress after the opening of hostilities seems equally applicable today:

And this issue (dissolution of the Union) embraces more than the fate of these United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question whether discontented individuals, too few in numbers to control administration according to organic law in any case, can always, upon the pretense made in this case or on any other pretenses, or arbitrarily without any pretense, break up their government, and thus practically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forces us to ask, is there in all republics this inherent and fatal weakness? Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?

An indirect answer to Lincoln's question was posited in his first inaugural address by Franklin D. Roosevelt, a president who subsequently would be vigorously accused of usurping powers denied him by the constitution:

Our constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible to meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form. That is why our constitutional system has proved itself the most superbly enduring political mechanism the modern world has produced. It has met every stress of vast expansion of territory, of foreign wars, of bitter internal strife, of world relations.

Thus, though constitutionally based questions have been frequent, the fact remains that the government of the United States has functioned responsively and effectively in peace and war for more than 180 years within the framework of a written and somewhat rigid document. This seems to support President Roosevelt's views of its ultimate adequacy as the basic determinant of domestic and foreign policy and as the principal limitation on both the absolute and relative powers of the Legislative and Executive branches.

In view of the number of guests expected at the

GLOBAL STRATEGY DISCUSSIONS

**the President of the Naval War College
will host two receptions at his Quarters**

on

Sunday, 14 June, 5:30 to 7:30 p.m.

to honor

**Under Secretary of the Navy
The Honorable John W. Warner**

and

Monday, 15 June, 5:30 to 7:30 p.m.

to honor

**Under Secretary of State
The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson**

**Upon arrival in Newport, guests will be
informed by their individual escort officers
at which reception they are expected.**

MEMORANDUM for Guests of the Global Strategy Discussions, 1970

From: Director, Global Strategy Discussions

1. Enclosed for your information and study is a copy of the Selected Readings. These Readings provide a background for the topics which will be discussed in committee seminars.
2. It is requested that civilian participants, at their earliest convenience, forward a passport-size personal photograph (2 x 2 inches) to the Naval War College, Code 315, Newport, Rhode Island 02840.


R.E. WILLIAMS

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

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President (Code 315)
Naval War College
Newport, R.I. 02840

threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere. The choice of this strategy was based on the following considerations:

- the nuclear capability of our strategic and theater nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or Chinese attack on our Asian allies;
- the prospects for a coordinated two-front attack on our allies by Russia and China are low both because of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation. In any event, we do not believe that such a coordinated attack should be met primarily by U.S. conventional forces;
- the desirability of insuring against greater than expected threats by maintaining more than the forces required to

meet conventional threats in one theater—such as NATO Europe;

—weakness on our part would be more provocative than continued U.S. strength, for it might encourage others to take dangerous risks, to resort to the illusion that military adventurism could succeed.

To meet the requirements for the strategy we adopted, we will maintain the required ground and supporting tactical air forces in Europe and Asia, together with naval and air forces. At the same time, we will retain adequate active forces in addition to a full complement of reserve forces based in the United States. These force levels will be spelled out in greater detail in the program and budget statement of the Secretary of Defense.



Map courtesy of Department of State. Reprinted from Issues in United States Foreign Policy series—No. 3—Commitments of U.S. Power Abroad.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • WASHINGTON, D.C.



Vol. 7, No. 22 February 28, 1970

— UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S —

A New Strategy for Peace



"A nation needs many qualities, but it needs faith and confidence above all. Skeptics do not build societies; the idealists are the builders. Only societies that believe in themselves can rise to their challenges. Let us not, then, pose a false choice between meeting our responsibilities abroad and meeting the needs of our people at home. We shall meet both or we shall meet neither."

The President's Remarks at the Air Force Academy Commencement, June 4, 1969.

President Nixon has defined and outlined "United States Foreign Policy For The 1970's."

The President termed his policy "A New Strategy for Peace." And he said, "The postwar period in international relations has ended."

"When I took office," the President said, "the most immediate problem facing our nation was the war in Vietnam. No question has more occupied our thoughts and energies during this past year.

"Yet the fundamental task confronting us was more profound. We could see that the whole pattern of international politics was changing. Our challenge was to understand that change, to define America's goals for the next period, and to set in motion policies to achieve them. For all Americans must understand that because of its strength, its history and its concern for human dignity, this nation occupies a special place in the world. Peace and progress are impossible without a major American role.

"This first annual report on U.S. foreign policy is more than a record of one year. It is this Administration's statement of a new approach to foreign policy, to match a new era of international relations.

"The postwar period in international relations has ended."

In the 119-page report to Congress Feb. 18 the President explained "A New Strategy for Peace," based on three key points: Partnership, Strength and The Willingness To Negotiate.

President Nixon said:

"Peace requires *partnership*. Its obligations, like its benefits, must be shared. This concept of partnership guides our relations with all friendly nations.

"Peace requires *strength*. So long as there are those who would threaten our vital interests and those of our allies with military force, we must be strong. American weakness could tempt would-be aggressors to make dangerous miscalculations.

"At the same time, our own strength is important only in relation to the strength of others. We—like others—must place high priority on enhancing our security through cooperative arms control.

"Peace requires a *willingness to negotiate*. All nations—and we are no exception—have important national interests to protect. But the most fundamental interest of all nations lies in building the structure of peace. In partnership with our allies, secure in our own strength, we will seek those areas in which we can agree among ourselves and with others to accommodate conflicts and overcome rivalries. We are working toward the day when all nations will have a stake in peace, and will therefore be partners in its maintenance.

"Within such a structure, international disputes can be settled and clashes contained. The insecurity of nations, out of which so much conflict arises, will be eased, and the habits of moderation and compromise will be nurtured. Most important,

a durable peace will give full opportunity to the powerful forces driving toward economic change and social justice.

"This vision of a peace built on partnership, strength and willingness to negotiate is the unifying theme of this report. In the sections that follow, the first steps we have taken during this past year—the policies we have devised and the programs we have initiated to realize this vision—are placed in the context of these three principles."

In the introduction to his report, the President referred to the first of the three key points, terming it: "Peace Through Partnership—The Nixon Doctrine." He described how much the world—and international relationships—had changed since 1947, especially through efforts of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

The central thesis of the Nixon Doctrine, the President said, is that "the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot—and will not—conceive all the plans, design all the programs, execute all the decisions and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world. We will help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest."

"America cannot live in isolation if it expects to live in peace. We have no intention of withdrawing from the world. The only issue before us is how we can be most effective in meeting our responsibilities, protecting our interests, and thereby building peace."

"A more responsible participation by our foreign friends in their own defense and progress means a more effective common effort toward the goals we all seek. Peace in the world will continue to require us to maintain our commitments—and we will. As I said at the United Nations, 'It is not my belief that the way to peace is by giving up our friends or letting down our allies.' But a more balanced and realistic American role in the world is essential if American commitments are to be sustained over the long pull. In my State of the Union Address, I affirmed that 'to insist that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility; it is a sharing of responsibility.' This is not a way for America to withdraw from its indispensable role in the world. It is a way—the only way—we can carry out our responsibilities."

"It is misleading, moreover, to pose the fundamental question so largely in terms of commitments. Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests over the long run with a sound foreign policy. The more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and others' interests the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."

Part III of the report is "America's Strength," divided into four sections: Shaping Our Military Posture, The Process of Defense Planning, Strategic Policy, and General Purpose Forces. Following is Part III:

SHAPING OUR MILITARY POSTURE

America's strength is the second pillar of the structure of a durable peace.

We aim for a world in which the importance of power is reduced; where peace is secure because the principal countries wish to maintain it. But this era is not yet here. We cannot



Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird

entrust our future entirely to the self-restraint of countries that have not hesitated to use their power even against their allies. With respect to national defense, any President has two principal obligations: to be certain that our military preparations do not provide an incentive for aggression, but in such a way that they do not provoke an arms race which might threaten the very security we seek to protect.

A basic review of our defense policy was essential.

In January 1969 the need for such a review was compelling. Profound changes in the world called for a fresh approach to defense policy just as they required a new approach to foreign policy. In the past, technology was relatively stable; in the contemporary world a constantly changing technology produces a new element of insecurity. Formerly, any additional strength was strategically significant; today, available power threatens to outstrip rational objectives.

We had to examine the basic premises underlying our military planning and begin shaping a military posture appropriate to the environment of the 1970's.

We launched a thorough re-examination of past concepts and programs and the alternatives we should consider for the future. The review, which is continuing, produced a reform of both national security policies and decision-making processes which was the most far-reaching in almost two decades.

For the first time, the National Security Council has had the opportunity to review a broad and complete range of national strategies for both conventional and strategic forces. This review was undertaken in terms of security and budgetary implications five years into the future. Also for the first time, the relationship of various levels of defense spending to domestic priorities was spelled out in detail for a five-year period.

As a result of this review, our interests, our foreign policy objectives, our strategies and our defense budgets are being brought into balance—with each other and with our overall national priorities.

Four factors have a special relevance to our continuing reappraisal.

Military and Arms Control Issues: First, we need to ask some

The Role of Ballistic Missile Defense

My decision to continue with the construction of the Safeguard anti-ballistic missile system is fully consistent with our criteria and with our goal of effective arms limitation.

I would like to recall what I said last March about the problem that led us to seek approval of the first phase of the Safeguard program:

"The gravest responsibility which I bear as President of the United States is for the security of the Nation. Our nuclear forces defend not only ourselves but our allies as well. The imperative that our nuclear deterrent remain secure beyond any possible doubt requires that the U.S. must take steps now to insure that our strategic retaliatory forces will not become vulnerable to a Soviet attack."

I believed then, and I am even more convinced today, that there is a serious threat to our retaliatory capability in the form of the growing Soviet forces of ICBM's and ballistic missile submarines, their multiple warhead program for the SS-9 missile, their apparent interest in improving the accuracy of their ICBM warheads, and their development of a semi-orbital nuclear weapon system. That this threat continues to be serious was confirmed by my Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board—an independent, bipartisan group of senior outside advisors—which recently completed its own review of the strategic threats we face.

I pointed out in the same statement that we cannot ignore the potential Chinese threat against the U.S. population, as well as the danger of an accidental or unauthorized attack from any source. Nor can we dismiss the possibility that other countries may in the future acquire the capability to attack

'The United States has interests in defending certain land areas abroad as well as essential air and sea lines of communication.'

the U.S. with nuclear weapons. Today, any nuclear attack—no matter how small; whether accidental, unauthorized or by design; by a superpower or by a country with only a primitive nuclear delivery capability—would be a catastrophe for the U.S., no matter how devastating our ability to retaliate.

No Administration with the responsibility for the lives and security of the American people could fail to provide every possible protection against such eventualities.

Thus on March 14, 1969, I stated the objectives of the Safeguard program:

"This measured deployment is designed to fulfill three objectives:

"1. Protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union.

"2. Defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.

"3. Protection against the possibility of accidental attacks."

I further described the system as follows:

"We will provide for local defense of selected Minuteman missile sites and an area defense designed to protect our bomber bases and our command and control authorities. In addition, this system will provide a defense of the Continental United States against an accidental attack and will provide substantial protection against the kind of attack which the Chinese Communists may be capable of launching throughout the 1970's. This deployment will not require us to place missile and radar sites close to our major cities."

Last year, I promised that "each phase of the deployment will be reviewed to insure that we are doing as much as necessary but not more than that required by the threat existing at that time." I further indicated that in strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union, the United States will be fully prepared to discuss limitations on defensive as well as offensive weapons systems.

The further steps I shall propose will be consistent with these pledges. The Secretary of Defense will put forward a minimum program essential for our security. It fully protects our flexibility in discussing limitations on defensive weapons with the Soviet Union. It is my duty as President to make certain that we do no less.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Premises

When I examined the objectives established for our general purpose forces, I concluded that we must emphasize three fundamental premises of a sound defense policy:

First, while strategic forces must deter all threats of general war no matter what the cost, our general purpose forces must be more sensitively related to local situations and particular interests.

Second, while the possession of 95 per cent of the nuclear power of the non-Communist world gives us the primary responsibility for nuclear defense, the planning of general purpose forces must take into account the fact that the manpower of our friends greatly exceeds our own, as well as our heavy expenditures for strategic forces.

Third, we cannot expect U.S. military forces to cope with the entire spectrum of threats facing allies or potential allies throughout the world. This is particularly true of subversion and guerrilla warfare, or "wars of national liberation." Experience has shown that the best means of dealing with insurgencies is to preempt them through economic development and social reform and to control them with police, paramilitary and military action by the threatened government.

We may be able to supplement local efforts with economic and military assistance. However, a direct combat role for U.S. general purpose forces arises primarily when insurgency has shaded into external aggression or when there is an overt conventional attack. In such cases, we shall weigh our interests and our commitments, and we shall consider the efforts of our allies, in determining our response.

The United States has interests in defending certain land areas abroad as well as essential air and sea lines of communication. These derive from:

- the political and economic importance of our alliances;
- our desire to prevent or contain hostilities which could lead to major conflicts and thereby endanger world peace; and
- the strategic value of the threatened area as well as its line of communications.

The military posture review I initiated the day I took office included a thorough examination of our general purpose forces. This study explored in turn our interests, the potential threats to those interests, the capabilities of our allies both with and without our assistance, and the relationship of various strategies to domestic priorities.

The National Security Council examined five different strategies for general purpose forces and related each one to the domestic programs which could be supported simultaneously. Thus, for the first time, national security and domestic priorities were considered together. In fact, two strategies were rejected because they were not considered essential to our security and because they would have thwarted vital domestic programs.

We finally decided on a strategy which represented a significant modification of the doctrine that characterized the 1960's.

The stated basis of our conventional posture in the 1960's was the so-called "2-½ war" principle. According to it, U.S. forces would be maintained for a three-month conventional forward defense of NATO, a defense of Korea or Southeast Asia against a full-scale Chinese attack, and a minor contingency—all simultaneously. These force levels were never reached.

In the effort to harmonize doctrine and capability, we chose what is best described as the "1-½ war" strategy. Under it we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese

improved coverage by their ABM radars. The following table shows the growth in Soviet land- and submarine-based missile forces in the last five years.

OPERATIONAL U.S. AND SOVIET MISSILES

	1965 (Mid-Year)	1970 (Projected) (For Year End)
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles		
U.S.	934	1,054
Soviet	224	1,290
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles		
U.S.	464	656
Soviet	107	300

The Soviet missile deployments are continuing, whereas ours have leveled off. In the 1970's we must also expect to see Communist China deploy intercontinental ballistic missiles, seriously complicating strategic planning and diplomacy.

The evolution of U.S. and Soviet strategic capabilities during the past two decades was accompanied by intense doctrinal debates over the political and military roles of strategic forces and the appropriate criteria for choosing them.

The strategic doctrine that had gained the greatest acceptance by the time my Administration took office was this: According to the theory of "assured destruction," deterrence was guaranteed if we were sure we could destroy a significant percentage of Soviet population and industry after the worst conceivable Soviet attack on our strategic forces. The previous Administration reasoned that since we had more than enough forces for this purpose, restraint in the build-up of strategic weapons was indicated regardless of Soviet actions. Further, it hoped that U.S. restraint in strategic weapons developments and deployments would provide a strong incentive for similar restraint by the Soviet Union, thus enhancing the likelihood of a stable strategic relationship between the two nuclear superpowers.

A Policy for the 1970's

Once in office, I concluded that this strategic doctrine should be carefully reviewed in the light of the continued growth of Soviet strategic capabilities. Since the Soviets were continuing their ambitious strategic weapons program, we had to ask some basic questions. Why might a nuclear war start or be threatened? In this light, what U.S. strategic capabilities are needed for deterrence?

We sought, in short, a strategic goal that can best be termed "sufficiency."

Our review took full account of two factors that have not existed in the past.

First, the Soviets' present build-up of strategic forces, together with what we know about their development and test programs, raises serious questions about where they are headed and the potential threats we and our allies face. These questions must be faced soberly and realistically.

Second, the growing strategic forces on both sides pose new and disturbing problems. Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face?

Our review produced general agreement that the overriding purpose of our strategic posture is political and defensive: to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies under the weight of strategic military superiority. We must insure that all potential aggressors see unacceptable risks in contemplating a nuclear attack, or nuclear blackmail, or acts which could escalate to strategic nuclear war, such as a Soviet conventional attack on Europe.

Beyond this general statement, our primary task was to decide on the yardsticks that should be used in evaluating the adequacy of our strategic forces against the projected threats. This issue took on added importance because such yardsticks would be needed for assessing the desirability of possible strategic arms limitation agreements with the Soviet Union.

We reached general agreement within the government on four specific criteria for strategic sufficiency. These represent a significant intellectual advance. They provide for both adequacy and flexibility. They will be constantly reviewed in the light of a changing technology.

Designing Strategic Forces

Having settled on a statement of strategic purposes and criteria, we analyzed possible U.S. strategic force postures for the 1970's and beyond. We reviewed alternatives ranging from "minimum deterrence"—a posture built around ballistic missile submarines and the assured destruction doctrine narrowly interpreted—to attempts at recapturing numerical superiority through accelerated U.S. strategic deployments across the board.

There was general agreement that postures which significantly reduced or increased our strategic programs and deployments involved undesirable risks:

—*Sharp cutbacks would not permit us to satisfy our sufficiency criteria, and might provoke the opposite Soviet reaction.* If the U.S. unilaterally dropped out of the strategic arms competition, the Soviets might well seize the opportunity to step up their programs and achieve a significant margin of strategic superiority. The vigor and breadth of their current strategic weapons programs and deployments, which clearly exceed the requirements of minimum deterrence, make such a possibility seem far from remote. They might also—paradoxically—eliminate any Soviet incentives for an agreement to limit strategic arms, and would raise serious concerns among our allies. This is particularly true for our NATO allies who view the U.S. commitment to deter Soviet aggression as being based mainly on our maintenance of a powerful strategic posture.

—*Sharp increases, on the other hand, might not have any significant political or military benefits.* Many believe that the Soviets would seek to offset our actions, at least in part, and that Soviet political positions would harden, tensions would increase, and the prospect for reaching agreements to limit strategic arms might be irreparably damaged.

What ultimately we must do in between these extremes will depend, of course, on many factors. Will the Soviets continue to expand their strategic forces? What will be their configuration? What understanding might we reach on strategic arms limitations? What weapons systems might be covered by agreements?

I recognize that decisions on shaping our strategic posture are perhaps the most complex and fateful we face. The answers to these questions will largely determine whether we will be forced into increased deployments to offset the Soviet threat to the sufficiency of our deterrent, or whether we and the Soviet Union can together move from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation, whether jointly we can pursue responsible, non-provocative strategic arms policies based on sufficiency as a mutually shared goal or whether there will be another round of the arms race.

COMMANDERS DIGEST

THIS PUBLICATION CONTAINS OFFICIAL INFORMATION, NEWS AND POLICY, DIRECT FROM WASHINGTON AUTHORIZED SOURCES.

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fundamental questions to establish the premises for our military posture. For example:

- In shaping our strategic nuclear posture, to what extent should we seek to maintain our security through the development of our strength? To what extent should we adopt unilateral measures of restraint? The judgment is delicate: the former course runs the risk of an arms race, the latter involves the danger of an unfavorable shift in the balance of power.
- How would either course affect the prospects for a meaningful strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union in the years ahead?
- What spectrum of threats can the United States responsibly deal with? Is it reasonable to seek to protect against every contingency from nuclear conflict to guerrilla wars?

Forward planning: *Second*, we have to plan ahead. Today's national security decisions must flow from an analysis of their implications well into the future. Many decisions on defense

'Virtually every major defense issue has complex diplomatic, political, strategic and economic implications. To insure balanced decisions, we see to it that every agency has a full opportunity to contribute.'

policies and programs will not have operational consequences for several years, in some cases for as much as a decade. Because planning mistakes may not show up for several years, deferral of hard choices is often tempting. But the ultimate penalty may be disastrous. The only responsible course is to face up to our problems and to make decisions in a long-term framework.

National Priorities: *Third*, we have to weigh our national priorities. We will almost certainly not have the funds to finance the full range of necessary domestic programs in the years ahead if we are to maintain our commitment to non-infla-

tionary economic growth. Defense spending is of course in a special category. It must never fall short of the minimum needed for security. If it does, the problem of domestic programs may become moot. But neither must we let defense spending grow beyond that justified by the defense of our vital interests while domestic needs go unmet.

Integrated Planning: *Finally*, planning our national security policies and programs in given countries and regions has often been fragmented among agencies. For example, our intelligence analysts, defense planners, economists, and political analysts dealing with a given country may have been using different assumptions about our policy objectives, our expectations about the future, and even the basic facts about our policy choices. There was a need for analyses which would provide a commonly understood set of facts, evaluations and policy and program choices. These would serve as a basis for consideration by the National Security Council of what we should be doing in given countries and regions.

In summary, we asked the central doctrinal questions; we looked as much as a decade ahead; we weighed our national priorities; and we sought ways of integrating the diverse aspects of our planning. In this fashion, we have reviewed the premises of our military policies, discarded those that no longer serve our interests, and adopted new ones suited to the 1970's. The 1971 defense budget reflects the results of our re-examination, the transition from the old strategies and policies to the new.

THE PROCESS OF DEFENSE PLANNING

This Administration found a defense planning process which left vague the impact of foreign policy on our military posture and provided an inadequate role for other agencies with a major stake in military issues. And it did little to relate defense and domestic priorities.

We set out to correct these deficiencies.

Insuring Balanced Decisions

Virtually every major defense issue has complex diplomatic, political, strategic and economic implications. To insure balanced decisions, we see to it that every agency has a full opportunity to contribute. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency participates in deliberations on de-



JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF—Left to right are General John D. Ryan, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chief of Naval Operations; General Earle G. Wheeler, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;

General William C. Westmoreland, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; and General Leonard F. Chapman Jr., Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps. Members of the JCS participate directly in evaluation of arms control proposals.

fense policy decisions that affect arms control prospects. In turn, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff participate directly in the evaluation of arms control proposals. The Departments of State and Defense review with the Bureau of the Budget and the Council of Economic Advisers economic conditions that influence the magnitude of defense spending. The Department of State examines with Defense officials issues that affect our relationships with allies.

These interagency exchanges insure that I receive all views on key national security issues. Disagreements are identified and explored, not suppressed or papered over. The full range of choices is presented.

Setting Rational Priorities

Our great wealth and productive capacity still do not enable us to pursue every worthwhile national objective with unlimited means. Choices among defense strategies and budgets have a great impact on the extent to which we can pursue other national goals.

We have no precise way of measuring whether extra dollars spent for defense are more important than extra dollars spent for other needs. But we can and have described the domestic programs that are consistent with various levels of defense expenditures. The National Security Council thus has a basis for making intelligent choices concerning the allocation of available revenue among priority federal programs. I do not believe any previous President has had the benefit of such a comprehensive picture of the interrelationships among the goals he can pursue within the limits of the federal budget.

As a result, I have decided on defense strategy and budget guidelines for the next five years that are consistent not only with our national security and the maintenance of our commitments but with our national priorities as well. This Administration is now in a position to weigh the impact of future changes in defense policies and programs on the whole fabric of government objectives.

Controlling the Defense Posture— The Defense Program Review Committee

To meet the objectives of balanced decisions and rational priorities, we made a basic addition to the National Security Council system. I directed the formation of the Defense Program Review Committee, consisting of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman), the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the President's Science Advisor, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission participate as appropriate.

This permanent Committee reviews major defense, fiscal, policy and program issues in terms of their strategic, diplomatic, political and economic implications and advises me and the National Security Council on its findings. For example, the Committee analyzed our options for proceeding with ballistic missile defenses on four separate occasions. This year, it will analyze our major strategic and fiscal choices over the next five years, together with the doctrinal, diplomatic and strategic implications of key weapons programs. It will do so while the defense budget for Fiscal Year 1972 is still in the earliest stages of formulation. The participation in this review by the Department of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Council of Economic Advisers, and other agencies insures that careful analysis and balanced evaluations will be available when the National Security Council next fall reviews our choices for 1972 and beyond.

Country and Regional Analysis and Program Budgeting

A major obstacle to the implementation of a consistent and coherent foreign policy is the multitude of U.S. agencies and programs involved in activities in any one country or region.

In the past it has been difficult for the President or the National Security Council to obtain a picture of the totality of our effort in any one country. Yet a rational foreign policy must start with such a comprehensive view.

To overcome this difficulty we have begun a series of country program analyses which will examine all U.S. programs in key countries and regions and their interrelationships.

The studies for the first time put every U.S. program into one budget framework. The basic tool for this analysis is the program budget, which allocates all of our expenditures in a country on the basis of the purposes served. It permits us to make decisions or set guidelines for all of our programs simultaneously; in the past, they were examined largely agency by agency in isolation from one another.

The results of the country analysis studies are presented to the NSC in the form of integrated policy and program options based on alternative statements of interests, threats, and U.S. foreign policy objectives. After the NSC has considered these options, a decision can be made about the course of action to follow over the next several years.

Of course, our efforts start from the clearly understood, fundamental premise that U.S. policies and programs must relate in a logical and meaningful fashion to what our friends and allies wish to do for themselves. We are dealing with sovereign nations each of which has its own interests, its own priorities and its own capabilities. All our country programming is designed to do is to make our actions as effective as they can be consistent with our mutual interests.

I am convinced that such a comprehensive approach to country programs will lead to a decidedly improved foreign policy. We are conscious of the need not only to make sound policy decisions but also to execute them. The country analysis studies will result in both a decision document for all government agencies and firm five-year program guidelines, presented in the form of a program budget. The members of the NSC, as well as the country director in every agency and our ambassadors in the field, then have a means of making sure that our decisions are followed up.

STRATEGIC POLICY

The Changing Strategic Balance

Following World War II, the U.S. had a monopoly of strategic nuclear weapons. Throughout most of the 1950's, our virtual monopoly of intercontinental nuclear delivery capability, in the form of a large force of Strategic Air Command bombers, gave us an overwhelming deterrent.

This assessment was unchallenged until it became apparent in the late 1950's that the Soviet Union possessed the potential for developing and deploying a force of intercontinental ballistic missiles that could destroy a large part of our strategic bomber force on the ground. The fear that our deterrent to nuclear war was in grave jeopardy, though it later proved exaggerated, focused our attention on maintaining our nuclear superiority.

In 1961, the new Administration accelerated our Polaris submarine and Minuteman ICBM programs and put more of our strategic bombers on alert. These measures provided a clear margin of U.S. nuclear superiority for several years. They restored our confidence in our deterrent; we now had two forces, our Polaris submarines and our Minuteman ICBM's, deployed in hardened underground silos, that were virtually invulnerable to attack by the Soviet Union with the then-existing technology.

However, after 1965, the Soviets stepped up their ICBM deployments and began to construct their own force of Polaris-type submarines. And they began to test multiple warheads for their SS-9 ICBM, a weapon which can carry roughly ten times as much as our Minuteman missile.

Once again, U.S. strategic superiority was being challenged. However, this time, the Johnson Administration decided not to step up deployments. This restraint was based on two judg-

ments. First, it was believed that there was relatively little we could do to keep the Soviets from developing over a period of time a strategic posture comparable in capability to our own. Second, it was thought that nuclear superiority of the kind we had previously enjoyed would have little military or political significance because our retaliatory capability was not seriously jeopardized by larger Soviet forces and because their goal was in all likelihood a retaliatory capability similar to ours.

As a result of these developments, an inescapable reality of

the 1970's is the Soviet Union's possession of powerful and sophisticated strategic forces approaching, and in some categories, exceeding ours in numbers and capability.

Recent Soviet programs have emphasized both quantitative increases in offensive and defensive forces and qualitative improvements in the capabilities of these forces—such as a new, more accurate warhead and perhaps penetration aids for their Minuteman-type SS-11 missile, continued testing of the multiple warhead for the SS-9, and research and development on improved components for their ABM system, together with



Map courtesy of Department of State. Reprinted from Issues in United States Foreign Policy series—No. 3—Commitments of U.S. Power Abroad.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

30 March 1970


FOREWORD

This volume departs from the usual practice of compiling selected readings from published sources as background material for the Global Strategy Discussions. Early in the Academic year, the students in the School of Naval Warfare examined the major political, economic, social and military forces and trends shaping assigned geographic areas of the world, exploring the strengths and capabilities of the nations therein. United States national objectives and policies were then determined for the different regions. These studies provided the bases for later courses in the curriculum. The statements contained in this booklet are only brief abstracts of major conclusions drawn from much larger and more detailed papers developed by the students. In some instances, they have been edited and adapted to meet the needs of the Global Strategy Discussions, but the essence of the students' thoughts have, in all cases, been retained. The COMMANDERS DIGEST, published subsequent to the student material, is included as an excellent resume of the NIXON DOCTRINE.

The thoughts and opinions expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

The term "Official Use Only" has been applied to this volume in order that the distribution of this material will be limited to those engaged in study at the Naval War College.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword 1

Table of Contents 2

Definition of Terms 3

Introduction 4

United States Foreign Policy to the 1970's (Extracts from the Nixon Doctrine) 8

United States National Objectives in the Area of Western Europe16

United States National Objectives in the Area of Africa South of the Sahara18

United States National Objectives in the Area of the Pacific and Asia20

United States National Objectives in the Area of Latin America and the Caribbean . . .22

United States National Objectives in the Area of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe . . .25

United States National Objectives in the Area of the Middle East28

C. U.S. Military Capabilities. Military capabilities must be considered in the light of three different types of military confrontation between the U.S. with her allies, and the U.S.S.R. and the nations favoring her. The first is a general thermonuclear war. The second is limited war, where conflict is confined to a specific region, and political goals are limited. The third is in opposition to insurgent actions of the type which the Soviets call "Wars of National Liberation." There is no clear line of demarcation between these two latter types. The situation in South Vietnam, originally an insurgent war aided and abetted by the Communist powers, is now clearly a limited war. By contrast, the Korean War was obviously a limited war from the beginning.

In preparing for these three types of war, the U.S. maintains the military capability for general nuclear war under the title of "Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces," while the capability for the remaining two categories is contained in "General Purpose Forces."

Within this framework, it has been U.S. policy to provide capability for fighting two "major" wars and one "minor" contingency. A recent change in U.S. military policy has reduced the capability required to that necessary to deal with one "major" war and one "minor" contingency.

Any analysis of United States military capability to support national objectives where they are in actual or potential conflict with those of the Communist world must consider that the U.S. cannot simultaneously provide adequate military assistance to all of the potential allies to whom commitments and assurances have been given. Most importantly, however, the Communist nations are also limited in their ability to project military and economic force on a broad base, and consequently cannot coerce the U.S. into a position where a large number of these commitments would have to be discharged concurrently.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

2. A new type of militarism has arisen in Latin America. Sometimes called "Nasserism", it is advocated primarily by younger officers who believe that democracy has failed in Latin America, yet who realize that social change is urgently needed. These "change agents", motivated by increasing impatience with corruption, inefficiency and a stagnant political order, seek to establish paternalistic dictatorships of extreme nationalistic character. What roles can they play in economic, political, and social development?

3. What are the strategic interests of the United States in Latin America?

4. Mexico presents a rather unique situation in Latin America in terms of its successful revolution and its one-party democratic form of government. What analogies can be drawn from this Mexican case to other Latin American countries?

5. To what extent does communist subversion and "Castroism" pose a threat to the political stability of Latin American countries?

6. Should U.S. aid to Latin American countries be given or denied purely on the basis of the type of government currently in power in each country?

**UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
IN THE AREA OF THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE**

U.S. objectives with regard to the USSR and Eastern Europe and proposed U.S. strategy to accomplish these are as follows:

A. Deter the Threat against the Physical Security of the U.S. and Her Allies in Accordance with Our International Commitments

Maintain a strong Western Europe to thwart any possible Soviet move in this area.

Continue present contribution of forces with back-up of U.S. strategic and tactical weapons.

Restructure NATO so that European countries willingly undertake their defense obligations.

Continue to work for strategic arms limitations.

Examine and restate treaty commitments so that intentions are clearly known to USSR and other nations.

B. Maintain Flexible Response to Aggression against the U.S. or Her Allies

Retain credible military strength, capable of fighting one major and one minor war concurrently.

C. Prevent Communist Attempts to Subvert the Political Institutions of Other Nations in Accordance with Our International Commitments

Honor international commitments with support appropriate to the situation.

Maintain "status quo" in Europe.

Remain disengaged in the China-USSR confrontation to permit intervention if outbreak of general war is threatened.

D. Encourage International Efforts in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping

Continue efforts to work through United Nations and regional organizations.

MIDDLE EAST

4. What steps can or should the United States take to attempt to regain better relations and influence with the Arab countries?

5. What are the major points of differences between the so-called "hard-line" and the "moderate" Arab States? Are there indications of fundamental shifts in this make-up? If so, what are the implications for the United States?

————— Ψ —————

MIDDLE EAST

D. Limit USSR Expansion into the Area

Maintain existing alliance or alliance relationships (NATO, CENTO).

Maintain a credible military presence in the area, encouraging maximum participation by other free world countries.

Concentrate economic, technical, and other assistance to friendly or neutral countries in the area.

Encourage free world economic, technical, and cultural activities in the area.

Seek a lasting resolution of the Arab-Israeli hostility, thereby minimizing Arab reliance upon the USSR military assistance which serves as a primary source of Russian influence.

E. Secure the Right of Innocent Passage through the Critical Waterways of the Area.

Support the UN Resolution of 22 Nov 67 which guarantees the right of Israel, as of all other states, to transit these waterways.

F. Avoid a Military Confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Continue cooperation with the USSR in seeking a peace formula.

Avoid giving Israel unconditional support which might encourage precipitous Israeli military adventure.

Maintain a credible military presence to deter Russia and her Arab clients from a similar military action.

SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. What are the United States interests and objectives in the Middle East and the Arab world?
2. The Soviet Union's activity in the Middle East and the Mediterranean has increased in recent years. What are the consequences of this activity with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the United States role in the dispute?
3. The Suez Canal has been closed since the Six Day War in 1967. Has this closing worked to the advantage of the Soviets relative to the West?

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

Work closely with the USSR to achieve peace when war breaks out in the "third world."

Work multi-laterally with concerned nations to solve conflict problems, with particular emphasis on not maneuvering "behind the back."

E. Promotion and Support of the Efforts of Independent Nations toward Self-Determination; Improvement of International Exchange in Cultural and Economic Areas; and Participation in World-Wide Efforts to Maintain the Ecological Balance of the World

Continue attempts to improve economic, sociological and cultural relationships with the USSR and Eastern Europe unilaterally and multilaterally.

Encourage Western Europe to improve relations with Eastern Europe and reach a European solution to Europe's problems.

Encourage self-determination without implying assistance which is not intended to be forthcoming.

F. Preserve Freedom of the Seas

Maintain credible and effective seapower, both naval and non-naval, and project it world-wide.

SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. To what extent can communist ideology be used as a means of explaining or predicting Soviet behavior? Discuss in terms of the roles of ideology versus pragmatic nationalism.
2. Are there any concrete indications that the Soviet system is becoming more like our own?
3. A favorite thesis of some Western observers is that the Soviet economy is inefficient. How does this fit in with the Soviet ability to produce and maintain the amount and kinds of advanced weaponry, as well as their space, maritime, and other achievements?
4. Does the Soviet Union still maintain its objective of world revolution? Discuss in terms of specific policies and examples.
5. Almost two years have passed since the 1968 Czechoslovakian occupation. Can this Soviet action be considered to have been a success or failure for the Soviet Union?

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

6. The Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty holds that the Soviet Union has the right to use military force to subdue any Communist nation whose current policies are contrary to Soviet interests. Has this policy brought about any fundamental changes in the relations between Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies?

7. Should the United States actively pursue a policy of "detente" and "bridge-building" with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact nations? If so, what should be the scope and limits of such a policy? If not, what alternative policies should the United States pursue in East-West relations?

UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

A. Establish a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East

Reemphasize support of the UN Resolution of 22 Nov 67.

Maintain continuing contact with the USSR in an effort to further substantive negotiations between the conflicting states.

While maintaining the military balance between Israel and the Arab States, attempt to curb the continuing arms race.

As the principal supporter of Israel, employ the leverage derived from this position to induce Israel to negotiate realistically on the basis of the 22 Nov 67 UN Resolution.

Support a UN peace-keeping role.

As appropriate, expand "Big-Four" talks to include other nations, leading to multi-lateral solutions reflecting the interests of the community of nations.

B. Maintain the Territorial Integrity and Political Independence of the Several States of the Area

Support the principle of non-interference in the affairs of states in accordance with the UN Charter.

Maintain cordial relations where existing and seek to establish a basis for relations where they are now nonexistent.

Concentrate diplomatic, financial, and other assistance to the moderate Arab States.

C. Maintain Free World Access to the Oil of the Area

Continue to provide necessary economic, technical, and other assistance to the oil producing states to enhance their internal development.

Maintain a balanced policy between the commercial oil interests and the interests of the producing states.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

- c. Encouragement of a political climate that will at once retain domestic investment capital and attract foreign investors.
- d. Administer aid through multinational organizations, rather than through bilateral arrangements.
- e. Promotion of mutually beneficial trade and investment between the United States and Latin America.
- f. Encourage investment of private U.S. capital in Latin America.

Objective 4: Promotion of the United States concept for hemispheric defense.

Strategies:

- a. Discouragement of excessive or unrealistic military expenditures.
- b. Promotion of the retention of U.S. rights in the Panama Canal.
- c. Promotion of the idea that military requirements need only meet internal security and limited defense needs since the U.S. will play the primary role in the defense of Latin America from external aggression.
- d. Establishment of a military aid program which will create a dependence on U.S. support and guidance.

Objective 5: Promotion of mutual trust and meaningful area development by encouraging the formation of regional political and economic alliances.

Strategies:

- a. Maintenance of U.S. influence in regional organizations at the lowest possible visible level in order to minimize the feeling of U.S. dominance.
- b. Encouragement and, where possible, aid in the further development of such regional organizations as LAFTA and CACM.

SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. What are the cultural, social, and political obstacles which inhibit the modernization process in Latin America?

UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA OF WESTERN EUROPE

National Objective Number One. To develop and implement policies and programs to encourage a politically stable Western Europe, friendly to the interests of the United States.

Strategy. (Germany): Support a strong West Germany. *(Portugal):* Support UN resolution for reform in Portuguese Africa directed toward ultimate self-determination. *(Spain):* Maintain U.S. neutrality regarding Gibraltar while continuing Spanish base rights negotiations. *(Mid-East):* Maintain neutrality and prevent resumption of hostilities while seeking permanent political settlement. *(Malta/Cyprus/Greece):* Maintain U.S. Sixth Fleet presence in the Mediterranean and encourage economic and political development and stability in each country. *(Western Europe):* Support these countries in the establishment of independent, peaceful relations with the USSR and the Bloc countries.

National Objective Number Two. To develop policies and programs to encourage and support a strong West European economy, with an environment favorable to trade and investment interests of the United States.

Strategy. (European Integration): Continue to encourage progress toward economic integration by the European Economic Community (EEC), and, particularly, the broadening of EEC's membership. *(U.S. Trade):* Seek to lower trade barriers between the United States and the EEC and European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries, and to ameliorate the EEC's restrictive barriers to U.S. agricultural products. *(U.S. Investment):* Shift policy to one of consistent encouragement of long-term U.S. investment, and discourage short-term speculation in Western Europe. *(Monetary Policy):* Continue efforts in the International Monetary Fund to encourage more flexible monetary exchange rates. *(Economic Aid):* Continue to urge West European countries to increase aid to less developed countries, channeling their assistance through international agencies.

National Objective Number Three. To encourage and support an individual and collective capacity on the part of West European countries to resist armed attack by powers whose interests are hostile to those of the United States.

Strategy. (NATO): The U.S. should continue support of NATO as a principal vehicle for containment of Communist military pressures in the North Atlantic, Western Europe and the Mediterranean. *(Nuclear Weapons):* The U.S. should continue to guarantee the defense of Western Europe (within treaty obligations) by deployment of tactical weapons as well as strategic forces. *(Military(Bases):* Dispersed bases in depth are important to the U.S. presence in Western Europe. Costs must be weighed against tactical and strategic planning for employment of forces. *(Soviet Naval Threat):* The U.S. must continue to maintain a strong naval presence, base rights and capability for rapid response with modern, effective forces. Integrated naval forces of the member NATO countries offer a desirable avenue for additional effectiveness and shared costs.

WESTERN EUROPE
SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. Taken at face value, the "Brezhnev Doctrine" proclaims the right of the Soviet Union to use military force to subdue any Communist nation whose current policies are deemed to be contrary to the interests of the Soviets. What should or can NATO's planning and strategy be if the Doctrine is invoked by the Soviets in some future crisis similar to the 1968 Czechoslovakian affair?

2. The move toward Western European political integration seems to have stalled; even economic integration appears to have advanced about as far as can reasonably be expected, even assuming entry of Britain into the Common Market. Are there any other routes through which Western Europe can assume an independent and effective third force role in world politics?

3. The "German" question seems to be at the head of the list of European political problems. How far should the United States go in active support of Brandt's policies in pursuit of rapprochement with East Germany? What kinds of support can the United States give to the process of normalized East-West German relations?

4. One of the major issues between the United States and its NATO allies has been the size of the individual nations' conventional force contribution for the implementation of NATO's flexible response strategy. Given the U.S. domestic pressure for reducing our conventional forces in Europe, what security alternatives are available to Western Europe if the United States does in fact drastically reduce the size of its ground forces in Europe? Can we realistically expect our NATO partners (outside of West Germany) to assume more of the conventional defense of Europe?

5. In his February 1970 report to the Congress on U.S. foreign policy, President Nixon spoke of a "more balanced association and a more genuine partnership" with Western Europe as being in America's interest. What policies can this country pursue to further this interest? In turn, what can the Europeans themselves do to enhance this partnership?

6. Do Great Britain's true interests rest within Europe or in its "special relationship" with the United States and the Commonwealth countries? What are the issues involved and what is the likely course of British foreign policy in this respect?

7. What opportunities (if any) exist in Europe for the United States with respect to France and its new leadership?

**UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA OF
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN**

Objective 1: Maintain the United States as the major political influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Strategies:

a. Exclusion of non-hemispheric, totalitarian influence from Latin America, most particularly the influence of international communism.

b. Continued isolation of Cuba.

c. Improvement of the United States image by making credible the U.S. policy of strict non-intervention and stressing our determination to be a partner, rather than a paramount.

Objective 2: Establishment of stable, representative governments in all Latin American states.

Strategies:

a. Encouragement of participation by a far greater percentage of the population in the political life of their country.

b. Being prepared to deal realistically with interim authoritative governments which actively and effectively pursue the economic, social, and political development of their country.

Objective 3: Encouragement and aid in the development of political, social, and economic stability through measures providing for overall national development, more equitable sharing of the benefits of the modern world, and an increased standard of living for the masses.

Strategies:

a. Encouragement and aid in the reduction of illiteracy as a principal requisite for all other developments.

b. Encouragement of a general concern in Latin American governments for the need of population growth controls, and being prepared to aid in establishing realistic and effective programs.

THE PACIFIC AND ASIA

there something else? Should there be any fundamental changes in U.S. policy toward Communist China? Discuss in terms of current and future U.S. interests.

2. One of the suggested strategies for the United States to adopt in the Western Pacific after the settlement of Vietnam is the so-called "off-shore" strategy, which provides for the withdrawal to U.S. owned or controlled islands. Discuss the pros and cons of such a strategy. Does this fit in with President Nixon's Asian policy for the 70's?

3. The emergence of Japan as a post-war economic power has great significance for the United States. Can and should the United States accept a Japan that is also a military power in the Far East? What are the implications of such a Japanese role? Would Japan's growing power be reminiscent of her World War II Greater East Asia "Co-prosperity Sphere"? Can and should the U.S. urge Japan to assume greater responsibility for the defense of our interests in Korea?

4. Can the Sino-Soviet split be considered as being in the interest of the United States? If so, how? Should we do anything to intensify this split?

5. What are the dilemmas surrounding U.S. policy toward Pakistan and India?

6. As a predominantly white nation, how realistic is it to expect Australia to assume a future major role in Southeast Asia and to have the nations of the area accept it? Discuss Australia's potential for bringing about more effective coordination and increased cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia and with the United States.

UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA OF AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

National Objectives. Basic U.S. national objectives in regard to Africa south of the Sahara can be stated as follows:

- a. Development of independent African nations capable of resisting Communist subversion and oriented toward the Free World.
- b. Maintenance of U.S. access to African raw materials of critical importance to the United States.
- c. Maintenance of U.S. access to African territory strategically important for transit and communications purposes.

Strategic Concept. U.S. strategy for Africa south of the Sahara should focus available U.S. resources on specific countries in which the U.S. has a significant interest and on problems most critical to the development of African nations. Because the U.S. has strategic interests which are limited or minor in most African nations south of the Sahara, and because of the potential for extensive conflict within the region, U.S. strategy should be governed by maximum flexibility and minimum direct commitments—a strategy of "selective involvement."

U.S. Strategy. For the attainment of national objectives, elements are as follows:

- a. Encourage other Free World developed nations and appropriate international organizations to maintain or increase their support to African development.
- b. Encourage full use of regional arrangements for pursuing national development objectives and in settling intraregional disputes.
- c. Recognize rapid change as an African characteristic and seek to accelerate constructive change at a rate sufficient to overcome disintegrative tendencies.
- d. Seek the development of responsible political leadership.
- e. Recognize military and radically oriented governments that come to power through nonstatutory means on a case-by-case basis and then only after consideration of a broad range of factors ranging from U.S. national interests and prestige involved to internal conditions of the subject country.

SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. During the next decade the situation in Africa will be undergoing rapid change. What effect will these developments have on our vital interests?

2. The tension prevalent in Southern Africa because of the race issue is likely to deepen. What can the United States do to help lessen this tension, keeping our strategic interest in the area in mind?

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

3. How extensive is the influence which French culture, trade and aid exerts in the former French colonial areas of Africa? How can this influence assist in solving the modernization problems faced by the nations which were formed from these areas?

4. Portugal's African overseas provinces are a heavy drain on her resources largely because of defense expenditures for the areas. How much is United States' policy toward Africa and toward Portugal, a NATO partner, affected by Portugal's African problems and policies?

5. What aspects of Communist China's ideology are responsible for the apparent reverses of China's policies in Africa?

6. Have the African regional organizations and the Organization of African Unity provided any cause for optimism with respect to their effectiveness for African economic and political cooperation?

U.S. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA OF THE PACIFIC AND ASIA

A. The Specific Objectives of Current U.S. Foreign Policy toward the Region are:

1. The achievement and maintenance of stable, popularly supported independent governments which are not hostile to the U.S.
2. The development and maintenance of a balance of power which will prevent one power domination in the area.
3. The maintenance of a sufficient military presence to protect U.S. national interests.
4. The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
5. The prevention of the spread of Communism.

B. Current Policies of the U.S. toward the Region are:

1. To fulfill honorably present treaty obligations.
2. To promote regional responsibility for security.
3. To provide the counter to possible CPR and U.S.S.R. nuclear blackmail.
4. To provide military aid to those countries which indicate a determination to use it effectively.
5. To promote economic development through capital investment, aid, and technical assistance.


Recommended New Policies. In recognition of the forces at work within the region, and the neo-isolationist sentiments within the U.S., some redirection of policy seems to be desirable. To some extent the recommended "re-direction" could be considered merely a change in emphasis of existing policies. Specific recommendations are:

1. Gradually reduce U.S. commitments to the defense of countries other than Japan and Australia while emphasizing regional responsibility, as outlined in the Nixon Doctrine for Asia.
2. Encourage Japan and Australia to assume a military responsibility for defense of the region in conjunction with other countries and the U.S.
3. Encourage Japan to take a leading role in economic development of the region.
4. Accept a minimal modification to base agreements in Japan, Okinawa, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines.
5. While continuing to resist Communist China's expansion, the U.S. should work toward an accommodation of China's legitimate interests in the area.

SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. The containment of Communist China and the control of Communist encroachment has been part of the American interest in East Asia. Is this still a prime U.S. interest or is

TWENTY - SECOND ANNUAL



GLOBAL
STRATEGY
DISCUSSIONS



UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, Rhode Island

15-19 JUNE 1970

SELECTED READINGS AND DISCUSSION TOPICS

For Official Use Only

SUNDAY, 14 JUNE

1730-1930 Quarters "AA"
Reception - Committees 1-20

MONDAY, 15 JUNE

0715-0815 Commissioned Officers Mess (Closed)
Breakfast for Guests (Optional)

0830-0915 Pringle Coffee Mess
Registration fo Guests

0930-1115 Naval Station Theatre
WELCOMING REMARKS
Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, USN
ADDRESS:THE CHALLENGE OF THE SEVENTIES
Honorable John W. Warner
Under Secretary of the Navy

1130-1200 Committee Rooms
Organizational Committee Meetings

1200-1330 As Scheduled
Luncheons (Informal)

1345-1545 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic:"The Nixon Doctrine in Perspective"
Political Reality: Domestic and Foreign

1600-1700 Sims Hall - Committees 1-20
War Gaming Demonstration:Battle of Midway and
Tour of Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator (Optional)

1730-1930 Quarters "AA"
Reception - Committees 21-39

TUESDAY, 16 JUNE

- 0715-0800 Commissioned Officers Mess (Closed)
Breakfast for Guests (Optional)
- 0900-1030 Pringle Auditorium - Civilian Guests, Observers
and Flag Officers.
BRIEFING: SOVIET MARITIME THREAT
Staff
- 1100-1230 Naval Station Theatre
ADDRESS: THE FORMULATION OF GLOBAL STRATEGY
Honorable U.Alexis Johnson
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- 1245-1430 Commissioned Officers Mess (Open)
President's Luncheon - Committees 1-20
- 1245-1430 As Scheduled-Committees 21-39
Luncheons (Informal)
- 1445-1615 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "USSR and Eastern Europe
Strategic Balance, Negotiation and the
Quest for Peace
- 1630-1730 Sims Hall - Committees 21-39
War Gaming Demonstration: Battle of Midway and
Tour of Navy Electronic Warfare Simulator (Optional)

WEDNESDAY, 17 JUNE

- 0715-0800 Commissioned Officers Mess (Closed)
Breakfast for Guests (Optional)
- 0830-1030 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "Western Europe"
The Nixon Doctrine and the Atlantic Community
- 1100-1230 Naval Station Theatre
ADDRESS: THE OUTLOOK IN THE SENATE FOR ADVICE
AND CONSENT
Honorable Harry F. Byrd, Jr.
U.S. Senator (Virginia)
- 1245-1430 Commissioned Officers Mess (Open)
President's Luncheon-Committees 21-39
- 1245-1430 As Scheduled-Committees 1-20
Luncheons (Informal)

AFTERNOON: FREE

THURSDAY, 18 JUNE

- 0715-0800 Commissioned Officers Mess (Open)
Breakfast for Guests (Optional)
- 0830-0930, Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "Africa, South of the Sahara
Development, Nationhood and U.S. Policy .
- 0940-1040 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "Latin America and the Caribbean"
Regionalism and Inter-American Cooperation
- 1100-1230 Naval Station Theatre
ADDRESS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY
IN NATIONAL STRATEGY
Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN
Chief of Naval Operations
- 1230-1415 As scheduled
Luncheons (Informal)
- 1430-1615 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "Middle East"
Rivalries, East-West Interests
- 1900- Commissioned Officers Mess (Open)
Formal Dinner Dance

FRIDAY, 19 JUNE

- 0715-0830 Commissioned Officers Mess (Closed)
Breakfast for Guest (Optional)
- 0900-1030 Committee Rooms
GROUP DISCUSSIONS
Topic: "Pacific and Asia"
New Relationships; Economic and Political
Partnerships
- 1100-1215 Naval Station Theatre
ADDRESS: DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY
Dr. Walt W. Rostow
Professor of Economics and History
University of Texas

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

30 March 1970

FOREWORD

This volume departs from the usual practice of compiling selected readings from published sources as background material for the Global Strategy Discussions. Early in the Academic year, the students in the School of Naval Warfare examined the major political, economic, social and military forces and trends shaping assigned geographic areas of the world, exploring the strengths and capabilities of the nations therein. United States national objectives and policies were then determined for the different regions. These studies provided the bases for later courses in the curriculum. The statements contained in this booklet are only brief abstracts of major conclusions drawn from much larger and more detailed papers developed by the students. In some instances, they have been edited and adapted to meet the needs of the Global Strategy Discussions, but the essence of the students' thoughts have, in all cases, been retained. The COMMANDERS DIGEST, published subsequent to the student material, is included as an excellent resume of the NIXON DOCTRINE.

The thoughts and opinions expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Navy Department nor of the Naval War College.

The term "Official Use Only" has been applied to this volume in order that the distribution of this material will be limited to those engaged in study at the Naval War College.

SUBMITTED



ROBERT E. WILLIAMS

Captain, U.S. Navy

Director, Global Strategy Discussions

APPROVED



F.G. BENNETT

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Chief of Staff

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Foreword	1
Table of Contents	2
Definition of Terms	3
Introduction	4
<i>United States National Interests and Historical Capabilities</i> United States Foreign Policy ^{for} to the 1970's (Extracts from the Nixon Doctrine)	8
United States National Objectives in the Area of Western Europe	16
United States National Objectives in the Area of Africa South of the Sahara	18
United States National Objectives in the Area of the Pacific and Asia	20
United States National Objectives in the Area of Latin America and the Caribbean	22
United States National Objectives in the Area of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe	25
United States National Objectives in the Area of the Middle East	28

Introduction

The purpose of this volume is to provide a common point of departure for discussion of strategic and policy issues confronting the United States in the 1970's. As in all Global Strategy Discussions, the value of the deliberations is primarily educational. No effort is made to establish any particular concensus, and the fullest range of views is encouraged. The success of our discussions is to be judged on how well we are able to delineate the major issues clearly.

To assist our discussions a set of definitions of major terms is included immediately following this Introduction. The definitions given are those used at the Naval War College. They are included so that we may begin with a common frame of reference. As with everything else on our agenda, they too are open to discussion.

Following the definitions is a short statement, again derived from student efforts, using the definitions to delineate in broad terms the national interests of the United States, the national capabilities and resources available to us as a nation for the implementation of those interests, and the military capabilities available as backing in the event of conflict.

Since the United States is now embarked upon a comprehensive review and reevaluation of its interests, objectives, ^{and overall strategy} and military capabilities, major excerpts from the "Nixon Doctrine" are next included.

The Nixon Doctrine is followed by the statements drawn from the student efforts mentioned in the Foreword. Each of these six statements, covering the major geographical areas of the world, is arranged in similar format, proceeding from each United States objective in that area to the strategies by which each can be attained, and then to the suggested issues for discussion which emerge. As we discuss each area we shall be asking what maritime and naval strategy is appropriate for the United States in the light of the Nixon Doctrine, how we are to ensure that we remain sufficiently strong as a nation to carry out our commitments, and what possibilities ^{exist} for partnership with other nations on a new basis, ~~are possible~~.

Our discussions are taking place in a time of great stress and domestic uneasiness involving substantial Constitutional issues. In the conduct of foreign affairs the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief confronts the power of the Congress to declare war and appropriate funds for its waging. Of particular concern to critics of present policies are Presidential commitments to other nations, especially the commitment of armed forces to combat in situations not characterized by direct military attack on the United States or accompanied by a formal declaration of war. The voice of youth is especially heard today, although all segments of the nation are vocal in the discussion of these issues.

The confrontation with crisis over our public affairs is not a new experience for the United States, even if the complexity of achieving adequate defensive capability is today made more difficult by technological change and rising costs. The American method of government rests traditionally on the solid basis of systematic and free debate. As we as a people attempt to chart new approaches to both old and new problems, we can draw comfort from the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt:

Our constitution is so simple and practical that it is possible to meet extraordinary needs by changes in emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form. That is why our constitutional system has proved itself the most superbly enduring political mechanism the modern world has produced. It has met every stress of vast expansion of territory, of foreign wars, of bitter internal strife, of world relations.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

National Interests: Those interests that the National decision making group determines are important to the maintenance of the state. These offer broad guidance to national leaders who are charged with the formulation of objectives, policies, and commitments. Some interests may be called *vital interests*, that is, those interests for which we may go to war. All other national interests may be termed *secondary interests*.

National Objectives: Those specific goals which are designed to support or secure the national interests. These may be further categorized as "long-term objectives" (fifteen years or more) which may also be called national goals, or "short-term objectives" usually referred to merely as objectives.

National Policies: These are specific courses of action which are designed to achieve objectives. They are the means (policy) to the end (objective). Several alternative policies may be available to achieve an objective.

National Strategy: This is "the art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war to secure national objectives."

Power: The strength or capacity that a sovereign state can use to achieve its national interests. The elements of power (demography, geography, economics, history, psychology, sociology, military, and government) may be used as a basis to assess power. An assessment of power may be expressed in potential or actual terms.

U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS AND ~~NATIONAL~~ CAPABILITIES

A. **National Interests.** The vital national interest—determined to be essential to the maintenance of the U.S. as a nation—is:

to safeguard the physical security of the U.S. against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

Within this vital interest there are commitments (including all treaty commitments for the mutual defense and support of other nations) which may vary from time to time in order of priority, but the vital interest itself is basic and unchanging.

Secondary interests are more transitory and are of lesser import to the extent that if they should conflict with the "vital" interest, the "vital" interest shall override. The secondary national interests are:

to achieve economic and social progress and to safeguard and promote those political institutions and ideals on which the U.S. was founded.

to participate freely and cooperate fully with other nations in international accords, treaties, and organizations which create a peaceful international environment.

to oppose by appropriate means including moral suasion, diplomatic maneuver, economic sanctions, and military force, other nations that act in opposition to our vital and secondary national interests.

B. **National Capabilities.** Basic U.S. capabilities affecting foreign policy implementation are impressive: a large, highly skilled population; immense natural resources within a favorable climatic and geographic setting; the most highly developed economy in the world; armed forces second to none; with both nuclear and conventional military capability. To this inventory must be added a highly successful space program which significantly enhances the U.S. power image and a superior ability to develop and utilize modern industrial and defense technology. However, there are important limitations which the policy-maker must take into consideration: a decreased willingness on the part of the American people to pay the price of supporting the present global strategy of containing communism, the currently depressed conventional forces' capability to respond to new challenges due to recent reductions and heavy involvement in Vietnam, and the economic constraints imposed by inflation and the balance of payments deficit. Of these, public opinion is perhaps the most important. Current manifestations of public opinion which are of particular relevance to foreign policy include student and black unrest, anti-Vietnam sentiment, a reaction against the "military-industrial complex," and pressures to shift expenditures from defense to the solution of domestic problems.

Substantive
trained

C. U.S. Military Capabilities. Military capabilities must be considered in the light of three different types of military confrontation between the U.S. with her allies, and the U.S.S.R. and the nations favoring her. The first is a general thermonuclear war. The second is limited war, where conflict is confined to a specific region, and political goals are limited. The third is in opposition to insurgent actions of the type which the Soviets call "Wars of National Liberation." There is no clear line of demarcation between these two latter types. The situation in South Vietnam, originally an insurgent war aided and abetted by the Communist powers, is now clearly a limited war. By contrast, the Korean War was obviously a limited war from the beginning.

In preparing for these three types of war, the U.S. maintains the military capability for general nuclear war under the title of "Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces," while the capability for the remaining two categories is contained in "General Purpose Forces."

Within this framework, it has been U.S. policy to provide capability for fighting two "major" wars and one "minor" contingency. A recent change in U.S. military policy has reduced the capability required to that necessary to deal with one "major" war and one "minor" contingency.

Any analysis of United States military capability to support national objectives where they are in actual or potential conflict with those of the Communist world must consider that the U.S. cannot simultaneously provide adequate military assistance to all of the potential allies to whom commitments and assurances have been given. Most importantly, however, the Communist nations are also limited in their ability to project military and economic force on a broad base, and consequently cannot coerce the U.S. into a position where a large number of these commitments would have to be discharged concurrently.

See next page

A recent change under the Nixon Doctrine is designed to produce what is called a "1½ war" capability. In the words of President Nixon, " we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere."

Given these capability guidelines, the emphasis in the Nixon Doctrine on three cornerstones of approach (partnership, strength, and willingness to negotiate) must be translated into a military effort which couples U. S. strength to partnership with all friendly nations, one in which obligations as well as benefits are shared.

In view of the rising importance of Soviet maritime power and the progressive cut-back in U. S. overseas bases, the honoring of the commitments reaffirmed by the Nixon Doctrine will require a thorough rethinking of U. S. maritime strategy as a part of the new overall U. S. strategy. Of prime concern is the question whether the interaction of all of these factors will lead the U. S. to depend more heavily on a forward naval strategy.

COMMANDERS DIGEST



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE • WASHINGTON, D.C.

Vol. 7, No. 22

February 28, 1970

— UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S —

A New Strategy for Peace



"A nation needs many qualities, but it needs faith and confidence above all. Skeptics do not build societies; the idealists are the builders. Only societies that believe in themselves can rise to their challenges. Let us not, then, pose a false choice between meeting our responsibilities abroad and meeting the needs of our people at home. We shall meet both or we shall meet neither."

The President's Remarks
at the Air Force Academy
Commencement, June 4, 1969.

President Nixon has defined and outlined "United States Foreign Policy For The 1970's."

The President termed his policy "A New Strategy for Peace." And he said, "The postwar period in international relations has ended."

"When I took office," the President said, "the most immediate problem facing our nation was the war in Vietnam. No question has more occupied our thoughts and energies during this past year.

"Yet the fundamental task confronting us was more profound. We could see that the whole pattern of international politics was changing. Our challenge was to understand that change, to define America's goals for the next period, and to set in motion policies to achieve them. For all Americans must understand that because of its strength, its history and its concern for human dignity, this nation occupies a special place in the world. Peace and progress are impossible without a major American role.

"This first annual report on U.S. foreign policy is more than a record of one year. It is this Administration's statement of a new approach to foreign policy, to match a new era of international relations.

"The postwar period in international relations has ended."

In the 119-page report to Congress Feb. 18 the President explained "A New Strategy for Peace," based on three key points: Partnership, Strength and The Willingness To Negotiate.

President Nixon said:

"Peace requires *partnership*. Its obligations, like its benefits, must be shared. This concept of partnership guides our relations with all friendly nations.

"Peace requires *strength*. So long as there are those who would threaten our vital interests and those of our allies with military force, we must be strong. American weakness could tempt would-be aggressors to make dangerous miscalculations.

"At the same time, our own strength is important only in relation to the strength of others. We—like others—must place high priority on enhancing our security through cooperative arms control.

"Peace requires a *willingness to negotiate*. All nations—and we are no exception—have important national interests to protect. But the most fundamental interest of all nations lies in building the structure of peace. In partnership with our allies, secure in our own strength, we will seek those areas in which we can agree among ourselves and with others to accommodate conflicts and overcome rivalries. We are working toward the day when all nations will have a stake in peace, and will therefore be partners in its maintenance.

"Within such a structure, international disputes can be settled and clashes contained. The insecurity of nations, out of which so much conflict arises, will be eased, and the habits of moderation and compromise will be nurtured. Most important,

threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.


The choice of this strategy was based on the following considerations:

- the nuclear capability of our strategic and theater nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or Chinese attack on our Asian allies;
- the prospects for a coordinated two-front attack on our allies by Russia and China are low both because of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation. In any event, we do not believe that such a coordinated attack should be met primarily by U.S. conventional forces;
- the desirability of insuring against greater than expected threats by maintaining more than the forces required to

meet conventional threats in one theater—such as NATO Europe;

—weakness on our part would be more provocative than continued U.S. strength, for it might encourage others to take dangerous risks, to resort to the illusion that military adventurism could succeed.

To meet the requirements for the strategy we adopted, we will maintain the required ground and supporting tactical air forces in Europe and Asia, together with naval and air forces. At the same time, we will retain adequate active forces in addition to a full complement of reserve forces based in the United States. These force levels will be spelled out in greater detail in the program and budget statement of the Secretary of Defense.



UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA OF WESTERN EUROPE

National Objective Number One. To develop and implement policies and programs to encourage a politically stable Western Europe, friendly to the interests of the United States.

a. *b.*
Strategy. (*Germany*): Support a strong West Germany. (*Portugal*): Support UN resolution for reform in Portuguese Africa directed toward ultimate self-determination. *c.* (*Spain*): Maintain U.S. neutrality regarding Gibraltar while continuing Spanish base rights negotiations. *d.* (*Mid-East*): Maintain neutrality and prevent resumption of hostilities while seeking permanent political settlement. *e.* (*Malta/Cyprus/Greece*): Maintain U.S. Sixth Fleet presence in the Mediterranean and encourage economic and political development and stability in each country. *f.* (*Western Europe*): Support these countries in the establishment of independent, peaceful relations with the USSR and the Bloc countries.

National Objective Number Two. To develop policies and programs to encourage and support a strong West European economy, with an environment favorable to trade and investment interests of the United States.

Strategy. (*European Integration*): Continue to encourage progress toward economic integration by the European Economic Community (EEC), and, particularly, the broadening of EEC's membership. (*U.S. Trade*): Seek to lower trade barriers between the United States and the EEC and European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries, and to ameliorate the EEC's restrictive barriers to U.S. agricultural products. (*U.S. Investment*): Shift policy to one of consistent encouragement of long-term U.S. investment, and discourage short-term speculation in Western Europe. (*Monetary Policy*): Continue efforts in the International Monetary Fund to encourage more flexible monetary exchange rates. (*Economic Aid*): Continue to urge West European countries to increase aid to less developed countries, channeling their assistance through international agencies.

National Objective Number Three. To encourage and support an individual and collective capacity on the part of West European countries to resist armed attack by powers whose interests are hostile to those of the United States.

Strategy. (*NATO*): The U.S. should continue support of NATO as a principal vehicle for containment of Communist military pressures in the North Atlantic, Western Europe and the Mediterranean. (*Nuclear Weapons*): The U.S. should continue to guarantee the defense of Western Europe (within treaty obligations) by deployment of tactical weapons as well as strategic forces. (*Military Bases*): Dispersed bases in depth are important to the U.S. presence in Western Europe. Costs must be weighed against tactical and strategic planning for employment of forces. (*Soviet Naval Threat*): The U.S. must continue to maintain a strong naval presence, base rights and capability for rapid response with modern, effective forces. Integrated naval forces of the member NATO countries offer a desirable avenue for additional effectiveness and shared costs.

WESTERN EUROPE

SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. Taken at face value, the "Brezhnev Doctrine" proclaims the right of the Soviet Union to use military force to subdue any Communist nation whose current policies are deemed to be contrary to the interests of the Soviets. What should or can NATO's planning and strategy be if the Doctrine is invoked by the Soviets in some future crisis similar to the 1968 Czechoslovakian affair?

2. The move toward Western European political integration seems to have stalled; even economic integration appears to have advanced about as far as can reasonably be expected, even assuming entry of Britain into the Common Market. Are there any other routes through which Western Europe can assume an independent and effective third force role in world politics?

3. The "German" question seems to be at the head of the list of European political problems. How far should the United States go in active support of Brandt's policies in pursuit of rapprochement with East Germany? What kinds of support can the United States give to the process of normalized East-West German relations?

4. One of the major issues between the United States and its NATO allies has been the size of the individual nations' conventional force contribution for the implementation of NATO's flexible response strategy. Given the U.S. domestic pressure for reducing our conventional forces in Europe, what security alternatives are available to Western Europe if the United States does in fact drastically reduce the size of its ground forces in Europe? Can we realistically expect our NATO partners (outside of West Germany) to assume more of the conventional defense of Europe?

5. In his February 1970 report to the Congress on U.S. foreign policy, President Nixon spoke of a "more balanced association and a more genuine partnership" with Western Europe as being in America's interest. What policies can this country pursue to further this interest? In turn, what can the Europeans themselves do to enhance this partnership?

6. Do Great Britain's true interests rest within Europe or in its "special relationship" with the United States and the Commonwealth countries? What are the issues involved and what is the likely course of British foreign policy in this respect?

7. What opportunities (if any) exist in Europe for the United States with respect to France and its new leadership?

What more might
be achieved
in partnership
terms in the area
of naval strategy?

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

3. How extensive is the influence which French culture, trade and aid exerts in the former French colonial areas of Africa? How can this influence assist in solving the modernization problems faced by the nations which were formed from these areas?

4. Portugal's African overseas provinces are a heavy drain on her resources largely because of defense expenditures for the areas. How much is United States' policy toward Africa and toward Portugal, a NATO partner, affected by Portugal's African problems and policies?

5. What aspects of Communist China's ideology are responsible for the apparent reverses of China's policies in Africa?

6. Have the African regional organizations and the Organization of African Unity provided any cause for optimism with respect to their effectiveness for African economic and political cooperation?

7. How will developments in Africa south of the Sahara affect the security of the Indian Ocean area? What U.S. naval strategy is appropriate for that area? In view of the low-profile of U.S. interests in Africa is the Nixon Doctrine concept of partnership applicable? If so, in what ways could it be expressed consistent with U.S. interests? Are African states likely to cooperate with one another for security purposes?

United States National Objectives in the Area of
Africa South of The Sahara

National Objective Number One. To develop independent African nations capable of resisting Communist subversion and oriented toward the Free World.

Strategy.

a.
b. Encourage full use of regional arrangements for pursuing national development objectives and in settling intraregional disputes.

b.
c. Recognize rapid change as an African characteristic and seek to accelerate constructive change at a rate sufficient to overcome disintegrative tendencies.

c.
d. Seek the development of responsible political leadership.

National Objective Number Two. To maintain U.S. access to African raw materials of critical importance to the United States.

Strategy.

1. Encourage other Free World developed nations and appropriate international organizations to maintain or increase their support to African development.

2. Focus available U.S. resources on specific countries in which the U.S. has a significant interest and on problems most critical to the development of African nations.

National Objective Number Three. To maintain U.S. access to African territory strategically important for transit and communications purposes.

Strategy.

a).

Because the U.S. has strategic interests which are limited or minor in most African nations south of the Sahara, and because of the potential for extensive conflict within the region, U.S. strategy should be governed by maximum flexibility and minimum direct commitments—a strategy of "selective involvement."

b). Recognize military and radically oriented governments that come to power through nonstatutory means on a case-by-case basis and then only after consideration of a broad range of factors ranging from U.S. national interests and prestige involved to internal conditions of the subject country.

SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. During the next decade the situation in Africa will be undergoing rapid change. What effect will these developments have on our vital interests?

2. The tension prevalent in Southern Africa because of the race issue is likely to deepen. What can the United States do to help lessen this tension, keeping our strategic interest in the area in mind?

United States National Objectives in the Area of The Pacific and Asia

National Objective Number One. To achieve and maintain stable, popularly supported independent governments which are not hostile to the U.S.

Strategy.

- a.
1. To provide military aid to those countries which indicate a determination to use it effectively.
- b. To promote economic development through capital investment, aid, and technical assistance.
- c.
2. Encourage Japan to take a leading role in economic development of the region.

National Objective Number Two. To develop and maintain a balance of power which will prevent one-power domination in the area.

Strategy.
a.

- ~~1.~~ To fulfill honorably present treaty obligations.
- ~~2.~~ To promote regional responsibility for security.
- ~~3.~~ To provide the counter-to possible C.P.R. and U.S.S.R. nuclear blackmail.

National Objective Number Three. To maintain
a sufficient military presence to protect U.S.
national interests while ~~are~~ encouraging
Asian efforts at self-defense.

Strategy →
a.

1. Gradually reduce U.S. commitments to the defense of countries other than Japan and Australia while emphasizing regional responsibility, as outlined in the Nixon Doctrine for Asia.

2. Encourage Japan and Australia to assume a military responsibility for defense of the region in conjunction with other countries and the U.S.

c.

1. Accept a minimal modification to base agreements in Japan, Okinawa, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines.

National Objective Number Four. To prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Strategy.

- a. Provide the counter to possible C.P.R. and
U.S.S.R. nuclear blackmail.

National Objective Number Five. To prevent the
Spread of Communism.

Strategy.

a.
5. While continuing to resist Communist China's expansion, the U.S. should work toward an accommodation of China's legitimate interests in the area.

SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. The containment of Communist China and the control of Communist encroachment has been part of the American interest in East Asia. Is this still a prime U.S. interest or is

-2-

THE PACIFIC AND ASIA

there something else? Should there be any fundamental changes in U.S. policy toward Communist China? Discuss in terms of current and future U.S. interests.

2. One of the suggested strategies for the United States to adopt in the Western Pacific after the settlement of Vietnam is the so-called "off-shore" strategy, which provides for the withdrawal to U.S. owned or controlled islands. Discuss the pros and cons of such a strategy. Does this fit in with President Nixon's Asian policy for the 70's?

3. The emergence of Japan as a post-war economic power has great significance for the United States. Can and should the United States accept a Japan that is also a military power in the Far East? What are the implications of such a Japanese role? Would Japan's growing power be reminiscent of her World War II Greater East Asia "Co-prosperity Sphere"? Can and should the U.S. urge Japan to assume greater responsibility for the defense of our interests in Korea?

4. Can the Sino-Soviet split be considered as being in the interest of the United States? If so, how? Should we do anything to intensify this split?

5. What are the dilemmas surrounding U.S. policy toward Pakistan and India?

6. As a predominantly white nation, how realistic is it to expect Australia to assume a future major role in Southeast Asia and to have the nations of the area accept it? Discuss Australia's potential for bringing about more effective coordination and increased cooperation among the countries of Southeast Asia and with the United States.

7. *What U.S. naval strategy is appropriate for the area, including the Indian Ocean? How is the Nixon Doctrine concept of partnership applicable? Are regional arrangements there best fostered with or without direct U.S. participation?*

UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES IN THE AREA OF
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

National Number One.

^ Objective ~~to~~ Maintain the United States as the major political influence in the Western Hemisphere.

Strategies:

- Work to exclude*
- a. ~~Exclusion of~~ non-hemispheric, totalitarian influence from Latin America, most particularly the influence of international communism.
 - b. Continued ^{to} ~~isolation~~ ^c of Cuba.
 - c. ~~Improvement of~~ the United States image by making credible the U.S. policy of strict non-intervention and stressing our determination to be a partner, rather than a paramount.

National Number Two.

^ Objective ~~to~~ Establishment of stable, representative governments in all Latin American states.

Strategies:

- a. ~~Encouragement of~~ participation by a far greater percentage of the population in the political life of their country.
- b. ~~Being~~ prepared to deal realistically with interim authoritative governments which actively and effectively pursue the economic, social, and political development of their country.

National Number Three

^ Objective ~~to~~ Encouragement and aid in the development of political, social, and economic stability through measures providing for overall national development, more equitable sharing of the benefits of the modern world, and an increased standard of living for the masses.

Strategies:

- a. ~~Encouragement~~ and aid in the reduction of illiteracy as a principal requisite for all other developments.
- b. ~~Encouragement of~~ a general concern in Latin American governments for the need of population growth controls; ~~and being~~ prepared to aid in establishing realistic and effective programs.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

c. Encouragement~~ment~~ of a political climate that will at once retain domestic investment capital and attract foreign investors.

d. Administer aid through multinational organizations, rather than through bilateral arrangements.

e. Promotion^e of mutually beneficial trade and investment between the United States and Latin America.

f. Encourage investment of private U.S. capital in Latin America.

National Number Four.

Objective 4 Promotion of the United States concept for hemispheric defense.

Strategies:

a. Discouragement~~ment~~ of excessive or unrealistic military expenditures.

b. Promotion^e of the retention of U.S. rights in the Panama Canal.

c. Promotion^e of the idea that military requirements need only meet internal security and limited defense needs since the U.S. will play the primary role in the defense of Latin America from external aggression.

d. Establishment~~ment~~ of a military aid program which will create a dependence on U.S. support and guidance.

National Number Five.

Objective 5: Promotion of mutual trust and meaningful area development by encouraging the formation of regional political and economic alliances.

Strategies:

a. Maintenance^{ance} of U.S. influence in regional organizations at the lowest possible visible level in order to minimize the feeling of U.S. dominance.

b. Encouragement~~ment~~ and, where possible, aid in the further development of such regional organizations as LAFTA and CACM.

SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. What are the cultural, social, and political obstacles which inhibit the modernization process in Latin America?

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

2. A new type of militarism has arisen in Latin America. Sometimes called "Nasserism", it is advocated primarily by younger officers who believe that democracy has failed in Latin America, yet who realize that social change is urgently needed. These "change agents", motivated by increasing impatience with corruption, inefficiency and a stagnant political order, seek to establish paternalistic dictatorships of extreme nationalistic character. What roles can they play in economic, political, and social development?

3. What are the strategic interests of the United States in Latin America? *What U.S. naval**

4. Mexico presents a rather unique situation in Latin America in terms of its successful revolution and its one-party democratic form of government. What analogies can be drawn from this Mexican case to other Latin American countries?

5. To what extent does communist subversion and "Castroism" pose a threat to the political stability of Latin American countries?

6. Should U.S. aid to Latin American countries be given or denied purely on the basis of the type of government currently in power in each country?

** strategy is appropriate for the area? How does the Nixon Doctrine concept of partnership apply? Can regional arrangements with or without U.S. participation be encouraged? Should they be?*

**UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
IN THE AREA OF THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE**

National Objective Number One.

U.S. objectives with regard to the USSR and Eastern Europe and proposed U.S. strategy to accomplish these are as follows:-

A. Deter the Threat against the Physical Security of the U.S. and Her Allies in Accordance with Our International Commitments

Strategy.

- a. Maintain a strong Western Europe to thwart any possible Soviet move in this area.
- b. Continue present contribution of forces with back-up of U.S. strategic and tactical weapons.
- c. Restructure NATO so that European countries willingly undertake their defense obligations.
- d. Continue to work for strategic arms limitations.
- e. Examine and restate treaty commitments so that intentions are clearly known to USSR and other nations.

National Objective Number Two.

B. Maintain Flexible Response to Aggression against the U.S. or Her Allies

Strategy.

- a. Retain credible military strength, capable of fighting one major and one minor war concurrently.

National Objective Number Three.

C. Prevent Communist Attempts to Subvert the Political Institutions of Other Nations in Accordance with Our International Commitments

Strategy.

- a. Honor international commitments with support appropriate to the situation.
- b. Maintain "status quo" in Europe.
- c. Remain disengaged in the China-USSR confrontation to permit intervention if outbreak of general war is threatened.

National Objective Number Four.

D. Encourage International Efforts in Peacemaking and Peacekeeping

Strategy.

- a. Continue efforts to work through United Nations and regional organizations.

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

- b. Work closely with the USSR to achieve peace when war breaks out in the "third world."
- c. Work multi-laterally with concerned nations to solve conflict problems, with particular emphasis on not maneuvering "behind the back."

National Objective Number Five.

^ Promotion and Support of the Efforts of Independent Nations toward Self-Determination; Improvement of International Exchange in Cultural and Economic Areas; and Participation in World-Wide Efforts to Maintain the Ecological Balance of the World

Strategy.

- a. Continue attempts to improve economic, sociological and cultural relationships with the USSR and Eastern Europe unilaterally and multilaterally.
- b. Encourage Western Europe to improve relations with Eastern Europe and reach a European solution to Europe's problems.
- c. Encourage self-determination without implying assistance which is not intended to be forthcoming.

National Objective Number Six.

^ Preserve Freedom of the Seas

- a. Maintain credible and effective seapower, both naval and non-naval, and project it world-wide.

SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. To what extent can communist ideology be used as a means of explaining or predicting Soviet behavior? Discuss in terms of the roles of ideology versus pragmatic nationalism.

2. Are there any concrete indications that the Soviet system is becoming more like our own?

3. A favorite thesis of some Western observers is that the Soviet economy is inefficient. How does this fit in with the Soviet ability to produce and maintain the amount and kinds of advanced weaponry, as well as their space, maritime, and other achievements?

4. Does the Soviet Union still maintain its objective of world revolution? Discuss in terms of specific policies and examples.

5. Almost two years have passed since the 1968 Czechoslovakian occupation. Can this Soviet action be considered to have been a success or failure for the Soviet Union?

USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

6. The Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty holds that the Soviet Union has the right to use military force to subdue any Communist nation whose current policies are contrary to Soviet interests. Has this policy brought about any fundamental changes in the relations between Moscow and its Warsaw Pact allies?

7. Should the United States actively pursue a policy of "detente" and "bridge-building" with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact nations? If so, what should be the scope and limits of such a policy? If not, what alternative policies should the United States pursue in East-West relations?

UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
IN THE AREA OF THE MIDDLE EAST

National Objective Number One.

A. Establish a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East

Strategy.

- a. Reemphasize support of the UN Resolution of 22 Nov 67.
- b. Maintain continuing contact with the USSR in an effort to further substantive negotiations between the conflicting states.
- c. While maintaining the military balance between Israel and the Arab States, attempt to curb the continuing arms race.
- d. As the principal supporter of Israel, employ the leverage derived from this position to induce Israel to negotiate realistically on the basis of the 22 Nov 67 UN Resolution.
- e. Support a UN peace-keeping role.
- f. As appropriate, expand "Big-Four" talks to include other nations, leading to multi-lateral solutions reflecting the interests of the community of nations.

National Objective Number Two.

B. Maintain the Territorial Integrity and Political Independence of the Several States of the Area

Strategy.

- a. Support the principle of non-interference in the affairs of states in accordance with the UN Charter.
- b. Maintain cordial relations where existing and seek to establish a basis for relations where they are now nonexistent.
- c. Concentrate diplomatic, financial, and other assistance to the moderate Arab States.

National Objective Number Three.

C. Maintain Free World Access to the Oil of the Area

Strategy.

- a. Continue to provide necessary economic, technical, and other assistance to the oil producing states to enhance their internal development.
- b. Maintain a balanced policy between the commercial oil interests and the interests of the producing states.

MIDDLE EAST

National Objective Number Four.

D. Limit USSR Expansion into the Area

^ Strategy.

- a. Maintain existing alliance or alliance relationships (NATO, CENTO).
- b. Maintain a credible military presence in the area, encouraging maximum participation by other free world countries.
- c. Concentrate economic, technical, and other assistance to friendly or neutral countries in the area.
- d. Encourage free world economic, technical, and cultural activities in the area.
- e. Seek a lasting resolution of the Arab-Israeli hostility, thereby minimizing Arab reliance upon the USSR military assistance which serves as a primary source of Russian influence.

National Objective Number Five.

E. Secure the Right of Innocent Passage through the Critical Waterways of the Area.

^ Strategy.

- a. Support the UN Resolution of 22 Nov 67 which guarantees the right of Israel, as of all other states, to transit these waterways.

National Objective Number Six.

F. Avoid a Military Confrontation with the Soviet Union.

^ Strategy.

- a. Continue cooperation with the USSR in seeking a peace formula.
- b. Avoid giving Israel unconditional support which might encourage precipitous Israeli military adventure.
- c. Maintain a credible military presence to deter Russia and her Arab clients from a similar military action.

SUGGESTED ISSUES FOR DISCUSSION

1. What are the United States interests and objectives in the Middle East and the Arab world?
2. The Soviet Union's activity in the Middle East and the Mediterranean has increased in recent years. What are the consequences of this activity with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the United States role in the dispute?
3. The Suez Canal has been closed since the Six Day War in 1967. Has this closing worked to the advantage of the Soviets relative to the West?

MIDDLE EAST

4. What steps can or should the United States take to attempt to regain better relations and influence with the Arab countries?

5. What are the major points of differences between the so-called "hard-line" and the "moderate" Arab States? Are there indications of fundamental shifts in this make-up? If so, what are the implications for the United States?

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6. What U.S. naval strategy is most viable in this area? What arrangements might be viable and feasible in this respect to encourage partnership, either with or without ^{direct} U.S. participation?

UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
IN THE AREA OF THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

National Objective Number One. Deter the threat against the physical security of the U.S. and her allies in accordance with international commitments.

Strategy:

- a. Maintain a strong Western Europe to thwart any possible Soviet move in this area.
- b. Continue present contribution of forces with back-up of U.S. strategic and tactical weapons.
- c. Restructure NATO so that European countries willingly undertake their defense obligations.
- d. Continue to work for strategic arms limitations.
- e. Examine and restate treaty commitments so that intentions are clearly known to USSR and other nations.

National Objective Number Two. Maintain flexible response to aggression against the U.S. or her allies.

Strategy.

- a. Retain credible military strength, capable of fighting one major and one minor war concurrently.

National Objective Number Three. Prevent Communist attempts to subvert the political institutions of other nations in accordance with our international commitments.

UNITED STATES NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
IN THE AREA OF WESTERN EUROPE

National Objective Number One. To develop and implement policies and programs to encourage a politically stable Western Europe, friendly to the interests of the United States.

Strategy.

- a. Germany: Support a strong West Germany.
- b. Portugal: Support UN resolution for reform in Portuguese Africa directed toward ultimate self-determination.
- c. Spain: Maintain U.S. neutrality regarding Gibraltar while continuing Spanish base rights negotiations.
- d. Mid-East: Maintain neutrality and prevent resumption of hostilities while seeking permanent political settlement.
- e. Malta, Cyprus, Greece: Maintain U.S. Sixth Fleet presence in the Mediterranean and encourage economic and political development and stability in each country.
- f. Western Europe: Support these countries in the establishment of independent, peaceful relations with the USSR and the Bloc countries.

National Objective Number Two. To develop policies and programs to encourage and support a strong West European economy, with an environment favorable to trade and investment interests