

CURRENT STRATEGY FORUM, 1978  
"U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGY AND FOREIGN POLICY"  
AN ADDRESS  
GIVEN AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
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BY  
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It's very interesting to hear stories about my father. I rather wish I had a more positive message for the Navy, given my background with the Navy, and the degree to which I worked for them. It's also interesting to hear about the P-6M. In some of the work I've done for CNA since we've had to think about base survivability and the survivability of bombers located on bases. I think back to the P-6M and the fact that it can be located on water ~~or~~ almost anywhere. I wonder if maybe it wouldn't have been a pretty good solution to some of the problems we worry about today.

I'm very pleased to be here today and to participate in this Current Strategy Forum. This isn't my first visit to the War College or my first opportunity to participate in the Forum. I was here about two years ago. It is the first time I've been a speaker. <sup>R</sup> I think the War College is performing an extremely valuable function in organizing these meetings. I've been very impressed by the talks I've heard so far, and I think <sup>e</sup> ~~this~~ kind of reasoned discussions that take place here are an important ingredient <sup>in</sup> ~~to~~ the government's decision-making

process. <sup>R</sup> I've been asked to discuss national strategy and I'm of course going to try to do that. I also want to make some comments on some issues of particular concern to the Navy.

<sup>No P</sup> Given the headlines recently, I feel a little like the Christian sent to reason with the lions. <sup>R</sup> I'd like to begin with some comments on the President's Wake Forest speech ~~and~~ I think one of the main purposes of this speech was to let everyone know how the President ties together a number of important issues that bear on national security. The most important relationship that he addressed, at least in my mind, was that relating arms programs to arms control efforts. My interpretation of what he said on this relationship can be summarized as follows: --Weapons programs and arms control agreements are simply means by which we pursue the main objective which is to maximize our national security.

-- Arms control agreements can be instruments of our national security only if we maintain appropriate military force levels.

<sup>R</sup> --If the Soviets don't cooperate in seeking balance <sup>d</sup> and verifiable arms control agreements, and instead try to increase and modernize their forces beyond the levels necessary for defense, we will do whatever is required to insure that they don't gain military superiority over us. <sup>R</sup> --This last point was illustrated

*in terms of* ~~during~~ our efforts to negotiate mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe--the continued Soviet buildup in Europe while these negotiations have gone on, and the resultant efforts that are now being made to strengthen NATO defenses.

The speech also spelled out a number of other important points: that we're going to oppose the aggravation of regional conflicts or intervention by others in the internal domestic affairs of other countries; that while assuring our own capabilities, we are going to seek security through dependable and verifiable arms control agreements wherever possible. <sup>R</sup> In the speech the President said that he'd implement these policies in three ways: by maintaining strategic nuclear balance, by working closely with our NATO allies to strengthen and modernize our defenses in Europe, and by maintaining and developing forces to counter any threats to our allies, friends, or vital interests in Asia, the Middle East and other parts of the world. That last part, I think, is very important for the Navy.

Finally, the President made several references to the cost of defense which, in essence, say we can afford, and he won't hesitate recommending, whatever expenditures are required to maintain adequate military forces.

For the careful student of the administration's national security policy the speech contains no surprises. Most, if not all, of its main themes are clearly reflected in DoD planning documents which have been described to some degree in the press, in various posture statements sent to the Congress, in the 79 Budget, and in various speeches and statements by Secretary Brown, Secretary Vance, Zbig Brzezinski and other people. That isn't to say that the Wake Forest speech said nothing new. There are some new concerns expressed. Then, of course, the

fact that these ideas are expressed by the President himself <sup>is</sup> ~~are~~ extremely important. <sup>While</sup> ~~Not~~ many people welcomed this speech, ~~This~~ of course doesn't mean that the policies it reflects or the processes used to develop these policies aren't controversial. They obviously are, which you can easily see simply by scanning the pages of Aviation Week or the Armed Forces Journal or any of the number of other newspapers or magazines.

I'd like to comment on some of the concerns that I hear being expressed, those generally of the form that we aren't doing enough or even if we are, that we're emphasizing the wrong things. In addressing these concerns I'd like to draw on a major study, a major reassessment that was referred to in the President's speech. It was done in the first six months of last year, Presidential Review Memorandum 10 or PRM-10. As one of its several purposes, this study carried out an assessment of the relative abilities of the U.S. and the Soviets, along with their respective allies, to bring military power to bear in a large number of contingencies. The contingencies can be divided into three general groups: strategic war; conventional conflicts other than a NATO-Warsaw Pact war; and of course, the NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional war. I'm going to comment on each one in turn but spend most of my time on the last one.

As far as strategic war is concerned, the study showed that, while the Soviets have made great strides in building up their strategic forces over the last decade, a situation of rough equivalence exists now and will continue to exist in

the near to mid-term future, even if we don't make any dramatic efforts to improve our force structure above and beyond the improvements currently planned for our strategic bomber forces, the SSBN forces and Minuteman. It did say that the trends of the strategic balance are going against us; that the Soviets are already ahead in some categories; and that we're going to have to initiate new programs or increase the planned deployments for strategic programs already coming down the pike if we can't get the Soviets to agree to strategic arms agreements that are balanced, verifiable and thus effective in curbing their buildup. This assessment, confirmed by others before and since, also showed, however, that while the trends are against us, they aren't moving so rapidly that we don't have time to find really good solutions to our strategic problems; solutions that will stand up to the rapid advances being made in military technology. While I do sense a lot of interest in getting on with some really major efforts to improve and modernize our forces, and while spending some additional funds to improve our forces right now might be psychologically very comforting, I think it's very important to find solutions that will stick.

One of the major reasons the B-1 lost out to the cruise missile as a solution to the problem of how to modernize our strategic bomber force, is that the cruise missile appears to have enough growth potential to keep ahead of Soviet air defenses for the foreseeable future. The problem with the

land-based Minuteman force and its growing vulnerability to Soviet ICBMs is similar. How do you find a fix for this force that will really stick? Simply hardening the Minuteman silos won't do; advances in Soviet missile guidance are likely to overcome any hardening we do within a few years after the current silos become vulnerable. Again, we need a solution that will stick and we're looking very hard for one.

I also sense a certain concern about the Trident force, based mostly on the delays and cost overruns that you've been hearing about recently, to some degree also on the very high cost of each one of these submarines. I think Trident is the right answer, however. Some combination of increased building rates in the future, plus perhaps a Trident II missile to maximize the effectiveness of each one of these ships, plus extensions of the lifetimes of current Poseidons--(some of the current Poseidons anyway)--are the appropriate ways to maintain and improve the capability of the SSBN force. I also think that focusing on the high cost of the Trident SSBN is probably inappropriate. We should instead take the larger view. How many survivable SSBNs do we need at sea? Given such an objective, what's the cheapest way to get them? I think that packaging in the large submarines is probably the best way to go. The fact that the most cost-effective package comes out at \$1 billion or \$1 1/2 billion isn't the point. It's the <sup>total</sup> cost of the <sup>total</sup> capability that we need that really counts.

In summary, in the strategic balance the trends have been against us, but a situation of rough parity exists today and will continue to exist in the near to mid-term future. While we have no time to waste, I think we do have time to sort out the best answers to our strategic problems and implement them. This broad reassessment that I'm describing also showed that, in most contingencies other than a NATO-Warsaw Pact war on the central front, we're in reasonably good shape in the following sense. Right now, and in the mid-term, we can bring military power to bear in most parts of the world as rapidly or perhaps somewhat more rapidly than can the Soviet Union. That's not to say that there aren't some problems, but I mean our gross capabilities satisfy that statement. Again, the trends are against us and the Soviets are improving their abilities to bring their conventional forces to bear far from their borders. These trends are also going to have to be countered by further efforts on our part, but the need doesn't seem as immediately compelling as some others, and I'd like to address them next.

In particular, one contingency we examined stood out from all the rest, specifically, the NATO-Warsaw Pact force balance in central Europe. That balance is significantly in the Soviet's favor right now. The best we could say about it is that, taking into account the advantages that seem likely to fall to us--given the fact that we'd be on the defensive with allies who would be defending their homelands--we doubt that the Warsaw Pact is strong enough to have confidence it could win a major

conventional war with NATO. A situation where they couldn't be confident of winning is hardly a comfortable one. Our interests in Europe are very strong. This accounts for the high priority being given to restoring a better force balance there. Not everyone agrees on this strong focus on improving our situation in the conventional force balance for a short war in NATO. However, in evaluating this focus I think a number of points ought to be kept in mind.

First, while NATO will always be one of our most important interests, if not the most important, the current emphasis it is receiving relative to our other military interests is probably going to drop off somewhat (relatively) as we move toward a better balance with the Warsaw Pact. (I suppose I can say if we move toward a better balance with the Warsaw Pact. There's some question about what they'll do. I think we'll be successful.) In other words, as we complete the deployment of the equipment required to support the ground forces that would deploy quickly to Europe in the event of a war; as we eliminate deficiencies in command control and communications equipment; as we build up our stocks of precision guided munitions which are at this point the best answer to the tank. <sup>P</sup> Admittedly, a large force structure in Europe probably implies larger continuing demands on our resources, but as the situation improves, a larger fraction of the disposable DoD funds will become available for forces less directly tied to NATO. For that matter the wording of the new consolidated guidance document supports this notion and I



quote, "Our near term objective is to assure that NATO could not be overwhelmed in the first few weeks of a blitzkrieg war, and we'll invest and spend our resources preferentially to that end." When that assurance is reasonably in hand, we'll turn our attention to whatever additional capability NATO might need to be able to fight at least as long as a Warsaw Pact war might last. Then, taking you beyond that point, on a broader scope yet, this immediate emphasis on the opening days of a NATO war is a manifestation of only our most pressing (but certainly not our sole) concern. For example, events in the Persian Gulf could soften the glue that binds the alliance as surely as an imbalance of military forces across the German border, and there are other words in the document that also suggest that this emphasis is something that we can expect to see decrease in the future relative to other important needs.

The second point I'd like to make is that improvements in NATO should have some beneficial side effects. with the increased confidence that a better balance might bring, our allies might feel freer to support us in protecting our many common interests elsewhere in the world.

Finally, in evaluating concerns about an excessive pre-occupation with NATO, we shouldn't lose sight of two important facts: Specifically, many of the improvements being made to NATO forces will improve our abilities to handle contingencies elsewhere. NATO forces, for example, are much closer to the Mid-East than forces located in the U.S. In addition, despite

the NATO emphasis, a great deal of money is being and will be spent on forces that are not directly tied to NATO. *continue to*

All of this, of course raises an obvious question, how does the Navy fit in? I don't know the answer. It isn't obvious, otherwise there wouldn't be so much controversy right now. Again, however, I would like to offer a few comments.

First, as far as helping out with the current primary emphasis, that is, improving the conventional balance in NATO, particularly on the Central Front, the answer wouldn't seem to lie with putting a lot of money into new ships, at least right now. It takes too long for them to pay off, and the air threat the Soviets can now or soon will be able to throw at us is going to be really severe close to the Warsaw Pact area. The ability of Naval forces to defend against really severe air threats is probably going to rise as AEGIS comes into the Fleet, as we deploy improved close-in air defense systems, and as we eventually move to build even more survivable ships using the sort of construction methods that were examined in the Sea Based Air Platform Study. But all of these solutions are rather long term, not the sort of thing that can solve our immediate problems in NATO.

In short, employing valuable naval forces close to NATO is looking like an increasingly risky option. The technology changes that might reduce the risk are going to be a little while in coming. This is not to say that there are no ways the Navy could increase its contribution to the solution of our

problems in this scenario. Marine forces can obviously contribute, and naval tactical aircraft could be used very effectively on the Central Front. Not only when provided from carrier decks deployed or immediately deployable when the war breaks out, but even aircraft whose carriers aren't ready to go might be made useful by buying and deploying ~~ships~~<sup>kits</sup> of support equipment that would allow them to operate from bases close to the front or perhaps to provide air defense for high value targets in NATO. The Air Force has nothing like the F-14-Phoenix system. Now, whether this latter idea is really feasible or not, I can't say at this point, but it does deserve looking into. For that matter, it would probably be easier to argue for more purchases of Naval tactical aircraft in the near term if these aircraft could be used in this flexible manner.

My second point with regard to the Navy is that there don't seem to be any irrevocable decisions in the offing. Navy funding will almost surely rise in the next few years in real terms, and the recent ~~size of your~~<sup>five year</sup> shipbuilding program, while certainly modest relative to recent expectations, involves no irrevocable decisions. We will continue to build attack submarines, Tridents, ~~an~~ AEGIS ship<sup>s</sup> of one type or another, amphibious ships, and carriers capable of handling either VSTOL or CTOL aircraft. While this five year program may point in a particular direction, it would take a succession of five-year programs to establish the Navy's course in the eighties and beyond. As far as carrier force levels are concerned, these probably won't

change in the near term either. Our commitments to the current policy of maintaining four carriers deployed overseas, would guarantee a force of 12 carriers at least for the next few years.

This leads me to my third point which is that the debate on the size, shape and missions of the Navy, while several years old, is probably going to continue for several years more. I've just received a copy of Sea Plan 2000 and the NSC is deep into its review of the Consolidated Guidance which says a lot of interesting things about Naval forces. I expect that our reviews of these two documents, as well as the Sea Based Air Platform Study, will eventually lead to some more very high discussions of some of the Navy issues that have been commented on here in this Forum. While the result will certainly be a further clarification of the participants' thinking on Naval issues, the question of where the Navy should be heading is going to require examination for a long time.

My fourth comment is that I believe the Navy can make a strong and powerful case. It has gone a long way already toward doing so, but I think more is possible <sup>for</sup> ~~if~~ its unique capabilities ~~are~~ to contribute to the President's stated interest in maintaining and developing rapidly deployable forces "to counter any threats to our allies and friends and our vital interests in Asia and <sup>the</sup> Middle East and other regions of the world." This case for contributing to the protection of our interests outside NATO would rest on the fact that the presence of Naval

forces can act as a powerful deterrent to action against our interests; The fact that extremely large percentages of the world's population and its GNP belong to nations with shores that the Navy can reach; <sup>and</sup> the fact that with the kind of crisis warning we can generally expect, Naval forces can be "fustest with the mostest" simply by virtue of the ease with which they can be moved to the vicinity of potential trouble spots and held in international waters until needed.

Well, that's basically what I had to say. I wrote a lot of it here while listening to previous talks. I hope you'll carry away several messages. One of them is that the Wake Forest speech is for real. The second is that, while there is no time to waste in solving our strategic forces problems, there's enough time to find and adopt the solutions that will stick. Third is that our interests in NATO are second to none and that's where the balance is most against us. It needs fixing right now, hence it has a high priority, but again that's right now. We hope the situation will improve there, and that will free funds for other needs. And last, while recent decisions seem to point the Navy in directions it must find troubling, nothing irrevocable has been done. If the Navy can build a good case, or a better case, or continue to improve its case, I'm sure that you can show, that all of us can show, the Navy can contribute to the President's strategy in ways that justify modernization and expansion of Naval capabilities.