

*Sr 3079
20 Oct 1969*

Dear Admiral,

Your acceptance of the invitation to speak to the Seapower Symposium on 19 November has given us real encouragement in this venture.

Enclosure (1) is a proposed conceptual framework of the address, which I am submitting for your comments and suggestions. I am also enclosing a copy of the brochure which has been sent to each Symposium invitee. Thirdly, I am enclosing the latest outline of Symposium events. As you can see, your address gives impetus to the ultimate thrust of the Symposium. That is, in view of the now emergent Soviet Maritime Threat and considering the apparent retrenchment of U.S. foreign involvement, future peace and stability depend in large measure upon the promotion of regional, naval cooperative measures among Free World nations.

Concurrently with this letter, we are soliciting comments from Champ Blouin and his Plans and Policy Division in OpNav. Thus, we will have available the current U.S. Navy positions on the matters to be discussed. I propose that, after receiving your comments and suggestions on enclosure (1), we respond with the draft for your approval. Once you are satisfied with the draft, I further propose to have a copy of the address placed at each Symposium participant's seat just prior to

his arrival for the address. This will assist in the language difficulties. Your idea of speaking for twenty to twenty-five minutes, followed by a question period, fits perfectly with my own concept.

Finally, to give you the latest information on your audience, I am adding enclosure (4), a list of the committed participants.

Prue joins me in the hope that Bobbie can be persuaded to join with you on the trip.

Sincerely,

Dick
Richard B. Colbert

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Enclosures:

- (1) Conceptual framework for address, "The Role of Naval Forces"
- (2) Brochure
- (3) Outline of events
- (4) List of Symposium participants

WRITTEN BY: CAPT TERRY (5:jlh) 15 October 1969

P.S. It was great to have you with us last night and today for lunch.

Dick

THE ROLE OF NAVAL FORCES

(Conceptual Framework)

1. Main Thrust.

The subject will be addressed from the standpoint of how naval forces can best be utilized in the future peacetime environment in order to assist in the maintenance of peace and stability. The speaker will take note of the strategic environment and the trends of the navies of the two super-powers (US and USSR), their strengths and weaknesses, and the strategic implications for other nations. Giving due recognition to political realities and constraints, the address should then delineate the alternatives available to the major powers and the attendant world-wide implications. It should then move to the main argument: that it is now a feasible and desirable option for free world navies to move further in the direction of multi-national, regional cooperative naval efforts and that these efforts should not necessarily involve directly the U.S. Navy. The feasibility of such a policy should be demonstrated by referring to the examples of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) and UNITAS operations. The principles of regional cooperative measures should be related to the provisions of the United Nations Charter. Finally, this policy should be related to what is beginning to emerge as a U. S. sea-based forward strategy.

2. Outline.

A. Introduction

- Brief discussion of the general relevance of all forms of military powers in preserving order and effecting change in the international system

- voices are increasingly questioning the role of force as a productive tool in the current world due to
 - == nature of weapons
 - == revolutionary character of forces for change
 - == imbalance in levels of development of nations
 - == mobility of populations
 - == growing limits to sovereignty
- the functional role of naval forces in the future, as it is addressed here, will not be substantially different than the classical role
- role addressed here does not pertain to the use of naval forces as vehicles for the delivery of strategic, nuclear weapons
- the role addressed here is the use of naval forces to
 - project power in order to influence events in support of either national or agreed multi-national aims
 - protect oceanic interests of nations or regional international organizations

B. The strategic environment of the 1970's; current trends and implications

- a brief description of the strategic environment in the near future
 - the nuclear weapons environment . . . the move towards parity between the super-powers, the prospect of nuclear proliferation, the emerging Chinese Communist nuclear capability . . . all of this promotes the urgency of solving local conflicts while keeping them localized and avoiding confrontations of the major powers
 - the nationalistic fragmentation of the so-called Communist Bloc, along with the application of the Brezhnev Doctrine in "buffer states."
 - the multiplicity of nations
 - the continuing ineffectiveness of the United Nations as a real force for stability
 - the continuing opportunities for "wars of national liberation" particularly in view of no clear-cut decision in Vietnam

- the trends of force structure in the USA and USSR navies, and the strategic implications
- the Soviet Navy continues to grow in capability and to change in its methods of deployment
 - == the Soviet submarine fleet is still the major concern; uniquely complementing torpedoes and ballistic missiles with guided cruise missiles; 12 per cent of the force can launch strategic missiles and 16 per cent carry cruise missiles . . . they have a relatively new ability to operate independently, over long distances, and for extended periods of time
 - == the new 18,000 ton missile equipped helicopter carrier Moskva represents not only new ASW capability but also provides limited capabilities for the projection of forces ashore
 - == in discussing the Soviet Navy, one cannot ignore the tactical significance of the events on October 22nd, 1967. On that day, Russian-made PT boats equipped with Russian-made surface-to-surface missiles attacked the Israeli 1,700 ton destroyer "Elath." The Israeli crew was superably trained and fully alert to the incoming missiles . . . there were four Styx missiles fired and four direct and fatal hits on Elath . . . this was the very first surface-to-surface missile attack on a combatant ship. It represents a significant tactical event for all the navies of the world
 - == the Soviet thrust into the Mediterranean has been spectacular especially since the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 . . . only last August, allied authorities reported an estimate of 65 Soviet warships in the Mediterranean
 - == since the six day war, the Soviets are using regularly the naval bases at Alexandria, at Mers-el-Kabir in Algeria, and at Latakia in Syria
 - == one can only speculate at this time what the intensity of the Soviet thrust southeastward will be, if the Suez canal is re-opened
- in short, in the last fifteen years, the Soviet Union has built a balanced, versatile and modern naval force which is second only to the U. S. Navy . . . related to this is the construction of mobile logistic forces designed for underway replenishment and advanced base support operations

- == only recently have we observed a Soviet capability to effectively sustain extended at-sea deployments of naval combatants . . . this somewhat diminishes the strategic significance historically given to the Soviet's restricted access to the sea
- it is important to note that the combatants and major logistic ships have been built in Russia . . . related to this is the recognized Soviet capability to build 20 to 30 nuclear submarines per year in covered shipyards which are immune to the eyes of reconnaissance satellites . . .
- another significant arm of the Soviet maritime capability is embodied in approximately 1,400 merchant ships totalling about 10.4 million tons . . . a significantly economic force and a potent vehicle for political-economic penetration
- all of these factors underscore certain realities which must be faced by maritime nations throughout the world
 - the Soviet Navy is formidable and a force which will be seen in all areas of the world
 - the Soviet naval strategy can no longer be described as defensively and coastally oriented but is taking on a globally oriented nature, both in force structure and in methods of sustained deployment
 - the Soviet Union, through its maritime strategy, has broken out of containment, in effect, has outflanked NATO, and it has the real capability to exert maritime presence throughout the world
 - the Soviet maritime strategy has a sound conceptual unity, being supported across the board by a modern and vigorous shipbuilding program
 - the Soviet maritime capabilities have opened up a vast new spectrum of opportunities for political-economic goals, . . . these goals are not new but the capability to effectively support them is . . .
- the force structure of the U. S. Navy is undergoing change
 - force cuts have been made recently but these cuts, forced by political realities, have not basically altered force balance
 - the effect of the cuts has been to retire ships which were already old

- this presents an opportunity to emphasize new programs
- there is a real reduction in capability . . . this reduction may be with us for some time to come
- the major striking power of the U. S. Navy has not been altered
- the future of the U. S. Navy rests on its projected ship-building program . . . the attainment of this program, given the political mood of the Congress, will be difficult but is a foreseeable goal
- many observers, official and otherwise, see a significant change occurring in the U.S. national strategy . . .
- but our military strategy remains in clear support of U.S. national commitments
- there are intense political pressures to force a major change in the national strategy
- very likely to emerge is a U. S. national strategy still supporting the vital commitments but more restrained in the direct use of U.S. military forces to support local governments on land

multi-national forces have a greater political and psychological impact than identically constituted national forces, while possessing essentially the same military capability

- this may auger well for a strategy more firmly planted on U. S. maritime power but if this is realized, that power will be subject to greater restraint by:
 - == political constraints based upon national priorities which look inward to internal problems
 - == the fact that no longer will the U. S. Navy makes its presence felt alone and without the accompanying presence of Soviet maritime power
- the changes in the maritime balance of power, combined with apparent strategic alterations, force all maritime nations to re-examine the alternatives presented to them

C. Alternatives presented to the free maritime nations of the world

- the alternatives we are concerned with concern the use (or role) of naval forces in the maintenance of future peace and stability

- the alternatives must be considered with full regard for the changing maritime balance between the two super-powers and with the assumption that most free maritime nations are now in far better position to assume greater roles in peacekeeping
- four basic alternatives to be considered in the future role of naval forces:
 - national naval forces and efforts
 - naval roles based on military alliances
 - integrated United Nations naval forces and naval measures
 - multi-national cooperative naval efforts based on regionally oriented, mutual interests
- national naval forces and efforts
 - among free world navies, this effort has depended heavily upon the direct involvement of the U.S.
 - while maintaining a guarantee of its treaty commitments, the U.S. will be less likely in the future to directly involve itself in the support of non-U.S. maritime interests
 - free world nations can and must do more on their own, but these efforts may be insufficient when attempted unilaterally
- naval efforts based upon military alliances
 - will continue to be effective but do not provide effective measures in many areas of the world
 - from the U.S. viewpoint, future military alliances will likely become more difficult to establish
 - alliances are usually oriented towards specific threats and become outdated, sometimes quickly
- UN naval forces in the maintenance of peace
 - the UN's organizational structure empirically has forced its use of military forces
 - == to be made up of neutral or neutralist forces
 - == to act after the fact in conflicts
 - == to perform in an observer role; to take passive measures
 - == to be closely controlled land forces

- lack of commonality of national interests forces an overwhelming inhibition in the structuring of integrated UN naval forces
- multi-national, regionally oriented naval cooperation
 - like all multi-national efforts, must take second priority to specific national interests . . . a fact of life . . .
 - more likely to succeed if based on regional, mutual interests; a real advantage over geographically broader based cooperation
 - multi-national, regional efforts offer real political advantages: (but, obviously, have the first requirement of mutual trust)
 - == limit the influence of super-powers in local matters
 - == demonstrate a substantive, mutual concern for stability
 - == can provide a base for further cooperation in economic matters
 - == are more apt to avoid cultural points of conflict
 - == multi-national forces have a greater political and psychological impact than identically constituted national forces, while preserving essentially the same military capability
 - the United Nations Charter fully endorses the basic concept of multi-national cooperative measures in support of regional concerns . . . this is compatible with the formation of regional naval efforts
 - from the evolving U.S. viewpoint, would likely gain far greater material support than those measures which necessarily involve the U. S. forces

D. The uniqueness of multi-national naval forces

- compared to army and air forces, are easily integrated into task forces
- commonality of training and experience exists among blue-water naval forces . . . a de facto fraternal bond, all sharing in the common hazards of the sea, regardless of nationality . . .
- the ship and her company, as the basic integral unit, maintains her national identity and therefore, is responsive to national policy and recall

- compared to other forces, the communications interface in command and control of a multi-national naval force is more easily defined and established . . . this has been demonstrated many times, and most notably by the NATO multi-national naval force, Standing Naval Force Atlantic, by SEATO naval exercises, and over a long period of time, by UNITAS operations.
- finally, naval forces, whether national or multi-national, can move quickly to an area of concern out of sight and without unwanted provocation of political sensitivities

E. Multi-national regional, naval operations

- can be extremely useful in common disaster recovery operations
- can, by increasing the number of forces available at one time, provide valuable professional training to ship's companies and commander's staffs
- can increase cultural contacts and exchanges through combined port visits
- can provide more efficient counter-insurgency coastal operations where adjoining littoral nations face a common threat
- can be the practical way to provide a basis for other methods of regional cooperation in promoting good will and enhancing stability

F. The Standing Naval Force Atlantic as an example of multi-national regional cooperation

- although many of the factual details and principles of operation of STANAVFORLANT are necessarily classified and within the purview of NATO authorities, certain principles can be logically inferred
- it demonstrates a regional, mutual concern of the nations participating in it . . . in this case, a concern for the Soviet threat
- it continues to show that multi-national naval units can operate together and can solve command and control problems
- by its existence, it illustrates that the participating nations are satisfied with the answers to questions regarding the reversion of units to their own national control
- it further shows and this is a crucial point, that the participating nations are satisfied that it will not be used in conflict with individual national interests

- it provides a means for showing, at sea, to the Soviet Navy itself the unity of the nations involved
- it utilizes destroyer types of ships . . . the type of ship most universally employed by maritime nations throughout the world

G. Conclusion.

- the maritime balance of power has changed and continues to change in favor of the Soviet Union
- the changing strategic viewpoint within the U.S. implies a continuing support of its alliance commitments with much greater caution in direct involvement in local conflicts . . . traditional recipients of U.S. aid will have to do more for themselves . . .
- the projected U.S. strategy will likely be one which is founded upon a sea-based forward strategy with less force ashore
- of the alternatives available for maritime nations to meet the Soviet maritime threat, the most promising one is the formation of regional naval forces which cooperate on the basis of regional mutual concerns . . . forces which do not necessarily involve U.S. naval forces . . . given the realities of U.S. economics and politics and the projected U.S. strategy, this alternative is the most practical and feasible one
- during the sessions that follow this address, I strongly urge all of you to give serious consideration to what I have suggested
 - after this Symposium concludes I would urge you to continue to assess the changing maritime strategic situation, how it affects the world as a whole, and your own country and local region in particular
 - the practical alternatives available are limited and the maritime challenge is real
 - there may be new, stimulating alternatives which I have not suggested . . . in any event, we all would do well to consider what can and must be done to preserve even the tenuous stability that we know now