



INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

RESUME
OF
FIRST AND SECOND SEAPOWER SYMPOSIA

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

RESUME OF FIRST SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

NOVEMBER 1969

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

MONDAY, 17 NOVEMBER 1969

Seminar Discussions, "Maritime Economic Interdependence," conducted by five committees organized on a regional basis.

Summary. Each committee considered not only the subject assigned but also the substance of the keynote address. In this summary as well as in the summaries of the meetings that followed, those points which reflect general consensus are outlined. Additionally, specific points made by particular committees, or by individuals who so requested, are identified as such.

There was consensus that the military, economic, political, and strategic aspects of the maritime situation are undergoing great change. There were some differences of opinion regarding the implications springing from those changes.

The Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic generally agreed that there had been a substantial growth in Soviet maritime power. There was less agreement on what this implied; whether it should be of equal and serious concern to all; or alternatively, whether it was just a response to Western actions. Concern was expressed that Soviet fishing efficiency is likely to drive other fishing nations from the sea. Suggested solutions were the subsidization of national fishing fleets, and fish farming, perhaps under broad international agreements. Not everyone, however, agreed that subsidization was a practical solution.

It was generally agreed that the aim of Soviet maritime expansion is not entirely limited to economic goals. It was emphasized that while it appeared one motive was to increase its political influence, the implications of Soviet military and economic policies must be addressed. For example the Warsaw Pact's naval forces, including the surface to surface missile capability, constitute a vivid, capable and present potential which has not been demonstrably offset by NATO capabilities. It was stated that there has been a NATO naval presence in the North Atlantic and Baltic area recently but that it may need to be made more visible. Finally, it was suggested that a guide to Western naval employment might be to maintain equally credible naval presences in areas of potential challenge. A collective approach to a Western naval presence, such as STANAVFORLANT (which has already been an effective demonstration of cooperative international effort) may provide a *model for other areas.*

The Committee on the Pacific voiced concern that there was a lack of popular understanding of Soviet maritime expansion and that the USSR was inserting its military and economic presence wherever there was tacit acceptance. Concern was expressed among the participants that despite the growing Soviet maritime presence, the development of their own navies had been given lower priority than the economic and social welfare and prosperity of their people and the attendant economic development of their countries, including the development of offshore resources. In assessing the very serious challenge to the vital sea lines of communication, both as an effective hot war strategy and, in situations short of war, as a strong threat potential with significant coercive power, some concern was expressed over the United States' willingness to meet international commitments in view of its own internal political developments.

The committee recognized that the prosperity of all the nations concerned is interdependent and cannot be individually isolated. It was pointed out that the potential maritime resources of nations must be identified and then safeguarded. Conservation must be practiced in order to prevent destruction of the resources. It was generally agreed that several nations have the capability to exploit the areas of contiguous fishing zones. This raised the point of how international law can be applied to the problem without compromising freedom of the seas. The committee then considered the concept and mechanics of an international exchange of maritime information among navies.

There was general consensus on the need for all peoples of all countries to be aware of the importance of the sea to their individual and national prosperity. This was considered a prerequisite to recognizing existing maritime problems affecting their prosperity and security.

The Committee on the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean agreed that the USSR has learned that it must have Seapower if it is to grow as a world power and that it is equipping itself accordingly. The Mediterranean was viewed as a particular "hot spot" because of the Arab-Israeli situation. There was general agreement that there is a real need for national Navy Leagues in each country, or similar organizations, to foster favorable public opinion for the need for Free World Navies. The committee agreed that nations of the region must act by agreement, consultation, and persuasion to:

1. Strengthen political links through regional agreements and stronger mutual economic arrangements.
2. Resolve regional differences.
3. Pool their resources to aid developing countries in a non-paternalistic fashion.

4. Build and carry out a common global maritime strategy.

5. Increase existing naval strength as forces in being through multinational forces and joint operations.

The Committee on the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific recognized that the Soviet Union is exerting effective influence as a sea power in the Mediterranean, Middle East and Africa. In Africa, they have registered successes above those previously obtained. Soviet maritime activity in the Persian Gulf is on the increase. In light of these increasing activities in the Indian Ocean area and the projected withdrawal of United Kingdom forces, it is important to determine the actual political motives and objectives involved.

All committees generally concurred with this committee that there is continuing difficulty of communicating with the general public on maritime problems and attendant solutions. The responsibility of naval officers to promote understanding was recognized as an important task in all navies.

Regarding maritime economic interdependence, there was strong consensus among all participants on the need for vigorous maritime economic interdependence; there was also strong consensus among all participants on the vital necessity to recognize the inherent advantages of free trade and free trade associations.

The Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific recognized the changes in maritime power but considered that the problem of generating regional economic cooperation was a more pressing first order of business for the countries represented in the committee. The position of Peru concerning a 200 mile maritime area was presented as a background for further discussions on the following day. The committee agreed that the area faces enormous maritime trade problems. This is primarily because the topography of Latin America makes overland commerce almost impossible and forces the nations of the area to behave as islands in their trading patterns. The greatest proportion of the area's external trade must be moved by waterborne transport. Since the area's commerce is dominated by flags external to the area, the countries concerned are experiencing an unacceptable drain of foreign exchange to support their essential external trade. In time, this situation also creates excessive dependence on other nations for the economic well-being of the Latin American countries. The solution to the problem lies in the development of stronger Latin American merchant marines. General approaches to the problem of developing stronger merchant marines were discussed, including;

1. The adoption of laws requiring a proportion of a

nation's cargoes to be carried in national bottoms. It was noted that Brazil, Peru and the Dominican Republic already have such laws.

2. The maximum use of regional organizations such as LAFTA and maritime trade agreements such as ALAMAR.

The difficulties of expanding the role of the local merchant marines include:

1. Capital availability.
2. Pressure by established private enterprises.
3. The possibility of the enactment of retaliatory laws by governments outside the area.
4. The increased probability of empty return trips for ships of countries that are minimizing imports as part of an economic development program.

TUESDAY, 18 NOVEMBER 1969

Seminar Discussions, "Freedom of the Seas," conducted by the five committees.

Summary. Each committee was provided with a U.S. Navy Judge Advocate General Corps expert on international law in order to assist, when desired by the committee, in the discussion of technicalities. Because the committees took differing approaches in their discussion, it is considered more proper to present the deliberations on this subject by individual summary.

Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific. General committee consensus was reached on the following points.

1. Expansion of territorial waters jurisdiction is urgently necessary to insure more thorough security control.

2. In meeting the urgent requirement to expand the present 3 mile territorial limit, another agreement will be required to provide for passage through international straits thus closed.

3. Jurisdictional expansion of coastal sea areas for exploitation of food resources need not interfere with freedom of the seas. There is no difference in philosophy between the U.S.-declared Continental Shelf Doctrine and the position of Peru, Ecuador and Chile in their 200 mile declarations.

4. Major world sea powers are main violators of "innocent passage" in that they conduct oceanographic surveys within territorial waters of small nations.

Committee on the Pacific. The following points were developed in the course of the discussion:

1. The concepts of territorial seas, contiguous zones, prohibited zones, exclusive usage and right of innocent passage were examined. There was substantial agreement that:

a. A territorial sea is required for security and that technological changes have made the width of territorial sea requirements an issue requiring international agreement. Consensus was that agreement could be reached on the width of the territorial seas and that width would probably be 12 miles.

b. Exploitation of the resources of the sea requires regulation and control. The different circumstances of each country make universal guidelines inapplicable; and the current lack of data about maximum exploitation allowable makes it difficult to establish finite limitations. The majority of the countries have entered into bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning fishing and other exploitation; however the problem of non-signatories and their actions or rights remain. The requirement for an organization, meeting in continuous session to establish acceptable and equitable distribution of resources and to provide a forum for settling disputes over regulations, was recognized.

c. The enforcement of regulations concerning exploitation, conservation, and pollution was discussed, and no clear answers were developed; but the desirability of a solution to the problem was recognized. This includes both the ability to enforce and the responsibility to enforce, including the problem of "responsibility to whom?"

d. The requirement for Naval participation in developing national positions for Law of the Seas conferences and political settlements was emphasized.

2. All the participants agreed that freedom of the seas must be preserved and the seas used for the benefit of all; and that agreement must be achieved for the common benefit of all relative to the rights of usage, passage, exploitation and security.

3. The split in the alternative concepts of innocent passage was discussed, and the "degree of innocence" was considered. A proposed definition was discussed, particularly addressing the issue of the innocent passage of a submerged submarine. The possibility of utilizing the Air Defense Identification Zone precedent regarding subsurface passage was considered; however, enforcement procedures were not considered.

4. The consideration of offshore oil exploitation in the Yellow and East China Seas highlighted the need for agreement, and the possibility of inimical interference in an orderly equitable development, unless such an agree-

ment were reached. Ideas on coastal state participation were considered.

5. One broad principle proposed for determining the validity of a country's claim is the consideration of that country's need for the resources involved and that an international forum such as the UN or World Court might be necessary to approve or support such a determination.

Committee on the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific. The seminar opened with a discussion about whether freedom of the seas is being threatened and whether an erosion of traditional law positions is evident with regard to straits, canals, and bays. The committee concurred that there were many problem areas of interest to all seafaring states. Members of the group then discussed various problems, outlined as follows:

1. The following areas of international law with regard to *innocent passage* need clarification:

a. When is a warship's passage innocent?

b. Is the right of notification legitimate and under what conditions?

c. Does the vague distinction between public and privately owned merchant vessels permit exploitation to advantage by some states?

2. The international law expert stated that:

a. States do not agree on the right of notification.

b. A state cannot use force to cause communications from a vessel transiting in innocent passage.

c. Navies often bring about changes to international law by bringing to the attention of their governments practical problems that need solution.

3. We need agreement on the territorial sea limit. Adherents to the various positions will have to compromise. At present the law is unfair and confusing.

4. Offshore oilwells and pipelines are creating new navigational problems with regard to risks to the installations. At present, laws applying to cables are being extended to pipe lines.

5. We need a convention on pollution to cover the increasing use of giant tankers and underwater pipelines.

6. Future laws concerning fishing should not be tied to the continental shelf.

a. Over-fishing by some nations threatens future harvests in traditionally rich fishing beds.

b. Future laws should apply to the fish regardless of where they migrate, for example, present agreements on whales.

c. Agreements on fishing are both necessary and obtainable.

Committee on the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. The discussion developed general consensus on the following points.

1. There must be laws and agreements that will provide free use of all seas and passages to maritime commerce and naval movements.

2. The growing importance of the seas and the changes in technology may suggest new laws. In developing any new laws, caution should be exercised to avoid any law that will erode already existing freedom of the seas.

3. While there may be disputes as to the limits of territorial water, it is better to have international agreements than to have international disagreements. Some compromise of a nation's self-interest should be made in favor of international interest.

4. Territorial seas should be as narrow as the vital interests of a coastal state will permit.

5. Any international rules dealing with freedom of the seas must be enforceable.

6. Coastal states must be free to determine their own rules in dealing with innocent passage, but should examine carefully their own international interests in doing so.

7. Additional points of discussion included the following:

a. The policing of fishing in the North Sea serves as a good example of an international agreement that has been effective for three-quarters of a century.

b. An interesting summary was given of the discussions now being carried on by the UN concerning prohibition of the placement of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor, free passage of vessels, fishing rights, and peaceful exploitation of the sea bed.

c. The question was raised concerning national reactions to:

(1) Electronic interference by ships operating outside of territorial waters.

(2) Exploitation of national resources immediately outside territorial waters by a second country.

Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic. The following ideas were developed during the seminar discussion:

1. Freedom of the seas is basic to any other use of the sea, but technological change is serving to erode some of the traditional freedoms. So far there has been no military challenge to the claim of 200 mile jurisdiction by Peru, Ecuador and Chile, and in the similar dispute between the United Kingdom and Iceland, the latter, with virtually no naval strength, carried the day for essentially diplomatic rather than military reasons. It was pointed out that with the passage of time, the failure to challenge a claim effectively tends to establish a *de facto* recognition of the claim. The only example mentioned of a deliberate challenge of an encroachment

upon international waters was the United Kingdom use of an aircraft carrier to challenge the Indonesian Archipelago claim some years ago.

2. Another problem area exists in the Arctic, where both the USSR and Canada have claimed sovereignty as far north as the North Pole. Norway has made an effort to maintain the international character of the Barents Sea by operating both ships and aircraft in the area. It was agreed that it is essential to separate the questions of innocent passage, which must be maintained, from that of fishing rights, which may require regulation in the interest of conservation of resources. The agreement on the development and control of the North Sea gas field was cited as an instance of successful area agreement, which might serve as a pattern for other agreements.

3. The problem of proper international institutions to handle questions of the law of the sea was discussed, but without agreement. The viewpoints expressed included: that there was a need for new institutions; that the institutions already existed under the UN, but needed to be revitalized; and that institutionalization would just set up another great bureaucracy which would achieve nothing at all. It was noted that in any such matters, the views of the Soviet Union would have to be taken into account, and that in some ways they would share Western concerns—as in the case of desiring free exit from the Baltic. Another suggestion was that it might be more profitable to consider some of the questions on a North Atlantic basis rather than a world basis, thus limiting the scope of the problems involved.

4. Another problem which may contribute to the erosion of freedom of the seas is that of protecting the area around a naval task force during periods of crisis. It was suggested that means of aviation area control such as the North American Air Defense System may serve as a precedent. Another view was that although the shooting may not have started, what was really being discussed was a situation of war and in that case, freedom of the seas went by the board.

5. It was stated that the pressures which had been discussed were not operating against freedom of the seas as a concept, but were operating to limit the size of the body of water to which such freedom is applicable, although the size of the oceans remaining is still immense. Finally, the importance was emphasized of navies maintaining contact with civilian leaders to make sure that maritime, naval points of view are given full consideration.

WEDNESDAY, 19 NOVEMBER 1969

Seminar Discussions, "The Role of Naval Forces," by the five committees.

Summary. All the committees reflected the general consensus stated by the **Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific** and the **Committee on the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific**; that is, regional cooperative naval operations and training are both feasible and desirable. The real limitations are those posed by political restrictions. The Standing Naval Force Atlantic and UNITAS operations provide excellent examples of such cooperative operations and exercises. Recognizing that political agreement is most difficult to achieve in attempting to establish multinational naval forces for any purpose, naval leaders should urge political leaders to recognize the great benefit to be achieved by navies operating together. The realization of cooperative exercises would best be accomplished through bilateral and multilateral agreements. Regional exercises need not involve large numbers of ships and could start with initial emphasis on communications and basic tactical training evolutions. Exercises also should include the cultural and psychological aspects of port visits. With the changing maritime situation, the use of naval forces, both national and multinational, as effective and essential tools of diplomacy will become even more important.

The **Committee on the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean** considered the following additional subject. In the Mediterranean, NATO has established an on-call multinational force. Two points of view on this force were expressed. One viewpoint was that the force would be more effective as a standing force because of its ability to confront potential enemy presence on a quick reaction basis with a force "*in-being*." The other point of view was that an *on-call* force would be more flexible since it could be organized as necessary to face the situation of the moment.

The **Committee on the Pacific** considered the following points during its discussion:

1. The rising costs of naval ships make standardization and reduced sophistication mandatory. The present practice of incremental change for sophistication and the loss of ruggedness and reliability adds to costs unnecessarily.

2. The centralization of control of the Soviet Russian Fleets (merchant/fishing/naval) was discussed and the

Norwegian pattern of informational exchange showed promise, without the inflexibility of the Soviet model.

3. The inhibitory effect of various United States' legislative amendments was pointed out. It is apparent that navies ought to work more closely with government leaders to resolve problems that have arisen in procurement and the interchange of information.

4. The concept of multinational consortiums to develop and produce ships and weapons systems has the most promise to reduce costs and standardize procurement. The establishment of consortiums can be evolutionary.

5. A freer exchange of information on developments is required on intra-naval matters between symposium participants to the end that individual national industries can provide mutual support.

6. The growing cost of ships and weapons systems forces a careful reappraisal of plans within individual navies. It is important to recognize that if seapower is to be utilized politically and militarily to its greatest extent, there must be recognition that navies are built to support political actions in a non-shooting environment as well as by military actions in war time. The many areas of interest throughout the world generate the demand for a large number of ships and for combined operations, despite budgetary limitations.

The discussion of the **Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic** dealt principally with the concept of a purely maritime "war at sea," based principally on covert attacks by submarines. The dependence on sea transport is not equal among possible contenders nor is access to the open sea. Interdiction of sea lines of communication could be particularly threatening. The questions which then arise are:

1. Is such a purely maritime war a realistic proposition; 2. if it happens, what would be the reactions of civilian populations and governments; 3. is the threat of nuclear war a credible deterrent to such a war; 4. if not, what avenues are open?

There was considerable discussion of whether or not such a war could generate a sufficient question of survival as to encourage the U.S., the U.K., France or the USSR to threaten nuclear war in retaliation.

Some members of the Committee did not believe that, in the situation described, the western nuclear powers would be willing to retaliate with nuclear weapons against shore targets. Some members felt also that both sides would feel sufficient uncertainty to cause them to hesitate to undertake a maritime war for fear of possible escalation. There was agreement that the best solution was to maintain adequate naval forces to meet sufficiently a threat in kind; and to be able to keep open sea lines of communication against attempts of interdic-

tion. It was suggested that a clear ability to keep these lines open would keep a war at sea from occurring. If the trend of increasing Warsaw Pact strength coupled with decreasing western strength continued, the situation would become dangerous.

Plenary Session, "The Role of Naval Forces."

Summary. Two major areas of concern were brought out by all committee representatives. First, there is clearly a shift in the balance of worldwide maritime power. Free nations must reassess their own policies in view of the changes in maritime strength. Second, new international agreements are necessary in order to preserve freedom of the seas. Important problem areas include agreements on the width of territorial seas, innocent passage, and the regulation of fishing and other commercial exploration of ocean resources.

One or more of the committee panelists emphasized the following points.

1. Regional naval exercises conducted on a bilateral and multilateral basis are necessary and feasible in the *Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean* area and in the *Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific* area. There is a need for regional multinational naval forces in these areas and in the Pacific.

2. The **North Atlantic and Baltic** committee suggested various responses to the increased Soviet fishing activity. These included greater organization in commercial farming of the sea, international regulatory agreements, and national subsidies of fishing enterprises.

3. There is a need for greater cooperation and pooling of resources among the various nations, especially in the area of naval ship construction. We need to find less expensive ways to build and maintain ships. The **Pacific** committee suggested establishing a multi-national consortium for shipbuilding.

4. The committee on the **South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific** pointed out that the three mile territorial sea limit is too narrow to permit interception of invaders and smugglers.

5. The committee on the **South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific** urged that UNITAS operations be expanded beyond the present emphasis on ASW. Further, it was stated that Latin American navies should be given a much greater role in the planning of UNITAS operations and that post-exercise evaluations should be given greater emphasis.

The plenary session continued with discussions centered upon the issues raised by the panelists and, in addition, the following points were covered.

1. The hard choices on force structure and balance, ship types and costs, and construction lead times were

discussed. The questions of equipment complexity and personnel manning levels were discussed in terms of the current trends and applicability to various navies and situations.

2. The question of new large, sophisticated, high cost destroyer types versus smaller, more rugged and reliable and lower cost ships, as espoused by Admiral Burke, generated a lively discussion. The consensus favored Admiral Burke's approach—which would not only provide ships within the economic means of the smaller navies but also would permit a larger number of ships in all navies.

3. The point was made that the United States needs to improve its ability to relate foreign military assistance more closely to the actual security needs of those allied and friendly countries which are receiving aid.

THURSDAY, 20 NOVEMBER 1969

Seminar Discussions, "Maritime Concepts for the Future," conducted by the five committees.

Summary. The seminar discussions centered generally upon the following subjects.

1. The protection of ships against the surface to surface missile was considered to be of grave importance to all navies. The concept of using manned aircraft to protect naval forces was considered valid only for those forces remaining under such an air umbrella. Also pointed out were the problems of naval forces not in company with a carrier task force, and the defensive problems of small navies. Various ways of coping with the SSM threat were discussed, including the use of decoys, ECM, surface to air missiles, submarines and mines. A point made strongly was that it was a mistake to concentrate so entirely upon defense against SSM's that offensive capability was lost.

The suggestion was made that in terms of open ocean capability, carriers were best, followed by missile firing helicopters, then surface to surface missiles on various types of ships. The systems under development in several countries were discussed. The trend seems to be toward use of helicopters and light aircraft firing missiles, and toward the development of missile equipped destroyers and fast patrol boats.

2. Another significant problem is that of surveillance, ranging from the protection of coastlines against infiltration, to the surveillance and exchange of information on global maritime activities. One committee made the point that the increasing capabilities of surveillance

satellites had a negative effect in that they reduced the ability of naval forces to use the vastness of the oceans for concealment. It was suggested that this increases the importance of having smaller ships in greater numbers.

3. Three of the five committees recognized as a growing problem the increasing difficulties of multi-national communications. Recent and rapid U.S. developments in communications technology were seen as placing inter-naval communications capabilities in jeopardy.

4. It was generally noted that most of the navies represented were sharing the same difficulties: rising costs, decreasing funds, and greater challenges. This situation, it was pointed out by one committee, bears directly on the two concerns of influencing national leaders and of making the hard decisions on force structure.

5. All of the committees recognized great value in this convocation and supported future Symposia. The recommended interval for such Symposia ranged from two to four years. In intervening years, regional Symposia could be held. Each region would propose agenda items and could submit papers for consideration and discussion by the major Seapower Symposium.

Plenary Session, "Maritime Concepts for the Future."

Summary. The five committee panelists outlined the subjects which are summarized from the preceding seminar discussion period. Additional points which were made include the following.

The Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic reported its discussion of the problems of cost and sophistication of modern naval vessels. The only solution suggested was specialization, both of navies and ships. It was recognized that there is no simple, inexpensive or unsophisticated way of countering a sophisticated threat, and there is a limit on the extent to which specialization is a practical solution for a small navy. The cost aspect appears to make it inevitable that many naval forces will be smaller. An alternative to smaller total numbers is smaller ships, but these must be specialized rather than general purpose.

The Committee on the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific emphasized the need for navies not only to cooperate but also to look each to its own national situation and regional requirements. A further point was made that there is a need for greater exchange of ideas on the perception of the changing maritime situation. A third point was made that navies should seek to promote

oceanography and controlled exploitation of the ocean resources where feasible. Finally, it was emphasized that larger navies must advise smaller navies of changes to equipment which affect their capabilities.

The Committee on the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, in addressing future roles of naval forces, suggested that in addition to the standard roles, national naval forces may be required to:

1. Supervise the maintenance of ecological balance in the oceans.

2. Take on a greater role in disaster recovery operations.

3. Assume a greater role of deploying strategic deterrent systems to sea.

The committee's report went on to outline the following problems which were considered important to the free maritime nations of the world.

1. The USSR will tend to use its military forces coercively, but without giving the appearance of a clear and immediate challenge, in order to take advantage of the political and economic gains that will accrue. The West's inability to find conceptual unity as to the challenge is one of our major problems. How do we achieve a common understanding of Soviet objectives in a particular situation?

2. There is a need for a coordinated free world military, economic, and political policy.

3. There is a lack of political structures for the establishment of multi-national naval forces outside of NATO.

The Committee on the Pacific reported consensus on the following points.

1. Regional combined exercises are necessary to maintain doctrine, training and proficiency. The Naval position should be that these exercises should be conducted at least annually, and more frequently if required.

2. In order to promote Naval cooperation, exercises on the high seas and exchanges of students, concepts, procedures, intelligence information, and tactics can be made even outside the framework of formal alliances. Inter-navy cooperation is vital.

3. There is a growing challenge to many of the nations that can be met only by increasing the numbers of ships, particularly patrol craft. The United States trend to multi-purpose, expensive, large, sophisticated ships is diverging from the requirements and needs of many other navies. This is a cause of serious concern as ships, tactics and doctrine cease to be compatible.

4. Mine warfare and Patrol are a concern and responsibility of many of the countries. The trend of the

United States away from these areas indicates that mutual help and exchange of information is necessary as mission requirements shift.

5. The need for a common, unsophisticated, ocean escort type for patrol and ASW as well as the common requirement for high speed patrol craft is recognized by the participants and requires further attention by all. The possibility for international cooperation to solve this problem should be examined more fully.

The Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific reported the following points of discussion.

1. The growing challenge of Soviet merchant fleet inroads in the area. The concept of freedom of the seas is helping the Soviet maritime expansion.

2. The immediate threat of communist subversion in the Caribbean Sea area.

3. The need for the United States to maintain strong hemispheric leadership.

4. The requirement for the naval forces of various countries to be appropriate to the national, local requirements.

The plenary session continued with discussions covering the following topics.

1. Regarding defense against the SSM and the development of a free world SSM capability, various approaches were discussed, including defensive concepts and systems already in being. The Swedish and German concepts of SSM weapon systems were aired. There was high interest expressed in the concept of applying low-cost SSM hardware to small, fast patrol craft.

2. The concept of limited war at sea involving major powers was discussed and, although the subject generated interest, there were widely varying opinions of the concept.

3. With regard to regional cooperative naval exercises, it was pointed out by several participants that bilateral exercises are being conducted in the South Atlantic area and that these have been very valuable. The point was made that these efforts can and should be expanded. The value of multi-national port visits was brought out. It was re-emphasized that communications equipment must be compatible and that all nations concerned in cooperative training efforts must participate fully in the planning and post-exercise evaluation phases.

4. Strong consensus was reiterated on the idea that there should be future Seapower Symposia, held every two, three or four years. Speaking on behalf of all the participants, the senior representative from the United Kingdom expressed high regard for the value of the Symposium and the appreciation of all the participants for the arrangements that had been made.

Sumarization and Closing Remarks, by Vice Admiral Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy, President, Naval War College:

"Gentlemen, as I said in my opening remarks, our goal during these four days together was to promote a mutual understanding of our common problems and interests and each other's problems and interests. It was our hope to provide a forum for discussion where each participant could discuss freely and openly all aspects of maritime affairs of interest—with the hope that this would broaden our individual and overall appreciation of these affairs.

"I feel that we have achieved this—and hope that you would agree.

"The experience of this conference has strongly confirmed what all of us already knew by instinct and experience: every speaker mentioned that the common aspects of so many of the problems we each face in operating at sea creates a strong fraternal bond. This unites all of us in "blue suits" who share similar professional concerns. We all recognize that there are political problems and interests which sometimes limit our cooperation. But it is equally clear that the broad interests of the world community we serve are enhanced by bringing our common perspective to bear on common problems. Much can be done on a Navy-to-Navy basis.

"The atmosphere of friendly cooperation which has prevailed among all participants has produced important dividends in the form of an interchange of ideas and thinking. This is in itself, I believe, ample justification for this gathering and meets completely the basic objectives of the symposium.

"But I believe that further objectives have been accomplished. Sparked by the major addresses given each day, several real insights have been generated by our discussions over these last four days—insights which could be meaningful for the future.

"Admiral Clarey's initial presentation set the stage admirably by showing how many questions of common concern existed, and how increasingly interdependent the free world maritime community has become. For example, there was much agreement that naval leaders must take a more active role in explaining the importance of maritime developments to the political leaders of our nations. There was also substantial agreement that the development of Soviet maritime capabilities is a subject requiring our most serious consideration and one of which the general public, in most of our nations, is relatively unaware. This is a subject which many of us seem to have emphasized, including our major speakers and the participants in both the committee and the plenary sessions.

"Admiral Holmes' address pointed to areas regarding

the law of the sea where progress in finding a common approach is required. A more exact definition of innocent passage, among other things, seems needed. Agreement on a particular width of territorial seas, though not crucial in itself, does seem important in relationship to continued free access by the navies and merchant ships of the world through international straits and channels. There was also a real consensus that pollution and conservation are topics which deserve our urgent attention.

“Admiral Burke’s presentation, especially because it dealt specifically with naval forces and their role, proved another high point in our deliberations. Many of the earlier committee discussions now seemed to focus more sharply, especially as we explored the desirability (and the difficulties) of increasing regional and subregional naval cooperation. A whole range of interesting thoughts emerged, as the plenary panel sessions yesterday and today clearly have revealed. Some of these ideas which appear in the eyes of most of us here to have merit include: First, maximizing the opportunities for exchanging naval visits on ceremonial occasions which lack political overtones and yet provide opportunities for some joint training. A second idea is that of increased bilateral exchanges and visits among nations not joined by existing multilateral arrangements. And third is the desirability of an increase in standardization of our doctrine and communication procedures which would facilitate joint training operations as these seem desirable.

“There is also the clear possibility that other more advanced forms of cooperation on the pattern of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic may ultimately prove useful as a means of handling certain of the regional problems, including peace-keeping problems in the spirit of Article 52 of the UN Charter.

“Out of the committee sessions this morning, there seems to have emerged still another topic of broad agreement. That is the need to devise some means of dealing with the threat to smaller navies posed by surface-to-surface missiles as well as the need to provide them an adequate and similar offensive capability.

“Admiral Moorer’s comments this morning were geared to a more general overview of naval problems and opportunities. Particularly interesting was his emphasis on the continuing importance of the smaller navies of the world, since in any future maritime conflict large fleet confrontations are highly unlikely. I have heard it observed repeatedly that his candor and clarity helped to crystallize many of the considerations which we have discussed.

“But, over and above the specific insights and concepts generated here, has been the opportunity we have had to exchange general ideas and thinking in a friendly, forthright, informal way—with our counterparts from thirty-seven different countries. Speaking personally, this has been an especially enlightening and stimulating experience for me. I hope the same is true for you.

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**RESUME OF SECOND SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM
NOVEMBER 1971**

**U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND**

MONDAY, 1 NOVEMBER 1971

The Committee on the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific reviewed Admiral Zumwalt's keynote address focusing on the Soviet Indian Ocean challenge and the Chinese People's Republic's influence in that area. Admiral Zumwalt highlighted ASW, secondarily noting gunfire and mining, specifically the Soviet fleet's significant mining capabilities. Also discussed were:

1. the opening of the Suez Canal, with emphasis on transits and the impact on world shipping rates once excess Soviet shipping became available,
2. the Ceylon Peace Plan, whether or not the Soviets would accept it, whether it would be of mutual benefit, and whether there would be problems on verification and legality,
3. RADM Chon's *Maritime Coalition* paper, calling for mutual maritime action,
4. questions of political limitations and constraints,
5. passing of surveillance information,
6. whether or not the concept of mutual operations involves use of each other's ports for logistics,
7. the issue of factors which inhibit maritime development, with particular emphasis on the economic factors,
8. developing countries' expenditures for hardware versus expenditures for training,
9. a need for synthetic training devices to reduce costs,
10. roles and missions of navies in the current maritime environment (roles have not changed as much as they have increased in depth and responsibility), and
11. a need to convince governments and the public of the maritime role.

The Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific discussed the major threat as being primarily based on an east-west orientation requiring a similarly oriented alliance system. The threat was viewed as the total naval power, economic base, and maritime commerce (including fisheries), which a nation can utilize. Economics became the basis for threat definition, while a navy's primary goal was seen as defense of home shores, waters, and trade routes. The most profound changes in navy roles were anticipated to be national although not necessarily equating to those of the United States. The observation was made that the growth of maritime power and naval strength is largely inhibited by internal developmental stress stemming in part from a lack of understanding in large segments of society of the role and value of the sea.

In the Committee on the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean there was general agreement with the keynote speaker that regional forums should be continued with the Naval War College acting as the central secretariat.

The North Atlantic and Baltic Seminar began with the discussion of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic/North Sea marginal seas, in the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. Generally it was agreed that:

1. Soviet force expansion makes peacetime surveillance and wartime control of the areas essential.
 2. The primary naval problem in meeting this threat was the lack of shipbuilding money.
 3. There is increased Soviet presence throughout the world, (there was less agreement on the purposes behind Soviet maritime buildup and naval operations).
 4. The aim of the small nation navies is the protection of their shores and close-in sea lines of communication.
 5. Worldwide protection of shipping including the provision of base facilities must be carried out principally by the larger navies in cooperation with local navies.
- There was some concern that Soviet operations might include actual aggression in the future to push western forces out of the Baltic and Norwegian Sea areas. Some changes in Soviet maritime expansion included:
1. long range amphibious capabilities, and
 2. new emphasis on hydrographic cooperation.

The Committee on the Pacific considered the formation of perhaps a sub-regional group, which would include representatives of military, industrial, shipbuilding and other maritime related institutions in their discussions. It was also suggested that:

1. selected naval exercises might be expanded to achieve some degree of combined training, but only after initial cooperation in academic discussions, and
 2. encouragement of greater use of officer exchange programs and exchanges of official visits between navies.
- Other discussion topics included:
1. Equipment/personnel constraints as obstacles in planning for the future.
 2. Lack of popular appreciation of naval missions.
 3. Soviet and bloc nations' economic threat through willingness to engage in commercial efforts to deprive the free world of its markets even at economic loss.

TUESDAY, 2 NOVEMBER 1971

The Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific Committee, in expanding on previous comments and Admiral Burke's remarks on personnel, politics, and economics, discussed:

1. General areas of training and synthetic training devices, including regional training centers and portable training vans to enhance the training status of the Indian Ocean coastal states.

2. Indian Ocean communication lines, particularly the economics of transporting by sea and pipeline.

3. Personnel problems, including:

- a. Levels of technical proficiency and training
- b. User/maintainer concepts
- c. Sea/shore rotation
- d. High people costs

4. Regional arrangements.

5. Foreign military aid/assistance under the Nixon Doctrine.

6. High cost of technology, research, and development in hardware and weapon systems.

7. The concept of the Free World Frigate (FWF) as a long term solution to mutual maritime problems.

Afternoon committee discussions centered around the briefing of the Free World Frigate and the need for such a ship in the Indian Ocean, specifically:

1. the minimum number of ships nations would buy,
2. costs,
3. cost effectiveness of alternatives, *e.g.*, hydrofoils, gunboats, PGs or waterskimmers,
4. a 50% subsidy program or long term leasing,
5. the concept of the Free World Frigate in association with a defensive regional entity like the standing naval force, and
6. necessity of familiarizing governments and peoples of the vital nature of the sea. The problem of/techniques for alerting the public of maritime force needs were addressed by Captain Delaney.

The Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific discussed Admiral Burke's speech, particularly:

1. The maintenance of naval personnel's spirit.
2. The necessity of convincing the public that their security depends on a strong navy.
3. Other navies' increasing role in the protection of free world lines of communication.

In the discussion of military aid it was repeatedly pointed out that the United States must continue to provide ship, educational, training, and technological assistance. Each country should receive aid according to

needs and ability to accept assistance, but countries should be aware of their responsibilities regarding the use of equipment/assistance in supporting the Nixon Doctrine.

4. The Free World Frigate, its practicality, construction, obsolescence, financing and final configuration in light of the perceived threat.

The Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Committee discussion centered on the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine as applied to the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Topics and ideas also noted and discussed:

1. National interest and commitments are neither easily defined nor commonly held.

2. Increased national naval capabilities are desirable and might lead to increase naval cooperation.

3. Training opportunities in naval services.

4. The Free World Frigate (evaluation of equipment interface problems).

5. Political difficulties.

6. Balance of payments considerations stemming from foreign component suppliers.

In the North Atlantic and Baltic Committee's seminar, the education of the public concerning the importance of the Navy's role in national security emerged as a topic of unanimous agreement. Other problems discussed included:

1. Education, emphasizing the need to improve communications with young people.

2. Trade union organizations' role in the military.

3. Multinational force desirability.

4. Ocean operations other than ASW.

5. Regional training centers.

6. Reduced numbers of effective but costly weapons systems (no conclusion as to whether increased cost was justified by comparable increased effectiveness).

7. The Free World Frigate:

a. Larger nations favored larger, more sophisticated, ASW oriented escorts.

b. Smaller nations favored less sophisticated, coastal defense, antiship oriented ships.

8. Priority of equipments (little common agreement; it was suggested that the best method of standardization might be for each nation to design its own hulls and standardize weapons suits).

The Committee on the Pacific in viewing the problems of today's navies, noted that each navy's task varies with the social/geopolitical realities of the country's world situation, and that economic constraints emphasize the need for development of adequate capabilities to meet specific threats. Seminar topics included:

1. The usefulness of a free exchange of technological data and expertise to maximize benefits of limited resources.
2. The common challenge to navies of obtaining resources, which in turn would result in a new era of naval interdependence.
3. The need for positive mental attitudes on the part of the citizenry.
4. The Free World Frigate
 - a. adequacy of technology,
 - b. projected operation areas,
 - c. constructing ships by consortium action,
 - d. prototype hull/propulsion plant for testing,
 - e. cost of \$40-50 million dollars, and
 - f. timing (interruption of present construction to pursue a common frigate)?

WEDNESDAY, 3 NOVEMBER 1971

The Committee on the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific reviewed its deliberations for presentation to the plenary panel including mutually vital naval interests which might enhance the evolution of maritime coalitions in the Indian Ocean and the south-west Pacific. Discussion continued on:

1. The Concepts of the Free World Frigate and its operational implications (operating in a maritime coalition).
2. The Suez Canal (opening would be of economic benefit to all, but especially the Soviets; strategically the canal appeared better closed).
3. Countries outside the region which interact with nations on the periphery.
4. Establishment of a maritime college of the Pacific with curricula addressing regional maritime strategy, sea control, and defense (as an approach to mutual maritime cooperation).

The South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific Committee discussions during the third day were, generally, a continuation of the first two seminar sessions. The most significant point in relation to the topic "The Maritime World and Navy Role" was that Latin America has extensive sea lines of communications and a slowly growing maritime fleet. As this fleet increases, naval protection of sea lines becomes critical in view of the limited capability of Latin American nations to buy or build oceangoing naval units.

Within the Committee on the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, an exchange of views ensued concerning:

1. navy roles, as described in the keynote address, including traditional humanitarian roles, felt to be a common denominator,
2. implications of withdrawal of the navies of the two superpowers from the Mediterranean, and the resultant Soviet Navy advantage stemming from the proximity of its own ports to that area,
3. interpretation of the law of the sea resulting from such a withdrawal, and
4. advantages and disadvantages of multinational forces.

The Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic discussed:

1. The need for increased presence of free world navies in the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic to counter the growing Soviet presence.
2. The need for a definite purpose for the operations of ships in the area (without a specific objective, deployment of forces solely to maintain a presence may not be worthwhile).
3. Future ship replacement.
4. Lack of agreement that protection of lines of communication is the primary task of all navies.
5. Priority of protection of LOC's and ASW in the task of supplying oil to Europe.
6. Lack of coastal nation authority to deal with mass destruction weapons in the seabed beyond territorial waters.
7. 1973 International Law of the Sea Conference.
8. The economical and military insufficiency of smaller nations to meet security threats and their dependence for assistance upon the superpowers.
9. International exercises as a means of improved mutual assistance.
10. Recommended operational requirements for naval warships of 1985-90.
11. The expense involved in R&D and the need for mutual cooperation.
12. Greater contingency military capabilities in merchant vessels.

THURSDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 1971

Following the remarks by VADM J.B.M.J. Maas, Royal Netherlands Navy, four papers were presented dealing with:

1. the rise of the Chinese Communist Navy as a threat,
 2. problems regarding smaller countries' navies,
 3. seapower in the Mediterranean, and
 4. regional committee recommendations
- followed by an address by U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. Under Secretary of State, on "Our Mutual Interdependence."

The Committee on the Indian Ocean and the South-West Pacific took up the review of work done in the first session two years ago. Comments and discussion followed regarding:

1. Territorial sea limits.
2. Naval responsibility to advise government leadership regarding consequences of their political actions, at the Conference on the Sea in 1973.
3. Secretary Johnson's points on seabeds and resources, fishing rights, and navigation.
4. Cooperation and competition in a maritime environment. (All vigorously agreed cooperative effort complemented competitive effort to increase maritime efficiency and security.)
5. Two basic new ship types:
 - a. technically simple, inexpensive vessels designed to counteract smuggling, infiltration and subversion, and
 - b. a more sophisticated, oceangoing, ASW vessel.

The Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific devoted its discussion to maritime cooperation.

1. Areas wherein cooperation could be expanded:
 - a. expansion of multinational ship training exercises,
 - b. increase in port visits, and
 - c. greater War College exchange of students and lecturers.
2. Regional conferences to complement the Seapower Symposium.
3. Desire to increase effectiveness of Latin American shipping to enhance competitiveness.

The Committee on Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean considered the problem of determining a suitable location for a regional meeting during 1972, and topics which should be discussed at that meeting. The topics were listed in the following day's presentation to the plenary session.

The Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic concerned themselves with the forthcoming Conference on the Law of the Sea and specified bilateral arrange-

ments which govern passage through straits, perceptions of territorial water extensions, and military implications of changes in the law of the sea.

The Committee on the Pacific heard a paper titled: "Issues in Regard to Cooperation of the Navies in the Pacific Area," which presented a Japanese opinion of how international maritime cooperation might be pursued and the international ramifications of the Japanese political process. Discussion of the paper and other topics of the day engendered agreement on several items:

1. Freedom of the sea is of primary importance and therefore each free world navy should share the burden of insuring that freedom.
2. The common challenge of sea control and improvement of regional/sub-regional cooperation, emphasizing the need to exchange data.
3. The adverse influence of some industrial and trade practices on the efficiency of maritime activity.
4. Cooperative naval definition of defense system requirements and related R&D efforts.
5. Recommendation that naval positions on the international concept of regional organization be fully developed before the United Nations Committee of 33.
6. Regional/extra regional naval cooperation.

FRIDAY, 5 NOVEMBER 1971

The Committee on the Indian Ocean and South-Western Pacific was addressed by Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, U.S. Navy, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, with a summary of the week's deliberations. Admiral Cousins pointed out that:

1. The committee's diverse views focused on mutual concern and cooperation with considerable agreement in most cases.
2. Smaller free world countries, though concerned with areas of naval operations different from the larger countries, nevertheless found room for agreement.
3. There was mutual agreement that Soviet intentions aimed at:
 - a. improving strategic posture,
 - b. replacing the United Kingdom as the dominant power in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf,
 - c. ensuring access to certain raw materials, and
 - d. exercising control of sea routes between eastern and western portions of the Soviet Union.

Comments on the Free World Frigate (FWF), the Suez Canal, the Ceylon Peace Plan, and finally a discussion of Admiral Burke's remarks completed the committee's discussions.

The Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific pointed up items of common ground; conclusions included the opinions that:

1. weak naval powers approximate a level of technology which equates to that held immediately after World War II,

2. developing nations have reduced capacity to fund sophisticated weapons systems, and

3. any war in the North Atlantic and Western Pacific would affect the committee's region.

Of the two alternatives for the future proposed by the keynote speaker, a world of cooperation or a world of anarchy, the committee suggested the highest priority as primary objective of the free world should be attached to the former. In this pursuit, the central country in the alliance is the United States. Soviet naval power, maritime power, merchant fleet, and fishing ship resources were all perceived as having expanded greatly. Additionally there was the belief that latent hostility exists between Russia and China. Also the committee considered that the free world is not exempt from conflict, but necessary maturity exists for pacific settlement. Finally there was further discussion of the law of the sea in oceanic alliances, and economic cooperation among the free world countries.

Presentations of Committees on Eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean noted unanimous agreement to respond to Naval War College initiatives to pursue regional meetings and training opportunities engendered by such meetings. Free World Frigate discussions were summarized. Topics of regional discussion were tabled, including:

1. the mutual exchange of ship locations to enhance

safety at sea, preserve property, and dispose of survivors,

2. the ecological policing of areas of common national interest.

3. meteorological information exchange, and

4. scientific oceanographic information exchange.

The Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic reviewed the keynote speech,

1. Soviet fleet buildup.

2. Marginal sea expansion.

3. Small nations naval missions.

4. The Free World Frigate role.

5. 1973 Conference of the Law of the Sea discussion topics, and

6. Education of the public to the importance of naval roles in national security.

The Committee on the Pacific recommended that free world navies frequently meet on a regional or sub-regional basis on matters of common interest. Other points were:

1. exchange and visit programs as a means of

- a. enhancing maritime cooperation, and

- b. meeting the challenge of communist influence

in the free world.

2. varying economical, social, and geopolitical problems faced by navies.

3. Free World Frigate

- a. limited concept (prototype hull and propulsion system),

- b. financing,

- c. role in fulfilling naval needs of the 1990's, and

- d. operational weapons suits.

4. Utilization of more flexible merchant vessels in military contingencies.

The Second International Seapower Symposium concluded with remarks by Admiral Zumwalt and Admiral Sir Horace Law.

