

Second International Seapower Symposium



1-5 November 1971

U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.






## FOREWORD

The "official" events of the Second International Seapower Symposium are now history. However, all who took part in those events will agree that the concept of increasing our mutual understanding through meeting in an academic forum is far from being past history; indeed, it is history in the making.

This brochure is dedicated to you who participated in the Second Symposium. It is a chronological record of the sequence of events, including the summary of committee discussions as approved by each committee for use in this brochure. Individual remarks and papers presented in Plenary Sessions have been reproduced with the permission of the author or as agreed upon during the committee sessions.

We at the United States Naval War College hope that the memories it evokes will be pleasant and lasting ones and that the Second Symposium is only another in a long line of such gatherings, which will broaden in the future and expand the accomplishments of their predecessors.



B.J. SEMMES, JR.  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy  
President, Naval War College





Admiral  
Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.  
U.S. Navy

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Chief of Naval Operations

## MONDAY, 1 NOVEMBER 1971

0900-0915—*Welcoming Remarks* by Vice Admiral Benedict J. Semmes, Jr., U.S. Navy, President, Naval War College.

0915-1015—*Briefing on Challenges at Sea*, by Captain Arthur F. Newell, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired), Staff, Naval War College.

1030-1115—*Keynote Address*, "Reality and Opportunity," by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations.

1130-1215—*Regional Committee Meeting* (for organizational purposes). Committee Chairmen, for each of the five seminar periods, were selected by a drawing of numbers. Each committee also selected a participant to represent the region on the Symposium Steering Committee, which conducted the Plenary Sessions.

1430-1700—*Seminar Discussions*. "The Era of Change and Challenge," conducted by the five committees organized on a regional basis.

*Scope:* To examine the present patterns and trends in the current maritime environment with particular emphasis given to the changes that have taken place since the first Seapower Symposium.

**The Committee on the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific. Committee Chairman: Vice Admiral L.D. EMPSON, Royal Navy.**

The committee reviewed the significant trends and opportunities developed in Admiral ZUMWALT's keynote address and applied its focus to the Soviet challenge in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the Chinese People's Republic (CPR) challenge was discussed to a lesser extent. When considering the Soviet challenge, the scenario developed saw the Soviets moving into smaller states by offering financial aid, technical assistance and political support backed up with an increasing naval presence. Considered in light of the vital sea lanes, principally the oil transporting lanes, this challenge represents a significant threat.

It was noted Admiral ZUMWALT's comments

highlighted ASW. Two additional significant areas for emphasis were considered: (a) gunfire, and (b) mining.

A mining campaign would create havoc in the Persian Gulf or Malacca Straits. These types of operations could also be conducted by the CPR. Damage to a supertanker or new supercargo ship would require months to clear and the effect on the oil requirements of Europe and Japan could be disastrous as would be the loss of a huge cargo. That the Soviet Fleet has a significant mining capability was noted, as well as the many other options not available to land forces.

The situation of the Suez Canal was discussed. It was noted that Soviet Indian Ocean presence requires the support of approximately 25% of the Soviet merchant fleet, due to the extra distances which must be transited with the canal closed. Several questions were raised regarding the canal if opened: Would allied nations send warships through? Would allied nations be allowed through? What would be the impact on world shipping rates once excess Soviet shipping became available?

The Ceylon Peace Plan was discussed. It raised certain questions worthy of further attention:

Would the Soviets accept it?—Would it be to their benefit?

How would it be verified—particularly in the case of submarines?

Is the declaration, in fact possible/legal?

What would become of the indigenous navies?

Can they continue to exist?

If not, who controls piracy?

Rear Admiral CHON's *Maritime Coalition* paper, presenting a concept, not a plan, was introduced and discussed. The Coalition concept calls for cooperation and mutual action in the maritime sense, rather than the political. It might be characterized first as bilateral agreements, later as multinational, interlocking arrangements, certainly within the context of Art. 52 of the UN Charter. Cases were cited in which mutual maritime cooperative arrangements, such as

joint patrol agreements are now in effect. There are some political constraints that are inherent in the constitutions of some of the potential partners. These do not preclude, however, assistance in the economic area, for example. Navy-to-navy cooperation in anti-smuggling, surveillance and piracy are areas for agreement—not necessarily in the sense of bilateral treaty arrangements. Such a network might also function as a deterrent. There may be, however, a problem inherent in cooperation as opposed to definite steps toward mutual security. In the area of exchange of maritime intelligence as an operating element of the Coalition, a fundamental factor was identified, that being a Coalition communications network. Several interesting questions were addressed:

(1) Are there political limitations (constraints) to the passing of surveillance information?

(2) Does this concept of mutual cooperation involve the use of each others ports/bases for logistics, particularly when in doing so one could extend his radius of operations?

The issue was raised regarding factors inhibiting maritime development which were considered to be principally economic: given limited resources, how should a developing country invest them between two alternatives such as (a) hardware or (b) training. A delicate balance would result depending on the security needs developed within the country. A need was expressed for greater use and availability of synthetic training devices to reduce travel and out of country costs.

The committee addressed their roles and missions in light of the current maritime environment through the medium of change. It was noted that the roles have not so much changed as they have increased in depth and breadth of responsibility, generally based on an evolutionary rate of change. A significant need surfaced, that being the need to convince/persuade governments and publics of the maritime role. A convincing argument might be to consider the effect of a threat to vital shipments of oil by interdiction of the communications lines in the Indian Ocean.

**The Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific. Committee Chairman: Rear Admiral Enrique DOMINGUEZ Garcia, Venezuelan Navy.**

The first discussion period covered several topics which are summarized below:

The major threat, whether bipolar or multipolar, is primarily based on an east-west orientation thus requiring a similarly oriented alliance system to the benefit of all. In this light, Latin American nations must of necessity look to outside assistance for the development of their navies so as to fulfill their alliance commitments. The threat is viewed as the sum total of naval power, economic base, maritime commerce, and fisheries which a nation can utilize and which must be countered. Economics, therefore, become the basis for threat definition and a nation's navy's primary goal is to defend her shores, waters, and trade routes against foreign incursions. The value of these economic assets determines the seriousness of the threat. Economic policies however are but a prelude to military threat and represent a less belligerent, but equally important, confrontation.

The navy role has changed as a result of the Soviet submarine threat but, generally speaking, the most profound changes today are internal to the individual country. Naval forces of Latin America are increasingly engaged in projects which are designed to assist national, political and economic goals. The role in regard to foreign alliances is static yet the future will bring changes as capabilities of fulfilling treaty commitments are considered. The postulated threat exists in economic form now but in time of crisis it will take a naval form and consist of submarine attack against lines of communication and possible missile attacks against South American land targets.

National and maritime roles are being fulfilled by the navies of the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific within their capabilities. National interests, as viewed today, do not necessarily equate to those of the United States.

The growth of maritime power, and in particular naval strength, is inhibited by several factors. Foremost is the stress on internal development which





stems in part from a lack of understanding in large segments of society of the role and value of the sea and the political value of more visible domestic projects. Lack of economic support for navies is closely allied to technological capabilities. Public opinion and political support also tend to be focused on internal matters vice external, maritime affairs.

**The Committee on the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Committee Chairman: Rear Admiral A.R. GELINET, French Navy.**

There was general agreement with the keynote speaker that a continuing forum for the exchange of views within a regional grouping should be established. To this end, most agreed: that the Naval War College could act as the Seapower Symposium Central Secretariat for this committee, and through the avenue of correspondence with the members of this region should solicit the endorsement of the idea by nations of the region and ask for volunteers to come forth and act as informal secretary to the remaining members.

Once implemented, this regional secretary, which would rotate, would be the agency through which papers and correspondence are distributed concerning the following:

- (a) agenda items for the next International Seapower Symposium;
- (b) the study of problems of internaval cooperation;
- (c) the coordination of requests for regional meetings; and
- (d) common maritime problems to be brought to the attention of all participants.

In proposing the establishment of such a regional secretariat, the original letter clearly should state that it is not intended to form or establish a supranational organization.

In addition, general discussion continued regarding the various views and opinions as to the nature and degree of the Soviet maritime challenge and of other portions of the keynote speech.



**The Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic. Committee Chairman: Vice Admiral Heinz KUEHNLE, Federal German Navy.**

The seminar began with a discussion of the growing threat of the Soviet navy in the Baltic/North Sea marginal seas, in the Norwegian Sea and the North Atlantic. It was generally agreed that this expansion of Soviet force makes peacetime surveillance and wartime control of the focal points in these areas (the marginal seas) essential. Suggestions on how to counter this threat included: increased surveillance of the Soviet navy, presence of a credible deterrent capability, maintenance of a ready response capability, and coordinated efforts through regional organizations such as NATO or a Standing Naval Force concept. It was generally agreed that the primary problem for each nation is the lack of money for shipbuilding and the primary problem for any coordinated effort is of a political and command structure nature.

It was generally agreed that the Soviets are continuing to show the flag with more regularity and in more different areas throughout the world. There was less agreement on the overall purposes behind the increased Soviet maritime buildup and naval operations. Concern was expressed by some that the recent Soviet exercises might be scenarios for actual aggression in the future. Some members felt the increased operations of the Soviet navy are aimed toward pushing the forces of the Western nations out of the Baltic and Norwegian Sea areas. It was noted that the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. gap could be a barrier as well as a gateway to the Norwegian Sea.

Some of the changes in the Soviet maritime expansion since the last symposium include a limited long range amphibious capability and new emphasis toward hydrographic cooperation. It was noted that the changing balance of the maritime forces is due not only to the Soviet shipbuilding effort, but also to the lack of shipbuilding by Western nations and to the dramatic change in confidence and willingness of the Soviets to exploit their maritime power.

It was generally agreed that the aim of the small

navy nations is the protection of their shores and their close-in sea lines of communication. The worldwide protection of shipping must be carried out principally by the larger navies in cooperation with local navies including the provision of base facilities.

It was generally agreed that a limited confrontation between two powers at sea could exist without expanding into large scale action unless there was an absolute threat to a nation's national interest.

**The Committee on the Pacific. Committee Chairman: Commodore A.G. McFARLANE, Royal Australian Navy.**

All navies agree in general principle that a regional or subregional committee can be formed for academic discussion of matters of common interest. For the Pacific area, perhaps subregional groups should be the beginning. (Japan, South Korea, Republic of China; Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia; and South American navies plus the United States (UNITAS) are examples of such subregional groupings.) Representatives of related military, industrial departments and organizations such as maritime unions, shipbuilding concerns, fishing, oceanographic and maritime research organization, and selected industrial concerns as are involved in producing missiles, aircraft, weapons, naval vessels, etc., should also be invited to participate in these discussions. Each regional committee meeting should be preceded by an agenda for discussion. Areas of consideration should not include questions of policy, at least initially, because of the political considerations involved. It was also suggested that scheduled naval exercises might be expanded by invitation to achieve some degree of combined training and exercising of doctrine. The UNITAS Exercises and their utility in testing and developing doctrine and concepts were specifically mentioned as most useful.

Only after initial cooperation has been achieved in academic symposia discussions should regionally planned exercises be attempted.

Greater use of exchange programs between navies, where younger officers would serve in ships on an exchange basis, ought to be explored and encouraged.

In considering the threat to our navies an evaluation of the capabilities and intentions of the Chinese communists must also be made. Although the short-range threat may be principally from the Soviet navy, the Chinese communists have embarked on an extensive program to build a maritime capability of international scope. In 10-20 years this force will be of significant international threat and this potential should be considered in today's planning.


In considering the challenge to our navies, one is necessarily limited by the equipment and personnel constraints of the 70's. Nonetheless, the committee noted that the doctrine and tactics developed in meeting the threat of the 70's will certainly influence the thinking and the developmental programs of the 80's. This fact should therefore influence considerations in selling the navy's program to the political powers and the populace of the various nations.

The economic threat from the Soviet Union in the maritime area is noted by the committee. The Soviet Union and bloc nations are willing to carry out their maritime commercial efforts at an economic loss, if necessary, to deprive the Free World of its markets and depress its shipping industry. To counter this threat we must build more efficiency into our maritime trade relations and look toward regional organizations in establishing maritime arrangements that can compete with the Soviets.

The lack of general appreciation of the Soviet threat to sea lanes of communication continues to be noted within the Free World. Although some slight improvement may be noted in the past two years, this area remains a vast desert of ignorance on the part of the general populace.

Exchanges of visits between friendly navies should be continued and expanded as possible. These visits are very useful in establishing friendly relations and in demonstrating to the Communist World a spirit of cooperation and joint assistance in the Free World.











**Admiral**  
**Arleigh A. Burke**  
**U.S. Navy (Retired)**

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**Former U.S. Chief of Naval Operations**  
**(August 1955-August 1961)**

## TUESDAY, 2 NOVEMBER 1971

0900-1000—*Address*, “Problems, Solved and Unsolved,” by Admiral Arleigh Burke, U.S. Navy (Retired), The Center for International and Strategic Studies, Georgetown University.

1015-1230—*Seminar Discussions*. “Problems, Solved and Unsolved,”—Regional Committees.

*Scope*: To develop the themes set forth by the speaker. The discussions should seek to identify major common problems and promising solutions.

**The Committee on the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific. Committee Chairman: Vice Admiral CHING Chullasukhum, Royal Thai Navy.**

The committee expanded on some comments generated in the previous session with regard to the general area of training and synthetic training devices. The formation of regional training centers and use of portable training vans offer an economical, efficient method of enhancing the training status of Indian Ocean coastal states. Discussion continued on the significance of oil and the Indian Ocean communications lines with greater depth in the economics of transport both by sea and pipeline. Investigation of the inherent capabilities and weakness of each system included comments ranging from the political difficulties encountered in pipelines and their repair to modular ASW protection packages for tankers.

Admiral BURKE’s remarks regarding problems solved and unsolved generated high interest. Discussion centered around problems related to three critical topics: (1) personnel, (2) politics, and (3) economics.

*Personnel problems* included the levels of technical proficiency and training, user/maintainer concepts, sea/shore rotation and the high costs involved in people as a commodity. Suggested solutions, based on

some minimum, irreducible number of people included user only concepts, reduction of number of crew on ships, careful study of wartime manning requirements, automation.

*Political problems* encompassed closer looks at regional arrangements and the effects of U.S. congressional actions with regard to foreign military aid and assistance programs, within the context of the Nixon Doctrine. A need for the understanding of the mission of Third World navies is important as well as the need for mutual cooperation in regional arrangements. For smaller countries to take an active regional role, assistance would be required to increase their capability and ability, such as by transfer of more modern ships and aircraft from the U.S. To this end countries whose vital interests were manifested in a region, although not physically located athwart the sea communications lines, could join together with the regional maritime association. Nations which have a vital interest in the Indian Ocean Area could be identified by a determination of who receives the oil and cargoes, and under which flag the cargo sails. The effect here would be an active demonstration of the interest of the concerned nation.

*Economic problems* included the high cost of technology and research and development in the hardware and weapon systems necessary for defensive forces in the Indian Ocean but consistent with individual and mutual national goals. Hardware costs themselves are prohibitive and emphasis on Admiral BURKE’s comments regarding foreign military assistance programs was made. The “hot ship” transfer program was discussed as meeting the immediate needs of the less developed nations as well as the problems of availability (assured) of spare parts and repairs. In the regard of repairs note was made of the current state of shipyards.

The concept of the Free World Frigate (FWF) as a long term solution to mutual maritime problems was discussed, particularly in light of a 50% subsidy or 30-year long term leasing programs for assistance in attaining force levels.

**The Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific. Committee Chairman: Rear Admiral Daniel ARELLANO, Chilean Navy.**

During the second discussion period the committee discussed the speech given by Admiral BURKE at great length. In the opinion of the group Admiral BURKE had touched on precisely the points which they consider to be vital in regard to the future of their individual navies. The priorities listed by Admiral BURKE were the maintenance of the spirit of naval personnel, the necessity of convincing the public that their security depends on a strong navy, and that other navies have an increasing role in the protection of free world lines of communication.

The point was repeatedly stressed that in the realm of military aid, the U.S. must continue to provide assistance not only in the form of ships but also in the realms of education, training and technology. The point was stressed that the development of a navy was keyed to the overall economic base of the country which includes the economic resources of the sea. Technological aid in sea development would increase the visibility of naval requirements. The impact of the development of shipyards on supporting industry was injected by mention of the examples of Brazil and Argentina. This was cited as an example of the type of development that not only has the obvious economic benefits but also increases the public awareness of naval power and its requirements. The point was made that each country should receive aid according to its needs and its ability to use and maintain these naval assets and further, that countries should be aware of the responsibilities regarding the use of this equipment in supporting the Nixon Doctrine under which a significant task has been levied upon Free World navies requiring mutual cooperation in the maintenance of open sea lines of communication.

**The Committee on the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Committee Chairman: Rear Admiral Otto CRAMWINCKEL, Royal Netherlands Navy.**

Discussion centered on the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine as it applies to the area. It was pointed out that national interests and commitments are not necessarily held in common in the area and that nations may not perceive the Nixon Doctrine in the same light. However, all agreed that increased national naval capabilities are desirable. This perceived need for increased national naval capabilities which might lead to increased naval cooperation, resulted in a dialogue concerning practical naval matters that face all nations in common.

Within the sphere of practical matters it was felt that the word "exercise" connotes bilateral arrangements, yet there is a regional awareness of the need for training opportunities. Thus most agreed:

- (a) that training services should be provided for all to be accepted on a voluntary basis,
- (b) that training services are to provide fundamental and basic training opportunities (air, gunnery, and submarine) and are to be conducted from fleet anchorages in international waters, and
- (c) that provision of a tender for repair assistance is desirable.

As a corollary subject, the complexity of ship weapon systems and their cost brought the discussion to a close.

**The Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic. Committee Chairman: Vice Admiral Henry A. PORTER, Canadian Forces.**

It was unanimously agreed that a problem exists in the education of the public concerning the importance of the navy's role in national security. It was generally agreed that some of the causes of this problem include: the attention the news media gives to military failures; the inability of navy officers to deal effectively with the news media; the lack of a threat to national security in many nations since World War II; the antimilitary attitude of post World War II educators; and, the misconception that a global war will result in a nuclear strategic exchange





thus eliminating the requirement for a navy.

There was general agreement on how to attack this problem of education. These ideas included: emphasizing successful operations; seeking all opportunities to talk to the public; admitting our failures to the news media; training officers to deal effectively and harmoniously with the news media; use of visits and cruises aboard warships, particularly for young people; use of naval vessels with suitable publicity, in humanitarian efforts such as rescue at sea and antipollution patrol; formation of regional groups to bring to bear the influence of outside opinion on national leaders; and, emphasizing the importance of the navy in limited conflicts.

Concerning the need for maintaining the spirit of naval personnel in the changing world, it was generally agreed that a primary problem was one of communication with the new breed of young people. It was emphasized that there must be a communication of ideas both up and down the entire chain of command.

There was less agreement on the role of trade union type organizations in the military system. Some nations who already have unionization of the military felt that labor unions can be used effectively if carefully controlled. Other members felt that there was no place in the military for unions.

It was generally agreed that a multinational force is desirable. It was pointed out that consideration must be given to other types of operations besides that of ASW on the high seas. This would include emphasis on coastal defense operations. In discussing the possibility of the Standing Naval Force participating in submarine surveillance to augment presently limited ASW training, it was considered that this was a matter for SACLANT to arrange.

It was suggested that regional schools should be utilized for common training, within the constraints imposed by the language problem.

The question of reduced numbers of weapon rounds carried in modern ships was discussed with the opinion being expressed that the newer, more effec-

tive weapons might permit more "salvoes" to be fired at individual targets than was the case previously. The dramatic increase in the cost of these new weapons was also discussed but with no conclusion as to whether this increased cost was justified by comparable increased effectiveness.

**The Committee on the Pacific. Committee Chairman: Commander D.B. DOMETT, Royal New Zealand Navy.**

In viewing the problems facing today's navies, the committee noted that each navy's task varies with the social and geopolitical realities of the country's world situation. Although certain navies might desire a full sea control capability, economic constraints force the navy in many instances to emphasize the development of that particular capability which she conceives as most adequate to meet her specific maritime threat. The committee recognized the usefulness of a free exchange of technological data and professional expertise on a regional basis when aiming at maximizing the benefits to be achieved from the limited pool of men and materials available.

The committee notes that the communist threat exists during peacetime as well as wartime. Although the threat may be more easily identified during a hot war, the dangers of infiltration and counterinsurgency, for example, are just as real during the cold war. Infiltration is countered by land forces; however, the ingress routes of infiltration may be by sea, and therefore, the prevention of infiltration is a significant naval problem.

The situation within the individual navy may vary significantly, but each navy is faced with a common challenge of obtaining sufficient resources to carry out its national mission. In meeting this challenge the committee recognized a new era of naval interdependence in which the question is one of both resources for the control of the seas as well as technological cooperation in achieving this control. During the period of transition to the realities of this new era, a

positive mental attitude on the part of the citizenry is very significant. In this regard the committee noted the importance of programs aimed at countering the threat of communist intellectual infiltration. Unless the Soviet intellectual threat is met head on and the populace is convinced of the realities of the situation, the Free World may well find itself in a position where the communists can close down Free World sea lanes of communication simply by threat without ever having fired a shot in intimidation.

1430-1600—*Free World Frigate Briefing*, by Captain Andre J.P. Schlim, Belgian Navy, Captain Paul H. Fischer, Federal German Navy, and Commander Eric E. Johnston, Royal Australian Navy. They were three of the five members at the Naval Command College Class of 1971, who developed the study at the U.S. Naval War College.

*Scope:* To explain the concept and rationale used in developing a low cost small naval ship to be constructed by a consortium of users.

1615-1730—*Seminar Discussions*. "The Concept of the Free World Frigate"—Regional Committees.

*Scope:* To examine the viability and feasibility of this pilot effort and to investigate other areas of specific items that would lend themselves to this type of investigation.

**The Committee on the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific. Committee Chairman: Captain Benjamin TANEDO, Philippine Navy.**

Discussion opened with several interesting questions being raised in terms of the existence of a need for the FWF in the Indian Ocean:

Is there a study showing the optimum number required for surveillance of the oil communications lines?

What is the minimum number of ships that a nation would buy?

The smaller countries addressed the problem of prohibitive cost in terms of national needs, where hydrofoil, gunboats, PGs or water-skimmers might more cost-effectively meet their needs. However, a program of 50% subsidy or long term leasing would

be grounds for alternate considerations. A feasibility study of the basic design and the development of a prototype would be necessary precursors for a final decision by any country interested in the FWF.

The concept of the FWF is subtly associated with the idea of a defensive regional entity not necessarily rigidly structured, but not unlike a standing naval force, where a common need exists to protect the mutually vital sea lanes. In this context, in the long term, interested nations not on the periphery could provide economic assistance (through subsidies or foreign military aid or through long term leasing of FWFs) to accomplish the common mission and concurrently increase the sophistication of the indigenous navy's capability in regional as well as national commitments. To this end there is a need for familiarizing governments and peoples of the vital nature of the sea. All naval officers have an obligation to make known their nation's interest in the maritime area.

Captain Delaney (consultant) addressed the problem and techniques for alerting the public at large to the need, uses and national dependency on the sea through a basic educational program utilizing such mass media as television or broadcasting.

**The Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific. Committee Chairman: Rear Admiral Marco A. MALDONADO Mino, Ecuadorian Navy.**

Discussions regarding the Free World Frigate were highlighted by the general consideration that the initial study was a valid academic effort but that the practicality of the concept had not been fully tested by technically qualified people and thus could not be endorsed more than in the most general of terms. The point was raised that there is a general need for such a ship but that each country would have to determine the final configuration in light of the threat as perceived by that nation. The precise answer to the acceptability of the Free World Frigate hinges on the cost factors and the equipment desired, by nation. Further study regarding the concept is merited.





Regarding the construction of the ships by a consortium the point was raised that this relates probably not to the actual construction but to a coordinated order for specific numbers of units. In this regard, the construction could possibly be accomplished by individual nations or consigned to other countries, depending on the shipyard capabilities of the nations involved.

An issue which merits further thought regarding the frigate is that of obsolescence by the time the first ship reaches the navies of the Free World. It was mentioned that most ships are built with some capacity for modernization and that this would probably be the case for this ship.

In regard to the financing of the Free World Frigate, it was pointed out that considerable financial assistance would be required in defraying part of the high cost of any such venture due to the inability of the nations to finance the quantities of ships required for their navies.

**The Committee on the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Committee Chairman: Commander Bechir JEDIDI, Tunisian Navy.**

As a follow-on to the Free World Frigate presentation most agreed that the concept was a good point of departure, yet it was the general opinion that a more concrete analysis and an evaluation of the problems of interface of equipment is necessary before a decision could be made as to the feasibility of this new weapon system.

It was also realized that some countries would have difficulty accepting such a project politically because of the necessity to depend on many foreign component suppliers, and because of balance of payment considerations and industrial problems.

It was proposed, subject to the future concurrence of the member nations present, that a regional meeting be held during the summer of 1972. Subject to such a concurrence, an actual estimate of the frigate's feasibility and cost, as developed by volunteering committee members, will, *inter alia*, appear on the agenda.



**The Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic. Committee Chairman: Admiral Sir Horace LAW, Royal Navy.**

There were two different views concerning the primary role of a Free World Frigate. The larger nations seemed to favor a larger, more sophisticated escort with ASW as the primary role. Some of the nations closely bordering Russia seemed to favor a smaller, less sophisticated ship with coastal defense and antiship capability as the primary role. There was general skepticism that all of the proposed equipment could be fitted in a ship of the size and cost stated in the briefing.

Concerning the ASW configuration, attempts were made to establish priorities of equipment to be installed in order to remain within a limited cost and size. There seemed to be no common agreement as to what the complete weapon suit should be. Most members agreed on the requirement of hull-mounted sonar. There was less agreement on requirements for VDS, helicopters, and ASW delivery systems. It was suggested that for coastal ASW work, shore-based helicopters might be a satisfactory substitute for ship-based helicopters, provided the ship was capable of in-flight refueling of the helicopter.

Most members agreed that there should be surface to surface capabilities as well as an air defense capability. It was also generally agreed that addition of all such sophisticated weapons systems would result in too great a cost and weight. It was noted that an ASW helicopter could also provide an antisurface capability against soft targets as well as a limited anti-ship missile defense capability.

It was pointed out that one nation was building a ship of the Free World Frigate size, but felt it would be unable to fit the proposed FWF weapon system and propulsion system at the suggested price for the Free World Frigate.

It was apparent that even in similar areas of operation, individual nations viewed their requirements differently. Some members indicated that, given budgetary constraints, they would build a

smaller vessel than the Free World Frigate. It was also noted by one member that the Dealey class hull is rather small for effective North Atlantic operations.

It was suggested that the best method of standardization might be for each nation to design their own hulls and standardize in the weapons and electronic systems. It was unanimously agreed that there still exist many difficulties in implementing any standardization program due to the problems of national interest, balance of payment, labor unions, etc. However, it was noted that there has been some buying of foreign equipment generally based on bilateral arrangements with compensating offset agreements included.

The committee agreed that within the limits of its technical competence, the study group had done a commendable job developing the concept of a Free World Frigate. They have helped particularly in developing a catalogue of weapon systems which would be useful in developing such allied weapon systems standardization.

**The Committee on the Pacific. Committee Chairman: Vice Admiral Kenichi KITAMURA, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force.**

The committee agreed that the concept of the Free World Frigate was feasible and that a need existed for a ship with capabilities similar to those proposed in the concept. The adequacy of the technology reflected, however, was the subject of question since the committee considered that the projected area of operation and use of the ship would in each instance influence the equipment makeup. Unacceptable obsolescence of equipment was not considered to be a problem which could not be planned around; however, certain committee members noted that the equipment proposed was of western manufacture and that procurement of parts and replacements might be of significant difficulty in the Far East.

The possibility of constructing the ship by consortium action was considered doubtful. It was

suggested that a combined group might successfully design such a ship and possibly build a prototype hull and propulsion plant for testing. The political realities of this suggestion were not examined. The cost of the fully-equipped ship was not estimated; however, the \$25M cost noted by the student committee was considered unrealistically low by most of the committee members. A cost of \$40M-\$50M was considered more probable. It was suggested that a well-designed ship might perhaps have some acceptability on a regional basis in certain cases, and further consideration of the regional approach to design and funding was suggested.

The critical aspect of timing was noted. Many nations are already engaged in developing a replacement ship with similar capabilities. The practicality of interrupting these design actions for a study of the common frigate was seriously questioned by certain committee members.











## WEDNESDAY, 3 NOVEMBER 1971

0900-1200—*Seminar Discussions*. “The Maritime World and the Navy Role”—Regional Committees.

*Scope:* To discuss papers previously submitted or developed in committee, in order to decide upon those to be submitted to the Inter-regional Steering Committee.

**The Committee on the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific. Committee Chairman: Rear Admiral L.G. CARR, Royal New Zealand Navy.**

The committee reviewed its deliberations for presentation to the plenary panel: In the Indian Ocean/Southwest Pacific Area there are mutual vital interests at the navy-to-navy level which will lend themselves to an evolution of a maritime coalition not unlike a multinational interlocking arrangement leading perhaps to a multinational standing naval group. One or more of the regional countries, acting as a catalyst or *motive center* is needed to bind together the network in mutual cooperation to defend vital regional communications lines and interests, while concurrently allowing freedom of action to pursue national interests. Nations not peripheral to the region with vital interests within the region should be prepared to assist. The Millar Study (T.B. Millar, *Soviet Policies in the Indian Ocean Area*, Canberra Papers on Strategy on Defence, No. 7) provides insight into possible Soviet threats to the regional political and economic stability.

Discussion continued on the concept of the FWF with greater illumination on the problems inherent in the plan. Notwithstanding the lack of a gun, there is a difficulty in ship design based on dissimilar requirements of mutually supporting, independently operating navies. Assuming a relatively inexpensive basic 2000T hull, it seems the greatest costs would be

involved with fitting in optional or tailored weapons and electronics packages. There would be additional shore support costs which would add greatly to overall costs. As a result, navies, of smaller countries, rather than achieve the goal of an expansion in size, would in essence modernize at fairly high capital investments, providing capabilities more toward regional security than along national interest lines.

The operational implications of the FWF concept operating in a maritime coalition subtly suggest a multinational force, perhaps not unlike a standing naval group, operating in defense of mutual regional concerns. Justifying the costs of the force by regional nations, or justifying subsidies by nations with a vital interest to develop the program will be admittedly politically difficult. But the effort is necessary in light of the threat. A consortium for mutual defense and protection of sea lanes may offer a mechanism to accomplish the goal.

A digression on the Suez Canal suggested that the opening of the Canal would be to the economic benefit of all, especially the Soviets. However, from a strategic point of view, in regard to Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean, the Canal is better closed.

The committee reflected on countries not in the region which interact with nations on the periphery. Even though the interaction is not direct, it can be nonetheless vital.

As innovative thoughts for mutual cooperation the establishment of a Maritime College of the Pacific with a curriculum addressing regional maritime strategy, sea control and defense was suggested. It would offer a forum for naval officers and possibly political leadership to exchange in the academic environment, concepts and opinions. The cost of operation would not be so great as the return. It could serve as a documentary center for Indian Ocean studies, located at the fulcrum of the region, perhaps Thailand, Indonesia or the Philippines. The committee saw no reason this College could not be afloat. Similarly the exchange of lecture or technical teams between naval colleges could be encouraged within the region.

**The Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific. Committee Chairman: Vice Admiral J. PARRA, Colombian Navy.**

Discussions during the third day were, generally, a continuation of the first two seminar sessions. The most significant point in relation to the topic "The Maritime World and Navy Role" was that Latin America has extensive sea lines of communications and a slowly growing maritime fleet. As this fleet increases, naval protection of sea lines of communications becomes critical in view of the limited capability of Latin American nations to buy or build oceangoing naval units.

**The Committee on the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Committee Chairman: Vice Admiral Constantine MARGARITIS, Hellenic Navy.**

There was committee agreement that papers by Greece and Italy be presented in plenary session.

An exchange of views ensued concerning the roles of navies as described in the keynote address. The traditional humanitarian role was also brought forth and was felt to be a common denominator of all navies.

The discussion was expanded to consider the implications should the two superpowers retire from the Mediterranean. It was pointed out that this would give the Soviet Navy an unequal advantage because of the proximity of its own ports to the area. Similarly it was stated that the more extreme interpretations of the law of the sea may result in the same effect.

Views on the advantages and disadvantages of organizing multinational forces were freely debated. The debate centered on the political implications and operational considerations of such organizations.

It was agreed that the committee deliberations thus far should be presented at the first plenary session in order to stimulate discussion among other committees and to elicit responses as to the progress made by other committees.

**The Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic. Committee Chairman: Rear Admiral Hans S. SKJONG, Royal Norwegian Navy.**

There was discussion on the need for the increased presence of the Free World navies in the Norwegian Sea-North Atlantic area to counter the growing Soviet presence. Some members felt that the Soviet's action is directed toward gaining recognition of an extended marginal sea and that this must be countered to maintain the concept of freedom of the seas. Some members felt that there is a definite need for overt surveillance to emphasize our concern over their presence. Conversely, it was stated that there should be a definite purpose for the operation of our ships in the area, and that without a specific objective, deployment of forces solely to maintain a presence is not worthwhile.

It was generally agreed that claims of provocative operations tend to be a "one-way street" with the Soviets protesting other navies operating near her coasts while Soviet naval presence is accepted near our coasts. It was also noted that the Soviet's claims of provocation appear to be directed more toward a multinational presence than toward an individual nation.

It was suggested that growing costs may preclude future replacement of ships by smaller nations and that a possible solution is standardization, perhaps funded by a common financial system similar to procedures used for the NATO infrastructure. It was agreed that this is a worthwhile endeavor but will be difficult to accomplish.

It was generally agreed that an interim regional symposium should meet prior to the next international symposium. This symposium would be devoted to the common professional interests of naval officers, and the agenda could include: review of the previous international symposium; plans for the next international symposium; proposals for common economical ship construction; international law problems such as fishing rights and exploitation of sea-bed resources; anti-pollution efforts; and, joint rescue-at-





sea procedures.

It was suggested by one member that perhaps an underlying difficulty throughout the seminars has been that not all members agree that protection of lines of communication is the primary task of all the nations' navies. It was noted by another member that, while protection of LOCs may not always receive the highest national priority, there must be high priority given to ASW in the alliances, because of the potential threat of submarines to the oil supply of Europe. Additionally, protection of LOCs could be considered a port-to-port operation which includes mine operations and coastal defense, an operation too great for any one nation. Because of the scope and diversity of the problem, there are appropriate areas where each nation can share the burden.

The committee discussed the lack of authority of a coastal nation to carry out any sort of enforcement of the prohibition against the installation of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed beyond its territorial waters. It was suggested that the outcome of the 1973 International Law of the Sea Conference may offer a solution to this problem, although enforcement of such agreements as may result from the conference may place increased requirements on navies, possibly including an international naval police organization to protect ships. It was generally agreed that one nation would unilaterally help another if piracy were involved.

It was suggested by one member that the Soviets do not have an unlimited economy and that the Free World does have the capability to restrain the Soviet navy if we recognize a real threat and if we have the necessary will.

**The Committee on the Pacific. Committee Chairman: Commodore M. ROMLY, Indonesian Navy.**

The committee directed that the following items be presented for consideration for the Plenary Sessions of the Symposium:

(a) Summary of Findings,

(b) the paper, "The Chinese Communist Challenge at Sea," and


(c) the paper, "ROK Anti-Infiltration Operations."

It was noted that many smaller countries were neither economically nor militarily sufficient to meet all threats to their security and well-being. Their security, of necessity, depended upon the superpowers for assistance. Within this context, therefore, the committee noted that regional cooperation with extraregional assistance by the superpowers was most important. Although such assistance may in many instances require political negotiation, cooperation among navies can also be useful. The lasting benefits of UNITAS cooperation between the United States and South American Navies was cited as an example. The recommended starting point for most exercise cooperation is through bilateral invitations to participate in upcoming exercises. Certain members of the committee noted that if a small initial effort could be established, it might be further developed through greater civilian understanding and support. It was noted, however, that seapower and politics are closely interrelated and that national policy should be developed only on that basis.

It was recommended that the operational requirements for naval warships of the 1985-90 time-frame be closely analyzed to ascertain exactly what their role might be. Some concern was voiced that the ship of the future could be so burdened down with defensive support systems that it might lose its ability to fight. Possible solutions include: satellite defenses; a submarine with a surface capability; the Japanese seaplane and the possibility of aircraft fitted with air-cushioned landing gear; hovercraft, hydrofoil, and semi-submersibles. It was also noted that an effective sea-control capability in the future would be inextricably tied to an effective, long-range surveillance system. The committee noted the expense involved in developing such sea-control systems and recommended maximizing the exchange of R & D data wherever possible to preclude "reinventing the wheel."

It was recommended that a greater contingency military capability be built into merchant vessels. Particularly useful would be a helo platform on each new vessel. This would serve a very useful search and rescue function during peacetime, as well as providing for wartime contingencies. Further, since there are not sufficient supply ships and oilers for wartime, a similar contingency underway replenishment capability on these types of ships would be very useful.

The committee recognized the complexities of dealing with the many nations' requirements at sea and noted the competing interests operable within each nation. Since compromise and negotiation will certainly be the order of the upcoming Conference on the Law of the Sea, it was recommended that each navy study the local complexities of its country's position in relation to its defense requirements, in order to make its position known to the civilian representatives at the International Conference.









Honorable  
U. Alexis Johnson

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Under Secretary for Political Affairs  
Department of State

## THURSDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 1971

0900-1030—Plenary Session, "Maritime Cooperation."

*Moderator:* Rear Admiral G. Tahler, USNR, Deputy to the President, Naval War College.

*Scope:* This session permitted participants to present papers chosen from each committee of the Symposium, and to promulgate other papers as determined by the Inter-regional Steering Committee.

*The following remarks were made by Vice Admiral J.B.M.J. MAAS, Royal Netherlands Navy:*

"Thank you—Mr. President—for giving me a few minutes to say some things.

"Gentlemen—you will forgive me for estimating that one flag officer costs his country something in the order of 10 dollarcents, every minute of the clock. If I would now calculate what it costs your collective nations to listen to me, I get funny feelings, and I promise, therefore—Admiral Semmes—to be short.

"This Symposium is one of the most stimulating experiences I have ever had. The free and constructive exchange of views, the friendliness, and the faith in each other's good intentions displayed by all, is exceptional and is something that few other gatherings can match.

"*This confirms my belief that the sea is a great unifying factor.* That perhaps the fact that the sea belongs to all mankind, and yet is no one's property, is what we so much cherish, and want to preserve.

"If this is the aim of our discussions, we still have a lot to talk about, and I am sure that we would like to have more frequent gatherings like this one. But you will agree that we cannot ask nor expect the U.S. Navy to do yet more than what is being done.

"Now, at the previous Symposium the thought was expressed to have intermediate regional Symposia. I would like to follow that thought up.

"I would suggest to you, that if all mankind lived in utter peace, so that the very thought of war would enter into the minds of no one, there would still be great activity at sea.

"There would be fishing, and a great flow of goods in ships. This would require legislation, research, hydrographic survey, and it would be necessary to ensure that all maritime activities could proceed in harmony and safety, and would not harm human and animal life.

"In fact, even in the absence of any kind of threat in the military sense, there would still be something that resembles Navies.

"I therefore suggest, that a regional Symposium, which examines international cooperation in maritime matters, does not primarily have a military flavour.

"With this in mind, I would like to extend, on behalf of the Dutch Navy, an invitation to those countries represented here, that belong to the Baltic, the Norwegian Sea, and the North Sea areas, for a maritime Symposium in Holland in the autumn of 1972.

"They could examine their maritime interest, and the trend of development in pursuit thereof. They could take the opportunity of such a gathering to examine in the academic spirit of the Dutch Naval Staff College factors that may become, or are already, detrimental to their interest, and harmful to human and animal existence. What is, and is not being done about it. Where in these matters they are interdependent, and what has been done, and can yet be done in recognition of interdependence. How the unhampered flow of international shipping can be promoted, preserved and ensured.

"To my country, this latter subject is of vital importance. The amount of seaborne freight, handled in the Netherlands per annum is over 15 tons per head of the population. More than 85% of it is carried in ships, that do not fly the Dutch flag. These two factors combined, are probably unique in the world. It is a truly international pattern.



"I therefore thought, that in such an international climate, a regional Symposium could be held, and I would like to ask my colleagues of Belgium, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom to recommend participation by their Navies. If it is felt that full participation would be difficult, observers would be welcome.

"I would also ask other nations, represented here, who feel vitally interested in this region to attend in an observer's capacity.

"I sincerely hope, that these thoughts may be shared and that the invitation may be acceptable.

"Thank you Admiral Semmes."

The following papers were presented:

"The Rise of the Chinese Communist Navy as a Threat" by Admiral SOONG, Chang-chih, Chinese Navy.

"Problems of the Small Countries' Navies" by Vice Admiral Constantine MARGARITIS, Hellenic Navy.

"Seapower and the Mediterranean" by Rear Admiral Gino DE GIORGI, Italian Navy.

"Regional Committee Recommendations" by Admiral SUDOMO, Indonesian Navy.

1100-1200—Address, "Our Mutual Interdependence," by U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State.

1430-1500—Plenary Session. A continuation of the morning session to permit the presentation of a paper by Captain YI, Su-yong, Republic of Korea Navy.

1515-1700—Seminar Discussions. "Maritime Cooperation"—Regional Committees.

Scope: To examine critically the record of cooperative effort and to examine the areas whereby more effective progress can be achieved.

**The Committee on the Indian Ocean and South-west Pacific. Committee Chairman: Vice Admiral J.B.M.J. MAAS, Royal Netherlands Navy.**

The committee reviewed the work of the first session, two years ago. General agreement was reached regarding the points they had made and with regard to symposia the suggestion that the major symposium be held every two years, with regional symposia held during the intervening years, held wide acceptance. The President, U.S. Naval War College, was requested to organize the responses to regional symposia. In the case of our committee, responses were suggested, with regard to hosting the interim meeting, by 15 January 1972. Admiral ZUMWALT offered the services of CINCPACFLT in the event difficulties were encountered in obtaining a regional host. It was noted that the concepts developed at the previous symposia were not so different in substance today, but perhaps there was a subtle shift in emphasis. A recapitulation of the major points to which our panel representative might respond were addressed. Comments on the Suez Canal included detailed thoughts on the consequences of its opening and remarks on dredging operations in terms of the operational aspects of opening.

Comments on territorial sea limits were reiterated. A point of central agreement was that we have a responsibility to our governmental leadership to inform them of the consequences of their political actions at the forthcoming Conference on the Sea in 1973, with regard to restricted waters and straits, innocent passage, and narrow or broad limits. Secretary JOHNSON's interesting points were endorsed to separate specific issues such as, but not limited to, treaties on: (a) seabeds and resources, (b) fishing rights, and (c) navigation. This approach could well lead to separate limits for separate purposes.

Discussion of the agenda items centered on cooperation and competition in the total of maritime environment and maritime activity. In this context there may have been a reversal of terms in western Europe today: What was competitive is now co-





operative, e.g.,—on the basis of ports, the more prosperous one is today, so it is with the others. It was noted maritime activity in the larger sense also included national legislation. Where maritime laws are contrary to friends' interests cooperation is certainly needed. All vigorously agreed cooperative effort complemented competitive effort to increase maritime efficiency and security. It was suggested that an important aspect of cooperation was the "library" or encyclopedia function for transfer of facilities, techniques, research, training, etc.

Discussing a regional symposium, all members agreed that the primary object of those present would be to formulate distinct subjects for cooperation, preferably by all, or by some, or on a bilateral or trilateral basis.

Finally, some nations made it known that other requirements for new ships lay in two basic types as follows:

- a technically simple, cheap vessel to counteract smuggling, infiltration and subversion, and
- a more sophisticated vessel with an ocean going ASW capability.

**The Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific. Committee Chairman: Captain Hector M. LOPEZ, Guatemalan Navy.**

The last committee session was devoted to the discussion of maritime cooperation. At the outset it was pointed out that the terms of reference indicated that cooperation may in fact be weak in the various regions. This is not, however, the case in the Latin American region. It was pointed out that there are more than 16 distinct areas of cooperation between Latin American countries and the U.S. It was suggested however, that some of these programs could be expanded. In this regard, the cost factors of both hosting conferences, the sending of students to foreign schools and the expanded use of existing multinational exercises and facilities was sometimes prohibitive.

In the discussion of specific areas wherein co-

operation could be expanded the following ideas were considered:

(a) expansion of Exercise Springboard to include individual ship training with a multinational exercise at the conclusion,

(b) increase in port visits and minor exercises in conjunction therewith, and

(c) the greater exchange of students and lecturers between war colleges.

It was suggested that the U.S. may be able to enhance the readiness of Latin naval forces by the deployment of a tender prior to the UNITAS cruise which would assist the nations in training maintenance personnel and insuring that the ships were ready in all respects for the UNITAS exercise. If this were not possible it was suggested that the U.S. could organize mobile training teams which could be assigned to countries for short periods of time for training and assistance.

The idea of regional conferences which would complement the Seapower Symposium was brought up with emphasis that this group could engage in discussions regarding Latin American problems, but that with the many other conferences, and overseas visits, normal underway funding could pose a problem.

An interesting desire was voiced which was designed to increase the effectiveness of Latin American shipping, this being the desire to see more Latin ships with Latin goods as opposed to the normally seen ships of other areas of the world.

**The Committee on the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Committee Chairman: Vice Admiral Ignacio MARTEL Viniestra, Spanish Navy.**

The committee considered the problem of determining a suitable location for a regional meeting during 1972. An informal poll was conducted by one of the members to determine whether an invitation to his War College would be acceptable as a common meeting ground for the regional members. There was general concurrence that the location would be

acceptable and the delegate indicated he would investigate the availability of facilities and the required logistics. Recognizing that a shore location would be most preferred, a U.S. ship was also offered as an alternate meeting place.

The agenda items suggested for this meeting can be divided into military and nonmilitary categories.

The nonmilitary category includes:

- a mutual exchange of ship locations with a view to enhance safety at sea, preservation of property and the disposition of survivors,
- the policing of areas of common national interest in matters of ecology,
- an exchange of meteorological information, and
- an exchange of scientific oceanographic information.

The military category could include:

- an evaluation of the Free World Frigate's feasibility,
- the provision of additional training opportunities, and
- the availability of repair facilities for warships.

The main purpose of this meeting would be to develop practical procedures for implementing such agenda items.

**The Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic. Committee Chairman: Commodore Leon L.J. LURQUIN, Belgian Navy.**

Concerning the forthcoming conference on the Law of the Sea, it was suggested that the ratification by a substantial number of nations of common principles of international law would result, through usage over a period of time, in general recognition and acceptance. Such principles would then tend to become binding on non-signatory nations through the pressures of international opinion.

It was noted that a number of bilateral arrangements between neighboring nations presently exist which govern passage through straits.

It was pointed out that there are often differences between the way small and large nations view the

extension of territorial waters. Small nations, particularly those with contiguous shallow waters where mine warfare is an essential portion of their defense, could benefit by an extension of territorial limits.

It was generally accepted that reexamination of territorial sea limits was desirable to obtain common agreement and reduce misunderstanding between nations. There was less agreement as to whether passage through international straits should be free passage or innocent passage.

It was generally agreed that military implications of changes in the law of the sea should be considered by our national representatives at the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference.

**The Committee on the Pacific. Committee Chairman: Vice Admiral KIM, Kwang-Ok, Republic of Korea Navy.**

*The following is a summary of Vice Admiral Kenichi KITAMURA's paper presented in Committee, and titled: "Issues in Regard to Cooperation of the Navies in the Pacific Area."*

*The summary is strictly Vice Admiral KITAMURA's personal opinion and does not necessarily represent that of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force.*

The Japanese Constitution prohibits the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. Under the current interpretation of this prohibition, large-scale, coordinated naval exercises with navies other than the United States, are not considered possible. However, the exchange of training visits, coordinated debate on military tactics and technology and the participation in international symposia without political interpretation, are possible. Such activities would be effective in promoting mutual understanding and friendship between the participating nations and would not invite false impressions and damaging speculation on the part of the general public. Similarly, small-scale exercises of opportunity at the ports of call of other navies have been undertaken and have been found very worthwhile.





Because of constitutional interpretation, all foreign inquiries concerning naval shipbuilding have been refused in order to avoid military contact with outsiders. In my opinion, in the future, if the same type of inquiry is received, Japan should enter into serious discussions with the requesting parties. Cooperation in this field will contribute to improvement of mutual understanding and trust among Pacific nations who should live with coexistence and common prosperity within their mutual theatre of the Ocean.

In spite of the Japanese Constitutional prohibitions against the use of force in the settlement of disputes, the Japanese Government has made it clear that it will deploy Japanese Defense Force ships on the high seas for the protection of vital shipping interests. The security of the sea is essential for Japan's survival, and regardless of operable political considerations, financial restrictions, and technological limitations, Japan should assume primary responsibility for the security of sea communications in the Western Pacific. This is especially true in the area which lies between Japan, Southeastern Asia and Oceania because of the importance of this area to Japan. Assuring sea communications in the Indian Ocean is also vitally important to Japan, because it is the main transportation route of crude petroleum imports; however, protection of sea communications in that ocean is almost impossible for Japan because of the maritime defense capability which would be required to do the task.

The Japanese people are fully conscious that their survival and growth depends on freedom of trade with the several nations of the Pacific. Conversely, many of these same nations depend on Japan for trade for their own economic development. Japan should contribute and cooperate as much as possible with newly-developing nations, if they so desire, for the maintenance and promotion of economic development, social security and international peace. Although operational military cooperation is constitutionally prohibited, it might be profitable to study appropriate ways of military coordination outside of

operational fields, as might be mutually acceptable to the participating nations.

The committee summary follows:

All navies agree that freedom of the seas is of primary importance. The committee therefore considers that each Free World Navy should share in the burden of insuring that freedom. Defining the extent to which each nation shares in the effort is difficult since many needs compete for available resources. However, inasmuch as control of the sea is a matter of defense of vital maritime trade, it is possible that the extent of each country's sea control obligation may be determined in relation to that country's volume of sea trade. In explaining the navy's needs to the populace, this sea trade sharing formula may prove more understandable than the current method of relating proportionate share to GNP.

In facing their common challenge of sea control, the importance of regional and subregional naval cooperation was again noted. Navies are encouraged to exchange hydrographic, oceanographic and astrological data within their regional groupings. Surveillance data can also be exchanged within the area, however, governmental agreement may be required in some instances. This agreement should be encouraged. Certain navies can conduct regional or subregional exercises without adverse political reaction. These operations are encouraged. It was recommended that navies which are prevented from directly participating in any regional activity participate through the presence of observers.


The committee noted that frequently the efficiency of maritime activity is adversely influenced by restrictive industrial and trade practices, by excessively competitive international trade practices and by inefficient allocation of resources. Although navies can point out the adverse nature of these practices, there is no easy solution. More cooperation among navies, however, in the definition of defense system requirements and in related R & D efforts could be profitable even if the resulting product were


produced on a strictly national basis. Other areas of cooperation were noted and further investigation of the problem was recommended.

The committee considers that the international concept of regional organizations, arrangements and cooperation can be reinforced and more effectively explained by ensuring that the navy position on the subject is fully developed before the United Nations Committee of 33. By getting agreement at this level, the committee believes that better support and cooperation will develop throughout the international community of nations.

The committee considers that national maritime responsibility can be shared on an ever increasing basis. Basic to this sharing is the development of an internationally acceptable Law of the Sea. All navies are enjoined to work toward this goal. Considerable advantage can also accrue from an expansion of cooperative agreements already in existence. For example, existing SAR support agreements can be reinforced on a regional basis; communications nets can be expanded with interconnection of subregional nets; existing exchange programs can be used for the sharing of ideas on new personnel habitability and comfort research, on ship preservation methods and many similar aspects which are wholly separate from the fields of naval tactics and doctrine.

Although regional cooperation among navies is the most effective method of fulfilling a navy's national tasks, extraregional cooperation may be desirable in some instances particularly where the situation is beyond the scope of regional resolution. For extraregional cooperation to be effective, however, it must be preceded by experience in working together with combined tactics, doctrine and comparable communications resources.









Admiral  
Ralph W. Cousins  
U.S. Navy

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Vice Chief of Naval Operations

## FRIDAY, 5 NOVEMBER 1971

0900-1000—Address, "Our Future at Sea," by Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, U.S. Navy, Vice Chief of Naval Operations.

1015-1115—Plenary Session. Summary of the week's discussion in Seminars.

**The Committee on the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific. Presented by: Admiral SUDOMO, Indonesian Navy. (Delivered Thursday)**

The deliberations of the committee on the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific have been interesting, lively and productive. I feel a few brief comments are in order before I summarize the committee's work so that you have some illustration of the broad range and, in some cases, the depth of the topics covered. Our diverse views were focused on areas of mutual concern and cooperation. There was considerable agreement in many cases.

But let me explain what I mean by diverse views: when we considered the concept of the Free World Frigate, the smaller countries believed that the cost of the ship might prove prohibitive and its general design did not serve the navy's mission in supporting national interests in areas such as antismuggling or counterinfiltration operations. Conversely, the larger states were quite concerned about ASW in the "Blue Water" reaches of the Mid-Indian Ocean. However, we found more areas for agreement, particularly in recognizing the Soviet threat. To this end we were fortunate to have submitted for our consideration, background papers, and two excellent reference materials. The first of these references was a study entitled *Soviet Policies in the Indian Ocean Area* by T.B. Millar and the second, *Indonesian Perspectives on the Indian Ocean*, by Guy J. Pauker. It is significant to note, in summary, that both authors saw the Soviet intentions as seeking:

- (1) to improve strategic posture and exert influence,
- (2) to replace the United Kingdom as the dominant external power in the Arabian peninsula and Persian Gulf area,

(3) to ensure access to certain raw materials and expansion of trade opportunities, and

(4) to exercise control over the sea routes between the eastern and western portions of the Soviet Union.

Whatever the true reason for the Soviet presence, it is real and it is a threat. A typical scenario to accomplish their aims, while moving in on smaller states might be as follows:

- (a) the offering of financial aid,
- (b) offering technical assistance, and
- (c) offering political support—each of these steps backed up with an increasing naval presence—oceanographic research ship, emergency repairs to several fishing vessels, a "thank you" protocol visit, a large liner/cargo stop, a warship visit.

Rear Admiral Tran Van CHON, of the Vietnamese Navy offered a paper, which is available before you now.

Admiral CHON's paper offers a good place to begin a review of the committee's deliberations: it is a response to the Challenge in the Era of Change that Admiral ZUMWALT addressed.

As Admiral CHON suggests the maritime coalition for Southeast Asia is a concept, not a plan. It calls for cooperation and mutual action in the maritime sense—navy-to-navy—rather than action in the political arena. As the concept evolves, it does not preclude political agreement. It might be characterized first as bilateral agreements, later developing as multinational, interlocking arrangements, perhaps even approaching a standing naval group type of concept, based on the defense of mutually vital sea lanes of communication.

Our committee noted that Admiral ZUMWALT placed primary emphasis on ASW—a mission certainly suited for the Free World Frigate. But we also considered the havoc that could occur from a mining campaign conducted, perhaps clandestinely by fishing trawlers, in restricted waters such as the Persian Gulf—or the Straits of Malacca. We noted this type of activity, at the relatively unsophisticated level, could also be conducted by the Chinese People's Republic.



Damage to a supertanker or new supercargo ship would require months to clear and the effect on the oil requirements of Europe and Japan could be disastrous as would also be the loss of a huge cargo. In a later session we also addressed the inherent capabilities and weaknesses of oil transport by pipeline as well as by sea. This investigation included comments ranging from the political difficulties encountered in pipelines, access, and their repair; to modular ASW protection packages for tankers.

The situation of the Suez Canal was discussed. It was noted the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean requires the support of approximately 25% of the Soviet merchant fleet, due to the extra distances with the Canal closed. Several interesting questions were raised regarding the Canal, if opened:

- (a) Would allied nations send warships through?
- (b) Would allied nations be allowed through?

In yesterday morning's discussion we again touched on the issue of the Canal. The interesting conclusion that was generated was that opening the Canal is to the economic benefit of all, especially the Soviets; however, from a strategic point of view, with regard to Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean, the Canal is better closed.

The Ceylon Peace Plan was discussed. Rather than the Plan, the questions it raised brought most attention:

- (a) Would the Soviets accept it? Would it be to their benefit?
- (b) How would it be verified, particularly in the case of submarines?
- (c) Is the Declaration, in fact, possible or "legal?"
- (d) What would become of the indigenous navies?
- (e) Can they continue to exist? If not, who controls such things as piracy?

Such questions lead directly to a discussion of Admiral BURKE's remarks on *Problems, Solved and Unsolved*. With respect to the navies of the Indian Ocean and Southwest Pacific, our problems could be grouped into three critical areas: personnel problems, political problems, and economic problems.

The effect of technology has certainly had an effect on proficiency and training levels, particularly when one considers the effect of the high costs involved in people as a commodity. It was suggested that we need to pay particular attention to the reduction of the number of men on ships which implies more automation, which carries with it the increased technical proficiency of the personnel required to maintain the machinery, and the inherent higher total costs. Not only are there thus generated personnel problems, but the economic problem of building a navy with limited resources comes directly forward. A solution would be cooperative and mutually beneficial maritime coalitions, such as Admiral CHON suggested. Article 52 of the UN Charter allows for regional organizations, but herein is a political problem. Some of the regional ocean states are constrained by their constitutions from entering into certain arrangements; however, joint patrol agreements are even today in effect. Navy-to-navy cooperation in antismuggling, surveillance and piracy are areas for agreement—not necessarily in the sense of bilateral treaty arrangements. An interesting feature of a multinational network would be that it serves as a deterrent to illegal activities.

The effect of U.S. Congressional action with regard to foreign military aid and assistance programs, within the context of the Nixon Doctrine generates some difficult political and economic questions. For smaller countries to take an active regional role, assistance would be required to increase their capability and ability, such as transferring to them some of the more modern ships and aircraft of the U.S. The "Hot Ship" Transfer Program was discussed as meeting the immediate needs of the smaller countries. Consideration should also be given to spare parts and shipyard repair capabilities. To this end, countries whose vital interests are manifested in the region, although not physically athwart the sea lanes, could join together with the regional association and offer economic assistance. Nations which have a vital interest in the Indian Ocean area could be identified by a determination of who receives the oil cargo, not





necessarily under which flag the cargo sails. The effect of identified support would be an active demonstration of the concern of the interested nation.

To accomplish economic and political support there is a definite need to convince and persuade governments and public of a nation's maritime role. A convincing argument might be to consider the effect of a threat to, or loss of, the vital shipments of oil by interdiction of the sea communications lines in the Indian Ocean. The committee enjoyed a brief discussion of the problems and techniques for alerting the public at large to the need, uses and national dependency on the sea, through a basic educational program utilizing such mass media as television and radio broadcasting.

The concept of the Free World Frigate (FWF) is subtly associated with the idea of a defensive regional entity, not necessarily rigidly structured, but not unlike a standing naval force, with a common need to protect the mutually vital sea lanes. What one questions is not its use in the regional context, but in terms of national needs. Smaller countries must address the problem of prohibitive cost, where hydrofoil, gunboats, fast patrol boats, or water skimmers might more cost-effectively meet their needs. Notwithstanding the lack of a gun, there is a difficulty in ship design based on dissimilar requirements of mutually supporting, independently operating navies. Assuming a relatively inexpensive, basic 2,000 ton hull and power plant it seems the greatest expenses would be involved in fitting in optional or tailored weapons and electronics packages. There would be additional shore support costs which would greatly add to overall expense. As a result navies of smaller countries, rather than expanding their size, would in essence modernize at relatively high capital costs, providing capabilities more toward regional security than along national interest lines. *However, an aid-type program of 50% subsidy or long-term leasing of newly procured specifically tailored FWFs would be grounds for alternate considerations.* The design of a feasibility

study and development of a prototype would be necessary precursors for final decision.

Let me turn quickly to some final points that grew out of our "innovative" session:

We considered the founding of a Maritime College of the Indian and Southwest Pacific Ocean region. It was suggested that the curriculum could address sea protection and control problems with the intent of crystallizing our multinational network. It was recognized that one or more of the states with vital interests in the region might center to bind us together in our common concern. Once the College is established—perhaps in the form of a "Floating College," it would offer a forum for naval officers and possible political leadership to exchange, in the academic environment, concepts and opinions. Similarly it was suggested that a Documentary Center for Indian Ocean studies be established, preferably at the fulcrum of the region such as Thailand or Indonesia.

Our accord strongly suggests the success of the International Seapower Symposia series. This should be more than sufficient testimony toward their continued flourishing. By far the significant event of this conference has been the opportunity to meet with the other Chiefs of Navies. The cooperation which has been generated is invaluable for the future.

Adm. SUDOMO briefly reviewed the above remarks, made yesterday, adding that (1) the committee agreed with Secretary Johnson's comments regarding the effect of the Suez Canal on peace and stability in the Middle East, and (2) another international symposium should be held in Newport in two years with intervening regional symposia. A study was distributed on the importance of oil movement along the sea lanes.

**The Committee on the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific. Presented by: Rear Admiral Carlos ALVAREZ, Argentine Navy.**

The discussions held by the committee of the South Atlantic and Eastern Pacific have resulted in good and prolific comments which have generally represented the consensus of the group and which

have followed the outline presented in the syllabus. But from these discussions came a series of ideas and concepts which we feel have a larger audience and which we hope may be of some use. These views are herewith presented.

1. We are a regional committee which is in no single region and in no single ocean and therefore our discussions should have been occupied by thoughts on naval strategy in an area of more than half the world. The most summary analysis shows us that we are made up by countries on both coasts of the North Atlantic, in the Caribbean, on both sides of the South Atlantic, and in the Eastern North and South Pacific Oceans, in addition to having two countries with watersheds into the Atlantic and two with direct interests in the Antarctic Ocean. In view of these facts our first and perhaps most intelligent decision was to consider ourselves a committee based on linguistics such that we adopted Spanish as the official language of our committee sessions. The proposal that we should consider the entire area of our assigned region was not accepted because of time factors in spite of the great importance that we give to the ocean and specially to the Atlantic.

2. We have found the following common facts within the arbitrary geographic restrictions:

(a) weak naval powers with a level of technology which equates to that of immediately after World War Two,

(b) developing nations with a reduced capacity to fund sophisticated weapons systems,

(c) located in an area removed from a conventional general war zone which is expected to be the North Atlantic and the Western Pacific,

(d) although so located, any war of that kind would profoundly affect us, and

(e) that that location away from the center of a conflict would raise the relative value of our surviving existing naval forces.

3. Of the two alternatives for the future proposed by the keynote speaker which were: (a) a world of cooperation, and (b) a world of anarchy, we would suggest that the first should receive the highest

priority as the political objective of the Free World.

4. It is clear that, granting the value of a nuclear deterrent, the world of cooperation can only be achieved through an oceanic alliance the key to which is the concentrated naval power of countries both large and small which, in the main, are represented here. It is only through this alliance that we can bargain from strength to achieve the future world of cooperation.

5. That the central country in this alliance is the United States by virtue of the extensive network of treaties which it maintains with the Free World and by virtue of the fact that it is the strongest military and economic power within the group.

6. That the Eastern bloc has not developed naval bases which directly threaten the region although that possibility exists in Cuba.

7. That Soviet Naval power has been greatly increased in recent years showing a decided desire for the use and control of the western seas.

8. That there is a visible expansion of Soviet maritime power in the increase of her merchant fleet, in her fishing ships which are present in all the world's oceans and in her accompanying oceanographic ships.

9. That there is latent hostility between Russia and China which is the classic case of conflict between national interests and is removed from the realm of ideological questions.

10. That the Free World is not exempt from conflict but that the necessary maturity exists for pacific settlement.

11. That this presents a strategic picture which deserves our careful attention and which obliges us to consolidate our present structure into a strong oceanic alliance that will maintain a clear advantage in relative naval power.

12. That the continuation of allied naval planning, the existence of multinational commands, the carrying out of combined operations, the standardization of doctrine and material and instruction will contribute to the strengthening of our naval power and





the credibility of the alliance.

13. That in support of that oceanic alliance the law of the sea should be formulated taking into account the interests of the coastal states, the different geographic characteristics of each zone and affecting to the least degree possible the freedom of navigation.

14. That the economically strong countries of the Free World should cooperate with the weaker ones by means of capital and technological grants which would help in the development with an end of consolidating the alliance which could disintegrate if the present disparities continue to mount.

**The Committee on the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean. Presented by: Captain S.S. KAP-SALIS, Hellenic Navy.**

The exchange of ideas and discussions during the week were frank and most productive for all. We arrived early and stayed late at all our meetings and we really could use another week.

Certainly it was clear that national interests and commitments are not necessarily held in common in our area and thus all may not perceive the Nixon Doctrine or the challenge, as briefed on the first day, in the same light. Thus, we moved from the abstract and concentrated on a discussion of matters practical to all.

First, we agreed to respond to the initiatives of this War College that will invite us both to endorse the need for a regional meeting, (as espoused by Admiral MAAS yesterday) and also volunteer to act as a secretary for all of us.

Through this informal medium, the secretary would act between International Seapower Symposiums as a coordinator of:

- (a) requests for regional meetings,
- (b) the inclusion of agenda items for the next International Seapower Symposium, and
- (c) the study of problems of internaval cooperation in our region.

Second, we determined that there is a regional

awareness of the need for added training opportunities in the area, training opportunities that can be accepted on a voluntary basis and that should be devoted towards basic and fundamental services. Without doubt, we all can use as much additional training as we can get in weapons training and seamanship. It was emphasized that the training opportunities to be offered would be conducted in remote waters and that international anchorages would be utilized as starting points and meeting places.

Third, when we considered the Free World Frigate, four of our members offered their resources in arriving at an *actual* estimate and evaluation of the frigate's feasibility and cost. Through the means of the secretariat mentioned before, we would determine a meeting place next summer, within the region, in order to discuss these evaluations, in addition to such other agenda items as may be proposed by the participants.

In this regard an informal poll was conducted by one of the members as to whether an invitation to his war college would be acceptable as a common meeting ground for the regional members. There was general concurrence that the location would be acceptable and the delegate indicated he would investigate the availability of facilities and the required logistics. Recognizing that a shore location would be most preferred, a U.S. ship was offered as an alternate meeting place.

The agenda items suggested for this meeting can be compartmentalized into military and nonmilitary categories.

The nonmilitary category includes:

- a mutual exchange of ship locations with a view to enhance safety at sea, preservation of property and the disposition of survivors,
- the policing of areas of common national interest in matters of ecology,
- an exchange of meteorological information, and
- an exchange of scientific oceanographic information.

The military category could include:

- an evaluation of the Free World Frigate's feasibility,
- the provision of additional training opportunities, and
- the availability of repair facilities for warships.

The main purpose of this meeting would be to develop practical procedures for implementing such agenda items.

We as the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Committee, are pleased to have participated in this symposium and strongly recommend a continuance of such meetings and that all participants here today strive to conduct a regional meeting prior to the next International Seapower Symposium.

**The Committee on the North Atlantic and Baltic.  
Presented by: Captain Robert HELSETH, Norwegian Navy.**

The group has through their discussions clarified the views of the nations on a large number of problems. Most of the discussions have centered, however, around the problems raised by Admiral ZUMWALT in his keynote speech. This presentation will briefly illuminate some of the more important points.

Firstly, on the importance of sea lines of communication there was a general agreement that the buildup of the Soviet fleet and their attempt to push the borders of their so-called marginal seas further out from their territorial waters constitute a growing threat to the sea lines of communication and thereby a very serious threat to the existence of free nations in Western Europe.

Some of the nations close to the Soviet borders feel that as far as their national mission is concerned, the first priority should be given the defense of the terminal points in their countries which are as important as the sea lines of communication themselves. The defenses of these nations must include a capability against a seaborne invasion. This is particularly important in view of the buildup of Soviet amphibious forces during the last years.

The aim of the small navy nations, therefore, is that of the protection of their shores and their close-in sea lines of communication. The worldwide protection of shipping must be carried out principally by the larger navies in cooperation with local navies including the provision of base facilities.

For reasons previously stated, there were two different views concerning the primary role of a Free World Frigate. The larger nations seemed to favor a more sophisticated escort with ASW as the primary role. Some of the nations closely bordering Russia seemed to favor a smaller and less sophisticated ship with coastal operations and antiship capability as the primary role. There was general skepticism that all of the proposed equipment could be fitted in a ship of the size and cost stated in the briefing.

Most members agreed that there should be surface to surface capabilities as well as an anti-air point defense capability. It was also generally agreed that incorporation of all such sophisticated weapons systems would result in too great a cost and weight. It was noted that an ASW helicopter could in addition to its primary task provide an antisurface capability against soft targets as well as a limited antisurface missile defense capability. It was apparent that even in similar areas of operation, individual nations viewed their requirements differently.

It was suggested that the best method of standardization would be for each nation to design their own hulls and standardize in the weapons and electronic systems. It was unanimously agreed that there still exist many difficulties in implementing any standardization program due to the problems of national interest, balance of payment, labor unions, etc.

It was unanimously agreed that within the limits of its technical competence, the study group has done a commendable job developing the concept of a Free World Frigate. They have helped particularly in developing a catalogue of weapons systems which will be very useful in developing such weapons systems standardization.

It was generally agreed that an Interim Regional Symposium should meet prior to the next Interna-





tional Symposium. This symposium should be devoted to an academic discussion on general maritime affairs and would include a review of the previous International Symposium and a planning session for the next International Symposium. The group welcomes the invitation extended by Vice Admiral MAAS for a Regional Meeting to discuss these problems.

Concerning the forthcoming Conference on the Law of the Sea, it was suggested that the ratification by a substantial number of nations of common principles of international law would over a period of usage result in general recognition and acceptance of such principles which would tend to become binding on nonsignatory nations through the pressures of international opinion.

It was noted that a number of bilateral arrangements between neighboring nations presently exist which govern passage through straits.

It was pointed out that there are often differences between the way small and large nations view the extension of territorial waters. Small nations, particularly those with contiguous shallow waters where mine warfare is an essential portion of their defense, could benefit by an extension of territorial limits.

It was generally accepted that reexamination of territorial sea limits was desirable to obtain common agreement and reduce misunderstanding between nations. There was less agreement as to whether passage through international straits should be free passage or innocent passage.

It was generally accepted that military implications of changes in the law of the sea should be considered by our national representatives at the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference.

It was suggested that there is also a need for an International Police Organization to enforce any law which may have been agreed upon.

It was generally agreed that any action which possibly could come under the term of "piracy" would be countered by all nations regardless of wherever it may occur.

It was unanimously agreed that a problem exists in

the education of the public concerning the importance of the navy's role in national security. Some of the causes of this problem include:

(a) the attention the news media gives to military failures,

(b) the inability of navy officers to deal effectively with the news media,

(c) the lack of a threat to national security in many nations since World War II,

(d) the antimilitary attitude of post World War II educators, and

(e) the misconception that a global war will result in a nuclear strategic exchange thus eliminating the requirement for a navy.

There was general agreement on how to attack this problem of education. These ideas included:

(a) emphasizing successful operations,

(b) seeking all opportunities to talk to the public,

(c) admitting our failures to the news media,

(d) training officers to deal effectively and harmoniously with the news media,

(e) use of visits and cruises aboard warships particularly for young people,

(f) use of naval vessels in humanitarian efforts such as rescue at sea and antipollution patrol with suitable publicity,

(g) formation of regional groups to bring to bear the influence of outside opinion on national leaders, and

(h) emphasizing the importance of the navy in limited conflicts.

Concerning the need for maintaining the spirit of naval personnel in the changing world, it was generally agreed that a primary problem was one of communication with the new breed of young people. It was emphasized that there must be a communication of ideas both up and down the entire chain of command.

**The Committee on the Pacific. Presented by:  
Captain YI, Su-yong, Republic of Korea Navy.**

The committee on the Pacific recommends that

the Free World navies frequently meet on a regional or subregional basis for the free academic discussion of matters of common interest. Selected representatives of naval related industries and scientific organizations should also be invited to participate in these discussions. In promoting greater regional cooperation and understanding the committee also recommends greater use of exchange programs not only involving visits between ships of the Free World navies, but also involving the exchange of young officers to serve in ships of other navies.

In meeting the world threat of today the committee notes the extensive new Chinese communist program for naval development. The ChiComs have given every indication that they intend to build their navy into a force of international importance. This intention and potential should be fully considered in every aspect of naval planning.

The committee considers that the many problems facing today's navies vary in each case with the economic, social, and geopolitical realities of the individual nation's world situation. Each navy has the challenge of obtaining sufficient resources to fulfill its mission. Although it may desire a full sea-control capability, economic, and technological constraints require that the navy emphasize the development of a specific, threat-oriented capability. In supporting this effort the committee recognizes the special utility of exchanging research and developmental data. Although government restrictions may preclude a full exchange of information, the maximum exchange possible, on a regional basis, of technology and professional expertise is particularly desirable. During this new era of mutual interdependence at sea, the twofold question is resources for the control of the seas as well as technological cooperation in achieving that control. Any method aimed at more efficient utilization of limited personnel and material resources is particularly supported.

In reviewing requirements for new weapons systems the concept of a Free World Frigate would appear feasible and useful in meeting projected individual navy needs and contribute to overall

maritime defense requirements. However, the technical systems of such a ship require flexibility since the operational need would vary with the area and type of situation involved. Therefore, it is suggested that the concept be limited to the design and construction of a prototype hull and propulsion plant. Convincing governments to agree to some type of consortium financing for such a venture would appear practically impossible for many reasons. However, regional funding for the design development may be possible and this approach merits investigation. Prototype development might result from a favorable reaction to the design submitted. Since many navies are now in the process of developing ships to meet similar needs, the frigate concept must be proposed soon for governmental consideration or in many cases it may be too late.

Naval needs of the 1990's should be closely investigated to determine exactly what type platform might meet the needs of sea control during the missile age. The possibility is that a ship during this age can become so overburdened with defensive systems that it will lose its usefulness as an offensive platform. The first need during this period is for a long-range, continuously active surveillance system. To support this system consideration should be given to new sea control systems: satellites, semi-submersibles, hydrofoils, submarines with a surface offensive capability, and multipurpose seaplane-type craft.

Naval support resources are always in short supply; therefore, the committee recommends that new construction merchant vessels be equipped with greater military contingency capability. In the past, certain countries have required reinforcement for gun mounts and the installation of a potential for degaussing. In the future, a particularly useful addition should be a helo platform. Such a platform would have significant search and rescue usefulness during peacetime and the proposal could be presented to the public on that basis. Its usefulness during wartime goes without saying. Oilers and support ships should also be equipped with a replenishment-at-sea capability. As was noted during Captain NEWELL's






briefing, the Soviets make full use of their merchant fleet in this capacity. Even if the slower astern method of replenishment were used, the capability on Free World merchant vessels would be of special usefulness during wartime.

The committee agreed that members should examine fully the implications of the laws of the sea as related to their own defense responsibilities, and to make the results of their study available for the development of their national position for presentation before the 1973 Law of the Sea Conference.

The committee considers that existing regional agreements can be advantageously expanded. For example, existing SAR support agreements can be reinforced on a regional basis; communication nets can be expanded through interconnection of subnets; through existing exchange programs navies can share ideas on new personnel habitability and comfort research, on ship preservation methods and on many other similar aspects of navy life, which are wholly separate from the fields of naval tactics and doctrine.

Finally, the committee considers that each Free World navy should fully share in the burden of insuring freedom of the seas. Since many needs compete for national resources, it is recommended that a new formula be devised whereby each navy's fair share of the burden may be determined not only in relation to the country's GNP but also in relation

to the volume of its sea trade. As control of the seas is a matter of defense of vital maritime trade, this sea trade factoring formula may prove more understandable and therefore more acceptable to the people.



The Second International Seapower Symposium concluded with remarks by Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., and Admiral Sir Horace Law.

Admiral Zumwalt recounted the weekly discussions and stressed the international psychological impact of the Symposium in terms of developing a sense of unity through the sharing of common problems. He also remarked that the Symposium has helped to develop further an increased awareness for the requirement to seek new approaches in mutual naval cooperation, and expressed his personal gratitude to all participants for their contributions.

Admiral Sir Horace Law spoke on behalf of all participants expressing appreciation for the opportunity to be present among such a distinguished group of naval leaders. He thanked the Naval War College for hosting the Symposium and providing a forum for a truly mutual exchange of maritime philosophies.











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
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
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
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
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
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


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