

ELEVENTH INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
6-9 OCTOBER 1991

International Seapower Symposium

Report of the Proceedings

ELEVENTH INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

Report of Proceedings of the Conference 6 - 9 October 1991

Edited by

John B. Hattendorf
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History
Naval War College

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE PRESS
Newport, Rhode Island

1992

Editor's Note

Every attempt has been made to establish a clear and accurate record of the symposium proceedings which faithfully records the opinions and views of the participants. In transferring the text to the printed page, the editor has silently corrected slips of grammar, spelling, and wording. He has occasionally inserted a word or phrase in square brackets in order to clarify a point. For the question and answer or discussion sessions, he has tried to identify every speaker. However, there were a number of instances when speakers did not identify themselves, and the editor could not identify them from the record. In these cases, the comments are identified as "from the floor."

The editor would like to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Commander William Malone, his staff in the Naval War College Special Events Department, and Mrs. Pat Sweeney of the *Naval War College Review* staff.

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Plenary Sessions

Welcoming Remarks

Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, U.S. Navy
President, U.S. Naval War College

ADMIRAL MORA, ADMIRAL KELSO, distinguished flag officers, delegates, ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure, on behalf of the staff, faculty, and student body of the United States Naval War College, to welcome each of you to Newport and to the Eleventh International Seapower Symposium.

For some of you, this gathering permits a renewal of your relationship with us and the wonderful City of Newport we call home. For others visiting for the first time, I hope that your experiences during this symposium will lead to an affinity for this college and Newport's charm.

But far more important than your impressions of Newport's beautiful waterfront, or this magnificent institution, are the relationships you will either renew or establish amongst yourselves in the next two and a half days. Last night's reception hopefully helped initiate that process, and I thank each of you for making the evening so delightful through your presence, following, for many, a long day of travel.

In 1971, as a student here in the College of Naval Command and Staff, I had the privilege of escorting the Chilean delegate at the Second International Seapower Symposium. While twenty years and eight symposia have passed, and my role in, and concerns for, today's ISS are somewhat different from those relatively carefree days as a student, my appreciation of what this forum is intended to do remains as finely focused as it was then.

Two decades ago, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, then United States Chief of Naval Operations, stated that the sharing of common problems in a forum like this helped to develop a sense of unity among participants as together they looked for appropriate solutions. That symposium was as historic then as this one is opportunity-laden today.

Communications and working together towards mutually beneficial ends have been the principal motives for these meetings since the first one was held in 1969. Today, we have in this auditorium twenty-nine chiefs of service, representatives of twenty-four of the world's naval war colleges, and a total of one hundred eight delegates—the largest number in the history of the ISS—representing fifty-seven nations. We should all be encouraged by this tremendous level of participation, but frankly, the opportunities and respon-

sibilities we face together virtually demand this level of attention from our respective nations.

Two years ago at the Tenth ISS, in his opening remarks, my predecessor [Rear Admiral Ronald Kurth] referred to the fresh winds of reduced international tensions filling our sails and offering promise for the future. This morning, as we begin our formal consideration of "Emerging Cooperative Maritime Roles in a Changing World Environment," I want to update that report and submit that our sails are now full with a virtual hurricane of change, not simply a fresh wind. Without a doubt, the international climate for this seapower symposium is unlike any that has existed in the past. The challenge facing us is to determine what those changes mean, and what we must do to keep our way on without being driven upon the shoals.

The process we begin today of sharing our perceptions of current and future events, and determining the opportunities and responsibilities facing us, is of the greatest significance and is filled with tremendous potential. As it has in past symposia, our success in this endeavor will be contingent upon the candor, insights, and conviction each of us brings to this auditorium, the regional sessions, the special service college group, and perhaps most significantly, the dialogue and reflection shared when the activities of each day yield to the formal and informal social occasions in the evening.

I look forward to the dynamic possibilities available to us. I am also confident that the process we are about to begin will help us cope with both the dramatic events occurring throughout the world as we speak and the inevitable ones looming over the horizon.

I look forward to getting to know each of you better during the next few days. If there is anything that we can do to make your time in Newport or at the Naval War College more enjoyable, please ask. Thank you, and again, welcome aboard. We are indeed honored to have each of you here.

It is now my great pleasure to relinquish the podium to my Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Frank Kelso.

Ψ

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations

THANK YOU ADMIRAL STRASSER, Admiral Mora, distinguished naval leaders, ladies and gentlemen. It is indeed a privilege to add my words of welcome as we commence the eleventh meeting of the International Seapower Symposium. At the reception last night, I was delighted to see many esteemed colleagues I've known and worked with in the past. I also had the pleasure of meeting a number of other distinguished naval leaders for the first time. I look forward to further opportunities both to renew old acquaintances and to establish new ones over the next few days.

As Admiral Strasser said, it is our good fortune to have a record turnout for this year's symposium, including more nations and more service heads than ever before. Many of the countries represented here have sent delegates to every meeting since 1969, and others have established attendance records nearly as solid. We appreciate your ongoing commitment to making these symposia successful. We are delighted, too, to have with us for the first time senior representatives from the nations of Bahrain, Bulgaria, the Congo, Poland, and Qatar. Gentlemen, I bid you special welcome. I know your input to our discussions will prove most valuable.

To all the delegates who have travelled vast distances and arranged business schedules to be here, I thank you sincerely for coming and contributing your experience and your insight to these proceedings.

As Admiral Strasser has remarked, these are opportunity-laden times. The need for mutual discussion and mutual understanding has never been greater. I believe the world's navies are uniquely equipped to make positive contributions in the days and the years ahead. What we accomplish here in Newport will serve as meaningful steps toward that end. Given the impressive record of previous symposia, and the depth and scope of experience represented here, I anticipate a highly stimulating and mutually beneficial examination of major issues which touch all of us.

For many of you this is a homecoming of sorts. Some of you have attended previous symposia. Others have come as students of the Naval Command College or the Naval Staff College. Whether you are intimately familiar with Newport or are here for the first time, I encourage you to explore this beautiful and hospitable city. Once again, welcome, and thank you for joining us. I hope your stay will prove both professionally rewarding and most enjoyable. Thank you for being with us.

Résumé of the Tenth International Seapower Symposium

Professor John B. Hattendorf
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History
U.S. Naval War College

ADMIRAL MORA PEREZ, Admiral Kelso, Admiral Strasser, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, as you begin the Eleventh International Seapower Symposium, it is my honor once again to summarize for you the main events of your previous meeting, the Tenth International Seapower Symposium, held here in Newport on October the 22nd through the 25th, 1989.

The last meeting marked the twentieth anniversary of these symposia, the first of which was held here in November 1969. They are one of several lasting contributions to international naval cooperation promoted by Admiral Richard G. Colbert, U.S. Navy, which included establishing the Naval Command College and the Naval Staff College courses here at the Naval War College, as well as the Nato Standing Naval Force Atlantic and the Mediterranean On-Call Force. This coming December marks the eighteenth anniversary of Colbert's death in 1973, while he was serving as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe.

The 1989 International Seapower Symposium had for its theme "Meeting Commitments in an Era of Fiscal Constraint." In his opening keynote address, Admiral Carlisle Trost noted that the issue was not new, despite what lawmakers and journalists in the United States believed. In his forty years in uniform, he had never known anything but fiscal constraint. The issue was one of degree, and that was something that lay in the eye of the beholder. "None of us," Admiral Trost said, "has ever had everything that we considered necessary to adequately provide for our nations' defense." Naval leaders and advisors must always face a certain level of risk, but it is their duty to assess the threat accurately and, in the light of it, to figure out the acceptable level of risk while maintaining a logical balance of forces ready to meet commitments.

To be ready to meet the future, we must have answers to some fundamental questions such as: What will be the threat? What commitments must be made? What resources will be available? What are friends and allies doing? To answer these questions, it is necessary to understand fully the global situation, and with that in mind, he focused his remarks on the situation in 1989.

Turning to the security posture of the United States, Admiral Trost emphasized that the United States is dependent on the sea for both its economic prosperity and its national security. The U.S. is a maritime nation separated by vast expanses of ocean from all but two of its friends. Thus, for forty-five years the United States has relied on forward deployment of forces and healthy alliances to secure collective interests. In the face of sharp cuts, the United States Navy has been able to maintain superior readiness, to keep quality people, and to invest in future capability. But Admiral Trost noted that he could give no assurance that that would be the case in the future. While he hoped that the United States Navy could maintain a reasonable balance between force structure and commitments, something might have to give. He noted that, like many other countries, both contingency operations and the augmentation of forces to combat international drug traffic will have an impact on the ability to meet other commitments. With declining defense budgets, one must accentuate more than ever the importance of maintaining healthy international security agreements. We may wish to explore ways in which we can better discuss our plans with each other and improve our ability to operate together. Our routine bilateral and multilateral naval exercises have helped to improve many of our navies. The value of such exercises has been evident in our recent experience in the Gulf.

In his concluding remarks, Admiral Trost noted other areas that could benefit from discussion. Among these, he highlighted the issue of how, in our respective alliances, we can capitalize on our individual strengths to better benefit each other. Another issue was naval arms control measures. Here he noted, we should focus on a difficult, but fundamental question: Are we willing, he asked, to accept altering the traditional tenets of freedom on the high seas at the risk of limiting the naval forces that have served us so well in maintaining the peace? We must think beyond specific arms control proposals, he said, and ask ourselves whether they would result in a stable, secure world for our nation and our friends.

In the second plenary session, Vice Admiral Paul D. Miller, U.S. Navy, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Warfare, gave an address, "The Shape of Things to Come: Naval Warfare—The 90s and Beyond." Setting the tone, Admiral Miller noted that we all "face the challenge of maintaining forces and sustaining readiness when, often in the public's eye, the principal threat appears to have receded to a distant challenge on the horizon."

Looking to the future, he spoke of the environment of the 1990s that will have several enduring characteristics, shaped by many geopolitical factors. Smaller defense budgets will be the norm, and debating them will lead to consideration of how much force should be forward-based and how much should be home-based. In addition, there probably will be fewer overseas bases from which to support deployed units. This, too, will lead to discussions over the balance between regular and reserve forces. Finally, in the light of Soviet initiatives and the state of the global economy, alliance cohesion will be tested

more severely than in the past. Yet, at the same time, the mutual cooperation of Free World nations will be more essential than ever before.

Turning to the character of future naval warfare, Admiral Miller noted that the centerpiece of U.S. naval operations in the foreseeable future will be the carrier battle group, complemented by amphibious task forces. While the basic mission and force composition may remain the same, the means to carry out these missions will change dramatically. Technology will cause a fundamental change in naval warfare, and these technologies will not be confined to just a few navies. As defense industries compete for a share of shrinking defense budgets, they will sell to anyone with money to pay, with little heed to nationality or foreign policy orientation. We shall have to deal with the possibility of highly sophisticated threats everywhere that fleets can operate. Low-observable platforms and weapons, "Stealth," will be widely available; reaction times in anti-air warfare will be reduced to a fraction of their current length. Space will be exploited for command, control, and communication as well as for navigation and surveillance.

Such developments will force us to restructure our doctrine and training and to emphasize technique over firepower. Naval leaders in the future will need to ensure that they use both highly technical equipment and somewhat unsophisticated machinery, together, in the best operational way. In conclusion, Admiral Miller noted that "the proper application of technology can go a long way toward redressing any naval imbalance." Yet, he emphasized, "Technology, by itself cannot become enshrined as that all powerful elixir. Superb training, proper tactics, and inspired leadership remain essential."

The second day of the symposium opened with a panel discussion on "International Maritime Cooperation: Expectations and Fiscal Reality," chaired by Admiral David Jeremiah, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. In the opening session, Admiral Jeremiah remarked that the hallmarks of the U.S. Navy's strategy are the shared interests and objectives in facing commonly perceived threats. One of the important and enduring things that has grown from them is practical maritime cooperation, reflected in combined operations and exercises. We all want to continue this cooperation, he said, but a changing and uncertain threat, competing national priorities, and constrained fiscal resources will create an era of uncertainty. Guiding policy may or may not be clear. In this situation, we will need to move beyond isolated facts. Clear-cut choices will seldom be possible, and we will need to expand on common concepts and tools that will allow us to deal with a possible mismatch between expectations and reality.

The next speaker on the panel was Vice Admiral Charles Larson, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations. During his comments, Admiral Larson remarked that the emerging instabilities and challenges of state-supported terrorism, chemical weapons proliferation, piracy, and

narcotics trafficking can best be solved through regional coalition strategies where we can pool our knowledge, our resources, and our capabilities. In discussing the U.S. Navy's future role and development, he noted that fiscal restraints will undoubtedly place growing pressure at home for reexamining the rationale for overseas commitments and bases. This trend will be matched by corresponding internal pressures in nations that host our forces. While the U.S. Navy commits itself to maintaining sufficient forces to meet global commitments, they may have to be modified, and American presence may become more flexible.

In conclusion, Admiral Larson remarked that he believed that the role for naval forces in the future will be even greater than in the present. We can afford nothing less than being ready with quality personnel and ready forces in forward deployment, along with maritime superiority and strength gained through regional coalitions and cooperation.

The next panelist, Vice Admiral Lee Chang-Hwan, Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Republic of Korea Navy, took up the suggestion that one needs a broad concept of maritime affairs to organize our thoughts in facing new challenges. With this in mind, he discussed the idea of the ocean as a lifeline. The sea not only contributes to the exchange of culture and goods, but it is also a means to acquire resources for mankind, while playing an additional role for military forces. "The sea is an indispensable area to each country's existence," he said, "and an essential element for the enlargement of national strength." In discussing fiscal restraint, Admiral Lee remarked that it was a question for each country, but he thought that every navy would be able to maintain combat readiness. The issue, then, will be to prepare for effective operations with a minimum budget and to allot multilateral duties in vital sea areas on a burden-sharing basis.

The next panelist was Rear Admiral Jorge Ferrer, Chief of Staff, Argentine Navy. In his remarks, Admiral Ferrer commented on two events that, in his opinion, had a great impact on the use of the sea: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the current disarmament negotiations between the Great Powers. These events, he said, "subvert the profits for a global war." The fundamental elements of any naval strategy (presence and sea control) must always be used. With new changes, the navy, more than ever, should become the most effective and powerful instrument for the preservation of peace. In this regard, we should focus on the peacetime roles of navies. This role, he pointed out, has a special meaning for nations which lack global projection. It is a paradox in an era of arms control and fiscal restraint, but some areas will require even greater naval activity in the future than ever before, particularly in control of shipping, fishing, scientific research, limitation of pollution, search and rescue.

To deal with these issues in the face of the fiscal problem, Admiral Ferrer mentioned that, in all regions, international naval coordination and cooperation gains special significance. Independent of their relative size or power, nations

with maritime interests share similar problems. This offers the opportunity to establish rules of cooperation, even among nations with different capacities and characteristics. This can be done, for example, through the establishment of different levels and degrees of participation in areas such as control of shipping or construction and repair. In discussing the critical problems in controlling the narcotics traffic, he stressed the importance of making legal changes to permit full participation of armed forces in this type of unconventional warfare. International cooperation, he concluded, will be "the real vector of force to obtain the best, cost-benefit relation."

The final panelist was Commodore Leonard Revang, Norwegian Navy. Commodore Revang focused his remarks on equipment collaboration. He noted that there are several difficulties in this area, caused largely by the fact that military systems often become more expensive from one generation to the next. Moreover, two countries seldom ever need new systems simultaneously. The problems associated with phasing in new equipment, removing old equipment, along with different national operating philosophies, make the situation even more difficult. Recent experience suggests that international cooperation in this area is more expensive than national programs. International programs are often subject to inordinate delays and, on occasion, sink under the weight of paper. One of the reasons for this, he believed, is that we often seek more than a one hundred-percent solution.

Despite problems, such projects can succeed. As an example, he pointed to the sea-based Sparrow missile program, which has run for more than twenty years and has one hundred fifty systems deployed in twelve navies, using a common support basis. In conclusion, Commodore Revang said that it should be possible for other projects to work, but "we should not always seek a Cadillac solution when a Volkswagen can do the job."

In a luncheon address, Secretary of the Navy Lawrence Garrett welcomed delegates to the symposium on behalf of President George Bush and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. Taking up the theme of the symposium, Secretary Garrett noted that strategy has nothing to do with wanting more ships or submarines, it "is applying rigorous logic to the allocation of scarce resources in order to secure the objectives of national security." In this context, a period of fiscal austerity is not a discouragement, but an opportunity to reestablish our priorities and to reaffirm our values. We must seize the moment and regain the initiative in thinking and planning for our forces. One way to begin is to apply a little *glasnost* and *perestroika* to our own navies. We should seize the opportunity to make our case, through the forum of public debate, for a strong and ready peacetime navy. It is a time, too, to arrive openly at a consensus regarding the size and shape of Western naval forces for the future. Perhaps it is also time, he suggested, for our free nations to reaffirm their openness to one another.

Perestroika is a way to meet commitments in a time of fiscal constraint. The U.S. Navy, he said, was already restructuring to fit new fiscal realities. In this regard, he stressed the point that seapower offers the best basis for streamlining national defense. In conclusion, Secretary Garrett noted, "Strong defense does not come cheaply, but it is far less expensive than war, which clearly weakness invites."

The fourth plenary session featured an address, "Dealing with the Resources/Commitments Mismatch" by Vice Admiral Sir James Weatherall, Royal Navy, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic. Admiral Weatherall noted that the biggest problem in all forms of cooperative ventures were the issues of varying national industrial interests with diverging local political aims and national policies. In his view, we should avoid high visibility—high risk ventures in which political considerations might deflect the aim. He recommended that we should stick to practical projects and simpler things. Role specialization is an area that deserves attention, he said, while interoperability and standardization are fields that cannot receive too much attention. We cannot close the gap completely between resources and commitments, but we must strive to make more effective use of our resources. Maintaining maritime credibility in this era will not be easy, but it can be done.

Following this presentation, Vice Admiral William D. Smith, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Program Planning, gave the final address of the symposium. He spoke on "The Effects of Fiscal Constraint on Program Planning." Admiral Smith briefly described the program planning and Federal budget-making process in the United States. While doing this, he showed the trends in defense spending and pointed out that the previous five years of negative growth could be expected to continue throughout the decade of the nineties. He noted that there are cycles in defense spending that reflect both foreign and domestic policy changes. Pointing to the current downward phase, he said, "the crucial issue will be to plan for the next change in the direction of the curve. We must be positioned to act correctly when resources permit us to grow. For most of us, that means making prudent investments in force structure, continuing research, and maintaining sustainability during a period of declining resources."

At the end of the symposium, the senior delegate, Admiral Jose Merino, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Navy, rose to make some farewell remarks, reflecting on his fifty-seven years in naval service and his attendance at seven of the ten International Seapower Symposia held in Newport. Following his remarks, Admiral Trost closed the conference by noting that the private and public discussions during the meeting had "touched on every issue that affects us as professional navy men around the globe. There is no substitute," he said, "for good people-to-people relationships, especially in the world in which we live and in the profession in which we serve."

Following Admiral Trost's remarks, Rear Admiral Ronald J. Kurth, the President of the Naval War College, adjourned the Tenth International Seapower Symposium.

Ψ

Review of Fifteenth Inter-American Naval Conference

Admiral Jorge Martinez, Chilean Navy
Commander in Chief

ADMIRAL KELSO, REAR ADMIRAL STRASSER, distinguished delegates, it is a pleasure to be here today to address you regarding the Fifteenth Inter-American Naval Conference that was held last year in Viha del Mar under sponsorship of the Chilean Navy.

For all those present who are not familiar with these conferences, I will give a brief synthesis of their historical evolution and, subsequently, refer to the principal topics discussed during the conference, its conclusions, and recommendations.

These biennial conferences began in 1959. They were convened by the United States, with the approval of naval commanders in chief of the American continents who perceived that there were a series of matters of common interest which, by being discussed directly, could be resolved in a most convenient manner. In addition, these reunions would contribute to the personal knowledge of the institutional commanders by strengthening the bonds of friendship and promote the exchange of professional ideas.

At the first conference, presided over by Admiral Arleigh Burke, it was agreed to the realization of combined exercises between the United States Navy and the navies of Ibero-American countries. Presently, the 32nd version of these exercises, denominated Unitas, is being carried out at this moment.

As time passed, it was convenient to establish specialized conferences in order to discuss specific topics. As of this date, the following specialized Inter-American conferences are in force:

- Naval Control of Shipping
- Chiefs of Naval Communications
- Directors of Naval War Colleges
- Directors of Logistics and Materiel
- Hostac (Helicopter operations on ships other than carriers)
- Directors of Intelligence, arms, and drug traffic, and coastal and riverine patrol operations

In regard to the Fifteenth Inter-American Naval Conference, a total of one hundred twenty-one persons from fifteen countries and the Inter-American Defense Board participated.

The following topics were presented for discussion in that conference:

Argentina: Integration of sea strategies of the countries of the Americas based on the analysis of maritime objectives and likely cooperation areas, in light of the evolution of the strategic concepts derived from the technological development and the different aspects that may be adopted by the common threat to the region.

In addition, the following topic was discussed: the integration of the "Permanent Exchange of Information concerning Flight Safety" and "Helicopter Operations on Ships Other than Carriers" systems.

Chile: Enhancement of operational capability between the navies to become a regional deterrent in a worldwide conflict.

Colombia: Bibliographic information and data network among naval academies.

United States: Presented the topic "Operation Unitas 30." It consisted of a review of what was carried out during said operation, highlighting that the participation in these exercises has remained constant and in some cases has slightly increased, therefore witnessing the level of commitment that the integrated countries of the Conference share.

In addition, the following topics were presented by the United States:

- Nato anti-air warfare system
- New coastal patrol boat (PBC)
- Integrated electric-drive machinery cluster
- Revolution at sea
- Navy's role in counter-narcotics

Peru: Access system to the technological advance on scientific research.

Venezuela: Military usage of the Exclusive Economic Zone in the Caribbean Sea.

Finally, the **Inter-American Defense Board** presented the topic: defense of Inter-American maritime traffic.

Twenty-one recommendations were derived from the topics discussed and reports from work groups that were formed in order to examine some aspects more profoundly. Among the most significative recommendations, the following should be mentioned:

- Define the cooperation initiatives in common affairs by utilizing the support that computer technology development offers in operative, logistical, and administrative areas.
- Orientation for the normalization of tactical and integration procedures and forms of combined training.
- Strengthen the Inter-American naval communications system by urging the navies of the continent to humanly and administratively support the network that has been established for this purpose.
- Unanimity in evaluating Operation Unitas as a suitable means of Inter-American naval training.

- Increased consideration given to naval control of Inter-American maritime traffic by creating a specialized Inter-American naval conference for this operative activity.
- Definition of cooperative areas in environmental, logistical, human resources, and operative matters.
- Expression of a professional point of view of the Inter-American political reality from the perspective of regional discussion in the presence of an eventual world conflict; likewise, in regard to International Maritime Law.
- The confirmation of the formidable influence of advanced technology in the administration of naval operations, naval construction, means of control for the operation of arms, propulsion, liaison, and auxiliary systems, among others, and the convenience of establishing hemispheric centers of common interest data and information.
- Create a consciousness of the very grave threat of drug trafficking and its evident association with terrorism, and the role of the navy in regard to this problem.
- And finally, the selection of the Peruvian Navy as the host of the Sixteenth Inter-American Naval Conference to be held in Lima during the month of September of 1992.

Conclusions. It is my pleasure to convey to the International Seapower Symposium that the Fifteenth Inter-American Naval Conference was extremely successful due to the topics that were discussed as well as the hierarchy and active participation of the visiting delegations. My country received with special pleasure the men of the sea and their distinguished spouses in Valparaiso, the maritime capital of Chile. The Chilean Navy felt honored by the confidence entrusted in her capacity to organize, carry out, implement agreements, and compose the final act of the Fifteenth Inter-American Naval Conference. My institution was enriched by the human contact as well as the integral experience which emanated from the challenge that the commitment of conducting an Inter-American Naval Conference represents. As a final conclusion, it should be mentioned that it is convenient to continue carrying out these Inter-American Naval Conferences.

With this, I conclude my report. Thank you.

Ψ

Review of Second Western Pacific Seapower Symposium

Admiral Prachume Kruawal, Royal Thai Fleet
Commander in Chief

GOOD MORNING ADMIRAL KELSO and all distinguished naval officers. It is my great pleasure to present you a brief review of the results of the last Western Pacific Seapower Symposium. It was the second Seapower Symposium for the Western Pacific nations and the United States, and it took place on 27-28 November 1990. Two topics that were agreed upon for discussion at the symposium were the regional protection of shipping and the dialogue on the law of the sea.

Before I start with these two topics, may I cover the impression of the regional situation that we got from that meeting. We started the bidding with the concept that the present-day stability was regional dependent and not bipolar. The concept was exemplified by the Gulf crisis. As for the Western Pacific region, the balance of power has shifted from bipolar to local security. We should keep in mind the role and strategy of both the superpowers and the local nations. Although it was agreed that the capability of U.S.S.R. naval force has been on the rise, its role is changing. One should speculate on the direction with caution, but also with imagination, while at the same time monitoring and calibrating its true intention and capability. A question was asked whether the Gulf crisis was just an isolated incident or was a signal showing an era of the new world order. The answer to the question indicated that, in the crisis, the superpowers joined hands and sought common resolution to resolve the conflict, honoring the fact that the political and military survivability was regional, not bipolar. The question next raised concerned the changing of U.S. activities and role in the region. The question concerning future U.S. activity in this area suggested that the U.S. role was shifting and changing, depending on the U.S.S.R.'s international situation. The U.S. goal, however, would not alter since this area was considered strategical and vital to U.S. interests. Referring again to the Gulf crisis, the discussion on imposing sanctions and military buildup considered these matters to be political rather than due solely to the economic issues. The discussion pointed out that in order to have mutual and effective cooperation, nations have to have common political goals and determination. The delegates agreed on the principle that regional stability, security, and economy required mutual trust. And finally, the

panel ended this session by emphasizing that regional instability and conflict in the future would be a direct result of economic rather than military issues. That is all for the situation.

The first topic that we discussed was the regional protection of shipping. We emphasized the need to secure sea lines of communication. There was a great interest in the proposal to establish a technical working committee to share information and to find commonly acceptable procedures. Two options existed in order to achieve this goal. The options of whether to reorganize this cooperation in a top-down or in a bottom-up fashion. The top-down arrangement would require political agreement at first, while the bottom-up cooperation would be immediately manageable and could be employed by the navies. The data exchanging and monitoring was seen to be a useful and practical outcome for the start. A facet of cooperation would include not only the exchanging and monitoring of shipping data, but also the data involving drug trafficking, smuggling, and pirating. It was proposed that this technical working committee be comprised of both military and civilian personnel. In peacetime, the civilian organization may play a regular role, while most of the body would be transferred to military authority in wartime. Participation in the scheme would be on a voluntary basis. Finally, the panel agreed that the setting up of a technical working committee, overlooking the monitoring and exchange of shipping data in the area, would be beneficial to all Western Pacific nations. However, there were still a number of unanswered questions and therefore the matters would be discussed further at a later date.

The last topic was a dialogue on the law of the sea. It was considered to be a complicated matter and highly technical, and a review that involves adjusting the law should be left to the experts or organizations who normally deal with it. It was determind that, with military force, one has to take the practical side of the matter. From this deduction, in making an agreement to achieve good and friendly relations, neighboring countries need to take a compromise approach, such as exchanging ideas, making compromises on injuries, arranging negotiations when questions arise, or cooperating in terms of bilateral or multinational exercises, such as a joint naval patrol agreement between the Royal Thai Navy and the Royal Malaysian Navy. Concerning the subject of the use of force by naval vessels, the panel agreed entirely that it should be used only on a self-defense basis. Any other form of action should be done through diplomatic channels.

Next, the discussion concluded that a unified agreement regarding maritime traffic control would be difficult to settle. The methods of maritime traffic control should be on an advisory basis. In the same way as air traffic control, the areas of maritime traffic control should not be limited by legal boundaries, such as the Exclusive Economic Zone.

A point on the effects of a naval arms control agreement on the enforcement of the law of the sea was raised. It was concluded that the agreement would

restrict or prevent a navy's freedom to operate on the high seas rather than the other way around.

And that is a short brief of the results of the last Western Pacific Seapower Symposium.

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Keynote Address

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations

WE ARE UNDOUBTEDLY IN THE MIDST of some of the most incredible changes the world has ever witnessed.

Since our last symposium, just two years ago, we've seen the destruction of the Berlin Wall, followed by the reunification of Germany. We've witnessed the rebirth of freedom in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. And we've seen a coalition of more than thirty nations band together to counter Iraqi aggression against Kuwait.

At the 1989 symposium, many of us spoke cautiously of the ramifications of *glasnost* and *perestroika*. We recognized that massive internal problems were weakening the Soviet Union. At the same time, we knew that their military might, including their naval forces, had not yet diminished. Now, an abortive coup attempt has accelerated political, military and economic change in the Soviet Union. The subsequent collapse of their communist party has reduced the influence of communism elsewhere in the world. Clearly, the Cold War is over. In response, little more than a week ago, the President of the United States announced sweeping, unilateral changes in this nation's nuclear weapons posture. These include the removal and stowage ashore of sea-based tactical nuclear weapons. Just yesterday, the Soviet President responded with a similar proposal. We hope these initiatives will constitute a major step toward a more peaceful world. Tangible evidence of a vastly altered geopolitical climate is the welcome first-time participation, at this symposium, of senior naval representatives from Bulgaria and Poland.

The full implications of these dramatic changes remain to be seen. Nor, I believe, have we encountered the last of them. Adapting to a new climate both day-to-day, and for long-range planning, has made our jobs extremely challenging. It is difficult to plan a few years downstream when we cannot be certain how events will unfold a few weeks from now.

Virtually all of the previous meetings of the International Seapower Symposium have focused largely on the Soviet naval threat. In the past, participants have spent a good deal of time analyzing in detail the Soviet order of battle. There was nothing gratuitous about this. The motives of a non-maritime nation, whose powerful naval forces far surpassed its defensive requirements, were for most of

us a valid and pressing concern. I am glad that the tenor of the times allows us to diverge from this traditional focus.

We are all hopeful, and I think the signs show promise for a more peaceful world. But despite the hopeful signs before us, I cannot say with any certainty that this earth is rid of strife. The end of the Cold War has not resolved many fundamental national and international problems. We are not capable of eradicating the basic causes of tension and instability in the immediate future.

Certainly by the first decade of the next century, it is not likely that economic problems around the globe will decrease. The gap between rich and poor will probably grow more pronounced. The security of nations will be defined increasingly in economic terms. In a world becoming more interdependent at every turn, economic competition may well prove more critical in leading to conflict than will ideological differences. Access to petroleum may prove a significant source for such conflict, making the stability of the Persian Gulf region an ongoing concern.

A rapidly increasing world population is another concern. By 2010, the world's population is predicted to grow from five billion to seven billion people. World population trends suggest there will be a much larger group of young people in the teenage category. These youngsters will live in primarily poor countries—they will be "have nots." These global teenagers, during the most volatile time in their lives, will be much better informed than similar youths have been in the past because they will be living in the information age; through walkman, television, radio, and communication devices, they will be aware of their poverty and destitution and the wealth of the developed countries.

The discord from civil, religious and ethnic strife has, if anything, increased over the past two years and shows no sign of declining. In an era when all seems possible, separatist and secessionist movements will be common. Despite committed efforts of the United Nations and other international organizations, our ability to resolve civil disputes peacefully is limited. For us, the major concern is the threat to regional stability, should discord spill across national borders.

Finally, the proliferation of technologically advanced, easily deployable, lethal weapons throughout the world is a major cause for concern. Even with the promising arms reductions being considered by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, the spread of those weapons will remain a critical issue for all nations. Indeed, such proliferation serves to undermine the effectiveness of arms control, in that it keeps us from being able to reduce as much as we might like. I am concerned, of course, not only about nuclear weapons. The spread of biological and chemical weapons is equally alarming. As we assess new threats to international stability, the presence of such weapons cannot be ignored.

As the possibility of global war recedes, there remains a very real potential for regional crises. This threat requires us to plan more intensively for contingency operations and crisis response. In many cases, our nations have common goals

and common concerns in particular regions of the world. Such common interests, along with force reductions in many nations, suggest that combined, rather than unilateral operations may be more prevalent in the future. And while operations *Desert Shield/Desert Storm* were, in many respects, unique evolutions, they may serve as a prototype for future combined operations. Our experience in the Persian Gulf demonstrated once again how well suited Maritime Forces are for coalition response. It validated the investment many of us have made in peacetime combined operations and exercises over the years.

It was surely no accident that such a large number of forces from so many nations could form together so rapidly, and operate safely and effectively in tandem. The procedures that allowed this to happen were not arrived at by chance. This overwhelming success was underwritten by years of bilateral and multinational maritime exercises throughout the world. These exercises have resulted in unprecedented levels of interoperability among naval forces from every continent. Many of you have participated with us in such exercises as Unitas, Pacex, WATC, Rimpac, Northern Wedding, Ocean Safari, and Team Spirit, to name but a few. And as we gather today, ships from eight countries are steaming together in the Mediterranean as part of exercise display determination.

Like the disparate naval forces which served together during operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, future coalitions will probably not be composed solely of navies linked by formal treaties or long periods of friendly association. We will once again see navies, not accustomed to operating with other countries, take part in coalition operations. The exercises I've spoken of, however, form a solid framework which makes such *ad hoc* coalitions viable. They provide a core of shared experience which enables new players to fit in easily and make valuable contributions to the collective effort.

Most of us will be forced to make budget tradeoffs in the foreseeable future. I believe it is imperative that we continue to fund participation in these valuable exercises. We also can benefit from as much formal and informal interface as possible. This includes personnel exchange programs, temporary "swaps" of personnel, "pasexes" and sister-ship programs. Our gains in mutual understanding and increased professionalism will repay our investments amply. Continued participation in ISS and other international conferences will also prove more valuable.

As leaders of maritime forces, we share a diversity of common concerns which go beyond the potential for collective effort in times of crisis. Many of us have been obliged to redefine our place in the defense establishments of our respective nations. We find that our role is inexorably linked to shifting national policy goals. A rigorous self-assessment is not necessarily a negative process. It allows us to reaffirm our essential missions, while de-emphasizing those whose priorities have lessened.

Something quite new, I believe, is the need to articulate the value of robust naval forces as an essential component of our national defense for the benefit of our own citizens and leaders. Most of us are not accustomed to having to justify our navy's existence. But that need may grow stronger as we deal with more people who believe the requirement for strong naval forces has declined in the face of a negligible global threat.

Back in 1973, International Seapower Symposium delegates examined the issue of the "non-military uses of naval forces." Today, we see a growing tendency to employ maritime forces in nontraditional roles. Some of these address concerns which are international in scope and lend themselves to joint efforts. These include narcotics trafficking, terrorism, and piracy. Drug interdiction operations have expanded significantly in recent years. Many naval forces have also found themselves more frequently involved in humanitarian operations. The U.S. Navy-Marine Corps team, for instance, has responded five times within a year to lend assistance in the face of natural disaster or political turmoil. Naval forces are uniquely qualified to carry out large-scale relief operations, both unilaterally and in concert.

The common concern we focused on here two years ago, fiscal restraint, has intensified dramatically in the intervening years. Working within a tight budget is nothing new for most of us. At the last ISS, my predecessor, Admiral Trost, said that he had never known anything but periods of fiscal constraint during his forty years in uniform. In light of recent events, the pressure to reduce defence spending even further will increase substantially, and most of us will feel the impact. As you know, U.S. naval forces will be cut by about twenty-five percent over the next five years, but these force reductions, coupled with our recent changes in tactical nuclear posture, do not alter our requirements to be forward deployed and visible; nor will they keep us from maintaining close operating ties with our friends and allies.

As career military professionals, it is only natural that we view with concern the resource reductions we are facing. But we should not be blind to the very positive implications of those reductions. Frankly, I am delighted at the prospect of my grandchildren being able to spend a smaller percentage of their tax dollars on defense, as I am sure you are. Some "belt tightening" is a small price to pay for a vastly diminished possibility of global war and the opportunities for lasting peace. Nonetheless, we are required to meet national security needs and carry out the missions of our respective navies at a time when our resources are significantly diminishing. The requirement to operate more efficiently with fewer resources has become universal.

As we draw down our forces, we are also being challenged to contend with a number of concerns which are not strictly military in nature. One of them is the environment. This is an issue which affects all of us. Because the air and water

do not stop at the end of one country's soil, preservation of the environment cuts across national boundaries.

Many practices which were considered environmentally acceptable ten or fifteen years ago are no longer acceptable. They can generate lasting, lethal effects. We are all obliged to address these issues. And no matter how much we support the goal of a cleaner environment, the programs to achieve that are both complex and costly. I might add that environmental protection, as a grass roots, popular movement, has gained tremendous strength in recent years. As we operate around the world, boats manned by Greenpeace activists have become familiar sights. The *Exxon Valdez* oil spill dramatized the issue in peacetime, and Saddam Hussein heightened international concern by making pollution an instrument of war. The problem is both real and highly visible, and it is not going to go away. It is clearly something which demands more from naval professionals than idle conversation. We must become good stewards of our oceans.

I've spoken mainly of the implications of change and the new challenges we are facing. But there are some reassuring constants as well. The most important are the enduring importance of seapower and the unique abilities of naval forces to influence events. All of us remain deeply committed to the principle of maintaining the freedom of the seas. It is to everyone's advantage that the sea lines be open for the use of all nations. Those sea lines may be shorter and closer to home for some of us than for others, but protecting them will always be one of our essential roles. This is a major peacetime concern in a world in which the majority of trade moves by sea, and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. The ability to control the seas will remain no less critical in conflict. The successful maritime interdiction operations in the Persian Gulf are the most recent example of this enduring reality. They denied Iraq the use of the seas, but enabled us to move the bulk of our materiel unhindered. And it is significant that approximately nintey-five percent of U.S.-based materiel travelled by sea.

The ability of robust maritime forces to deter conflict and to respond quickly and decisively when deterrence fails has been demonstrated on may occasions in past years. These capabilities will prove no less valuable in the years ahead. Naval forces are particularly useful and cost-effective, because they can achieve their mission without firing a shot. Forward deployment of naval forces allows us to exert a positive influence before crisis occurs. Their ability to sustain themselves for extended periods enhances their utility. In terms of mobility and flexibility, strong naval forces are unsurpassed. None of the changes we've witnessed will deprive maritime forces of these unique capabilities. They will continue to afford our national leaders a wide range of options.

Our ability to come together and engage in a beneficial give-and-take on major issues comes not only from our common professional concerns and interests; it comes because we speak a common language which transcends both borders and political differences, and that is the language spoken by those who

go to sea and stand ready to sail in harm's way. The ties which bind sailors the world over have always been strong, and they are as significant in time of peace as they are in war. In fact, they have traditionally influenced, in a positive way, the treatment of enemies in wartime. It is this spirit which allows seafaring newcomers, like the representatives of the nations who have joined us for the first time, to feel comfortable in our midst, whether engaging in serious discussion or swapping sea stories. It is my hope that these traditionally strong and fraternal bonds will be renewed and strengthened during our time together in Newport.

It would be unrealistic to suggest that we can resolve major issues over the next three days. But focusing on them will undoubtedly bring us a step closer to resolution. Exchanging views and gaining new perspectives in this symposium will better equip us to use our forces for positive contributions in a challenging but promising future.

Thank you very much.

Question and Answer Session

Captain di Paola, Italian Navy: The problem we are facing is shrinking forces and not shrinking commitments. Is multinational cooperation the solution to the problem?

Admiral Kelso: Yes, as I look at my required obligations for the Navy, I see a dozen ships in the Caribbean dealing with drug interdiction operations, a carrier battle group in the Mediterranean, a carrier battle group in Southwest Asia, a Marine amphibious group in Southwest Asia and the Mediterranean, and various ships deployed throughout the world. Most of those are deployed at the request of our unified commanders who feel these are necessary to carry out their mission. Therefore, as the number of ships declines, something's got to give.

I do believe we can operate more flexibly than we have in the past. The diminished threat from the Soviet Union does not cause us to have to be at the same places we were in the past in order to deal with what might be quick conflict in Central Europe. Therefore, we have the ability to move them around more. We have decided to have less ships and battle groups, for example. We are looking at more flexibility in how we operate, to take up some of the slack between the way and the numbers with which we have operated, before, and today. But, of course, the commitments are always determined by the political leadership feeling that they need military forces in various places in the world. I don't see that demand necessarily going away if my prediction about the instability (politically and economically) in the world continues to go forth. I don't see us having to be positioned for a quick global conflict, but regional events will create turmoil and will demand conventional forces to be in various areas.

What we worry about from the standpoint of the people equation is that if we can not get the flexibility in operations, we will end with a sailor staying at sea on a ship all the time and he will decide that it is not a very good life. That is the tough part of the equation.

Vice Admiral van Foreest, Royal Netherlands Navy: There is one little problem which I think might have to be solved, and that is, how to make things legitimate. Now, it is easy from a U.S. point of view, seeing the vast military and naval power that you have, to make use of it in an international sense. It is less easy for a great number of the countries here to find the legitimate basis to participate in any such actions as you have just discussed. We feel very strongly in our country that it should be done on the basis of United Nations Security Council resolutions, but there might be other possibilities to carry on with the route which you have just disclosed. What fashion do you see it? Do you see it as a new world order, like President Bush has said, in which the United Nations Security Council is going to have more of a posture and be more the vehicle for the legalizing action, or do you see other venues possible for that?

Admiral Kelso: Hopefully it is a new world order. I think it is different than it has been for most of my career. As I looked at Southwest Asia, it was the first time in my life that the world was not polarized militarily between East and West. A political dialogue continued throughout it, and I don't think we ever worried that it was going to break into a global conflict. The United Nations functioned better than it had in a long time, and clearly, I think, Mr. Bush deserves a lot of credit for bringing people together. It is always going to take that kind of leadership to make it happen. Today we are fundamentally working in the Persian Gulf region under the auspices and direction of the United Nations. It is not U.S. regulations telling us to interdict trade and not let Iraq move military equipment; these are United Nations issues. One of the problems in the past was that it had been hard for many nations to accept political leadership by one nation. But as all our forces get smaller, and we see issues in the world that are clearly in the interest of a large number of us, we are going to have to be willing to work together under the leadership of the U.N., or whatever entity turns out to be the leader in the crisis which will give legitimacy to a smaller nation coming in with its forces. I would also contend that we are not likely going to be able to afford everything in any of our nations. Minesweeping in the Persian Gulf was something for which we had very few assets. The Saudis and the European nations brought in minesweeping assets and they proved very valuable in the conflict. The frigates that each nation brought took a load off of us as we deployed from so far away. I think it is more likely going to be more of a world of cooperative effort than it has been in the past. In the past so many people were

aligned ideologically one way or the other, and they couldn't step across that boundary because they had so many ties that would be severed. They didn't know what would happen after the conflict was over. So, I hope that is the kind of world we are walking into. Hopefully, by knowing we will stand together, we will deter conflict. You only deter as long as people recognize that you have the means to deter. If some sort of conflict occurs, I hope we can put together the kind of coalition which allows us to put it to bed quickly.

From the floor: Admiral, in referring to the Gulf, you stated the importance of maritime forces to the coalition. Coalitions are larger and larger. In order to be efficient, maritime forces have to work together to be interoperable. Then we have a dilemma, if we enlarge and if it is good politically to do that. On the other hand, we need to train among us. Could you expand a little on how this problem of interoperability can be solved when you have so many counties in a coalition?

Admiral Kelso: When I first started working in the European arena, we had very little capability to interface air forces from land and air forces at sea. Today, it is not perfect by any means, but we made it work pretty well. We solved a lot of things which initially hampered us like language barriers and crypto systems. We haven't solved some tough problems, like a common IFF system, so there are a lot of things to continue to work on, but I think we steadily made progress and I believe that steady progress has been a result of the multinational, bilateral and trilateral exercises that have gone on over the years. Through them we have learned better and better how to operate with each other, and we need to continue them so that we will have that capability today and in the future. There will always be something of a problem, because we will probably always, for example, buy a national radio. We just need to make sure that what we buy is interoperable with those of our friends. We need to keep working that problem, but I think we have come a long way.

Captain Sadiq, Pakistan Navy: My question is in two parts. Historically, there have always been two superpowers in the world. Now we are left with one superpower, and that is the United States. The Soviet Union is finished. What is going to happen in the future? The fall of one superpower has always given rise to another. So, do you see another superpower coming in the future?

And the second part is, you said the Soviet threat has diminished. Given the fact that the Soviets have not actually reduced their naval forces and continue to build state of the art ships and submarines, has the threat diminished or is the warning period increased?

Admiral Kelso: I would sign up to your view of history that quite often there have been two superpowers, or maybe it was two camps that balanced each other

in power. Whether they were truly superpowers in a sense that we think of that today, I'm not sure. But clearly within the world that was developed, many times there were two superpowers or two great powers together. I would say we had a unique period when Rome was in charge. We probably had a unique period at the end of the Second World War which continued through the Cold War. We probably have a unique period today. I hope we don't go back to a period of confrontation where the world is polarized or worried about nuclear missiles falling in from either side in the night. One of the things that I think is hopeful about the times is that we have had amazing change in the world with very little bloodshed.

The Warsaw Pact is dissolved and the nations of Eastern Europe made a political change without a revolution in the sense that we normally think of it. Russia is making an enormous political change without the sort of revolution that we saw in the early part of the 19th century. I have no crystal ball that can tell you what is going to happen next year or next week. Certainly a coup can go in one way and then the other way. But what is unique is that we have seen these changes take place without much bloodshed. Romania was an exception to that. We live in a period of time when what happens in Newport can be reported in Moscow within minutes, if somebody wants to report it. Nothing goes on in northern Iraq without somebody putting a television camera on it and telling the world what is taking place. So, I think, you can't do things today in a way which is withheld from people, as you could in the past. This has an enormous influence on events in our world.

The economics of the world have changed. We are no longer economically independent. We all depend so much upon each other. I think economics will play a far larger role than just military power. There have been a lot of changes from what took place in the past. I firmly believe that my country has no desire to see anything but peace in the world. We are not interested in using military force to do anything but make the world a more peaceful place, to keep it stable. That is why you see the political leadership wanting to reduce it; they feel that as much as we had in the past is no longer necessary.

Now let me tackle, the second question. Has the Soviet threat diminished or is it warning time. Clearly, the idea that we had envisioned for so long, of two armies lined up at the Fulda Gap, ready to go to war in the morning, has changed. We put hundreds of miles between the armies. The nations that the Soviets thought would support them clearly are no longer in the Soviet camp. Certainly the ability for a conventional war to start in a short time no longer exists. Does the Soviet Union still pose a threat to the world militarily? Clearly, it has some of the world's most sophisticated hardware. Clearly it can pose a nuclear threat to the world in the morning if it chose to do so. But, it does not appear to me that the Soviet Union is going in that direction. Their political approach so far has not gone toward revolution, although it has had that opportunity. It seems

that the people are trying to solve it another way. What we know about the Soviet Union today is much different than what we knew in years past. We know its economic state. We know they can't solve their problems in a short period of time. We know what their ecological state is, and they have an enormous ecological problem. We know about their ethnic, religious, and political strife. It's hard to see how they will become a nation with an outward thrust any time soon. Maybe it will become an economic superpower in two or three generations and have different views. So, I think the view, that in the morning we are going to have a war with the Soviet Union, is not a vision that you can sell much anymore. The facts just don't support it, and that's where I find myself in trying to define the threat. Could there be something that might make it a threat in the morning? I do not have an answer to that question. I would say that we in the West have never been very good at predicting futures. We need to keep reminding our political leadership that the past has put us in this place before. When we thought all was well, it turned out not to be so well. I learned about the coup going on in the Soviet Union while watching CNN. We had no prior warning. That's my point; the world is not absolutely predictable. I think about the teenage revolution, and there is going be a teenage revolution. If you look at all the changes that have taken place over the last three or four years and watch your television set, who were the movers and shakers? It is the young people that I think will have an effect on our world.

From the floor: Navies have traditionally resisted attempts to get involved in what are not strictly naval roles, what may be called Coast Guard type roles. In the new order that you see emerging, do you see a time when the Navy may actually be fighting for some of these roles or might readily agree to assume some of these roles in order to justify its own existence to the politicians and the taxpayers? At that stage, how do you deal with maintaining naval posture while at the same carrying out meaningful Coast Guard type functions?

Admiral Kelso: I think the answer is dependent on the way in which the military in the country involved is organized, so I'll try to answer it in a general way. It is fair to say that most of us who wear these blue suits have tended to look at open ocean as blue water, beyond coastal maritime operations. Some nations are organized with a separate coast guard who are responsible for policing the economic zone in territorial seas. The U.S. Navy, for example, is prohibited by law to make an arrest. If I wanted to function in that role to support our Coast Guard, I will have to have a Coast Guard detachment on board a ship to actually do the physical arresting of people. When I'm engaged in a maritime drug interception operation in the Caribbean, Vice Admiral Martin H. Daniell [of the Coast Guard] has a group of people on board to carry out those functions. I know many of you have a responsibility within your navy for a coast guard, either

separate or working for you, that has a function to police your internal waters and your rivers. The U.S. Coast Guard in our country also is responsible for internal waters, the navigable rivers, boating safety, and all those sorts of things. We do, from time to time, have disputes in the United States between the Coast Guard and the Navy as to who should get certain resources. So, I suspect no matter how you organize, disputes are going to come up from time to time. If the world continues to become more and more peaceful, and if interdiction of ships on the high seas gets to be less and less of a threat, then I think that you will see many nations turn to a more inward look at what their own particular requirements are in their territorial seas. I think you are going to have a give and take wherever it might be. In areas like some countries in South America where you have narcotics traffic on the rivers and you are trying to stop it, you will have people that will want to put the resources that probably would have gone to the Navy into those kinds of areas. The Navy may not agree with that, but I just think that it is the give and take that you must have.

From the floor: You described in your lecture the change in the focus of your attention from global war to regional conflicts. I have a question concerning tactical nuclear weapons. As far as I know, two years ago you replaced the tactical nuclear weapons which were anti-ship oriented with the more power-projection oriented nuclear forces. My question is this: Isn't there some contradiction in replacing those power projection-oriented tactical nuclear weapons on the one hand, and the proliferation of mass destruction weapons in the regions that you described on other hand?

Admiral Kelso: We did not change what we call strategic weapons at sea. In other words, we didn't change those ships that fire SLBMs (sea-launched ballistic missiles). The Trident program we are going to continue, and we will build eighteen Trident boats which will be our sea-based deterrent for as far as we can see in the future. What we said was, we are going to take all other nuclear weapons off of tactical platforms. We are going to take off tactical depth-bombs, TLAMs, nuclear war-head Tomahawks, all those things so that there would be no other tactical nuclear weapons on U.S. tactical platforms.

Now your question, I think, was how do you square the fact that you are going to keep one and not the other?

We are not going to be willing to give up all nuclear weapons until we have absolute assurance that the last ones are gone from this earth. We are not going to be without a deterrent in this world, because according to my reading of history, when you can no longer deter, there's always somebody who decides he will play. We are trying to reduce the threat of tactical nuclear weapons being proliferated in the world by saying we are willing to get out of nuclear weapons, and we would like the rest of you to get out of them so that we can back off

from that threat. One of the greatest worries we had during the Soviet coup concerned what would become of their enormous number of tactical nuclear weapons. Who was in control of them? Who would take care of them? So we wanted to back away to give the world an opportunity to back away from that threat. We didn't think that we would back away in a short time, and certainly not unilaterally, from the ability to have a deterrent with nuclear weapons.

Vice Admiral MacDougall, Royal Australian Navy: Admiral Kelso, we had a recent demonstration of the efficacy of a coalition of forces. You, in your keynote address, spoke of the increasing complexity of economics and the reduction in the independence of action that's open to the great powers. I wonder if you could offer us your thoughts on the viability of traditional alliances and the expectations of the partners, noting that circumstances are becoming more complex with more interaction in a world economy, and therefore, there are difficult questions arising in the traditional alliances.

Admiral Kelso: I think that as the world evolves around us, the circumstances which made an alliance viable will be reviewed from time to time. We are going through that in Nato today. They are looking at a new strategy. They have various opinions about whether Nato should continue or not, and those types of issues. You see articles from time to time about whether they should take in new members. Is it now a political alliance, whereas it was originally thought of as a military alliance? I would contend that in reality it has always been a political alliance as much as military. But I think that is just going to be part of this world change we see. People will from time to time review where each nation has stood and see if they want to continue. My belief is that most of them [alliances] have served us well, and the world has not changed that much yet. As an American, I hope very much that we will stay in Nato because I believe it's important that Western Europe and North America continue to be tied together in the political dialogue. If we didn't have that alliance, I think that the economic competition which exists between North America and Western Europe would become more of the process than the dialogue we have with Nato for other issues. I hope that it stays together. I look back over the history of this century and it seems to me, when we had a dialogue, it was a lot more peaceful than when we didn't. So you have to go back for the enduring reasons why we are in some of them and not let the changes that are taking place in the world immediately around you necessarily change your basic views. I don't think anything has changed in the area you live in that would make the nations there feel that an alliance was not to their benefit. It is to their advantage to see their interests together. But alliances should be reviewed from time to time and maybe quite often because of internal politics within any one nation.

Captain Fisher, Royal Navy: I very much took the point in your address that whatever the future holds it would hold more financial pressure upon us. I can already see the thin smiles in probably all our capitals, saying your main military threat is going or has gone, and now you are inventing lots of reasons for why you should continue with your same levels and postures. We are all going to have to confront that argument and I wonder whether I could ask you to develop your argument against it?

Admiral Kelso: Well, I don't mind telling you that I think it is my toughest job to develop a good argument that everybody will believe. We are going to have to answer questions that we never thought that we would have to answer in the past, and things that I seem to see so clearly are things that a lot of people don't understand. I have a little trouble getting people to understand why we need the size navy that I think the United States needs, based on how we operated historically. To some extent, we are our own worst enemy because we used the threat of the communist world for so long to justify our forces. Now when you pull that rug out from under us, those who said that was what we supported you on, now say, well what the hell do you need all these things for? The threat is gone and you don't have to deal with it. We are going to have to go back and get across the fundamental ideas of what forces based at sea do for our nation. You can put a naval force off a place where there's tension. It doesn't have to strike. It can be seen. It can be pulled away. It has sustainability. It can help out in all sorts of problems. It protects your citizens. If you know an embassy is being overrun, it can go in and extract your ambassador—those sorts of things. The point is, if you are not there, you are not going to have any effect. You need to talk about those basics. No matter how I get to the Indian Ocean, it is seventy-five hundred miles. Many people see that as a puck on a map and I call them puck-watchers. They think you just move a puck from Norfolk to there. They don't understand the equation of maintaining ships, training people, or that half of that time is transit time and you are not even on station. Ninety of one hundred eighty days is transit time. It takes a lot of ships to maintain a presence continuously and were going to have to do a better job of explaining that. So, I think the simple things that we sometimes take for granted are what we will have to articulate well. We had one of our prominent politicians say recently, "What is the threat to sea control? If the Russians are not going to threaten sea control, who can?" I would have to say he's absolutely right today, but if you continue to fund us like that *ad infinitum*, then we will have a navy that's very, very small and then somebody will say, "Well hey! They're gone, now we can threaten sea control." History will tell you that every time that occurred, somebody thought they could threaten sea control. There are several nations here whose history says that as well. It will happen again if we do not make our arguments well enough. That is the kind of argument that we will have to make. Not big esoteric

arguments, just simple ideas about how the world functions at sea. I might say I'm not doing very well at it.

Rear Admiral Boehmer, Federal German Navy: Admiral, first I would like to thank you for mentioning the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the German reunification as one of the events depicting the big change in the world situation. I would say that it is my conviction that this did not happen because the East has changed, but because our coherent policy created, in one way or another, this change. I think this leaves the West with some responsibility to continue. What is our idea to influence the events in the East? Are we just sitting there and keeping a watchful eye on them, or are we trying to influence by our ideas? To put it in a very short question, will we see a Russian Admiral here next year?

Admiral Kelso: I don't know the answer to that right now. I would agree with you that we do have an obligation to try to continue to make it move in the direction it's going. Now I'm not capable of answering all of the international ideas about whether we are going to pay large dollars or things like that. But I think, from the standpoint of the military people, I want to say one other thing. I gave a lecture not too long ago at our Naval Academy, about the Berlin Wall falling down. But I started it a little bit different. I said that when I was a midshipman sitting where they were, I didn't know the Berlin Wall was going to be erected, much less torn down. That's how the world really has changed in our lifetime when you stop and think about it. It really continues to evolve. But I do think we have an obligation. I think that the president's initiative to take tactical nuclear weapons away was one of those initiatives, because he thought the world had changed enough, that we could take that step. Hopefully, The Russians would also. It looks like they've taken the step, too, to continue down this path. I'm looking forward to my counterpart [from the Soviet Union] visiting here this year. That opportunity will include discussions, ship visits, and all of those types of things that have been positive. I can't think of anything about them that has been anything but positive, and I hope we will continue to go that way.

Vice Admiral Labouerie, French Navy: While our politicians continue to draw down our naval force levels, we are witnessing an explosion of arms exports throughout the world. How can one reconcile these two phenomena, and what is the best equilibrium to seek?

Admiral Kelso: I think that is one of our tough problems. While we reduce arms, other people are selling arms. As I looked at Southwest Asia, one of the things that was clear to me as things built up over there was that if we, the West as well as the Soviets, hadn't sold so many exciting arms, this situation could not have unfolded the way it did. At the same time, I'm pragmatic enough to know that we all have armament industries that have a lot of people that work for them,

and we live in democratic societies that tend to want to keep people working. So, there is going to be some sale of arms regardless. However, that's one of the things we need to look at very closely as we walk into this new world. How do we control the expansion of exotic armaments? If we could figure out some way to do that, I think the tension in the world from a military standpoint would be reduced. But it is going to be a very tough problem because of the economics and politics involved. I agree it's something we need to continue to explore and work on.

Rear Admiral Serrano, Columbian Navy: My question is the following: Taking into account that the actual threat that mankind is facing is narco-traffic, some consider that it is threatening the continental security; others consider that this threat is against the affected countries. What do you consider to be the role of navies in facing this threat?

Admiral Kelso: I think that is a wonderful question. I have been involved, I guess for the last five or six years, in our buildup to deal with the counter-narcotics interdiction operations in the Caribbean. I started out at CincLantFlt and then at CincLant when we established the joint task force in that area of the world. I think that we have improved our ability to interdict narcotics, and we caused the drug traffickers to change their patterns, but we have not stopped it. I was worried when we started interdiction that it would not solve the total drug problem as you discussed. I do think it's a threat to our nations and nobody has seemed to come up with a very good solution. I'm a believer that all of our nations are going to have to do more from the standpoint of where it is produced than from the standpoint of where it is demanded.

Let me give you an example of what we did in the U.S. Navy. We started about ten years ago to try to get rid of drugs in our navy because we knew that we were having a difficult time. We were finding drugs on our ships. We had people who were involved in accidents and who, it turned out, from autopsy reports, had used drugs. We had been trying by interdiction to keep it off our ships. Even though that is a pretty controlled environment, we had not been successful. We finally decided that we were going to try to determine if people were using it and we developed a test. We randomly tested people and we started driving the drug usage down. When we first started testing in some places, we'd find that forty percent were using it. Today when you test people on ships, you may find one, or two percent at most, as you randomly test people. Every once in a while, they even come to me and say, "Your number came up; its time to go and get your test." It is random and we did a pretty good job of driving demand down. What was more important, by creating the deterrent that they might get caught, the peer pressure changed to "Why do you want to use drugs here? We are non-drug users." We haven't made that step in our society.

I've always thought that we must do more to eradicate it where it is grown, but that is not easy because you have a lot of political decisions to make in that part of the world. I do think it is a menace that we have to work at. It will have to be a cooperative effort to do away with it. We should use the maritime forces that we have in the best way we can to interdict it. That is one part of it. I think we are better at it today, but we haven't solved the problem by interdiction alone. Whether we ever will or not, I don't know.

Captain Varona, Philippine Navy: Economic competition is really a crucial factor vis-à-vis differences that might be a key potential source of conflict in the future. Compared to what is happening now in Europe—for example the demolition of the Berlin Wall and then the emergence of the republics independent from the Soviet Union in the future, and your indication that perhaps the navies of today will be more involved in non-naval missions, i.e. humanitarian missions, drug and law enforcement related missions, and such other missions addressed more to guarantee maintenance of the peace—I was trying to project how it might be possible for some kind of United Nations navy emerging in the future instead of United Nations forces being formed from time to time to manage a post-war peace. How would you look at the emergence of United Nations armed forces and a United Nations navy established as an institution to prevent war rather than manage peace after war?

Admiral Kelso: I'm not sure that I'm capable of answering that because I think the question you're asking is really a political question of all of our nations. We have not, in my opinion, been willing to take that step. When the United Nations was formed, there was the view that there would evolve a United Nations peace force, and maybe other nations would not have individual arms. It has never come close to that, and I don't see it happening that way in the near term. There are very few sovereign nations that are going to subject their sovereignty and not have their own independent means of defense and pay for a separate one that would fight against it. So, I think you're going to be in a position of persuasion before you're going to have an international set of navies, armies, or air forces operating from some United Nations direction. I don't personally see that on the near horizon.

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Patterns of Naval Multinational Cooperation
Past, Present, and Future

Admiral William D. Smith, U.S. Navy
U.S. Representative to the Nato Military Committee

ADMIRAL MORA, ADMIRAL KELSO, and all of the very distinguished symposium participants, it is truly an honor to have the privilege of addressing such a distinguished group of international naval officers on a subject that, in view of the world events, is both important and timely. Naval multinational cooperation among the free world's navies has a history that dates back to the beginning of national navies. During this symposium, attended by the most senior naval officers of fifty-seven free-world countries, we have the unique opportunity to exchange views concerning multinational naval cooperation, to discuss a host of subjects on cooperative maritime roles, and to hear the views of a number of very experienced and articulate naval officers, whose nation's views are important to the future of today's free world.

The subject that I will discuss today is at the very core of the symposium theme. As I speak on "naval multinational cooperation—past, present, and future," I hope to stimulate your interest in expanding current, naval multinational cooperation into an even greater and broader spectrum.

Now, how should I go about doing this? As you are quite aware, we can pick any time in history and any geostrategic portion of the world and find numerous examples of successful naval multinational cooperation. Knowing that I have one hour of allotted time, I have chosen to cover only the most important and most pertinent examples, some of which may simply be informative. Others of which, quite possibly, may stimulate your own national and professional interest to participate more fully in future naval multinational exercises.

What makes up the very basics of naval multinational cooperation in today's navies? In other words, what do we need as basic building blocks to strengthen the cooperation between the world navies?

First, we must have common national goals, and I believe we do. Witness this audience, representing fifty-seven different navies, gathered here today. Second, in combined naval operations, we must be able to communicate clearly and quickly. The rapidly changing hazards of safe operations at sea demand it. And third, we must be able to operate safely as a unified force in times of crisis without the benefit of prolonged preparation.

Therefore, as I talk today, I hope to thoroughly discuss these last two basic building blocks. Before I do so, I want to review a little naval history from the point of view of successful multinational operations. I'll start with World War One and culminate with the special challenges of today's naval environment.

It is not my intention to give a history lesson to such an astute group of naval officers as are assembled here, but it is important to remember that the navies of the world are the best architects of multinational cooperation.

Although World War I was predominantly a grueling trench warfare land battle, there were still numerous examples of successful naval multinational cooperation. For example, in 1917 the United States sent a division of battleships to join the British Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow. Even though they never saw combat, their presence ensured that another large-scale surface encounter was avoided.

During the first major modern naval battle of the Atlantic, under Royal Navy command, the United States had numerous destroyers actively involved. It is interesting to note that many of these destroyers operated from European harbors, such as Queenstown in Ireland, Gibraltar, and Brest, France. Meanwhile in the Mediterranean, the British Royal Navy commander of convoy escorts used French, Italian, and Japanese ships.

After World War I, the pattern of multinational maritime cooperation continued. During the period 1919 through 1924, British, American, and other allied naval forces maintained a presence in Turkish waters to maintain free passage, to police the armistice, and to contain the Greek-Turkish conflict that followed World War I.

Naval multinational cooperation was prevalent during the Spanish Civil War when British and French naval forces helped maintain an exclusion zone around Spain to uphold the agreed policy of non-intervention. This naval cooperation, consisting of approximately thirty destroyers from each country, also included sharing each other's naval bases. This effort was the ultimate in naval multinational cooperation. The purpose was to protect neutral shipping as well as to prevent the Spanish Civil War from erupting into a general European conflict. This historic naval multinational effort, prior to 1939, was a crucial beginning to the later success of the Allied navies' cooperation in World War Two.

During World War Two, in 1939 and 1940, British and French surface combatants formed joint surface groups to track down enemy raiders. Of course, this type of national cooperation ceased with the defeat of France, but due largely to the determination and courage of many individual French units that sided with the Free French, some French warships continued to participate individually in a variety of operations. Most notably, the French battleship *Richelieu* joined the British Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean in 1944 and 1945.

These were not the only courageous units from occupied nations that participated with the Royal Navy during World War II; others included

destroyers and submarines from Poland, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Greece.

Of course, entire books have been written on the Normandy landings in June 1944. Operation *Overlord*, the largest single multinational naval operation to date, included American, British, Belgian, Polish, Greek, and a substantial number of Free French units, operating under combined Allied command.

Meanwhile, as the Battle of the Atlantic raged on, the U.S. Navy and the British Royal Navy divided responsibilities along geographic lines, with the U.S. Navy escorting convoys west of Iceland, and the Royal Navy, to the eastward. This geographical separation is obviously the quickest cooperation method that can be achieved, and it can be successful with minimal training and minimal planning.

In the Mediterranean campaign of 1942 to 1944, American naval units supported Allied landings in North Africa, Sicily, and the Italian mainland, under British naval command. The Allied landing in southern France in August 1944, commanded by an American admiral, was predominantly an American force, but also included British, Canadian, Free French, Greek, and Polish warships.

Concurrently, Allied forces in the Pacific theater were combined in the multinational ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Australian) Command. This command had not sufficiently trained together and, in fact, lacked a common signaling system, which ultimately led to their defeat by a force of Japanese cruisers in the Battle of the Java Sea. This defeat is a clear example of what can result when the second and third building blocks of naval multinational cooperation are missing. Thereafter, individual Dutch and Australian units operated as part of British and Australian task forces, while Dutch submarines operated under British command in the East Indies.

In the last naval battles of the Pacific war, the British Pacific Fleet, organized as Task Force 57, fought in the Battle of Okinawa under American tactical command.

After World War Two, the world navies again participated in regional conflicts in both Korea and Vietnam. In Korean waters, British units, including aircraft carriers, joined American units under U.S. command. The surface units provided naval gunfire support, while the carriers flew close air support, interdiction, and combat air patrol missions from 1950 to 1953.

More recently, the Middle East Gulf crisis has again shown the strength, resolve, and flexibility of multinational forces. In 1984, Iran and Iraq each attacked tankers transporting the other's oil, and in 1987 Iran laid mines in the Gulf shipping lanes. Navies from seven countries, including the United States, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, and Italy, joined to escort tankers into the Persian Gulf in the well-known operation, *Earnest Will*. These efforts and air power from U.S. carriers in the northern Indian Ocean protected oil-laden tankers at a time when both Iran and Iraq seemed likely to

attack these tankers with missiles and mines. This very fine example of naval multinational cooperation was only a precursor to the largest example of naval multinational cooperation in recent times: Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. (More on those campaigns later.)

Clearly, modern naval history since World War One demonstrates that naval multinational cooperation is a vital prerequisite to successful naval operations. Absolutely essential to successful combined naval operations are the last two basic building blocks of operational communications and common operating procedures.

One management tool that we at Nato have successfully used to build these two blocks is the Military Agency for Standardization, more commonly referred to as MAS.

What is MAS and how does it work? MAS was founded in 1951 in London, and moved to Brussels in 1967. Each service—army, navy, and air force—has its own MAS Board that is tasked with promoting standard tactics and operating procedures.

The naval MAS board is composed of a senior officer from each Nato country. The naval board acts as the decision-making body for a wide range of standardization agreements (called Stanags) and maritime Allied publications. The Stanags provide the foundations for allied publications that, in turn, form the basic building blocks for naval multinational cooperation. Allied publications cover a wide range of important naval subjects and have been in service for many years, dating as far back as 1942. Nato published its first naval publication, "Naval Control of Shipping in War," in 1952. The naval board currently has eleven working parties improving and developing a myriad of naval publications. These unclassified publications are generally distributed to non-Nato navies on a need-to-know basis. For example, when a non-Nato navy is participating in a Nato or U.S. bilateral naval exercise, the appropriate publications are shared to ensure safety and effective operations and training.

I want to give a specific example of multinational cooperation relating to the work of the naval board that has been achieved through the publication APP-2. APP-2 is the manual for helicopter operations from ships other than aircraft carriers.

The following integrated operations scenario is common at sea today: a U.S. Navy helicopter will brief for an ASW mission at its parent ship and may refuel on an Italian ship en route to its mission area. Once airborne, the helo may be controlled by ships of several different nations and arrive at the scene of action to relieve a Royal Navy helo or a French Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft prosecuting a submarine contact. After being relieved on station by another nation's aircraft, the U.S. helo may proceed to a Dutch ship to refuel before returning to its home ship.

Although these types of operations happen often, the best recent example I can offer is the case of the Royal Navy helicopters that embarked on a Dutch ship in home waters and then deployed to the Gulf during the Iraq crisis. These Royal Navy helos stayed aboard the Dutch ship during *Desert Storm*, safely performing daily in the most demanding of all operations—combat! Such multinational operations are based on publications produced by the MAS naval board at Nato. Without these standardized publications, such combined operations would be impossible.

Another program that has been quite effective in the naval multinational cooperation arena has been the navy personnel exchange program, or PEP for short. PEP was consolidated in 1971 from an existing program called the Nato/Seato Exchange Program. This program has matured into a naval exchange program representing twenty-one nations. Currently, there are approximately one hundred thirty-five U.S. naval officers and sixty-five enlisted naval men and women serving exchange tours throughout the world. Assigned personnel are placed directly into the host service and are fully integrated into that service. Normal tour length is two years.

This is unquestionably a successful ongoing program with a purposeful and clear goal to "foster extensive naval multinational cooperation." This supports my second building block: communications. It is through this program's young officers, men and women, that the future understanding and communication between navies will continue to prosper.

The third building block, operating safely in time of crisis, is helped by naval multinational cooperation in joint exercises. There are far too many for me to discuss here, but it is impossible to discuss naval multinational cooperations and not mention the extensive combined exercises that all of us have shared. I know that I personally have been involved in combined exercises with many of the navies represented in this august group. I know that there are numerous regionalized combined exercises that are ongoing in your geostrategic areas of concern, even now. The direct result of these exercises, in which we have worked so hard for so many decades, is the ability to safely operate together in time of crisis as an effective and insurmountable fighting force.

We in Nato have formalized our combined operating forces into the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic and the Standing Naval Forces Channel (and the soon-to-be-established Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean). These Nato naval multinational forces are identical in concept to Unitas, established via the Mutual Security Act of 1951. But as early as 1950, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) tactics were being shared by the United States through training and combined exercises with our Latin American neighbors.

The Nato standing naval forces have successfully operated together, only since 1967, with all Nato countries that have a navy participating in one way or another and operating virtually every class and type of vessel. These operations have

included "out or area" operations. A recent example being the operations in the Eastern Mediterranean during *Desert Storm*. These forces, flying a Nato flag, are commanded by all the participating countries on a rotating basis, using a fully integrated staff from participating navies. They exercise their war-fighting abilities in all the major warfare areas, to include AAW, ASW, and ASUW. All of these combined operations, including port calls in the operating countries, not only strengthen the communications and personal ties among the participants, but they also allow us to draw from these experiences when it becomes necessary to operate together in time of crisis.

That brings us to the recent events of Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. The spectacular success enjoyed by all seventeen navies involved during *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* was the product of decades of combined operations experience garnered through numerous peacetime joint exercises, some common equipment, and continual communications training. The significant progress made in the conduct of such operations over the years was dramatically reflected in the successes on the maritime battlefield.

This unified naval force, which mounted a successful maritime interception campaign in response to U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq, required the control of nearly 250,000 square miles of sea lanes. Not an easy task!

Under U.N. Resolutions 661, 665, and 670, Commander, Middle East Force and his staff developed and executed the maritime intercept plan. Battle group and destroyer squadrons in the Red Sea and the northern Arabian Sea coordinated the intercept plan. Challenges were issued over radios from warships, P-3 aircraft flying maritime patrol, helicopters, and tactical aircraft flying combat air patrols.

From the first days of the maritime intercept mission, warships like the USS *John L. Hall* (FFG 32), the first ship to challenge a merchant vessel, averaged ten challenges daily.

USS *Brewton*'s (FF 1086) law enforcement detachment participated in the first multinational boarding of a Iraqi vessel on 14 September 1990, but only after *Brewton* and the Australian frigate, HMAS *Darwin* (FO4), fired warning shots across the Iraqi vessel's bow after she initially refused to slow down.

By Christmas of last year, the number of maritime intercepts neared six thousand, with 713 vessels boarded by multinational teams. The high degree of coordination exhibited by the multinational naval forces in enforcing the U.N. sanctions reflected years of peacetime training and cooperation among the navies involved. The maritime interception campaign was an example of multinational cooperation at its best.

This multinational maritime force continued its demanding mission as *Desert Storm* began. While the air war raged on, the maritime intercepts continued at a steady pace, especially in the northern Red Sea where cargo holds were painstakingly checked for Iraq-bound materials.

When hostilities ended on 28 February, the maritime interception forces had diverted in excess of one million tons of shipping carrying prohibited cargo. This cargo included surface-to-air missile systems, command-and-control equipment, early warning radars, weapons, ammunition, repair parts, foodstuffs, and general supplies required to maintain Iraq's industrial base.

General Norman Schwarzkopf, during his May address to the 1991 graduating class of the U.S. Naval Academy, paid eloquent tribute to the multinational naval effort during Operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. In part, he stated

> . . . the multinational naval force formed a steel wall around the waters leading to Iraq. . . . Thanks to these superb efforts, not one cargo hold, not one crate, not even one pallet of seaborne contraband ever touched Saddam Hussein's shores. The result: Iraq lost ninety percent of its imports, one hundred percent of its exports, and had its gross national product cut in half.

He went on to say that these efforts "deterred, indeed, I believe, stopped Iraq from marching into Saudi Arabia."

As you all undoubtedly know, this monumental naval embargo continues today. As of 1 October 1991, over 174 ships from seventeen allied nations have challenged more than 11,705 merchant vessels, boarded 2,348 to inspect manifest and cargo hulls, and diverted 139 for violations of U.N. sanction guidelines. The most current divert of seaborne contraband, aboard a Russian ship, took place just eight days ago. This continues to be a significant effort by a unified naval force.

In conclusion, let me share with you a saying that is common among the United States armed forces. The adage is, "The more you sweat in peacetime, the less you bleed in combat." This well-used peacetime adage has proven itself time and again during the present events of *Desert Storm*.

During the Iraq crisis, how did 175 ships from seventeen countries gather together on relatively short notice, in restricted waters, on three fronts safely and successfully to protect international shipping and control the sea lanes of communications? The key phrase here is, how did we accomplish this safely, with no collisions at sea between the multinational navies? The answer is certainly obvious: The coalition had a common goal. The coalition knew how to communicate, and we had sweated profusely in peacetime by repeated combined exercises to be able to operate safely as a unified force.

The challenge we have before us in these very promising and "potentially peaceful" times is to safeguard this peace with increasing international responsibilities and decreasing national assets. It is a well-documented fact that many nations' soldiers are being disbanded in large numbers, and airspace sovereignty has reduced the flexibility of these nations' air forces. Therefore, it will be increasingly required of the nations' navies to "protect the peace." What we need in times like these are "naval force multipliers," and we have the most obvious

force multiplier in our grasp today. That multiplier is the synergistic effect of naval multinational cooperation. So I propose that we continue, at all cost, what we have worked so hard for and what has proven to be so effective. We must continue to communicate. We must jointly exercise our young naval men and women at sea in peacetime so that they don't bleed during time of conflict. Thank you for your attention.

Question and Answer Session

Rear Admiral Abbott, Royal Navy: I enjoyed what you had to say and agree, I think, with nearly all of it. There was one omission which, I think, one ought to address and that is the question of command. However big or however small the operation is, whether it is something on the size of *Desert Storm* or whether it is operating with a small coast guard, one needs to know who is in charge and one has got to practice that. Doing this in peacetime, perhaps with an exercise, is more easily done and less argued about than in wartime. We need to practice for what we will do in war and we need to be more flexible as to who is going to be in command. The question that there must be someone in charge seems to me to be absolutely unassailable. In Nato, we have worked a long time on this, and the command structure is well established. To establish command structures outside Nato seems to me to be something that's probably very difficult to do unless you do it on a flexible pragmatic approach, but that is something difficult to practice. Have you any comments?

Admiral Smith: Because Nato requires a consensus of sixteen sovereign nations, it has been very popular to rotate command, particularly in the standing naval forces and in the on-call force in the Mediterranean. There is also the principle that says the country that brings the largest force generally gets an opportunity to have the command, unless the others have a more qualified member. Many of the early World War Two, and even World War One, combined operations were commanded by Royal Navy flag officers. I think that was due principally to the fact that the preponderance of the striking power in those cases was from Royal Navy ships. If we could have standing naval forces in other regions of the world, at the mutual consent of the interested parties, those standing naval forces could be a way to represent a contribution by each of the member countries to a common cause, a common force projection, or a common force for stability. Certainly a force for stability is becoming a more popular Nato concept than the confrontational view of the Soviets as the threat. The command issue will probably end up, as you say, being solved pragmatically. For example, in the discussion on the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, the command issue has come up. The consensus in the working group has been that

you only have a vote on who can command if you bring ships to the organization. Hopefully, that principle will be continued.

From the floor: I see a major problem apart from the command problem. It is the rules of engagement problem. When we are in combat, like in *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, you have an enemy and you fight, so the rules of engagement are simple. When we are not in combat, and in a crisis management situation, the rules of engagement vary from nation to nation. How do you think we can solve the problem for a non-Nato multinational force. Do you envisage that we can develop common rules of engagement in a crisis management situation?

Admiral Smith: I think that there are a couple of principles here and this would be a good time to bring them out. A couple of times in my remarks, I referred to integrated command or integrated operations. We in Nato are beginning to differentiate between multinational cooperation and integrated operations. Integrated operations are best represented in the deployment of the Nato AWAC. This is an aircraft which uses individuals from different countries within one organizational structure. That integrated operation, I think, proves to be very successful, because it is probably the best test of our ability to develop procedures which can be understood by each member. There is another aspect which says that each nation's experience level to operate these forces may be different because they have had a different level of resources and training. So another principle that is being developed is the more complete integration of staffs so that each nation can have key members in that staff to learn the operation as young officers so that as they become more senior they then have an opportunity to use that experience in whatever new situation arises.

I think in crisis management the most difficult problem we will have for the use of naval forces will be the political problem. The political problem says we must have a consensus on how the crisis should be approached. For example, there is currently no consensus in Europe regarding how to approach the crisis in Yugoslavia. If you are going to use a military force to help resolve such a crisis, first you have to have political consensus. During the *Desert Storm* portion of the campaign in Iraq, the most difficult problem Nato had to deal with was how to politically respond to that situation. The military application was relatively straightforward—if you were able to set the political aspect aside. Unfortunately, politicians don't like to do that. It is much less difficult to apply force than to require the consensus of governments with different interests to agree to an approach. The problem will be at the political level, not at the individual training level. That is clearly the experience in Nato today.

Vice Admiral Talal, Royal Saudi Naval Forces: Admiral, reviewing the slides that were listing the countries and the navies that were present in the area, I could

not help but notice that many navies have been ignored. They were not mentioned at all: mainly the Saudi Arabian Navy and all the Gulf navies. The Saudi Arabian presence was only second to the United States, with more than twenty ships committed to that effort. Not all of them are big ships, but there were frigates, supply ships, and corvettes. The whole of the Saudi Arabian Navy was, in fact, committed to that effort. Since you were not talking about only the navies that came from far away, but you were talking about the navies present in the area, I wonder why those navies were not mentioned in that effort?

Rear Admiral William H. Wright: I think that was obviously an oversight on our part. There was, perhaps, an emphasis dealing with the navies that came from much farther away. We obviously missed out on the major contribution of the Gulf states.

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Panel Discussion

Coalition Maritime Operations

Confronting the Common Threat

Problems and Successes

Moderator: Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr.
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Program Planning
U.S. Navy

Panelists: Admiral Jorge Ferrer
Chief of Staff
Argentine Navy
Vice Admiral Talal al-Mofadi
Commander, Royal Saudi Naval Forces
Vice Admiral Herpert van Foreest
Chief of Staff and Commander in Chief
Royal Netherlands Navy
Vice Admiral J. D. Williams
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
Naval Warfare
U.S. Navy
Rear Admiral Peter Abbott
Vice Chief of the Naval Staff
Royal Navy

Vice Admiral Mauz:

TO INTRODUCE THE MEMBERS OF OUR PANEL, to my right is Admiral Talal from the Royal Saudi Naval Forces. Admiral Talal is the commander of those forces and, of course, they were centrally involved from the very first day of the Kuwaiti crisis until the very last day, operating right up against Kuwait and performing great work there. To his right is Vice Admiral van Foreest, the Chief of Staff and Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Navy. The Dutch were there right from the beginning as well, shortly after

the crisis started. They came into the area and were great assets. To his right is Vice Admiral J. D. Williams from the friendly country of Tennessee. J. D. was the commander of the Sixth Fleet during the *Desert Shield* buildup and worked very closely with Central Command, providing support and forces for the operation. Admiral Williams is now the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Warfare. To his right is Rear Admiral Peter Abbot. Admiral Abbot is the Vice Chief of Naval Staff in London and was also involved in *Desert Shield/Desert Storm* from the point of view of being London's man to go back and forth to tidy things up. Finally, Admiral Jorge Ferrer, Chief of Naval Staff from Argentina. His forces also were among the first committed to the adventure and whose forces participated very capably throughout. Let me say a few words and then I'll turn over to the panelists who will each, in turn, say a few words before we open to questions and answers.

The topic that we have this morning is "Confronting the Common Threat: Problems and Successes." It is mainly a story about successes. The coalition naval forces made *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* possible. We were there in the beginning, and we had the framework for a coalition already in place. We had carriers in the Red Sea and the North Arabian Sea as part of the U.S. Middle East Force that has been in the Gulf since 1949. French and British navies were in the area, as they had been for many years. All of these countries were working with the GCC countries very closely. Nobody knows for sure if Saddam Hussein's ambition was to grab a bite—that is, Kuwait—then look at the international reaction and go farther south. It was certainly possible. It is also probably true that his long-term ambition was to control the flow of oil from the Gulf. But we, working together, deterred further Iraqi advances, and we also enabled the introduction of large-scale land and air forces. Those air forces and army units came in steadily, building up until, in February, there were over half a million. But that process took six months. In the critical early days, without the access to the Saudi ports and to the other countries in the area, it would not have been possible. So in fact, naval forces, I believe, were the foundation of the coalition. We have worked well for many years together. We have set examples that our army and air force compatriots are now emulating. We were able to set up a loosely organized international command structure which enabled us to do things like set up an international air defense network in the Gulf right from the very beginning. We had a situation in which it was first U.S. fighter aircraft off a carrier flying combat air patrol missions in the central and northern Persian Gulf under control of the U.S. cruiser coordinating with the Saudi AWACS or U.S. Air Force AWACS, and as the days went by, it would be U.S. Marine fighter aircraft flying from a base in Bahrain under control of that U.S. cruiser. Then, as time went by, it was Canadian CF-18 fighter aircraft, again under control of that cruiser cooperating with the Saudi AWACS, all being tied in with a data link that included many countries. That initial air defense posture, I think, contributed

greatly to the solidarity and to the conviction that we would prevail in the long run. I want to say a few words about the particular contributions of the GCC countries. There has not been, especially in this country, a great deal of recognition for their contributions. I will start from the south and work north:

Oman. We have had relations with Oman that have been very positive and constructive in terms of letting the U.S. Navy use a base in Masira for P-3 operations. The U.S. Air Force has also had some pre-positioned materiel stores in Oman. During the crisis, Oman expanded its cooperation to allow more forces to come in to operate from its bases and also made available to the U.S. Navy amphibious exercise areas on the south coast, which were very important to us as we tried to develop the capabilities to do an amphibious landing in Kuwait. I should also say that Oman continued to exercise very close control over the Straits of Hormuz, watched the traffic come and go, and provided an additional measure of security in that area.

United Arab Emirates. The UAE immediately opened her doors to our ships and made bases available to us. We had extensive ship visits to Dubayy and Abu Dhabi. We also set up a minesweeping base in Abu Dhabi. I know that other navies benefitted from that support as well. UAE also provided air bases and amphibious landing areas.

Qatar. Qatar had been, because of its location, a key player in this coalition. They made their international airport available which became a fighter base for both the U.S. Air Force and Canadian Air Force.

Bahrain. Bahrain's contribution was extensive and massive. That little country assimilated tens of thousands of U.S. airmen, U.S. Marines, and U.S. sailors in bases, both in the capital city of Bahrain, and down at Shair Isa, a new air base in the south. Bahrain's contribution was absolutely instrumental to the success of the whole operation.

Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, as I mentioned, not only had naval forces operating off the coast of Kuwait and in the northern Persian Gulf right from the beginning, and were our eyes and ears up there for a long time, but also provided port facilities. The ports of Dammam and Jubayl really allowed the introduction of land and air forces by granting access to Military Sealift Command forces.

Kuwait. Although Kuwait was seized by Iraq, some Kuwaiti forces did get out. The remaining ships and units of the Kuwaiti Navy came to Bahrain. There, they cooperated with U.S. Central Command. When the war started, they were actually up in the northern Persian Gulf, working very aggressively against their enemy.

Egypt. I want also to mention Egypt. Although not a GCC country, Egypt did contribute directly to the maritime intercept operations that took place in the northern Red Sea. Egypt cooperated by allowing operations inside their territory waters and by allowing the port of Hurghada to be used by our ships

for replenishment via a course that guaranteed the security of the Suez Canal. One of the earliest activities of this coalition naval force was the maritime intercept operations which were established under the U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq. We had a conference in Bahrain in September. At that conference, we sorted out which countries could participate and to what degree, what individual national rules of engagement pertained, what area assignments would be appropriate and so on. We discussed intelligence flow, communications procedures, and all the mechanics to make an international operation like that work. And it did work very well. We were able to carve out responsibilities to the commanders that fit national instructions. I'll tell you, it is so much more effective to have two or three ships conduct an intercept and stop and board an Iraqi ship than it is for just one country. In fact, we had examples where a U.S. ship would ask an Iraqi ship to stop for boarding and search, and he would keep going. We would ask for other navies to come up and to join us in this effort, and then the Iraqi ship stopped. I think that he was more worried about our allies being more inclined to shoot than we were. In any case, throughout that operation there was no overall supreme commander at sea. There has been some discussion about whether it would have been nice to have a single commander in charge of all the naval forces from all the countries. I'm not sure it would have been possible, although probably desirable. In this case, I don't think it was necessary and it may have cost us some flexibility, because as it was, the naval forces were left together in the area to work out arrangements themselves, without interference from higher authority. Had we had a common U.N. commander, we might have been in a situation in which we had less flexibility. Certain navies came under the tactical control of U.S. forces, U.S. carrier battle groups, and operated directly in support of them. The number of U.S. escorts for our carriers was a little bit less than we would liked to have had because some of the ships were off firing Tomahawks or doing other missions. The number of escorts, therefore, was a matter of concern. Allies were most welcome. Allies also directly operated in the northern Persian Gulf. When the shooting started, it became necessary to seize control of the northern Persian Gulf immediately and wipe out the Iraqi naval threat. Allies contributed significantly to this operation. In fact, they did the lion's share of the work. Mine warfare certainly was primarily an allied effort. I also note that, during *Desert Storm*, intercept operations continued as they do to this day in the northern Red Sea.

As far as lessons learned, I'd like to give you a couple from the U.S. perspective. Clearly our navy has been designed for blue water operations against the Soviets. As we are now focusing more on coastal areas, we find that some of our radars and weapons systems are not optimized for near-land operations. We are working on that to try to fix the shortcomings. In the area of command, control, and communications, we've also found some deficiencies, particularly in dealing with shore commanders. We work fine with navies at sea, but the link between the

forces at sea and forces ashore is more difficult. We need to work on better C^3. We will never match, for example, the air component commander in Riyadh, a U.S. Air Force three-star with a staff of 2,900 people. We're never going to be able to put that many people ashore, but the people we do have there must be able to communicate very effectively. There was lots of intelligence, actually there was lots of information, but the fusion of all that information and the distribution of the fused product was wanting. That's something that we are going to work on as well. Battle damage assessment is a subset of this. You cannot rely on satellites to provide you battle damage assessment and hope to get back and deal with that target in the near term, because it takes time to process that system. Communications between the countries of the coalition at sea were generally satisfactory, but I think we can all agree that we could have done more in providing better communications. It varied from country to country, but I think with some common approach to the problem we can help out. Finally, one lesson relearned, I guess, is that the more exercises we do in peacetime the better we'll be able to do in the next coalition that will arise — and it will arise. So, I would promote among all the countries here, the notion that we have more exercises on a regular basis.

Vice Admiral Talal: Good morning gentlemen. First, I'd like to start by thanking the U.S. Navy for giving us the opportunity, in the form of this symposium, for the navies of all free countries of the world, to come here, meet together, exchange views, and talk about their common problems. This is really something that promotes friendship and cooperation between the navies of the free world. I would like also to thank Admiral Mauz for giving the audience some details of the cooperation that Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states have given to the *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* effort. This *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* incident—this historical incident—attracted the attention of everybody in the world. But for us in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, it had special meaning. We have lived it hour by hour, minute by minute, watching and seeing things and happenings unfold in front of us. We received hundreds of thousands of troops, tanks and munitions, all kinds of cargos associated with the operation. We received, right from the beginning, thousands of aircraft that were dispersed all around the Gulf states. We received the ships of all the coalition navies, providing whatever we could for assistance. We tried to make sure that this operation came to the successful conclusion that we were looking for.

This operation really taught us many lessons. First, the cooperation of the countries of the world, under the United Nations auspices, was a valuable tool to carry out and to ensure the safety and good order of the international community. I told everybody that aggression cannot prevail if the goodwill of the international community is presented and the determination of all the countries is to see that aggression does not prevail. The cooperation between the

international community to forbid aggression and promote peaceful coexistence is of utmost value for everybody. It cannot be done without such cooperation as was presented in the *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* operations. As Admiral Mauz just told us, there were many lessons learned from this. Some of which he enumerated, but, for us, there were also some of our own. One for instance, was testing our infrastructure, the ability of our facilities to handle such big operations. They were not really made for such a thing, but we have discovered that with the facilities we have, we are doing excellently. It really reassured us that we will be capable of handling such big movements or even bigger ones. We were also proud of the way that we handled the support of so many big operations and for so many troops, like providing fuel for all the armies that were there, providing food, and providing water, which is not a small thing here. Again, our capabilities in this area were really something to be proud of. The incident also gave the international community not only a chance to repel aggression, but also to have an exercise that could not be obtained under normal conditions. There is no training better than actually doing the thing, especially in the mine warfare field. Mine hunters were actively dealing with live mines and neutralizing them. They were gaining invaluable experience.

The naval operation was a little bit different from the land operation, especially in the field of command. For many navies, it was in the form of cooperation and coordination rather than in the form of straight command as in the case of the land forces. Everything went really fine, given the special situation and the urgency for all the navies to come together. It was easier for the Nato countries to cooperate and deal with each other because they already had the basis for this cooperation. For other navies, it was a little bit harder and we had to cope with many problems of communications and reporting. At the same time, we were dealing with foreign navies while we were also carrying our own problems of defending our coasts and assuring that no aggression happened against our own very high-value targets. The shortcomings of communications and reporting occurred because there was no time to prepare good systems. That gives us an indication that in the future we should do everything we can to make exercises original and international with all interested parties. When there is reason to cooperate in such operations, then the whole thing will be much easier. I want to point out that the lack of good communication resulted in some sad accidents. We had a ship in our navy hit by a friendly aircraft, just because there was not good communication. Some things cannot be planned in advance. We had had some exercises with the U.S. Navy, but there was not only the U.S. Navy in the area. There were many navies that we had to deal with and that showed us exercising in advance can really pay off and can prevent accidents, not only achieve the goals. Thank you.

Vice Admiral van Foreest: Admiral Mauz, admirals, gentlemen. I was asked to address three topics. The first one, how did the Netherlands get involved? The second one, to say something on interoperability, and number three, to say something about the lessons learned.

It must have been remarkable to many other nations that our country joined in and the speed at which we did. Because everyone knows, if you look into our hearts, that we are a trading people. We have a great maritime economic tradition. We don't have a great war-fighting tradition. We are a people who would rather negotiate or buy than fight. But, if we would have to fight, we will fight, and the paintings of van de Velde can prove that we can fight, whether it be in the straits, the narrows leading to the Baltic, or against the Brits, the Spanish, the French, and others of that time. We are also a people with a very legalistic view on life, and I remind you of Hugo de Groot and his *Mare Liberum*. We find that we need, as a country, a legal basis to do things. We are also a moralistic people. Tie that into the present situation of the Christian Democrat and Socialist coalition, and something must have gone on to ensure that the Netherlands could participate in the Gulf crisis. And something did go on. We had a major policy change which was brought forward in September '89, when for the first time it was acknowledged, politically, that security could involve something outside of the Nato area. The winds of change have carried on since then in our country, because now it is politically agreed that the use of military means to underpin our foreign policy is a thing which is valid. It means that our nation, as such, feels a co-responsibility in the maintenance of international order. We find that we should have that co-responsibility on the basis of our relative wealth within the nations of the world. To use a good English word, that really was the *raison d'être* for our participation in the Gulf. It also had to be legitimate, and I put that point forward yesterday. It was legitimate, in our minds, because the whole operation was based on the United Nations Security Council resolutions: the first ones, the 660 and 665, which had to do with the embargo and, of course 678, which had to do with *Desert Storm*.

And now why the navy? Well, there were two reasons. The first one is quite obvious. The navy was prepared and ready. We went to action stations on the 6th of August and when our political masters returned from their holidays, which they broke off on Sunday the 12th of August, there was only one option on the table and that was to send the navy. The second reason is that we managed to convince our political leadership that maritime forces are the most flexible forces during an evolving conflict, in terms of political control. That really put everyone over the brink and our parliament agreed. That answers, actually, my personal point that I would talk on how the Netherlands got involved and why the navy.

Now on interoperability, a lot has been said and written on it, and the same applies to the lessons learned. I have this beautiful review, *The United States Navy in Desert Shield/Desert Storm*, and I have nothing to add to it. I completely agree

with what is written down there. Interoperability, to my idea, concerns far more than C^3I, communications, and all the other problems. I think, and Admiral Kelso brought this forward very strongly yesterday in his keynote address, that it also has a lot to do with trust and mutual respect. That runs all the way from the top level, CNOs, down to the bottom. I personally was very happy that through personal contacts with Admiral Kelso we could get problems sorted out in the C^3I field. I was also very happy that I had very close personal relations with Admiral Louzeau of the French Navy, the French CNO at that time, who helped me clear up all sorts of political problems which had arisen in accordance with our operations on the Western European Union scene, and that he helped me solve the problems which were arising at the Quai d'Orsay. It goes all the way down to when we talk about trust and mutual respect; the ultimate test lays with our commanders at sea. It's about trusting the other partner during replenishment at sea. It's like maneuvering at close quarters and seeing what the other's capabilities are. So to me, interoperability, next to C^3I, really starts up here, between the ears. It also has something to do with the heart.

The second thing I would like to remark about interoperability is that I would strongly underline the words spoken by Admiral Smith on procedures, common books, Stanegs, standardization, and all the other things—all the great benefits of forty-one years of Nato. These made it possible that we did not run into the same disasters that you also mentioned yesterday, Admiral Smith, with the ABDA Fleet in January and February of 1942.

Finally, on a lighter note, gentlemen, I can assure you that interoperability can have a personal touch. I think that I am the living proof that it can be, because I forgot my service tie when I arrived here and I got into great distress. But today I am wearing Admiral [William H.] Wright's spare tie. I can tell you, it fits. It has the right color, and I really feel at home wearing it.

Now, a few of the lessons learned outside of the big book. I am convinced that the success that we had, the piece of mind in advising our political leaders about the means that we could use in the Gulf, and the quiet nights of sleep, realizing that we had good means out there, in both materiel and personnel—all that success was due to the very great efforts of my predecessors. I think that we are going to come to this game again. My first lesson which I learned from the Gulf is that we should plan. We should prepare for something similar to happen, so that my relief (or the relief of my relief), can have the same peace in his mind when he offers the options to the political masters or when he sends the ships to sea. The second lesson to me, personally, is to keep Nato alive, not as an institution, but I would say as a very, very important instrument to optimize our operational readiness. I agree completely with Admiral Mauz; I see, in our part of the world, no substitute for that. We have also found, if we look carefully, that our operational readiness before the Gulf crisis turned out to be marginal for immediate reaction forces, especially with relation to the biological and

chemical threat. So, the third lesson for the Royal Netherlands Navy is that we must tighten, rather than slacken, our standards. The fourth lesson that we learned is that war is never going to be the same anymore, because we will have to live with the syndrome that I call the "This is Peter Arnett, reporting live from Baghdad" syndrome. That will have lasting effects on our business both in relation to the peace of mind of the families who stayed behind and the people who are in the operation, and also in the minds of the politicians at home when they make their decisions. So lesson number four for my successor is: be prepared to be in the limelight.

Trust and mutual respect is the name of the game, so my lesson number five is—and I'm very happy that there are so many non-Nato nations here—please keep the International Seapower Symposium going in the future. Thank you.

Vice Admiral Williams: I am going to deliver a few comments applicable to *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* as well as to some past coalitions that I participated in as U.S. Sixth Fleet commander. The only prediction that I will make today is that many, or at least some, of the navies and countries represented today will form some kind of coalition in the future for a common objective, whether it be in a national disaster for humanitarian aid, as a deterrent operation, or in a conflict. That is the only prediction I think will come true. It may be one year, five years or ten, but some of us will be working together in the future. I certainly support Admiral van Foreest's thought that we need to work together in Nato and in non-Nato areas so that we will be ready for that when it happens. Navies don't see boundaries, as I think the CNO mentioned yesterday. There are none at sea. There are around two hundred twenty nations that border the oceans and only about forty that are landlocked. Many of those that are landlocked are reachable, even by helicopters and certainly by Tacair. The first thing that is needed to form a coalition or cooperation is communications. I have believed for a number of years that communications is the world's biggest problem. INMARSAT was extremely useful in the Gulf to establish communications with units that even our navy did not normally work with, including support ships, civilian ships and merchant ships. In fact, it was a life saver. It could even be called an INMARSAT war from the standpoint of communications. It provided essentially a private, unsecure line for voice or data link on INMARSAT lines. With the right equipment, it will also provide you a secure line. It is a first step. It provides you a phone number. Just like in anyone's pentagon, the first thing you need to get from the person you're relieving is his list of phone numbers and contacts. Then you can usually solve the problems. That's what INMARSAT does. This is a personal recommendation from me, not the United States Navy. I recommend that all the countries here buy, or at least consider buying, in-line one-up (meaning an INMARSAT), so that when the next crisis occurs you either have it on board your flag ships or at least you know where you can get it. It does not

take a long time to install. It is commercial, off-the-shelf, and simple to operate. I have talked to at least two other countries here and asked them whether they have an INMARSAT. The comments, coming from captains and admirals, were the same as mine. It really saved them and gave them communications back to their national headquarters. Many times, it was the only way they had communications, and it was direct and voice. I think that is the simplest way. We could work here for a number of years and still not solve the common communication procedures, but there is one on the shelf we can buy and you do not need any political approval to buy it.

Another point I'd like to make (and I've experienced this more than once) is that willingness for senior officers to cooperate, sometimes without national political direction, is essential for the success of a coalition. I don't encourage that cooperation in violation of a national political will, but certainly in support of the national political objectives. Similar, sometimes brazen, procedures are needed for deconfliction and safety as well as for cooperation. The willingness for senior leaders to cooperate is absolutely essential. In one particular case, a country sent a naval group to an area as a political statement. He had no direction except to proceed and stand off. He also happened to be in the same area that we were in, so I invited him aboard for lunch and we established some deconfliction procedures that really were essential for safety. Then, I established communications with a different country's air force chief of staff, because common procedures for air contacts were essential for safety. If conflict had broken out, we would also have prevented blue on blue or friendly on friendly air engagements. In consort and concurrence from those two countries, I established some IFF procedures between planes so that we could all know who the friendly aircraft were. Again, there was never a political decision requiring the three countries to cooperate, but it was essential that we communicate and cooperate together, not on a military basis, but just for safety and deconfliction. It works and I think that it is essential. I know that this took place during the Iranian crisis and in the early stages of *Desert Shield*. It is essential for the leaders, especially the admirals at sea, to get together to do that. I think it would have worked without knowing the general and admiral in this particular case, but it did ease the problems, since I did know the admiral that had command of the other forces as well as his air force chief of staff. So, it did make things easier because of that mutual confidence and respect that we had. We, in fact, had worked together in past exercises.

The next thing I would recommend, if it is possible to establish, is a common air picture via a data link. Working out a common air picture is essential for safety of flight. If there is a shooting war, it is essential to prevent blue on blue engagements or at least friendly on friendly. Even if it is not a coalition party, you do not want to shoot down a friendly country's aircraft. When I did not have a common air picture with the country that we were operating adjacent to

on shore, I requested and got help from the Pentagon. In a period of less than a year, we developed a system called MALTS, where we could put a unit ashore with Nato Link-One. For the first time since Nato has been formed, we could share the air picture at sea with a land-based radar picture ashore, through all Link-Ones in Nato. Admiral Jerry Tuttle [Director, Space and Electronic Warfare] helped me on that and was able to do it for five percent of the price that Nato had been trying to do it for twenty years, but was never funded to do. With today's technology and software, I can say it's a high probability you can get an interface with a land-based air picture with our Link-11, probably with any land-based system in the world. It will take some design changes in that little box that we had, and some money, but you can do it for a very small percentage of what it used to cost. It only takes that mutual confidence and trust that you want such a system. But, you can't have it after the conflict starts, you have to do it before.

Another point I would like to make, and I could talk for an hour on just this one, liaison officers between the exercising participants in a coalition force, in my opinion, are worth their weight in gold. I advocate having more than one. If you have liaison officers, it not only solves the language barrier which will many times exist, but it will also ease the procedural differences between the navies and air forces. Every exercise I have been in, and I've been in many, the liaison officer made a significant difference. Without a liaison officer, the exercise can sometimes be a failure. I think it is essential, as we look to the future, to meet with the senior officer present and then, with permission from both sides, exchange liaison officers to further that cooperation and coalition.

In summing things up: communications problems must be solved. It is not the only thing that must be solved, but it's the first thing that must be solved. I had a saying which I still think is true, "we must communicate to fight and not fight to communicate." You can't command unless you can communicate reliably and quickly. I would recommend, just as we have these seapower symposia, that we establish periodic communications with each other, whether we are allied together or not. If we are just friendly, we need to be able to talk, and of course, INMARSAT could be a basis for that. Exercising together in the past, as Admiral Mauz and Admiral van Foreest pointed out, absolutely built the best basis for quickly forming a coalition to do anything we decide to do, whether in peace, war or whatever. The Nato procedures was the lifesaver in terms of *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm,* because that is basically what we used in many cases. Probably, it is what will be used in the future. As Admiral van Foreest said, we should keep Nato alive. I think we should do it for a lot of other reasons, but as a minimum, we should keep it alive just so we can have some procedures to work together before the next crisis. It is absolutely essential to be able to work together if we expect to get things done. Thank you.

Rear Admiral Abbott: Good morning ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much. Much of what I would like to say has probably already been said. I think the very first thing I would like to stress is what Admiral Mauz said to start off with and that is, this was an operation that was a success. Perhaps the small criticisms and the lessons learned that we all talk about, and those are perhaps the interesting things to talk about, shouldn't make us forget that it was a great success. I would endorse, one hundred percent, what Admiral Williams said, that the greatest single factor that contributed to that success, I'm sure, is personal contact between the commanders at the higher level and the liaison officer exchanges. It is certainly the case of the Royal Navy. It took considerable effort on our manpower resources to provide fairly high-ranking liaison officers at various points: commanders, captains, high grade, quality officers, but they were worth their weight in gold. I would also like to make one point. We were extremely fortunate in the logistic support, the infrastructure that was available to us. We had very high-grade facilities made available to our LRMP aircraft in Oman, and that was a tremendous success. There were training facilities provided by the Omani Navy which were of use to us. Places where we could take various training forces out to shoot at sleeve targets and things like that in the slightly second-line nature, were provided by the Omani's. The wonderful airhead at Dubai was a key to our logistics support and the wonderful facilities at Jeboali, just down from Dubai, which made our own dockyards at home look small and inadequate. I think that we should all be looking out for pieces of equipment like INMARSAT, as Admiral Williams said, which was fundamental to our ability to talk to each other. Maybe there are other pieces of kit, other pieces of software that are out there on the shelves that will provide some form of interface and some form of particular means of easing our data link exchange or our communication exchange. I think that that's an extremely important point.

Admiral van Foreest mentioned the business about public relations, and I am sure he is right. My only feeling there, perhaps, is that it illustrates a point that we learn these lessons, but our human memory is terribly short. Our successors will forget them, just as we forget them. I was reading a letter the other day from Lady Nelson, not Lady Hamilton, not the mistress, but the wife. She was complaining after the battle of the Nile, at the end of the eighteenth century, about the terrible newspaper reports that she had read. She mentioned the terrible effect that they were having on the morale of families of the captains and sailors who were in the ships at the battle, and the rumours that were being spread, and how these newspaper reporters should be totally banned. It sounded pretty up-to-date television stuff to me.

There was one particular lesson that I would like to offer the seminar which was something that the Royal Navy and the United Kingdom have derived from the operation and that concerns joint force command and control. I think it is relevant because national tri-service integration into a secure, political and

military framework assists the successful formation and management of a coalition force. In the United Kingdom, the chief of defence staff is responsible for the conduct of all operations, intention, and war. He exercises this responsibility through a director of operations and a joint operations center in the Ministry of Defence. He then goes straight through to a four-star commander in a joint headquarters, which in this particular operation was at High Wycombe, or it might be at Northwood. The chain of command is, then, through a two or three-star commander, in theater. There is a deliberate degree of flexibility about the contingency arrangements, because crises will develop differently and the chief of defence staff will wish to retain the flexibility to appoint commanders appropriate to each situation. These commanders, who can be from any of the three services, or even a Royal Marine, operate very much within a tri-service framework. The Royal naval forces in the Gulf during *Desert Storm* reported to an Army three-star, joint force headquarters in theater, who reported to an RAF four-star at joint headquarters. Now, I must admit, that initially the Royal Navy had reservations about these command arrangements, but events justified the value of a single command chain from ministers to forces afloat and in the field. Furthermore, there were very distinct advantages for the Royal Navy when its requests for changes to rules of engagement and the deployment of additional assets were forwarded to the Ministry of Defence by influential and impartial, and that is really the key word, people in the tri-service chain. There was, then, no possible accusation that this was Royal Naval empire-building or having some particular desire to make some particular dark blue point. That, I think, was hugely valuable.

Many of the lessons that I would have wished to make have already been made. The need for interoperability and the need for exercising has been stressed. One point which has not been talked about concerns rules of engagement. Some of the units that came together to investigate (for example, a suspect vessel in the early part of the proceedings), they were allowed to board, while other vessels they were not allowed to board. Some were empowered to fire warning shots, while others were not. These things were gotten over, but the only point I would like to make is that the rules of engagement is a sensitive and political subject, and it is not surprising that you get difficulties. I think this is an area where anything that we can do to provide some framework would be important. I am sure that as military men we would prefer to enter an operation as part of a coalition which has clearer aims and which feels a balanced force with common rules of engagement. I think, however, that there is something utopian about that, and I think that it is much more likely that future multinational maritime operations will follow the pattern of the Gulf crisis. That is, as units arrive in theater as part of a loose grouping, and as politicians reach understandings with each other, a web of bilateral and multilateral relationships will be established in theater. I see our job as, firstly, to warn politicians that a coalition force which

has been brought together under such circumstances is not going to be able to achieve the results that a comparable national force might. Secondly, that those in theater must cooperate as closely as possible. This brings me back to the friendship and the liaisons which can arise out of meetings like this and that of our Nato framework. I agree entirely with Admiral van Foreest and Admiral Williams that this is something that we desperately need to keep alive, and I am sure we will. Thank you very much indeed.

Admiral Ferrer: Thank you very much. Admiral Kelso, distinguished representatives, good morning. One of the key elements of today's international system is the importance of world public opinion. This special kind of public opinion bears a strong ethical and moral significance. It tends to support the achievement of aims which are supreme for humanity, such as freedom, peace, and development.

World public opinion will increasingly become a determining factor for the behavior and actions of national leaders. I do not doubt that it will rule the intellectual, scientific, and technological evolution of humanity. Today's and tomorrow's leaders will assign an increasing importance to what the rest of the world perceives of their actions. The consolidation of world public opinion, together with other human advances, is good news. However, the world still faces dangers that have not been overcome. Among them we can mention as the most significant: overpopulation, starvation, poverty, scarcity of energy, damage to the environment, the ancestral tendency toward the use of violence in order to impose wills.

Therefore, we must consider likely the appearance of threatening actors committed to the use of violent methods that must be countered by military options. World public opinion will gradually make it necessary for the military options to be supported by the highest possible degree of legitimacy. The level of legitimacy increases with the number of nations representing international consent, united to face the disturbing agent's threat. Therefore, the multinational military option will probably be the best answer to future threats of this kind.

Moreover, as we all know, the use of the naval component is the element that allows a more rational use of force in the handling of crises and conflicts, because of its inherent flexibility.

There is no doubt that the number of nations upholding and supporting with their actions the achievement of supreme human values will be the determining factor of the deterrence of a threat to international peace and stability. I must also mention another consequence, which is sometimes little noticed. The international system is formally organized under the concept of nation states. The U.N. embodies this concept.

In a world that becomes more transnational daily, the power of different organizations, such as those Alvin Toffler called, in his last book, "World

Gladiators," will present a new kind of threat and may be increased. Therefore, a real strengthening of the U.N., like the one achieved in the last world events, is extremely positive. I think that the operations in the Gulf constitute a very important precedent for the future. I also think, that the particular Argentine point of view and experience regarding that conflict might interest you.

The Argentine government decided to participate in the multinational effort on the basis of a political commitment to the defence of freedom and peace, a commitment which condemns aggression and violence among the nations, with clear intention to be protagonists and morally responsible. This decision found a navy that was ready and spiritually motivated to play its role in the nation's foreign policy. This allowed the first two units, a destroyer and a frigate, to leave six days after the operation was ordered, for a theater located 11,000 nautical miles from our country.

Now, I would like to be specific about the operation of my navy in the Gulf, the difficulties encountered to reach the theater of operations, the actions executed, and finally, the experience gained. I deem it noteworthy to mention that the participation of the Argentine Navy in the recent crisis is not our first international experience.

In other circumstances, during the last thirty years, Argentine ships joined units of other navies in missions connected with humanitarian assistance, the maintenance of peace and international stability, in combined training tasks, and in the alternating command of the CAMAS (South Atlantic Maritime Area Control).

Our first operating decision dealt with the design of the task group. After carefully considering elements such as the threat level, the interoperability with other navies, and the costs involved, we combined the anti-air, anti-missile and anti-surface capabilities of a destroyer and a frigate.

From the very beginning, the Argentine Navy knew that, although the initial situation was meant to control the commercial embargo against Iraq, the evolution of the crisis would make it necessary to operate in high-intensity tasks. Moreover, the technological origin of the different systems of both units, the most modern type available in our inventories, would basically make likely the interoperability with many ships of the multinational force. Later, to relieve the first task group in March, we opted for a frigate and a transport, taking into account the decrease of the threat level and the contingency of humanitarian assistance tasks.

Moving to the operations area meant a significant effort, since we did not have a logistic support ship to make up the task group. The lack of such a ship was countered by choosing a route along the Mediterranean. Although it involved a longer distance, this was balanced by more and better supporting ports. The brief calls, at Brazil and Senegal, were only for resupply, while in France and Italy, readiness was completed with the valuable cooperation of those navies.

In the theater, the logistic support, essentially fuel, was provided by the seven navies who had tankers in the area. We also received specialized medical assistance in the hospital ships, USS *Mercy* and USS *Comfort*. The rest of the logistic supply was provided by the Argentine Navy and was received by air at the ports of the United Arab Emirates. This was an important effort in the conduct of the operations under our responsibility. During *Desert Shield*, the Argentine ships, in coordination with the rest of the multinational force, were stationed in the areas close to the Strait of Hormuz. They intercepted and inspected more than six hundred merchant ships in the period between November 15th and January 15th.

At the beginning of *Desert Storm*, the Argentine task group joined the combat logistic force, escorting the allied logistic train and also patrolling fixed areas to protect larger coalition units. All this was carried out under the tactical control exercised by the Canadian task group commander. We think that his conduct was excellent, and no problems arose.

Interoperability of the Argentine units with the coalition forces was favored by the knowledge of U.S. Navy doctrine and procedures obtained through the combined operations that I have already mentioned. Among other activities, this allowed us to develop effective weapon exercises, to carry out cross-deck helicopter operations, to resupply underway, and fundamentally to have an effective air defence coordination. In our view, the greatest problems arising from the integration and interoperability were lack of common cryptographic capability, lack of up-dated doctrine procedures released to the Argentine Navy, and lack of common data link. The Argentine Navy's recent production of Link-America, to be used in the Unitas exercise, is an example of a possible solution.

It was also evident that, if there had existed an important naval opposition during *Desert Storm*, the coalition operations could not have been carried out in the same way. Had opposition existed, the different components of the multinational force would have had to apply more homogeneous criteria with respect to two fundamental aspects: command relationships and the rules of engagement.

Our opinion regarding these topics, which bear a strong political significance, and whose perfection is indispensable to assure the future feasibility of these options, is too extensive to be developed now, but will be submitted to each of you in writing following this panel discussion.

The Argentine Republic participated with her navy in the operation leading to the liberation of Kuwait and collected the benefits arising from the common effort in the coalition: to participate in a renewed international environment and, thus, have an updated understanding of today's world of future threats.

The most evident conclusion is that the multinational naval cooperation operations, protected by U.N. mandate from now and ahead, will constitute the military option with the greatest probability of success in the maintenance or reestablishment of peace. This concept is to be applied in any region where disturbances and threats to international security may arise. Thank you.

Question and Answer Session

From the floor: I believe a common thread running through the panelists is the call for more exercises of possible coalition forces, be it Nato or an expanded coalition type force. This call has been made now against the background of shrinking military forces, shrinking defense budgets, and I am wondering if one of the possible answers could be more simulation at a wider coalition level? The army has what they call tactical exercise without troops. I know the navy has its own war gaming, but could this be a possible answer where coalition forces could get together to exercise their command communications in a simulated scenario, and to what extent would the distinguished members of the panel be willing to use this as a substitute to get these exercises done?

Vice Admiral Williams: Obviously, that requires a policy decision, but let me say with computer simulations we now have, and especially the joint simulations we now have within our own country down in Florida between the army and air force, we've established some computer systems there that will allow that. I think more simulations, even had there not been shrinking budgets, probably would be productive, and I think would be useful to prepare for the next coalition effort, whatever that might be. I think it will be something that we could look into and see how that could apply to the symposium participants on an international scale. I think it would work. Let me also say I am a big proponent of the global war games, which I know many of these countries participate in now. I am just thinking out loud now, but maybe it is even time to look at a global exchange exercise here that is not necessarily a war game, but just to explore some of those procedures that we can use to work together before the next conflict.

Rear Admiral Pedersen, Royal Norwegian Navy: I just wondered if it would be possible to consider something like a mobile sea training group or facility that could be of benefit to the ships moving into the area? Something derived from, for instance, flag officer sea training, but be mobile. During the Gulf crisis we benefitted very much from sending our ship to FOST (Flag Officer Sea Training) for a few days to catch up on nuclear defense and biological defense procedures in SHAPE.

Rear Admiral Abbott: I think that is something that one could do, and I think that it is a very good point. We had RFA *Diligence*, a support ship, that is ready for maintenance, but it has often been a thought of mine that if there were the need, one could embark elements of a sea training staff on board her and that one could produce some form of joint exercise opportunities. We had time to

spare in the four or five months leading up; there was an ideal opportunity to undertake that. I think that is a thought very much worth proceeding with.

Admiral Ferrer: I will confirm from our point of view, the problem for the future, for future operations, is not materiel or training. The problem really is a political problem, because it is very important to anticipate the level of violence each country can do. The degree of participation, the common relationships between the alternative or to Nato, the definition of the hostile act and hostile intent and rules of engagement will be very important. It is possible to prepare, during the future, some rules for a coalition when some emergency will arise. For instance, we propose to make an international definition of hostile act or hostile intent, and then to prepare some rules of engagement, using the same language. Perhaps in the future it will be easier, when some emergency arises, to put all together, and then to define for all the countries using the Nato framework the types of effort to conduct naval operations at sea.

Vice Admiral van Foreest: Well, that is always one of the problems. There are many more problems with the rules of engagement, even if you use the English language. To train a weapon means something completely different for the Brits than it does for the United States. One country says that to train is to turn your weapon around, and the other one says that to train might be to aim. So there is a lot to be done certainly in the field of a clear definition of hostile intent and hostile act. Although, I think that within Nato we have our act very, very well together, and we were able to explain it quite clearly to our political masters. So I do not really see that there is too much of a problem there. The problem with rules of engagement is that it is national, in the way that we operated within the coalition. So you cannot speak about common rules of engagement between the different participating nations as you can within Nato in a Nato operation. We must strive for the maximum harmonization of the rules of engagement. That means the political consent to transfer to the other coalition partners, exactly, the rules of engagement which you have been offered. I think that by doing that, even though the wording of all the rules of engagement might be a little bit different between nations, I think that the problem can be solved. But it will never be, in a coalition effort, a common set of rules of engagements sponsored by the United Nations. I think it will remain a national obligation. That is why I am so happy, that should anything happen within the security arrangement which Nato has, that we do then have common rules of engagement.

From the floor: Yes, my question goes to Rear Admiral Abbott, please. I was very much interested in his comments on joint command structure. I wonder if he could elaborate more on that point? In particular, I would like to know if this

joint command structure applies mainly to contingency and war situations or how it works in day-by-day operation?

Rear Admiral Abbott: It applies mainly to contingency and war operations. So, our fleet on a day-to-day basis would be operated by an admiral at Northwood, who is operating it on behalf of the chief of the defence staff. Within the Ministry of Defence, we have a well-developed, joint staff and that forms friendships and relationships that immediately come into play should you go into a contingency or a wartime situation. So there is a peacetime, call it a breeding ground or something similar, where the whole concept is being worked up. That has been a change since 1984.

Rear Admiral Dumancas, Philippine Navy: I just would like to pursue a point mentioned by Vice Admiral van Foreest about the role of media and the prosecution of the operations. If there is anything for which *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* could be remembered, it would be for the part it brought to the living rooms of the households all over the world. Somehow the media and its coverage of the operation posed problems, I am sure, for the management and control of the media. Up to what level is that management exercised until we term it censorship? Thank you.

Vice Admiral van Foreest: Well you see, what we found out was that we needed an organization at home. We weren't really prepared for it. To support the home front and to answer any questions, we opened up bureaus. Due to the press comments which were coming in, people at home were not feeling safe. We were worried about the people who were out there, and they could phone in to certain numbers. We had a complete organization which we set up; we had never done that before in our navy. I was only talking from the experience of the Peter Arnett impact on our navy. We had to do it. In real life, in crisis management, you will have to confer a lot with your politicians. If you are sitting in meetings with your parliament and, maybe its the same in other countries, you see all your parliamentarians sitting there with the morning or with the evening newspaper, depending on the time—they would say, I have just heard or I have just watched CNN, and what is your answer? It influences their minds in the final political decisions, whether you can go ahead with certain things, yes or no? So, you have to have in your organization, you must be prepared for, all this. We never did. We thought, "we will say it, and they will believe it." Now, we have to prove it, because they just read it in the newspaper. They sit there and they say, "hey! is that true? Is that not true?" Especially for the people staying behind at home, who are worried. It is very, very important to have an organization to support them. That was the spill-off of the syndrome I was talking about. I think the United States Navy and probably the Royal Navy are far more

advanced and ready for this kind of thing, because they have been doing it more in the past. But we had to learn that lesson, and we have.

Vice Admiral Mauz: I might add that on the operations perspective, up where the operational forces were, we had to come to grips with dealing with the press in a much more forthright way than we have in the past. We found that we had to dedicate helicopters, dedicate space, dedicate communication circuits, really go out of our way to make the press a part of our staff and not treat them as extra baggage. Those who treated the press as extra baggage got treated that way by the press. It wasn't a happy experience. I think that we have about run out of time, and I would like to conclude this panel discussion now. Thank you very much for you attention.

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Logistics and Sealift in Multinational Cooperation

Vice Admiral Francis R. Donovan, U.S. Navy
Commander, Military Sealift Command

Vice Admiral Stephen F. Loftus, U.S. Navy
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics)

Vice Admiral Donovan:

AS THE MILITARY SEALIFT COMMANDER, I have three different roles. One, I am the manager for sealift under the secretary of navy and through the chief of naval operations. Two, I am a component commander for the U.S. Transportation Command. Third, I am the type commander for the navy's civilian crude oilers, cargo, and ammunition transports which support U.S. naval battle groups and amphibious ready groups, such as those involved in *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. This hat is roughly the equivalent of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. What I am going to discuss today are the three phases of strategic sealift:

Phase One. The effort that started on 7 August and went through early November to bring the *Desert Shield* blocking force into place.

Phase Two. Started when President Bush announced on 8 November that a second force was underway to be on-station by mid-January to enforce the U.N. resolutions should that become a reality.

Phase Three. The force modernization which came about as a result of a Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) agreement. In this phase, we took a thousand- plus tanks out of Europe along with considerable amounts of ammunition. Those tanks went to the theater as replacements or to sit in reserve for the army units. The ammunition was moved as a separate lift. This is the replenishment ammunition that went out as a follow-on—the number of the combat units that went directly up front took initial ammunition with them.

The first items are what we call surge shipping; that is, shipping which gets the combat elements out there plus their ammunition. Then behind that comes the sustainment, which is winter uniforms, additional food and so forth. The

total for *Desert Shield/Desert Storm* amounted to 3.5 million short tons. To put this in perspective, one maritime prepositioned four-ship squadron off-loads about fifty thousand short tons. That is enough equipment to support a marine expeditionary brigade of about 16,500 people for thirty days. This includes all their rolling stock, ammunition, fuel, food, water, wire, sandbags—whatever. We only have three of these MPSs, two are four-ship squadrons and one is a five-ship squadron. We have one in the Indian Ocean, one in the Pacific, one in the Atlantic. Although there was a great deal of fuel available in the theater, we still moved almost seven million short tons of petroleum products around the world in support of *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. All of this was done with no preactivation of assets.

When the word came on 7 August, we started things moving. Eight thousand seven hundred miles is the distance between Savannah, Georgia, to Dammam. The first big lift sailed from Savannah, and that port remained important. The distance from Savannah comes out to be the average or the mean of the transits that we had to do. Of course, they are longer from the West Coast, a bit longer from the U.S. Gulf coast, shorter from northern Europe, and shorter for the lift that we took out of the Mediterranean ports. The average day steaming time to the Persian Gulf was thirteen days for faster ships, the big fast thirty-knot sealift ships, and twenty-four days for the 15.5-knot ships.

The peak of the lift was on 26 December, during the second phase. At that point, the VII Corps was coming out of the European ports, and the First Mechanized Infantry Division was coming out of the U.S. Gulf Coast ports, and materiel was still coming out of Jacksonville and Savannah. On this particular day, 26 December, we had about 238 ships. On that particular day, we had about 180 of those ships underway. On the average, that puts one ship at about every forty-eight or forty-nine miles along the 8,700-mile route. The rest were either off-loading or still loading. A pretty significant effort.

Of the successes during *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, the first is the maritime prepositioned ship concept. On 7 August, the deployment order was issued and the Indian Ocean and Pacific squadrons were told to sail. The first units from those squadrons arrived on day C plus 8, 15 August. The equipment was off-loaded through very modern ports and was out on the desert within a matter of hours. There are thirteen ships in the maritime preposition ship program, one five-ship squadron, and two four-ship squadrons. There is no difference in size. The equipment loaded in the ships is identical. Each one of those squadrons is married up to a specific Marine Expeditionary Brigade that is based in the continental U.S. or in Hawaii. The concept is that when the deployment order is given, the ships get underway—the Military Airlift Command moves the Marines. Then, the Marines arrive, and the ships arrive with their equipment. It worked right out of the textbook, right out of the planning that went on from

the very initial concept. As a result, we had heavy combat power on the ground eight days after the deployment order was given.

The second success is the MPS ships themselves. These are great big commercial ships which have 120 to 170 thousand square feet of deck space. They are roll-on/roll-off ships primarily, and they carry on deck the barge ferries and powered causeway sections which can be used if you do not have a port from which to operate.

The next success is the afloat prepositioning ship. The afloat prepositioning concept is not quite the same as the MPS. These are merchant ships that carry bare-base equipment. One of them had a complete field hospital cocooned on the ship, for example. We have on these ships the ability to put a port in place, if there is none available, and to make the port work. These ships carry some ammunition, some combat support, and service support equipment. They are primarily to support the Air Force and the Army with bare-base equipment. An example of one of the ships from that force is what we call a LASH (Lighter Aboard Ship). These carry big barge-like structures. They can be put in the water and then moved to shore for unloading. They can be moved into a shallower area than the ship can go. They can be serviced alongside, plus they can provide storage in a port area until the forces are ready to use whatever is in that particular lighter.

Another example of the afloat preposition concept is the float-on/float-off ship. This works in concert with the LASH. This is a converted tanker that can flood herself down. She carries cranes, various landing craft, and yard tugs, all of which can work to service the units in the afloat prepositioned force when it arrives. This is also the type of ship that can carry minesweepers to avoid excessive use of their engines in transiting to a theater. Another is the fast sealift ship. These are the premier ships in the rapid deployment of forces from the continental U.S. or from anywhere. These ships are container ships which have been converted to roll-on/roll-off ships. They have a capacity of 150,000 square feet of deck space. When moving the 24th Division, these ships made 33-knot transits, slowing to fuel once, which we stopped doing because we found they did not need to do that. Despite slowing to refuel and transiting the Suez Canal and travelling at 30-plus knots in the open ocean, these ships averaged 27 knots in the transit from Savannah to Dammam. These are a very capable and a very significant part of the sealift force. We have seven of these ships and they carried ten per cent of the 3.5 million short tons. They were able to carry that ten per cent because of their rapid turn around. By the time the ground war ended, some of these ships had made seven round trips to the Gulf.

These fast sealift ships sit in what we call a four-day ROS. They have a partial crew onboard—about a third. They keep the machinery warm, and we exercise them regularly. When we called for them on 7 August and told them to break out and sail to their embarkation port of Savannah, they came out in 48 to 72

hours. Only one took longer than 96, and she was in an overhaul. She came out in about ten days.

Next is the much maligned Ready Reserve Force. The Ready Reserve Force is a different concept altogether. These are older merchant ships no longer in commercial use. They sit unmanned up in the James River, down outside of Norfolk, and in Susin Bay in California. They sit unmanned waiting for the call. These ships were sitting allegedly in five, ten, and twenty-day break-out status. We had some come out in four and a half days. The ones that got the notoriety are the ones that came out later. Some of these have been sitting idle for as long as thirteen years. Imagine trying to light a boiler in a ship that has been sitting still for thirteen years and get it underway in five days. In fact, the Ready Reserve Force performed beautifully. Once the ships got out and operating, and the plants were taken care of, they performed very well and ended up carrying about 20 percent of all the cargo that we took out to the theater. I went over and testified one day on Capitol Hill about the Ready Reserve Force. I pointed out during that particular testimony, and in an interview afterwards, that on that particular day we had 104 of 110 ships that were running back and forth. That works out to 94.5 percent; when I was in school, that used to give me an A. The next day the newspaper only reported that six ships were broken, and one was being towed to Spain. So, no matter how hard we tried we didn't do very well with the press during that particular period.

The merchant marine crews that man these ships are worth noting. As we started calling out the ships, we had to get mariners who had not been sailing for a while. They came back in good numbers for us. The chief engineer of one particular ship was a school teacher. His oiler, the senior unlicensed onboard, was 67 years old and had come out of retirement. He was out there doing the job and doing it very well.

The next group to talk about is the special Middle East agreement ships. This is the agreement with seven U.S. liner companies, whose ships we charted space on. We did not charter the ships, the companies ran them on their regular runs. They were straight container ships which are part of the U.S. merchant marine. We shipped our sustainment cargos out this way and handled them as a straight commercial flow. Shipping under this agreement reached its peak between December and February, when we shipped forty thousand containers.

Another group is the charter market. In this area, the response was a success and there is no question about that. The charter market, both the U.S. charter market and ships that came to us from other nations with other flags, participated in the carrying of cargo for us. There is no question in my mind that chartering was a huge success. I think the multinational participation cargo carrying for the effort out there was also a coalition effort. We had thirty-five different nations involved. We used 216 dry cargo ships of which about 180 of those were other than U.S. flag vessels. The ships came to us willingly and rapidly. Frequently,

when dealing with commercial ships, you are not dealing with just the flag that is flying on that ship. There is an owner in one country, a flag for the ship, officers could be from another country, and the crew from somewhere else. But these ships came and responded and did the job. The masters and engineers of these ships really looked at their task as a mission. Granted they were sailing under charter where there was a monetary profit involved, but these masters talked about the opportunity to participate in such an important and lofty effort. They felt that they really had a mission in doing so.

Finally, we had free and donated shipping. We had chartered ships, and then we had some donated ships. Around the end of August and in early September, there was an effort underway, not of MSC's or the Navy's doing, to request free ships on a government-to-government basis. This started to work down the system and caused some confusion since, at the same time, we were in the marketplace chartering ships. Ship brokers and owners were unsure as to which way they should respond. This actually delayed us a little bit. In the future, we might look at establishing something like the Nato ship pool, on a broader international basis, in which ships can be made available to carry cargo.

The percentage of lift and dry cargo delivered by the maritime prepositioning ships and the prepositioned ships adds up to a relatively small eight percent. This number is deceiving. These ships made only one trip in that role. Once they were empty, they became a common carrier and transported cargo from the U.S., Europe, or somewhere else, and the Gulf. They often picked up other cargos and made additional trips to the region. The eight percent figure is only the first off-load by these ships in their primary role.

The initial plan was to deliver the blocking force cargo in 120 days. We actually delivered it all in ninety-five days, about a month early. After the President's announcement on 8 November, there was a tremendous surge to deliver the VII Corps out of Europe and the 1st Infantry, plus some additional armor out of our Gulf ports, to the theater. Included in this surge was the Third MPS squadron, deploying to the theater from the Atlantic. Those seven big and very capable MPS fast sealift ships accounted for almost ten percent of the whole cargo delivered by all ships. Overall, there was ninety-five percent delivery by sea, of which eighty percent was delivered in U.S. flag ships.

To achieve, this we had tremendous assistance in ship repair, emergency towing, procurement of parts, bunkering, canal transits, and port handling as ships moved back and forth all during *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*.

Now for some lessons learned and conclusions:

First, we do not have enough shipping to cover the surge phase. In *Desert Shield*, the availability of allied ships was key to getting the surge cargo delivered.

Second, the U.S. flag shipping is adequate for sustainment. We are a containership merchant marine and we can sustain ourselves with that.

Third, we must be ready to adapt to rapidly changing requirements, and we are going to have to be even more adaptable in the future. When General McCaffrey brought the 24th Division to the port of Savannah, we expected 1.3 million square feet of cargo. The 24th actually had 1.7 million and we had to adjust to that fact with additional shipping. The general wanted to take his tanks with ammunition in them, something we had not planned on but which made sense. That made the tanks weigh 72 tons instead of 63, which meant we had to add a little bit of additional shipping. To make up for that the ships loaded faster.

Fourth, we are going to make a case for more roll-on/roll-off ships in the U.S. flag strategic sealift program. We will be able to define this need when we complete the mobility requirement study now underway.

Fifth, the response of the charter market was very valuable in that it eliminated the need for us to have to requisition ships from the U.S. merchant marine fleet.

Sixth, the readiness of the reserve force has to be improved. We paid in time and money, at the start of the operation, for maintenance to these ships that had been deferred in years past. The surge sealift investment in the 1980s, when we built the fast sealift ships, was invaluable and we used everything we had.

And finally, U.S. flag shipping cannot meet the surge, but we can provide sustainment. The availability of merchant marine crews is adequate now, but rapidly diminishing. We have to address that. As our merchant marine gets into bigger container ships, smaller crews, and fewer ships, the reserve of trained mariners to come and man the ready reserve force is a problem that we are working on. In maintaining the flexibility to deal with the change of requirements, the ships from other nations came in and helped us tremendously as those requirements grew.

Thank you. I would now like to turn this over to Admiral Loftus.

Vice Admiral Loftus: Admiral Donovan has just given you his observations on sealift and logistics in *Desert Storm* from an operational perspective. In my duties as the deputy chief of naval operations for logistics, I look at these same issues from a slightly different angle.

I am what we call the resource sponsor for the strategic sealift program. That means it is my responsibility to determine sealift requirements for the chief of naval operations; what kind and how much. Obviously, we cannot afford everything that everyone wants. Those requirements have to be prioritized in order to maintain an effective and balanced sealift program.

From my perspective, the strategic sealift story of *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* was a great success. We moved more equipment to Saudi Arabia in three weeks than we moved in three months during the Korea War. As many ships arrived in theater during the first five months of *Desert Shield* as there were during a year and a half of the massive convoy operations to northern Russia during World War Two. Fully ninety-five percent of all the materiels that went to the Gulf

went by sea. Of that, eighty-five percent was dry cargo and ninety-nine percent of the POL was delivered to the Persian Gulf by sealift.

The credit for this success lies with the people and organizations behind the operation, such as Admiral Donovan's Military Sealift Command, as well as the allied nations that provided the additional shipping that filled in for our shortages. It is significant that nineteen percent of all dry cargo was delivered by allied and friendly flag shipping. We could not have done it alone.

This story might have been different if we had not made some bold decisions early in the 1980s. Events in the late 1970s, such as instability in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, emphasized the need for rapid force deployment capabilities. An increased possibility of a protracted conventional conflict with the Soviet Union, coupled with the rapid decline of the U.S. merchant marine and the collapse of merchant shipbuilding in the U.S., all coincided to place attention on the sealift issue. The U.S. Navy took the lead by identifying strategic sealift as a navy mission and establishing the Strategic Sealift Division within the Department of the Navy to serve as the focal point for all sealift programs and policies. Major studies that were conducted at that time showed significant deficiencies in our sealift capabilities. To correct those deficiencies, we began a vigorous shipbuilding and conversion program. The assets from this program are those that were in place and ready to respond to just such a contingency as *Desert Shield*. This sealift acquisition program resulted in an investment of over $7.5 billion. Although that is a small portion of the defense budget, some argued that it was a hefty bill to pay for sealift. Looking at the results of *Desert Storm*, it is clear we made the right decisions.

But we must make a note of caution. We were so successful that we have to be very careful not to draw conclusions from the past that might not be applicable to the future. Conditions for sealift execution were nearly perfect in the *Desert Shield* scenario: We were unopposed. We had lots of help from allies and a strong international consensus as a foundation for this cooperative effort. The destination port facilities were absolutely ideal, and the Suez Canal was open. These conditions were situational. We cannot always plan on them.

As we talk about requirements, there is something else we have to keep in mind. Strategic sealift is not just a single service asset. We support all the services—army, air force, and marines—in executing what I would characterize as a national program. Our efforts of the eighties and of today have been successful because our nations' leaders were astute enough to recognize the need for strategic sealift.

Looking back, just ten months prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President Bush articulated a National Sealift Policy which basically stated that,

> Our strategy demands that we be able to move men and materiel to the scene of a crisis, at a pace and in numbers sufficient to field an overwhelming force. As our overall force levels draw down and our forward-deployed forces shrink, we must sustain and expand our investment in airlift, sealift and, where possible, prepositioning. . . .

It is this well-defined objective that has guided our efforts in the strategic sealift arena and will continue to do so for years to come.

While *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* provided valuable lessons learned and a wealth of empirical data, that experience alone cannot establish our future mobilization requirements; these must be a function of our fundamental force structure and be established in the context of the president's aspirations toward a new world order. On 2 August 1990, while the Iraqis were invading Kuwait, the president was giving a speech in Aspen, Colorado. In that speech, he said,

> In an era where threats may emerge with little or no warning, our ability to defend our interests will depend on our speed and our agility. . . . And in many of the conflicts we could face, we may not have the luxury of matching manpower with prepositioned materiel. We will have to have air and sealift capacities to get our forces where they are needed, when they are needed. . . .

Operation *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* confirmed this need for mobility. It also confirmed that the United States military will play a critical role in the evolving world order. Moreover, our experience in the Gulf forces us to recognize that this role will be constrained by political realities of popular expectation. You have heard it before and you will hear it again: Military action must be short. Military action must be decisive. Casualties must be minimal. Therefore, force superiority must be achieved quickly.

With scheduled force reductions, these constraints must be addressed by increased responsiveness and mobility. This translates into the need to increase the capacity of responsive sealift to meet the surge and the sustainment requirements, one of the conclusions discussed by Admiral Donovan.

Let me cite some examples: Our Ready Reserve Force is a fleet of ninety-six inactive ships maintained by the U.S. Maritime Administration. When one of those ships is activated for a contingency, the navy assumes operational control. We activated as many ships of the Ready Reserve Force as we could use and validated once again our need for additional roll-on/roll-off vessels.

So it is clear that, while *Operation Desert Storm* was a success in terms of achieving our overall strategic goals, thanks in large part to the actions we took in the 1980s, we learned that there are in fact shortfalls that need to be addressed.

What are we doing to correct these shortfalls? Prior to *Operation Desert Shield*, we were already looking hard at our strategic sealift program to determine how to follow up our efforts of the 1980s. After budget adjustments, the 1990 Defense Bill provided us $375 million for the construction of sealift ships. In June 1990, just prior to *Operation Desert Shield*, the navy initiated a "zero-based study" with the specific intent of establishing a baseline requirement for programming those funds provided by the Congress. Then, in November 1990, after *Operation Desert Shield* began, Congress added $900 million to sealift construction funds, which gave us a total of $1.3 billion to increase our sealift capacity. In addition, Congress

directed the Department of Defense to provide a comprehensive analysis of all of our mobility requirements.

The Joint Staff is currently working on this new study to determine requirements for airlift, sealift, afloat and ashore prepositioning, as well as amphibious lift. This is an extensive effort currently referred to as the "Defense Mobility Requirements Study." The study is scheduled to be completed late this year, but an interim response was provided to Congress this past April and that report forms the basis upon which the navy staff has been channeling its efforts.

The report looks at a variety of scenarios and sealift alternatives. The analysis is based on projected sealift assets for the year 1999. The one conflict that appears to drive sealift is what you would expect, another major regional conflict in southwestern Asia. This scenario calls for mobility assets to move four or five heavy divisions the farthest distance possible. As Admiral Donovan noted earlier, that is about 8,700 miles. The interim report concludes that we need more large, medium-speed (19 to 25-knot) roll-on/roll-off vessels. The MRS final report, due out in November, will identify the specific number and the employment mode of these ships.

In the meantime, the navy has pressed on with an aggressive implementation plan, recently delivered to Congress, that is flexible enough to accommodate any of the potential requirements derived from the MRS final report. This is moving very quickly. Contracts have been awarded and designs are already being presented to the navy.

The navy plan encompasses concept design of medium speed roll-on/roll-off ships of two sizes—a 950-foot and a 700-foot ship. Either ship is useful for prepositioning overseas or positioning in a reserve status in the United States. The smaller ship, the 700-foot ship, is also designed for potential use in commercial trade, under a build and charter program. Implementation of this plan will lead to a shipbuilding or major conversion program, the size and scope of which will be determined by the MRS final report.

Besides the acquisition of new or converted ships, the navy plan also supports the continuation of the on-going efforts by the Maritime Administration to expand the Ready Reserve Force to 104 dry cargo ships by 1994, as a means by which to meet sealift shortfalls in the near term. We are also looking at the incorporation of government-funded, national defense features into merchant ships as another way of enhancing their military utility and reducing sealift shortfall. For example, a ship designed to carry automobiles will have reinforcements build in so that it could carry heavier vehicles.

Thus far I have talked about *Desert Storm* and what the U.S. is doing to increase our sealift capacity. Now, let me discuss how the international community plays an important part in this.

One of the keys to our strategic sealift capability is the use of allied and friendly nation shipping as an adjunct to what the U.S. is able to provide. During *Desert*

Shield/Desert Storm, the response from U.S. and allied flag carriers was excellent, and as Admiral Donovan has shown you, it filled in the gap between requirements and assets. Allied-flag charters proved critical to our success during the operation.

In today's climate of declining defense budgets, we must be careful to husband our resources carefully. We will not have the luxury to spend billions of dollars on a sealift program at a time when we may be struggling to maintain our personnel, training, and weapon procurement accounts at an adequate level. The dollars we can save by implementing an efficient and a well-thought-out strategic sealift program can be spent instead on other high priority issues. That is where our allies play an important part.

Once our requirements study is complete, the navy will embark on a comprehensive plan to meet the shortfalls which we have identified. Part of that plan must include how you, our allies and friends, can help us in providing additional sealift. Many of you are involved already under the Nato rapid reinforcement plan. We also have the potential for additional bilateral agreements. Commitments from allied nations to provide this kind of shipping and host-nation support in the event of a contingency are essential to success and, as we have seen, can contribute significantly to the United States moving its forces and supplies wherever they are needed in the world.

We need to work together to formalize agreements so they are in place when we need them. We should act jointly, perhaps through the United Nations, to develop an identifiable pool of sealift assets to be available in the event of contingencies. These assets would be used *only* for a U.N.-sanctioned intervention, and would of course be subject to the approval of the country supplying those assets at the time they were needed. This would not in any way alleviate the need for the U.S. to continue upgrading our own sealift capacity, but I believe this system would give us a means by which to identify early-on what additional assets are available and who has them. It also sends a message to would-be aggressors that there is a strong coalition of peace-loving nations ready to respond quickly to any act of aggression.

Basically, to have sealift to meet any future contingencies, we need two things: a strong shipbuilding program, which I believe we have underway, and we need allied support. Your interest and involvement in the sealift program I have described is vital to the interests of all of us and to worldwide peace.

Question and Answer Session

Rear Admiral Abbott, Royal Navy: I found that very interesting and I do not want to make the mistake that is always leveled that amateur soldiers talk tactics, and professional ones talk logistics, but $7.5 billion dollars spent on sealift ships

is an awful lot of money that could have been spent on submarines or aircraft or tanks. What evidence do you have that the charter market could have provided more?

Vice Admiral Donovan: The charter market is there, and as I said, it worked very, very well. The key point is that, in the surge shipping, when you are getting underway to respond quickly, as we saw on a couple of Admiral Loftus' slides, and its obviously very necessary when you want to get that first heavy division moving rapidly, you need ships that are available on quicker notice than a ship that has to come in off the trade somewhere and be chartered. So for that initial surge shipping, for that first period, and I use ten to twelve days or maybe up to fifteen days, you have to have that basic force to get that first group out and moving. What the charter market provides for you is to meet some of the changing requirements, some of the growth that inevitably will come. I am an amphibious officer, and I loaded marines many times. The way we could tell that the brigade was finally there was when you saw the volleyball net coming down the pier in the back of a truck. Then you had everything. So, you are going to always carry more than you initially started out with, and that is where the charter market comes in. It provides capacity for the lift requirement for that fifteenth day and after. Up front, you have to have the dedicated assets to get them on berth quickly. *Capella*, for example, was our first fast sealift ship. She's part of the $7.3 billion conversion and so forth. She came out of the St. John's River and made a very rapid transit from the Jacksonville area to Savannah. She took the first units of the 24th Mechanized Infantry Division and was alongside the pier in Ad Dammam twenty days from when we told her to light fires in her boiler. So she got underway, transited to her breakout port, loaded for two days, transmitted to the theater and was down-loading twenty days from the seventh of August. You cannot get that from the charter market. In the first charter ships that we got, for example, we needed heavy roll-on/roll-off capable ships in the Gulf coast and we had a big roll-on/roll-off ship in a Gulf port. We had to make an agreement to have him down-load his cargo, get it stored, get underway, proceed to an embarkation port. It is that first surge—that is what you really need.

Vice Admiral Loftus: Let me just add that part of that investment provided us with the hospital ships, the *Comfort* and the *Mercy*, of course, and the eight SL-7 conversions that Frank talked about that would not be commercially viable in the market. As a matter of fact, that is one of the reasons that they were available. Plus, it provided us with TAVBs and the kinds of ships that gave us the intermediate maintenance capability on the beach. So there were other things inside that contributed to the early part of this thing.

Rear Admiral Pedersen, Royal Norwegian Navy: In the Gulf you were able to concentrate all your forces in the action going on in the Gulf. Did you think you would have enough resources? You had Nato to protect the sea lines of communication across the Atlantic and through the Mediterranean and were still able to marshall all that force in the Gulf. It was a simple operation, in that respect, that all your warships could go directly to the Gulf without having to protect the sea lines of communication.

Vice Admiral Loftus: You are absolutely right. That was not tested. This was one of the lessons learned that we have to be careful that we do not ignore. It was unopposed and one the things that the CNO is wrestling with is force structural levels which would provide us with the proper balance and acceptable risk to be able to handle these kinds of operations. So it was not tested and its something that we cannot forget as we look at contingencies in the future.

Vice Admiral Donovan: I was asked that question in testifying one day. My response was that the first thing that we would have to do would be to come back to Congress and get back the whole class of ocean escorts that we were decommissioning in order to meet our other requirements and in order to be able to do what we were doing. We have, in place, convoy commodores, retired navy captains and flag officers, who can form up and steam a convey. We have naval control of shipping people who can work with the merchant ships. We have the system in place to form and to move ships in company if we have to do that.

Commodore Athanassiou, Greek Navy: I would like to ask you, since there is still a need for international sealift capability to be provided, have you come to conclusions on what shipping you need? Can this information be provided to maritime nations, such as the Greek merchant marine, so that shipowners can go on and build the ships you might need in the future?

Vice Admiral Loftus: The mobility requirement study that is underway right now will try and determine what the size and kind of employment will be for those ships. The two ships that I mentioned, the 700-foot and the 950-foot ships, are clearly those kinds of roll-on/roll-off ships which we think we are going to need anyway. That is why the concept designs are coming in from that viewpoint. They provide you, on the smaller basis, with about a 257-thousand-square-foot ship, and the larger will give you literally more than 400 thousand square feet. Until we have the roll-on/roll-off numbers down and the kinds of ships, then, we are relatively well off. In the other areas, they will continue to purchase on the open market. But as far as building, those are the two types of ships that we will be looking to build in U.S. shipyards. Thank you very much.

Luncheon Remarks

The Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III
Secretary of the Navy

THANK YOU VERY MUCH. Admiral Strasser, Admiral Kelso, distinguished officers, ladies and gentlemen, it is a privilege to be here this afternoon and a pleasure to see so many of our friends and colleagues from navies around the world, and of course, it is always nice to get out of Washington, a place that was recently described as 62.7 square miles surrounded by reality.

This is the Eleventh International Seapower Symposium to be hosted here at Newport. I suspect that it is also, by far, one of the most important. What you are confronting here this week, as I see it, is nothing less than a fundamental redefinition of the most basic assumptions about international security and of seapower's role in protecting that security. I say that for the simple reason that the world we are living in today is nothing at all like the one we knew two years ago when we met here last.

The Warsaw Pact is gone. Communism has run its course in the Soviet Union. The wall that separated free peoples from tyrannized ones has fallen, literally, in Berlin, and figuratively, almost everywhere else. The fear of a nuclear world war three, that fear that determined so much of our strategic thinking over the last forty years, is suddenly and mercifully remote. For all of those things, we should be relieved and pleased. Maybe, even a toast is in order today. We were certainly justified in sharing the happiness of those who literally tore down the Berlin Wall. But (and there is always a "but") even those happy crowds in Berlin had to figure out what to do with the debris in the street, come morning. That, in a sense, is what we are doing now, all over the world. How do we deal with the debris of the old world order? What is to be built in its place? And the ultimate question: how do we ensure that the end of the Cold War will further international peace and stability and not merely the resumption of ancient conflicts and conventional violence?

I do not think there is any doubt that those solutions will require governments to develop and to refine further the habit of cooperation at all levels: political, economic, cultural and, certainly, militarily. The collective presumption among all nations must be that differences are best resolved, as Winston Churchill once put it, by "jaw-jaw" and not "war-war." The forum for such cooperation might logically be the United Nations. Or, perhaps, nations will more naturally form

regional communities, like the European Community or the Organization of American States. Or maybe the new world order will simply rest on a network of close bilateral relationships.

Only one thing is absolutely certain and that is, that no matter how successful we are in creating a civil, global community, there will always be someone, somewhere, ready to violate it with armed force. There will always be Saddam Husseins, there will always be seeds for civil war, and there will always be outlaw factions bent on spreading international terror. For that reason there will always be the need to defend our interests with armed forces of our own, to be used if the habits of a civil order are to be preserved in cooperation with one another.

Furthermore, I am convinced that seapower, represented by all of you in this room, must be a vigorous component of those forces. I say that not just because of my office nor because of my audience. I say that because, for one thing, the strategic focus for most of our governments has changed from enormous, and possibly nuclear land battles for the control of continents to the destabilizing dangers of localized crises, many of them far from our own shores and many of them located in littoral regions.

We, in the United States Navy and Marine Corps, for example, are shifting the emphasis of our planning and weapons programs away from the support of a major war on the central front of Europe, the threat which constituted the Cold War's center of gravity. We are shifting that emphasis, instead, towards maintaining and enhancing our ability to project maritime power in conjunction with our allies, wherever and whenever it is needed.

That is not by any means to say that the United States sees itself as the world's constable; it does not. It is, however, to say that President Bush has made it clear that America's policy is, among other things, to support world stability. Threats to that stability, especially in the post-Cold War world, are likely to arise in places where we have no established bases of military operations and where relations with our friends and allies are only informal. In places, that is, where self-contained, mobile, and combat-ready forces afloat may represent our most appropriate and immediately available response.

But equally important is that seapower offers nations, acting as a coalition, the ability to influence a crisis without the intrusive and irrevocable commitment of troops on someone else's soil. Warships can be placed anywhere, from just off shore to over-the-horizon, consistent with whatever message the world community wants to send. Even more importantly, they can linger, almost indefinitely, in nearby international waters, demonstrating interest in a problem without becoming part of the problem.

Certainly, in our experience over recent history, naval forces have proven themselves in high demand for dealing with crises, both below and across the threshold of outright war, for containing a conflict, or for taking preliminary military action while strategically powerful land forces are given time to deploy.

As we all know, maritime forces fulfill a wide variety of non-lethal missions as well. Disaster relief operations are perhaps the most dramatic; over the last year we have learned again, in Bangladesh, in southern Turkey, and in the Philippines, that trained and ready military forces at sea can be as valuable in saving lives as they are in fighting aggression. But no less important is the value of routine visits by the ships of one country to the ports of another. They are a powerful symbol of continuing friendship and cooperation, and they provide yet another human link between two cultures and two peoples, even former adversaries. I, for one, won't very soon forget the image of Russian families opening their homes to American sailors or of Soviet seamen trading hats and establishing friendships in San Diego, California.

Finally, naval forces may offer yet another unique characteristic, one that will be especially useful in a new, cooperative world community, and that is that they are particularly well-suited to working together in combined, multinational operations.

Ships can be brought together as discrete, self-contained units in a multinational task force, at any given place of any ocean, without disrupting their internal shipboard organizations, without having to adapt to new doctrines at all levels of the chain of command, and without the political complications of comprehensive military integration. We proved that in Operation *Earnest Will.*

Certainly there is value to developing, over time, that kind of total multinational collaboration, but we won't always have the luxury of time. More and more, there are likely to be occasions when units from diverse nations have to operate together *ad hoc*, and the simpler and the more practiced their operational relationships, the better. We saw that, I think, in the Persian Gulf War. Ships from all over the world responded to Saddam Hussein's aggression and sailed to the region, and once there, they were able to enforce, quickly, effectively, and cooperatively, the United Nations' sanctions against Iraq.

For all these reasons, it is vital (in my view, absolutely vital), that we continue the habit of cooperation among our respective navies, even as many of us restructure and downsize our fleets. Such multinational exercises as Unitas, Rimpac, Ocean Venture, Cobra Gold, and Solid Shield, contribute directly to our ability to operate together in a crisis, an ability that was indispensable in the Arabian Gulf and likely, highly likely, to be indispensable in many future crises.

I want to stress that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, for their part, will continue to be actively engaged in the world. We will be smaller, certainly smaller than we needed to be at the height of the Cold War, but that does not mean that we will abandon our ability to help secure stability or to play a role defending the interests of the world community.

We are, for example, looking for ways to enhance our sealift capability. We are overhauling our approach to joint operations with the army and the air force. We are developing technologies for dealing with sophisticated and even

unconventional threats. We are seeking cost-effective ways to project power wherever it is needed. As President Bush announced just eleven days ago, we are dramatically altering our nuclear posture.

In short, a great deal of new strategic thinking is taking shape in the Pentagon, just as it is in your offices all over the world. For that reason alone, I think this chance to come together and to share thoughts and ideas is extremely important, and I urge each of you to take full advantage of it.

I want to thank all of you for coming. I want to thank Admiral Strasser for being such a gracious and cordial host, but most of all I want to thank you for this opportunity to share a few words with you. I hope you all enjoy the rest of this symposium, and I hope you won't overlook any opportunities to sample the pleasures of Newport in this beautiful weather.

Thank you all, very much.

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Panel Discussion

"Seaborne Threat to Regional Stability"

Moderator: Vice Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr., U.S. Navy
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations
for Plans, Policy, and Operations

Panelists: Admiral Paul D. Miller, U.S. Navy
Vice Admiral Guy Labouerie, French Navy
Vice Admiral Shariff Bin Ishak, Malaysian Navy
Rear Admiral Oswaldo Viteri Jerez, Ecuadorian Navy
Commodore Jubrila O. A. Ayinla, Nigerian Navy

Vice Admiral Smith:

GOOD AFTERNOON ADMIRAL MORA and distinguished guests. Ladies and gentlemen, we have a difficult task, and we will try to keep you awake for the next hour. I want you to know that I have just had these glasses repaired. I can read all name tags and should any heads be seen nodding I shall take your name and you will be uninvited to dinner tonight.

As we review the events of the past two years, one might say that we could have easily borrowed the title of the first Seapower Symposium, "Change and Challenge" and, in fact, be right on the mark. Clearly we have witnessed momentous changes. From these changes one can reasonably expect to anticipate very positive consequences, but I hasten to add, as our Secretary did just a few moments ago and as our CNO did yesterday, that we also face a future filled with uncertainty, ambiguous warnings, and problems which will not reflect the very positive events that we have just recently experienced. We have a famous baseball player by the name of Yogi Bera who once said, "the future ain't what it used to be," and clearly that holds true. I am certainly delighted that we have such a distinguished group of panelists to address some of the problems, and the audience to interact with them in a question and answer period. I hope that you will address your questions to the panel as they speak to you, either individually or collectively, and we will field them as they come.

Now, more than any other group, this one assembled here should know that maritime forces do not have to go threat shopping. There is plenty on the horizon

to keep our attention focused ahead, and there is certainly plenty to keep us busy. We have some very difficult challenges: terrorism, narco-trafficking, drug cartels, environmental pollution, and piracy. Because of these challenges, naval cooperation is now more important than it has ever been before. We here in this auditorium have an opportunity to contribute to the future by defining ways that we can address these problems.

While it is to our great benefit that we can turn to a future that does not have in it the spectra of global war or nuclear confrontation, it will in fact require us to look at other problems which previously were considered to be lesser offenses. Because our futures can be characterized by transnational economics, global communications, and ever-increasing interdependence, active terrorism in one part of the world carries with it the potential of having an impact on most of us in this room. Now, I am not sure what we can do to resolve the issues, but I am sure that how we approach them is important, and that how is in a collective and a cooperative way. It seems to me that this forum is a place where friendships start, discussions ensue, exercises follow, and coalitions are built; they are built around the confidence and the creditability that is established from knowing one another, and I think that certainly we have established some of that here.

This afternoon we have a distinguished panel to discuss the issue on the board, and it is my pleasure to introduce you to them now. On my immediate right, Vice Admiral Shariff, a gentleman with extensive at-sea experience, including four commands at sea, staff experience in plans and policy, and a gentleman who assumed the position of chief of staff of the Royal Malaysian Navy in 1990. To his immediate right, Commodore Jubrila Ayinla, chief of staff of the Nigerian Naval Training Command. Commodore Ayinla is a world-class chess player, I might warn you up front. He is also a delightful conversationalist, and operationally, he has had a significant background in that he was the first commanding officer of a Meko frigate—the first commanding officer of the first Meko frigate built—and he was the first Nigerian captain to take his ship across the Atlantic. He has also commanded four other ships in his extensive naval experience. To his right, is Admiral Paul David Miller, commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. Admiral Miller is the former commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. He also had battle group command in the Pacific, and he was a ship commander. He has had extensive Washington experience, both in the role as executive assistant to the secretary of the navy, and most recently as the director of naval warfare before taking over his current position as commander in chief of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. On his right, Rear Admiral Oswaldo Viteri, commander in chief of the Naval Squadron Ecuador. Admiral Viteri has commanded six ships and currently commands the Naval Squadron, which includes all of the sea-going ships of the Ecuadorian Navy. His previous duties included, among other things, attaché to Italy. And on his right, a good friend and a gentleman that I had the opportunity to work with in the Indian Ocean, Vice Admiral Guy

Labouerie, commander of the French Naval War College. He was commander of the French Navy's Indian Ocean forces in 1988 and 1989, and I had the privilege of dining with him on his flagship and, at that time, told him I would look forward to the opportunity to return his hospitality. Little did I know that I would have the opportunity to do that last night, and it was indeed a pleasure. I will cease my comments now and turn the floor over to Admiral Shariff, but before I do I would encourage you to listen and think about the challenges that we face and prepare yourselves to ask this distinguished group of panelists some very probing questions.

Vice Admiral Shariff: Distinguished delegates, honorable moderator, ladies and gentlemen. Since I come from the region of Southeast Asia, I would like, if I may, to focus my discussions on this part of the region, which I am sure would also be relevant to the other areas of the world. As some of you are well aware, this region is strategically located in the hub of maritime activities and economic development. The anticipated increase in the volume of international trade means that more goods will travel the seas, and the exploiting of resources, both living and non-living, will be carried out with more vigor. As Admiral Smith has rightly pointed out, the increased importance of the maritime environment is likely to lead to corresponding increases in the seaborne threats to common security. These threats would be from the following:

Firstly, terrorism. The region's fragile social political setting could easily be exploited by political terrorists belonging to ethnic or religious extremist movements, or even desperate refugees who fail to gain acceptance to Third World countries. The targets could be the numerous oil platforms or ships transcending through the regional checkpoints. The sure, deceptive potential of attacking the marine environment, in terms of trade volumes, prizes, and insurance, to name a few, make such terrorist actions extremely appealing. Apart from the possible damage to life and property, terrorism could create hostility between regional states. For instance, counter-terrorist actions by one state could be perceived as a provocative act to another's integrity. Acts of terrorism, conducted under the fiat of certain sensitive domestic political issues, could destabilize a government by bringing about chaos, and hence, jeopardizing development efforts.

Secondly, narcotic trafficking. The Golden Triangle, located along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, accounts for about sixty percent of the world's narcotic supply. By virtue of their geographical proximity, Asian capitals have often been used as distribution centers from the "Drug Triangle." Statistics show that more than fifty percent of arrests involve seaborne trafficking. The evils of narcotics on societies and countries are well recognized. Not only will it rot the root of the society, it also propagates crimes and other associated problems, which have the potential to escalate into a situation of lawlessness. Experience of some countries shows that drug barons could buy not only law, but also government

leaders. These are enough to show the extent of how narcotics could undermine regional stability.

Pollution. The economy and strategic significance of the seas of the region has meant the susceptibility to pollution. This has been an immediate concern in recent years. About 72 per cent of the tankers loaded with crude petroleum from the Middle East to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea pass through the Malacca and Singapore Straits. More than ten percent are vessels of 30,000 gross tons and above. The total number increased from 150 per day in 1987 to 170 per day in 1990, an increase of eleven per cent. The potential pollution resulting from collisions, groundings, discharges of tank cleaning, leaks, and human negligence is far greater with the increase in the volume of shipping. In the management of marine pollution, there are still major problems to be addressed. Amongst them include the need for an effective coordinating body at the regional level to handle disasters.

Last, but not least, is economic refugees. The influx of the so-called economic refugees, or what we in the region term as illegal immigrants, also provide the region with a potential threat. They have caused strained relations between ASEAN states in the past, and the possibility of its recurrence is always there. They have caused strained public infrastructures and created criminal and health-related problems. Now, how do we contain these threats? In our proceedings yesterday, it was suggested that the navy should change from a military to a non-military role. This, in my opinion, is really not necessary, because most of the navies in the region (the smaller navies), when they were formed, were given these tasks as their primary role. It is already in-built. Secondly, there exists today a series of bilateral arrangements among ASEAN countries which is used as a vehicle for combating common security threats. Among them includes joint patrols in the high-risk waters, and this kind of arrangement, besides serving as an instrument of confidence-building, also increases the overall security of the area.

Now, how can we improve further? I would like to suggest the following: First, we should enhance the existing cooperative arrangement to the maximum limit of political acceptability. Secondly, I would like to suggest that defense equipment manufacturers should try to re-channel some of their research and development efforts from primarily the development of military equipment to new development for drug and pollution control equipment and gadgets. So, ladies and gentlemen, in conclusion I would like to say that in spite of the end of the Cold War, seaborne threats to regional stability still exist in the form of terrorism, narcotic trafficking, pollution and economic refugees. Countries within a region have to work together to combat these threats, and more research and development effort should be given to develop better equipment in order to effectively control the problem of drug trafficking and pollution. Thank you.

Commodore Ayinla: Admiral Strasser, moderator, distinguished flag officers, ladies and gentlemen. I first want to recall my stay here in the War College and the fact that we used to refer to this place as the "blue bedroom." Usually, when we came in the afternoon, after a big lunch like the one you had, the president used to order that the lights be switched off. I do not know why he hasn't done that today. However, it would appear as if we have some very serious matters to discuss, and that is why the lights are not off, so I will please ask you to keep your lids apart, the eyelids, I mean.

Well, right through this conference, this symposium, we have been forcefully reminded of the facts that so many of our interests and concerns are such that we just have to be interdependent, no matter whether we are big powers like the superpowers, medium powers, or even some of us who are the small powers. This afternoon, the secretary of the navy reminded us that in spite of the fact that the world is becoming more peaceful, we are faced with new threats, if you like. They are not threats that are new as such, they are unconventional and, therefore, we tend to overlook them. These are the threats which our discussion panel is meant to tackle this afternoon. My chief, here on my lefthand side, has voiced certain concerns which equally apply to my region of the world, when we talk in the areas of terrorism, narco-trafficking, piracy, and pollution. He has voiced our concerns. I want to add that the whole world is one big ocean, and there is nothing that affects any part of the world that does not affect the other parts. Things—take for example, pollution, dumping of nuclear waste and toxic material in, say the East Atlantic—may affect you in the Western Atlantic. Somehow, the currents may bring them to you. Pollution in the Persian Gulf, in terms of smog and everything, has been carried to as far as our country in Africa by the prevailing winds. So, we have a kind of interdependence. I will specifically address narco-trafficking in my brief remarks.

We, in my part of the world, as Africa, have noticed that as you tighten up the screws on the carriers and the barons in the industrialized world, they tend to look for the areas of least resistance to carry out their trade and, therefore, you would perhaps have heard in the news recently that there is an upsurge in trafficking in our region of the world. We have been very disturbed by this phenomenon, and most disconcerting is the fact that our youth have now become users and abusers of drugs, as well. So, we share the concerns of the industrialized world in this regard, and we see that in our efforts to combat this threat, which threatens to destroy the very fibre of our future generations, we are able to combat some of the trafficking by air and by land, but the most pervasive now is the trafficking by sea. I would like to inform this gathering that some of the ploys of these traffickers is to use fishing vessels to do their trafficking, both in transferring them from one place to the other and also in packaging them and even laundering money. You find fishing vessels at sea receiving drugs in exchange for fish, for shrimps, and then pass them on through whatever other means they have. The

other area we have noticed is that these drugs are hidden, concealed in containers, and the container traffic can be so high that even if you employ the efforts of a whole navy like mine (and it is a relatively large navy, when we are talking of the area), the whole navy can be involved in checking containers and doing nothing else. That is, I think, a problem, a big problem.

What is the way forward? We would like to benefit from the skills and the technologies that you in the industrialized world have developed to combat these problems. We would like, for example, to interact with your coast guard and have our men trained so that we can all, as one people, tackle this big problem which is engulfing the world. For these operations—these, shall I say, unconventional operations—we need to benefit from intelligence information and perhaps have access to better communications so that on a global scale we can, perhaps, tackle the problem more effectively. It is like a balloon; you press it on one side and it bulges on another, and I think we need to get together here.

Now, piracy. Piracy has existed from those times when man starting using the sea. What we have as a concern is that we need to amend our laws such that we can prosecute pirates, even in international waters adjoining our littoral seas. What we do, of course, to reduce piracy in our waters is to carry out patrols. In this regard, even seaborne patrols are not entirely effective, so we have to go up in the air and show our presence over our waters. I believe it is a concern of most of our small navies, in our areas. Once again, we would benefit from your experience in these areas which are problems to us.

In conclusion, I would like to say that we, in the East Atlantic, would like to benefit more from the training cruises which the United States has always organized. We would like these cruises to include the coast guard, because most of us have coast guard functions. If the coast guard can be included among the Operation *Venture* ships, they can then come in-house and carry out some of this training, which would help us to combat these ills. Thank you very much.

Admiral Miller: Good afternoon. Distinguished flags, ladies and gentlemen, Admiral moderator, it is a genuine pleasure to see so many familiar naval leaders. I have had the good fortune in the past, and I am grateful now, for having the opportunity to work closely with many of the navies represented. On behalf of the entire U.S. Atlantic Fleet, I want to thank all of you whose navies sail, train, and support Atlantic Fleet ships, wherever they operate worldwide. I am sure that Admiral [Robert] Kelly, my Pacific Fleet counterpart, would like me to say that this sentiment comes from him also. We appreciate it greatly and it is a pleasure to be part of this distinguished panel, but it is an ambitious tasking to meet the moderator's challenge. It is sort of tough to convey a new set of factors about addressing the threats we are discussing today. Those threats that are, unfortunately, too familiar to all of us. We do not have easy answers. Let's review, at least from my vantage point, some aspects we must confront together in dealing

with nonconventional threats to regional stability in our fast-changing world. I trust you will agree that there is some linkage among these threats.

We are using the American military, not just naval forces, but the army, air force, and coast guard, along with numerous other government agencies, to confront these threats worldwide. For example, we have been devoting an increasing percentage of our resources, significant numbers of people, ships, and aircraft to detect, monitor, and interdict the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. Notably, these efforts continued—they continued unabated—even during the conflict of Southwest Asia. The U.S. Navy, as we know, is not designed, not built, not chartered, to counter the nonconventional threats we are focusing on today. They have capabilities to do that, though. Our elected leaders have properly called upon us to use naval forces to confront the seaborne challenges to our national and mutual security. We have found that we can adapt our equipment and adapt our skills to the realities of the modern nonconventional threat environment. In a changing world, we must adapt to change.

Our best hope for success, as voiced before, lies in mutual political and military cooperation. Effective cooperation can be achieved only through a full appreciation of the valid legal limits, within which each agency and each nation may act, as we all coordinate our efforts against nonconventional threats. We all recognize that good intelligence can provide strong leverage against the kind of threats we are discussing. As in other areas, we must adapt and focus our sensors, our systems, and our procedures to targets that often have little resemblance to the traditional targets of military intelligence. While the threat, even the target, may be nonconventional, it is often not unsophisticated or lacking in resources. Good physical and operational security are just as critical in confronting these threats as they are in classic military operations. Because of the extraordinary financial resources associated with drug trafficking, the counter-narcotics operations, I believe, are particularly vulnerable. By their very nature, these threats do not yield to military solutions alone. The efforts of our military forces must be part of a comprehensive, coordinated national, regional and international strategy or we will not achieve the successes that we seek, success which is crucial to the improved regional stability throughout the world. I trust that the panel today, in their opening statements and the discussion that follows, will provide some insights into the ways we can adapt to that threat to promote a better understanding of the law, rules, and regulations under which our various services operate, and at least hint at ways in which we can improve intelligence collection and operational security with respect to the nonconventional threats. I know there is not time to do that here, but in your regional committees, in the focus of your discussions, you may be able to come up with some of the ways in which our maritime forces might most effectively contribute. Thank you very much, Mr. Moderator.

Rear Admiral Viteri: [Translation from Spanish] Distinguished representatives of the navies here present, moderator, distinguished officers that are with me in this panel.

I have been very attentive to the comments that have been made by the panel, and I fully agree in the identification of those nonconventional threats. I intend now to address what the drug traffic means to our countries.

Yesterday, Admiral Frank Kelso, in his address, made a general analysis of the situation in which nations are immersed, and he referred with much precision to specific topics, especially those that referred to the radical differences in the economic situations of the countries in the region and that this could be the reason or the origin of other problems that we are facing today.

The current world in which we live today, above all, is the final product of the work and effort of man. Uncountable are the achievements reached by mankind in every order of daily life, but it is no less true that this these technological developments have created dissatisfaction, particularly in the young, who found in drug addiction a way out. Today, drug trafficking possesses a close relationship to terrorism and presents a clear threat, whose solution is very difficult. This is by no means a new thought; on the contrary, it has been addressed in this forum on more than one occasion. It has not only been discussed, but has resulted in valuable recommendations which, regretfully, have not been implemented.

Today, we are lagging behind the drug traffickers. The economic benefits for the traffickers are greater than they were yesterday, and therefore, drug traffic is a more attractive business. Demand is increasing, and the price paid by the consumer is higher, covering any possible risk and allowing the maintenance of very well-structured organizations that have enough resources and means to evade surveillance.

As you well know, this problem has three different stages or processes: production, commercialization, and consumption. To think of a solution which focuses on only one of these aspects, independently of the others, would be erroneous. The action that is needed must cover the entire spectrum, in a coordinated effort. This is a problem which involves all the organizations of a given country.

Here we have the naval representatives, and we should discuss what role navies can assume in this contingency. This, I think, is the main question that this panel should address. It is true that the drug problem is one that does not affect all countries with the same intensity. It is easy to identify the regions where this problem is more important. It is true that each country has its own legislature and each will follow it under the right of being a sovereign country. It is also true that each navy is structured and organized to accomplish specific tasks that are not always related to those of the maritime police. Above all, navies continue to fulfill a fundamental duty: to guarantee the national security and to try to reach

this goal through the progress and well-being of its people. Drug trafficking threatens national security, and therefore, we must commit ourselves to act. I cannot see a country having complete external security when, inside, it is being destroyed by a problem like this. I think that navies have a clear responsibility in this matter and should be used to counterattack this threat. I agree with my colleagues; there are many actions that could be implemented if we have the understanding and the willingness to do it. The road is not easy, but we should not be afraid of it. The road is going to be built as we walk on it, in the same direction, exterminating drug trafficking. Thank you.

Vice Admiral Labouerie: I will speak for only two minutes about three specific points. I would like to address first the drug traffic problem in France. In 1991 this activity is estimated to involve cash transactions of some 35 billion francs, the equivalent of some 6 billion dollars, the equivalent of the entire French Navy's budget. Although these drugs can come by aircraft, car, and train, the largest part arrives in Europe by sea.

Secondly, drug production. There are four principal areas for drug production. Three of these areas, Latin America, the Middle East, and Asia's Golden Triangle, have already been discussed by previous speakers. The fourth area is generally forgotten. It is a vast area in central Asia, near Afghanistan and the southern republics of the Soviet Union. There is really no central authority in this area to monitor and control drug activity. Overall, these four drug-producing areas are estimated to produce about $700 billion worth of drugs a year. With such fantastic amounts of money, we can encounter anything, especially state-sponsored terrorism, widespread government corruption, illegal flow of armaments, and the creation of numerous associated illegal businesses.

Third, and for us this is a major point, there is the problem of criminal activities like the Mafia. Until 1989, we have lived with criminal gangs on the Marseille region of southern France or Corsica, in New York and Chicago in the United States, in southern Italy and in Sicily, and so on—numerous regional mafias—but their links were known to us and could be carefully watched. But the Soviet Union, with its specific political systems, has hidden the fact that she is a kingdom of mafias of many kinds. We are afraid now, after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the fall of the Berlin Wall, that we shall see, over the next two years, the creator of a real empire of mafias, not like in the movies with 007 and Spectre, but rather an international network for drug trafficking and other illegal activities.

Dealing with these problems is, of course, very difficult, and the solutions are essentially political. But navies also have a role to play in this war, using special forces, prepositioning, forward surveillance, and quick surgical military sorties. Each country has different legal constraints on their actions, and so international cooperation in this area, by organizations like Nato, is a major subject of great interest. Of course, we have precedents in working together with the U.S. and

other countries, although monitoring illegal trade is normally, by law, designated as a customs function rather than a naval mission.

At the same time, it would interesting if the twelve European countries could consider working together in a European maritime guard. We all have different border patrol organizations, and we must observe an area of some 24 million square kilometers with no common organization to control it. We concur with President Bush that the fight against drugs must be treated as a war, a real war. Up to now, we have tried to treat the problem with doctors, politicians, psychoanalysts, and other experts, but now the time has come for more direct, efficient action. This is a worldwide question. Of course, as you well know, I am not a diplomat and this is merely a seaman's view.

Vice Admiral Smith: That's a true statement. You are, in fact, a seaman, and I can attest to that. If I could summarize very briefly, and I do not know how much time our MC is going to give us, it seems to me that essentially what has been said is that naval roles do, in fact, include the threats that are posed by pirating, narco-trafficking and the terrorism. Cooperative arrangements, building on those that already exist, are important to combating the threat because the economics of narco-trafficking, specifically, will insure that the threat will exist for some time. There are three phases in narco-trafficking, and we cannot concentrate on one at the exclusion of the other. Industry should focus some of their resources towards assisting and developing ways to combat it in a sophisticated way, because critical to our success will be intelligence and the operational security in combating it. While piracy, terrorism, and narco-trafficking are by no means conventional threats—they are nonconventional threats—we should not surmise that their methods and their operational procedures are less sophisticated. In fact, the opposite is true. They will operate in areas of least resistance, so we have to cooperate to insure that we cover, to the maximum extent possible, those areas where we might see these kinds of threats. In a nutshell, I think that covers most of what was said, and I would be more than happy to have the panel address some of your questions if you have some for us.

Question and Answer Session

From the floor: [Translated from Spanish] Thank you. It is worrying to watch the special situation of naval activity relating to maritime police operations. This is appreciated and very important, because maritime police operations mean an absolutely different conception for naval operations. I would like to express to Admiral Labouerie that I agree with his conception, and I would like to suggest that this problem could be handled, inside, as a general authorities' problem, where the navy's tasks should always be kept.

At this moment, there are situations where the maritime police concept is working and substantially saving the navy's fundamental task of seapower, for each nation. I wanted to explain this concept, because I worry about excess attention to a task that is not exactly a navy's task. Thank you.

Vice Admiral Smith: Your point is well made, admiral. I would also like to point out that Admiral Miller commented, that during *Desert Storm*, which took a large percentage of our naval forces, we still were able to cover the counter-narcotics mission. While we believe that our navy should be involved in it, and is heavily involved in it, clearly, it is not at the expense of other things that our navy does. I do not know whether that addresses your concern or not, but I completely understand what you have said.

Admiral Miller: I think the point raised deserves special treatment. I think that elected leaders have properly called upon the navy, particularly the United States Navy, to use naval forces to confront the seaborne challenges. We have the capability to do that. We have the capability to reach out to open sea room, where other forces might not be able to take action. What do we derive from doing that? This last year, even throughout our activity in *Desert Storm*, we were able to contribute nearly thirty-five hundred ship-days. I will be the first to acknowledge that when we send the ships that we send, we are not using every maritime capability within that ship to address the narco-trafficking problem, but while the capabilities embodied in those ships are applied to that threat, we do much training in each of the other sections of those ships while at sea. In those ship-days, we had 465 boardings of ships. We expended nearly 20,000 flight-hour assets, and we made sixty-five seizures on the open ocean with the assistance of the U.S. Coast Guard. These were seizures that probably would not have taken place if we had not had our naval forces on the open seas. What did this do? This took off 88,000 pounds of cocaine from the streets somewhere in the world and it relieved them of about 24,000 pounds of marijuana. The total street value of these drugs is over a billion dollars. It is my judgment that we need to have available to the national leaders the capability to address this problem. As my colleague said, from where it is grown, to its transshipment points, to where it is used, education has to be part of it. This is a full circle effort that needs to be made. In my view, naval and maritime forces have a legitimate role in it.

From the floor: I agree with Admiral Labouerie in his statement that we are better seamen than politicians. I agree also with Admiral Shariff, who said that we have to adapt our skills and realities in dealing with drug traffickers, but further down the pyramid, what are we doing do eradicate the production? What are we offering to the producers in the field to find substitutes to give them enough incentives to change their production from an agricultural point of view?

Vice Admiral Smith: Admiral Viteri, you brought up the subject of the three phases of production. The growing—the question is, what are we doing to combat the drug problem at that level? Would you like to take a stab at answering that question?

Rear Admiral Viteri: [Translation from Spanish] Thank you. In my last intervention, I stated that the drug problem had a global character and it cannot be particularized or attacked independently in only one of its phases. It is clear that the navy can do little about the production phase. My idea is that the problem should be recognized by everyone in society, by the entire country, and by all institutions in a way that we can then perform a coordinated, simultaneous, and joint action.

I think, therefore, that while the navy will be able to do nothing about the crop problem, it will be different in the transportation phase where it will have an important role in interdiction. This, of course, must be done in coordination with the other activities that each country implements in its fight against the drug problem. Thank you.

Admiral Miller: In addition to providing forces to Admiral [Leon] Edney [Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command] for the seaborne aspect of counternarcotics interdiction, I am also the component commander for General [George] Joulwan, our Southern Forces commander. He is working very closely with the countries of Latin and South America to address the problems which were addressed by the admiral who asked the question. He has a full scheme of country-specific activities to operate within the legal structures of the countries. They consist of offering substitute products for growing by the farmers all the way up through targeted types of activity against actual shipping of drugs. I think that brand of activity is going on. Sometimes it does not receive the publicity in all forums, but at least from the region of the world that I know about, I would like to say that they are being addressed. Can they be addressed more strongly? The answer is probably, "yes," but I think that we are off to some good starts.

Captain Fisher, Royal Navy: I would like to make a narrow point about the Soviet Union without falling into the trap of crying "wolf," or "*bear,*" if that is more appropriate. I have always been taught that threat is the sum of capability and intent. While I fully accept that the intent of any ability to affect regional stability is very considerably declined, and probably declining, in the Soviet Union, I do not yet accept that the capability, in strict military terms, has yet declined in the same degree. While I know of the issues that the panel has quite rightly brought up, of the policing roles and the other activities, I would like to ask them, at what pace should we keep half an eye looking backwards on the potential for

future change in what we used to call the Soviet Union, given that we have seen so much change in the last two years.

Vice Admiral Smith: I think that I would offer to you that we are keeping both eyes looking over our shoulders in that context right now. Naval forces are still deployed, in terms of U.S. forces, in the Mediterranean, in the North Arabian Sea, and in the Pacific, much the same as we have had them deployed there before. Admiral Kelso and Secretary Garrett, I think, made the point that, while we may be smaller, we still intend to remain engaged in a global sense. Whether it is a Soviet threat or a threat from another source, we would intend to be involved. I do not know if that answers your question or not. Perhaps Admiral Miller, who looked at me just as I started to speak, would like to take it further. He is one of the ones who has to provide the forces to be deployed, and he has to train them. He still has to worry about whether that capability still exists. While we may not think that the intent is there, we have not lost sight of the fact that the capability certainly is.

Admiral Miller: Admiral Smith, I agree fully. I guess probably the best example that I could raise, so as not to take much time, is that, returning to Norfolk in the next couple of days is a group of ships just trained in the North Atlantic for the first time in a very large number of months. We took that opportunity to train in northern latitudes because it is important for our ships to be able to do that. When we are in the northern climes, you train against certain capabilities. We did that with very severe scheduling consequences. The carrier that we used was USS *America*. She returned from her activities in the Persian Gulf on 15 April. She has been up participating in a sixty-day exercise, and on 2 December, we are going to sail there again to the Mediterranean for a six-month period of time to support operations there. So, in sum, the fleet commanders are still having not only one eye, but more so, on the capabilities that are extant. We train, and we operate accordingly.

Vice Admiral van Foreest, Royal Netherlands Navy: What I really miss a little bit in the discussion is the complexity which has not been mentioned by anyone in the panel, and neither by you, Admiral Smith: the complexity of the threat. The threats which were addressed, terrorism, environment, and drugs, do not only concern departments of defense, but more than one department, which makes it extra complex. If I think of terrorism, the justice department will be involved; the department of the interior will be involved; defense will be involved. If I think of the environment, I am certain that our ministry of environment, our ministry of transport, our ministry of justice, our ministry of defense, everyone will be involved. The worst case is with drugs, because we have the justice department for the police, the finance department for the customs. We have the

coast guard, which operates under the department of transport, and we have ourselves. This brings me to the factor as to who should take the lead in this whole operation. What is the linking pin in our regional or international cooperation? Should it be the defense department? Should it be another department? That is really the question. I am putting it to you, Admiral Smith, to pass around to the one you think can give the best answer.

Vice Admiral Smith: Thanks a lot! I think it is time to close! First of all, you could not be more right. It is an enormously complex issue that involves an enormously large number of bureaucratic organizations whose structures are, perhaps, not as streamlined as ours. I am not equipped personally to answer your question as to who might be in charge. We have a Drug Enforcement Administration. We have Robert Martinez, the former governor of Florida, I believe, who has been appointed as the individual who is charged with the success of the drug operations. Clearly his success is a function of whether the Customs, Treasury Department, the Defense Department, and the State Department all can cooperate with him. If we want to try to try to stop a terrorist act, then we not only have to worry about all the departments that you mentioned, but you forgot State Department. That is a very difficult part. Then we have to get through State Department to your State Department. If I were to try to get out of that particular complex question, I would say that it is situational, at best. We attempt to put the forces that we can bring to bear against the problem as it is defined to us. Then, as we have a terrorist situation where, as you pointed out, Justice, State, Defense, and all of those come together, there are ways to do that; I am not quite sure who—I cannot put my finger on the man in charge. We had a gentleman in the State Department, for instance, Ambassador [Morris] Busby, who was at one point charged with the counter-terrorist task force. So, he would, perhaps, be in charge of drawing all of those units together as far as our country is concerned. Admiral Shariff, the question poses, perhaps, the same complexities to your country. Could you address it?

Vice Admiral Shariff: If I can give the Malaysian model, we have got an organization called Maritime Enforcement Agency, which coordinates all those departments involved in maritime matters. They will be the one, and they come under the Prime Minister's Department, which is the highest department in the organization. I agree with you. You need coordinating agencies to marry up all these organizations together. Hopefully, all other countries will follow that. When we work together, there is only one agency talking to another, between the nations. Thank you.

Commodore Ayinla: What we have is a National Drug Law Enforcement Agency. They coordinate all the activities of all the other ministries and departments that

are involved. I am talking specifically about the narco-trafficking. The other dimension, which we did not touch and which I just skipped in my talk, is that the economies of certain of the developing countries are so small that even the drug trade is larger than these economies. So, the ante is really up. Powers need more than navies to tackle the narco-traffic in the world. It is very strong, country-to-country. Our economies are shattered just by drug trade. They launder the money in, and the currencies become useless. This leads to a vicious circle in which you have other sociopolitical problems. The circle is complete.

Vice Admiral Smith: Thank you, sir, for those views. May I also thank the panel for their preparation on this very difficult topic. And thank you, Admiral, for your last question that points out just how difficult it is, that above and beyond the actual combating of the act, is the taking of those who perpetrate it down the road to justice so that we do not trod on each other's legalistic toes.

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Open Plenary Discussion

Moderators: Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz, U.S. Navy
Vice Admiral Leighton Smith, U.S. Navy
Vice Admiral Stephen F. Loftus, U.S. Navy

Rear Admiral Wright: Fellow delegates, this morning is designed for reflection and a bit of sweeping up of, perhaps, unanswered questions or hearing statements from the floor that we were unable to get to. We will do this in a couple of venues. The first is a three-man panel consisting of Vice Admiral Mauz, Vice Admiral Smith and Vice Admiral Loftus. They each have short summary remarks to make, then the floor will be opened for a plenary discussion and questions. If someone has a statement that they were unable to make or would like to emphasize, we can use this allotted time for those discussions. Admiral Mauz will lead off the panel discussion.

Vice Admiral Mauz: Thank you, Admiral Wright. The theme of this symposium has been coalitions. Obviously, it has been a very useful dialogue and a very timely subject. It seems to me that the prospects for future coalitions in regional crises are greater in the future then they have been in the past. I say this for two reasons: First of all, the superpower confrontation that we used to have, and hopefully it will stay in the past tense, is no longer such an impediment to regional cooperation. There was a time when the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block countries could veto U.N. action that might address a regional crisis. I think that in the future that we can expect the Soviet Union and those countries to cooperate and actually to promote a U.N. solution, at least more so than in the past. I think that this coalition effort might be directed not only toward the crises like we saw in Iraq and Kuwait, but also to terrorism or other acts of that nature. The other factor that will probably produce pressure toward more coalition activity is the budgetary facts of life in the future. No navy, and I speak for the U.S. Navy particularly, is going to be in a position to do everything, all the time, all over the world, as we have in the past. Our force structure is going to go down by twenty-five percent, and we hope to hold it at that level. There is a possibility that, as future budget pressures occur, we could go down even further. The pressure on our naval forces to deploy and to maintain a forward presence around the world to promote regional stability is going to be great. Therefore, any regional cooperation, any regional coalitions that can be developed, that are not already in place, will be greatly welcomed.

Regarding our recent experience in the Gulf, each country has developed a long list of lessons learned. I have on my desk in the Pentagon a stack of fourteen

volumes about the U.S. Navy's experience in that conflict. It has been mentioned by several of the delegates in conversation that nobody has really addressed lessons learned from the coalition point of view, or what coalition factors might be appropriate to address or to review in the future. Therefore, I have discussed with Admiral J.D. Williams, Op-07, in the Pentagon, the idea of perhaps countries submitting lessons learned from a coalition point of view. We could compile and distribute them to the delegates who are interested. I suggest that we may want to discuss this some more and I think it is a useful thing to follow through on. With that I will conclude my remarks. Thank you.

Vice Admiral Smith: I took the opportunity to rove, if you will, and visit several of the different seminars. I have compiled a list of what I think are the main thoughts that have been captured in a number of different places. First of all, it is fairly well agreed that while the Cold War might be over and the specter of global conflict somewhat a memory of our distant past, as our Secretary said yesterday, we need to understand that there is still a capability out there that must be reckoned with. Yesterday afternoon, one gentleman opined that the sum of a threat was rather the sum of the capability and intent and that we certainly have a capability across the oceans which we need to worry about. We can't turn our back on that. Now, even though the world is perhaps free of the specter of that global conflict, we do not have exactly what one might call a rosie future before us. Our future can be defined in terms of economic problems, where economic issues will define and become more a function of the stability for countries than before. We are going to become more interdependent because of the technological explosion, the global communications, and that economic interdependency we talked about. Populations are increasing rapidly and this could give rise to discord from civil, religious, and ethnic strife. That will be something more on our horizons, as well.

Weapons proliferation will become a problem because, as one individual pointed out on the first day, that is an economic situation that we will have difficulty in controlling. There are going to be those companies and countries who will continue to build weapons and the proliferation will increase. We talked of narco-trafficking, terrorism, piracy, and pollution as being enemies that we must deal with in the future. I think it was reasonably well concluded that the impact of any one of these kinds of acts—because of the interdependence and interrelationship—an act of terrorism, of piracy, or narco-trafficking in one region of the world has the potential for impacting us all. Finally, there will be nonmilitary events which will require our attention, specifically in the area of humanitarian relief, response to natural disasters, the requirement to take people out of countries where they may be threatened. We then get down to what might our missions include as we look to the future. I think it is fairly well believed that our missions will include the low end of the spectrum of conflict,

well into what we might call the "peace-time engagement" region, where our forces will be used by our political masters for flexible deterrent options, to go places, to gain access, to influence events, and to control and/or stabilize events so that we do not have to use force. But, if situations deteriorate to the point where force is required, then we should do so decisively.

A common problem we all share, and one which Admiral Mauz talked about, is that reduction in funds is going to lead to reduction in force structure. Again, so too is the reality that we will be continually called upon to answer the challenges of the uncertain future that we discussed earlier. I think that this symposium stressed a number of ways to approach those problems, but it all boiled down to collective efforts leading to coalitions. The ways to proceed included the continuation of this International Seapower Symposium and perhaps to expand it to regional symposia, if required, so that regional navies and/or regional militaries can gather together much like this and discuss in greater detail what they may do to address specific problems of the areas. I know that some of those exist today; perhaps an expansion of that was suggested. We need to look at our exercise structure to determine whether our exercises are aimed at what we think the future is going to hold for us, in terms of how forces may be used. We need to redefine, restructure if necessary, and expand the exercises to include forces that we have not previously included. We need to exercise smart. One individual pointed out that the cost of operating ships at sea is now becoming so prohibitive that exercising as much as we can ashore is becoming more and more important—in simulations, war games, whether they be simulated war games, table-top war games, or seminar war games, and also I might include in-port exercises and low-level passing exercises where we exploit the opportunity to communicate with each other. As Admiral Williams pointed out yesterday, in developing exercises and coalitions, that has been one of the most difficult parts. He used the term, "we need to communicate to fight, not fight to communicate."

On combined standing forces, there was some discussion made in that regard. A thought was put forward that perhaps we can go further than just the Standing Naval Forces, Atlantic. The standing naval forces in other areas of the world could include regional navies gathering together, one ship, perhaps two, three or four, to exercise together, sail the oceans together, and attack regional problems together. It was offered that these kinds of exercises and these kinds of standing forces might offer the advantages of synergistic operations, taking advantage of the fact that we still need to learn how to communicate and to work together, recognizing that lower force levels are going to require dependence on one another, more and more. These would also provide the opportunity to develop written procedures, much as Admiral Smith talked about on the first day: the Nato Allied Tactical Publications, APXs, AXPs, and so forth. Unitas is an example of what I am talking about here, not necessarily a standing force, but

certainly one that exercises on an annual basis and in a very large way and in a phased way. In working out our military issues, Admiral Abbott brought up the point that we can address and solve the military-to-military problems very easily because we understand each other, we have worked together, and we understand our interests and limitations and capabilities. We have also established credibility among one another, so it is fairly easy to march out smartly and develop ways that we will operate together. But we need to bring into this complex equation the political side of the house, because we need to ensure that our politicians are talking together in the same way that we are talking. Admiral van Foreest pointed out that wording is a difficult problem, particularly as you attempt to develop common rules of engagement. He used the example of "training weapons," a phrase which means one thing in one navy and something quite different in another navy, so that developing all encompassing rules of engagement will be a very difficult problem, but one that we do need to address.

Greater reliance on multinational naval cooperation, it was pointed out, involves increased risks, the risks of operating together in areas where we have not operated before, the risk of sharing information, both in terms of intelligence, command, and control, and technological exchanges. Information that perhaps has not been released before may have to be released in order to understand one another better. There are certain risks involved with that, and we need to weigh the advantages of that sharing versus the risk involved. We need to be aware of the fact that the nontraditional or nonconventional threats, such as narco-trafficking, piracy, terrorism, and things of that sort are not necessarily unsophisticated. The narco-traffickers have very good intelligence networks. We, in turn, have to have intelligence as well. Admiral Miller pointed out the very real requirement for intelligence in order to combat the narco-trafficking problem.

Operational security is another issue, as well. They have good networks, they know what we are doing, and they know where we are going to be. We have to practice operational security in a sophisticated way against what perhaps has been previously thought of as an unsophisticated threat.

Finally, our challenge to the future is to plan for and adapt to new changes, but those conditions change almost daily. Admiral Kelso said in his keynote address that it is difficult to plan a few years downstream when we cannot be certain how events will unfold in a few weeks. The final point I would make is that, as our Secretary said yesterday, we will be getting smaller but we will be engaged. From what I heard and gathered, as I walked around this symposium through the regional discussions and the seminars, was that this is generally held as a common view. That while our navies are getting smaller, our navies will remain engaged, and the best way to do that is through a collective effort. That concludes my summation.

Vice Admiral Loftus: Good morning. There has been a recurring theme as you have heard this morning, and that recurring theme is, of course, declining

resources and enhanced multinational cooperation and coalitions. I think that is quite clear to everyone. In the keynote address, we heard the first challenge, that multinational cooperation is in fact going to help. That was followed up that afternoon in the sense that it was described as perhaps our greatest force multiplier. Future symposiums like this will continue to try to bring out those kinds of international cooperation which will provide us with force multipliers in any kind of a multinational arena.

Another area which became very clear, too, is that we need to design our structures in peacetime that will be in place when crises arise. The clearest examples of the ability to operate at great distances from the United States was the fact that we had so many of these structures in place that were developed during preparation phases. Should we get into an arena again, where we are going to us these structures, it is important that we not let them fall, but in fact, continue to enhance those structures. These structures are in all areas, not in just the areas of logistics, but in areas of command structures and communications, rules of engagement, language, and so forth, including funding.

Another point that was made at yesterday's panel was that our elected leaders have called upon us to use our capabilities and to adapt these to changing threats. Of course, that is not to be interpreted as inventing new missions, but rather a reprioritization of the missions that we already have. There is a continuing need to expand our cooperative efforts in the research and development arenas, clearly for logistics, maintainability, and supportability of all our systems, especially in a regional or multinational area.

There are three points that I would like to bring out that were part of most discussions, both at the regional panels and in general conversation. One is to follow up on sealift. I suggested yesterday that perhaps we need to identify, through the United Nations, if that is the proper format, an identifiable pool of assets which would be available in the event of contingencies. We need to know how to do that and how to follow up on that. I think that is probably something we can work on together. Admiral Mauz indicated that lessons learned were a key thing. I think all of us, in our discussions, have realized that. With as many nations that played in the Persian Gulf Crisis, someone needs to shuffle the deck and to put those kinds of lessons learned together so that we have a chance to use them in the future. Finally, in each of the discussions that we have had on the panel side, the environment continues to come up as a major problem. It is one that will require increasingly cooperative efforts between all of us in order to control the environment, especially at sea. There is a tremendous need to share technology and, perhaps, to have regional international conferences in this area. It is an area of increasing importance to us all. That is all I have.

Vice Admiral Smith: Admiral Wright pointed out earlier that our challenge this morning is to ask you to share with us your views that might add to this discussion,

or pose questions to anyone in the audience. So I invite your participation in that way.

Rear Admiral Wright: It struck me yesterday, towards the end of the day, that one of the questions having to do with the counter-drug effort by the U.S. may not have had sufficient time for a full answer. While the Department of Defense's role in the detection and monitoring seems to come through, perhaps Vice Admiral Daniell, Vice Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, would care to make a statement on his perspective on this subject.

Vice Admiral Daniell: Thank you, Bill. The question that I would like to clarify a little bit this morning has to do with the question that was asked from the floor yesterday in terms of the U.S. organization for the drug war, and that is a good question, "Who's in charge?" We talked about the variety of agencies which are involved in the drug war, the U.S. Coast Guard, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, and surely all of these United States federal agencies do, indeed, have a major role in the war against drugs. Each of these agencies has their own mission, their own jurisdiction, and it is obvious that, when so many people are playing on the same playing field, there can be jurisdictional disputes, and there can be operational overlaps. This loose coalition of forces does require a tremendous amount of *ad hoc* coordination. The list of committees that try to affect this coordination is as long as my arm, but it does work. Beyond the federal agencies which I have mentioned, there are two other echelons. We have state agencies, such as state police, marine patrol, and state departments of law enforcement that are involved. Beneath that level, we have local forces: sheriffs' departments and police departments. As far as the war on drugs in the U.S. is concerned, it is what all of those people who go to sea for a living call an "all hands evolution." It is really an effort that has involved everyone.

Now, insofar as who is in charge, the organization, the Office of National Drug Control Policy, was mentioned yesterday. This is the principle point that I would like to make. That organization is in overall charge of the United States drug effort. It is an office which is located, very importantly and particularly, in the Executive Office of the President of the United States. That is where it gets its strength and it gets its power. It is nominally a coordinating organization, without a direct chain of command. However it perhaps has the most powerful influence, one that is consistent with the problem that we have talked about here in terms of budgets, because it makes recommendations to the President and recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget in terms not only of policy, but also in terms of budget and resource allocations. In its most recent strategy, it has made recommendations as to the adequacy of resources in terms of detection, in terms of monitoring and in terms of interdiction. It has made

recommendations as to resources, which at one point were developed by the U.S. Coast Guard or the Customs Service and which, in terms of the national interest, are in this budget year being transferred to the Department of Defense in order to achieve a more coherent operation that is more consistent with the tasking which has been passed out. So, in summary, there is somebody in charge. The person who is in charge of drugs in the United States is really the President of the United States through the Office of National Drug Control Policy. That is where the chain of command reflecting his views and the importance of this effort starts. So, I would like to offer that to clear up the point of who is in charge. Thank you.

Rear Admiral Wright: Thank you, Admiral Daniell. The panel is prepared to answer questions along a broad spectrum of subject matter. The design here this morning is to pull together anything that may have been hazy, points of clarification, and those types of things.

Vice Admiral van Foreest: I would like to thank the panel. I was really very impressed by the way they did this summary. I might bring up a new point here. I feel that there are some signs, some parallels which are going on today, which you could tie into the situation, post-World War I, which led to arms control, maritime arms control. I am referring to the Washington and London Treaties and everything which happened. To me, it seems that many of the objective factors, and also emotional factors, of that time are now in play again. I know that we have always taken a very strong stance towards maritime confidence and security building measures, and towards maritime arms control. But I see what is happening in the nuclear field at the moment, and I think that I must address Admiral Smith on this question. Do you foresee a change in the rather hard stance that we took together, in the past, with concern to this subject, or do you think that the winds of change will also affect our stance up till now?

Vice Admiral Smith: I am going to have to spend more time with you, sir. Well, thank you for that question. I do not think that there is any great benefit to be derived from bringing naval arms control onto the table. First of all, we need in the navy the flexibility to go where we need to go, at the time we need to go there, with the forces that we need, at least, to take care of the situation at hand. It does not at this point seem to be an attractive alternative to bring arms control, which might limit that flexibility. I am not aware of any thinking in our navy, and at the great risk of being just dead wrong, we have the expert on that in this room. I would ask if Admiral Kelso has anything to add on that.

Admiral Kelso: Herpert, I think that is a good question. It will continue to be asked and discussed in many forums. I think that we are going to reduce arms

by the fact that we are not going to have a consensus to maintain arms at the same level we ever had. My particular opposition to naval arms control does not change much in the world we are going into. The fundamental facts of life are that the geography of our world does not change much and that we who go to sea have to deal with the size of the ocean in which we live. Naval forces are flexible. They can go and sustain themselves for long periods of time where they can be unobtrusive and pulled away easily. I believe fundamentally that the free use of the seas, by all nations, should be the right of all nations, and I believe, if you look back over history, that that has been something that all of us require. Much of the arms control rhetoric in the last few years has been not arms control. In my view, it has been an idea that we will restrict the sea to make an advantage for one or another. I think we should keep the sea free so that it is not an advantage for one or another. I do not believe that there is anything to be gained in us getting into an arms control regime where we decide in some large international forum how many frigates the Netherlands will have or how many frigates this country will have. We all have independent sovereign interests. We also have global responsibilities, and I do not think there is any easy forum in which to be able to negotiate that. If you could get a zero solution, I guess, that would be one solution. I think that is impossible practically. And so I think we will discuss this, but I am not one that is very much a believer. As I look at what we did in the U.S. a week or two ago, when the President was willing to reduce tactical nuclear weapons on our ships, we made a decision which we believed was the right decision to make with the world situation at the time: to show that we thought that the world had changed. It was a decision made in relation to what we thought would make it possible for us to go forward. We had opposed many of those ideas in the past, because the only way that people would talk about them was in an arms control regime where you have to negotiate; you have to have an inspection verification regime for it to make any sense. I think none of those ideas are going to change. People are going to talk about them. There are those who talked about confidence in security-building measures and that we needed those measures because the navies of the world could cause dangerous things to happen, and they made people afraid that they would react in different ways. I think taking off tactical nuclear weapons, for example, made a big difference. It is pretty hard to make a case that the world is going to become unstable because of navies. I always thought it was a bogus case, that it was more propaganda than reality, because I contend that navies, alone, seldom are threatening to landmasses. There are very few people who can threaten landmasses with a navy, particularly if you take nuclear weapons away from it. I hope we have taken some of the things that worry people off of the table as a result of that. I think we have done very well with security confidence-building measures. The best one, of course, is the Incidents at Sea Agreement, which we have had with the Soviets for years, and we have very well honored it on both sides. Many

nations have now, for various reasons, entered similar type agreements. I have no problem with that, but to have an international agreement like that where all of us are locked into it would be difficult. I think you need an agreement so you can deal with the issues between one or two nations. If you deal with it with forty or fifty nations, and it [the issue] deals with only two, you know, my ship and your ship, why do we need the opinion of all to deal with a simple matter at sea? I think it is going to be an issue that will continue to be pushed. In the West, many have wanted arms control to reduce forces. That is happening anyway. So, I do not think that the group who has pushed arms control is going to have as strong a point with it today, as they have in the past. I do not have an absolute answer for you, but that's kind of my view of where we are going. I think it is just an issue we are going to have to deal with, as we go forward, and I would like to continue to have the flexibility to operate our navies as we see fit, as each individual nation for its own sovereignty, and for us to come together, when it makes sense, in a multilateral coalition that benefits all of us.

Vice Admiral van Foreest: Admiral Kelso, would you sort of agree, sir, that we might just take all the maritime arms control bit out of the CSCE process? The whole world there has changed, and if we are going to do anything about it, we should make this a worldwide sort of discussion, just like it was post-World War One. When we think of the Washington Treaty, it was not Europe-oriented or anything else, in that sense. It was a worldwide kind of a problem that they were addressing. So in my opinion, it is not a valid discussion within the CSCE kind of process any longer, because the world has changed.

Admiral Kelso: It would certainly be all right with me, but I do not think it will be any easier to deal with in a world forum, either.

Admiral William Smith: I would like to direct a short question to Admiral Loftus. Steve, there has been work going on in Nato to develop what is now called the Rapid Reaction Corps. This is a fundamental change in Nato's posture and in Nato's direction. It reflects the need to better use smaller, available land, sea, and air forces. Within the Rapid Reaction Corps, there is going to be a land component which will consist of mobile units. There will be an air component which will involve airlift, combat air brigades, as well as tactical fighter support. Within the sea component, the current plan is to use the Standing Naval Force for wherever this crisis or this power projection requirement happens to be. In your discussion of an identifiable pool of sealift, does it seem reasonable that we in Nato should make sealift a component of this Rapid Reaction Corps and, therefore, give the opportunity for Nato nations—maybe expanded at some later time beyond Nato—but give the opportunity for Nato nations to contribute

sealift, if that is easier for them to do, rather than contribute grey hulls into the maritime component?

Vice Admiral Loftus: I think that is exactly the right place for it. It lends itself not only to identification of those assets but to the potential for exercise in a standing component as well. One of the reasons that so many of the sealift assets were available as quickly as they were is the fact that they had participated in various exercises. It seems to me that once the list of assets is identified in the Nato structure, that part of the sea component should be part of the sealift assets. I also think this inventory of assets should be expanded beyond Nato, into the non-Nato countries as well, so that you have a global look at what assets might be available under U.N.-sanctioned operations.

Vice Admiral Smith: I would like to take an opportunity to add something to that, and it has to do with exercising, perhaps not of the sealift forces, but of the forces that are going to be lifted. And that may or may not fall within the bailiwick of some of us in this room. I recall that Admiral Donovan talked about the growth of what was anticipated, and what was actually shipped. I happened to be in Europe at the time the Seventh Corps was ordered to be deployed to Southwest Asia. The first estimate that was made in terms of the total number of ships required was fifty-five. That was an Army estimate that came out of Washington. The second estimate of the number of ships required was sixty-two. That was an estimate by the United States Army, Europe, that their people thought would be required. A third estimate was one hundred twenty ships. That was made by the people that were working for us in the J-3 organization. As they watched the Phase One move, they began to plug in the percentage of growth, which was over and above what people normally thought they would deploy with. The actual number that it took was one hundred eleven. Now, there are a large number of factors involved, so that is one side of the exercising of this maneuver force that is important.

The second point would be that we would not have been able to move the Seventh Corps out of Europe had we not done Reforger exercises for the past x-number of years. I do not how long they have been doing Reforger, but Reforger exercises are the exercises for the reinforcement of Europe. While we never moved forces out of the central area, we had moved forces in. So, in that context, there had been relationships developed over time with the port authorities in the northern ports—Antwerp, Bremerhaven. There were three or four major ports up there, and we knew what the facilities were like. We knew what the storage capacity was like, and we knew what the routes to get into those ports were like and how much of a problem we were going to have moving those forces into those port areas. We also knew how to develop the relationships, or how to call on the relationships that had been previously developed in working

the trains, the roads system, and the barge system throughout those northern countries to ensure that the gear moved. We moved, for Seventh Corps alone, over seventy thousand people. Now it was initially thought that we would do it all by train. The estimate was six hundred trains. We ended up using trains, barges, and roads. I would tell you again the value of exercising was demonstrated conclusively in that exercise or that operation because a deployment order, for instance, came on 8 November, as I recall, and Frank [Donovan, Commander, Military Sealift Command] had already started moving ships in that direction. He must have had some clairvoyance or something. The first major unit to deploy out of major port was only thirteen days later. So, that was put into place, and that was moving forces that had not moved in forty years, but, again, against the backdrop of having exercised in that regime for a number of years. So it is important, I think to include the maneuverability part in the exercise scenario, because it is not easy.

Colonel Homan, Netherlands Marine Corps: Gentlemen, now that the strategic warning time has become two years, you often hear that armed forces can be used for other things. Yesterday we heard a lot about new naval roles for the naval forces. I have two remarks about it. In the first place, if there were no naval forces at all at this moment in the world, should we establish naval forces to deal with drug traffic, pollution and so on? I think the answer will be "no," because the rationale for naval forces will stay. That is part of foreign policy. Naval forces can implement, when necessary, organized marched files. That is one. And two, in stretching those more or less police tasks, is there danger that politicians, especially in an era of fiscal constraint, will misuse naval forces so that the main mission of naval forces will be neglected? Thank you.

Vice Admiral Smith: It is, perhaps, an extension to a question that was asked yesterday. Admiral Miller answered it, in part, by saying that, even though we have naval forces devoted to nonconventional roles, counter-narcotics being the example, those forces are continuing to practice in areas of warfare which are not being used in the counter-narcotics business, but can conceivably be used in another area and in another scenario. So, we do not lose a great deal in terms of training with those forces in those particular mission areas.

Secondly, in those particular mission areas, our naval forces are still, in fact, carrying out issues of foreign policy. Because our political masters, specifically our President, have identified as a vital interest (or if not vital, certainly of grave interest to the United States and a lot of other countries) that we try to stifle—that we try to stop—the drug flow, I would offer to you that, while they are stressing missions which are outside of the conventional sense of how naval forces should be used, I would not share the opinion that they are missions that we should not undertake. They do threaten the regional stability that we feel is so important.

Let me take that, perhaps, one step further. Those threats are not necessarily new. Previously, they were included in the overall context of things, as lesser included offenses. We built forces to go after a larger threat, a capability of the Soviet Union, as an example. Those particular areas, were subsumed within that naval force.

Now you asked the question as to whether forces should be developed specifically to go after these kinds of police actions. I do not, personally, believe that they should be at the expense of the larger mission. So while you may consider them to be policing efforts that perhaps are not suitable for naval forces, if that was your question, I would personally disagree with that, if for no other reason than our naval forces are designed to carry out the mission given to us by our political masters, and that is one of our principal missions in this area of the world right now.

Vice Admiral Mauz: I have nothing to add to that really. I think it is fair to say that when the U.S. Navy was first brought into this new mission area we were reluctant. In those days, it was the height of the Cold War. We saw it as a dilution of our primary effort, and I think that, as time has gone on, we recognize it as an important mission and, frankly, it is one additional justification for retaining force structure.

Captain Villanueva, Guatemalan Navy: [Translation from Spanish] I am from the Guatemalan Navy. I want to make the following comment:

I believe that each naval force lives its own particular situation. Clearly, the change in the international scene has determined that the situation at the continental level has changed, and in consequence, the regional framework has also changed. Close to the United States there are many "pocket-sized" countries with navies so small they could be disposable. Nevertheless, we have our situation to take care of. We believe that we exist, as well, to accomplish the responsibilities assigned to each naval force representing each state. The Guatemalan Navy, specifically the Atlantic Ocean Naval Base, has captured more than one thousand kilograms of cocaine destined for the American market. Perhaps the drug problem was not included in the traditional concept for navies, but in the particular case of the small navies that operate also as a coast guard, we are accomplishing this mission. In addition, we view with great concern that, because of all the changes that are developing on a daily basis on the international scene, there are heavy cuts in the budgets of the armed forces, and the politicians are interested in sending the military back home. Given that, we must find a new way of integration so that, besides our basic functions, our armed forces can accomplish new missions integrated with all the other forces of our countries, serving as a force that can help in the development of all these countries.

I think that the possible multinational efforts that can be carried out in the future at the regional level will serve the purpose of maintaining friendly relations between navies and will ensure the survival and peaceful coexistence between the military and political forces in all of our nations.

This was only a comment in order to enrich the result of this panel discussion.

From the floor: I would like to follow on to the problem on nonconventional types of missions. I would like to put a question as to the desirability of stressing our participation in this kind of mission, as a way to get more money. Now, if the emphasis should shift in the future from conventional mission to nonconventional mission, then also our future force structure will be influenced from that. At present, you are conducting nonconventional missions with the force you have now, which has been designed for larger missions. But, in the future, if we are going to say, okay, to our politicians, we need money for nonconventional missions, then this also affects our force structure. This will affect our ship development, because we argue why we need larger ships for doing this kind of mission. So, at present, there is no problem. In the future force structure, there could be a problem. For example, how do you think this will affect the United States Navy's future force structure?

Vice Admiral Mauz: Not on the horizon that we can see at this time. The forces that we have in the Caribbean, for example, turned out to be ideally suited for that kind of mission. We have E-2C airborne early warning aircraft working in the area, and they are tracking small aircraft. It turns out that capability is very useful. It is the same capability that we designed for use against the Soviets. Aegis cruisers and other ships provide a command and control capability in the Caribbean to focus our surveillance and detection assets. So far, we have not seen a great deal of emphasis or requirement to restructure our navy to handle that mission. As for the future, if that becomes our primary mission, then there may be some direction to build smaller ships or other responses, but I do not see that on the horizon.

Vice Admiral Mauz: Let me follow up on that only to say that there are research and development efforts today that would enhance the capabilities of the forces involved in drug operations—different detecting devices, for instance, in the maritime patrol forces for surveillance areas. I would suggest that you would continue to see those [enhancements], where you would probably not, on the horizon, see the changes in structure and kinds of ships and aircraft (that you will see in future developments and R&D for detection capability).

Rear Admiral Claes Tornberg, Royal Swedish Navy: The role for the United Nations on the naval arena has not been very much discussed here. On land,

peacekeeping operations are well developed and have found form, as I see it. Could or should the United Nations' role develop at sea as well?

Vice Admiral Smith: We had an expert in one of the seminars that I sat in on, who had been on the U.N. Military Committee. If he is in this room, it might be helpful if he could elaborate on that particular point. I am not so sure that the U.N. is the forum to take on a drug problem. If it is considered to be a world problem, and if that is what you are asking, then I would not see any reason why we could not develop some sort of a relationship that would attack that particular threat, just like we would attack any other. I am not aware of any particular thoughts in that direction.

Vice Admiral Mauz: Just an observation that, you are right, the U.N. peacekeeping forces ashore have been established for many years and they, in effect, keep opposing sides apart and will police a troubled area, a no man's land, in between opposing forces and try to keep the peace in that way. There is no theoretical reason why that could not apply to naval forces at sea. If you have a troubled area with opposing interests on either side, naval forces under the U.N. flag could operate in a peacekeeping role. There really has not been that many opportunities, but it is possible. However, I would like to point out that there are naval activities right now going on under U.N. auspices. We are still boarding and searching. I say "we"—several countries are still cooperating in the boarding and searching of ships heading into Aqaba in the northern Red Sea, and are enforcing the U.N. sanctions against Iraq.

From the floor: I would like to make this question about the United Nations even a bit more difficult. Admiral Kelso, you are roughly saying that we are entering a century which would be dominated by global information. You referred to "kid generation" which will be in possession of information of the whole globe. I think the last war in the Gulf has shown already the big influence of world public opinion on an event like this. It seems to me that the legitimacy depends very much on the question, how may countries join in when military force will be used? The more who agree that this is legitimate, the more the public opinion will go towards that direction. From that perspective, I think the question is worthwhile to ask, is this the moment now to strengthen the United Nations' role and put it in the position to ease the decision-making process on using military force in a world police role?

Vice Admiral Smith: I need some help on this one, because I sat in a seminar and one of the gentlemen pointed out that the military committee in the U.N. had determined that their role is in peacekeeping, not in another way. In other words, they would not be used to enter a conflict. They would be used after the conflict

was over, and that would be the way that they were intended to be used. So, I think that what we are trying to do is to determine whether or not the current structure should be used, and if that is the case and if this information is correct, and I interpreted the comment correctly, then it seems to me that maybe that is not going to be the structure.

Admiral Kelso: I think the U.N. is like many of our countries; they may have a much larger role than we have ever seen before. I think that opportunity exists today, because for most of our careers the U.N. had the same polarization between East and West for every question which came up. There were a certain set of nations that sided with the Western world, and there is a certain set of nations that sided with the Eastern world, for whatever their economic or political reasons. So, it was quite difficult to get a consensus because of this polarization that existed. I believe that there is great opportunity for the U.N. to address issues, which in the past it was quite hard for it to cope with, and, in a maritime sense, I do not see why that should not be true. I think that we have some differences on land and on sea that will change the U.N.'s fundamental role. As Admiral Mauz said, in general, where we have had a peacekeeping force under U.N. auspices, there has been a peacekeeping force to separate two sides, where the boundaries were fairly clear. The boundaries at sea are not very clear. It is hard to separate what you want to do. I also think you have a different issue "on how do you control forces at sea?" The U.N. basically does not have a mechanism to operate naval forces. So it is going to have to depend upon some group of ships, commanders, whatever, to be able to function and to carry out a mission. I think the maritime interception operations in the Persian Gulf, which continue, may be an example on how the U.N. might ask maritime forces to function in the future. There was clearly a state that the U.N. had an issue with, and I agree with the idea that the more nations that agree to an action, the easier it will be for the U.N. to take decisive action. In this case, they took action that was certainly decisive. There was not a particular commander chosen by the U.N. to do this; it was a coordinated effort. I would contend that it is not a bad way to approach it when you are not going right into a conflict. Quite often this is appropriate for the military leadership at sea because of the geography we deal with, which is large and easily apportioned. The rules must be fairly clear on what you want to do; here we wanted to intercept ships and not let a certain amount of trade pass through, and all of our maritime forces were trained for this operation. It was not an operation where you were likely going to have to shoot quickly or be into a large fight in a short period of time. I would contend that, politically, it would have been impossible to get agreement for one nation to be in charge of all this, but yet it worked extremely well with a coordination role, each nation taking its own approach. So, we had something that worked under the auspices of the United Nations without having to have an absolute political

decision as to how it was going to be done. I think that this is a way that the U.N. might march in the future, to try to prevent conflict when it can focus on what the issue is. I think we have much more likelihood that we might see maritime forces used in this way. I think it will always have to be that some group of nations, who have the kind of maritime forces that can do this in concert with a lot of other nations, must get together and figure out how to make it take place. There has got to be some agreement on the local level as to how to cooperate. I do think that opportunity is far more likely today than it has been in years past. I do not foresee the likelihood of having maritime operations where you have the U.N. on one side saying do not cross latitude X, and some other group on the other side saying we are going to try to cross latitude X. I just do not think that is a practical idea. It is going to be the application of maritime force to whatever region of the world the application needs to be taken.

Commander H. Conway Ziegler, U.S. Navy: If I can follow up just briefly on this point of the U.N. concept on the use of force, I think that what Admiral Smith was referring to was a distinction that came up after the U.N. involvement in the Congo, defining the difference between a deterrent force and a peacekeeping force. I think that, after some of the unfortunate experiences there, the United Nations Military Committee reached a decision that they no longer wanted to use military force to deter someone from doing something. Now subsequently to that, when the multinational forces and observers were put in the Sinai, there were Italian minesweeping units that were put along as a naval component for that. But, I think that the broad question is that once you raise the U.N. flag over a vessel, then all of a sudden nations have lost a flexibility which they had, for instance, in *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*, to agree to operate under U.N. auspices and under U.N. principles, but still under national command. You lose a tremendous amount of flexibility, and I think that is where the problem comes up when you actually try to deter someone using force.

Rear Admiral Wright: Thank you very much for the clarification.

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Regional Committee Summary Reports

Rear Admiral Wright:

WE ARE AT THAT POINT in our syllabus where the regional and special committees make their reports to you. The first committee looked at service colleges and was represented by, in most cases, the commandants of the war colleges or staff colleges in each of the countries. This report will be delivered by Colonel J.E. Zilmer. He is serving as the Commandant of the Royal Danish Defense College.

Committee One: Special Group—Service Colleges

Colonel Zilmer: Thank you. Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. To demonstrate the truly joint efforts that we have been carrying out over these past days, I am going to report for the college committee.

Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, President of the United States Naval War College, agreed to chair the committee and head the discussion. He began by calling for topics of discussion. Six areas were identified for review. To begin the afternoon session, Admiral Strasser gave a short brief on the Naval War College, its mission, its programs, and the makeup of the four resident programs as well as the College of Continuing Education. The committee members then asked questions regarding academic freedom and the career status of the officers in attendance at the Naval War College. A discussion on how course syllabi were kept current to meet the changes in the political and environmental conditions of the world followed. General consensus indicated service colleges were able to keep up with the multitude of changes through faculty attendance at symposiums such as this, through guest speakers from both internal and external sources, and through seminar discussions. Conferences, reading material, and media were other sources of information used to ensure that the curriculum had the latest material for the students in relation to the external environment.

The question on whether the war colleges teach war or peace was addressed. The view of participants was that neither war nor peace was directly taught. Students are taught to think strategically, to make sound strategic decisions based on the facts available to them at the time, and to use the forces available to them.

The fundamental purpose of the military is to deter war. To do this, they must be ready to fight. The degree of jointness and how joint operations are presented to the students were discussed. Some countries recognize total jointness, while others emphasize the individual services with a degree of joint operations taught. No one service can operate on its own. Students are consequently taught, to various degrees, first, how to be professionals in their own service, and then how to operate professionally in a joint arena. One of the major areas of concern for all countries is the area of communications and, in particular, the compatibility of communications systems. On the political level, an agreement on procedural cooperation is necessary. Once the procedures, including common definitions, a common language, and a common understanding of how communications should work, are in place through certain agencies, such as the United Nations, then equipment compatibility can follow. Unless forces operating together can communicate with each other and practice communicating with each other, in advance, communications will not succeed in time of war.

Rear Admiral Strasser opened the second day of discussion with a suggestion that the group look at how war games can be most appropriately used for the betterment of multinational cooperation. It was suggested that the war game design to test the command structure in a multinational peacekeeping force structure would be a viable option. In this way, the political problems associated with countries working together would be minimized. A war game in one location, with teams of personnel from other countries playing first at a tactical and then at a strategical level, was suggested. Interoperability was seen as a major problem facing war games of this type. Most of the participants were enthusiastic about trying a war game of this nature.

The final discussion of the day centered around service college exchange programs for both faculty and students. Exchange programs are a successful way to build confidence and understanding between nations. Other benefits include an increased exchange of information, increased cooperation among countries, better qualified professors for the country's service school once a student returns to his nation, and a lifetime international friendship. Language is the only major drawback. Students or faculty who participate in the exchange program must be able to speak the language of the host nation, since the curriculum is taught in the native language. In addition to the exchange program, use of satellite transmission of foreign guest speakers is becoming available. Some satellite transmissions even allow the students and professor to have verbal exchange in a question and answer period via the satellite net.

After thanking everyone for their participation, Rear Admiral Strasser adjourned the second day's discussion so that those members interested in a demonstration of the Naval War College war-gaming capability could take advantage of this opportunity. This ends my report.

Rear Admiral Wright: Thank you Colonel Zilmer. I did not mention that the format for this segment will include presentations down the line with, as time permits, questions at the completion. Admiral Jorge Mora Perez, Chief of Naval Operations of Mexico, will present his report on the regional committee on the Caribbean, the South Atlantic, and the Eastern Pacific.

Committee Two: Caribbean, South Atlantic, and Eastern Pacific

Admiral Mora Perez: [Translation from Spanish] Good morning everybody. Admiral Kelso. Let us begin this comment by making an appreciation to all the people who took part in the committee for the Caribbean, South Atlantic, and Eastern Pacific area, on both coastal sides. At the beginning, we tried to identify the role that our armed forces have to play in the light of the current changes. As it has been shown in the other sessions, we considered this change as a development of the missions that our navies are performing. Roles like maritime policing are getting bigger, without forcing us to neglect the traditional missions that have been put in our hands. All of them were considered as a security guarantee for our countries.

The war against drugs has acquired a special importance. This topic has been discussed extensively during this symposium. There have been some comments touching on the employment of our armed forces in combating drugs, but it is clear that this has to be a shared effort. It is necessary that there exist a close cooperation between our navies in the region, and our ships will be necessarily involved. In a comment related to coordination with the Coast Guard service, it has been established that there is a possibility for U.S. high technology to be used by our countries. In order to be successful, it was also understood that there must exist cooperation among us. It was also understood, as it was in yesterday's discussion, that this activity must be discussed before, and until, it is possible to find a solution. After analyzing it in terms of the different legal aspects and conditions that each of our navies have, it was understood that this represents, perhaps, one of the most important activities today. The proposal for information interchange will be basic, and it was consigned in this way in the document that was written as a result of the discussions. In yesterday's meeting following the proposal of the Chilean admiral, it was expressed that is was necessary to interchange in order to improve our knowledge and to be ready to perform our activities. It was generally agreed to accept this proposal, and it was decided that we will forward, through official channels, the invitation to open the opportunity for courses and exercises to all of us. We finished our activities with a clear consensus that through a shared effort we will be in a condition to find a possible solution to these problems. Thank you.

Rear Admiral Wright: The next committee dealing with the Western Pacific will be covered by Vice Admiral Ian MacDougall, Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Australian Navy.

Committee Three: Western Pacific

Vice Admiral MacDougall: Thank you. Admiral Kelso, fellow flag officers and delegates, lady and gentlemen. The committee agreed to identify areas of mutual concern and changes that may have occurred in the region which would affect these concerns. The mutual concerns which the committee identified were:

Sea lines of communication. All nations in the region are dependent upon maritime trade. The security of SLOCs from whatever threat must, therefore, be an enduring consideration.

Disputed territories and sources of resources. Any instability will impact adversely on trade.

The narcotic traffic. About sixty percent of arrests arising from the flow of drugs from the Golden Triangle are made at sea. Navies will have a significant role in support of civil agencies in combating this menace.

The potential for imbalances in economic competition—noting that the Pacific is the fastest growing marketplace in the world.

Environmental issues which could lead to a growth in environmental legislation which could increasingly influence naval operations.

A restless China. It is impossible to predict the outcomes, but the potential for change, perhaps dramatic change, exists.

The congestive nature of large water areas in the western Pacific region, particularly in archipelagic circumstances.

Differences in ideologies. As an example: the two Koreas.

Humanitarian endeavors. For example, the flow of refugees by sea in small boats, and piracy. The committee harkened to the statement made by Admiral Shariff in the panel discussions yesterday in which he stated that there are about 130,000 refugees in camps in Malaysia, and about four hundred arrive each month. Some have been in camps for over seven years and other countries in the region have problems of similar magnitude.

Secessionist movements—these arising from the development nature of some Southwestern Pacific countries. For example, Bougainville, Papua New Guinea. These give rise to concerns.

Tactical nuclear weapons. The removal of tactical nuclear weapons from naval ships in the region by the U.S. and U.S.S.R., while others in the area have or might acquire a tactical nuclear weapon capability.

This is not an exhaustive list, but certainly enough to demonstrate the need for cooperation between states in the region in order to maintain stability.

Discussion centered on whether the current focus of bilateral arrangements should be expanded to multinational arrangements in order to better deal with these issues. One of the delegates noted that there were some areas of mutual concern, such as SLOCs, which might encourage multinational arrangements. Another delegate felt that the U.S. must be the core of bilateral arrangements in the area. It was noted that, with the current emphases on downsizing U.S. military forces, the U.S. presence in the region might lessen, hence its influence upon stability. One delegate pointed out that Nato's success has been largely in its ability to enable the countries represented to maintain an effective dialogue with each other. Perhaps a more multinational focus in the western Pacific could serve the same purpose. It is, however, unlikely that the Nato model would ever be universally applicable to the area, because concerns from north to south in the region vary dramatically, and many issues do not lend themselves to a multinational arrangement.

The question was asked if nations had the means for effective communication in the area. It was agreed that there was scope for developing improved communications, using such forums as the WestPac Naval Symposium, the International Seapower Symposium, and the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences.

Environmental issues was one area of concern, which it was agreed, lends itself to multilateral solution. This, in turn, could lead to other multilateral arrangements, such as reducing drug trafficking in the area. In the case of environment protection, one nation's adoption, unilaterally, of new standards could impact upon the operations of another. Dialogue would be useful to avoid misunderstanding or confusion. Disputed territories have the potential to become a problem and could impact on trade. With respect to disputed territories, it was considered that this problem is being addressed effectively on a bilateral basis with some positive indications. Multinational treatment of this issue would, however, need to be kept as an option. If these bilateral arrangements were not working in favor of a particular nation, it could present a concern in the long term. However, it was believed that they should be given at least a chance to work.

In summary, at the end of session one, the committee agreed they had common concerns and goals and that, in most instances, bilateral arrangements could best handle these issues for the present. It was agreed that better means of communications to improve cooperation in the area need to be actively pursued. Using panel discussions on the second day as a basis, further consideration was given in session two to the issues addressed in the first session, resulting in a refinement of the degree of difficulty implicit in the concerns and some proposed initiatives for the future. A goal for the nations in the regions will be to develop common doctrine for as many naval operations as practicable and, if possible,

seek release of appropriate Nato publications to achieve this. Unless this is accomplished, it will be more difficult to make progress in terms of cooperation using common procedures. The committee noted the potential for further examination of the issues at the next Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 1992 and that useful progress had been made, in this regard, during this symposium.

In concluding, the committee wishes to express its appreciation of the outstanding efficiency of Professor Carol Figerie, its rapporteur, for pulling together the record of its deliberations. Finally, the committee wishes to thank Admiral Kelso, Admiral Strasser and his staff, Admiral Wright, and the various presenters for providing this valuable opportunity to come to grips with many complex issues, some old and some new, which confront nations in the region.

Rear Admiral Wright: The committee that dealt with the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf will be reported by Vice Admiral Saeed Mohammed Khan, Vice Chief of Naval Staff, Pakistan Navy.

Committee Four: Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf

Vice Admiral Khan: Thank you, Admiral. Admiral Kelso, distinguished delegates. I am pleased to represent my colleagues from the committee on the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf. I will be brief in my summation. Our deliberations were both serious and, in keeping with the theme of the conference, most cooperative. A continuation of such mutual understanding would certainly bode well for the region if it would extend that spirit to those nations and navies not represented here today. There is no question but that the world was tested severely in the last year, and the focus was absolutely fixed on the region which we, in our committee, have been discussing. We spent some time at the outset to try to define the chief interests which could be threatened in the future and to identify which disputes might disrupt the peace over the next five to ten years. The interests were, first and foremost, the sovereignty of each of the nations in the region, followed by the unimpeded flow of oil, both as an essential commodity for the importers of that oil and as the economic lifeblood of many nations in the Gulf region. Also to this end, we reaffirmed our common interest in freedom of navigation, economic exchanges, preservation and protection of the environment, and control of other threats, not necessarily carried out by naval forces. In the latter category we, of course, include the threats imposed by terrorist activities and drug trafficking. Of the major threats to the region, we were convinced that the Soviets were no longer an imminent threat in the near term. Still, there was some lingering doubt about the permanence of the disappearance of the threat. Obviously, the most contentious threat still present in the region is Iraq. If the United Nations were to falter in its steadfastness, while carrying out the conditions of the Security Council resolutions, we could be faced with a more determined and, certainly, a more dangerous Iraq in a few years time. That Iran

could also threaten the stability of the region was expressed by some of the committee members. We discussed the mischief which could be wrought by the uncontrolled sale of arms in the region and concluded that efforts be made to curb this, as best possible. Other less serious, but nevertheless troublesome, situations involve border disputes. Although most nations in the region are wise enough to negotiate solutions in such matters, others are not so wise.

Our discussions frequently considered the role of the United Nations and whether that body could do more to prevent open conflict, rather than to arrive after the bloodshed to try to preserve the truce. We generally agreed that the manner in which the allies conducted themselves in the last conflict, through the United Nations, has strengthened that body and its potential for future conflict resolution. However, we also agreed that the United Nations did not have the military tools for thwarting aggression nor the decision-making apparatus which would permit the execution of bold steps which would buttress deterrence.

We also considered the issue of reduced defense budget and the consequent impact on peace enforcement forces from outside the region, principally, but not exclusively the United States and its formidable navy.

Other forms of presence were also discussed, namely the utility of pre-positioned ships and supplies.

Turning to naval functions which might lend themselves to cooperative effort amongst navies in the Gulf region, we agreed that some of the less difficult options should come first, such as pollution control and combating environment damage.

Next, we will recommend cooperation in search and rescue operations. This would be appropriate, not only within the Gulf, but also in large ocean areas beyond. As a natural result of the mining that occurred in the Gulf, in both the Iran-Iraq War and the most recent war against Iraq, I believe a consensus was reached that this, too, could be a mission which would reasonably lend itself to cooperative effort now. We discussed the prospect of this becoming an item for the next meeting of the navies of the GCC countries. We also concluded that the Gulf, because of its size and the proximity of so many countries, would be the best area in which to start such effort, followed by the north Arabian Sea and extending from Oman to Pakistan to Diego Garcia and India.

Maritime patrol aircraft of many nations, including those of the United States and the U.K., were mentioned as relatively easy to coordinate in initial efforts. By exercising together, many of these cooperative efforts would be improved to the point of being somewhat routine.

Throughout our discussions, we were not swept up by the mood of cooperation to the extent that we ignored the sovereign rights of each nation to make bilateral agreements when it was in their best interests to do so, but we also recognized that some nations may not be able to afford, perhaps because of the economics or other reasons, such as demographics, all the tools of deterrence. In such instances, it would seem to make sense to share the burden, both in cost

and in the distribution of mission areas. Each country could make reasonable contributions to the defense of the region according to their assets and abilities.

In summary, I must say that this has been a most useful and enjoyable symposium. The exchange of ideas will unquestionably foster greater understanding, and I believe we will have better served our navies by having attended it. Thank you very much.

Rear Admiral Wright: Admiral William D. Smith, the U.S. Representative to the Nato Military Committee will provide the report of the committee on the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Eastern Atlantic region.

Committee Five: Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Eastern Atlantic

Admiral Smith: Admiral Kelso, distinguished delegates. Our committee was honored to welcome to their first International Seapower Symposium, Vice Admiral Pavlov from the Bulgarian Navy. He participated freely in our deliberations, and it was a pleasure to have him in our regional committee.

Our committee's discussions centered on three interrelated considerations: reduced global tensions, economic constraints, and mutual benefits to be gained by expanding the interoperational capabilities of our maritime forces. We centered our discussion, eventually, on those initiatives which were most essential to the navies in the region under discussion. We came to the conclusion that the expansion of interoperability through development of commonly used operating processes and procedures would be of benefit to each of the navies. There needs to be greater application of maritime forces to nontraditional roles, such as drug trafficking, pollution control, smuggling, and piracy. This subject took up quite a bit of our time because it had a variety of aspects in that very troubled region of the world, and each nation properly described the unique problems facing their navy.

There were two very specific recommendations which emerged from the two sessions of our committee. One of the early recommendations that began to draw interest from our members was the idea that a regional seapower conference might be arranged among the navies of West Africa during a time when the West African patrol of U.S. Navy ships was in the area. Perhaps, such a conference could even be conducted on board the flag ship. This initiative will receive further study by the nations involved. There was also considerable interest on the part of the navies of the region that have a coast guard mission to have the coast guard aspects of small navies explored in greater detail. That recommendation will be passed to the next International Seapower Symposium with the idea that a voluntary committee under the supervision or direction of one of the U.S. Coast Guard officers would examine that particular subject further.

In conclusion, there was a realization by the members of our committee that nontraditional roles for naval forces are essentially here to stay in the area of

regional cooperation. Each of our navies needs to look at those nontraditional roles if we are to continue to serve our countries to the best of our ability. It was graphically described that, if navies elect not to accept the nontraditional roles and those roles are assigned to other forces of the government, then the navies become more irrelevant. Our group concluded with the realization that the navies were finding it relatively easy to discuss these problems, even though their countries might have historic differences, and those discussions brought us to the realization that the navies can easily be in the forefront of this closer cooperation and might lead to better political cooperation over time. Thank you.

Rear Admiral Wright: Thank you, Admiral Smith. Admiral Carlos Vila Miranda, Chief of the Navy General Staff for Spain, will provide the summary of the deliberations on the committee that dealt with the North Atlantic and the Baltic region.

Committee Six: North Atlantic and Baltic Sea

Admiral Vila: [Translation from Spanish] Admiral Kelso, distinguished delegates and colleagues. Our group was composed of Nato and non-Nato members, specifically two admirals, one Swedish and the other Finnish, and a Polish colonel. This mixed group perhaps caused us, throughout the discussions, to consider the impact of the capabilities of the workings of regional Nato members. Colonel Marian Moraczewski's presentation was particularly interesting.

The committee devoted a good deal of time to the comparison of Nato and non-Nato naval problems. It came to the conclusion that, in order to establish multinational naval cooperation, it is necessary to work toward the goal of interoperability of equipment and procedures. As a consequence, it is necessary that the allies should, in their endeavor to achieve technological advances, not allow their friends to fall behind. Although it is true that through pursuing high technology one can lower the cost of military equipment, this pursuit must be done with the thought of the interoperability which has historically distinguished the Nato alliance. This is especially important, and perhaps easiest in the area of communications, particularly now that the threat level has diminished, which allows us to employ less sophisticated equipment. Another facet, which in the view of the committee should be thoroughly worked out, is procedural or doctrinal interoperability. For a long time Nato has had this capability, but it has not been accessible to all navies. Once the doctrinal procedures are diffused, it is then possible to move toward increasingly more complex combined operations which, in turn, will make easier more multinational cooperation.

On the second day, taking into consideration all that was said during the first day, and particularly those points emphasized in the panel discussion dealing with the collaboration of the forces in the Persian Gulf coalition, the subject of just

how to incorporate non-Nato navies in future multinational efforts was taken up. As I have already said, the problem is not one of just communications, it is one of tactical procedures. The committee considered the possibility of revising (and if necessary declassifying) some Nato publications that promulgate general procedures. Such a procedural handbook could be issued under the auspices of the United Nations or, should the United Nations not prefer to participate, by Nato itself. Individual nations themselves could adopt these procedures before trying to use them in bilateral or multilateral operations.

The final topic was common to all committees and dealt with the issue of nonconventional operations that face all navies: the interdiction of drug trafficking. It seemed to me, and I said it, that there seems to be a collective call to arms in the struggle against drugs. The discussion centered on the question of the execution of the law and how far navies can go. We have the military capabilities, like intelligence support, that can be critical to civil authority in the accomplishment of its mission. We came to the conclusion that the drug problem is a national problem, and that a balance must be struck between the use of navies in the defense of traditional national interests and the burdens imposed by vigorously waging an anti-drug campaign.

Also taken up was the continuing issue of piracy that, in recent times, seems to have seen a resurgence. With this, the meeting of the committee of the North Atlantic and Baltic ended. Many thanks.

Rear Admiral Wright: Thank you, Admiral Vila. This concludes the presentation of the committee reports.

Ψ

Closing Remarks

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations

FIRST LET ME THANK Admiral Strasser and the members of the War College staff for your outstanding efforts to make this a wonderful symposium. To our interpreters, we appreciate the efforts that you have put forth so that we may understand each other better. Admiral Mora, distinguished naval leaders, ladies and gentlemen. As we bring this symposium to a close, I would like to tell each of you how much I appreciate the time that you have taken out of your busy schedules and demanding assignments to be with us over the past three days. I am sure you will agree that the time was spent productively. I was deeply impressed by the vigorous participation and by the many eloquent and well-reasoned presentations. Our examination of changing threats and changing roles in an altered and geopolitical climate has proven both wide-ranging and, I believe, thought provoking. Once again, we have demonstrated the importance of providing opportunities to share firsthand insights in a cordial and a responsive environment. No less important, I think, has been the opportunity we have had to develop personal relationships. There can be no doubt that the ties among us have been strengthened significantly. The ultimate value of both the dialogue and the friendships we have established will undoubtedly go far beyond the relatively short time we have spent together. As we could have anticipated, we are not in total agreement on all issues. Indeed, the opportunity to explore different views is really what this symposium is all about. But I think there is little doubt that we have reached a broad consensus in several areas. One is that well-prepared maritime forces, acting in concert, afford our national leaders a viable option in crisis response. Clearly, such forces will constitute the basis for our ability to counter regional threats in the future. I see nothing on our horizon which is likely to change this. We are also in concurrence that years of multinational training underwrote the success of coalition forces in operations *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. We recognize, too, that the value of these exercises will only increase in the years ahead, as our forces are likely to get smaller. We have heard several ideas for enhancing our ability to work in tandem, through the use of simulators and mobile training teams. These ideas definitely bear examining, but mainly as an adjunct, rather than a replacement, for live exercises. There is no substitute for operating together in a real world, real-time environment.

Despite our previous successes, we need to refine our procedures and our coalition efforts, particularly in the communications arena. We cannot wait until the next conflict to make this happen. As Vice Admiral Talal told us, communications gaps among our forces can lead to fatal consequences. But as Admiral van Foreest has rightly claimed, interoperability is more than just communications, it is fundamentally a matter of mutual trust and mutual respect. Exercising together fosters those qualities and so does the interaction we have experienced here in Newport. Yesterday, Vice Admiral Williams remarked that in some crucial situations it may be necessary for senior naval leaders of various countries to cooperate without benefit of other direction. I would contend that the foundation for such cooperation is laid in meetings like this. I think another point we agree on is that the media will be a part of all future crises and that our skills in dealing with the media will be quite critical to success with our people in uniform and in the populace within our nations. Clearly, CNN is here to stay. Finally, there is little agreement that we do not predict the future well. Time and time again we have been surprised. We must try to keep our political leaders aware that although we cannot, minute-by-minute, describe the next crisis, history tells us that it will come. We must maintain the forces and the readiness to deal with the unknown. In this regard, I am glad we have taken the first step in tapping some tough issues relating to combined operations, such as command structure and rules of engagement. I would add that I believe we are surely better off to work out the command structure military-to-military and let it evolve as we get closer to conflict. Both command structure and rules of engagement seem much easier to resolve politically when conflict is near. I also think that it is important to remember that often the command and control capability will dictate the choice of commander, in the final analysis. Needless to say, these points cannot be resolved in a three-day period, but getting them on the table is a significant accomplishment. Not unexpectedly, we found no easy answers in our discussion of seaborne threats to regional stability. These remain, in many aspects, gray areas. We recognize fully, however, that narcotics trafficking, pollution, and piracy are mutual concerns. Vice Admiral Shariff has suggested a need to increase our research and development in these critical areas, adding that joint patrols can lead to increased security in regional areas. Other participants are less comfortable with the idea of naval forces assuming police duties. There is general agreement that these issues are complex, particularly because they cross departmental bounds in many of our respective nations. As Admiral Miller commented, naval forces, however, can make positive contributions to drug interdiction. The problem is worth pursuing, and this week marks an important contribution to that effort. Before closing, again, I would like to thank Admiral Strasser and the Naval War College staff for their superb support and hospitality. I am sure I speak for all of you when I thank again our interpreters for their remarkable contributions in helping us achieve our dialogue across the language

barriers. I would like to thank the distinguished representatives of the five nations attending this symposium for the first time. We look forward to your continued participation in all facets of the mutual interface among our navies. In a world changing more rapidly than most of us can keep up with, our efforts to train together and establish an ongoing dialogue will, I believe, pay vast dividends. I believe our navies can make real contributions toward a more peaceful world. Most importantly, my deep thanks to all of you for coming and making our symposium a success. I hope you have found our time together as professionally and personally rewarding as I have. I feel I have many more friends today, and I look forward to seeing many of you again at the Twelfth International Seapower Symposium. Until then, I wish each of you, fair winds and following seas, as you return home. Thank you very much.

Ψ

Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College

ADMIRAL MORA, Admiral Kelso, distinguished guests. Before adding my farewell, I would like to make just one or two comments on one subject that I think is very important. Admiral Kelso just now spoke of the importance of us getting to know each other and getting to trust each other, developing friendships and camaraderie. There is one area in which I think we do that especially well, and I would just like to review it for you for about two minutes.

We are indeed very grateful to all of your nations for the wonderful officers that you send to us here for our international courses at the Naval War College. You can see projected before you the number of graduates and the flag officers and the chiefs of service that have come from the courses. Since the Naval Command College was formed in 1956, we have had almost eleven hundred officers from your navies graduate from that course. A total of seventy-two countries have sent officers, at one time or another, to the Naval Command College. As you can see, more than half of those officers have become flag officers in your navies. The number would be higher, except the last four or five classes are not yet senior enough to be considered for flag rank. We have had ninety-nine, or almost ten percent, of the officers become chiefs of service, and fifteen are serving in that capacity today. By way of interest, the class of 1975 has the highest number of flag officers. Twenty-seven of thirty-eight officers in that class have become flag officers. The highest percentage was the class of 1967 in which eighteen of twenty-one officers became flag officers in your navies. The most chiefs of service have come from the classes of 1978 and 1980—each of those classes have had six chiefs of service. Today, three of those chiefs of service, from one of those classes, are in the auditorium: from Portugal, Australia, and Israel.

The Naval Staff College, a much younger group, which was formed in 1972, has had almost eight hundred graduates, sixty flag officers, twenty four chiefs of service, and twelve serving in that capacity today. I would think that this goes a long way to promoting the type of friendship, the type of camaraderie, and the type of trust that all of us have talked about as being so important. So I would encourage all of you, please, to continue to send in the coming years the very fine, very talented officers that you have sent to our two courses here. We are very grateful for your support, and we look forward to having the representatives from your countries here.

All of you have been wonderful guests, and it has been a pleasure for us here at the Naval War College to host you. I should apologize now for the great

financial damage that I know your wives have brought on all of you during their shopping sprees, but I can tell you that Rhode Island appreciates it very much. There was a comment in the newspaper a few weeks ago that said the financial situation in Rhode Island was so serious that the Mafia had laid off three judges.

I think we have discussed some very important subjects here which will impact on all of us and hopefully make it much more easy for us to operate together in the future. I wish each and every one of you a safe trip home, and we hope that you will come back again to Newport. I now declare that the Eleventh International Seapower Symposium is officially closed. Thank you very much for your participation.

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Regional Committee Minutes

Committee One
Special Group—Service Colleges

Members

Argentina	Rear Admiral Jose Luis Tejo
Denmark	Colonel J.E. Zilmer
Ecuador	Captain Carlos Galvez Cortes
Egypt	Rear Admiral Magdi el-Abd
Germany	Rear Admiral Jörk Reschke
Israel	Rear Admiral Rafael Apel
Italy	Rear Admiral Luigi Donolo
Malaysia	Lieutenant Commander Mat Taib
Mexico	Vice Admiral Sergio Loperena Garcia
Netherlands	Colonel Kees Homan
Norway	Captain Jan Reksten
Pakistan	Captain Sadiq
Peru	Rear Admiral Jose Teixeira Rivarola
Philippines	Captain Eriberto C. Varona
Portugal	Rear Admiral Leiria Pinto
Spain	Vice Admiral Jose M. Perez Antelo
Sweden	Rear Admiral Claes Tornberg
Turkey	Rear Admiral Orhun Ozdemir
United Kingdom	Captain Robert J. Fisher
United States	Rear Admiral William H. Wright IV
	Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser
Uruguay	Captain Antonio Bugna
Venezuela	Rear Admiral Raul Bustamante

Rapporteur: *Lieutenant Commander Katie Reid, U.S. Navy*

Session One

Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, President of the United States Naval War College, agreed to chair the committee and head the discussion. He began by calling for topics of discussion. Six areas were identified for review.

To begin the afternoon's session, Admiral Strasser gave a short brief on the Naval War College: its mission, its programs, and the makeup of the four resident programs as well as the College of Continuing Education. The committee members then asked questions regarding academic freedom and the career stages of the officers in attendance at the Naval War College.

A discussion on how course syllabi were kept current to meet the changes in the political and environmental conditions of the world followed. General consensus indicated service colleges were able to keep up with the multitude of changes through faculty attendance at symposiums, guest speakers from both internal and external sources, and through seminar discussion. Conferences, reading material, and media were other sources of information used to ensure the curriculum had the latest material for the students in relation to the external environment.

A question on whether war colleges teach war or peace was addressed. The view of participants was that neither war nor peace was directly taught. Students are taught to think strategically, to make sound strategic decisions based on the facts available to them at the time and to use the forces available to them. The fundamental purpose of the military is to deter war. To do this, they must be ready to fight.

The degree of jointness and how joint operations are presented to the students were discussed. Some countries recognize total jointness while others emphasize the individual services with a degree of joint operations taught. No one service can operate on its own. Students are taught, to various degrees, first, how to be professionals in their own service and then how to operate professionally in a joint arena.

One of the major areas of concern for all countries is the area of communications and, in particular, the compatibility of communications systems. On the political level, an agreement on procedural cooperation is necessary. Once the procedures, including common definitions, a common language, and a common understanding of how communications should work are in place through such an agency as the United Nations, then equipment compatibility can follow. Unless forces operating together can communicate with each other and practice communicating with each other in advance, communications will not succeed in time of war.

The committee adjourned with an invitation by Rear Admiral Strasser for members to attend a demonstration of the Naval War College's war-gaming facilities at Sims Hall following the next day's discussions.

Session Two

Rear Admiral Strasser opened the second day of discussion with a suggestion that the group look at how war games can be most appropriately used for the betterment of multinational cooperation. It was suggested that a war game designed to test the command structure in a multinational peacekeeping force structure would be a viable option. In this way, the political problems associated with countries working together would be minimized. A war game in one location with teams of personnel from other countries playing first at a tactical and then at a strategic level was suggested. Interoperability was seen as the major

problem facing a war game of this type. Most of the participants were enthusiastic about trying a war game of this nature.

The final discussion of the day centered around service college exchange programs for both faculty and students. Exchange program success is best described as a way to build confidence and understanding between nations. Other benefits include an increased exchange of information, increased cooperation among countries, better qualified professors for the country's service school once a student returnes to his nation, and lifetime international friendships. Language is the only major drawback. Students or faculty who participate in the exchange program must be able to speak the language of the host nation since the curriculum is taught in the native language. In addition to the exchange program, use of satellite for transmission of foreign guest speakers is becoming available. Some satellite transmissions even allow the students and professor to have a verbal exchange (question and answer period) via the satellite net.

After thanking everyone for their participation, Rear Admiral Strasser adjourned the second day discussions so that those members interested in a demonstration of the Naval War College war-gaming capabilities could take advantage of this opportunity.

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Committee Two
Caribbean, South Atlantic, and Eastern Pacific

Members

Argentina	Admiral Jorge Osvaldo Ferrer
Bahamas	Commodore Leon Smith
Brazil	Rear Admiral Arlindo Vianna Filho
Chile	Admiral Jorge Martinez
	Captain Eduardo Schnaidt
Colombia	Rear Admiral Roberto Serrano
Dominican Republic	Vice Admiral Jose Santos Sanchez
Ecuador	Rear Admiral Oswaldo Viteri Jerez
Guatemala	Captain Edgar Villanueva
Honduras	Captain Reynaldo Andino Flores
	Captain Girodano Fontana
Jamaica	Commander Hardley M. Lewin
Mexico	Admiral Jorge Mora Perez
Peru	Vice Admiral Carlos Martinez Rozas
Trinidad/Tobago	Commander Anthony Franklin
United States	Vice Admiral Martin H. Daniell
	Rear Admiral "Ted" Gordon
Venezuela	Vice Admiral Julian Mauco

Rapporteur: *Professor John H. Maurer, Naval War College*

Session One

The meeting began with the committee asking Admiral Mora Perez of Mexico, the senior delegate at the symposium, to serve as committee chairman. He agreed, and opened the discussion by asking for suggestions about themes that might form the basis for the committee's work. Three questions were proposed to guide the committee's discussions. First, what are the peacetime missions that navies will be called upon to perform in the rapidly changing international environment? Second, how can the navies of the Western Hemisphere better cooperate with each other to support common national goals? Third, what role can naval power play in dealing with the international drug traffic and with narco-terrorism? Admiral Mora Perez pointed out that these questions are interrelated and provide a good starting point for the committee's deliberations.

Peacetime naval missions. The committee began its discussion by examining the many ways that navies serve as an instrument in advancing a state's foreign policy in peacetime. Navies contribute to maintaining the peace by promoting deterrence and thereby fostering international stability.

Another traditional task of navies is the control and protection of sea lanes of communication. Sea control requires intelligence capabilities, logistical support, naval and naval air forces, and marine units. These capabilities are required for coastal and riverine operations, as well as the control of the open oceans and critical choke-points.

Navies are also called upon to exert a state's control over surrounding territorial waters and sea areas. Naval power is needed to help preserve the environment and protect offshore economic resources. ln particular, navies have the task of protecting Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). The sophistication of today's fishing fleets, for example, show that the problems of controlling sea space and protecting the environment are no longer simple tasks; indeed, they require considerable resources and sophisticated technologies. One committee member observed that guarding a state's EEZ might absorb a navy's entire assets.

Another committee member commented that the maritime forces of small states are developed along lines different from the navies of more powerful states. Coast guard and maritime police tasks are of critical importance to small states, and they are of common interest to all the states and navies of the Western Hemisphere.

Several members of the committee argued that all the navies of the region face another common problem: shrinking resources and greater accountability from political authorities. One committee member enjoined his colleagues to confront this reality and plan for reduced budgets. Another participant agreed with this assessment. Political authorities are calling for reductions in the spending on the armed forces throughout the region, while the costs of carrying out operations, fuel, spare parts, etc., grow larger and the demand for naval capabilities increases. Poorer countries in the Western Hemisphere are finding it difficult to meet these costs. lt was suggested that the wealthier countries can help by cooperating with some of the forces at their disposal, such as airborne surveillance.

Another mission for the navies of the region is to uphold international legal norms and standards. This often requires that navies support police operations. One particularly demanding task facing the navies of the region is the struggle to suppress the international drug trade and narco-terrorism.

War against drugs. Admiral Mora Perez stated that the international narcotics trade and narco-terrorism is a cancer to the states of the Western Hemisphere. The problem posed by illegal narcotics and its associated terror even threatens the stability of several countries in the region. Several participants of the committee agreed with this bleak assessment, asserting that the main problem

facing the navies of the Western Hemisphere is the international drug traffic. Moreover, some members of the committee made clear that their navies were focusing their resources on this problem. This role is unavoidable for navies of the region.

It was agreed that the struggle against the illegal drug trade and narco-terrorists requires both the coordination of law enforcement officials and naval forces within a country, and the cooperation between the navies within the region. Navy ships can assist police forces by carrying law enforcement agents who have the legal authority to carry out searches, seizures, and arrests. These combined operations of police and naval forces are required in the fight against the drug traffic. United States naval forces, both Coast Guard and U.S. Navy, are stepping up their involvement in the war against drugs. Illegal drug use has become a national security issue. The U.S. Navy brings to the struggle against drugs sophisticated technologies and more ships than are available to the Coast Guard. Within the U.S. Navy, the war against drugs has been a dramatic success. One committee member asserted that each country should exert its own authority to the fullest within their own areas of legal jurisdiction to fight the drug trade.

One participant noted that the war against drugs must be undertaken on several different fronts simultaneously. In addition to interdicting the drug traffic and attacking its distribution network, the narcotics industry can be hit at its production sites. While the narcotics themselves might be difficult to detect and interdict, the chemicals required to manufacture drugs are more readily recognizable. Thus, an anti-drug strategy must also give attention to ways that the production of narcotics might be disrupted as well as to controlling the flow of the narcotics themselves.

Naval Cooperation. The struggle against the international drug traffic and narco-terrorism requires a high degree of cooperation between the states of the region. A number of bilateral and multilateral approaches to cooperation between the navies of the Western Hemisphere were suggested in the committee's deliberations.

One member argued that cooperation requires a high level of professionalism. To this end, the exchange of information and personnel between navies was considered essential. Another committee member suggested that ships that carry out police roles can be made up of multinational crews. Several participants pointed out that there already exist some very good examples of bilateral cooperation between the navies of the Western Hemisphere. The Bahamas, for example, puts its personnel aboard U.S. Coast Guard ships in an attempt to deal with the international drug traffic. Other bilateral arrangements could be made and fostered along these lines to meet common security threats.

Another specific area of cooperation is the interchange of personnel in training and educational institutions. This is one way to exchange the experience gained

by the navies of the region in facing common problems. This human factor, one participant noted, is all-important.

Strong intelligence links are a key component of cooperation between the navies in the Western Hemisphere. This is another concrete area where there is a need for greater cooperation.

One participant noted that there were often disagreements between the various countries represented on the committee about economic zones and international legal procedures. This lack of agreement on international law hurt cooperation between them against their common security threats. Effective multilateral cooperation demanded agreement on some of these basic international norms and rules. Another participant agreed, arguing that it is very difficult for navies of the region to deal with the many legal issues raised by controlling the drug traffic. International cooperation in bilateral arrangements and regional agreements was a prerequisite for success in the war against drugs. The United Nations, it was suggested, was one forum, for taking steps to bring about greater international cooperation in combating the drug problem.

Session Two

The committee recommenced its work with Admiral Mora Perez providing an overview of the previous day's discussion about the hurdles that the region's armed forces must overcome in combating the international drug trade. He also presented an analysis of the efforts made by the Mexican armed forces to control the illegal drug trade in Central America. The timely exchange of information between the countries and navies of the region are essential to combat the drug trade.

Admiral Ferrer of Argentina pointed out that the various navies of the Western Hemisphere have different maritime organizations and jurisdictional procedures for handling of the drug traffic. Some countries, such as the United States, have separate navies and coast guards, and each force has been given different legal authority in dealing with police functions. This raises an important question: who has authority in each country for police activities within territorial waters? This is an important subject in attempting to promote cooperation in the war against illegal drug trade.

Admiral Martinez of Chile argued that naval officers require a common understanding of the international legal issues that confront them. International law is not frozen, he asserted, it is constantly changing. Naval officers must understand the changes taking place in the international legal environment so as to facilitate cooperation between their navies in dealing with common problems. He issued an invitation to members of the committee to attend a symposium in Chile in April 1992 to examine recent changes in international maritime law. Admiral Mora Perez concurred with this assessment of the importance of training officers and crews in maritime law. He welcomed the opportunity provided by

Admiral Martinez's invitation to engage in a serious exchange about international maritime legal issues.

Joint operations in an era of shrinking naval budgets. The committee agreed that it should move on in its work to discuss ways in which the navies of the region can cooperate with each other and engage in joint operations. Admiral Martinez of Chile argued that naval leaders and planners face some difficult problems in balancing resources with mission requirements. Even as their budgets are being reduced, navies are given yet more tasks to perform. lt is extremely difficult to maintain operational readiness and high levels of efficiency with naval forces when the available budgetary resources are shrinking. ln an era of shrinking naval budgets, he argued, it is all the more imperative that the navies of the region take concrete steps to promote cooperation and thereby help meet the demands made of them by their countries' political authorities. He believes that they should focus their attention on joint exercises and training. This enables the navies of the region to benefit from each other's experiences and expertise.

Admiral Martinez also contended that specific initiatives should be undertaken to develop a common communications network with standardized software for joint operations. Equipment and software could be developed jointly by navies. Another member of the committee agreed: navies of the region should regularly exchange technical information about ship design, weapons performance, and software capabilities. A coalition of naval forces, he asserted, can only perform effectively if the participating navies possess specific knowledge of each other's capabilities.

But some committee members also pointed out that navies in the region must overcome obstacles that stand in the way of joint exercises. One committee participant asked that they simply consider the different types of navies that exist within the Western Hemisphere and the various missions that they were designed to carry out. Another participant highlighted other problems with joint exercises. First, political considerations sometimes cast a shadow on these exercises. Second, there is considerable cost involved in deploying warships far from their home ports. He proposed that more study be given to the ways that American navies might integrate their efforts on a regional basis to achieve coherence in their training exercises. For example, the navies of Central America, the Caribbean, the Western Pacific, and the Atlantic Ocean night integrate their training.

The forces of the Caribbean states were upheld as an example of a successful program designed to improve the capabilities of maritime forces within that region. Some one thousand officers and junior ratings, involving seventeen Caribbean countries and naval forces ranging in size from the Coast Guard of the Bahamas to small states possessing only six maritime police officials, are involved in these joint training programs and annual conferences. Thus, there

already exists a loose grouping of Caribbean states trying to address jointly some of the issues that they have in common.

Another seminar participant highlighted the importance of liaison officers, officer exchange programs, and attendance in each other's schools. He emphasized that lifelong relationships are formed when junior officers study in another country. In his view, educational exchanges are a tremendous investment to the future ability of navies to cooperate.

The meeting adjourned with the committee thanking Admiral Mora Perez for chairing their discussions.

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Committee Three
Western Pacific

Members

Australia	Vice Admiral Ian MacDougall
	Commodore Chris J. Oxenbould
Canada	Rear Admiral Peter W. Cairns
Japan	Admiral Fumio Okabe
	Captain Hideaki Kaneda
Korea	Rear Admiral Kim Sung-Yong
Malaysia	Vice Admiral Shariff bin Ishak
New Zealand	Rear Admiral Ian Hunter
	Captain Jack Welch
Philippines	Rear Admiral Mariano J. Dumancas
Singapore	Commodore Teo Chee Hean
Thailand	Admiral Prachume Kruawal
	Rear Admiral Buncherd Phuncharoen
United States	Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon
	Vice Admiral Robert Kihune

Rapporteur: *Professor Carol Figerie, Naval War College*

Session One

Vice Admiral Ian MacDougall, Chief of Naval Staff, Royal Australian Navy, volunteered to chair the committee. The committee agreed to identify areas of mutual concern and changes that may have occurred in the region which would affect these concerns. The mutual concerns which the committee identified were:

Sea lines of communication. All nations in the region are dependent upon maritime trade. The security of SLOCs, from whatever threat, must, therefore, be an enduring consideration.

Disputed territories and sources of resources. Any instability will impact adversely on trade.

The narcotics traffic. About 60 percent of arrests arising from the flow of drugs from the Golden Triangle are made at sea. Navies will have a significant role in support of civil agencies in combating this menace.

The potential for imbalances in economic competition—noting that the Pacific is the fastest growing marketplace in the world.

Environmental issues—leading to a growth in environmental legislation which could increasingly influence naval operations.

A restless China? It is impossible to predict outcomes, but the potential for change, perhaps dramatic change, exists.

The congestive nature of large water areas in the WestPac region—particularly in archipelagic circumstances.

Differences in ideologies—as an example, the two Koreas.

Humanitarian endeavors. For example, the flow of refugees by sea in small boats, and piracy. It was noted that there are about 130, 000 in these camps in Malaysia and about four hundred arrive each month. Some have been in camps for over seven years. Other countries have problems of similar magnitude.

Secessionist movements. The developing nature of some Southwestern Pacific countries, e.g., Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, give rise to concerns.

Removal of tactical nuclear weapons from naval ships in the region by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., while others in the area have, or might acquire, a tactical nuclear weapon capability.

This is not an exhaustive list, but certainly enough to demonstrate the need for cooperation between states in the region in order to maintain stability. Discussions centered on whether the current focus on bilateral arrangements should be expanded to multinational arrangements in order to better deal with these issues. One of the delegates noted that there were some areas of mutual concern, such as SLOCs, which might encourage multinational arrangements. Another delegate felt that the U.S. must be the core of bilateral arrangements in the area. It was noted that with the current emphasis on downsizing U.S. military forces, the U.S. presence in the region might lessen, hence its influence upon stability.

One delegate pointed out that Nato's success has been largely in its enabling the countries represented to maintain an effective dialogue with each other. Perhaps a more multinational focus in WestPac could serve the same purpose. It is, however, unlikely that the Nato model would ever be universally applicable to the area because concerns from north to south in the region vary dramatically, and many issues do not lend themselves to a multinational arrangement.

The question was asked if nations had the means for effective communication in the area. It was agreed that there was scope for developing improved communications using such forums as the WestPac Symposium, the International Seapower Symposium, and the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conferences.

Environmental issues was one area of concern which, it was agreed, lends itself to multilateral solutions. This in turn could lead to other multilateral arrangements, such as reducing drug trafficking in the area. In the case of environmental protection, one nation's adoption, unilaterally, of new standards could impact upon the operations of another. Dialogue would be useful to avoid misunderstanding or confusion.

Disputed territories have the potential to become a problem and could impact on trade. With respect to disputed territories, it was considered that this problem is being addressed effectively on a bilateral basis, with some positive indications. Multinational treatment of this issue would, however, need to be kept as an option. If these bilateral arrangements were not working in favor of a particular nation, it could present a concern in the long term. However, it was believed that they should at least be given a chance to work.

In summary, at the end of session one, the committee agreed that they had common concerns and goals, and that in most instances bilateral arrangements could best handle these issues for the present. It was agreed that better means of communication, to improve cooperation in the area, need to be actively pursued.

Session Two

Using panel discussions on the second day as a basis, further consideration was given in session two to the issues addressed in the first session, resulting in a refinement of the degree of difficulty implicit in the concerns, and some proposed initiatives for the future.

A goal for the nations in the region will be to develop common doctrine for as many naval operations as practicable and, if possible, seek release of appropriate Nato publications to achieve this. Unless this is accomplished, it will be more difficult to make progress in terms of cooperation using common procedures.

The committee noted the potential for further examination of the issues at the next Western Pacific Naval Symposium in 1992 and that useful progress had been made in this regard during the International Seapower Symposium.

In concluding, the committee wishes to express its appreciation for the outstanding efficiency of Professor Carol Figerie, its rapporteur, for pulling together the record of its deliberations.

Finally, the committee wishes to thank Admiral Kelso, Rear Admiral Strasser and his staff, Rear Admiral Wright, and the various presenters for providing this valuable opportunity to come to grips with many complex issues, some old, some new, which confront nations in the region.

Committee Four
Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf

Members

Bahrain	Captain Adnan al-Marshed
Egypt	Rear Admiral Ahmed Saber Salim
France	Vice Admiral Guy Labouerie
India	Commodore Suresh Bhandoola
Kuwait	Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed al-Mulla
Oman	Commodore Hilal al-Rashidi
Pakistan	Vice Admiral Saeed M. Khan
Qatar	Lieutenant Colonel Abdullah Falamerzi
Saudi Arabia	Vice Admiral Talal al-Mofadi
United Kingdom	Captain Robert Fisher
United States	Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr.
	Vice Admiral Francis R. Donovan

Rapporteur: *Professor Hugh F. Lynch, Naval War College*

Session One

Vice Admiral Saeed M. Khan of Pakistan was elected chairman of the committee. He then called for a discussion of the threats in the region; another member of the committee asked for a discussion, as well, of the various interests in the region which could be threatened.

Of course, for the nations in the region, the chief interest that could be threatened is their sovereignty. But beyond that, the chief interest of both the nations of the region and of other nations is oil. It was stated that oil was a vital interest of the United States, but that other nations and regions of the world were more dependent on exports of oil from the Arabian Gulf to satisfy their energy needs. Further, the member stated, the historical interest of the United States in the region since World War II was not because the Soviets were present, but rather was precipitated because of a desire to protect regional stability.

Another speaker pointed out that there were other interests in the region beyond the oil in and on the littoral of the Arabian Gulf, namely, the mining of the seabed and other commerce.

Regarding threats in the region, there appeared to be a consensus that the Soviets were no longer a current threat to the region. Nevertheless, there were some nagging doubts that a resurgent Soviet Union could possibly become a threat after several years of rebuilding her economy. One speaker commented

that the Soviets have had dreams of hegemony, but that in the current era, those could only remain dreams.

Some countries believe that the more immediate threat appeared to emanate from Iran, even though the Iranians were beginning to make moves to rejoin the community of nations. Iraq may be an impotent threat in the aftermath of the war, but that could change over time if trade sanctions were lifted while the current regime remained in power.

Other threats to peace in the region are less ominous but might include border disputes, particularly with nations not represented at this conference.

One speaker pointed out that, in the past, the Indian and Pakistani navies have not been as close as they might be, but hopefully the two navies will lead in terms of improving relations; their other forces might then follow. Another member of the committee pointed out that some nations were wise enough to settle their border disputes peacefully, but others were not so wise.

The discussion shifted to the role of the United Nations, particularly for the future. Could the U.N. be doing more to prevent war, rather than providing peacekeeping forces after a war occurs? In the instance of the war against Iraq, it was considered that the treachery of denying intent right up to the fact of the invasion of Kuwait gave the U.N. little warning upon which to act. One participant commented that the U.S. did act in a manner which would strengthen the U.N. for the future.

When questioned on the role for the U.S. Navy in this region over the next five to ten years, one speaker offered that the U.S. Navy intended to be there as it had been in the past unless asked to leave. Moreover, he stated, the U.S. would listen to voices of the region. He saw the need for cooperative arrangements with and among countries in the area. He also stated that in the past when tensions were low the U.S. had been able to maintain a carrier battle group in the area only six months of the year, while still keeping the U.S. Middle East Force in the Gulf, and could return to a lower level again as tensions subsided. A discussion followed on the utility of maritime prepositioned ships in avoiding a spread of hostilities after the Iraqi invasion, and the potential for such forces in the future.

Another speaker pointed out that it was essential for nations of the region to provide for their own defense to the extent possible.

The topic shifted to the future of China in the region. It was asserted that China will play a role as a seller of arms. She also intends to build a "blue water" navy and reassert herself in the South China Sea when her economic conditions permit such expansion.

When asked if the U.S. would like to see indigenous forces built up, one participant thought that the U.S. would support that, particularly in terms of a combined naval force in the Gulf and the same in the Red Sea for Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Another speaker pointed out that the first interest of his country was in freedom of navigation, and after that were the interests in particular geographic areas.

A considerable period of time was spent discussing the threat posed by mining of the Gulf, both in the past and as a future possibility. One speaker remarked that a GCC mine warfare force might be an appropriate cooperative endeavor, and mentioned that this threat was another incentive for Gulf states to develop their own capabilities.

The exchange of information regarding boats employed in piracy was another type of cooperative effort to be encouraged among Gulf states. Other such initiatives could involve: search and rescue, environmental pollution control, and stemming the drug trafficking.

Session Two

The discussion began with a restatement of those interests in the region held in common, namely:

- Sovereignty and self-defense
- Unimpeded flow of oil to the benefit of both the seller and the buyer
- Economic exchanges in general
- Control and defeat of terrorism
- Control, containment, and elimination of pollution

One speaker asked what it was that navies could or should be doing in areas such as: the combating of drug trafficking and the struggle to control and eliminate pollution. It was pointed out that until recently such activities had been within the purview of the U.S. Coast Guard and similar forces in other countries. Other committee members pointed out that smaller countries did not have any other maritime policing forces other than their navy.

The discussion returned to the threat, in particular, the mine threat. It was offered that industrialized nations should not be selling sophisticated mines to nations in the region. Another participant commented that a common evasion was that countries purchasing such weapons could claim that they were being stocked for strictly defensive purposes. With this as a starting point, several comments were made regarding the need for cooperation in the Arabian Gulf on matters of mine warfare. It was noted that there are very specialized disciplines within the general category of mine warfare, namely: mine hunting, minesweeping, explosive ordnance disposal, etc. Each specialty requires sophisticated and expensive equipment and training. Rather than each country in the Gulf attempting to possess all these capabilities, it was suggested that specialization by countries, and combined operations and exercises could be the most effective solution. Cost-sharing could help as well.

It was stated by one participant that regional countries should look after their own region, but it was also noted that in the Indian Ocean there are various

pushes and pulls which are not conducive to cooperative measures. However, the same speaker stated that with confidence-building measures, there was hope that countries on the littoral of the Indian Ocean would eventually progress to cooperative measures as well.

The comment was made that the committee should not mix up the issue of sovereignty with the processes of consultation and cooperation; each state has a legitimate right to make bilateral agreements, but for common problems, it is appropriate to work together.

It was reiterated that attempts at international cooperative measures should start with the easier, nonmilitary projects first, such as control of pollution and drug trafficking. A concrete but somewhat simple first step could be the exchange of information on the common problem.

A discourse on explosive ordnance disposal followed. A new twist on the subject was consideration of the issue of where efforts by navies should leave off, and where efforts by commercial firms should begin. It was agreed that such questions will be decided on a case-by-case basis with the controlling factor being the elements of time and equipment. The availability of specialized equipment will dictate which resources will be utilized and for how long.

The suggestion was made that such cooperative measures as have been discussed at this conference and in this conference could become topics for further discussion at future meetings of the navies of the GCC countries. It was also pointed out that there could be exercises in the future to test these cooperative concepts both with and without the assets of non-Gulf navies. For instance, in the future the U.S. will have the capability to load four mine warfare ships on a mother ship and proceed from their home port in Texas to the Arabian Gulf at a 15-knot speed of advance. This capability could be utilized for exercises as well as crises.

One speaker suggested that outside the Gulf there could also be cooperative efforts by Oman, Pakistan, India, and perhaps the U.S. and the U.K., particularly utilizing maritime patrol aircraft. Such endeavors might extend to aircraft originating from Diego Garcia.

In concluding the session, the speaker remarked that the participants had been discussing ways in which nations of the region could cooperate with each other. The regional approach was advocated more than an outside force such as the U.S. or a United Nations force, but it was certain that the United States needed to help for the foreseeable future.

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Committee Five
Mediterranean, Eastern Atlantic, and Black Sea

Members

Bulgaria	Vice Admiral Dimiter Nikolov Pavlov
	Captain Peter Stranchevski
Congo	Captain Pierre Ngombe
Greece	Commodore Dimitrios Athanassiou
Guinea Bissau	Commander Feliciano Gomes
	Lieutenant Didio J. Costa
Israel	Rear Admiral Michael Ram
Italy	Captain Gianpaolo Di Paola
Jordan	Colonel Hussein al-Khasawnew
Lebanon	Brigadier General Alberto Gorayeb
Morocco	Commander Omar el-Abridi
Nigeria	Commodore Jubrila Ayinla
	Captain Olutunde A. Oladimeji
Senegal	Captain Alexandre Diam
Tunisia	Commander Habib Boudrigua
Turkey	Captain Eser Sahan
United States	Admiral William D. Smith
	Vice Admiral Stephen F. Loftus

Rapporteur: *Professor Saverio De Ruggiero, Naval War College*

Session One

Admiral William D. Smith was selected chairman of the committee. The committee's discussions centered on three interrelated considerations: reduced global tensions, economic constraints, and mutual benefit to be gained by expanding the interoperational capabilities of maritime forces.

The end of the Cold War permits some maritime forces to be reassigned to other missions. The end of the Cold War also prompts governments to consider reductions in the size of their respective maritime forces. The committee expressed concern that the missions of maritime forces will not be reduced relative to reductions in national maritime force capabilities. The potential for reduced national maritime forces was viewed as a significant reason for the expansion of interoperable, multinational, maritime forces.

Viewing the desirability of expanded interoperability, the committee's discussions centered on problems that could deter expansion. Differing logistic require-

ments and capabilities; differing command, control, and communications systems; resource constraints; and differing national interests were cited as principle obstacles that must be simultaneously addressed. Nato was cited as an example of a successful multinational force, a force which has developed through the continued recognition of common interests and objectives.

The committee reaffirmed the essentially complementary missions and objectives of maritime forces. Mutually beneficial missions and objectives may be collectively achieved, given combined exercises; mutually acceptable command, control, and communications systems; and mutually supportive logistic systems.

The committee adjourned with a desire to discuss further the concept of expanded multinational maritime forces, forces capable of flexible, and perhaps regional, interoperability. The committee will discuss recommendations to work toward a West African Conference as part of a West African Patrol. The committee also will examine the concept of a future ISS seminar, or committee, attuned to navies with coast guard missions.

Session Two

The second committee session began with the discussion of continuing initiatives to establish regional and special interest international seapower symposia, such symposia to occur during the period prior to the convening of the Twelfth International Seapower Symposium in Newport. A West African conference and regional conferences of navies with coast guard missions were specifically identified as desirable inter-ISS objectives.

Significant discussions ensued on the application of naval forces to nontraditional operations: environmental pollution, drug trafficking, narco-terrorism, smuggling, and piracy. Committee views differed relative to the capabilities of individual maritime forces, capabilities relative to the disquieting effects of such activities on individual states, and relative to the degree of regional instability prompted by such illicit activities. Of particular concern to certain committee delegates is the movement of drug trafficking operations from areas policed by major maritime forces to areas policed by lesser maritime forces. Increased levels of cooperation between maritime forces, regionally and internationally, can effectively limit the ability of drug traffickers to seek safer havens. Increased levels of cooperation between maritime forces would specifically include the exchange of criminal activity intelligence data; increased levels of interoperability training, including the utilization of standard command, control, and communications systems; and the establishment or strengthening of cooperative logistic support arrangements between collaborating maritime forces.

Numerous committee delegates expressed a strong interest in the publication of a document which could be entitled: "Lessons Learned by Small Navies Participating in *Operation Desert Storm*." While no such publication currently exists, delegates voiced the opinion that a publication of that nature would be of

inestimable value to non-Gulf participants who view increased regional and international maritime force collaborations as an agreeable consequence of "*Operation Desert Storm.*" Particular support for the development of that type of document was evidenced by committee delegates whose maritime forces now have the opportunity to enter into broader multinational arrangements.

Committee discussions continued with the reiteration of a perceived urgency of need to increase collaborative efforts—efforts which would be inclusive of: unified command, control, and communications systems; increased opportunities to participate in multinational exercises; improvements in the exchange of criminal intelligence data; the development of cooperative support arrangements; and the dedication of combined maritime forces to the control and eventual eradication of illicit drug trafficking; as well as the enforcement of the law of the sea relative to environmental pollution.

The committee concluded its discussions by recognizing an enlarged requirement to devote multinational maritime forces to once nontraditional roles, and to new opportunities for collaborative arrangements between maritime forces once separated by disparate ideologies. Expanded opportunities for multinational forces to engage in interoperability exercises, the acquisition and utilization of standard C^3I procedures, and a sustained effort to achieve ISS-inspired cooperative efforts, were cited as continuing objectives of the delegates. Regional and specialized ISS force conferences, and regional and specialized maritime force exercises will be pursued as objectives to be realized prior to the Twelfth International Seapower Symposium.

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Committee Six
North Atlantic and Baltic Sea

Members

Canada	Captain Peter Dumbrille
Denmark	Rear Admiral Knud E.J. Borck
Finland	Rear Admiral Jouko Sakari Visa
Germany	Rear Admiral Hans-Rudolf Boehmer
Netherlands	Vice Admiral Herpert van Foreest
Norway	Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen
Poland	Colonel Marian Moraczewski
Portugal	Admiral Antonio Carlos Fuzeta da Ponte
Spain	Admiral Carlos Vila Miranda
Sweden	Vice Admiral Dick Börjesson
United Kingdom	Rear Admiral Peter C. Abbott
United States	Admiral Paul D. Miller
	Vice Admiral J. D. Williams
	Captain James Stark

Rapporteur: *Professor Paul St. Laurent, Naval War College*

Session One

Admiral Carlos Vila Miranda, Chief of Navy General Staff, Spain, was chosen as committee chairman, and he requested that each member provide his views on the topics for discussion. A number of issues and concerns were raised. They included:

- The missions and roles of the navy: "How much is enough?"
- The role of Nato and Nato members within and outside the alliance; global commitments.
- Cooperation of forces within the region; roles for stability and safety; organizational structure.
- Education of the public and persuasion of political leaders as to the importance of, and the necessity for, maritime forces.
- Interoperability of forces, equipment, and doctrine.
- Security and the continued Soviet capabilities.

After a brief and informative synopsis by Colonel Marian Moraczewski of recent and proposed changes to Poland's military strategy and force structure,

the chairman reminded the committee that, in 1989, Admiral Sir Julian Oswald had suggested that the next meeting might discuss a change in strategy for any new force structure. The committee then agreed to discuss its concerns within a framework of 1) area assessments, 2) threats and risks, 3) cooperation in and out-of-area.

As the discussion continued, members agreed that in order to justify the force structure needed, parliamentarians must be given a justifiable and credible argument for the existence of such forces. The forces must be capable of supporting both internal, external, and alliance requirements. Although diminished in some areas, the Soviet threat, especially in the Kola Peninsula, continues to be of vital concern to nations in the region. This must be a consideration as we discuss a force structure. Cooperation among navies is essential. The future may require more participation in multinational operations. The political ramifications both within and outside Nato must be considered. An ideal organization within which to operate, a framework or structure, must be decided for such operations. First, we must begin by establishing what we need within this region.

In order to operate within this framework, interoperability of equipment and doctrine is required. However, as important an issue as this is, allies must realize that in their pursuit of technological advances they must not leave their friends behind, particularly when they contemplate overly complicated or expensive equipment changes. It is important to devise a structure, a common level from which to maintain such interoperability. This is especially important in the area of communications. In doctrinal interoperability, it was agreed that more use of Nato standard agreements would be better for all. The underlying issue for interoperability must be the willingness of nations to have interoperable forces.

Cooperation in exercises is a prerequisite for operating together as a coalition. It is important that all nations with common interests cooperate and train with each other. The question was raised whether the United States should be the central focus for such cooperation and training. Discussion followed, however, no consensus was reached.

Prior to adjournment, the thought was offered that if we cannot find a way to cooperate in this region, then how will we cooperate when we must operate outside the area.

Session Two

The Chairman opened this session by indicating that many areas of concern for this committee were discussed in the plenary sessions. He observed that we have reached a degree of interoperability and cooperation within Nato, but we must concern ourselves with these factors in a non-Nato environment. He then posed the question of what we should do to facilitate the integration of non-Nato forces into multinational operations and exercises. Before such cooperation can

take place it is important first to validate the capability for interoperability. This might begin at bilateral levels. The suggestion was made that cooperation could take place within the framework of the United Nations as it had in the recent Gulf conflict.

As with the discussion in session one, communications was seen to be a critical issue when participating in any type of operation. Communications can be improved only by exercising together, preferably in relatively simple exercises at first. The idea was suggested that some Nato publications might be reviewed for use by non-Nato members to establish common operating procedures in multinational operations. This could be accomplished under the auspices of a U.N. manual. Nations could implement such procedures internally before attempting to use them on a bilateral or multilateral basis. A danger exists however, that different versions of the same document may be developed. Also, it was brought out that various international organizations exist that can strengthen the capability of nations to work together.

A second question was raised by the chairman: Should there be a procedure established for transferring command when other than Nato members are involved? The possibility of using Nato as a subordinate command of the U.N. was raised. A more fundamental problem is the determination of the mission of a force. It was agreed that involving the appropriate U.N. committee in this issue as well as in questions of rules of engagement and in the distribution of operating publications would be beneficial.

The final question raised was the role of a nation's navy in anti-drug operations. As a result of the plenary sessions, the chairman suggested that there seems to be a collective cry for help from many of the smaller nations for assistance with this problem. The discussion centered around the law enforcement question and the extent to which navies should participate. Forces associated with drug operations may not be available to perform primary missions. Military capabilities such as intelligence support are critical to civilian law enforcement authorities in such operations. It was agreed that, although this is a national problem, a balance must be reached in the use of navies to support anti-drug operations while concurrently maintaining the capability to perform primary missions.

A short discussion ensued on the extent of piracy in some areas of the world. It was agreed that, although this is a navy problem, the extent of the problem may not be very well known.

The chairman thanked each committee member for his participation and adjourned the session.

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List of Delegates

Eleventh International Seapower Symposium

List Of Delegates

Argentina	Admiral Jorge Osvaldo Ferrer Argentine Navy, Chief of Staff
Argentina	Rear Admiral Jose Luis Tejo Director of the Argentine Naval War College
Australia	Vice Admiral Ian MacDougall Chief of Naval Staff
Australia	Commodore Chris J. Oxenbould Director General, Naval Policy and Maritime Doctrine
Bahamas	Commodore Leon Smith Commander, Royal Bahamas Defence Force
Bahrain	Captain Adnan al-Marshed Executive Officer, FPB45
Brazil	Rear Admiral Arlindo Vianna Filho Director, Brazilian Naval War College
Bulgaria	Vice Admiral Dimiter Nikolov Pavlov Commander of the Naval Fleet
Bulgaria	Captain Peter Stranchevski General Staff, Ministry of Defense
Canada	Rear Admiral Peter W. Cairns Deputy Commander, Maritime Command
Canada	Captain Peter Dumbrille Commandant, Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Center
Chile	Admiral Jorge Martinez Commander in Chief, Chilean Navy
Chile	Captain Eduardo Schnaidt Director of the Chilean Naval War College
Colombia	Rear Admiral Roberto Serrano Naval Attaché
Congo	Captain Pierre Ngombe Commander of the Congolese National Navy
Denmark	Rear Admiral Knud E. J. Borck Flag Officer Denmark

Denmark	Colonel J. E. Zilmer Commandant, Royal Danish Defence College
Dominican Republic	Vice Admiral Jose Santos Sanchez Chief of Staff, Dominican Navy
Ecuador	Captain Carlos Galvez Cortes Director, Ecuadorian Naval War College
Ecuador	Rear Admiral Oswaldo Viteri Jerez Commander in Chief, Naval Squadron
Egypt	Rear Admiral Magdi el-Abd Director, Egyptian Naval Higher Institute
Egypt	Rear Admiral Ahmed Saber Selim Chief, Operations Department
Finland	Rear Admiral Jouko Sakari Visa Commander in Chief, Finnish Naval Forces
France	Vice Admiral Guy Labouerie Commandant, French Naval War College
Germany	Rear Admiral Hans-Rudolf Boehmer Deputy Chief of Staff, German Navy
Germany	Rear Admiral Jörk Reschke Director of Faculty, Führungsakademie
Greece	Commodore Dimitrios Athanassiou President, Hellenic Naval War College
Guatemala	Captain Edgar Villanueva Commander, Atlantic Naval Base, Puerto Barrios
Guinea Bissau	Lieutenant Didio J. Costa Deputy
Guinea Bissau	Commander Feliciano Gomes Chief of Staff of the Navy
Honduras	Captain Reynaldo Andino Flores Commander in Chief, Honduran Navy
India	Commodore Suresh Bhandoola Naval Attaché, Washington, DC
Israel	Rear Admiral Rafael Apel Naval Attaché
Israel	Rear Admiral Michael Ram Commander, Israeli Navy
Italy	Captain Gianpaolo Di Paola Chief, Plans and Policy Division, Naval Staff

Italy	Rear Admiral Luigi Donolo Commandant, Italian Naval War College
Jamaica	Commander Hardley M. Lewin Commanding Officer, Jamaica Defense Force Coast Guard
Japan	Captain Hideaki Kaneda Chief, Plans Section, Plans and Operations Department
Japan	Admiral Fumio Okabe Chief of Staff, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force
Jordan	Colonel Hussein al-Khasawnew Commander, Royal Jordanian Coast Guard
Korea	Rear Admiral Kim Sung-Yong President, Naval War College
Kuwait	Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed al-Mulla Deputy Chief of Naval Forces
Lebanon	Brigadier General Alberto Gorayeb Commander, Lebanese Navy
Malaysia	Lieutenant Commander Mat Taib Staff Officer II—Navy Department
Malaysia	Vice Admiral Shariff bin Ishak Chief, Royal Malaysian Navy
Mexico	Vice Admiral Sergio Loperena Garcia Director, Center for Superior Naval Studies
Mexico	Admiral Jorge Mora Perez Chief of Naval Operations; senior delegate
Morocco	Commander Omar el-Abridi Chief of Intelligence and Military Security, Royal Moroccan Navy
Netherlands	Colonel Kees Homan Director, Royal Netherlands Naval Staff College
Netherlands	Vice Admiral Herpert van Foreest Chief of Staff and Commander in Chief, Royal Netherlands Navy
New Zealand	Rear Admiral Ian Hunter Chief of Naval Staff
New Zealand	Captain Jack Welch Director, Naval Force Development Studies
Nigeria	Commodore Jubrila O. A. Ayinla Chief of Staff, Naval Training Command

Nigeria	Captain Olutunde A. Oladimeji Commander, Naval Information Management Corps
Norway	Rear Admiral Rolf E. Pedersen Inspector General, Royal Norwegian Navy
Norway	Captain Jan Reksten Commander, Naval Tactical Warfare School
Oman	Commander Abdullah al-Raisi Commanding Officer, Royal Navy of Oman Training Center
Oman	Commodore Hilal al-Rashidi Principle Staff Officer, Royal Navy of Oman
Pakistan	Vice Admiral Saeed M. Khan Vice Chief of Naval Staff
Pakistan	Captain Sadiq Naval Attaché
Peru	Vice Admiral Carlos Martinez Rozas Chief of Naval Staff
Peru	Rear Admiral Jose Teixeira Rivarola Director, Peruvian Naval War College
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Philippines	Captain Eriberto C. Varona
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Portugal	Rear Admiral Leiria Pinto Director, Portuguese Naval War College
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Saudi Arabia	Commander Ibrahim al-Ouraini
Saudi Arabia	Vice Admiral Talal al-Mofadi Commander, Royal Saudi Naval Forces
Senegal	Captain Alexandre Diam Chief of Naval Staff
Singapore	Colonel Lee Seng Kong Naval Attaché
Singapore	Commodore Teo Chee Hean Chief of Navy, Republic of Singapore

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Spain	Admiral Carlos Vila Miranda Chief of Navy General Staff
Sweden	Vice Admiral Dick Börjesson Commander in Chief, Royal Swedish Navy
Sweden	Rear Admiral Claes Tornberg Head, Armed Forces Staff and War College
Thailand	Rear Admiral Buncherd Phuncharoen Deputy Chief of Staff, Royal Thai Fleet
Thailand	Admiral Prachume Kruawal Commander in Chief, Royal Thai Fleet
Trinidad/ Tobago	Commander Anthony Franklin Commanding Officer, Trinidad and Tobago Coast Guard
Tunisia	Captain Habib Boudrigua
Turkey	Rear Admiral Orhun Ozdemir Commandant, Naval Staff College
Turkey	Captain Eser Sahan Naval Attaché
United Kingdom	Rear Admiral Peter C. Abbott Vice Chief of the Naval Staff
United Kingdom	Captain Robert J. Fisher Commandant, Naval War College
United States	Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon Assistant CNO, Undersea Warfare
United States	Vice Admiral Martin H. Daniell Vice Commandant, United States Coast Guard
United States	Vice Admiral Francis R. Donovan Commander, Military Sealift Command
United States	Admiral Leon A. Edney Commander in Chief, Atlantic Command
United States	The Honorable H. Lawrence Garrett III Secretary of the Navy
United States	Rear Admiral "Ted" Gordon Judge Advocate General
United States	Admiral Frank B. Kelso II Chief of Naval Operations

United States	Vice Admiral Robert K. U. Kihune Assistant CNO, Surface Warfare
United States	Vice Admiral Stephen F. Loftus Deputy CNO, Logistics
United States	Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr. Deputy CNO, Navy Program Planning
United States	Admiral Paul D. Miller Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet
United States	Mr. Bruce Powers Special Assistant for Plans and Analysis Office of Assistant CNO, Air Warfare
United States	Vice Admiral Leighton W. Smith Deputy CNO, Plans, Policy, and Operations
United States	Admiral William D. Smith U.S. Representative to Nato Military Committee
United States	Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser President, U.S. Naval War College
United States	Vice Admiral J. D. Williams Deputy CNO, Naval Warfare
United States	Captain William H. Wright IV Director, Political-Military and Current plans, OP-61
Uruguay	Captain Antonio Bugna Naval School Director
Uruguay	Rear Admiral Mario Martinez Director, Naval Training
Venezuela	Rear Admiral Raul Bustamante Director, Venezuelan Naval War College
Venezuela	Vice Admiral Julian Mauco Deputy Commander, Naval Operations

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