



TWELFTH  
INTERNATIONAL  
SEAPOWER  
SYMPOSIUM



U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND  
7-10 NOVEMBER 1993

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
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**International Seapower Symposium**

**Report of the Proceedings**

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# TWELFTH INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM

Report of  
Proceedings of the Conference  
7-10 November 1993


Edited by

**John B. Hattendorf**  
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Naval War College



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## Editor's Note

The editor has made every attempt to establish a clear and accurate record of the symposium proceedings which faithfully records the opinions and views of the participants. In establishing the final text from speaking notes, transcripts, and tape recordings, the editor has silently corrected slips of grammar, spelling, and wording. He has occasionally inserted a word or phrase in square brackets in order to clarify the text.

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# Welcoming Remarks

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Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, U.S. Navy  
President, U.S. Naval War College

**A**DMIRAL MARTINEZ, ADMIRAL KELSO, distinguished delegates, it is my great pleasure on behalf of the staff, the faculty, and the student body of the United States Naval War College to welcome each of you to this college, to Newport, and to the Twelfth International Seapower Symposium.

For many of you, these symposia permit a renewal of your relationship with the Naval War College and the City of Newport. If my figures are correct, some fifty of you are graduates of this institution, and many others have previously attended meetings or war games here. For others who have never participated in an activity here, I hope that you will take away with you a new friendship for our college and our city. More significantly, many of you will use this gathering as an opportunity to reestablish or strengthen ties with other members of the international naval community with whom you have served or operated at some time throughout your distinguished careers. Many new relationships and warm friendships will also develop in the next two and a half days of discussions and social contacts. I know that these processes began during last night's reception, and I thank each of you for making the evening so delightful through your presence, following, for many, a very long day of travel.

When I was a student here in the Naval War College in the College of Command and Staff in 1971, I served as the escort for the Chilean delegate at the Second International Seapower Symposium. In 1991 and again today, I have the privilege of welcoming you here as the President of the college. Twenty-two years and nine meetings have passed since my initial introduction to this symposium, but many of the impressions formed so long ago remain today. Each of these biennial reunions has been sharply focused on the task of understanding the events that shape our unique maritime environment with the hope that such understanding will produce objective and useful insights into future areas of potential cooperation. These symposia also improve our abilities to communicate and work together to achieve results which benefit all of us. Today, we have in this auditorium thirty-six chiefs of service, directors of twenty-one of the world's naval war colleges, and a total of one hundred thirty-one delegates representing seventy nations—the largest number in the history of the Seapower Symposium. These numbers roughly double the numbers experienced at the first symposium in 1969. It is extremely encouraging that our respective

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countries are becoming more and more aware of the common interest we all share in coordinating the activities on the world's equivalent of the superhighway—our global oceans. Moreover, our combined operations at sea and our attendance at meetings such as this provide us with opportunities and experiences that few of our countrymen enjoy. Is it not we in the military, and particularly in the naval service, who are the most skilled in cooperation on an international basis? Can we and should we not in these days set an example for the economist, the diplomat, the industrialist, and others who are attempting to forge new links of international relationships? In so doing, we not only help to further their efforts, but we do a great deal to preserve that sense of cooperation between the nations of the world, which, I would suggest, will be critical in the days and years ahead. Today, as coalition forces monitor maritime traffic in unique environments such as the Arabian Gulf and the Caribbean Sea, it is a particularly pointed time for us to be examining the entire subject area of maritime coalitions and international security. The process we began two years ago of sharing our perceptions of the then current and future events must continue now as we try to project meaning onto today's trends and search for the direction where tomorrow will lead us. As it has in past symposia, our success in this endeavor will be contingent upon the candor and the conviction each of us brings to the discussions in this auditorium, the regional sessions, the special War College group, and the dialogue and reflections shared when the activities of each day yield to the formal and informal social occasions of the evening.

Woodrow Wilson, a past United States President who had a keen appreciation of the need for an integrated, international response to world events, stated that "understanding must be the soil in which grow the fruits of friendship." I know that we are creating just such a rich soil at this symposium, which will be of great value to us and for those who will follow in our footsteps in the future. I look forward to getting to know each of you better during the next few days. If there is anything that we can do to make your stay in Newport and at this college most enjoyable, please ask. Thank you, again, and welcome aboard. It is our pleasure to have you here.

Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, U.S. Navy  
Chief of Naval Operations

**T**HANK YOU, ADMIRAL STRASSER, and good morning to all of you. It is my privilege to welcome you to Newport for this year's International Seapower Symposium. With seventy-odd nations participating, this is the largest gathering we have ever had for this symposium, and I am confident that it will be one of the best that we have had.

As I look around today, I see some veterans of past conferences and also some newcomers. Seven nations are represented here for the first time, and I want to extend a special welcome to the officers from Albania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, South Africa, Tonga, and the Ukraine. To all of you who have never attended an ISS, let me say that we have found these gatherings to be extremely beneficial in years past. They give us an opportunity for open and frank discussions of some of the most important issues that we face as senior naval officers and leaders in our countries. We may not always settle every issue, but in many cases what we accomplish here serves as the foundation for future discussions. I am sure many of you feel as I do that the rapid and dramatic changes in the world make it impossible to control even what goes on in our own navies. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, whose vision helped inspire this symposium, once told me a story about that. He was driving in Washington, and he had his little grandson in his car with him. In those days, the car seats that were built for children sometimes had toy steering wheels on them so the children could pretend they were driving the car along with its driver. The admiral was driving along when he looked over at his grandson and saw him turning his toy steering wheel around and around, always in the exact opposite direction in which the car was going. Years later, Admiral Zumwalt said to me: "Sometimes I feel like I had about as much control over the direction the Navy was going as my grandson did over that car."

This symposium won't necessarily give you any control over how world events affect your navy, but it is important because it allows us to set the stage for solutions to problems and for examination of issues which are of mutual interest to all of us. I always have a feeling of accomplishment after the ISS, because teamwork here makes the difficult issues seem a little more manageable. One of the greatest benefits of these conferences is the opportunity for senior leaders of the world's navies to develop strong working relationships with each other. I am convinced that ISS and the various regional naval conferences that we attend help our services and ultimately our nations work together more cooperatively and more effectively. I think our more junior men and women will attest to the value of this. They have many chances to exercise and to operate

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at sea. They participate in exchange programs at operational commands and at our service colleges, and they know firsthand the benefits of working partnerships with navies around the world. I hope each of you will find this symposium as beneficial and as enlightening. I also hope that you take some time to explore this beautiful city. Newport is a real favorite of American sailors and officers, and I know it has become a favorite of many of you as well. We have put together a busy schedule of events and panels, discussion groups, and speeches, but we have tried to leave you a little time for sight-seeing as well.

Once again, I thank you for breaking away from the demands of your positions and joining us here for the Twelfth International Seapower Symposium. I look forward to a productive and informative conference, hearing your views, visiting with many old friends, and making many new friends.

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# Résumé of the Eleventh International Seapower Symposium

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Professor John B. Hattendorf  
Ernest J. King Professor of Maritime History  
U.S. Naval War College

**A**DMIRAL MARTINEZ, ADMIRAL KELSO, ADMIRAL STRASSER, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen. As you begin the Twelfth International Seapower Symposium, it is my honor, once again, to summarize for you the main events of your previous meeting held here in Newport on October the 6th through the 9th, 1991.

The last meeting marked twenty-two years since these symposia began in 1969. They are one of several remarkable contributions to international naval cooperation promoted by Admiral Richard Colbert, U.S. Navy, which have included the establishment of the Naval Command course here at the Naval War College as well as the NATO Standing Naval Force, Atlantic. Next month will mark twenty years since Richard Colbert's death in December 1973, while serving as Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe. In remembering him, we honor a man who stressed the common concerns and natural ties among navies.

The 1991 symposium had for its theme "Emerging Cooperative Maritime Roles in a Changing World Environment." In his opening keynote address, Admiral Frank Kelso spoke of the dramatic changes the world had witnessed, bringing the end of the Cold War, but that they had not resolved other fundamental problems. The potential for regional crises remains. Since many nations have common concerns in particular regions of the world, such interests suggest that combined, rather than unilateral, operations will be more prevalent in the future. In this respect, the naval operations for DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM might serve as a prototype. Such exercises form a core of shared experience, which enable others to join in easily, making valuable contributions to the collective effort. As maritime leaders, he said, our common concerns go beyond collective efforts in times of crisis. We must all rigorously reassess the essential missions of navies and clearly explain the value of naval forces as an essential component of national defense. There is a growing tendency to employ maritime forces in non-traditional roles. Some of these lend themselves to combined efforts. So, too, we can expect to participate together in humanitarian efforts and in large-scale relief operations. We should not be blind to the positive



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implications that force reductions bring to the world, he said. Nevertheless, we still need to meet national security needs and to carry out the missions of our respective navies more efficiently, with fewer resources. As we reduce our forces, we face some challenges that are not military in nature. One of the most important of these is the preservation of the environment.

Change in the world brings with it many implications for us, but there are some reassuring constants as well. The most important of these are the enduring importance of sea power and the unique ability of naval forces to influence events. Maintaining the principle of the freedom of the seas will always be an essential role in a world in which the bulk of trade continues to move by sea. Maritime forces can deter conflict and respond quickly and effectively when deterrence fails. This capacity will continue to be useful in the future, often achieving results cost-effectively and without firing a shot. Here in this symposium, our shared professional interests and concerns allow us to speak with an understanding that transcends both national burdens and political differences. It allows us to welcome the representatives of new nations to our midst as we build on these fraternal bonds.

In the second plenary session, Admiral William D. Smith, U.S. Navy, spoke on "Patterns of Naval Multinational Cooperation: Past, Present and Future." In an effort to stimulate interest in expanding cooperation, he suggested that there are three basic building blocks. First, we must have common goals. Secondly, we must be able to communicate clearly and quickly. Thirdly, we must be able to operate safely as a unified force in times of crisis.

Before discussing these points in detail Admiral Smith reviewed naval history, showing that there have been a relatively large number of successful multinational operations. At the same time, the defeat of ABDA command's naval forces in the 1942 battle of the Java Sea is an instructive example of what can happen when key elements for cooperation are absent. Modern naval history demonstrates that multinational cooperation is a vital prerequisite to successful naval operations. The events of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, involving seventeen navies, were the product of decades of combined operational experience, some common equipment, and continual communications training.

The second day of the symposium began with a panel discussion moderated by Vice Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr., U.S. Navy, on the subject "Confronting the Common Threat: Problems and Successes." He looked at the subject in terms of the experience of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM, outlining the general maritime situation at the time and noting that the framework for a coalition force had already been in place through the long experience of the U.S. Navy, the French Navy, and the Royal Navy in working with the navies in the region. As military and air forces began to flow into the area from countries outside the area, naval forces provided the foundation of the coalition. The ports of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states provided access that was critical to success as

a loosely organized international command structure developed and the different navies worked out divisions of responsibility without having a supreme overall commander. In terms of lessons learned through this experience, the U.S. Navy found that some equipment and procedures designed primarily for blue water were not optimal in near-land operations. There were deficiencies in command, control, and communications, particularly in dealing with shore commanders. While work went well between navies, it was less satisfactory between sea and shore.

The next speaker on the panel, Vice Admiral Talal, Commander, Royal Saudi Naval Forces, emphasized that DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM showed that cooperation under the United Nations demonstrated that the international community can prevail. From Saudi Arabia's perspective, the operations tested infrastructure and support facilities that were not designed for such large operations. Nevertheless, they stood up well. For non-NATO navies, it was harder to cope with the many problems of communication and reporting. This, too, supported the importance of future exercises focusing on these issues.

The next panelist, Vice Admiral van Foreest, Chief of Staff, Netherlands Navy, made three points. First, he explained that the Netherlands was able to become involved in the Gulf through a 1989 policy change which acknowledged, for the first time, that Dutch security could involve something outside the NATO area. His second point was that interoperability has to do with trust and mutual respect. As such, it benefitted from the work of NATO, making it possible to avoid the same disaster the ABDA fleet had met in 1942. Thirdly, Admiral van Foreest itemized the conclusions he reached from the Gulf War: We should plan for something similar to happen; we should keep NATO alive as an instrument to optimize operational readiness; we should tighten readiness standards, especially in relation to biological and chemical threats; and we must be prepared to be in the public limelight of news broadcasting.

The next panelist, Vice Admiral J.D. Williams, U.S. Navy, summarized the lessons he had learned as Sixth Fleet Commander during the buildup to DESERT STORM: The first thing needed for cooperation is communication, he said. Additionally, it is essential for the success of a coalition that senior officers on the scene be willing to cooperate without national, political direction on every detail. Liaison officers in a coalition force are essential to solve quickly language barriers and procedural differences, and a common air picture via data link is necessary for flight safety. In concluding, Admiral Williams stressed that while communications problems were not the only issues, they were the first things that must be solved.

The next speaker, Rear-Admiral Abbott of the Royal Navy, added to what the previous speakers had said by pointing out the effective manner in which national joint-force command and control assists the successful formation and management of a coalition force. National tri-service integration creates a secure,

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political and military framework, he said. Pointing to another issue, he noted that rules of engagement involve sensitive, political issues, and it is not surprising to find difficulties in this area. Anything that can be done to provide a framework will be helpful. In this, however, the military commander's first responsibility will be to warn politicians that a coalition force, particularly one brought together on the basis of loose bilateral and multilateral relationships, will not be able to achieve the results that a comparable national force might achieve.

The final panelist, Admiral Ferrer, Chief of Staff, Argentine Navy, opened his remarks by pointing out that world public opinion has special importance, carrying strong ethical and moral significance that will become a determining factor for world leaders. World opinion requires the highest possible degree of legitimacy to support the use of military force. Since legitimacy increases with the number of nations, multinational military options will often be the best answer. Many fail to notice, he said, that the international system is organized on the concept of nation-states and that the United Nations embodies this concept. In this regard, the UN's exercise of strength during the Gulf operations established an important precedent.

Going on to discuss his own country's experience, he noted that Argentina's participation in this action was not her first in such international efforts, but followed on thirty years of experience. In the Gulf, Argentine units benefitted from previous exercises and knowledge of U.S. Navy procedures and doctrine, as they worked out exercises, cross-deck helicopter resupply, and effective air defense coordination. The greatest problems arose from lack of common cryptographic capability, lack of up-dated doctrinal procedures, and lack of a common data link. If there had been naval opposition during this operation, he said, the components of the multinational force would have needed more homogeneous command relationships and rules of engagement. Admiral Ferrer concluded by saying that multinational naval cooperation, under UN mandate, will constitute the military option with the greatest possibility of future success in the maintenance of peace.

In the next plenary session, Vice Admirals Francis R. Donovan and Stephen F. Loftus of the U.S. Navy made a joint presentation on "Logistics and Sealift in Multinational Cooperation." As the Military Sealift Commander, Admiral Donovan explained the operational phases in the strategic sealift for the Gulf operation. After going through the chronology of events, he pointed out the lessons learned from the experience. First among them was the lack of U.S. shipping to cover the initial surge, although it was adequate for sustainment. One must always be ready to adapt rapidly to changing requirements, he said. In this, ships from other nations provided great assistance.

Admiral Loftus continued the presentation by discussing the issues from his perspective as deputy chief of naval operations for logistics. DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM was unusual, he pointed out. It was the perfect scenario, and

we should be careful not to draw conclusions from this experience that might not be applicable to the future. In this case, we were unopposed at sea. We had lots of help from allies and a strong international consensus. The destination port-facilities were ideal and the Suez Canal was open. One can not always plan on having such ideal conditions. In the future, the constraints of future force reductions must be met with increased responsiveness and mobility. Some of these are already part of the NATO rapid reinforcement plan and there is potential for additional bilateral agreements. We should work together, perhaps through the United Nations, to develop a pool of sealift assets that could be used only for UN-sanctioned operations and subject to the approval of the country supplying those assets.

In a luncheon address, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Lawrence Garrett reminded delegates that they were confronting a fundamental redefinition of international security. The world of today is nothing like the world of 1989, he said. Yet, no matter how successful we are in creating a global community, there will always be someone, somewhere, ready to violate it. For that reason, we need armed forces of our own. Navies must be a vigorous component, particularly since the world's strategic focus has shifted from nuclear land battles to localized crises. The United States is not the world's constable, he said, but self-contained forces afloat may represent the world community's most immediately available response. Navies offer to a coalition the ability to influence a crisis without the intrusive commitment of troops. Navies have a unique characteristic in that they are particularly suited to working together as self-contained units. This can be done at any place, in any ocean, without interrupting their internal organizations, without having to adopt new doctrines at all levels of command, and without the political complications of comprehensive integration.

The final panel discussion of the symposium, moderated by Vice Admiral Leighton Smith, U.S. Navy, took up the theme of "Seaborne Threat to Regional Stability." Admiral Smith reflected that navies did not need to go shopping for threats. There were many already on the horizon.

Vice Admiral Sharif of Malaysia suggested that the increased importance of the maritime environment is likely to lead to increases in the seaborne threats to Southeast Asia's common security. These include terrorism, which could destabilize the region's fragile, social-political setting. Secondly, narcotic trafficking could undermine regional stability by escalating violence. Thirdly, maritime pollution is a major issue. Finally, the influx of economic refugees could stress public infrastructures and create criminal and health-related threats. Admiral Sharif suggested that navies enhance their cooperative efforts, rechanneling some of the naval research and development programs to include drug and pollution control devices.

Commodore Jubrila Ayinla of Nigeria mentioned a rise in the drug trade in Africa, pointing out the interdependence of the world's nations in dealing with

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this issue. It would be mutually beneficial to all if the industrialized world would share the skills, technologies, and intelligence information to combat this problem. Turning to piracy as a major problem, he noted that the same benefit could accrue if African nations learned from the experience of others in enhancing seaborne patrols by air searches and in amending national laws to prosecute pirates.

The next speaker, Admiral Paul D. Miller, noted that the United States Navy was neither designed, built, nor chartered to deal with non-conventional threats. It has capabilities to deal with them, however, our best hope for success lies in mutual political and military cooperation. In this, good physical and operational security in non-traditional operations is as important as it is in classic operations. To be successful, our efforts must be part of comprehensive and coordinated national, regional, and international strategies.

The next speaker on the panel, Rear Admiral Viteri of Ecuador, suggested that the main issue for the panel was to determine what role navies can assume in dealing with the drug problem. Since drug trafficking threatens national security, navies have a clear responsibility and must commit themselves to act, counter-attacking this threat.

The final speaker on the panel, Vice Admiral Labouerie of France, made three points. First, he pointed out that drugs arrive in Europe by all means of transportation, but the largest measure arrives by sea. Secondly, while previous speakers had mentioned several regions of drug production, no one had mentioned the vast area in central Asia near Afghanistan and the southern republics of the former Soviet Union, which posed a particularly serious threat. There is no central authority to monitor or control drug activity in that region, where one encounters every kind of security threat. Additionally, navies have a role to play in dealing with organized crime and regional mafias, he said, using special forces, prepositioning, forward surveillance, and quick surgical sorties. To deal with these problems, Admiral Labouerie suggested that European navies might consider working together in a regional, maritime guard.

Following a plenary session devoted to open general discussion of the issues and another for the summary reports from each of the committee chairmen, Admiral Kelso brought the symposium to a close. Underscoring the value of the symposium as a means of exchanging views and developing personal relationships among naval leaders, he noted that the delegates had reached a broad consensus in several areas. Among the most important of these was that years of multinational training underwrote the success of DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.

Following Admiral Kelso's remarks, Rear Admiral Joseph Strasser, the President of the Naval War College, adjourned the Eleventh International Seapower Symposium.

# Review of the Sixteenth Inter-American Naval Conference

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Admiral Alfredo Arnaiz Ambrossiani, Peruvian Navy

**A**DMIRAL KELSO, REAR ADMIRAL STRASSER, distinguished delegates, it is for me an honor to address such a selected group of naval authorities in presenting a summary of the activities of the Sixteenth Inter-American Naval Conference, which took place in Peru in the City of Lima from 21 to 25 September 1992. As you all know, these biennial conferences, which began in 1959, have as their main purpose to gather together the highest naval authorities of the continent to directly discuss various aspects and situations that are of common interest, in order that through an exchange of ideas we may find a solution or propose action in a coordinated fashion. Time has proved, because of the results that we have achieved, that these professional meetings have made definite achievements for the good of the navies of our continent. The delegations that participated in the conference were as follows: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Chile, Ecuador, the United States of America, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. There were observers from the Inter-American Defense Board and from Nicaragua. We held eight working sessions and took up the following subjects, as reported by the following countries:

**Argentina:** "The American Navies on a Course Towards the Third Millennium." This presentation, of an informational nature, provided a special viewpoint on the future world scene where we expect a period of progressive pacification as a result of the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the reunification of Germany. However, this has been affected by conflicts in Yugoslavia and the Persian Gulf War, which in turn has led to a revitalization of the United Nations Organization as a superstate institution that has even been given the mandate of activating and commanding multinational military forces in taking up a new role aimed basically at protecting international peace. The end of the East-West confrontation makes us think of the roles and the functions of the armed forces as linked with world political realities in search of guarantees, so that we may achieve in the third millennium an atmosphere of generalized peace. In this context, new roles are considered for the navies to participate with the rest of the navies of the region in joint combined operations for the defense of hemispheric security against any type of external aggression;

to exercise control of maritime traffic in the areas under the jurisdiction of each country by strengthening coordination mechanisms as well as an exchange of information; to exercise control of the sea and of their respective airspaces.

**Bolivia:** "The subversion of Bolivia, the Tupac Katari Guerrilla Group and its links with Shinning Path, the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, and drug trafficking." For purposes of information, the Bolivian Navy made a presentation on the origin, evolution, political, and strategic objectives of the Tupac Katari Guerrilla Army, setting forth the Army's links with outside subversive groups such as Shinning Path and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement as well as with drug trafficking—since information exists that they serve as assassins for these latter groups, particularly in the area of Cochabamba. Then another subject was presented by the Bolivian Navy (although not originally on the conference agenda, it was included after submission to the delegates for consideration): "The Bolivian Navy and its relationship with national interests in the Paraguay-Parana waterway and other water systems." Motivated by their landlocked situation, Bolivia is attempting to find a partial solution that will allow access to the Atlantic Ocean through the exploitation of the Paraguay-Parana Waterway, from its head waters in the Brazilian port of San Luis de Caceres through the Uruguayan port of Nueva Palmira at the mouth of the Uruguay River, very close to the Plata River delta, with a navigable extension of 2,100 miles. Bolivia does have access to the waterway through the Paraguay River. This project has been approved by the five countries of the Plata River Basin Treaty.

**Brazil:** "Naval Power as an Instrument of Deterrence." The new world order of a low level of confrontation and a high degree of stability is counterpoised with the appearance of conflicts of a different nature—those stimulated by religious, ethical, or tribal considerations. Thus, crisis predominates in various areas of the world. Non-governmental agencies may become instruments which cause the rise of conflicts among states on the level of international, juridical order. Military power is no longer considered a decisive element on the battlefield, and naval power should develop a basic role as an element of deterrence in support of national interests.

**Columbia:** "Evaluation of the SINCYT Red Pilot Project" (a scientific and technological information system). The technical and operational validity of the proposed system of access to the scientific and technological data bank, proposed by Peru in the Fifteenth Inter-American Naval Conference, was proved. The following recommendations were approved at the Sixteenth Conference: to continue the implementation of the pilot project of the Inter-American Naval System of Access to the Data Bank on Scientific and Technological Information;

to appoint the Peruvian Navy as the new coordinating site of the SINCYT Project; to carry out that function until the Seventeenth Inter-American Naval Conference.

**Chile:** "The Strategic Naval Situation of the Continent *vis-à-vis* the New World Order." The presenter analyzed the new world order that emerged from the unipolar situation following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, thus putting an end to the existence of two opposing and conflicting blocs—the so-called Cold War. The new situation is propitious for economic development and an increase in trade, with a resultant increase in the maritime component of world activities. Increased maritime activities will have a bearing on the naval strategic situation, proving the validity of the concepts of the great thinker of the United States of America's Navy, Alfred Thayer Mahan, with regard to the importance of controlling maritime routes and thus outlining general concepts on new naval strategies for the Pacific Basin. The Chilean Navy believes that the threat to the continent in traditional forms is improbable; however, the increase in maritime trade on the world level through the Pacific Ocean is an economic and strategic objective of increasing importance for the future, and one that merits cooperation among the navies and coordination of their strategies to further oceanographic research as well as measures to protect the ecosystem and the excessive exploitation of marine resources.

The second subject presented by the Chilean Navy was "Development of a Statement with Regard to the Holding of Inter-American Naval Conferences on Law of the Sea." A naval seminar on international maritime law was held in Chile in April 1992. The Chilean Navy presented to the committee of delegates a proposal for a periodic celebration with the intent to exchange ideas regarding the law of the sea, by including this subject in either the Inter-American Naval Conference of War College Directors or the Inter-American Naval Conference Specializing in Naval Control of Maritime Traffic.

Finally, the meeting approved the proposal presented by the navies of Chile and Venezuela that the Law of the Sea be discussed in the Inter-American Naval Conference of Naval War College Directors.

**Ecuador:** "In the Last Decade of the Twentieth Century: New Challenges to Naval Power." The delegate from Ecuador analyzed world events following the Soviet disintegration and German reunification and their effects on the region. The possibilities of a generalized war are very remote; however, the world cannot in the near future eradicate the basic causes of tension and instability. An analysis was made of the social-economic aspects of the situation, establishing that oil will be a general source of conflict. It raised as a challenge the use of naval power as part of maritime power for a system of support to develop and increase activities. He also mentioned that we should not lose sight of the fact



that total security can be affected by drug trafficking, which is a possible threat in the American continent.

**The United States of America:** "The Navy After the Disintegration of the Soviet Union: Perspectives and Forecasts." The Soviet Navy, now known as the Russian Navy, since the majority of its units belong to the Russian State, continues to operate in internal and international waters, although at a notably lower level. The mission of the Russian Navy has been reoriented toward the defense of its maritime accesses in order to insure its capability to protect in this economic crisis period. Likewise, there has been a reduction in the budget and in the building program for the Navy in the next decade. As to the future of the Russian Navy, it is still not clear what can be expected of it. The present political situation is very delicate and unstable. As of now, their new mission is no different from the old, that is, to protect maritime access and economic zones; however, we can look to a better relationship between the Russian Navy and the navies of the West. At the present time, the Russian Republic considers the retention and maintenance of a highly capable navy to be of great importance.

Now, the delegate from the United States of America presented the following subject: "From the Sea: A New Policy, A New Era: Naval Strategic Concept in a Changing World." The United States, because of new national interests generated by changes in security policy as a result of the new world order, is contributing a new approach to the development of a maritime strategy. That strategy is based on naval force operations from the sea that are capable of projecting their naval power toward land through expeditionary naval forces conceived to carry out joint operations in accordance with specific kinds of crises for which it has established a requirement in support of naval forces. The United States plans to maintain operation of its logistical and operational capabilities (in light of the requirements of their national and international policies) in international waters in order to preserve stability and international order as well as keep on alert in order to answer quickly to any crisis.

The United States Navy presented, in addition, the following subject: "Presentation of UNITAS No. XXXII Operations." It is a global vision of operations carried out in which the objectives of improving interoperability on a multinational level at sea are achieved. During the exercises, we were able to incorporate the automated exchange of tactical information, and new operational procedures were implemented.

**Peru:** "Improvement of Inter-Navy Operations or Capabilities so That They Can Be an Element of Deterrence on a Regional Basis in the Face of a World Conflict." In the past, the maintenance of inter-navy operational capability was based on a threat coming from the Cold War between the largest naval powers, who were basically defending their respective ideological postures. The new

situation that prevails permits us to establish the following: Changes on the world scene show objectively that the probability of a world conflict based on ideological polarization has been minimized. At this transitional stage, the United States emerges as a dominating military power while regional economic power blocs are being established. The United Nations Organization has strengthened its presence and participation in the definitions of situations that affect peace and international order. New intra- and extra-continental threats have arisen, such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking, subversion, *etc.* In addition, the speaker addressed the present situation of the political framework within the inter-American system, the existing strategic environment, and the actions that can permit an improvement in the operational capability between navies so that they can become an element of integration and strengthening of regional peace and of deterrence on a worldwide level.

Peru also presented the following subject, "Participation of the Peruvian Navy in the War Against Subversion." The Peruvian Navy's work was defined as going beyond its water resources, assuming territorial responsibility in the struggle against subversion in the areas that were declared to be in a state of emergency. The following terrorists groups constitute the subversive threat: Shinning Path, and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement acting in collusion with the drug traffickers.

**Venezuela:** "The Role of the Navies in the Control of the Exclusive Economic Zone." The Exclusive Economic Zone—a controversial subject which was given origin from the declarations of some countries (principally Latin American countries) of a 200-mile limit on territorial seas. The Exclusive Economic Zone grants rights of sovereignty and provides for the establishment of security zones, it being the obligation of the coastal state to guarantee to the other nations freedom of navigation through these waters. A consequence of the jurisdiction of the coastal state and the Exclusive Economic Zone is the acquisition of greater responsibility in fighting against illicit activities of various kinds that may be carried out without the consent of the coastal state. Since the Exclusive Economic Zone is a new situation in maritime law, it is difficult to be specific as to the traditional role of the states in exercising their sovereignty and jurisdiction in these zones.

**Council of Delegates:** Finally, we will provide you with the recommendations approved by the Council of Delegates of the Sixteenth Inter-American Naval Conference.

The recommendations approved by the Council of Delegates during the Fifteenth Inter-American Naval Conference held in Chile in 1991 were ratified, and among these were the following:

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- To recommend to the American navies to send to the Secretariat of the Inter-American Naval Conference information on exchange of fuel.
- That within a year, an analysis will be made and a report will be presented on the proposal of the Brazilian Navy on changes to the Basis of Agreements and Rules of Debate.
- The proposal of the Argentine Navy and the suggestions of the Peruvian Navy with regard to expressing their interests in joining the activities of the areas of cooperation.
- In addition to the aforementioned recommendations, the Council of Delegates also approved the following presentations and proposals made throughout the Sixteenth Inter-American Naval Conference:

To admit the Canadian Navy as a member of the Inter-American Naval Conference.

To thank the naval force of Nicaragua for its presence as an observer in the Sixteenth Conference. The member navies will at the proper time express their opinions to the General Secretariat of the Seventeenth Inter-American Naval Conference regarding the accession of the Nicaraguan Naval Force as a member of the Inter-American Naval Conference and this subject's inclusion on the agenda of the Seventeenth Inter-American Naval Conference.

To approve the recommendations made by the Data Link Special Commission on the transmission of tactical data between units during combined operations. This mission entrusted to the Argentine Navy.

To reject the establishment of a General Secretariat with a permanent headquarters and to approve the report presented by the Secretary General of the Fifteenth Inter-American Naval Conference in the sense of not making any changes with regards to the standards established in the Basis of Agreement since they have proved in time to have been adequate and effective.

To accept the offer made by the member navies to commission officers of the Navies of Ecuador, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru to cover the expenses of the Inter-American Telecommunications Network.

To confirm that the Fifteenth Inter-American Naval Conference for War College Directors be held in Venezuela in October 1992.

To designate Columbia as a host country for the Second Inter-American Naval Conference for Directors of Intelligence, Coastal and Riverine Patrol Operations, Arms Trafficking and Narcotics to

be held in October 1993. Bolivia was given as the second choice, and Ecuador as the third.

To designate Venezuela as a host country to hold the Tenth Specialized Conference of Chiefs of Naval Communications in the fourth quarter of 1993 or the first quarter of 1994.

To designate Chile as a host country for the First Inter-American Naval Conferences specializing in naval control of maritime traffic in 1994, at a date to be confirmed. The first alternative site is Venezuela, and the second choice is Brazil.

To designate Uruguay as a host country for the Sixteenth Inter-American Naval Conference of Naval War College Directors. It should be held at least six months before the Seventeenth Inter-American Naval Conference. The first alternate site is Chile, and the second choice is Argentina.

To designate Uruguay as a host country for the Seventeenth Inter-American Naval Conference to be held in 1994 at a date to be confirmed. The first alternative site is Venezuela, and the second choice is Argentina.

Before ending my report, I would like to state that the active participation of the delegates present in this lofty meeting once again permitted us to deal successfully with subjects of professional relevance in these times of great changes on the international level. In this regard, the Peruvian Navy believes that the subjects that were discussed and the agreements that were taken will permit us to face successfully the challenge for our navies—that is, a common effort for better use and security of maritime space.

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# Review of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium

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Vice Admiral I. D. G. MacDougall, Royal Australian Navy

**A**DMIRAL KELSO, FELLOW DELEGATES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, it is my pleasure to provide you with a review of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) held in Hawaii in early November 1992. This was the third symposium that drew together the chiefs of navies of the Western Pacific region to discuss maritime issues, both globally and within the region. The spirit of communication and pursuit of open and frank discussion featured in the first two symposia continued during our interlocution in Hawaii.

The agenda revolved around three things, namely: individual perspectives of the global and regional situation, multinational naval cooperation, and combating environmental pollution. I intend to outline broadly the threads of discussions held in Hawaii and then progress on to the achievements of the WPNS workshop held in Singapore in July 1993, including those initiatives underway and expected to be presented to WPNS IV, which is to be held in Malaysia in November 1994.

## **Global and Regional Update**

In the opening session, Japan, Singapore, and New Zealand provided individual perspectives on global and regional developments, which afforded an illuminating exposé of thought on security matters across the region. You are well aware of the continuing change in such spheres, as security perceptions and analyses of strategic stability, and one year on, their individual perspectives will no doubt have adjusted further to that change. The follow-on discussion highlighted the importance of sea lines of communication and how they are becoming even more intertwined with a nation's sovereignty. Protection of SLOCs probably means that navies will have to work even closer together to enhance existing interoperability. The degree to which we envisage it will be required is not currently enjoyed in the Western Pacific region, for a multitude of reasons, nor is it likely to be in the short term.

Pacific rim countries will now be forced to reconsider how to protect their SLOCs, with the rescheduling of the U.S. presence in the region and new routines of participation and cooperation adjusted to what is domestically acceptable. The consensus from the session is that there is a requirement *now* to increase the overall size and complexity of bilateral exercises. Also, there needs

to be more stringent thought given to developing coalition exercises to enhance interoperability, particularly on humanitarian issues such as disaster relief but, and I stress, at a pace which is comfortable to all WPNS participants.

### **Multinational Naval Cooperation**

The multinational naval cooperation session featured issues such as a review of the inaugural WPNS maritime issues workshop held in Australia in July 1992; an overview of multinational naval cooperation which was conducted by the USN representative; presentations on counter-narcotic operations from Thailand; counter-piracy operations from Malaysia; search and rescue operations from the Republic of Korea and Papua New Guinea; and peacekeeping and disaster relief operations from Japan. The diverse array of topics presented in this session generated much discussion.

The WPNS navies belief is that navies have a role to act as a conduit or facilitator to ensure that the correct agencies in each respective country receive information to help them maintain their maritime sovereignty. To better manage such an information requirement, it was concluded that the key to acquiring better regional interoperability could be the development of common WPNS doctrine and documentation.

Some of the initiatives cited include the Maritime Information Exchange Directory, the WPNS *Tactical Signals Manual*, and the proposed establishment of a WPNS Command-Post Exercise. Besides the notions of interoperability and maritime sovereignty, a common thread that has been pursued in the development of these initiatives is their applicability to humanitarian issues. The ongoing development of these initiatives will be addressed later.

One development favored for WPNS interaction is the creation of more simulated military exercises ashore, rather than at-sea exercises. This has become necessary due to the resource constraints placed on some WPNS members, and I am sure this is a common challenge amongst all navies today, which prevents them from participating fully in all initiatives.

In closing WPNS III, Admiral Kelly, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and our host, summed up the observations made at the symposium by stating that one of the messages that came loud and clear from the symposium was that economic strength, vitality, and growth depend on security and stability. It is also true that without economic success, there can be no stability. There cannot be one without the other.

Additionally, the message that there has been no peace dividend in Asia equivalent to the so-called peace dividend in Europe was well enunciated. The general agreement was that the WPNS nations should begin work on a non-binding document for better communication and understanding at sea. Furthermore, the push for multilateral exercises would be premature, and WPNS nations

preferred, as a whole, to remain wedded to our highly successful bilateral relations.

Accordingly, the symposium directed that a workshop be convened in mid-July 1993 in Singapore to progress the following action items: Firstly, investigating the feasibility of the conduct of a WPNS Command-Post Exercise in which all members can participate; secondly, the development of a straw man for a common tactical communications publication to enhance interoperability among the members; and thirdly, continued compilation of the Maritime Information Exchange Directory from the embryonic form presented at the symposium.

### **Second WPNS Workshop, July 1993**

The second workshop was held at the Brani Naval Base, Singapore, on 15 and 16 July 1993. The stated aims of the workshop were to discuss issues of common interest confronting the Western Pacific Maritime Environment and to develop proposals for a regional consensus on naval cooperation. I am happy to report that the workshop is becoming an increasingly successful forum for the pursuit of these challenging objectives.

Discussion at the workshop focussed around four subjects: the Maritime Information Exchange Directory, interoperability in the naval multilateral framework, the development of a WPNS *Tactical Signals Manual* and a WPNS Command-Post Exercise.

### **Maritime Information Exchange Directory**

The discussion on the Maritime Information Exchange Directory (MIED) was led by the Australian representative. When completed and endorsed, the directory can be used as a reference manual for ships of member navies. The directory is intended to be kept on the bridge of WPNS warships and used as a reference book for ships deployed to or transiting the waters of other members.

Through the information contained in the directory, member warships will be aware of those matters of interest which will require reporting if observed in the waters of another member. For example, matters of interest could include piracy, illegal fishing, and marine pollution. The directory uses navy-to-navy communication in preference to the current system of communicating through coastal radio stations. This was seen as the favored option due to the difficulties associated with foreign warships liaising directly with differing internal organizations responsible for maritime surveillance and enforcement in different countries, and the enduring difficulties associated with language differences, particularly when the emphasis is on communicating time-critical information.

Most of the directory submissions have been received by Australia for compilation. It is intended that by early 1994 all members will have produced their submissions, using a common format, and that a final directory will be



produced for consideration at WPNS IV. One difficulty that is currently being experienced is that members have produced submissions with excessive variations. To ensure the success of the directory as a workable and practical document for our fleets to use, I hope that by the time the final directory is produced, all of the submissions will be more closely aligned.

### **Interoperability in the Naval Multilateral Framework**

The Royal Malaysian Navy representative led the discussion on interoperability in the naval multilateral framework. Areas of discussion included combined replenishment at sea, helicopter operations, tactical procedures, naval control of shipping, weather information, and navigational warnings. Although these issues produced some lively debate over the role of WPNS and what activities are appropriate for the forum, it was generally agreed that there is significant potential for further cooperation.

At this stage, a number of the proposed areas for cooperation are being followed up.

Each member is currently producing a submission to be compiled by Malaysia into a Replenishment at Sea (RAS) handbook. This handbook will be given to the WPNS fleets and will detail ship's layouts and replenishment procedures for each of our navies. It is intended that once each navy becomes comfortable with these procedures, RAS exercises will follow.

While naval control of shipping is seen as an increasingly important sphere of operations that will require improved coordination and interoperability between our nations, most members agree that a separate WPNS naval control exercise would be difficult to implement. As an alternative, it was agreed that those WPNS members that are not participants in the *Exercise Bell Bouy* series should seek approval to participate, initially as observers.

The development of a common doctrine is an important objective for many WPNS members. At this early stage, the U.S. Navy is seeking to gain clearance to distribute a number of NATO doctrinal publications to WPNS members, however, if approval is not achieved, the development of separate non-NATO WPNS publications will be further investigated.

### **WPNS Tactical Signals Manual**

The WPNS *Tactical Signals Manual* was an initiative that was first considered at WPNS III. The proposed manual is a WPNS common, non-NATO signals manual that can be used during bilateral or coalition exercises conducted between any WPNS nations. The development of the manual has been lead by the United States and is currently close to completion. Noting my earlier comments regarding the requirement to develop separate WPNS doctrinal publications if the clearance of NATO publications is not approved, the *Tactical*

*Signals Manual* could prove to be a catalyst to the production of other common publications.

### **Command-Post Exercise**

Many of the navies in the group are examining the possibilities for using simulated military exercise opportunities to replace, in part, at-sea exercises. The development of these exercises ashore will improve communications interoperability between the members, while also improving each navy's understanding of the capabilities and strengths of their fellow members.

The first of such opportunities will be the command-post exercise, which is being developed by the U.S. Navy. This first exercise is envisaged to be a simple desk-top communications exercise, and it is intended that a scenario be set and each participant be allocated certain "triggers" to which they must react.

The first scenario will most probably involve an exercise collision between an oil tanker and ocean passenger liner in high seas off the east coast of the Philippines. Within the scenario, each participant will be briefed to be responsible for a number of actions to assist in the search and rescue effort as well as in the effort to avert a marine pollution disaster. Participants will use simple facsimile transmissions between individual headquarters to relay messages on the success of their desk-top reactions. It is expected that the first exercise will be held during 1994.

### **Concluding Thoughts**

Given the success of the Third Symposium and the second workshop, I am very pleased to report to this forum that the prospects for greater cooperation and understanding among the navies of the Western Pacific region are very positive. I believe that in addition to the confidence and understanding between navies that is engendered at the symposia and the workshops, WPNS is becoming an even more important forum because we are beginning to witness the creation and implementation of some quite exciting, practical initiatives.

I have high hopes for the future of the forum, and I believe it has an important role to play in ensuring stability and security in the Western Pacific maritime environment over the coming decades.



# Review of West African Naval Symposium

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Captain Moustapha Mamadou Thioubou, Senegalese Navy

**F**IRST OF ALL, on behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Senegalese Navy, I would like to thank you for your invitation. Admiral Kelso, I would like also to thank you on behalf of the Senegalese Navy that my navy has been chosen to present the results of the International Symposium on West Africa. And now on my own behalf, I would like to express my acknowledgement for having been invited to come to the Naval War College. I am very touched and I am very moved to be here again, where I was once a student. I cannot forget the conferences and the lectures that I have heard and participated in here.

I would like now, very briefly, to report to you the results of the first international symposium on coastal security in West Africa, held in Guinea-Bissau, 21-24 April 1992. This symposium was organized by the Guinea-Bissau Navy, with the financial cooperation of the United States. This conference included representatives from Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal. Each delegation was lead by its chief of naval staff. A U.S. delegation, led by the sub-regional defense attaché, attended the meeting.

The main goals of the symposium were the following: to present the maritime surveillance system existing in each of these countries, to exchange views concerning coastal security, specifically dealing with the subjects of greater interest for the sub-region: protection of fishing resources, drug enforcement, protection of the maritime environment, and right of hot-pursuit.

The coastal surveillance systems of the several countries that attended the meeting are very similar. The systems are the result of cooperation between the fishery service, which is a civilian agency, as well as the navies of all these countries. Sometimes, the air force will also cooperate in providing surveillance services of the coast. Cape Verde, however, has a system that is different, because it is going through an important reform now to create a maritime patrol system. They want to create a coast guard, but this is a very unusual system. In the meantime, as they create these new structures, they have the cooperation of the sub-regional navies.

At the end of our deliberations, the delegations approved the following recommendations, which were then transmitted to their respective governments. Concerning the protection of maritime environment, the following recommendations were approved:

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- First, the creation of a sub-regional commission for the protection of the maritime environment.
- Definition of the legal bases for protection of the environment.
- The establishment of funding-raising methods and financing for coastal signaling and trying to adopt a unique system for coastal signaling in the region.

To prompt research about the eco-systems in the area:

- An inventory of existing species, reproduction zones or areas.
- Protection of the mangrove in the region.
- Fight against coastal erosion.
- To promote an awareness campaign concerning the environment—the problems of exploitation or over-exploitation of the above resources.
- To define standards to protect the endangered species in the region.

Concerning the protection of fishing resources in the various countries, the delegations have approved the following recommendations:

- The development of a joint scientific research program with a goal of understanding completely the potential of fisheries in the region and establishing a national resource management system.
- A fisheries plan will be developed for the region to avoid over-fishing and will also be the basis for an annual fisheries plan.
- To form a negotiating block to negotiate fishing agreements, especially with the EEC, and to harmonize rules dealing with the situation.

On the subject of drug-trafficking and the right of hot-pursuit, I would like to mention that United States representatives have participated in these deliberations. Guinea-Bissau presented a special document, which was the basis for our work and was titled "Drug-Trafficking." After our deliberations, the following recommendations were adopted:

- To organize meetings in the sub-region so that several law enforcement agencies as well as the navies and customs authorities in the region could participate in establishing the sub-regional rules for this activity.
- The unification of radio communication systems in the region has also been approved along with making a complete inventory of the human and material resources needed for achieving this. The U.S. delegation has reported the willingness of the U.S. government to help with radio equipment for fisheries as well as for drug-trafficking.

- Activities to increase the awareness of the populations and the sailors concerning the dangers of drug-trafficking.

The right of hot-pursuit has been discussed by all of these countries, plus Mauritania. Considering the legal aspects and also the sovereignty of countries, the delegations have, however, recommended that these issues be brought up at the next ministerial-level conference about the subject.

The U.S. delegation, with three senior naval officers, has been a discrete, but important participant in the deliberation of this first international symposium. The U.S. delegation presented U.S. cooperation in terms of the protection of the maritime environment as well as in combating drug-trafficking.

African civil action was also presented as well as three other programs which are part of it: military civic action, military health affairs, and African coastal security. The meeting in Guinea-Bissau has been financed through this latter program and, of course, its goal is to protect and to preserve the coastal waters of these regions.

A special meeting was held by the delegation leaders in which they approved several recommendations. Aware of the need to better protect biological resources of this area, but taking into account the differences between the different countries and the need to fight piracy with these resources, Gambia, Cape Verde, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal have proposed: to create a committee of chiefs of staff in the region; to establish a communication network among these countries and their staffs, which will meet once a year in one of these countries; to better train the sailors of these navies, nationally and internationally; and to organize once a year a combined operations exercise in this region.

We have not yet planned a second meeting like this one; however, thanks to the Sub-regional Commission on Fisheries and the importance of this symposium for all the navies, all have taken a favorable position toward this meeting. All the navies of the above countries, plus Mauritania, signed a convention in Conakry, Guinea, on 1 September 1993, on sub-regional cooperation on the right of hot-pursuit and a protocol on the implementation of surveillance by the member states of this sub-committee. Indeed, the region's navies have already started combined operations for surveillance of those areas under their jurisdiction.



# Keynote Address

## Maritime Coalitions and International Security

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Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, U.S. Navy

**O**NCE AGAIN LET ME SAY what a pleasure it is to host the International Seapower Symposium. I am honored to address such a distinguished group of colleagues. In these times of promise I believe this forum has become more relevant and more valuable than ever. When we met two years ago, we focused on the major changes we were going through at that time—changes which began with the collapse of the Berlin wall in November of 1989. Not long before ISS Eleven, a coup in the Soviet Union ended more than seventy years of communist party rule, and later that year, the USSR, as we had known it, ceased to exist. That event represented, for most people, the official end of the Cold War.

As you and I gathered in Newport in 1991, we sensed that the global security environment had changed for all time and that our maritime forces would have to cope with the implications of those changes. But another dramatic event of equal significance for naval forces was also on our minds. In March of 1991, we had witnessed the successful conclusion of operation DESERT STORM, the reversal of Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. That victory was made possible with the collective efforts of some thirty nations. More than a dozen of our maritime forces had contributed to that success, but ISS Eleven was not the scene of mutual congratulations. We spent an extensive amount of time in a candid assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of our efforts, our primary goal being to improve the abilities of naval forces to operate together in the future.

And while the delegates at ISS Eleven did not reach consensus on every issue, several things were clear: in the world as we saw it two years ago, our naval forces would continue to support our respective nations' economic and security policies. Many of them would play at least some role in maintaining regional stability. Finally, the opportunity for our forces to work in tandem would undoubtedly present itself again.

But even then we recognized those needs would be tempered by an almost universal climate of fiscal constraint. Many of us had already begun downsizing or restructuring in the face of economic problems at home and diminished defense requirements.

Today, however much we might like a quiet period of the *status quo*, that is probably, in my judgement, not in the offing. Our world *continues* to change



rapidly, and there is little sense of closure in sight. In many respects, we are still living amidst the fallout of the Cold War, and associated with that are both pluses and minuses. The big plus, of course, is the vastly reduced threat of global conflict—let alone nuclear holocaust—and that outweighs every negative aspect.

Further, the eased tensions between East and West have generated opportunities for peace in regions with seemingly insurmountable obstacles. For me, seeing Mr. Arafat and Mr. Rabin shake hands on the White House lawn a few weeks ago was certainly among the most moving experiences of my life. We also continue to see signs of progress in South Africa which are most heartening. There is significant momentum toward free-market economies and democratic values in many of the nations of the former Warsaw Pact.

At the same time, while I believe all of us are truly grateful that we no longer have to worry about World War III, the suddenness of this change has, in some ways, generated even more chaos and uncertainty in our world. A few weeks ago, Dr. Manfred Wörner, the Secretary General of NATO, spoke about the two contradictory realities with which we are living. On the one hand, we have an upsurge of democracy around the world, and on the other, a resurgence of fragmentation. Ongoing events in the former Soviet Union and much of Eastern Europe bear witness to Dr. Wörner's assessment.

We must also remember that the failure of Soviet communism has not solved some longstanding, fundamental problems in *other* parts of our world—indeed, it has triggered many new ones. John Keegan, the British military historian, called this “a wicked and dangerous world, full of malcontents and irresponsible peoples itching to get their hands on weapons of mass destruction.” The disparity between the world's “haves” and “have nots” is widening. In places like Somalia and Haiti, we must deal not only with hunger but also with the violence that it sometimes breeds.

Where and when will the next crisis erupt? My crystal ball is no better than any of yours, and these days we have all become a bit more humble when it comes to prophesying. The measure of predictability during the days of the Cold War may be gone forever, but I *can* tell you that maritime forces from many of our nations are just as engaged and just as much in demand today as they were during the Cold War, and even during the war with Iraq. In my own navy, U.S. sailors are deployed throughout the globe, often working with the naval forces of friends and allies. They are still in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea—about three times as many as before Iraq invaded Kuwait—helping to enforce the no-fly zone and economic sanctions. At the last count, we and our coalition allies had intercepted over 18,222 ships, boarded almost 8,910 of them, and turned back 429.

Just last Thursday, the aircraft carrier *America* relieved USS *Abraham Lincoln* off Somalia. Today, *America* and an amphibious group with 1,800 Marines are standing off Mogadishu, should the situation there deteriorate. In the Mediterranean and Adriatic, you will find another amphibious group led by USS

*Guadalcanal*, as well as several surface combatants and submarines. These ships are not alone. We are joined by ships from ten nations monitoring the tense situation in Bosnia.

On this side of the world we have three cruisers, a destroyer, and two frigates on station off Haiti, enforcing UN sanctions along with ships from four other navies whose countries are represented here. At the same time, we continue our active engagement in combating drug smuggling throughout the Caribbean and South America.

Why do I foresee maritime forces being called upon just as extensively in the future? Because their inherent flexibility and mobility continue to give our nations' leaders the greatest variety of possible responses. Naval forces can sail in international waters without anyone else's permission. With a carrier, we use air power and do not worry about overseas bases or overflight fights. We can wait patiently offshore, or we can move in quickly. And if we need to project power, we can do it with manned aircraft, cruise missiles, or Marines. Finally, naval forces can be sustained for long periods of time.

Today, U.S. naval forces can deploy in large numbers virtually anywhere in the world and *sustain* that forward presence almost indefinitely. That is what we consider our core capability in our navy. It is critical, I believe, to both our nation and to the rest of the world, that we maintain that capability. Nothing over the past two years has shaken my faith in the value of forward naval forces. Today, no less than during the Cold War, if we want to be able to influence events—if we want to deter conflict or respond quickly to protect innocent lives and our collective interests should deterrence fail—we must be *there*. But we must learn to do the job in this environment with substantially less funding.

The question my colleagues and I have wrestled with in the past two years is how to provide our nation with the kind of capabilities that I have described, but at significantly reduced costs to the American taxpayer. Many of you are addressing these same concerns. I won't pretend that an answer came to us, in the U.S. Navy, all at once. But we clearly recognized we would not get there by holding on to the past. Instead, we learned to see the changes in our world as *opportunities*. Let me explain how we in the U.S. Navy have seized some of those opportunities.

First, we reassessed our position in the world. In the early eighties, our "Maritime Strategy" outlined how naval forces would operate in a global war. Its primary emphasis was on sea control and sustained operations on the high seas. "The Maritime Strategy" served us very well during the Cold War. But the war with Iraq bore little resemblance to an open-ocean superpower conflict. We had to improvise in areas we had not focused on in the past, such as joint warfare, shallow-water mine countermeasures, and rules of engagement in crowded sea and air lanes. With the possibility of global war no longer driving

military decisions, we were free to concentrate on regional scenarios, absent superpower confrontation.

The result was a new strategy which we call . . . *From the Sea*. This strategy emphasizes our traditional expeditionary role and focuses on regional rather than global conflict. It ties us more closely than ever to our Marine Corps and prepares us for operating with one foot on the land and one foot at sea in a demanding environment of the world's littoral or coastal areas.

*From the Sea* also acknowledges that most military operations in the future will be joint. That is, we will use whatever forces are necessary from all of America's services to get the job done. Because we are most often the first on the scene, naval forces first must always be ready to open the door and enable safe insertion of heavy ground and land-based forces, much as we did in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

With the end of the Cold War and continuing domestic budget problems, it was clear that we would have to cut and restructure our military forces. For the Navy, this means going from nearly six hundred ships to a planned force of around three hundred fifty. Since I have been the Chief of Naval Operations, we have decommissioned more than one hundred fifty ships; at the same time, we have commissioned only around fifty.

Next year, we will decommission seventy additional ships, many with more than a decade's worth of life left in them. We are reducing our inventory of carrier aircraft in a similar manner. We are giving up force structure early so that the ships and aircraft we retain are high-quality and well-maintained. Moreover, we will be able to devote more of our funds to recapitalization.

We have also moved to reduce excess support capability at our shore bases. In the 80s, we told our legislative leaders in Congress that we wanted to build bases in their districts. In my country, that is easy, politically. Now, we are telling them we want to shut them down—and the fallout has been difficult. But to spend dollars on bases and capability ashore that we no longer need is not responsible; it would take away valuable funds for training our people and maintaining the equipment that they *do* need in this world.

In Washington, we cut our headquarters staff by half. We eliminated half our vice admiral deputy billets, among them the so-called platform "barons," who traditionally had channeled money into either surface, aviation, or submarine programs. In the Cold War, we tended to see the world according to the "chariot" we rode. If, like me, you were a submariner, you saw it one way. If you were an aviator or a destroyer sailor, you saw it differently. If you asked for the best way to strike a target, you probably would get three different answers. That way of doing business became increasingly inefficient as we shifted our strategy to focus on joint mission areas like strike warfare, littoral warfare, and surveillance. The "chariot" boundaries were no longer relevant, so we changed.

These changes have reduced in-fighting and streamlined our budget process. Our operational commanders now have more to say. Through war games, we are testing our budget recommendations *before* we spend the money. We will not spend taxpayer money on weapons that we do not feel we absolutely need.

So we changed our strategy, our organization, and our budget process. But we were still left with the requirement to serve our nation's forward presence around the world, while cutting our force significantly. Our solution is to change how we employ the force. In the absence of a global threat, we are deploying smaller groups, without the escorts needed for open-ocean defense. For example, since there are few Russian submarines still operating in home waters, we have retired all our frigates designed exclusively for anti-submarine warfare, and we have stopped building such single-mission ships.

Aircraft carriers and Marines, which have traditionally served as our primary means of affecting events ashore, however, will remain fundamental to our mission for as long as I can see. Our leaders' support for twelve carriers and amphibious ships sufficient to lift two and a half Marine Expeditionary Brigades reflects a clear appreciation of their value. Carriers and large amphibious ships are costly, it is true, but because we get as much as fifty years service from them, I think they are unbeatable investments for my country.

Today, we are also tailoring our naval groups to handle specific circumstances by changing the mix of aircraft, ships, and people. For example, when we recently deployed the carrier USS *Theodore Roosevelt*, we replaced the anti-submarine aircraft with extra strike aircraft, as well as six hundred Marines and their helicopters. When the carrier *America* sailed a few months later, it was the key element of a joint task group, specially tailored to meet the diverse requirements in the Adriatic.

Another reason we can support our commitments with fewer numbers is the quality of ships and aircraft we are building. Pound-for-pound and dollar-for-dollar, they are far more powerful and capable than anything we have ever had before. Precision-guided bombs and missiles, advanced air surveillance systems and greatly improved communications enable us to do more with fewer ships.

As just one example, Tomahawk cruise missiles can now, in some situations, enable us to use surface combatants and submarines as a substitute for carriers. In June of this year, President Clinton directed a punitive strike against Iraq in response to an assassination attempt against former President George Bush. Two surface combatants (a cruiser and a destroyer) launched twenty-three Tomahawks, which destroyed much of Iraq's intelligence capability without risking the lives of U.S. personnel. Just a few years ago, dozens of our best surface ships together could not have carried out that mission.

But fewer ships mean we cannot provide the same level of presence everywhere in peacetime that we had throughout the Cold War. To avoid increasing an already heavy burden on our sailors and their families, we are changing our

deployment patterns. In the past, we used carrier and amphibious ready groups to provide unbroken presence in places like the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, and the Western Pacific. With substantially fewer ships in our inventory, we can no longer afford unbroken presence in all areas simultaneously.

It takes us about twenty-five days, non-stop, to get a carrier from Norfolk or San Diego to the Persian Gulf. We know from experience that our people can tolerate peacetime family separations for no more than about six months, and they need at least a year of training and upkeep before they are ready to deploy again.

As a result, we are covering more than one geographic area, with each deploying group using a tether policy. Rather than guaranteeing unbroken presence in all regions, we are keeping battle groups on a tether, within a certain number of days' sailing for specific areas. This lets us provide reasonable coverage of areas where our strategic interests lie, without putting an undue burden on our people.

Obviously this change is not free of risk. It requires our regional unified commanders to compete for naval assets that may represent their only quick-reaction capability. We may be farther away from a crisis when it first breaks out. As we get smaller, we will not have the capability to surge as much as we did in the past. And clearly, there is a limit to how far we can draw down before our commitments outstrip our resources. But I believe Secretary of Defense Aspin's Bottom-Up Review, which called for a navy of about three hundred fifty ships, including twelve carriers, provides a logical endpoint to naval reductions. With the understanding that we can no longer be in as many places simultaneously, this smaller, but technologically unmatched navy will continue to meet our nation's needs.

Underpinning our changes to strategy and tactics are the principles of Dr. W. Edwards Deming, the management authority whose life's work has revolutionized corporate practices in the United States, Japan, and in many other nations. Dr. Deming says that improving the process rather than trying to fix the product is the key to success. In our business, where the product changes often, improving the processes helped us to adapt rapidly and efficiently to change. We must find better ways of doing all that we do—from training new recruits to building ships. Though it will take us a decade or more to implement all Dr. Deming's ideas—which we call Total Quality Leadership (TQL)—throughout our organization, we have already seen many tangible results noted in man hours and dollars saved. With a projected forty percent reduction in U.S. Navy funding between 1989 and 1994, and a loss of some 200,000 Navy men and women, we must explore every means to improve our efficiency. Incidentally, some of our shipmates in other navies are also exploring the ideas of

Deming. I believe Vice Admiral MacDougall, of the Royal Australian Navy, can speak of similar success.

But, to turn to the crux of why we are all here, one of the most significant ways for all of us to improve our capabilities in a world of shrinking resources is to continue our efforts to exercise, train, and operate together. That kind of cooperation makes sense from a fiscal standpoint and from a security standpoint. The potential is great for combined operations which cover the entire spectrum from peace to conflict, and we must preserve and improve those capabilities.

On any given day, U.S. naval forces are operating with the forces of about a dozen other countries, and these operations enhance not only our interoperability, but increase the competence of our individual navies. At the same time, they strengthen the already friendly ties that the fundamentals of going to sea promote among us.

But the payoff from these efforts extends far beyond improved interoperability and increased professionalism. History records that nations whose armed forces exercise and operate together rarely fight each other. Peacetime exercises nurture strong relations among participating states and help improve relations among nations within a region. UNITAS, the annual exercise of Western Hemisphere navies, is a compelling example of a success story that has been replicated in many other regions. Recently, the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, expanded the annual Baltic operations (BALTOPS) exercise from the traditional core of German, Dutch, Danish and U.S. units. The exercise now includes participants from Sweden, Poland, Russia, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Norway. The Commander of U.S. Naval Forces for the Central Command has initiated an exercise program with the forces of Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. The annual Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise with the navies of Japan, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and the U.S. continues to reinforce strong relations in that important region of the world. We in the United States intend to keep combined operations and exercises at the top of our priority list.

However, with a new security environment, we must ensure that the *focus* of combined endeavors remains relevant. When we last met, at ISS Eleven, we began grappling with the fact that we are no longer drawn together primarily by the need to counter a global threat. No longer are our relations defined by "negative" terms such as anti-Soviet and anti-communist. Today, we stress the positive—pro-democracy, pro-trade, pro-free markets, and so on. We are freer to engage in pursuits that further the goal of international stability. These include nation-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, oceanographic research, and disaster relief. But we still cannot take for granted the freedom of the seas which enables about ninety-five percent of world trade. This, indeed, remains the primary responsibility of most of the navies represented here today. In today's politically and economically interdependent world, information,

capital, raw materials, and manufactured goods must continue to flow freely across borders and oceans.

So it is clear that, despite massive changes in our world since I first began meeting with you, there continue lasting bonds in areas of common interest and concern. Over the next three days, we have a unique opportunity to make tangible gains in addressing the important issues we face. Some of them, like interoperabilities, shared technology, and rules of engagement are extremely complex and will take our very best efforts to resolve. But I am convinced the potential for real progress is greater than ever before. To quote Dr. Wörner again, "we intend to build bridges, not barricades." I believe we can continue the great progress we have made in strengthening our maritime bridges. If stronger ties among our navies lead, in even a peripheral way, to warmer relationships among our parent nations, I think we will have accomplished a great deal indeed.

### Questions and Answers

*Vice Admiral Buis, Netherlands:* We see right now that violence is taking place between ethnic groups and on racial issues. What is the role of military forces to control this new violence, as you see it around the world? In particular, how can naval forces contribute to control that new violence, as we see it in Somalia, Yugoslavia, and so on?

*Admiral Kelso:* Well, if I had an answer to that question they would move me up in my job a little bit, but it is a good question and I think it is one that we are going to wrestle with for sometime in this period of change in our world. As you rightly point out, many of the problems that exist today are the result of historic issues and views that have existed in many countries for a long, long time. During the Cold War, there was sort of a lid that kept that from coming forth, and now it tends to bubble quite easily in many places.

We are wrestling with it in places like Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and other parts of the old Yugoslavia. We are wrestling with it in Haiti. They all have their own origins and their own problems, and they do not lend themselves very easily to a purely military solution. They have to be solved, in my judgement, with a political solution, and political solutions do not come about very easily when these historic problems continue to exist. At the same time, I think military forces are going to be used, as we have seen them used, when it makes sense: When our nations' political leaders, either in coalitions or through the United Nations, want to do things like providing the resources to enforce embargoes, providing the kind of logistic support that is required for us to be a long way from home, to providing the humanitarian assistance that we have done in Somalia. I would contend that you cannot do that without the kind of

sustaining capability that exists in the naval forces of the world, particularly, when you have got to take your food, your water, and whatever else you want to go. So, I think we are going to be used in those ways. I think it is going to be hard to find other solutions when you go in on the ground and are involved in a conflict. Without the support of the maritime forces, I think it will be difficult to be able to support places. In many areas of the world that are not close to our countries, you could not even start without maritime forces. So, I think we are going to be an enabling force to help find a political solution. We are not likely to be able to write too many clear military solutions to political problems. It is going to take time to do that.

*Commander Hardley Lewin, Jamaica:* Admiral Kelso, I was very happy to hear you mention nation-building as one of the missions that you see yourself in, either now or sometime in the future, because that is a mission that has been very close to us in the smaller countries. However, we have had some difficulties in terms of military assistance when a vessel is provided mainly for the job of war, and we have difficulties assigning it to other missions such as nation-building. So I'm very happy to hear you say that, and I hope I can quote you on the nation-building aspects later on. In the areas you outlined, it seemed to me that low-intensity conflicts have been dealt with from the U.S. Navy perspective, but you have been involved in some constabulary functions. Do you see this as a greater role for the Navy? And how are you preparing for it?

*Admiral Kelso:* I do not think you will see, other than in things like the drug war, U.S. military forces engaged in a constabulary role. Our laws do not permit us to engage in arrest. The only way we can participate is with our Coast Guard. (Admiral Nelson [Vice-Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard] is here with us today.) So, generally, if we are going to be in an enforcement role at sea in that arena, we will be in concert with our Coast Guard, because they provide the role, within our government, for the arrest function. We do not have that mission now, and it is unlikely that we or our political leadership will want to take it on in the future.

As for your earlier question about nation-building, we would like to do as much as we can to help nation-building. My country, as well as many of your countries, is looking at how resources are going to be spent in the years ahead of us. In some of the areas where we have traditionally been able to provide assets by trading funds and that sort of thing, it has become harder in recent years for us to convince the political leadership to provide this support. But I will continue in my effort to recommend that we have the opportunity to provide training, which is very important to us, and the sorts of things that are useful in nation-building.





# Theatre Commander Requirements in the Littoral

## Adapting the Force to Meet the Need

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Admiral Paul David Miller, U.S. Navy

**A**DMIRAL KELSO, ADMIRAL MARTINEZ, and distinguished maritime leaders, it is a distinct pleasure to be here. Before I begin my remarks, I will ad-lib just a couple of things. First, my congratulations to Admiral Kelso on his remarks this morning, and I want to mention in front of everybody here how grateful we are to have him as a U.S. military and a U.S. naval leader. We are inspired by his leadership, and it is my pleasure to join him behind this podium today. He gave you a great lecture this morning, and it is my pleasure to say that we couldn't be blessed with a finer naval leader. Secondly, at lunch today a couple of my colleagues were lamenting about having to go to, as they called it, a lecture after lunch. One of them mentioned that he had just finished a course of instruction here at the War College, and they called this auditorium the Blue Bedroom. Another said that in his country they scheduled all lectures before lunch because it was so difficult after lunch. So, with those due cautions, I am going to try very much in the next twenty minutes to make sure that none of you take a nap, because I'll be watching.

It is a pleasure to be with you again, at this year's Seapower Symposium, to see old friends, acquaintances, and naval leaders of the world's maritime nations.

When I spoke at this forum in October 1989, events unfolding in Europe signaled a sea change as great as that which dramatically altered the world balance of power in 1917.

Indicative of this change, at this year's symposium we have naval leaders from nations of Central and Eastern Europe. And three weeks ago, I was with Secretary Aspin at the naval planning group at Trivandrum, where he proposed that NATO invite members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and other nations of Europe to join a "Partnership for Peace." This partnership will facilitate non-member states' participation with NATO member states in a broad range of multinational missions such as search and rescue, peacekeeping, and crisis management.

These events should send a clear signal to all of us that the last four years have been ones of dynamic, far-reaching change from which there will be no turning

back. In fact, in no similar period in military history, going back half a century, have we seen such unprecedented change in the world's security environment.

Four years ago I quoted Napoleon's observation, "Peace has been declared . . . what a fix we are in now. . . ." as indicative of the deep, fundamental soul-searching in which the American military was then engaged.

The process continues.

Today, all of us function in an environment of challenges and dangers that place new demands on our military. Geographic borders are becoming transparent to the flow of people and turmoil, global institutions have constituencies unresponsive to governmental authority, and instantaneous global telecommunications directly affect the way societies relate to the world around them.

We are being pulled in several directions at once, and our ability to match diverse commitments with limited resources is challenging fundamental beliefs and traditional approaches to national security. Our ability to draft coherent and consistent policy is constrained by the reality that none of us have ever traveled this course before.

I liken today's security environment to the aftermath of a hurricane or a series of tornadoes. When the storm is over, there is work to do—repairs to make. While one neighborhood may have been devastated, another may have suffered little damage.

Normal city services are affected—police and fire protection is not always quickly available. Some take advantage of the situation by looting and vandalizing. Getting around is difficult. Some roads are blocked, but others are passable. On all roads, the normal traffic signs are blown down. The guideposts for individual actions are missing.

So we proceed with caution. We determine where our interests lie and assess the commitments we should make. We learn from each situation and carefully formulate a plan, responding to the hurricane's aftermath.

All of us in this post-Cold War era need to carefully develop a coherent strategy based on the new security environment in which we find ourselves. We need to define our goals and establish just what it is that we want to accomplish within the limits of resources available to us.

Rather than focusing on numbers and force structure, we need to recognize that each of us brings certain capabilities to the table. These capabilities can complement one another and be blended together to create a coalition for specific missions, littoral or blue-water operations.

With the Cold War as history, U.S. national military strategy is being directed towards regional issues and peace operations. Yesterday, on the television, I heard it said a different way: "to give people a chance," President Clinton remarked in response to a question about Somalia operations. While in the future these may be unilateral, allied, or coalition operations, from the American

vantage point, they will have one thing in common: *they will all be multiservice efforts.*

You will no longer see *major* United States military operations carried out by units solely from one of our services. For as America reshapes and as we downsize our forces for the future, we will have to continue supporting our commanders in the field with the full *range of capabilities* that they need, regardless of which service "claims ownership."

Note that I focused on "capabilities," not numbers of ships, squadrons, or battalions. Over the years, the American people have not bought and paid for a force exclusively designed toward a single threat. Instead, they have purchased capabilities—capabilities that span the entire spectrum from peace operations to regional conflict—tools to get the job done, wherever, whenever, and however they are needed.

Our current capabilities must be maintained as we downsize towards levels indicated in the recently completed Department of Defense Bottom-Up Review. Given today's budget levels, our armed forces need to more effectively utilize *what we already have*, for we all know that we cannot expect new, large-scale capital investments in the near future.

From the national side, we are achieving a better understanding of what we already have and how platforms and capabilities, regardless of service affiliation, can be integrated into a unified, mission-ready force.

From the international side, all of us here represent capabilities that, to be effective as a coalition, must be exercised, trained, and operated together. *We must groom our forces to be compatible, our capabilities to be complementary.* Changes in the world environment leave us little choice. We must construct new approaches to our security problems.

The United States, in order to maintain required levels of overseas presence and to avoid overcommitment, is constructing tailored or adaptive force packages of air, ground, special operations, and maritime forces to meet overseas requirements and to participate in combined military exercises with many of your nations.

And as the size of our carrier force declines, gaps in coverage will be accommodated by taking advantage of the full spectrum of our deployable military capabilities. In lieu of carrier forces, other capabilities and programs, such as land-based air, Tomahawk-capable ships, submarines, amphibious forces, prepositioned equipment, military-to-military contacts, and multi-national exercises will all continue to provide a highly visible and effective military presence.


Such concepts represent initial changes in the fundamental paradigm by which America will assemble military capability in the future. The term "force package" is being used often now and you will see it in different writings, but to further illustrate the course we are setting, consider a Rubik's Cube. It serves as an ideal

conceptual model. The cube is a brain-teaser that tests one's ability to correctly align six colors on one side.

When I talk about this, I talk about it as being a "capabilities cube," because each side represents a set of capabilities: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines—by their service colors; our national agencies by a color; and the international community by another.

The rules of this game allow us to construct combinations of force packages, rather than a "single color to each side of a cube." You "win" by constructing a pattern whose combined and integrated capabilities can best accomplish a particular mission.

### Rubik's Cube



It is important to stress that there is not just one configuration, because real world dynamics and the flexibility of forces preclude a "set" prescription. You have to work at it all the time, and the correct answer, over time, may have to be modified to reflect new realities and new capabilities.

For example, within a year we are looking at an upcoming joint task force deployment to Europe that will be configured with the capabilities from all four of our services. Such configurations will be capable of responding to specific operations such as DENY FLIGHT in the Arabian Gulf or SHARP GUARD in the Adriatic, and more general tasks such as forward presence, peacekeeping,

noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian or natural disaster relief. And if the need arises, the joint task force can be readily reenforced with capabilities based in the United States.

In another example employing the same methodology, a joint task group could be constructed to support a United Nations effort. This task force could include armed forces and nonmilitary agencies from both the United States and the international community.

The package of capabilities could include military engineering units such as Navy Seabees or the Army to build highways and restore infrastructure, and others to modernize and professionalize local military and police forces. Required support could also come from other nations, coast guards, and police organizations. My point is that both of these examples simply illustrate the variety, the flexibility, and the scope of capabilities that are available. Those of us in the sea services have long prided ourselves on what we would like to call the "-ility" words—flexibility, mobility, and adaptability—of our maritime forces. Now we have to carry flexibility over into thought processes as we consider the strategies and options during these final years of the twentieth century.

In the time ahead, all of our navies will be called upon to do what I term "future-oriented missions." And as America has discovered of late, those missions are not always easily defined or described. You do not always find them in "textbook correct" terms. Few of these missions, despite what we might prefer, are of the "get in and get out quickly" nature. But to deal with the current world disorder, we are all going to have to be willing to share these types of burdens, either on a bilateral, allied, or multinational basis.

Along with focusing on capabilities and future-oriented missions, we in the U.S. Navy are looking at the best way to employ a solid-state, computerized, Tomahawk-equipped force, with strategies and mind-sets from the thyratron tube, slide rule, Tartar missile era. We have to break with the momentum of the past and actively explore new ways to provide today's commanders with the capabilities that they really need now, not what our predecessors deemed necessary ten or fifteen years ago.

An initiative to make a clean break with the Cold War organization became a reality on October 1st, with the establishment of a new mission for the job that I hold in the Atlantic Command. It was change borne of necessity.

USACOM, as the Atlantic Command is now referred to, is responsible for the combatant command of nearly all deployable forces here in the United States. *And*, working in close cooperation with the U.S. component commanders and supported CINCs, USACOM is now responsible for the joint training of those forces—forces that must be ready for a continuum of requests from commanders like George Gowin in Europe or Joe Horne in Southwest Asia, which will

include appeals for presence for humanitarian peace operations, for contingency response, and yes, if need be, for regional conflict.

USACOM is responsible for ensuring that forces from the continental United States are fully prepared to complement forces overseas "without skipping a beat," wherever, whenever, or however our national leadership directs.

But regardless of which service four-star has the job in the future, USACOM will be charged with realizing the full potential of America's armed forces in a *resource-efficient and operationally effective manner*.

Future major exercises will focus on joint training to train leaders from all of our services in joint operations and to evaluate and improve our joint doctrine and our tactics.

We will continue to encourage coalition training and exercising our forces, while recognizing your respective navies' capabilities and blending them with our own to provide capability across the entire maritime spectrum of operations.

And as we begin to close out the history of this past century, it is a time of both danger and opportunity. We can limit the dangers by grasping the opportunity to undertake new security approaches, and we must do this in close consultation and cooperation amongst ourselves and the governments that we all represent. In this way, we can end this century on a successful note together.

### Questions and Answers

*Admiral Miller:* I will be happy to take questions and respond to things that I have said here, or any other questions about the new organization, USACOM, that you may have read about, as well as anything else that might be on your mind.

*Derek Boothby, United Nations:* We are seeing more and more Security Council requirements for military forces to be involved in sanctions operations such as the sanctions operation in the Adriatic, the one that is now taking place off Haiti, and doubtless there will be others coming along. Could you offer us any indication of the kinds of problems that these produce in command and control, the relations of the different technologies and different capabilities in ships, and the amount of tail that is needed to support five, six, or ten ships at sea, maintaining those embargoes?

*Admiral Miller:* I will answer that question in a couple of ways. First, whenever the United Nations puts together a resolution and begins to take action in a peace operation, it is a continuum of activity that all nations need to be mindful of. The reason that I am poised for this is because I recently published from Tufts a monograph titled, *Leadership in a Transnational World: The Challenge of Keeping*

*the Peace.*<sup>1</sup> One of the things I see is that sometimes embargo operations are called for—and then there will be another step to take. That is why I would like to talk about things in a continuum of activity. When you ratchet up to peace enforcement, that is a special set of activities as opposed to the one that you mentioned. I can speak from personal experience with the maritime interdiction operations activity that we have going off Haiti right now, in which, of the four nations represented here, three have already contributed ships. The maritime environment is the easiest place to put together collective capability, because we all operate in the same sphere. There was no problem at all in setting it up. Ships joined; we trained together; we operated together. In the Adriatic right now you have maritime operations with a standing naval force of ships from the Atlantic with standing naval force ships from the Mediterranean under the WEU flag. Again, all are maritime units with different command lines, but they get the job done. There are always some problems with regard to the command and control network, because some ships are equipped with more power capabilities than others, and the demands might not all be the same. The local leaders sort through those things quickly, and from all of my observations and activity, maritime forces really prove their utility when they come together for the first time without skipping a beat. Nothing that I have witnessed was insurmountable, even when the forces were brought together in dark of night to rehearse setting up an operation. So I do not have a sign-post to flaunt that says “Hey, it’s difficult.” Usually, the most difficult part is getting the political process cleared to let the maritime units contribute. Once the maritime units get to sea, then the mission is pretty easy.

*Admiral Martinez, Chile:* The Rubik’s Cube of operations and the capabilities that you presented—how is that entered with regard for international maritime law? That’s my question.

*Admiral Miller:* This is just a simple illustration, Admiral, because when we started talking about putting capabilities together, and we started talking about different services and how to bring to the table the different capabilities, it was difficult for people to bring to mind a mental illustration of the concept. We talked about tailoring it, doing better with what we have. Some would call it doing more with less. And so all we did was come up with something that just about everybody in the world was familiar with. We acknowledged that in the time ahead the missions that the military were going to become involved in had to take into account other agencies of national government, whether they be those of the U.S. or of any other country. We had to take into account the

<sup>1</sup> Miller, Paul David. *Leadership in a Transnational World: The Challenge of Keeping the Peace*. National Security paper number 12 (Cambridge, Mass. and Washington, D.C.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Association with the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1993).



international environment, international organizations, alliances, and coalitions. Respecting all the laws in the international community, we said that if there was a mission, how best could we tap the capabilities that each of the services contributed, complement them with the agencies the international community contributed, and be able to find that set of capabilities to meet the mission, regardless of the "colors," that finally showed up. We just thought that this was a nice way of illustrating it. I have had published in the *Royal United Services Institute Journal* this month, a full, 5,000-word explanation of how we came about this and what the meanings are behind the Rubik's Cube illustration. For those of you who want to know more about what lies behind the concept, I commend it to you; it just hit the streets in London this last week.<sup>2</sup> With regard to the law, whether it be economic zone enforcement or the like, the concept is still applicable. Each nation has capabilities to draw from both military and national agencies. With reduced budgets, and with reduced numbers of units to participate, we have to find the most efficient and effective way to do the mission assigned, and this was simply a way to illustrate it.

*Rear Admiral Jean-Luc Duval, France:* Admiral Kelso talked about interoperability this morning, and when you talk about interoperability you should not limit yourself to concepts, but you also must think in terms of practical aspects. In talking about interoperability, I fear that you may end up alone because, in terms of technology, things go so fast that maybe no navy will be able to accompany your pace of evolution. At this point what do you make of your concept?

*Admiral Miller:* This is a very important question. Technology, more than ever, permits, as opposed to limits, navies of the world working together. Why do I say that? I say it because I believe that technology now permits us to capture the interoperability that Admiral Kelso was talking about, by permitting units to be able to talk and work together, to be able to use information more than ever before. The units that are not as technologically advanced as some of the other ships that they will be working with will have to concentrate on acquiring the ability to receive information and display it; that does not cost a lot. They need to have communications equipment to be able to talk; that does not cost a lot. I told the NATO ministers last summer, when they were asking the same question, that there is a capability in our system called Joint Distribution Intelligence System (JDIS). For \$75,000, which is not a great deal of money, you can put together a capability on board a ship, or in a headquarters, that makes you interoperable. That provides you lots of information. I think technology, correctly targeted, is going to help interoperability, to help bring the concepts that we all must have for the new security environment—to help bring them to

<sup>2</sup>For a more detailed explanation of this concept, Admiral Paul David Miller, U.S. Navy, "Harmonizing the Alliance with the Dynamics of Change," *The RUSI Journal*, vol. 138, no. 5 (October 1993), pp. 15-22.

the practical level to make it work, as we are going to have to make it work, in the security environment that we see ahead. So I see more opportunities, not fewer.

*Commander Hardley Lewin, Jamaica:* Admiral, the examples you draw upon in the Adriatic and in Haiti are cases where there isn't a chance of somebody firing at the vessels and forcing the embargo. But suppose that had been the scenario, would you have found it so easy, when considering things like rules of engagement with coalition forces?

*Admiral Miller:* No. Any time that you have potential for being in a hot conflict, things have to work themselves through an escrotoire process in the rules of engagement world. As a major NATO commander, I was aware of all the things that General Shalikashvili and Mike Boorda went through with regard to the rules of engagement in the Adriatic. I can report to you that even in the Haiti environment we were putting together the status of forces in the rules of engagement for the Haitian assistance group to go there. This was mainly a bilateral effort between the United States and Canada, but even those rules of engagement, when having to work them through the UN, are not easily done. It went back and forth a few times between Port au Prince, Norfolk, Ottawa, and then, New York. So, the more difficult and the more intense the potential situation, the more difficult it will be to get everybody to agree to rules of engagement. But the more opportunity we have to put on the shelf successful examples for achieving rules of engagement, such as in the Adriatic and such as we did in a limited way in Haiti, the more learning we will have to draw on and build on, regardless of the intensity of future operations. At least we have a benchmark to launch from, but we are going to have to take one case at a time.



## Cooperative Security at Sea

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Panel discussion moderated by  
Rear Admiral John R. Brigstocke, Royal Navy

**T**HIS MORNING WE WILL KICK OFF with the first of three panel sessions. The topics for the panels progress from a general overview of cooperative security at sea to a more specific focus on coordination, combined maritime operations, and finally, pinpointing the practical considerations for conducting combined maritime operations. The sessions will begin with the moderator introducing his panel members, each of whom will then give a seven to ten-minute talk or statement, followed by a question and answer period. During this question and answer period, I encourage everyone to comment on the speakers presentations, to ask questions, or to interject your own thoughts on the subject matter. We have allowed enough time to develop a dialogue on this important subject. The first panel, which will discuss cooperative security at sea, will be moderated by Rear Admiral John Brigstocke of the Royal Navy. Admiral Brigstocke was educated at Marlborough College and the Britannia Royal Naval War College, Dartmouth. As a junior officer, Rear Admiral Brigstocke served aboard frigates, destroyers, the royal yacht, and commanded the minesweeper HMS *Upton*. He also commanded HMS *Bacchante*, HMS *York*, HMS *Ark Royal*, and the Third Destroyer Squadron. Shore assignments included the Directorate of Naval Plans in the Ministry of Defence, Captain of Dartmouth, and Commander, United Kingdom Task Group. Rear Admiral Brigstocke assumed the duties of Assistant Chief of Naval Staff in September of 1993.

*Rear Admiral Brigstocke:* Admiral Kelso, fellow delegates. If I could first introduce the members of this morning's panel.

At the far end of the table, Vice Admiral Buis, Commander in Chief of the Royal Netherlands Navy—a submariner, a command veteran, an expert in personnel matters. I am sure he shares my pride in the United Kingdom–Netherlands Joint Amphibious Force, which I believe to be an example of the very closest maritime cooperation in peace as well as in potential war.

Next to him, Admiral Martinez, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Navy since March 1990, an anti-submarine specialist by background with considerable experience in command at sea, and a distinguished historian and political scientist.

Vice Admiral MacDougall, Chief of the Naval Staff of the Royal Australian Navy, has a unique background as, first, a supply officer and, then, as a submarine commanding officer. With wide command experience in the Pacific, Southeast Asia, and Indonesia, he is, of course, his country's maritime commander.

Colonel Ahmed, a graduate of this college, brings considerable multinational experience to this forum from his earliest career under training in England, and later with the Malaysia Navy, and then to Germany to bring the newly built Fast Attack Squadron back to Kuwait. In the historic events of 1990-91, he commanded the Kuwait Naval Forces in Bahrain and led his ships, as members of the multi-national coalition, against Iraq.

Finally, myself: The introduction has already been made, but I would just correct one point. As Commander, UK Task Group, I am pleased to have been one of only three seagoing admirals in the Royal Navy. I do not know whether you have the same problem, but in the media in the UK, they are currently running a theme that we have more admirals than ships, and none of them go to sea. We do have three seagoing admirals. My first Sea Lord was heard to comment the other day that perhaps they are the three doing the least work, which is not quite fair either. Before my panelists give their five to ten-minute introductions, I would like to comment on cooperative security at sea, because my last two and a half year sea-command appointment involved just that sort of cooperation, from day one to the very end of the appointment. I took over the command just as Desert Storm started and placed my carrier task group in the Mediterranean, unofficially, in the ultimate *ad hoc* arrangement under the command of Admiral Bill Owens, then commander of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. I operated, for all practical purposes, as part of the Sixth Fleet, as he had lost all his carriers to the Gulf. I finished the appointment commanding the UK Task Group in the Adriatic. It was, and remains, a national task group, but working in the very closest cooperation with the Italian Navy, with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, the Western European Union, and the U.S. and French carrier task groups. I believe that in discussion we might wish to return to the Adriatic, as it encapsulates all the problems of cooperative security, political military countries from different regions of the world, from different organizations, the interface between NATO and WEU, and so on. As part of my job also, I was responsible for all United Kingdom warships operating overseas, particularly in the Caribbean, the Far East and the Gulf. In the Caribbean, I placed my ships regularly under the tactical control of Rear Admiral George N. "Nick" Gee, Commander, Joint Task Force Four in Miami under the Caribbean Regional Security System. The RSS, I think, is a classic example of cooperation at sea against the drug trade. In the Gulf, my ships on the Armilla Patrol worked ever more closely with Admiral Douglas Katz, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command, and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. My message is that cooperative security at sea,

from my recent personal experience, is flourishing. But there are problems which I am sure the three panels will address. My intention now is that we hear all four panelists before going on to a discussion period, which I regard as a debate between the panel and the audience. In other words, if you do not ask us questions, we might ask you a few. If I could start with Admiral Buis, who will kick off the proceedings with his maritime region.

*Admiral Buis:* Admiral Martinez, Admiral Kelso, admirals, ladies and gentlemen. Before addressing my topic, The Regional Maritime Cooperation of NATO Europe, I will first go back a little bit in history. After the Second World War, a system of collective security was set up once again, but it did not prove to be very effective in the case of a serious crisis, and at that time not a hot but a cold war threatened the free world and the uninterrupted use of the sea, a *conditio sine qua non* for the recovery of a Europe in ruins. On the Western side, the situation was being brought under control by the foundation of the North Atlantic Alliance, a coalition of sixteen nations kept together by the perception of an overwhelming threat. Internally, the Alliance was controlled by a chief whip, the United States of America. The impoverished countries of western Europe recovered remarkably well, and, supported by the Marshall Plan, nations became prosperous, thanks to the undisturbed exchange of commodities across the sea.

For the first time in history, within the NATO Alliance, armed forces from a variety of countries learned to work together, to speak each other's language, to understand each other, to use the same doctrines and procedures, *etc.* They succeeded in setting up a common military infrastructure as never before seen in history. All this was achieved on a voluntary basis, directed and decided by democratically elected governments. Contrary to land forces, at sea the extent of this cooperation reached to the smallest unit possible. Ships, aircraft, marines, and submarines worked together in numerous NATO and multilaterally organized exercises in a great variety of scenarios and compositions. Standing naval forces were set up to which many of the Western countries contributed naval units, operating together in close harmony in a professional way and demonstrating NATO's coherence and resolve should the free use of the sea become at stake. Despite all the political debate in NATO—which is, undoubtedly, by no means a sign of weakness—between sovereign and democratic members of the Alliance, the achievements in the military field were enormous and have resulted in the ability to operate and to communicate together despite idiosyncracies and different languages. This ability to work together was developed under the pressure of an overwhelming enemy threat to the vital lines of communication on which the Western powers depended so heavily for their prosperity. Within the NATO area of responsibility, you might truly say that Nato brought what I call a cooperative security environment at sea for the benefit and the well-being of the Atlantic partners.

Now, the Cold War is over; the achievements of this maritime cooperative security environment are too precious to put at stake as a result of decreasing defense budgets and erosion of the cement that has kept NATO together. Although the Cold War is over and despite euphoria, chaos and disorder is spreading around the world. Ethnic and interstate violence, as well as regional, interstate crises, can easily affect the interests of our nations. This development has changed the execution of tasks of naval forces as well as the areas of interest where they will operate. The operational focus has shifted towards embargo and blockade operations, crisis management, and projection of power ashore, but we should not discard the possibility of a shooting war. At the same time, the protection of the sea lines of communication remains a primary objective, as they can easily be affected by a regional crisis or war. And those vital sea lines have become even longer in comparison with during the Cold War period.

As we have seen already, under the aegis of the United Nations or other organizations, *ad hoc* coalitions have been formed, and the ability of maritime forces to operate together in close harmony has been put to the test. Whatever the common thread was, the ability to form a credible fighting force has been made possible for the navies of the Alliance only by years of experience gained within the NATO framework during the Cold War period. In this context, from a professional point of view, it is worrisome to note that in Europe there has been a development and even a competition between a variety of organizations to set up their own military networks, although they lack funding and manpower to build an effective and credible military instrument to underpin their communications, their declarations, and their memorandums. Ironically, on the one hand, these developments towards a so-called European defense identity are being furthered by the United States, and on the other hand, they are being criticized as being detrimental to the NATO alliance.

There is another reason for the navies of Western Europe and North America to avoid drifting apart. As practically all navies are facing cuts in their budgets, the only way to maintain the high professional standards achieved will be to coordinate and to calibrate carefully the most efficient use and deployment of the scarce resources available. This applies to ships, aircraft, and marines as well as to infrastructure and support facilities. In particular, for the smaller navies, it is going to be tough in the future to retain and to develop all the means needed for a navy in which all elements of naval warfare are present and practiced at a high level of professionalism. As a commander-in-chief, I see it as my duty to retain a balanced fleet, providing my politicians a maximum of options, wherever asked for, pending the situation. So far, as we have seen in recent years, frequent calls upon the navies are being made to provide all sorts of assets, including submarines, to contribute to a variety of naval operations deemed necessary to deal with the new evolving security situation in the world.

Despite all of the discussions about political integration in Europe and a wish to formulate a common foreign and defense policy for the foreseeable future, it will be up to the various sovereign governments to decide whether or not maritime units will be made available for the multinational task units or forces. Whenever this is done, it is imperative that they be able to form a credible and capable force that is ready to operate together, also in the circumstances of a shooting war. Whether you call future operations peacekeeping, peace enforcement, crisis management or whatever, the policies of countries or international organizations will be credible only when they are being supported by adequate, well-tailored, capable, and flexible military means. At sea, this can be achieved only by naval units who have experience in operating together at high standards and are being directed by a sound and clear command and control organization, where the communications and the information exchange systems ensure the required connectivity. If this is not the case, and many times it is not, although it looks nice and shiny, these forces can easily become a nuisance to each other. Facing this challenge is, in my opinion, a common interest of the NATO partners. This can be guaranteed by the cooperative maritime security which was achieved during the years of the Cold War and can bear fruit in the years ahead of us.

It cannot be denied that, with the conclusion of the Cold War, the United Nations has seen a revival. To optimists, finally the era of collective security has arrived, but the results are not very hopeful so far. In particular, in heavy weather, as we see now in Yugoslavia and Somalia, *etc.*, the perceptions of the participating countries in UN operations are quite different. In particular also, when it comes to shooting situations, governments and parliaments are not sharing each others' views, and the cost-tolerance factors vary considerably between the different countries. But when an *ad hoc* coalition is being formed from nations of the Atlantic Alliance, to which my country belongs, it will be one of the achievements of NATO that enables such a coalition to operate as an effective force. This achievement must be preserved in order to generate what I have called cooperative security at sea. For the future, although it is not in my realm, I would like to see significantly greater flexibility of maritime forces and the use of common procedures, handbooks, command-to-control facilities, as have been practiced in NATO or possibly other multilateral and regional alliances, gradually being made available to the United Nations. In this way, the UN will be allowed to play a more effective role in preventing hostilities or in enforcing sanctions.

*Admiral Martinez:* Admiral Kelso, fellow admirals, delegates, ladies and gentlemen. The viewpoints that I will set forth do not represent a collective vision, but one of the many approaches that could exist *vis-à-vis* the problem that has been raised. I have found it difficult to translate exactly what you seek with the term "security cooperation at sea." The term, when translated into Spanish, does not represent the idea exactly. The subject necessarily has a political component



that falls within the scope of our political leaders, a subject which cannot be avoided without distorting the context of the ideas. That is, it always serves as a framework for our ideas. Having made these clarifications, I would like to get into the subject, specifying that everything that is said, in the long run, refers to the fact that through these actions we should not impinge on international maritime law when agreements are reached by the United Nations.

The reality of the world today makes it necessary to reject previous concepts as to the existence of a single threat and, in its place, to guide our thinking toward imagining the nature of conflicts that foreseeably could affect international security and peace within a framework of multipolar power in the millennium that approaches. The over-exploitation of ocean spaces, the use of the sea as a place to dump polluting substances, interdiction of maritime communications that could be carried out by maritime powers outside of our region are, among other things, the challenges that our navies should work on in a coordinating fashion to try to avoid or to counteract through effective surveillance and control of the sea.

There has been a lot of speculation in this last decade of the century as to the importance of establishing new roles for our navies and what should be expected from navies for the third millennium. However, in maritime matters, there are a great many constants that condition the use of force and which are, of course, unchanging: the means, that is, the ocean and geography. On the other hand, the variables are men and their ideas, ships, and circumstances. At the same time, we must remember that one characteristic of our navies is versatility in adapting to threats. The disappearance of the former Soviet Union has also generated processes that question the roles and the functions of the armed forces. Contrary to what some may have thought, the reason for our navies' existence did not come from that threat or from any single threat in particular, but rather from the need to maintain the existence, identity, and interests of the nations that we each serve. In this regard, I should point out that the members of the navies of the South American continent have common qualities that contribute to strengthening a system of continental security. Professionally, we have a similar strategic conception, and our procedures, both operational and tactical, are born from the same sources. We know the sea, and we appreciate the vital importance that it has for the national security of our respective countries. Each one of us is committed to the defense of the maritime interests that are found in, born in, and developed in the sea. So, our capability for collective action is potentially present. The magnitude and composition of our respective navies is determined and structured by an unavoidable operational and organic need, designed to counteract the threats that affect the vital interests of our nation, always within a framework that is designed to create and to maintain an atmosphere of international peace and tranquility. Only a high degree of capability and operational readiness of naval forces that participate in collective security

missions will produce the deterrent or compulsive effects that are sought before potential aggressors and will provide the conditions of peace and stability to which our community aspires.

At the present time, we can think of achieving peace and economic progress in our community through international cooperation. The situation, transferred to the maritime scene, is what we understand and call "cooperative security at sea," which is nothing less than replacing arms struggle with cooperation, in the complete sense of the word, in order to achieve the same objectives. Cooperative security operations at sea represents a shared effort of the various navies that get together to seek imaginative solutions to threats to the security of freedom and peace. Carrying out the political will of our rulers in this way authorizes us to apply the force provided by the threatening use of arms or by the direct use of arms. The crystalization of this shared cooperative effort can be expressed in many ways, but undoubtedly one of the most important is the one that deals with technological exchanges between partners in a shared enterprise. Only by maintaining our naval forces technologically up to date, with modern and efficient units and weapons systems, with a good offensive capability to operate efficiently with other navies and a proven logistical capacity, can we aspire to deter threats to our common interests. We visualize certain activities that should be intensified in order to increase this cooperation. Among them: combined exercises; inter-American, intercontinental and world war games; bilateral and multilateral war games; exchange of observers in various naval areas; seminars and symposia on naval and maritime subjects of common interest; exchange of training courses at a war college level; exchange of students between naval schools and academies at various levels; exchange of senior and mid-rank officers in operational units. This cooperative security, in every case, should watch over the protection of the freedoms of the respective peoples and of their own sovereignty and territorial integrity. We must avoid the dangerous trend to utilize the force that this collective entity gathers together against the vital political interests of a state, by introducing a temporary variation of international maritime law, which in the long run, can totally destroy it and under which equality among states would be a utopia.

Going into further detail, I will try to define the subject in the light of the United Nations' trend to require member states to use force to effect changes of policies during international or internal situations of conflict. Cooperative security is achieved as these units, which come from different cultural, matériel and equipment backgrounds, form a naval force operating with common standards of operational conduct, procedures, and language, with command and criterion unity. In this unity of force, the political will of each state will contribute its navy to the task, making it possible to obtain results in the maritime field that will contribute to the achievement of the ultimate objectives set forth by the United Nations. The following subjects should be discussed in considering collective action of navies.

First, what is the naval task in the maritime field that the United Nations seeks? Awareness of this task would lead to determining the contribution of force that each participating state will make. As a commander in chief, I have the obligation to explain the viewpoint that is applied by international maritime law on the political and strategic interaction levels. It is particularly important to understand the limitations in international maritime law which exact respect as a first priority. This analysis leads to the rules of conduct of the naval force and, once the hostilities break out, the rules of engagement.

Second, unified command, quickness in decision making, and action. Who should command this force? What should be its prerogatives and limitations? How long should the person stay in that position? What should be the rotation among those who are participating in this task in order to achieve the objective that has been laid forth?

Third, logistical dependence. What will be our logistical dependence? Will it be individual or collective? What will be the distribution of the load, the cost, and the payment that this represents?

Fourth point, arbitration of conflicts within the force. What references should be adopted to resolve differences of criteria among the participating commands, especially regulations? How do we protect the independence of each participating naval force? What will be the civil-military interaction within the force in handling a crisis situation? How should the force be handled, as far as the concept and the scope of the means are concerned, in cases when one or more participants withdraw or separate because of internal conflicts?

*Vice Admiral MacDougall:* Admiral Kelso, fellow delegates, ladies and gentlemen. When considering regional cooperation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, it is important to remember that these areas are vast and complex. The area is not homogenous, thus, the topic requires examination of a number of sub-regions, each with its own complexities and potential for dispute, perhaps conflict, and certainly, misunderstanding. In my brief presentation today, I hope to leave you with a view of why cooperation is important in these oceans, how it is being managed, and what the future might hold.

For the sake of geographic neatness, I will begin in the Indian Ocean. My feeling is that more could be done to foster cooperation in the Indian Ocean region. Nevertheless, there is a growing awareness of the need to be more involved in the Indian Ocean, especially inasmuch as the sea lines of communication through that ocean are vital in world trade terms. It is worth noting that 60 percent of the world's oil supplies are located in the Persian Gulf, and a huge volume of these supplies and other trade crosses the Indian Ocean, including for instance, 30 percent of my country's trade. The Australian decision to base up to half its fleet on the west coast is evidence of the importance placed in maintaining a presence in the Indian Ocean. While this move puts us nearer our

primary interests in Southeast Asia, it will also allow us to focus more clearly on Indian Ocean security.

A start has been made on cooperation with a number of naval exercises. India, for example, has had bilateral exercises with both the United States Navy and the Australian Navy and is also seeking support for multilateral regional exercises. Visits by senior naval officers have also taken place between Australia and India and between India and Indonesia. Significantly, we have senior officers from both the Indian and Pakistani navies attending a major international conference, which is titled "Australia's Maritime Bridge into Asia," in Sydney next week. They will also present papers at a one-day seminar on "Maritime Security in the Indian Ocean" in Perth next Monday.

Given the size of the Indian Ocean and the political, economic, and cultural diversity of its littoral states, the foreseeable future is unlikely to bring speedy developments in maritime cooperation. That said, there are some positive signs, but in general, efforts towards regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean will be characterized by continuing visits by ships and senior officers and patient development of bilateral exercise programs.

Turning to Southeast Asia, lying between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, we encounter confined waters characterized by some of the busiest shipping routes in the world, a number of vital straits and choke points, many disputed territorial and boundary claims, and two of the world's major archipelagos. All in all, it is a region of great maritime complexity.

The complex nature of the region has now prompted a growing appreciation for the need for regional maritime cooperation. Again, SLOC security is central to the need for improved maritime cooperation as the expanding economies of East and Southeast Asia depend heavily on seaborne trade. Hence, there is a desire for peaceful resolution of the territorial and boundary disputes which involve all the ASEAN states as well as Vietnam, Cambodia, and China.

Necessarily, law of the sea issues are dominant, particularly in the Malacca and Singapore Straits and in the archipelagic waters of Indonesia and the Philippines. Freedom of navigation is a concern for the major maritime powers, while the coastal states have an understandable desire to manage or control shipping, if only for reasons of safety or environmental security. The Law of the Sea Declaration of Archipelagic and Transit Passage Rights has eased concerns over restrictions to freedom of passage, but the problem of "creeping jurisdiction" remains. It poses a challenge for maritime cooperation within the region.

Environmental and resources security are also fertile grounds for maritime cooperation. This is especially so in consideration of the potential for environmental disaster in the confined and disputed waters predominant in the region and in recognition of the reliance of some states on offshore resources—notably oil, gas, and fish.

The recent and ongoing growth in regional maritime forces underlines the growing need for cooperation in the region. Unless the growth is accepted as contributing to regional security—as it is claimed, at present—it could prove destabilizing and be the spark for an arms race.

Despite a longstanding wariness of multilateralism in security issues, there are signs that some Southeast Asian nations are prepared to take a more collective approach to security issues of a humanitarian nature. Broader military relations, and particularly exercises, are essentially of a bilateral nature, except for the Five Power Defense Arrangement, and I believe they are likely to remain so, at least for the medium term.

Maritime cooperation is also evident in the extensive bilateral training programs in the region. As well, there is an ongoing schedule of reciprocal visits by the senior officers and ships of regional navies. These have become commonplace within Southeast Asia.

Worthy of note, too, is the arrangement for Indonesian and Australian coordinated surveillance and information-sharing in the Timor Sea Joint Development Zone. Although it took many years to put this treaty in place, it stands as an example to those in the region who face similar jurisdictional problems. Of course, not all such disputes will be resolved in this way.

The future pattern of maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia will reflect the slowly maturing consensus that more cooperation is the only practical solution to a number of otherwise intractable, territorial problems. Despite this, the different security perceptions of local states will mean that multilateral activities will evolve with a very measured tread.

Future maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia is likely to reflect a continuing desire to build on emerging relationships. More joint patrolling is a possibility as is a greater sharing of surveillance information, all of which could lead to something approaching collective security. But for some time yet, territorial and resource claims (especially in the South China Sea) as well as law of the sea issues, will retain a capacity for creating tensions.

I would like to finish with a quick look at the Pacific Ocean. Like the Indian Ocean, the Pacific is a vast expanse, but it differs in that it is dotted with many small island nations or microstates. SLOC security is much less a problem in this region where the primary motivation for maritime cooperation revolves around reducing the region's substantial economic dependence on foreign aid. These microstates have Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) which are huge compared to their landmasses and often provide virtually the only potential for resource-based development.

Until very recently, the microstates had no national capacity to protect their EEZ resources. This is changing with the implementation of a number of cooperative measures. One of the most significant of these measures being the

acquisition of patrol boats by various island states. There have also been bilateral exercises between nations to refine the patrol crafts' operating procedures.

Both Australia and New Zealand supplement island-state patrol and surveillance with regular air surveillance flights as well as patrol craft and other ship deployments. The effectiveness of these measures is ensured by the NIUE treaty on cooperation in fisheries surveillance and law enforcement in the South Pacific. This treaty is unique in that it allows the authorities of one consenting state to enforce the laws of another in that state's territorial sea or archipelagic waters.

The future pattern of maritime cooperation in the Pacific, and the South Pacific especially, will probably remain much the same as it is now, given that in the short term most of the microstates are unlikely to improve their economic positions to the extent that they will be able to forego substantial external help. Consequently, resource protection will continue to command regional attention.

One problem which could tax maritime cooperation is the yet to be quantified effect of global warming. Rising sea levels associated with global warming could threaten the very existence of some of these low lying nations. It could also, therefore, reduce the extent of national EEZs and the availability of resources. This would have drastic implications for the economic future of the nations concerned.

In this very broad sweep across three vast and complex maritime regions, I would like to think that I have demonstrated that the need for maritime cooperation is appreciated and that it is being acted upon, noting the need for attention to national sensitivities. Further, I believe that those of us in these regions are alert to the potential for future problems to disturb the relative stability that we now enjoy and are conscious of the vital part that maritime cooperation can play in preventing, containing, or solving these problems.

*Colonel Ahmed Al-Mullah:* Good morning, distinguished colleagues, it is indeed a pleasure and an honor to be able to address you this morning. As the Commander of the Kuwait Naval Force and a resident of the Arabian Peninsula, I am vitally aware of the importance of the interdependence of regional security and maritime cooperation. The safety and security of my children and all the children of the Arabian Gulf depend on these two closely related concepts and goals.

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, maritime cooperation and regional security obviously remain in the forefront of all Gulf naval leaders' thoughts and concerns. Our concerns include strategic considerations such as our large non-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors and recent future offensive weapons acquisition programs that they have and may embark on. Of particular concern are the inevitable post-United Nations sanctions and the arms buildup that Iraq

is likely to pursue. Of equal concern are the near term or more tactical considerations, if you will. These tactical considerations run the gamut from maintaining freedom of navigation with limited assets in the face of state-of-the-art offensive missiles and submarines to the current fledging status of our regional maritime coalitions, which need enhanced command, control, communications, and intelligence effectiveness; to real-time requirements to develop coalition Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs); to obtaining NATO tactical publications; and, of course, to continuing the current maritime interception operations in support of the UN sanctions against Iraq.

Current regional initiatives to enhance security and cooperation include the U.S. Navy-sponsored Gulf Maritime Commanders Conference, which is held every three months; extensive bilateral and trilateral naval exercise programs which enhance security and cooperation in numerous ways; GCC mutual training and exercises; joint war games, including command-post exercises; ongoing visits, boarding, search and seizure training throughout the region to assist in the UN sanction required in maritime interception operations; and finally, joint submarine surveillance and antisubmarine warfare training programs. Regional proposals to further enhance security and maritime cooperation are numerous and address many areas for new initiatives: improved data-sharing between the multinational naval forces and the GCC naval force; increasing defensive assets in the Gulf; continuing to press for the release of NATO tactical publications to GCC forces.

In summary, long-term regional security in the Arabian Gulf is vitally dependent on building a strong maritime coalition. Developing a cooperative, coalition-based strategy, on a defensive posture, is essential to long-term peace in the Arabian Gulf.

*Rear Admiral Brigstocke:* The panel has achieved the first bit of cooperative security this morning in completing their dissertations exactly on time, for which I thank them very much. My remit from the War College to keep the panelists' opening remarks to a maximum of ten minutes each was unequivocal and pretty threatening.

Gentlemen, I will try, very briefly, to sum up the key points which I believe the panelists have made. First of all, the continuing and undiminished importance of the sea. First, in terms of trade, we have had the example of 60 percent of the world's oil from the Gulf, 30 percent of Australia's trade transiting the Indian Ocean, and, of course, in Europe, 95 percent of trade is seaborne. We have been reminded that Southeast Asia has the busiest shipping lanes in the world, as well as food and mineral resources. The interesting point in the Pacific is that, there, many states have huge exclusive economic zones compared to their landmass. To the importance of the sea, I would like to add one thought of my own, which is the concept of leverage, very much in line with the U.S. Navy's new doctrine

in . . . *From the Sea*. There is an apposite quote, I believe from Dudley Knox in his book on *The Naval Genius of George Washington*. Knox quoted George Washington, "the supreme test of the naval strategist is the depth of his comprehension of the intimate relation between sea power and land power and of the truth that basically all effort afloat should be directed at an effect ashore." There are two points to this. First is the support of the land battle from afloat, and second is the protection of the sea lines of communication. It may be of interest to some that the headquarters, alone, of the allied rapid reaction corps in NATO, which obviously has contingency plans to go to Yugoslavia, requires the whole of the UK amphibious lift capability plus the chartering of numerous merchant ships even to get it there. This is a point, I believe, that our land compatriots often forget. Secondly, the need for cooperation. As to the increasing threat, the Gulf is probably the best example where there is an expanding maritime threat from non-GCC countries: regional instability, territorial claims, piracy, drugs, and pollution. There is a need for additional cooperation because of increasing UN involvement and the expansion of regional agreements. And there is an accelerating need, financial and political, for burden-sharing.

Third, examples of established cooperation. NATO, highly effective through the leadership of the United States, has the chief whip. It is a common military structure of procedures as never before seen in military history. There are numerous other examples, many of which the panelists have mentioned. The Maritime Commanders' Conference in the Gulf, the Five Power Defense Arrangement, UNITAS, the NIEU, the Indonesian-Australian Cooperation in the Timor Sea and associated exercises and surveillance. The point has also been made that we have one great advantage at sea, that is, cooperation down to unit level is a routine activity. The romantic British would describe it as the brotherhood of the sea.

Fourth, the problem areas, and there is no point in pretending that there are not some. This panel is concerned with the conceptual level of debate and later panels will discuss in depth the problems of LINK, C2, Rules of Engagement, and so on. But at the conceptual level, there is the difficulty, first, of achieving agreement of common objectives and, secondly, of different perceptions of vital interests. Thirdly, there is the problem of control and delegation, and fourthly, maritime law and ROE. In the military sphere, there are difficulties, for example, the competition between a variety of organizations to set up their own military networks, despite the absence of funding or manpower. And again, I would add one of my own: readiness for war-fighting. The use of multinational task groups is growing, but how do you achieve task-group readiness when many of the ships have never operated together before? We have been fortunate, I believe, in recent cooperative security ventures to have a long buildup to the actual period of hostilities. If we are ever faced with fighting in short order, I believe this could be a significant weakness. There are also the problems and advantages of



technology, inter-operability, war gaming, exchanges of personnel, training and logistics.

That, I hope, summarizes the main points that the panel has made. We now have forty-five minutes for discussion between you and the panel. An initial theme that might be worth pursuing is "the top-level command and control of cooperative security missions." In DESERT STORM, with great effect, we had a United States-led *ad hoc* coalition with UN approval. In former Yugoslavia, we have a UN operation, using NATO as one of its agencies and using NATO command and control, without which certainly the air and maritime operations could not, in my judgment, proceed at all. We also have the NATO-WEU compromise, an interface which took months to broker, works effectively, but did not work in the initial phases of the operation. So what is the optimum model for top-level C<sup>2</sup> in operations of this sort in the future? The panel would welcome both views from the floor on which we may comment and specific questions from the audience. If I could make a final bid again to keep this at the conceptual level—in order to avoid taking away the beat from the other two panels' deliberations later today and tomorrow. We, of course, have a United Nations' representative in the audience. I do not know whether I can encourage him to start the ball rolling on how we should conduct operations in concert with the UN.

### Discussion

*Derek Boothby, United Nations:* Thank you very much for this invitation and thank you for the presentations that we have had. In this matter of command and control, certainly we are finding it an issue in the United Nations as more and more operations take place. Of course, most of our operations are land operations, but there is a steady and increasing need for naval ones. Command and control is a very difficult issue to address. We find different national attitudes to command and control. We find difficulties between the ideas, the concepts, and the practices of effective military forces, even within such organizations as NATO. When they are put into a United Nations context, then we do indeed come against difficulties of our own. We have problems over the military situations which need quick reaction in often difficult circumstances, and have to go up through a multinational political tree. So it comes up, through the Secretary General's special representative in an area, perhaps to the Secretary General himself, and one needs to keep operational matters out of the hands of the Security Council, because you can not get quick answers and quick action from such a political body on these kinds of issues.

We have found difficulties in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have found particular difficulties in Somalia. There were not quite the same problems in Cambodia, but all these three operations, each of them, have involved over 25,000 troops

and two of them have naval side operations going on. So, I would very much like to hear, either from the panel or from members of the audience, any particular thoughts that they might have in the way that these things can move forward. The one thing about Bosnia is that NATO is there with established NATO command and control. If we start doing operations, as are likely to happen in other parts of the world, we will simply not have that advantage and we should be even further back in trying to resolve some of these issues. I will have things to say later on this afternoon about encouraging regional thinking on these matters, but any thoughts that anyone has to contribute on these issues, I would be very grateful to hear.

*Rear Admiral Duval, French Navy:* I would like to talk about the concepts raised by Admiral Brigstocke. Admiral Buis said that we should be in a position to furnish the right means to the politicians. In the past, in the situation of the Cold War, it was easy. The political decisions were made very quickly, in case of military aggression from the East. We had to defend ourselves and do so quickly. Now, the situation is very different. We go through a period of risk and uncertainty and we do not know exactly what to do. It is a situation of uncertainty. These days, interventions are carried out on an *ad hoc* basis and they are carried out in terms of political interests that are defined collectively. This is what we saw in the Gulf with the coalition forces that operated there. It is on this basis, of common political interest, that our politicians now make the decisions. In other words, the decision-making process is much longer, but for us seafarers, this, of course, gives us the time to deploy the naval forces, if they have not been prepositioned in this case. I think that it is in the light of this system of defining objectives and common political interests that we must consider the role of naval forces today. In Europe, we have established a system of political, monetary, and economic cooperation with common security interests. The recent creation of the European Corps and the maritime force that we put in the Mediterranean, of course, are all symbols of this cooperation. Europe must now define a space for collective security. This must not be done against NATO, in a negative fashion, but rather in a positive fashion for Europe. I think that we Europeans must present to the world and to the other regional security zones an example of cooperation among nations.

*Admiral W. D. Smith, U.S. Navy:* Some time ago General Shalikashvili, as SACEUR, made the observation that, unlike the past two hundred years where sovereignty was supreme and much respected as a national asset, under the United Nations we have recently legally intervened in national sovereignty issues because of grave humanitarian concerns. That intervention, in the cause of humanitarian issues, into another nation's sovereign space has changed the rules by which military forces deploy and operate. So Shalikashvili made the

observation that, under this new UN mandate to violate sovereignty, by consensus of the other members of the UN or the decision-making body, we have entered into a new era of warfare. So, I would like to ask the panelists, starting with Admiral Martinez, how he sees this concept affecting his view—the South American view—of the primacy of the law of the sea in conducting naval operations. We know, for example, that the UN specifically authorized NATO and WEU operations within the territorial waters of the former Yugoslavia for the purposes of enforcing the embargo. That is an interesting context in which to place our traditional view of the law of the sea. Perhaps, other panel members would like to join in.

*Admiral Martinez:* The problem, I believe, is framed in the ideas that Admiral Duval set forth, that there is an *ad hoc* intervention. Each case is different, but one would have to think, and in this I am thinking out loud here, how frequent are these *ad hoc* situations? How are we modifying our conduct, without a true agreement from all the parties involved? How are we truly changing the law of the sea? Up to what point does the UN permit this violation? Up to what point can one anticipate that, before an *ad hoc* situation, you can intercept a third flag country. The third problem is how can we define in the future what exactly a humanitarian situation is? When it is atmospheric it is quite clear, but from the information that I have, the country affected has always been consulted if that country wishes action to be taken. So, the concept of equal status of countries under law has always been present.

*Vice Admiral MacDougall:* I would like to relate this issue to Mr. Boothby's question of whether there are any suggestions for the United Nations. Admiral Martinez has just been talking about the uncertainties of *ad hoc* arrangements. Each of the humanitarian cases that we have been dealing with in the last few years has been different, and I suspect that all future cases will be different from one another. Mr. Boothby knows that there has been some criticism, just or unjust, of the rigor of the planning at the strategic level. We would like to think (we, the military that are engaged in these exercises) that the rigor of our planning at the operational level is pretty good, that it has to be good, particularly for coalition arrangements, and that what is lacking is the rigor of this planning at the strategic level in the UN to come to grips with these factors. I mean, that is almost a response to your call for suggestions. This area really needs beefing up, because we have got an imbalance between the two, and that is making it difficult, and it will be difficult in the future for us to cope on an *ad hoc* basis. You might care to respond.

*Mr. Boothby:* Yes. The answer is, yes, we do need better planning. I have worked in the United Nations for fifteen years and, for most of that time, the only military

staff that we had in the United Nations was a major general and about three military officers. At that time, we did not have many peacekeeping operations happening. We have now had this huge explosion in the number of operations, and yet we have scarcely increased our planning staff. We do have more seconded military officers available now, but the fact is, you are quite right. Each and every operation is different. It is different from its predecessor, and every new one that comes up is different again. We find that you cannot translate everything that you have learned from one operation to the next. So in fact, in my view, we need not more standing UN forces—that would be quite wrong—but certainly there should be a consistent planning staff within the United Nations to assist the Secretary General when the political people come up with ideas and resolutions for military operations. If I may say, some of the resolutions the Security Council adopts are ridiculous, because the troops in the field and the forces simply do not have the resources to carry them out. One way of keeping their feet on the ground would be if we had a multidisciplinary staff, not just army, but an army and navy and air force combined planning staff, which would be able to identify some of these problems—to do as Admiral Buis mentioned, get some of these procedural, tactical documents and signal documents published, to help the small navies and the small armies understand what is going on. I think that would be very useful and anything that can be done, in an audience of senior officers like this, to encourage your respective governments to move in that direction or to think in that direction will be much appreciated.

*Vice Admiral MacDougall:* I think you would probably agree that there is a very significant time imperative to this. There is a great risk that people will be disinclined to commit resources to UN peacekeeping operations whilst there is this lack of planning at the level we have just been talking about. I think there is a time imperative to this which is very significant.

*Rear Admiral Brigstocke:* Can I ask Colonel Ahmed to give his view? He has obviously had the direct experience of a coalition operation in high-intensity war.

*Colonel Ahmed:* I think, in this case, what happened in the Gulf as we see there, was a quick reaction made by the UN. Then, the U.S. just took the lead and formed the coalition. Moving from there, the forces faced most of the problems together, under one command, being led to a clear objective in the Gulf. This made things not quite so difficult. Some difficulties arose in command and control during the Gulf operation, but this, I think, with the U.S. leading the forces, actually disappeared by the time of the operations, and command and control was achieved in a quick and a proper way. Perhaps political leaders will consider that violation of seas during operations in areas such as the Gulf might

actually be negligible in light of the important objectives to be achieved. What we see after the war is that we still, as a small nation, missed being activated within the coalition, on a full-scale, detailed basis, because we did not have the full current procedures and means of communication which could have put us in the right aspect of the current, full-time operations.

*Commander D.L.W. Sim, Royal Navy:* I would like to ask the panel and the audience if they believe that maritime cooperation would be better served by revival of the MSC (Military Staff Committee) to deal with such dynamics as objectives, command, ROE, plans, and training.

*Rear Admiral Brigstocke:* Admiral Buis?

*Vice Admiral Buis:* Yes, I want to think a little about it.

*Rear Admiral Brigstocke:* Who would comment from the audience, who does not need to think? I thought the commander in chief from Germany wanted to say something.

*Vice Admiral Boehmer, German Navy:* Yes, I think we all feel that with the development of NATO's command structure there is an authority missing with maritime knowledge, which is required, especially in the field of leading forces in a crisis operation. ROE, for instance, is a very important thing in that context. Yes, we, all around the North Atlantic, regret that we do not have that maritime voice as loud as we would like to have it.

I had raised my hand originally in order to make another point, if I may, to Admiral Buis. Being your neighbor, I could not agree more on all of what you said about NATO. I share your skepticism concerning the hastily put-together coalition forces, especially maritime forces, and I also share your viewpoint that NATO, as an integrated military and political instrument, is too precious be put away. We have seen and will see again this instrument used, and possibly by the United Nations at a future point in time. It is not only since we have had CNN that public opinion has played a major role in any conflict; unless you have public opinion on your side, you are probably bound to fail in your military operations. Therefore, legitimacy is a very important thing, and I feel that in future crisis situations NATO members will be very reluctant to make a decision unless they are sure of the legitimacy of what is to be done. In this context, I think the United Nations will play a major role in giving legitimacy to a policy that may include military force. Now, if that is the case, and I can see that Admiral Buis is approaching that, I feel that it must be required that this precious instrument of NATO be open to include other flags, especially for the sake of legitimacy. Though you are still thinking, Admiral Buis, may I ask, was your proposal that

NATO make procedures, signal books, and other things available? And if you could, would you propose the idea of on-call membership or case-by-case membership in NATO? If a country wants to join in, for instance in the situation as we have it in the Adriatic Sea, could it have a seat on the military committee for only the time of the operation and have all the procedures and signal books and STANAGS available so that the force that country sends could participate?

*Vice Admiral Buis:* Thank you very much, Admiral, I was still thinking, but I would like to come back to your question. First, I want to address the Commander, because if a commander asks a couple of admirals a question, and nobody can think of an answer, there is something wrong. What does MSC mean? That is my question, first. So, tell me a little bit more about your question and then I can answer you.

*Commander Sim:* The Military Staff Committee (MSC) is the body established to advise and assist the Security Council on matters relating to military requirements. It is the support body to the Security Council — to provide this strategic level interface between the political and the military formulation of mandates in the discussion of ROE. The committee has been moribund due to the Cold War set-up for so many years.

*Vice Admiral Buis:* Right, Sorry about my lack of knowledge. I do not have a very clear answer to that, but as far as this discussion up until now is concerned, it is absolutely clear that there is a gap in understanding. It has already been said that in the field of planning we need more military men in New York on a higher level and the UN representative has agreed with this. That means that if there is more military influence in the United Nations headquarters, there will be more influence from the military on the people who are responsible for the decisions. That is all I can say about it.

Admiral, we neighbors, we always stick together. We discussed my speech, so you stick to your word: you were to agree with me, today. Thank you; it is the only time you agree with me. Yes, I think that whether we will have new members in NATO is not for us to decide. We have seen Travemünde; we see the next summit, and that is politics. I do not know anything about politics, but one thing is for sure, and that is being in Western Europe, being a NATO member, a very loyal NATO member, being everywhere from Haiti to Cambodia to the Atlantic, we run into more and more countries who are not NATO members and we still have to cooperate. It is difficult to operate with non-NATO members. I heard yesterday in the seminar discussion that everything went smoothly in certain cases. Then, we heard about the transfer of personnel by helicopter and by boat and that sort of thing that can be done easily. But I am talking about catching submarines and making integrated operations up on the

decks and that sort of thing. I think doing that without the proper procedures, without proper handbooks, without proper training is almost impossible. Therefore, I think I disagree with the representative of the United Nations that it is not a matter for our governments primarily. I think it is primarily a matter for us here, in this conference hall, that somehow we put our heads together and start thinking about how we can cooperate more than just saying that we want to cooperate, but make the means available to really cooperate. That means that we should operate widely. I am talking about NATO, because that was my naval life—but there may be other coalitions possible. When there are handbooks, let's look into the matter. It cannot really be a problem to issue NATO handbooks about replenishment and to give them to all other countries who are in the neighborhood. Mine warfare, you name it, all those books are really needed. To operate widely, we will, in the future, need to be able to cooperate not only NATO with NATO forces, but NATO forces will need to cooperate with people from Malaysia and Indonesia, and those countries. We will operate together in the future, so let us prepare. There is, I think, the means for us here to create a coalition to do something about these ordinary, down-to-earth matters, without which we cannot operate.

*Rear Admiral Brigstocke:* I will come back to Mr. Boothby in a minute, who I know wants to speak again. If I could just pick up a couple of points. I think we have got to be extremely careful about *ad hoc*-ary; it works extremely well when there is no shooting. When the shooting starts, it could be lethal. If I could just give a personal example. I was authorized in the Adriatic to provide my sea harriers and the Sea Skua-armed Lynx aircraft to support the NATO embargo operation and to provide surface combat air patrol. The trouble is that when the aircraft took off from my carrier, they were under UK national rules of engagement, which differed markedly from the NATO rules of engagement for the embargo operation. So, in mid-flight, with twenty-two year old, highly inexperienced, gung-ho pilots in the cockpit, those aircraft changed their ROE and changed their commander, halfway between me and flying over the force, just off the Montenegrin coast. These are the sort of things which, in war, could, I believe, cause chaos and disaster.

Picking up the C-in-C from Germany's point, that one solution to this would be, if I understood him correctly, temporary membership in NATO by participating countries and using NATO procedures, I would be very interested in views from non-NATO countries, bearing in mind that in the Adriatic for a long time now, on land, many of the forces have been from non-NATO countries. Do those sort of countries support the use of NATO as an agency for the UN, as maybe the only means of applying the necessary command and control in the right time scale, or is it a concept they are uncomfortable with? I do not know

if Malaysia would like to comment; I know they are sending troops to Yugoslavia, for example.

*Vice Admiral Shariff:* I have one point, which is about cooperation at sea. I foresee in the future that most of the navies will be involved in combined operations under the umbrella of the United Nations. This would mean in operations for peacekeeping, peace enforcement and humanitarian operations. To do these operations you need doctrine or operating procedures. To me, these procedures are really nothing secret and they can actually be developed and issued to most of the navies in the world. It is not really very difficult to develop this doctrine. There should be an agency, either at the United Nations or among the navies of the world, which should try to develop these so that we will be able to cooperate at sea, in the future, to carry out the UN role. I foresee this as the most important role we have to play. In the more complicated role, I do not think the UN would undertake such a role (which Admiral Buis was mentioning about hunting submarines and things like that), although it may come in the future. That would certainly confine the job to the navies that have the means to do it, but overall, most of the navies would be involved in these three main roles: peacekeeping, peace enforcement and, perhaps, the humanitarian role. So, we should develop the SOP for that. As to using NATO doctrine for the non-member countries, I support that idea. Yesterday at the Western Pacific regional committee, we discussed the idea for NATO to release some of the non-secret doctrine for the use of other navies.

*Vice Admiral MacDougall:* Without trying to get into the work of other panels, I would add another dimension to having common doctrine. Admiral Mauz, yesterday, was talking about the fact that technology is becoming cheaper, and we need to take advantage of that. You need to add, I think, to the common doctrine, the ability to pass technical data in real-time terms between the participating units in a coalition. Otherwise, the operational contribution, particularly in a shooting circumstance, will become meaningless. So, I think you have to put those two things together as doctrine.

*Rear Admiral Brigstocke:* Before we come back to Mr. Boothby on this overall issue, would anybody else, again particularly from other-than-NATO countries, like to comment on the two alternative models of an operation like Desert Storm, led by the United States with United Nations approval, or a United Nations operation using NATO or any other organization, perhaps in a different circumstance—the FPDA or the GCC, as an agent of the UN? Is there anybody who dislikes one of those models or favors one compared to the other?



*Admiral Molina Pico, Argentine Navy:* We had the opportunity to cooperate in the Gulf as a non-NATO member. From the point of view of doctrine and procedure, we did not have any problem, perhaps because all South American navies have a long history of cooperation with the United States Navy in the UNITAS exercises. I think that the problem will be, as Admiral Brigstocke said, about the level of participation in cases of a real confrontation, because the rules of engagement that each state might have are different from the rules of engagement of whoever leads the coalition. I think that this is the main point of view that we have to focus on. From the operational point of view, we have had no problems. Perhaps it might be necessary to establish systems, not procedures, but technical systems for communications that would facilitate things.

*Admiral Mauz, U.S. Navy:* I would like to point out, just from my own personal experience in the Gulf (I was there in the early days of DESERT SHIELD), the issue of developing a maritime command and control arrangement was done on an *ad hoc* basis. It was done on the basis of individual countries' instructions, what their capitals allowed them to do and on their individual rules of engagement. We had a meeting in Bahrain, Colonel Ahmed was there, and we discussed our individual rules of engagement and what our capitals would allow us to do. Therefore, the form of the maritime campaign was based on what individual countries allowed their navies to do and the tasks were assigned accordingly. This seemed to work pretty well. Countries who had very restrictive rules of engagement and whose platforms, whose ships, were not fully capable of dealing with an Exocet threat, for example, were given one kind of mission, that is, the embargo enforcement. Other countries who could take the fight to Kuwait, to Iraq, did in fact participate in that phase of it. That was done on a practical basis and it seemed to work pretty well. There was a doctrine discrepancy among the participating navies. I think the non-NATO member, Argentina in particular, suffered a little bit because of doctrinal differences, also in communications. That needs to be addressed; also whether we can make more NATO pubs available to more countries, which I personally support, but we have had problems with the Alliance, with the political side in getting them released, but I would support doing that. At least we can, I believe, develop a publication among ourselves that we can use for operations with NATO and non-NATO forces together anywhere in the world. In fact, we have in draft right now, a first cut at such a publication that we would like to share and try to get agreement on as to whether it includes all it should include—perhaps tactics, communications, basic doctrine, the basic building blocks of operations at sea. We would like to float that, at least on a bilateral or multilateral basis, maybe under the NATO umbrella, maybe not, but that pub needs to come out.

*Rear Admiral Brigstocke:* I will just come back to Mr. Boothby now. You may think he is very brave, a lone UN civilian coming to this military audience, but, of course, he was trained by the Royal Navy, therefore he is surprisingly at home in this company. He would like to give a final UN slant on the debate.

*Mr. Boothby:* I happen to have the Charter of the United Nations with me and I wonder whether it would be useful if I just read out what the Military Staff Committee (MSC) is, because it could be quite significant and many officers may not have this document:

**Article 47.** There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions related to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security. The employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments and possible disarmament. The military staff committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the committee shall be invited by the committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the committee's responsibilities requires the participation of the member in its work. The military staff committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently. The military staff committee, with the authorization of the Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional subcommittees.

Now there's quite a lot there that has remained dormant for forty-seven years. There is a lot that could be done, although I might say that with the United Nations these days, there are a lot of countries who might be hesitant to put too much in the hands of the military chiefs of staff of the five permanent members. That, too, would have to be looked at rather carefully, but otherwise, I think some of the things that have been mentioned today have really been very interesting and very useful for me to take home and discuss back in New York.

*Rear Admiral Brigstocke:* Thank you very much. I think we have now run out of time. If I could just briefly sum up the discussion, as I see it. I think there is a consensus that cooperative security is the name of the game and a growing requirement. I believe most people in the audience accept that *ad hoc* arrangements are, broadly speaking, effective and that the top-level command and control will be circumstance dependent. It may be a UN operation; it may be led by one power with UN approval; either are acceptable. There is a need for common publications, either by wider distribution of NATO publications or by some other means. I would add that I think, in one or two areas like rules of

engagement, there might be some reluctance to declassify NATO publications of that particular type, but many NATO publications would provide the basis for perhaps a UN-approved international means of doing business. I would finally add my own view that, one of these days, when we have a cooperative security operation where the shooting starts on Day Two, rather than after six months, some of this *ad hoc*-ary could let us down. The arrangements in the Adriatic, just to take one example of the NATO-WEU arrangement, took months of negotiations to achieve. If the pressure is really on, that could be a fatal consequence.

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# Argentine Strategic Vision

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Admiral Enrique Emilio Molina Pico, Argentine Navy

**M**ISTER SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, Admiral Kelso, distinguished delegates. My presentation is a summary of the Argentine Navy's interpretation of national strategy and the way the Navy contributes to the fulfillment of its objectives.

From an Argentine perspective, we see the world "upside down." The southern cone is a wedge between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans; Argentina is an "insular" country, nearly isolated by a range of mountains, rivers, and sea. More than 90 percent of its foreign trade is transported by sea. The sea is used not only for international shipping but is a prime source of a variety of resources.

Argentina enjoys a privileged situation because it has a large continental shelf that provides, on one hand, the "habitat" for a large variety of living species. On the other hand, mineral resources from the ocean floor are easily accessible, thus making their exploitation more economical. The non-renewable resources lie in sedimentary areas in the vicinity of the continental shelf. More than fifty sites have been drilled in the resulting seven oil basins, thanks to government and private efforts.

## **The Global Strategic Picture**

The notable reduction in East-West differences, due to the Soviet disintegration, dramatically modified the strategic picture at the global level, turning it into something undefined and with a high degree of uncertainty regarding its evolution. The ideological conflict associated with the former bipolar order has ended and a new order has yet to be defined.

New conflicts as well as dormant rivalries have surfaced. Their most visible effects are: nationalistic and religious fundamentalism, migratory movements, and, moreover, ambition of potential aggressors to take over another country, mostly when the possession of natural resources of economic significance are at stake.

To make the international picture more complex, new non-state villains, such as drug-terrorists, have entered the scene as power brokers who take an active part in, and exert influence on, the developing international processes. Additionally, new non-violent players have emerged. After the logistical and technological effort that the "Cold War" mandated, the United States has achieved worldwide supremacy in the military field.

# ARGENTINA AN "INSULAR" COUNTRY



# ARGENTINE CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL BASINS



From the economic point of view, the global system has multipolar characteristics, with protagonists showing a high degree of interdependence and a strong link with each other. The United States, the European community with unified Germany, Japan, and burgeoning China constitute huge focal points of industrial, technological, and commercial supremacy. In this field, the general trend seems to be towards integration and cooperation by establishing geo-economic spaces, with bilateral and multilateral supplementary agreements.

Meanwhile, nations that belong to the heterogeneous, underdeveloped group endure conflict involving the environment as well as economical and technological development as they encounter the effects caused by protectionist measures and market closures that have a strong impact upon them.

Mankind faces the aforementioned common problems, and the new international context leads to the need for a *collective security* concept as nations recognize their interdependence. That which affects one, influences all within the huge global community.

### **The Regional Strategic Picture**

The principal characteristic in the regional framework is that almost all nations are in the process of democratic consolidation and economic recovery, although they encounter the most significant obstacles in social claims. Particularly in the last decade, and as a result of the above-mentioned considerations, an approach to cooperation and a search for integration have been developed. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay seek integration through the southern cone free trade common market (MERCOSUR), with great efforts to overcome the serious issues affecting them individually.

There are certainly problems that hinder integration in the Western Hemisphere. The different socio-economic levels—a characteristic of each continental nation—the internal situation each of them is undergoing, the different perceptions and even the distrust existing between some of them hamper the cooperation process.

In spite of the above reasons, the Organization of American States (OAS) is attempting in the security area to address regional defense mechanisms. Latin-American countries are in agreement to reducing the possibility of conflict and preventing proliferation of mass destruction weapons in the region. The acceptance of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the bilateral nuclear agreement signed with Brazil, and the agreement signed in Mendoza, Argentina, on the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons are examples of maturity and responsibility with regard to relations between nations. This concept does not apply to certain trans-national organizations that create drug-trafficking problems, mainly associated with terrorism, which have not yet been controlled. Moreover, and as a consequence of there being no common defense policy, nations have developed

their own systems according to their perceptions, individual interests, and possibilities.

### **The Basis for Strategic Analysis**

As we know, strategic thinking is an intellectual process that begins with conflict analysis and takes into account scenarios, performers, and their interests. Let us analyze each question under the issue of defense that may be defined in terms of a threat or a mission faced by the armed services, especially the navy.

### **Deterrence**

Argentina has demonstrated its will to foster cooperative relations with other nations. Consequently, its successive governments have adopted an eminently defensive national strategic attitude, wishing to establish all relations in cooperative terms. In his address to the Congress on 1 May 1992, our president reasserted this position and summarized the characteristics of the military strategic policy in the following terms: "The deterrence should be necessary in order to guarantee regional stability, thus ensuring national sovereignty." It is therefore understood that stability depends on an adequate capability for deterrence.

With the exception of the global ideological conflict that developed during the sixties and seventies as a consequence of the cold war, and which disrupted continental stability during two decades—a situation which is largely diminished today—we do not perceive, in this regard, any world power having vital interests in this part of the world that might affect us. This situation has positive implications for us.

Moreover, during the last century, the American continent has proven to be one of the most stable and less disputable regions in the world. It is true that many problems have strained the relations between states, but, as a whole, they have been resolved through diplomatic channels. The existence of adequate deterrence at the right time proved essential to the solution of conflicts. In peacetime and as a way of encouraging mutual trust, our navy is conducting combined exercises with the navies of neighboring countries.

To summarize, Argentina does not have hostile intentions and has detected no enemies in the community of nations. It wishes to continue, as a sovereign nation, to protect its citizens, interests, and territory.

The principal objective of its armed forces is to deter those who intend to use force or coercion against Argentina or its interests and to be able to respond to any aggressor accordingly, should deterrence be inadequate.

### **Protection of Sea Resources**

After nearly a decade of discussions, in 1982 the new Law of the Sea was able to codify most of the customary sea law. The essence of its meaning is that, at



sea, the absolute concept of "sovereignty" is dimmed as we depart the shores towards the "high seas."

The creation of an "exclusive economic zone," which is a new definition of the Law of the Sea, might well be considered one of the achievements of mankind, where, by means of timely and careful changes in the international legal order, an adjustment was made to the millennial practices of the use of the sea.

There is no doubt that these changes represent an adaptation to meet increased global needs at the end of this century and the beginning of the next, due to the anticipated scarcity of food resources for an ever-growing population. Therefore, with regard to the "exclusive economic zone and continental shelf," where our country is greatly favored due to its oceanographic characteristics, the sovereignty rights of the state are limited to the exploitation of the existing resources. Undoubtedly, different sea resources have, at present, a great, transcendental, and vital economic significance for a number of countries.

In the past, there were many countries that used seafood as a supplement to their nourishment, but never to the extent and in the proportion that it is being done at present. Since the seventies, we have detected a growing interest and a presence of generally predatory fishing fleets coming from the antipodes of our continent, which have turned into a permanent source of conflict. These fleets that use the seas irresponsibly, conducting predatory activities, have no ethical limits. Their actions are based exclusively on the criterion to obtain the largest possible economic profit. We might well classify them as modern-day "pirates."

### **World Order Preservation**


During the last few years we have witnessed a change from the bipolar to a multipolar world, where the interdependence of the nations has acquired a decisive meaning. There is every indication that mankind is converging to well-recognized, generally accepted, common values: democracy, individual and economic freedom, freedom of worship and opinion, human rights, private property, and so on.

In the meantime, we continue to face threats that affect public welfare. Although we are approaching the end of the twentieth century, the ancestral human tendency to use violence to impose illegitimate decisions on fellow beings still persists. An international antagonist who justifies his action on economic ground, power ambition, religious fundamentalist reason, ethnic reason, etc. can easily resort to aggression or coercion to achieve his goal in the absence of check and limitation. Moreover, this has been confirmed on different occasions during the course of this century. The new global, let me say, "disorder," where the political and economic events are not always the direct consequence of a completely rational process, results in situations of enormous uncertainty.

# ECONOMIC EXCLUSIVE ZONE & CONTINENTAL SHELF



DISTRIBUTION OF FISHING VESSELS IN SOUTH - WEST ATLANTIC OCEAN MAY 1993



Meanwhile, those countries that could somehow be called "responsible" within the international community and who share universally accepted values are trying to find a universal peace and security framework where they can foster their economic development in search of the welfare of their people.

A group of nations exposed to common risks, who are determined to protect themselves by means of an organization that assembles them, such as "the United Nations" at the global level or the "Organization of American States" at the regional level, can contribute with a high degree of deterrence power against those who attempt to disrupt the incipient, fragile international stability.

Nowadays, the use of military power within this context needs to be based on the concept of *legitimacy*. At the international level, the degree of legitimacy depends directly on the number of leading nations acting under the auspices of those organizations. In this respect, the Gulf War was an evident example.

Although from the operational point of view the United States armed forces were capable of driving Iraq out of Kuwait on their own, the U.S. needed and sought support in a coalition of twenty-eight nations (Argentina participated in this coordinated effort) to legitimize the operations in the Gulf of Arabia.

Traditionally, Argentina has adopted an isolationist international policy, which has at times derived the benefit of preserving the country from involvement in an extra-regional conflict, but in turn, that isolationism actually excluded Argentina from significant global processes. The present government has basically altered the national strategy that the country had been implementing for years. With the deployment of naval forces to the Gulf of Arabia and a fast patrol boat group in the Central American conflict acting as a peacekeeping force, as well as the participation in the former Yugoslavia and other conflicts in Africa, Asia, and recently in Haiti, the country has conveyed a clear message to the international community: "It wishes to participate as a responsible performer before the community of nations, rather than be excluded from the serious problems and global benefits which concern mankind." Our President specifically expressed this wish at the opening of sessions in congress this year when he stated: "We will extend our military involvement in peace mission and in the restoration of the international legal order under the authority of the United Nations." Thus, with the emergence of this compelling political determination to work with other navies in the international scenario, there is a need to increase and accelerate the interoperability of the naval forces who are involved.

The annual implementation of combined training with the U.S. Navy, within the framework of UNITAS exercises, established a foundation to enhance further our training capabilities, and for this reason we intend to improve our contacts with the U.S. Navy, Canadian Navy, and the Standing Naval Force, Atlantic, by participating in exercises such as FLEETEX. Furthermore, the combined exercises that we conduct with the navies of friendly countries, such as FRATERNO with Brazil, CIMARRON with Uruguay, SIRENA with Paraguay, ATLANSUR

with South Africa, IBERIA with Spain, and other operations on a non-regular basis with the Italian, German, and Japanese navies are likewise to achieve a degree of interoperability that we deem essential for participation in *ad-hoc* coalitions.

To sum up, the international community is engaged in the control of conflicts, and it is trying to act preventively to avoid reaching levels that would involve a larger number of protagonists, resulting in unpredictable and irreversible consequences—such as has occurred in the past. Geopolitically speaking, Argentina is in an ideal position to participate as a peacekeeper. Its location, which is far from the present conflict scenarios, and its absence of vital interests in the conflict areas, permit Argentina's impartiality as an observer or arbitrator for contending parties.

### **South Atlantic Control**

Until the last century, the transit from the Pacific to the Atlantic Ocean and *vice-versa* was made through Cape Horn or the Magellan Strait, both of which gained great significance in the eyes of maritime powers. The opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 inflicted a severe blow to the maritime lanes and routes that circumvented Cape Horn or passed through the Strait of Magellan, since the South Pacific and the South Atlantic somehow became "eccentric" Oceans. Strategically, if compared with other regions, the western portion of the South Atlantic was and still is considered to be of secondary value by military powers. From the viewpoint of statistics, this is demonstrated by the number of ships that use this sea lane of communication, although this is not necessarily true in qualitative terms. Today, the Cape Horn route is the only one used by the super tankers sailing from the Atlantic to the Pacific and *vice versa*.


With regard to maritime control of shipping, we have been joining efforts with Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay for more than thirty years now, through the creation of the South Atlantic Maritime Area coordination organization known as CAMAS. Such control implies availability of an adequate data flow for identifying ships in transit and the objectives pursued by them.

Furthermore, such information allows and facilitates the organization of search and rescue (SAR) missions in a significant area of the South Atlantic, for which we are accountable by virtue of the responsibility vested in us by the International Maritime Organization. Search efforts must be combined with Atlantic countries in both South America and Africa. In this regard, we have improved our relations with the South African Navy in the effort to coordinate and exchange information.

### **Malvinas**

In our opinion, the issue of the Malvinas Islands sovereignty—still unresolved—has undergone a favorable development. We have conceived the idea of placing the so-called "sovereignty umbrella" over the claims supported by both parties,

# SLOC'S & STRATEGIC CHOKE POINTS



## ARGENTINE S.A.R. AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY



1. RCC BUENOS AIRES
  2. RSC S.A. OESTE
  3. RSC PUERTO MADRYN
  4. RSC MAR DEL PLATA
  5. RSC BAHIA BLANCA
  6. RSC COMODORO RIVADAVIA
  7. RSC PTO DESEADO RSC RIO GALLEGOS
  8. RSC USHUAIA
- SUBCENTRO COORDINADOR DE BUSQUEDA Y SALVAMENTO MARITIMO

while we seek a solution that takes into account the political and economic aspect of the controversy. Keeping pace with the course of negotiations, the Argentine Navy is acting in support of the national foreign policy and, in turn, the government has assigned it an active role therein. Thus, our Navy has taken over responsibility for the coordination and control of maritime activities in the area providing for communication and the necessary information exchange with the British military authorities in the islands. Simultaneously, action has been taken to strengthen mutual trust in the southern region in order to create a political framework for the bilateral negotiations underway. Furthermore, certain procedures have been agreed upon for the control of unlawful predatory fishing by third-party vessels within the area and for the gradual enforcement of a more flexible and less restrictive reporting system for deployments of both parties' military units.

### **Antarctica**

As you are aware, Argentina plays an active role in Antarctica. In this regard, the country is committed to the strengthening of the Antarctic Treaty and the system ruled thereby, which has proved to be an adequate international instrument and has succeeded in balancing the wide variety of interests sustained by the numerous parties acting in the region. Among other issues, policies implemented at the national level involve the promotion of cooperation with other American countries, the knowledge and protection of the environment and its ecosystems, and the preservation of fishing and mining resources. Likewise, these policies provide for further scientific research, designed to improve knowledge concerning existing resources. Last but not least, established policies take into account the possibility that our country may render services to third parties, including, but not limited to, communication facilities, transportation, supplies, meteorological and cartographic support, support in case of ecological contingencies, shared use of the Argentine facilities in the region and of supporting ports and airfields in the Antarctic continent and the southern continental region.

We have a vital geopolitical interest in the Antarctica because of our proximity to that continent. In short, Argentina will continue to uphold the position maintained during 1992, whereby Antarctica is to be regarded as an area where the ecological factor should be privileged, basically because any alteration to the ecosystem would have a direct deleterious impact on the country because of its geographical location.

### **Narco-Terrorism**

Our concern on this matter focuses directly on the seriousness of this problem at the global level. The increase of drug trafficking brought about a surge of illegal business transactions which, in turn, affect not only legal economic business but also the politics and safety of various countries as well as the



hemisphere as a whole. In general, the main routes used for cocaine and marihuana traffic are well identified. However, the great number of alternative routes change continuously. At sea, maritime control of shipping monitors merchant ship routes in order to detect eventual wrongdoers. Pursuant to the national legislation in force, the Argentine Navy provides for logistical support to anti-drug operations performed by law enforcement agencies.

### **Basic Naval Capabilities**

The country is firmly consolidating its economic stability together with a consistent, medium-term plan in the widest sense. Accordingly, with this plan, the Navy faces the challenge of striking an adequate balance between resources assigned for operation and maintenance of missions to be accomplished, and analyzing the restructuring of the entire naval organization. To confront the wide spectrum of issues we have just addressed, the Navy needs to develop or maintain capabilities as follows:

- Deterrence.
- Control of the Sea.
- Deployment of assets under the auspices of international organizations.
- Effective presence and logistic support to activities in the Antarctic.

The means required to ensure the above mentioned capabilities are as follows:


For deterrence and international participation, we intend to maintain a balanced surface force, a "Fleet Amphibious Unit," internationally known as "M.E.U." (Marine Expeditionary Unit), of about two thousand men, with a landing battalion as its core. Moreover, a "Fleet Air Group" must meet the requirements of surface and antisubmarine warfare, attack surface forces, and direct air defense. At the same time, it must provide for troop lift requirements by means of medium or heavy helicopters. Finally, a force of up to six submarines represents another deterrent element.

The surface force, as mentioned above, for deterrence purposes, is also the most suitable to deal with deployments under the auspices of international organizations, such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

Sea control and coastal defense are performed by corvettes, which are the most suitable surface ships for these tasks, especially because of their cost-effectiveness. This scheme is supplemented and completed by the essential anti-mining capability. Having valuable naval assets, such as an icebreaker and support bases in Tierra del Fuego Province and in Antarctica, allows us to participate and play an important role among the countries in that region.

To conclude, the naval strategy was developed by the Argentine Navy as a conduit to implement national strategy directions issued by the government, within the Navy's sphere of responsibility. These directions are based on *deterrence* for the preservation of the national territory and participation in *multinational*

# COCAINE SMUGGLING ROUTES FROM LATIN AMERICA TO THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE



operations in support of foreign policy. The naval strategy acknowledges *collective security* and seeks to achieve it in the region through the principle of *cooperative security*. Simultaneously, it aims to guarantee an effective control of the sea and an active presence in Antarctica.

### Questions and Answers

*Admiral Martinez, Chilean Navy:* Admiral Molina, your presentation has been extremely interesting. If you allow, I would like to add some additional information, because where the Strait of Magellan is and Cape Horn is, it would be interesting, I believe, to recall our very good relations in the area that is within the sovereignty of Chile.

*Admiral Molina Pico:* This is an interesting point, because the drawing did not show a thank-you for your participation Admiral Martinez, and I believe that the existing relations between Chile and Argentina in the region is one of the best examples of cooperative security. We have permanently cooperated. The two navies have had a common effort for all matters where we have shared responsibilities, such as SAR (Search and Rescue) and ecological matters, and we have insured a standing relationship that has lowered the level of potential controversy.

*Rear Admiral Strasser, U.S. Navy:* Admiral Molina Pico, in one of your slides it showed that this change of policy, from a somewhat isolationist to a more active role, was a decision that was made by the government of President Menem. I wonder if you might speculate on whether this is a permanent change or whether it is something particular to this government. Might we see change again with a new administration?

*Admiral Molina Pico:* Thank you, Admiral Strasser. I think that the change that President Menem has adopted is a definite change. When he made the first great public decision, which was the participation of the Argentine Navy in the Gulf War, he broke with a period of history. The policy of the government is supported by almost the whole of the Argentinean people, who have decided that it is not possible to be isolated in today's world.

*Vice Admiral Shariff, Royal Malaysian Navy:* Sir, you mentioned developing a deterrence capability. Now, will this not encourage an arms race within the region?

*Admiral Molina Pico:* Our deterrence capability has been established on the basis of our reality—our reality taken as an isolated country within Latin America. At

this point, we are permanently analyzing the situation so that we establish cooperative relations so that we do not have to use deterrence; in other words, to have deterrence as a contingency tool. We have accentuated cooperation with the neighboring countries of Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, and Paraguay so that we can have coordination for everything and in everything. I do not know if this responds to your question, sir.

*Admiral Merlo, French Navy:* One of your slides talked about economic threat. If you are talking about oil supplies, I agree with you. However, if you mean world economic competition and normal competition between countries, don't you think that this entails a risk of extending conflicts and risking instability for the whole world?

I also think that we are among the major navies, and all the navies try now to be in solidarity with one another in order to control world crises. I think it is important that the problems of economic competition do not impair the solidarity toward a better controlled world crisis.

*Admiral Molina Pico:* Thank you Admiral, the problem of the economic dilemma has two sides in Argentina.

There is a political aspect. We have an economic capability that does not allow us to confront situations that normally occur in the North. The subsidies of European countries, subsidies that exist in certain parts of the United States, make it difficult for the countries of the South, like Argentina, to develop. This is not a military problem, but it is a problem that affects all our countries, politically, and affects the development that we could reach.

Now, speaking on a military level, the only economic threat that we have at present are the fishing fleets that fish without control in the EEZs. The northern fleets, with flags of European Community countries having a single fishing policy, have gone to the South Atlantic to fish. In that area, they are acting in a predatory manner, without any control. This is one of the problems that the countries of the southern cone of Latin America are facing. I do not know if I have responded to your question, sir.

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# Maritime Coalitions and Global Peace

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The Honorable John H. Dalton  
Secretary of the United States Navy

**I**T IS INDEED AN HONOR AND A PRIVILEGE to have the opportunity to speak with you today and to welcome you here. I am glad that you are here and I hope that you are finding this symposium to be productive, interesting, and enjoyable.

On 30 August 1781, a mighty fleet appeared off the Virginia Capes. There, this fleet conducted an amphibious landing of troops, transported the forces of allies, and engaged an enemy in a sea battle that was strategically decisive. It then supported the conduct of land operations that captured an army and, in effect, ended the hostilities between the two major combatants of that theater.

That war was the war for American independence—an event that we who are citizens of the United States consider to be of great historical importance, even if our opponent later became one of our staunch allies. The operation supported the objective of the Americans, but the fleet was French. We remember that today. We would remember that through two world wars.

The event was clearly not the first example of a maritime coalition. Nor was it necessarily a classic case of multinational naval cooperation. In fact, the Continental Navy could provide little support, having been decimated after many independent actions. But, it represented a strategic fact that has since been repeated: the cooperation of maritime coalitions has been a decisive element in the conduct of international relations and the making of world history.

Now, it is not a requirement of my office to be a naval historian, even though I certainly enjoy studying naval history. My job is to produce a quality naval force that can carry out the objectives given to it by the American people. And I am not going to recount for you the numerous examples of how the cooperating navies of diverse nations were able to achieve success in joint operations. You are undoubtedly more aware of these examples than I am. They have been the focus of your discussions during this conference. But, it does not take a keen strategist to recognize that our navies, if united in purpose and capable of mutual support, can be a critical element in the preservation of world peace.

The world has changed so much in the past five years—it has been truly breathtaking. We are no longer in a world defined by the clash of ideologies. We are no longer in a world where possible superpower confrontation remains an overriding factor. We are no longer in a world where the nations are held

within an alliance system that they do not want, poised to fight conflicts that are not theirs. The iron curtain has fallen. Other walls have fallen as well. Let them never return.

I note that these changes are reflected in this symposium's participants. For the first time, we are welcoming officers from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Ukraine as well as South Africa to our discussions here. Other nations who have been invited to participate for the first time include Costa Rica, Fiji, Grenada and Tonga. For some of you, this is your first occasion to accept an invitation.

Our world now has a greater potential for lasting peace than it has had at any other time in recent history. But peace, as always, can be elusive. It takes vigilance to enforce it. It takes cooperation for those vigilant efforts to be effective throughout the many regions of the world. And this vigilance and cooperation has a maritime component. That is why we have navies. That is why we must work together. And recognition of this fact is why, I believe, we are here today.

The point of this symposium, so graciously hosted by Admiral Kelso and so effectively coordinated by Admiral Strasser, is for all of us to have the opportunity to discuss the particulars of maritime strategy and cooperation. To some extent this symposium is a symbol of the natural, underlying cooperation between those who sail the world's oceans. All sailors have a natural bond. But more than that, it brings together navies from different regions—navies that might not normally encounter each other, but which may indeed share similar concerns.

Yet, just because your ships can sail together does not necessarily mean they can cooperate in combat operations, peacekeeping, or peace enforcement. As you all are well aware, it takes much more. Elements such as command and control, rules of engagement, and logistics need to be worked out. I am sure these are the sort of things you may have discussed or will review. Many of these elements are well practiced in some of the annual exercises and cruises that our navies conduct together—such as Standing Naval Force Atlantic, UNITAS, and RIMPAC.

The problem areas identified are clearly not insurmountable. Coalition naval forces performed well throughout operation DESERT STORM. As we speak, there are at least three multinational naval operations that are ongoing—enforcing sanctions in the Red Sea, the Adriatic, and off Haiti. As a practical matter, I think it is easier to integrate navies than it is to integrate armies—all navies practice the same basic skills. The result is that the navies of the world work together to promote peace. Though it is natural for the United States to provide leadership, this is not a single nation's effort. Nor is it just an Alliance effort. It is indeed a world effort.

Now, I recognize that committing forces to such operations is not done easily. It requires a political commitment. This political commitment includes many dimensions, one of which is the potential for harm. The choice to put our sailors

and Marines, our soldiers and airmen in harm's way is a very intense commitment. And it is one that our respective governments do with only the gravest consideration. Perhaps one area of solace is that, in this choice, we sail together.

But another element is financial. Peacekeeping operations may have been funded mostly through the United Nations, but the new breed of peace enforcement requirements carries greater costs. Much of this cost must be borne by navies that have to choose between funding participation in multilateral operations or use that money as they would normally—to train and equip their forces. As someone who is tasked with training and equipping the force, I can understand these difficult choices.

With the end of the Cold War, the trend in naval forces of the world can be characterized by the word "downsizing." I know that many of you are experiencing that in your navies today. In our efforts, I prefer to use the term "right-sizing," since that describes our concern with preserving our quality and readiness, even as we shape our forces to fit the different threats of today's world. Most navies are getting smaller, even though they are requiring more sophisticated equipment. But the task of keeping and enforcing the peace seems to be getting bigger. The international community has elected to take a strong role in ensuring justice and the rule of law.

The solution to these concerns lies clearly in the topic of this symposium. As navies get smaller, multinational cooperation and maritime coalitions become more and more essential. The United States Navy and Marine Corps clearly recognize that such cooperations are not a luxury—they are an absolute necessity.

That is one message that I hope you will take away from this symposium. We in the U.S. Department of the Navy recognize the importance of multinational naval operations and the importance of your contributions. We welcome your full participation, and we recognize the dilemmas that you may face through involvement in these operations, particularly with the transition from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

We knew we needed a coalition with the French Navy back in 1781. We know that we all must cooperate together in 1993 and the years beyond. We all have a mutual security interest in peace.

Another mutual interest is in preserving the freedom of the seas, a principle that promotes trade and the value of economic interdependence. This has always been a global principle—and with the changes that have occurred in recent years, one in which even more nations are free to enjoy.

One of many things we share in common is the challenge of explaining, under fiscal pressures, exactly what our navies contribute, and how they are a credit to our nations' balance sheets. We can do this by demonstrating the unique advantages navies bring to peace enforcement and how multinational cooperation and maritime coalitions compound the return on investment in national



navies. The capabilities demonstrated through such coalitions can not be duplicated in a single navy. The spirit of international cooperation, understanding, and peaceful relations is greatly enhanced through operations and discussions between navies. This is a dividend that can not be easily quantified. But it is one that is essential in a world that is 70 percent ocean, and where 70 percent of mankind lives within one hundred miles of the sea.

I want each of you to know how much I appreciate your being here. I thank you for attending this symposium. I salute your efforts at forming the basis for maritime coalitions and your efforts at keeping the peace. God bless you, and may He keep us all meeting in peace for as long as there are oceans and brave sailors to cross them.

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# Coordination in Combined Maritime Operations

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Panel discussion moderated by  
Vice Admiral Khalid M. Mir, Pakistan Navy

**D**ISTINGUISHED DELEGATES, observers, and other participants in the International Seapower Symposium, our schedule this afternoon will start with the next of our panel discussions, which, I think and I hope, will build up the very lively and very good dialogue and discussion that we started this morning. This panel will become, however, a little more specific and will address coordination and combined maritime operations. Vice Admiral Khalid M. Mir of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is this afternoon's moderator. Vice Admiral Mir graduated from the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth, where he was awarded the Queen's Sword of Honor. After having served in destroyers, he joined the submarine service and went on to command two submarines and a submarine squadron. He later commanded two destroyers and a destroyer squadron. His shore assignments included many staff appointments at naval headquarters, and finally, he was Deputy Chief of Naval Staff for Operations. His last appointment was Commander of the Pakistan Fleet. Vice Admiral Mir is a graduate of the Naval Staff College, Greenwich, and the National Defense College of Pakistan. He has been Commander, Karachi, since 1992.

*Vice Admiral Mir:* Admiral Kelso, fellow delegates, ladies and gentlemen, the discussion this morning partially left the ball in the court of the United Nations, and I shall take the liberty of starting off our discussions from that point. The United Nations Secretary General's report of 1992, titled *Agenda for Peace*, has stimulated a lot of debate, but one item it leaves emphasis on is Article 43 of the Charter, which enables coalition forces to develop under the aegis of the United Nations. However, the implementation of this article is not exactly easy, as we have heard this morning. In the first instance, the force has to be developed depending on the political situation, the political will of the participants, and the nature of the tasks to be accomplished. Should the force be regional or should it be global? What should be the capability of the force? What should be its quantum? These are some of the questions that have to be answered. We then have to ensure a smooth command and control of the combined task force, keeping in balance national sensibilities and effective execution of the mission within the mandate authorized. This is to be followed by formulation of specific

rules of engagement, which is not an easy task, as we are all aware, but is crucial to successful operations. Finally, we have the execution of the mission through coordination between sea and land forces.

Today, we are fortunate to have some extremely distinguished speakers on the panel who will address these varied topics and, thereafter, take on the questions that you may have. It is my proud privilege to introduce them in order of the sequence of their presentations.

Firstly, we have Mr. Derek Boothby, whom we have heard this morning on a number of questions that came up. He first started his career in Navy blue and graduated from the Royal Naval College Dartmouth in 1957. He subsequently joined the United Nations in 1978. He has some considerable experience in the Department of Disarmament Affairs. After the Gulf War, he was appointed Deputy Director of United Nations Special Commission for the Destruction and Removal of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction. Subsequently, he was Senior Staff Advisor to Mr. Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen in dealing with issues of the former Yugoslavia. Mr. Boothby is currently a Principal Officer in the Department of Political Affairs at the United Nations, where he heads the Europe Division. He shall be speaking to us on the process leading to development of a coalition force.

Vice Admiral Peter Cairns, Royal Canadian Navy, has evenly divided his distinguished career between submarines and destroyers and has been in command of both. He has also held very senior appointments ashore, such as Commandant of the Canadian Forces Maritime Warfare Center and Director, General Personnel. He has also served as Commander Maritime Forces, Pacific, and Deputy Commander Maritime Command in Victoria, British Columbia. He is presently Commander of the Canadian Maritime Command and shall be speaking to us on command and control of a coalition force.

Vice Admiral Marc Merlo, from the French Navy, entered the Naval Academy in 1953 and chose submarines as a career in his earlier days. He has commanded both conventional and nuclear submarines with distinction. He also commanded a frigate. After some very important appointments ashore, he became the Commander of the Mediterranean Fleet. He is a graduate of the Naval Staff College and National Defense University. Last year, he was assigned the task of creating the Joint Staff College—a task which he has accomplished successfully, and he was recently appointed Commander of the College. Vice Admiral Merlo will be speaking to us on rules of engagement.

Lieutenant General Charles Krulak, U.S. Marine Corps, will be our final speaker. He graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1964 and has held various staff and command appointments that have included Assistant Chief of Staff for Maritime Prepositioning Ships and Deputy Director of the White House Military Office. In 1989, he was assigned the duties of Commanding General,

Tenth Marine Expeditionary Brigade. In 1990, he assumed duties as Commanding General, Second Force, Service Support Group, Commanding General, Sixth Marine Expeditionary Brigade, Marine Force Atlantic. He is presently Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and is most eminently suited to talk to us on cooperation between sea and ground forces in coalition.

With that gentlemen, I would like to invite our first speaker, Mr. Boothby, to talk to us on developing the force.

*Mr. Boothby:* Admiral Kelso, Admiral Martinez, ladies and gentlemen, in 1985—yes, over eight years ago—the United Nations produced a study on naval issues which identified developing circumstances that would require new forms of maritime cooperation to deal with changing maritime challenges in the years ahead. I recall at the time that the United States Government was not too keen on our conclusions and neither, for that matter, were the British, the Soviet Union, nor the French, because you will recall that 1985 was a period in the depths of the modern Cold War. And yet, in 1985, at least some things were apparent to us. Although we did not foresee what was also starting in 1985, namely the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, we did see very clearly the implications of the law of the sea, the increasing number of member states joining the United Nations, the much increased maritime responsibilities that coastal states would acquire because of the Exclusive Economic Zone, and that many coastal states would become developing countries. We were very conscious that 90 percent of the world's fish is caught within 200 miles of the coast and that of the forty countries who use fish for their main source of protein, thirty-nine of them were developing countries. Therefore, they would be keen to develop the capacity to look after those interests.

For quite different reasons, we also foresaw that there was going to be an increase in ethnic and resource-based tensions, probably leading to conflicts in the years ahead. All this was beyond the East-West competition. So, it was not surprising that in that study we called for greater maritime cooperation to deal with fishery protection, safety at sea, drug running, maritime pollution, piracy, disaster relief, and similar maritime activities.

Then came the end of the Cold War, and that brought a very important change to the United Nations. Now as you know, issues of threats to international peace and security are dealt with by the Security Council, which has fifteen member states. For resolutions in the Council to be adopted, a vote of nine in favor is needed, but a single negative vote from one of the five permanent members of the Council can stop a resolution stone cold dead. While the disagreements between the permanent members did not cease altogether with the end of the ideological struggle between the East and the West, at least they significantly faded away; and then the Security Council, in the late '80s, around

about 1990, began to work as had been originally intended when the Charter was written and agreed upon in San Francisco in 1945.

The traditional term "peacekeeping" does not appear in the Charter because it was fashioned later. The traditional term of "peacekeeping" began to take on wider meanings; new concepts were added, such as, peacemaking and peace enforcement, and the United Nations began to find itself not always involved in conflicts between states (interstate) but rather intrastate—involved in conflicts and tensions which were going to take place within states. The issue of humanitarian assistance and protecting humanitarian assistance began to come to the fore. The number of military operations authorized by the United Nations increased considerably, and putting together mixed military forces from various countries around the world became an increasingly difficult task. At the United Nations, we usually try to achieve a broad geographical spread in a peacekeeping force so that they just don't all come from one localized group of countries; but, as you well know, there are very large differences in military capabilities, in procedures, in levels of training and readiness, and equipment, and in weapons; and command and control, as I mentioned this morning, can and often does present particular problems which we're not really capable of resolving yet.

In general, we have found it useful to avoid using troops from countries that have either historical connections with the areas of operations or troops from immediately neighboring countries—immediately neighboring states. That's not an absolute rule, but it is a general rule. And, certainly, until the Cold War finished, we also avoided involving combat troops from either of the two superpowers. Until very recently, the only troops from (what was then) the Soviet Union and from the United States of America who were involved in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine were thirty-six unarmed observers from each country.

We have found, as our experience has grown, that operations may be under a UN flag with blue helmets and vehicles painted white, helicopters painted white as in Cambodia or in former Yugoslavia, or they may be simply authorized by the United Nations—given the seal of approval, but without United Nations command and control being involved. Such was the case in operation DESERT STORM in Kuwait and Iraq. So, there are many options that can be used, and I think that these will probably grow even wider as time goes on. There is no given, standardized way of doing it. Every operation has been different. We learn lessons each time. Sometimes we even have to learn old lessons that we should have remembered from before. And, to give you an idea of the scale of current United Nations' military operations, in October 1993, just last month, there were eighteen separate military operations taking place, including the one in Cambodia which is now winding down. Those eighteen operations involved over 76,000 military troops and civil police drawn from seventy-five countries. You can imagine the kind of interoperability problems we have. We have

countries whose forces are militarily effective; countries with their own ways of doing things. We borrow, as we have done in former Yugoslavia, the kind of built-in control and command arrangements of NATO. And, at the other end of the scale, we will often take six hundred troops from a very small developing country that has uniforms and sidearms but does not have armored personnel carriers; it does not have tanks and it may need communications equipment. These troops must be trained to use equipment when it is given to them—very wide variations.

I have lingered on military operations—Army operations—because, in fact, there have been very few naval operations so far, and even fewer have sailed under the United Nations flag. But, I believe that both types will grow in the future. The escorting of the Kuwaiti tankers in 1991 might just as easily have been a U.N. operation. It was not, but it could have been. The present naval operations in the Adriatic Sea by NATO and the Western European Union, and the naval ships now off Haiti enforcing the United Nations Security Council sanctions—all are examples of recent, cooperative maritime operations. And, as I described earlier, and indeed as you will recall from this morning's panel, there will indeed be an increasing number of tasks at the lower end of the scale of naval operations. So, in sum, there is a rising need. As Admiral MacDougall said this morning, "Greater maritime cooperation is the only way to address some of the coming problems." Small navies, therefore, need to think in these terms, and they need help. Large navies need to find imaginative ways of sharing their naval expertise, but to do so in a non-threatening way, not in such a way that small navies may somehow feel pressured. I know very well from our experience in the United Nations how sensitive some nationalities can be. They perceive these things even when they are not intended.

In fact, this particular symposium is a very good example of bringing so many nations together. I would like to express, on behalf of the United Nations, warm appreciation to the United States Navy for this particular kind of gathering.

Now, it is Chapter 6 within the Charter of the United Nations that provides the rationale for traditional United Nations' peacekeeping, but it is Chapter 7 of the Charter that authorizes enforcement actions and economic sanctions. We have seen more use of economic sanctions as a political tool, which often has to be backed up by naval force—naval embargo force—to make sure that it is carried out. But, it is Chapter 8 of the Charter that provides the legitimacy for arrangements that are appropriate for regional action in dealing with matters of maintenance of international peace and security.

One of the things that is very clear to us in the United Nations as we have gone into this new area is that regional organizations are far from being developed in this military capacity. They need a lot of working together. They need a lot of trying in order to iron-out problems with each other and amongst themselves in order to produce the capacity to help.

In the United Nations, for instance, we would very much like to be able to use the CSCE or the OAS, or other regional or sub-regional organizations, but the military capacity of those organizations is far from being advanced. So, I would strongly urge that you think more actively about naval cooperation amongst countries of a region and the help of those out-of-area navies which have the capacity and experience and the hardware to assist.

Now, in the United States, anyone who wishes to make an emergency telephone call for fire or an ambulance or the police, dials 911. But in international political terms, the United States no longer wants, nor does it have the resources or the public support, to be the only country answering the 911 call. In the United Nations, we are able to provide the overarching international political authority, but the United Nations itself does not have any standing forces. As I said this morning, I do not think that it would be a good thing for an international organization to have a standing force as a mark of national sovereignty; it is something that goes with a national government, not with an international organization. We, therefore, have to depend on the availability of multinational forces, which will include naval forces, to possess sufficient interoperability to perform the tasks authorized by the Security Council and to tackle those lower-level tasks arising from the Law of the Sea and from other reasons that I spoke of earlier.

Now, putting together appropriate forces for Security Council tasks, whether for combat or for supporting sanctions or for economic development, will not be easy. It will pose different problems on each occasion, and the best solution will not necessarily be a UN-flag operation. It may be a UN operation—but not necessarily so. However, it does need the development of better understanding, common procedures, and better interoperability in some of the simpler operations. In my view—and this is a personal view—I think it needs the development of an improved military staff with a naval component within the United Nations, not within the Military Staff Committee, but within the United Nations, so that it can provide planning and policy guidance. There are also day-to-day operations and reaction to events. You cannot do this from a military staff committee designed on the basis that I read this morning from the Charter.

Now, there already is a small staff, which has grown quite significantly from what it used to be within the UN, but there are so many things to do that it never gets time to plan. It is always dealing with the initial issues—the crises that come in by fax or by telephone or by cable each day—and we need a capacity to plan. And, as far as I am aware, there is no naval component of it that is able to address the issues that I referred to today.

Finally, I would like to leave you with one other thought that I picked up from what the Secretary of the Navy said at lunch. If you persuade your respective governments that you have the need for the naval capabilities to look after the economic developments in your coastal waters, as Argentina showed

us this morning, and you need naval capabilities to support UN operations, then you will have two very good arguments to give to your respective political leaders for protecting your financial share of the budget. That is something that I suspect would be attractive to you all. That is the thought I leave with you.

*Vice Admiral Cairns:* Admirals, ladies, and gentlemen. Over the last several years, the Canadian Navy has been involved in a number of combined maritime operations. This involvement has redefined, to a certain extent, the way in which we perceive future tasks for our Navy. From now on, we believe deployed operations for the Canadian Fleet will most likely be undertaken as contingency operations in conjunction with forces of other like-minded nations, under the auspices of NATO or the United Nations. Our experience holds some interesting lessons for command and control of combined operations, and these are not large-scale operations I am talking about. They are the sort of operations that are going on today. At the same time, it brings to light areas in need of work, and I hope that some of this work might be started here today. During this short talk, I hope to put in context three issues that I believe are fundamental to successful coalition operations in the future. These are communications, conductivity, command and control doctrine, and common rules of engagement. Let me first review Canada's experience in combined maritime operations. During the Second World War, a fundamental principle was established with respect to command of our national forces. Canadian forces were to be under the command of Canadians. Throughout our experience in Korea and in NATO over the next forty-five years, this principle was not changed. Indeed, it was reinforced. This has led to a well-defined national concept of operations for deployed maritime forces as self-sustained task groups. Our force structure plans have emphasized—with varying degrees of success, I might add—the need for versatile, capable, and mutually supporting maritime and maritime area units. Now, the face of modern sea warfare is changing. I believe that what we are seeing is perhaps a renewal of what has always been the business of sea power. Nevertheless, the likelihood of global, or even major regional, conflict on, under, or above the sea is somewhat slim. More likely, we will see the use of naval power in support of limited objectives in littoral areas or ashore. These limited objectives may be national and aggressive in character, or they may be international and have as their object the maintenance or restoration of peace and stability to a particular region. In any event, we have seen the development of two trends in these maritime operations. They are *ad hoc*, and they involve the forces of a number of nations.

In the Gulf War, Canada's maritime contribution consisted of two destroyers and an AOR plus a squadron staff. Our initial contribution at sea was backed up by a shore-based joint headquarters to take operational command of all Canadian forces in the Gulf. Tactical control of our forces at sea was given over to the



Commander of Task Force 151, the U.S. naval commander in the Gulf, for the blockade of Iraq during operation DESERT SHIELD. As the deadline for expiry of the UN ultimatum to Iraq approached, it became apparent that there was a significant inter-coalition maritime communications problem. One of the virtues of our ships was the wide range of fitted communications equipment, in both type and age. This allowed us to talk to almost anyone from the newest NATO ships to the more elderly vessels. This and the embarked command staff made the Canadian Task Group an eminently suitable candidate for controlling the Combined Logistics Force when this group was established. Now, the Combined Logistics Force was the only major maritime component of the coalition effort that was not under direct USN command. I would not like to give the impression that this was smooth sailing. There were problems with crypto, standing operating procedures, and communication plans, but it became workable in the period before hostilities, and we learned a lot for the future. One of the things we learned is that we would be unwise to bank on the luxury of a benign probation period. Moreover, I hesitate to use the terms command or control in referring to the Combined Logistics Force operation. It was more coordination and cooperation. Finally, our ability to carry out this task from within the resources of our small task group stemmed from the policy of deploying a force with inherent command, control, and communications capability, which was necessary for the national control of our own task group.

Now, following the Gulf War, the UN sanctions against Iraq were enforced by a Maritime Interdiction Force operating in the Gulf and in the Northern Red Sea. Canada contributed one destroyer for this effort in the Red Sea. Again, it is significant that, throughout, the ship was under Canadian control, exercised from my headquarters in Halifax using a satellite-based communications system. The ship operated with other nation ships in the area under the overall coordination of the United States Navy, but at no time was operational command of the ship devolved to a foreign authority.

During the first six months of the United Nations operation in Somalia, HMCS *Preserver*, an AOR, supported operations ashore and afloat. In fact, this vessel provided command and control facilities for the Canadian Joint Force Commander, an army officer, during the early stages of the deployment. In addition, *Preserver* offered replenishment for the multinational naval force in the area, stores-support, and helicopter services for the Canadian contingent on the ground, significant medical and dental support to the deployed forces, and even sent sailors ashore to assist in the Somali infrastructure repair and relief operations. Throughout this operation, the force was commanded from Canada, but cooperated with other nations in the theater. As an aside, the AOR acted as a communications gateway for participating Indian naval ships, and this was an unusual communications connectivity, exercised in view of the primarily ex-Soviet and indigenous electronic outfits of those ships. I think that the most

significant aspect of this operation, from a maritime command and control perspective, was that the Canadian Joint Force Headquarters operated from a ship for the first time and did so effectively.

From the examples just outlined, spanning about three years, and not including what we are doing now in our recent experience of operations in the Adriatic and in Haiti, it is clear that command and control was exercised in different ways. These ranged from the most complex problem of controlling a multinational force entirely afloat during the Gulf War to the simple national arrangement during MIFOPS in the Red Sea.

Conspicuous by its absence from these operations has been common doctrine and procedures for command and control. Even definitions of command and control vary among the participating navies, and I think what is needed is a sort of ATP-1 for non-NATO combined operations. This basic set of operational and tactical instructions and procedures would go a long way to improving command and control interoperability. On this point, though, I want to emphasize that the work done by NATO is not entirely applicable here. At the higher levels of command in multinational coalition operations, the function is more one of coordination than one of control, more one of cooperation than one of command. We need to develop doctrine to reflect and to facilitate this reality.

When I talk about communications connectivity, I also talk about the transfer of data. This connectivity with coalition or allied partners is the key to the success of our command structure. Because Canadian ships operate frequently in a NATO, CONUS, or Pacific rim environment, we have communications connectivity options. Nevertheless, there are problems in this area which must be overcome. The lack of a common crypto for secure communications, for example, is one which we wrestle with in practically every combined operation. As well, in some cases, communications outfits in ships are so many generations of technology apart that they cannot even talk to each other in plain voice. These problems demand our attention.

Combined exercises, involving ships of nations that have not traditionally exercised together, must be sought in the future to ensure that nations acting together in support of the United Nations' resolutions can readily work together with little time lost in becoming inter-operable. It took years to accomplish this within the major alliances, and we had months to sort it out prior to the start of the war in the Gulf. We have to work even harder on this aspect, because we may not have the luxury of time in the future.

Another aspect of command and control of combined operations is rules of engagement. I do not want to steal the thunder of the next speaker, but I would like to make a brief comment. From recent operations, we have learned that a lot of work is required to harmonize rules of engagement, agree on definitions of hostile action, intent, and our responses to them, and to articulate the concept of levels-of-force. This pertains to the maritime ROE of the various participating

nations in an operation, but it equally pertains to the ROE for land, air, and maritime forces in what has become a very joint world.

So, what lessons can we derive from our experience to date? I will focus on three. National, as distinct from alliance, command, and force structures, will continue to be a feature of coalition or multinational forces. Therefore, we must develop doctrine that accepts this reality and, when necessary, ensures that the integrity of national contingency is maintained.

Secondly, communications connectivity is the single, most important aspect of command and control in multinational operations. Or do we mean cooperation and coordination? Without it, these operations cannot be effective because forces operating under national command, but with a high degree of cooperation, require extensive information exchange. There is a lot of work to do in this regard. Close coordination of rules of engagement among the various national forces is required so that operations can commence without protracted negotiations after the decision to deploy a combined task force is taken. Again, work can be done to facilitate this before the fact.

Now, despite the valuable lessons we have learned about combined maritime operations, certain questions remain. For example, how do we promote interoperability in an age of non-proliferation, downsizing, and budgetary restraint? Do we accept the idea of a standing U.N. maritime force; and, if so, are we prepared to surrender command, or even control, of these forces to the United Nations in its present configuration? The answers to these questions are not simple, but they may form the basis of interesting discussion at the end of this session.

*Vice Admiral Merlo:* Admiral Kelso, Admiral Martinez, gentlemen, the French Navy has gained a certain degree of experience in coordinated, or combined, naval operations with its allies during the last international crisis: for instance, ensuring security of shipping traffic in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War between 1985 and 1988, in three types of activities—escorting merchant ships, reducing the mine threat, and having its own retaliation capabilities. Other examples include participating in the control of vessel traffic, embargoes, blockades, or warfare operations in the Gulf War, in the Iraqi embargo which has been in place since 1990, and the embargo and the blockade currently imposed on Yugoslavia, and in the embargo around Haiti. In this kind of situation, there are three simple principles which directed the French Navy.

First, total and earliest possible cooperation and solidarity with our allies and partners.

Second, candor among the military, whatever their positions may be, on the political level.

Third, a pragmatic posture and the search for maximum efficiency in cooperative activities, be it joint, combined, or allied operations, and at all levels

of command, control, intelligence, communications, interoperability, and logistics.

For these types of operations, our navy benefits from nearly fifty years of practical experience, from NATO documents, and from Allied exercises. In combined air naval operations, the rules of engagement present well a situation of intermediate crisis between peace and declared conflict. These rules present a difficult, sensitive, and complex problem. These rules of engagement must reflect the political will of the coalition. In other words, they must be adequate, and they must be firm and yet tempered in order to master the situation without unexpected escalation risks. They must be approved by all the participants. These rules of engagement must also be easily implemented. In other words, they must be simple and clear. These rules of engagement preferably must be displayed and include a period of advance notice in order to limit involuntary incidence. These rules of engagement must also limit the accepted risks taken by our forces, by our seamen, by our pilots. It is necessary to avoid incidents that may lead to escalation or to avoid a media scandal of worldwide proportions. It is also necessary to avoid forcing our commanders or our pilots to risk and bet in a few seconds—like in a heads or tails game—the life or death of their own units. All this is politically, technically, and tactically very difficult.

Politically, first, within a coalition, there are always different views. There are hawks; there are doves. We must add to that the language and vocabulary problems; the same word does not always have the same meaning, and the same word may lead to different interpretations.

Technically, both the time needed for assessment and thinking, and the choice of weapons are not always the same, depending on whether air or naval means are used. For aircraft, decisions must be made quickly, immediately, and on an all-or-nothing basis. For ships, in general, the time allotted for reactions may be better controlled; and, to a certain degree, they may even be modulated. I mean here, ships that you may encounter that may represent a threat for you.

From a tactical standpoint, it is never possible to accept a mission without accepting a minimum of risks. All you can do is try to limit or define a ceiling or a maximum limit for these risks. There is a specific problem of exclusive areas, security zones, or sanctuaries. These zones could be established on a geographical basis, or they may be placed in a special relative position to a given valuable unit. These solutions may be satisfactory, but they are politically difficult to accept. In order to be brief, I would like to say that the basic problem of rules of engagement is a major difficulty in crisis situations, even if one is acting as a single country. It is an even more difficult situation within a coalition. To solve this problem, all prior, detailed, and informative documentation is very, very useful. There will always be a modicum of national or personal subjectivity in the implementation of these rules of engagement. A personal, direct contact between the admiral and those who implement the rules in certain cases or in

certain situations is invaluable and even irreplaceable. In more concrete terms, since air and missile threats are very widespread threats, and those are the most serious and most urgent threats, they require the longest possible period of advanced warning. For that, you must establish and keep current the view of the situation covering a radius longer than the enemy's weapon system and obtain the corresponding delegation of functions. It is no longer possible, in most cases, not to have deep field devices and air watch capabilities. We can no longer not have air watch capabilities. During daytime or nighttime, identification problems are priority, and they are not always simple.

Third, it is always necessary to cover a contact element in a perceptible way. For instance, an element carrying out an operation of searching a merchant ship must be perceptibly covered all the time, and visibly so, in order to be able to quickly react in case of reversal of fortune. And finally, it is necessary to avoid leaving, without any serious reason, our units exposed to dangerous situations for too long and with limited defense capabilities. The definition of rules of engagement usually results from a compromise between all these limitations between the politicians and the military experts. Our recent experience in France suggests the following trends in a decreasing order of importance.

First, respect of international law.

Second, limiting actions to self-defense.

Extension of the notion of self-defense to neighboring friendly units, for air and missile self-defense, and using the same level response in other areas.

The notion of prevented self-defense is a controversial issue. It is a question that politicians in my country do not even want to hear. They do not want that question, but only by saying "no," or perhaps something else if they might change their minds in moments immediately preceding a crisis. To conclude and to say something having to do with what has been previously said, I would like to add that if collective security operations at sea are risky and complicated, collective security operations on land are even more complicated and even more risky. Therefore, risk-sharing is what shows the credibility of the commitment of nations in operations for a collective security.

*Lieutenant General Krulak:* Admiral Kelso, Admiral Martinez, distinguished delegates, it is a great pleasure to be here to talk on my assigned topic of cooperation between sea and ground forces. The very fact that a Marine Corps officer has been asked to discuss this subject in a group composed primarily of naval officers is indicative of the importance that the United States naval service places in this sea-ground cooperation—either that or Admiral Kelso has allowed a fox into the hen house! I think it is the former. As you would expect, my

primary focus is on expeditionary warfare and on amphibious operations, Therefore, for the next few minutes, I will discuss the emerging war-fighting concepts of the United States Marine Corps and how they dovetail with our new naval strategy. Please understand that the issues I will raise regarding the cooperation between the U.S. Navy's and the United States Marine Corps' sea and land forces will most certainly exist, most certainly exist among both combined and coalition forces. Understand that when I speak of what is required for effective war-fighting by the United States Navy and the Marine Corps, those same requirements exist in an equal or greater measure in coalition warfare. This is a key point and should be kept in mind as I make my remarks.

As all of you have read and know, as well as I, the passing of the Cold War and an expansion of instabilities have required the United States naval services to shift their thinking to a new strategic concept entitled . . . *From the Sea*. This recognizes the pivotal importance of naval forces in projecting power, both in peacetime and in war. This concept seeks to mesh land, air, and sea forces into a single military campaign. The heart of our new strategic concept is something we call the Naval Expeditionary Force. This is a combined-arms naval force that can fight on the sea, beneath the sea, in the air, and significantly, across the beach and inland as well. The mission of this force is the projection of power from the sea to strike at an enemy ashore. To do so, it envisions a totally integrated air, sea, and land force. One in which sea and land forces are mutually supporting. As the landward extension of this Naval Expeditionary Force, the United States Marine Corps has developed a coherent operational concept for amphibious operations into the twenty-first century. It is entitled *Operational Maneuver from the Sea*, and it basically applies the principles of maneuver warfare to the maritime campaign. Unlike past amphibious operations in which the high-water mark delineated a distinct separation of responsibilities, this new type of warfare envisions no such separation. Combat power derives from the Naval Expeditionary Forces, as a whole. Two examples readily come to mind, and I think they fit into some of the discussions that we have heard already from our distinguished panel members on the actual coordination of sea and land forces. A UAV launched from a ship at sea, but controlled by a remote station ashore, can provide visual and electronic eyes not only to the landing force commander but to the offshore naval commander as well. It is a Naval Expeditionary Force intelligence asset, regardless of who owns it, regardless of who operates it. In a like manner, carrier-based aircraft should be as responsive to the land force in providing air defense and offensive air support as would, say, Marine aircraft operating either from ships or expeditionary airfields or shore, and also be ready to fight in support of naval forces off the coast. This type of mutual support and trust is going to be required and most necessary to win the first battle of the next war. War-fighting on the littoral demands sea and land forces that operate as a single entity rather than as two distinct forces merely cooperating with each

other. To achieve this, three basic requirements must be met, and you have heard all three of them from my distinguished panelists.

First, command and control systems must be fully inter-operable. No longer can naval and land forces afford the luxury of independently developed and largely incompatible communications systems.

Second, sea and land forces must be totally integrated in both planning and execution in all phases of an operation. Naval Expeditionary Force staffs, coalition staffs must contain sea and land officers able to think and plan in both the seaward and landward dimensions of the battlefield. Equally important, commanders must be conversant in all aspects of warfare—air, sea, and land.

Finally, and most important to success, these successful Naval Expeditionary Force operations must be based on a common sea and land intellectual foundation.

As an example, in the United States, the newly activated Naval Doctrine Command is staffed by both naval and marine officers and is a giant step forward in achieving this type of cooperation. Equally important, the doctrine that is produced by this command must be reinforced by continuous training and integration before a conflict begins. To use an old adage, "We Fight As We Train." Again, this specifically applies to coalition forces.

Suggestions that we can simply throw together or mix-match forces in response to a crisis, shifting assets as if they were interchangeable blocks in some sort of military Lego-set, portray a lack of understanding of the complexities and nature of combat. It is for that reason that the recently formed U.S. A-Command could be a critical organization in coalition warfare, because it is only through a truly joint, coalition, combined exercise program that we will be able to turn what I term as *ad hoc*-ery into effective joint, coalition, and combined war-fighting capability.

The new U.S. strategic view of . . . *From the Sea* promises to fully integrate the U.S. Marine Corps' and U.S. Navy's land and sea operations, but changes are still necessary, even in an organization as tightly tied together as the naval service, not just in technology and hardware but also in thought processes. There are what we call rice bowls involved—rice bowls that need to be broken. We must have the courage and commitment as a naval force and as coalition partners to think out of what I would call our traditional boxes. While the *status quo* will always have its defenders, it is our responsibility to blend what is proven amongst ourselves with the innovative, so that the future must bring us success. The bottom line is that the future must always be represented in all of our talks and discussions.

Again, looking at the time—I am trying to save us a little bit of time here—the most important and critical thing that I believe has been spoken on this panel today is the need:

1. To be able to talk together—command, control, and communications.
2. We need to get out of the box and start exercising together, planning and training together.

Unless we do that, all of the wonderful things that we would like to see happen and to achieve, as we carry out our individual responsibilities to our individual nations, will not be as effective as if we put ourselves and our organizations together and train for the coalition warfare that is certain to be on the horizon.

### Discussion

*Vice Admiral Mir:* Gentlemen, some very interesting points have come up during the talks that the panel has put forth to you; but, before we open the discussion, I would just like to remind you that tomorrow's panel will be dealing with the practical considerations for conducting combined maritime operations, which would include details of communications, integrating capabilities, logistics, law enforcement, etc. Since we would not like to steal their thunder, I would appreciate confining ourselves primarily to the discussions of this panel. And now, if there are any questions, we will endeavor to answer them. May I suggest that some of the points brought up by Mr. Boothby were interesting enough for us to comment on, and the first one that hit me was the development of regional organizations to form coalitions in the peacekeeping role. Would anybody like to comment on that? Yes, please.

*Rear Admiral Marfiak, United States Navy:* I think the issue that Mr. Boothby raised with respect to regional organizations would seem to magnify some of the difficulties we have already articulated with respect to command and control, given that even under a United Nations aegis, certainly the command and control requirements that Vice Admiral Cairns was talking about (*i.e.*, direction of connectivity, data, rules of engagement, rapidity of response) would raise questions even more difficult to resolve in a regional context, although there are some regional organizations that bear promise. I think under the present circumstances—and perhaps Mr. Boothby will amplify this—the United Nations is the organization with the greatest political sweep at this point.

*Mr. Boothby:* Yes, the United Nations has the greatest political sweep, but really what we are not good at are these military operations, and we have done a lot



of these things. But look, you know, all of a sudden in the last two or three years, the United Nations is kind of rediscovered at the end of the Cold War. People turned around to the UN. The Security Council, started adopting resolutions and initiating actions for which the UN was totally unprepared. We did not have the expertise and experience behind us. The kinds of things that we had done in peacekeeping were far removed from peace enforcement. Some of these sanctions, you know, are an easy tool to put on politically, but they are actually difficult to implement, and they tend to bite rather slowly. Then, in the end, they are very difficult to take off.

Now, I do not want to go down the sanctions track. I want to go back to the military. There was inside the UN to start with a kind of in-built reluctance to get involved in some of these more muscular, robust operations. There was a feeling that that was not what the United Nations was supposed to be about. But, when in fact one looked around to try to find ways of implementing these resolutions, apart from NATO, there was no regional organization. And, let me point out that NATO is in fact a sub-regional organization. You know, it is western Europe. It is not central Europe, and it is not eastern Europe, and it can only operate inside the NATO area. There is no other regional or sub-regional organization that over the years has worked out procedures, signal manuals, everything from replenishment at sea to operating tanks in the battlefield, things like that. We suddenly found ourselves in Cambodia, having to deal with Australians and Japanese in a military context, where for constitutional reasons the Japanese had not operated like that before and found ourselves dealing with Somalia, and there was no government to deal with in Somalia. It was a humanitarian assistance and millions of people starving, but there was no government ashore, on the ground, to deal with, so you actually had lawlessness and anarchy. How could you put into place a military organization where there was nothing in Africa—no regional organization in Africa that could deal with that—and then, find the countries with the assets. The United States has assets way, way beyond what anyone else has available, but when the United States arrives on the scene—with respect to the Americans here—it tends to sort of sweep in with its ways of doing things, its own linguistic style, its own acronyms, and tends to leave a lot of other people not knowing what they are talking about. In the division for which I am responsible, handling European affairs, we are trying to deal with the CSCE. Now, the CSCE is an organization of fifty-two member states. Because of the breakup of the Soviet Union, this is a conference on security and cooperation in Europe. It includes Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, who are mentally far away from European issues, and the CSCE does not have a Chapter Seven. It does not have conflict resolution responsibility. It does not have a Security Council. It does its business by consensus, and trying to find consensus amongst fifty-two member states is distinctly difficult. Now, all those political things get in the way of effective military

operations. And so, I return to the point—I hope all this long answer is in fact addressing the issue you raised. All of a sudden, with the absence of the Cold War and this ideological sort of struggle, which seemed to produce the NATO and the Warsaw Pact and their systems, it is as though for forty-five years we have been developing a set of tools to fix the plumbing. We have ratchets, and we have plumber's putty, and we have all those things that will stop the water leaks. Then all of a sudden, after forty-five years, we find that the problems are not in the plumbing, they are in the electrics. We need tools to deal with the electrics, the sparks, and the shorts, and none of the international tools that exist are good enough. We have to shape them politically, and they certainly need to be shaped militarily. Many of the issues that come up are not the high combat issues. Only a restricted number of countries can get into those. Many of the issues that we have to find ourselves addressing are either at the median end of the scale or at the lower end of the scale; there are not even procedures to deal with them. That I think is where I am trying to point up: sure, there will be high combat; there will be the occasional DESERT STORM. But most of the things that come up will not be like moving half a million men halfway around the world with a massive display of efficiency. They will be rather messier, rather more inconclusive, rather more difficult. You will have to have different nationalities with different ways of doing things. It is no good, as was said this morning, to use *ad hoc*-ery at the moment. It needs planning, and the military are very good at planning, providing the military get together first.

*Vice Admiral Cairns:* Our own experience is that it tends to be the people on the ground who sort out the command and control in these various areas. I am not necessarily convinced that it is bad. I believe we need fundamental communication. We need fundamental procedures; we need fundamental ROE, and we can develop from that. On that, I agree with Mr. Boothby. The places where we have found ourselves lately are a long way from home and they are not large tactical NATO scenarios. These are not exercises in the Vestfjord with three hundred ships. There are several ships that have never met each other before. There are airplanes of various kinds of configurations, both fixed wing and rotary wing, and soldiers from all sort of nations with various kinds of equipment. I think there are fundamental issues here that need to be addressed, and I believe we have to be very careful that we do not try and go with the speed of light, when really what we are trying to do here is walk. For many of us in the room, this is pretty mundane stuff, but, for a great number of others, it is a big issue. One thing we have not talked about here is logistics, which is also part of this combined operation. For us in Canada, you know, where we have been lately, we could not have picked a place farther from home. It has been extremely difficult to maintain a ship in Somalia, a battalion of troops, and various folks on the ground thirty days steaming away from our home country. We had the same problem in the Persian Gulf. The Gulf War could not have been farther away

from home for us. This is another issue that we could spend some time on, I believe: It is fundamental logistics capability. I think you find in these operations that many nations come willing to do the job, but they do not have the tools. Somehow in our preparations we have to give them not only the procedural tools but some of the mechanical tools to do the job.

*Admiral Merlo:* I would like to make a remark dealing with the effectiveness of sanctions. I think that sanctions may be effective, especially as we are concerned with maritime blockades. It is necessary, however, to really believe in it and to take the necessary steps to make them effective. For example, the geographic situation may allow for very effective blockade.

I think this type of collective action is less traumatizing than armed operations, and it would be easier to gather international consensus for a blockade than for an armed operation. So I think that we should not give up right away, or resign ourselves to renounce these sanctions. We know very well that where there is political will there is a way of putting pressure on a country by using sanctions.

*Lieutenant General Krulak:* I would like to make one comment. To go back to logistics and also command and control, one of the things—if you look at Somalia and look at how we are postured there now and how we might be postured if we came to some kind of agreement on our capability within the coalition—would be the utilization of sea basing. There are a lot of positives for doing that. Primarily, you cut your infrastructure ashore. You obviously avoid requirements for land forces defending logistical supply points ashore. By bringing command and control of even a coalition force on board a ship vice ashore, you also assure security. There are a lot of things we could probably draw from lessons-learned in conflicts over the last few years. One of them, I think, is the utilization of all of our naval forces in a manner that keeps us from having to put a heavy footprint on another country's sovereign territory, rather, remaining offshore and conducting your operational command and control from that location.

*Rear Admiral Duval:* Admiral Cairns mentioned the possibility of permanent naval force for the United Nations. This has never happened, and I would like to know Mr. Boothby's opinion about this possibility, I mean, about command in New York, logistical problems, definition of rules of engagement and behavior. Do you think the UN, in our day, would be in a position to start to study this possibility?

*Vice Admiral Cairns:* I do not think the question was really for me, but I threw that in at the end just to see whether we would get any comment. It is something that has been talked about for a while, and, as quick as a flash, we did not get very much comment, I am afraid. But, I think, from my point of view, and this

is strictly myself, it seems to me that it would be very useful to have a small maritime staff in the United Nations Organization somewhere to do the planning, to deal with some of these fundamental issues so that we have fundamental capabilities available for people. As for whether that translates into some United Nations permanent force or not, I think we are some years away from that, myself.

*Mr. Boothby:* Admiral, thank you very much. I will make a comment about the idea of a standing force. *Je suis contre.* I am firmly against it. I do not think that an international organization should have an army or a navy or an air force of its own at its regular call. To start with, it is the matter of propriety. I just do not think that is right. Secondly, there's a matter of where would it be. Where would it be situated? How big should it be? Because you would find that if you had eight ships or ten ships or three ships, you would either have not enough, and then you would still need more, or alternatively, when it is doing nothing, what would it be doing? Who would be paying for it? Where would it be based? Taking the army as a case in point, if you had a standing army of 15,000, let us say, and after all we are not talking about very many, the facts would still remain. Where would it be based? How many nationalities would take part in it? How would you deal with a mixture of nationalities, and mixture of backgrounds and training and systems? Who would be responsible for it? And should an event arise—as I said this morning, every United Nations operation is always different from its predecessor—when an event came up, you would probably have the wrong configuration of military capabilities. Now, for all those reasons and others that I have not thought of, I just do not think that a standing force is a good idea. On the other hand, something on-call, something on very short notice would be different. Let me give you a very specific example, which is a pathetic example of how member states do not give us the resources. They sit around the table in the Security Council and they raise their arms to vote for a resolution and then they do not give us the resources to carry it out. On 27 July this year, a cease-fire was agreed between the Georgian forces and the Abkhaz separatists in Abkhazia, the Republic of Georgia. As part of that arrangement, the Georgians wanted, and the Russians supported, the idea that there would be a United Nations observer force—not a military intervention or a peacekeeping force, but simply an observer force—out in Abkhazia. We sent out a small team to identify how many should be sent there, and they came back and they said they thought the job should be done with eighty-eight observers. By this time, we were in the middle of August. By October 16th, we had fifteen observers in place. We tried. We went to member states and said, "Could we have ten; could we have eight?" and they said, "Well, it is August. It is vacation period. Well, it will take us three weeks to think about it. Try us again in early September." And, when we got to them in early September, they said, "We

will make them available, but in three weeks time or in two weeks time." And then it would take them two more weeks to clear their medical entitlement. I mean, on October 16th, we had a Danish brigadier general and fifteen observers out in Abkhazia. We had managed to get eleven vehicles flown out to Zagreb from UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force], and we flew them to Sochi, which is in Russia and the nearest airfield to the Abkhaz border. He detached eleven of his observers to go and get these vehicles—Cherokee Jeeps. Can you imagine the problems of spare parts for Cherokee Jeeps in the Republic of Georgia! While that happened, the Abkhaz forces attacked the Georgians. There was some very spirited fighting, and the Abkhaz threw the Georgians out of the capital city of Sokhumi and broke the cease-fire. Then, there was nothing to be observed anymore. The Georgians were highly resentful that the United Nations had not moved fast enough. The Russians complained that we had not moved fast enough. The UN gets a bad reputation. We had no permanent troops to send there, and we had no on-call people to send there. Now, what I am saying as an illustration to you is that, without having a standing force, if we had something that was on twenty-four or forty-eight-hour call, that would greatly help. Yet, there is not a single member state that has been prepared to stand forward and let us have that. Now, it is on-call forces of some nature that I think that we would very much appreciate. To be backed up, then, by the right kind of military force with the right kind of military configuration, as soon as you work out what the circumstances are.

*Admiral Martinez:* I cannot help but express my total agreement with what was said by Mr. Boothby as to the fact that we cannot think of a standing military force at the United Nations. If this were the case, we, in the navy, would be witnessing a very delicate and serious matter affecting the international, juridical status of that force. From the point of view of the law of war, it would be completely alien to our understanding of a force that depends on a sovereign state. I believe that this is a subject that you just cannot think about, and I would like to establish this very clearly, because, if not, we would be witnessing a very strange phenomenon, which we have seen coming for some time, in changing certain juridical status. Our navies operate in an international milieu. Operations such as blockade and others are governed by certain standards of conduct which are the product of experience and tradition covering many years.

# Practical Considerations in Conducting Combined Maritime Operations

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Panel discussion moderated by  
Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, Jr., U.S. Navy

**S**O FAR IN THE INTERNATIONAL SEAPOWER SYMPOSIUM we have explored some broad proposals presented by Admiral Kelso and Admiral Miller. We have heard Admiral Molina Pico present Argentina's outlook on regional cooperation, and we have had the opportunity to express our own views in committee meetings and in question and answer and comment sessions here with panels. Our final panel discussion focuses on the details of multinational operations.

Rear Admiral Phil Coady, who has recently reported to Washington following command of Cruiser Destroyer Group Five, where he commanded the *Kitty Hawk* Battle Group in support of "Operation Restore Hope" and "Operation Southern Watch," will lead this morning's panel. A graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Admiral Coady has also attended the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and served as a Research Fellow at the National Defense University. When serving as Director of the Political-Military Policy and Current Plans Division on the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Coady was also Master of Ceremonies during the Tenth International Seapower Symposium in 1989.

*Rear Admiral Coady:* Thank you very much Admiral Doran. Admiral Kelso, Admiral Martinez, distinguished delegates. In the two panels earlier this week, we have had lively and learned discussions of collective security in cooperative operations. Rear Admiral Brigstocke, in his panel, gave us a worldwide view of these topics as seen from each of the major maritime regions. Vice Admiral Mir, in his panel, conducted a thoughtful examination of the major issues that concern naval leaders contemplating international maritime operations—issues such as command arrangements and rules of engagement.

Our task in this final panel of this symposium is more mundane and more specific. And, although we are last, we are not merely sweepers after the parade of policymakers. We have been charged with focusing on the real obstacles and practical problems that persist in cooperative international operations long after the more lofty and more political concerns have been resolved. For the purpose of our deliberations this morning, we can assume that the panels that preceded

us have completed their assignments perfectly and have resolved all of the weighty matters of command relationships, of command and control, and of rules of engagement. It is now just a simple matter of going forth and doing what navies do, as Admiral Miller suggested—or do we have more work to do before we can achieve a useful level of mutual support? Is our kit stocked with the right tools for the task? Or, are we responding to an electrical problem with a plumber's kit, as Mr. Boothby alleged yesterday?

Admiral Buis, in his excellent presentation, suggested that there are some fundamental mechanisms that must be established before we can be more than just a nuisance to one another in international cooperation. Well, what are those mechanisms?

Each panel has suggested that a level of communication, a degree of integration, and a system of logistics must be present for any international force to be effective. Perhaps we can all agree on that list. We have a panel of true experts here today to guide our thinking along those lines. There is one further consideration that I would like to offer: Many of the blue-water navies are excluded by law or by practice from law enforcement activities. Yet, very often, the mission of our multinational efforts involves the enforcement of international law—an area that is confusing to all. We will offer you this morning an expert in enforcement of international law to guide your thinking and to prompt some discussion in that area.

Our panel this morning is indeed distinguished. I will introduce them in their order of presentation. Rear Admiral Thomas Marfiak is the Head of the Surface Warfare Plans, Programs, and Requirements Branch on the Staff of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, D.C. He is a 1966 graduate of our Naval Academy and has pursued advanced studies at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris and at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in Medford, Massachusetts. Admiral Marfiak has extensive sea experience in frigates and cruisers, and commanded the USS *Doyle* and the Aegis cruiser, *Bunker Hill*. In the course of the Gulf War, he was the anti-air warfare commander for the multinational forces in the Arabian Gulf. He will use his experience in that capacity to excite your thinking on the topic of communications and information-sharing.

Admiral Vila, the Chief of Staff of the Spanish Navy, is our second presenter. He graduated from the Spanish Naval Academy and was commissioned in 1953. He has had extensive command experience at sea and ashore and, an expert in ordnance and gunnery, he has trained extensively at home and abroad. He has commanded a minesweeper, and a frigate in the Canary Islands Maritime Defense Zone. He was appointed the Vice Chief of Staff in the Spanish Navy in 1988 and the Chief of Staff in May of 1990. He directed the involvement of Spanish forces in the multinational effort during the Gulf War. He will draw on

that experience and his vast experience in naval matters to guide our thinking on integrating the capabilities of the multinational force.

Rear Admiral Luigi Donolo graduated from the Italian Naval Academy in 1958. He is an expert in ASW and is a qualified radar frogman and a diver. He has commanded several minesweepers, three frigates, and a frigate squadron. He was in command of the Italian Naval Forces in Lebanon during our multinational efforts there. He has also commanded a division of raiders, frogmen, and divers in an elite force in the Italian Navy. He is currently serving as the Commandant of the Italian War College. Admiral Donolo will guide our thinking on the topic of "In-theater Logistics."

Our expert on international law enforcement is Vice Admiral Robert T. Nelson, the Vice Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard. A 1958 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, Admiral Nelson is a highly decorated combat veteran of the Vietnam Conflict. He has an extensive command record including command of the Second Coast Guard District, two Coast Guard cutters, and the icebreaker *Westwind*. He has served in numerous staff assignments including Chief of Staff of the U.S. Coast Guard

The format for our deliberations this morning is identical to that with which you have become familiar over the past few days. I will ask each of the panelists to make a presentation of his topic in approximately seven to ten minutes, and, after conclusion of all presentations, we will open the floor to questions. I am confident that these topics will excite some real interests and some lively discussions.

*Rear Admiral Marfiak:* It is indeed an honor to be with you this morning and to have shared with you the deliberations of the past two days. It has been a most stimulating education, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank all of you and to thank Admiral Strasser for making the symposium the success it has already become. I am deeply conscious of the expectations that have been raised, as each succeeding panel has said, "Wait until Wednesday. They will have the answers."

While I do not pretend to have all the answers that you seek, I do have the advantage of some experience in the establishment of communications and information-sharing, by which we mean the communication of both data and voice information in a coalition operation. As Admiral Coady has mentioned, I was one of the warfare commanders in operation DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD. As the Air Warfare Commander for the Gulf, I found it within my area of responsibility to establish satisfactory link operations amongst both land and sea-based commands including the U.S. Marine Corps Units and Allies in the southern Gulf as well as the airborne units such as the AWACS and E-2 aircraft.



In this first portion of my presentation, I would like to give you some appreciation for the extent of the data links and communications we had to establish in order to permit the rapid response and effective connectivity of DESERT SHIELD. I offer these comments in the hope of clarifying the discussion of the past two days.

Single-circuit connectivity or data without voice coordination would not have been sufficient for weapons coordination and safe execution of the rules of engagement in an environment where, as Admiral Brigstocke mentioned yesterday, there was already an element of risk. The data links that characterized the beginning five-month period of DESERT SHIELD relied on a single U.S. Air Force—AWACS—and USMC shore stations along the Gulf. Participating ships were limited to those ships that were north in the Gulf providing for air coverage of the units operating in a multinational interdiction force to the south. In addition, the establishment of an area-wide electronic warning net was in its infancy, and sufficient resources were not yet fully in place, but this is important: the ships were on station. They maintained their communications on-line, frequencies were established, and sustainability, thanks to our Allies, was provided so that the situation could mature. Eventually, over thirty circuits were activated, and data frequencies could be changed readily, with great accuracy. It must also be noted that overhead air patrol flights were flown continuously, twenty-four hours a day, with a minimum of at least one section of CAP airborne, and more if the situation warranted. Those aircraft were maintained on station by the combined forces of the Canadian Air Force and the U.S. Marine Corps' Third Marine Air Wing, operating from bases in the central Gulf for nearly five months. In the face of repeated Iraqi sorties and provocative maneuvers, they were the area bulwark over the northern Gulf for the multinational forces operating to the South.

The coordination of those air assets and their supporting tankers required three-dimensional air search capability and airspace management facilities that were afforded by the Aegis system and its related communications. It is the same system present today near Bosnia and in the Caribbean.

Once the war had begun, the number of AWACS aircraft airborne increased to three. Some of them were from the Saudi Air Forces. The location of the shore-based stations, which as I mentioned was critical to relaying the signals to the Gulf ships, was changed to the north. Some of the problems that General Krulak mentioned the other day, with respect to shore data connectivity, occurred when those facilities were moved. Having said that, we established a link with nearly one hundred subscribers and that number could be cut quickly if there was any sign of intelligence or warning of hostile acts.

Finally, the carriers, operating initially in the south-central Gulf, moved progressively northward. The routes that the aircraft followed, as they returned from their strikes in Iraq, came out over the water for almost all forces, all

nationalities. Aircraft densities often exceeded two hundred aircraft per hour. Each aircraft had to be identified or, as we said, "deconflicted," routed to the appropriate carrier, handed off to a controlling aircraft, or even diverted to a land base, if it had been seriously damaged. SAR coordination took place in the midst of such activity. Mine destruction continued throughout, whenever free-floating mines were encountered, utilizing both helicopters and EOD (or Explosive Ordnance Disposal) Men.

During the first period of "Desert Storm," those activities were punctuated by periodic launches of Tomahawk missiles, which proceeded without interruption to the unprecedented intensity of the coalition air warfare. Even when alongside for fuel, we continued to control aircraft overhead. It should be evident from the foregoing that an extraordinarily high degree of professional qualification is a necessary underpinning. Not only that, we must have the people with the right training. The depth for players on the team was essential to sustain such an effort over a long period of time.

Finally, it was not merely the communications or the data links that enabled us to mount a credible and effective deterrent force throughout that operation. It was the instantly responsive weapons system, coupled with the radar, that gave us the ability with confidence to confront the threat. Data alone would not have been sufficient. Communications alone would not have sufficed. Electronic warfare and intelligence circuits, which did mature into wide area nets with robust resources, would have been merely supportive but not determinant in the absence of long-range, overland sensors coupled to weapon systems capable of engaging low-altitude, high-speed threats. But, that was yesterday. What about tomorrow? What efforts should we have in place to incorporate the capabilities of our allies and friends wherever we can?

We have, through the work of the first two panels, discussed issues associated with the creation of coalition forces. We cannot always predict where the need may arise, but we can with some accuracy foretell the capabilities that will be required to accomplish a given set of tasks against a specific threat. Assuming a basic level of interoperability that we can communicate on at least one voice circuit and that professional standards in navigation and pilotage are met, what can we do to achieve the greatest operational effectiveness and safety for our forces.

From the communications standpoint, the first question is the availability of encryption material. Clear-voice is exploitable, even though we have made strides in reducing the expense. Even commercial encryption is not always affordable for all forces. Further, in areas where its use might be acceptable from a military standard, there may be legal restrictions. In addition, as one delegation has already mentioned in our regional committee, equipment from the former Soviet Union may lack the frequency compatibility necessary to communicate with equipment built in the West.

What, then, should we do in the short term, absent the wholesale replacement of such equipment? Common use of distress frequencies for urgent communications is an emergency solution. Merchant ships will soon rely on INMARSAT, which does offer telephonically based communication via satellite, but has only limited capability for the transference of data. To offer a more tactically relevant solution, we are working on the concept of portable or fly-away packages—a type of communications network in a box, adaptable to a variety of voltages and frequencies. Once set up and operating, presumably with some familiarization, it would improve the level of interoperability significantly. While there may be questions of ship-fit or compatibility, I believe there should be no question of our technical feasibility. As I have already mentioned, however, communications alone may not be sufficient. Where the prospect of weapons employment is near, rules of engagement and the management of risk demand that we carefully and completely coordinate our actions, share identification resources and, if necessary, consider subordinating national control to the best-equipped force commander to assure the safe operation of heavily armed and alerted forces in proximity. Certainly, to achieve the greatest leverage from any force, we must continue to conduct bilateral, multilateral, and regional exercises with allies and friends, building on the skills and teamwork already existing. The planning function for these exercises is in itself quite valuable, since it brings together operators from all sides to compare data, to grow more knowledgeable in the needs and capabilities of the participants.

With respect to our long-standing and established relationships, such as those founded on the NATO Treaty, we cannot afford to be complacent. Technology is on the march. Tomorrow's operations may require imagery as well as data requiring circuits capable of handling gigabytes of information in lieu of kilobytes. When we add superior encryption and data compression, you can see the necessity for us to continue to work together to achieve such a high degree of mutual supportability. Where they do not already exist, as in the NATO context, we may need to consider the creation of regional interoperability committees to afford a means of collecting useful information, demonstrating the utility of a degree of interoperability with a neighboring state. This is a complex area, and technology has much to offer, but I offer this caution: technology is much too important to be left to the technologists alone. Standards and agreements on frequency management will be needed, and they will require our leadership. Certainly, as the two days of discussion have underlined, there is much that needs to be done to ensure cost-effective, technically up-to-date communications, and data connectivity. An area of enhanced interoperability at sea is at hand with significant promise for safety and the ability of the international community to swiftly and effectively contain crises as they occur.

Finally, Admiral Martinez has given us his vision, his wisdom on the rules of engagement, noting that they work most effectively where there is a unified,

clear chain of command. I believe Admiral Brigstocke also made a similar point. If communications and data are minimum requirements for the successful identification of a threat within an operating area, rules of engagement applied just as quickly by well-informed commanders are also prerequisites. In such environments, as Admiral Mauz suggested yesterday, we may want to continue to allocate tasks on the basis of capabilities. It is at least one way of apportioning risk. As you know, we operated in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM with naval, air, and ground forces from around the world. Especially in the early days, as new forces arrived almost daily, we needed to solve problems related to encryption, data flow, communications links. The cooperation and willingness of all hands to work together made it possible to achieve the largest and most effective military coalition in modern history. I would respectfully submit that the record of no blue-on-blue over-water engagements, a safe return of over 60,000 aircraft, and the coordination of warships and aircraft from many nations in that environment marks a standard in coalition operations to which we will refer again and again for lessons. NATO served us well, but so did ingenuity and the support of our allies and friends without which it might have been a much tighter affair.

It has been suggested that we have cleared all the hurdles; that the worst is behind us; that the way ahead is clear of obstacles. We must be realistic and cautious mariners. Even in a quasi-benign environment, safety at sea, in the air, and beneath the sea depends, in today's world, on the careful and timely coordination of all aspects of our operations. As has already been noted, in a low-threat environment, we might be willing to accept less. We might, but in the presence of an aerial threat or a low-altitude, low cross-section anti-ship missile threat, anything less than integral weapons and sensors unified by command and control suitable and appropriate to those sensors may invite unfortunate consequences.

I will now turn the rostrum over to Admiral Vila, who will speak further on the integration of our capabilities.

*Admiral Vila:* Thank you, Admiral. Admiral Kelso, Admiral Martinez, colleagues in this symposium and other colleagues. First of all, I would like to excuse myself for being in civilian clothes, but, unforeseen circumstances are forcing me to leave quickly as soon as the symposium ends.

There has been talk here of political and strategic circumstances that have changed so much that we have to adapt ourselves to new circumstances. It is, therefore, advisable to foresee the establishment of combined forces as witnessed by the good influence of the existence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact on stability in Europe over the past forty years. Although it is true that we have to have combined forces, and although it is true that these combined forces will increase the whole, the sum being greater than its individual parts, serious difficulties arise

when very different navies merge. I think that among those present here we can classify our navies at four levels: the superpowers (the United States); the medium-size navies; small navies (among which is my own); and there are even smaller navies.

When there is a threat that is serious and of substantial peril that everyone perceives as being imminent, there is an understanding that makes it easier to join together. It makes it easier to integrate everyone's capabilities, as happened in the Gulf. It was an example of how the countries placed all of their capabilities in the service of higher cause. But, we should not forget, and this has already been said in one of the panel discussions, that in the Gulf we had almost six months to get together. When the time arose for the war to break out, we had worked together for a long time. We should also not forget that perhaps—and I include myself in this—we are giving too much importance to the problem of the large navies—I say the large ones, including those which I used to call small, perhaps to the detriment of the problem of the even smaller navies. When we want to establish a multinational force that will include navies whose capabilities are very different from our own, we find a problem. I believe that I and the Royal Navy of my country are well qualified to analyze this problem because we have been in a unique position, and we are still in a unique position *vis-à-vis* a multinational force. For thirty years, we were with NATO from the outside. We were not in NATO, but we were side-by-side with NATO. We carried out exercises in multinational forces, but without belonging to the alliance. We saw the problems that are brought about by working with a group of navies that have common procedures and are accustomed to acting routinely and jointly. And, at that time, although we also worked routinely with the NATO navies, we were neither up-to-speed with all of the procedures nor with all the communications equipment being used. That problem we saw, as I said, for thirty years. Now, we are in NATO. We joined NATO as full partners. We have been working, participating for a long time, in all maneuvers and exercises, and in real cases. We have been in the Gulf. We were in the Adriatic, and we know and see that this cooperation can take place. They are easy; they are simple for us since we have had thirty years of experience, as I said, with NATO but side-by-side with it, and now, ten or twelve years inside NATO. But we also did exercises with the navies of our geographic areas that do not belong to NATO and also that do not belong to what we might call the Western cultural milieu. Although we are similar—we have had relations with them for a long time—in our communications we still find that problems do arise as far as integration is concerned. To give you a very specific case, there are no exercises with foreign countries that have ships built in Spain, with equipment established in Spain or made in Spain. It is not easy, but we have to make an effort, and we are making an effort to achieve that commonality and ease of cooperation. This, I believe, is what I have most missed in these conferences. How, if a time comes when

there no war, when there is no threat or serious threat of war or imminent threat of war, and therefore there is no urgent prod for us to achieve immediate cooperation, how, if we need—and we do need, all of us need the cooperation of other navies including the smallest, a navy smaller than our own—how can we do this, if these other navies are technically, technologically, and let us say procedurally, different from our own?

Admiral Marfiak has explained what can be done technologically. In that regard, it is true, you can do a great deal. The technical means exist, but technical means are expensive and oftentimes they are not within the reach of everyone. We have problems, all of us, even when we have the money and the budget to do this. We have problems in obtaining certain equipment, because, of course, the countries that develop and manufacture the equipment give priority to their own needs. This, I believe, is a matter which we should think about and bear in mind. That is what we have to do. Each one of our navies has to think that it must clothe the navies surrounding it—the navies with which we have great degrees of contact—and to facilitate their possible integration with ourselves. We need to make a conscious effort to do this, but I think that effort will be profitable.

Having said this, which is a sort of call, a call for help even, that we need the support from those that are on a higher level than this, and we have to give support to those that are below. Speaking of the four levels that I have established, I could say very little more than what has been said by the admiral who spoke of these matters. We could say that learning lessons from the Gulf War, and now from the Adriatic, if we want to establish multinational units, they should be multinational at the lowest possible level. That is to say we should not integrate one squadron but not another. We should have every level integrated so that contact can be multinational at the level of commander, of officers, and that, in addition, responsibilities go down as far as the lowliest echelons of the chain of command.

We should have a common language, but a common language is not only to speak the language that is spoken on the street. We must use a language that includes a glossary, a dictionary that has perfectly clear definitions of technical terms. NATO has it, but we come back once more to the old, I say old, because this has come up in other symposia, thesis of the need for facilitating other navies and giving them NATO documentation. It is vital for the documents that reflect our naval way of thinking to be within the reach of each and every one of the navies. I understand the problem involved. I am the first to recognize that there are a lot of secrets that cannot be given out, but 90 percent of what we use is easily accessible to anyone.

If possible, and this has been said already by the worthy representative of the United Nations, it is advisable in a combined action of this nature that command and achievement be entrusted to nations and forces that are in a single geographical area or that are of the same cultural background. This facilitates the mission.

In addition, it helps to dissipate mistrust, the logical mistrust of the countries that are going to be given help.

It is important that the nation that is to lead the operations have the responsibility for ensuring the greatest possible interoperability of all the components. This was done with extraordinary results by the United States in the Gulf War.

We should also take into account the possibility of a specific infrastructure for the operations. This also was done in the Gulf, but they were navies that set up their own logistics structure. We did not, but there were other navies that did in the Gulf and also in the Adriatic.

If we are going to think about the possibility of acting globally—creating a doctrine, agreement, or an appeal to all of the navies represented here concerning operations that could be held anywhere in the world—the intelligence should be as broad as the operational concept. To that end, I believe that it would be important to have something resembling regional intelligence groups. I know that they exist, but for this operation or any operation, there should be a more flexible communication as far as intelligence matters are concerned. It is vital and, unfortunately, it is not always there—it is vital to have greater ease of communication and operations with diplomatic sources or personnel. Unfortunately, we have different backgrounds and training. We work differently, have different procedures, and sometimes different aims. We must have more open channels in order to handle our forces with greater ease. Going into details of matériel or tactics, it would be good if we could experiment in our navies. I know this is being done in some navies and that we conduct exercises that are as joint as possible in addition to being combined. The use of helicopters, of army helicopters on our ships, of army anti-aircraft means or the use of our ships in supporting land operations would greatly facilitate our mission.

Admiral Marfiak has talked about written materials and data communication. Those are things that we have to test and adjust constantly to achieve the greatest operational flexibility and rapidity. It would be good if we could stretch our imagination and increase opportunities for working with our sister services, taking advantage of what they have to offer. Finally, this is something which consciously or unconsciously we resist and I am guilty of this also—in these cases, we should attribute much greater importance to the press—the press and television. We know, and we have said it here, that operations at a level lower than war have an increasingly large political content. Politicians need the support of the people, and the people will only support them if they are well-informed and know the objectives that we have as well as the way in which our operations are taking place.

*Rear Admiral Luigi Donolo, Italian Navy:* Delegates, ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I would like to thank the U.S. Navy and Admiral Kelso for the opportunity

they have given to me to discuss, in such an important context, topical problems of agreed interests for all our navies. As a representative of my country and as Commandant of the Italian Naval War College, I also wish to express to Admiral Strasser my appreciation of this occasion, but above all I wish to tell him that the Naval War College continues to represent an important point of reference for naval culture in the world and that such a role will continue to grow. Coming to the theme of my speech, which is "In-theater Logistics for Conducting Combined Operations," I must first of all point out that my observations and conclusions refer fundamentally to the experience of the Italian Navy during the operations conducted in Lebanon, in the Persian Gulf, in Somalia, and in the Adriatic Sea with naval groups always representing a high percentage of those endeavors.

In the foreseeable future, the possibility of becoming involved in a crisis of major or minor intensity is ever-increasing. Response from the sea will be the most common option, because naval forces will add flexibility, mobility, and endurance. They have the ability to meet the conventional military risks they may be subjected to. They have a simple logistical support organization in reference to their other services.

If the intervention required is the presence of forces ashore, the operational and logistical support from the sea will be invaluable. The shedding of political responsibilities will bring with it more international cooperation. Multinational forces must have the capacity to conduct a unified action with commonly defined goals in order to be effective. From the logistical aspect, as far as Italian national organizations are concerned, we distinguished two possible operational situations: operations conducted in the Mediterranean and operations conducted out of area. In the first case, the logistical support for the units at sea in the Mediterranean is based essentially on the existing support ashore with the utilization of helicopters and the supply ships for the movement of materials and men, when the combatant units cannot go back to national port.

In the second case, considering the longer transit time in addition to supplying its ship and naval group with spare parts before leaving, and always including in the group at least one supply unit, it is important to create a logistical flow for all those materials, fuels, and food, which are sometimes impossible to find in the operational area, for instance, in Somalia. The flow line, which originates from national bases, should be directed and organized by a coordination center and by a group which prepares expeditions, utilizing also civilian assets and commercial means of transport.

In advance, set the logistic base to be organized near the operation area, preferably on a friendly nation's territory. The supply ships of another group involved in the operation could then also carry out a shuttle task between the logistical base ashore and the unit at sea.



In the multinational field, the logistic support for combined operations will often be complicated. The forces of certain countries might have logistic support from the services of their own country, from international organizations, or from organizations of the host country. The responsibility for logistical support will remain, in many circumstances, fundamentally national, but the problem should be monitored by only one organizational element, both at the strategic level and in-theater level. The duplication of logistical functions should be minimized, at least in certain areas, creating when possible multinational pools and specialized rules. In logistics, command and control, communication and operational procedures will remain in many situations a problem of standardization for which there may not be an immediate solution—and perhaps there never will be—until operating in the multinational field. Some forces will be earmarked for such missions conducted by international organizations. Therefore, at all times, attempts must be made to achieve, at the very least, compatibility in procedures. We cannot indicate, at present, the rules which are always valid. We must be able to adapt to everything: to the various types of missions and the forces employed. Maximum simplicity and effectiveness can be achieved by utilizing forces already assigned to an alliance or to regional forces or by resorting to complementary tasks. From the experience in the multinational field, we know that besides the natural difficulties due to the different characteristics of the means, administrative difficulties sometimes occur because of the different laws of participating countries. Such difficulties are minimized if operations are carried out within an alliance, but it can be reduced by a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the exchange of possessions and services. We must try to overcome these obstacles, because it must be considered that cooperation in the logistics sector may well reduce expenses. Nothing can make military forces from different nations operating in a specific area more interdependent than a logistical organization that has, at least, some point in common. The most important thing is that logistical support, also including medical support, is an integrated component of a combined multinational force and must be taken into consideration in terms of needs and solutions during the operational planning phase. Experience has shown that the most critical areas of logistics in maritime combined operations are concerned with ship and airplane refueling, food, repairs, and spare parts, and finally transportation. In all these aspects, there may be points of cooperation between the participating nations, but especially in fuel and transportation.

For transportation, military assets from the navy or air force may be utilized in conjunction with national or commercial companies that may be available. The employment of military means is therefore indispensable when an urgent need occurs or when the airspace of a country close to the operational area is banned to traffic. This consideration gives the opportunity to say that cooperation with civilian organizations in the logistics field is extremely important to

supplement shortages in military means, particularly in areas concerning ground and maritime transportation. A sound balance between the utilization of military and civilian resources should be actively pursued, especially during a peacekeeping operation when the threatening condition might be less hostile. The possibilities of utilizing civilian resources must also be carefully explored, especially in transportation, infrastructural and industrial support areas. When possible, bases able to provide mooring, logistical, and technical support should be found near the operation area—bases that are able to serve as advanced logistics points.

It is important that relations between the host nation and the multinational forces are regulated by special agreements, making sure that there is no conflict with other international agreements. Base or bases must be managed by a coordinating logistics agency with a commanding officer and staff who are experts in the logistics area and the level of support they must provide. They must identify areas of common interest, the local availability of materials, repair capacity, and the transport organization to and from naval groups using both military and civilian helicopters. Although the presence of bases ashore is important, it is better if logistical support is totally prepared with mobile components in order to assure flexibility and a perfect adhesion to the operation. It is particularly important that forces operating in distant areas without support ashore have containerized logistical support. The sustainability of multinational maritime forces is not just about fuel and matériel or supply; there is also a very important area connected with maintenance and repair. A mobile system of engineering and associated tools with spare parts should be embarked on one or more containers and transported by warships, merchant ships, or by air. These containers can be located ashore or afloat in the operation area. Containers, in some instances, can also be used to increase a warship's capability to transport materials or to recover particular teams of people, such as medical staffs with their equipment.

*Vice Admiral Robert Nelson, U.S. Coast Guard:* Admiral Kelso, Admiral Martinez, distinguished delegates. I am pleased to represent the United States Coast Guard and to talk to you about maritime law enforcement. Maritime law enforcement is definitely on the low end of the scale of military operations, but I believe that it has a number of very practical "implications" for us to consider here. In today's new world, I believe that maritime law enforcement is at the high end of the scale in terms of national security priorities for many nations. I have met in Washington with many of you or your representatives over the past couple of years, and I have visited a number of your countries. I have been impressed with a common theme that has surfaced during my visits.

As part of their national security strategies, nations are redirecting their maritime services' efforts toward the threats of illegal drug trafficking, illegal alien

smuggling, the destruction of the marine environment by pollution, and the uncontrolled harvesting of our living marine resources. This is in sharp contrast to the national defense-oriented paradigm of the past.

The concept of combined maritime law enforcement operations has merited two significant areas: First, it unifies and strengthens deterrence of illegal activities internationally, through reciprocal enforcement of commonly recognized violations. Secondly, it elevates flag-state enforcement to a mutually agreed upon international level, effectively erasing the territorial boundaries that have provided safe havens to violators in the past. Therefore, it is not surprising that international cooperation in law enforcement is absolutely essential for success.

To name just a few examples of cooperation, the Coast Guard rarely participates in UNITAS exercises with the U.S. Navy and the navies of Central and South America, although we are part of a multinational maritime interception operation enforcing the UN sanctions in the Middle East against Iraq and in the Adriatic. We have entered into bilateral counter-drug enforcement agreements with the Bahamas, Belize, United Kingdom, and Venezuela, and we are working on an agreement with Columbia.

For several years, the Coast Guard has been participating in some very successful combined counter-drug operations with Bahama officials, interdicting drug smuggling aircraft and vessels that attempt to deliver illicit cargos of drugs to the Bahamas for transshipment to the United States. We are also conducting a series of combined international law enforcement operations that involve Coast Guard law enforcement detachments on board the United Kingdom's West Indies guard-ship patrolling the Caribbean Sea. This additional law enforcement presence, a real force multiplier, heightens drug smugglers' fears of all naval vessels and prevents their uncontested access to the maritime smuggling routes.

As a final illustration of cooperation, I would like to share with you a recent very successful cooperative operation undertaken with our good friends to the South: Mexico. On very short notice, Mexican authorities allowed the United States to covertly surveil two suspect vessels that had departed another country and were sailing through Mexican waters. Uninterrupted surveillance was permitted until the Mexican authorities interdicted the two vessels and brought the case to closure. The end result was eight tons of cocaine confiscated, seventeen people arrested, and probably fifteen more will be arrested. This is an excellent example of success on the international level, using timely cooperation, information sharing, and the efficient use of available resources.

Another growing problem that requires international law enforcement cooperation concerns illegal immigrants. Illegal migration is increasingly becoming a global problem, as nations struggle with economic, political, and legal sensitivities related to this issue. Recently, there has been great progress toward improved international cooperation on illegal immigrant issues, especially regarding migrant smuggling operations conducted by criminal syndicates, and

there has been a lot of international effort to develop cooperative agreements. In fact, just last week, the eighteenth session of the International Maritime Organization passed a resolution dealing with the suppression of alien smuggling by ships.

In the area of our fish resources, we have had several initiatives worthy of mention. International treaties have been signed to protect salmon stocks on the high seas. Moreover, UN moratoriums on large-scale drift-net fishing on the high seas and straddling stocks in the Central Bering Sea have met with resounding success and are being enforced under international law and bilateral agreements.

The mechanism to accomplish these international law enforcement operations is often transparent outside the military, but there are a number of obstacles. Those obstacles have been discussed in detail in the last two days, and I will simply highlight them. One is the difference in the operating philosophies between the large battle group navies and the smaller coast guard type navies. Others are the determination of who should be a lead agency and the determination of a legal authority of your navies to conduct maritime operations. Communications is absolutely essential, like any other military operation. Intelligence sharing, fast intelligence sharing, and timely intelligence sharing is absolutely critical. Conflicting authorization and jurisdiction, rules of engagement, hands-off procedures, hot-pursuit into national territories, interpreters—all of these are some of the obstacles to effective maritime law enforcement.

Now I will shift quickly to another problem—oil spills. Oil spills respect no national boundaries. Of particular concern are environmental violations in the form of oil and hazardous chemicals, medical waste, and refuge pollution that impact the waters of other nations from the high seas. Apparently, standardized sampling techniques are being developed and reciprocal evidence-gathering between some nations is being conducted to pursue violators. These are just some of the practical considerations that must be considered toward more effective, combined maritime law enforcement operations on an international scale.

We seek professional exchanges to improve cooperation in maritime law enforcement. To that end, the Coast Guard has responded to many requests for technical assistance and training on a variety of areas, and we have an invested interest or have developed an expertise in a number of areas.

Since 1987, we have sent one hundred ninety-five mobile training teams to seventy-three countries, at your invitation, to provide technical training and assistance to thousands of students. Additionally, we presently have twenty-three international cadets at the Coast Guard Academy and have accepted over one hundred fifty international students to attend our specialized service schools each year.

In summary, I see opportunities that will form the basis for cooperative international commitment in support of maritime law enforcement operations.

### Discussion

*Rear Admiral Coady:* You have heard from our panelists. We have time for a few questions, and I now invite them. Certainly, several of the topics discussed must excite your interests; if not, I have a few questions that I would like to ask. First, your opportunity.

Admiral Donolo, I know that you have had some insight into the operations in the Adriatic and the means by which you are establishing some logistics bases to be able to do that work in that area efficiently, in spite of the complexities of that climate. Could you give us some insights as to how that is being done?

*Rear Admiral Donolo:* Yes. I think that about the Adriatic operation there are two important points. One refers to the host nation, and the other, to the forward water logistics base. I may say that, from a logistical point of view, the operation in the Adriatic seems to have different characteristics compared to those previously mentioned. In Lebanon, the cooperation between the ships and between the nations was completely absent, with the exception of the cooperation between the Italian Navy and the U.S. Navy in two particular fields: communications for transmission of operational information, and resupply. In Somalia, for instance, the logistical support was unusual because there are no places ashore to replenish our food or fuel. In the Adriatic area, in contrast, the operations are in the vicinity of friendly Italian harbors. The presence of friendly naval bases and airfields simply removes many of the logistical problems in the Adriatic Sea, not only for NATO units but also for national groups whose task it is to intervene and, if necessary, to pick up their forces ashore or support their forces ashore.

In regard to this matter, there was an article in *The RUSI Journal* in August 1993, written by Rear Admiral Blackham of the Royal Navy in which he stated:

I ... recognize that Italy was ... acting as a host nation. She was invited to accept airheads, a huge range of ... requests for ships and aircraft of several nations [twelve nations or more], interference with her own operations and training, and many other demands....

If ... Adriatic operations are a good pointer towards future maritime peacekeeping operations, then the need to make preparations for host nation support is just as great as for actual military operations, and maritime activity must take account not only of the normal courtesies, but of the quite

legitimate sensitivities of the host country. It probably involves early, and high level, political and military contacts.<sup>1</sup>

In spite of this, let me tell you that the Italian Navy is very proud to participate in these operations and also to help, as best as possible, allied and friendly ships.

Another point of interest is the institution, the construction, of one of the advanced or forward points for forward logistic operations. What are the advantages of these forward points? They should be established, yet at a location that permits the reception and forwarding of selected high priority materials, including munitions, personnel received from the other points of the logistical organization, as well as to and from the units operating at sea in the area by rotary or fixed-wing aircraft. The base should possess the requisite medical support and have the capability to accept and stabilize all the battle casualties until they can be returned to duty or evacuated by intra-theater airlift, and should be linked to other nation's bases to receive materials, foods, and personnel needs.

For instance, currently in the Adriatic Sea, the logistic point was built near Brindisi, at a small airfield of the Italian Navy. To give an idea to delegates about operations in the Adriatic, and because there are present at this moment delegates from the other side of the wall, the NATO, Royal Navy, and WEU Fleet, under the operative control of the NATO Southern Naval Forces Command, consists of units from up to twelve different countries. These units operate in perfect coordination and are carrying out operational control of naval and commercial traffic. At the end of September, 2,400 ships were intercepted. One hundred to three hundred inspected, and almost four hundred were forced into harbor for inspection. The NATO and the WEU embargo enforcement forces are operating with other national groups. The Italian contribution in the Adriatic Sea, operation SHARP GUARD, since July 1992 has consisted of two cruises, one destroyer, eight frigates, six corvettes, and one supply ship, together with maritime patrol aircraft.

To give a perfect example of the complete integration of units in this operation, it is interesting to note that a Canadian commodore hoisted his task group command flag on board our aircraft carrier *Garibaldi*.

*Rear Admiral Coady:* I believe our time is expended. I will summarize briefly some of the key points that I think we should draw from this discussion here today:

From Admiral Marfiak's discussion on communication, we had a picture of compelling complexity in the Gulf War, with many, many circuits; he mentioned thirty in his discussion. That certainly involved the key warfare commanders and many of the more sophisticated warships.

<sup>1</sup>Rear Admiral J. J. Blackham, RN, "Maritime Peacekeeping," *The RUSI Journal*, vol. 138, no. 4 (August 1993), pp.18-23. Quote from p. 22.

Admiral Vila counseled us and enjoined us to bear in mind, when we do our planning for international operations, that the very small navies do not have the ability to operate in that type of complexity and it would be worthwhile to consider training to involve them in a way that will enhance their contribution to support. Admiral Vila also keyed on several points that were important to the integration of forces: a common language, a common glossary, the extensive use of publications. NATO publications were once again cited as a possible base for common direction in multinational operations.

Admiral Donolo's presentation on logistics cited many things that have certainly been familiar to us in the operations that we have done in the past, but cited in particular the need for logistics plans to be simple but flexible, to make full use of civilian as well as military capabilities, and to make full use of all of the nations that are involved, so that we can prevent duplication and gain from each other's capabilities.

Admiral Nelson struck a note on the international law, when he educated us on the various means and programs that are going on worldwide that invite international cooperation, such as counter-drug programs, programs to halt international illegal immigration and illegal fishery, which have been discussed previously at this forum.

# Regional Committee Summary Reports

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Moderated by  
Rear Admiral Walter F. Doran, U.S. Navy

**A**DMIRAL MARTINEZ, ADMIRAL KELSO, delegates, observers, and participants. Welcome back. At this point, to start our final session, I will call on the chairman of each of the regional committees to present a fifteen-minute review of the committee's deliberations. At the end of each review, if there is time, we will be able to take questions or comments, so I will try to keep us on schedule. Moving along, I will introduce each of the committee chairman prior to his presentation.

Our first committee is the special group on service colleges, headed by Vice Admiral Quesada da Andrade, Director of the Portuguese Naval War College.

## **Committee One: Special Group—Service Colleges**

*Vice Admiral Quesada da Andrade:* Admiral Kelso, Admiral Martinez, fellow delegates, ladies and gentlemen. I have had the privilege and the pleasure to chair the special group on service colleges and I will go on with the summary report.

Leading off with the premise that education is one of the most important activities in the world today and that the way we educate in our service colleges will actually bear on the outcome of operations at sea, our committee and the discussion focused on change. Just as there is change in the dramatic characteristics of the global political environment in this final decade of the century, so change in our college curricula must address the new roles and missions of naval forces. Our officers must broaden their studies beyond the purely military to include civilian issues. There must be some caution that, as we might focus on new areas such as environment, law, social science, and the like, we must never neglect the call of our profession: war-fighting. As our forces become more involved with non-traditional roles, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, we are reminded that mastery of the operational art remains essential.

The service college has a special obligation, which transcends the purely military and which is the intellectual broadening of the mind. There was general consensus in our committee that as officers mature, the capacity for analyzing information and synthesizing data becomes increasing critical—the more so in this era of rapid technological advancement.



Other manifestations of educational change and challenge that arose in our discussions were the stress of joint warfare and its demands for familiarity with other services besides the Navy, international cooperation and coalition warfare, the special needs of officers serving in the navies of smaller countries and the way those needs differ from larger navies, and the question of developing naval doctrine in the formal sense.

Considerable discussion revolved around this last subject, with disciples of the traditional mode of oceangoing war-fighters relying on their adaptability, knowledge of the enemy and flexibility, which differed from those delegates who sense that naval officers in the far more complex milieu of the next century will benefit from a more formalized, published doctrine. Again, the factor of change was raised wherein the naval officer of old tended to operate at sea alone and on his own. Our students will in the future face more connectivity with non-naval forces, thus strengthening the argument for formal published doctrine. There was general agreement, however, that a new reliance on any published doctrine runs the risk of undermining the strong self-reliance that has been the tradition of men at sea.

During our final session, several of the delegates shared the details of programs in their service colleges whereby students may earn an academic degree in conjunction with completing their military studies. For example, in one country, the student can complete his degree work at a neighboring private university, and in another, the service college is accredited by an outside agency to award its own master of arts degree. In this same discussion, another delegate described how in Europe several service colleges cooperate in an exchange program whereby the students enjoy the week visiting another country's service college, thereby deriving a better understanding of their respective allies and neighbors.

We concluded with an expressed conviction that this sharing of problems, solutions and ideas, such as we enjoyed this week, will be increasingly important in the future. The well-being of our officers and the quality of their education depends on it.

#### **Committee Two: Caribbean, South Atlantic, and Eastern Pacific**

*Admiral Alfredo Arnaiz Ambrossiani, Peruvian Navy; Admiral Kelso, Admiral Martinez, delegates.* I have been asked to give a summary of the work carried out by regional committee number two, covering the Caribbean, the South Atlantic, and Eastern Pacific.

We began our sessions reminding everyone that during the Eleventh Symposium the committee discussed subjects having to do with the missions of navies during peace: their involvement in the fight against drug trafficking as well as activities of regional and international cooperation. It was an excellent occasion, since we were meeting to assess the way in which these subjects had evolved during the two-year period since that time, and in accordance with the main

subject of this symposium, which is that of "Maritime coalitions and international security."

It was mentioned that both the UN, as well as the Organization of American States, has requested the participation of navies to carry out different kinds of operations such as the blockade of ports, induction of immigrants and refugees, support of refugees, support in the fight against drug trafficking, *et cetera*. We proposed that the main subject for exchange of ideas be the development of naval cooperation in the region.

Under this subject, we discussed the specific activities with which we can materialize that coordination, always bearing in mind that there are different situations and realities within the navies of the region and that on the basis of those different realities and situations we consider that bilateral and trilateral as well as sub-regional agreements should be entered into. An excellent example of cooperation and training in operations was mentioned, and that was the UNITAS exercises as well as other bilateral operations. Likewise, it was interesting to listen to the delegate of Argentina speak about the participation of his country's navy in the Persian Gulf War as well as the experiences acquired during that operation.

There was a broad discussion about the importance of drug traffic and control as well as control of illicit arms trade and other actions that could be considered as constabulary activities and that are presently being adopted by some of the regions' navies, but not all.

We also analyzed the importance of having communications systems in order to link the navy commands at different levels and thus, with effectiveness and speed, be able to carry out activities of cooperation and coordination.

Our committee concluded its session with more clear ideas of how to implement activities of regional cooperation as well as of the importance of exchange of information for which we need to have communication devices that are speedy and flexible.

The committee would also like to express to Admiral Kelso, Rear Admiral Strasser, and all the delegates and participants its appreciation for having allowed us to analyze the very important aspects and subjects that we are now facing and that will be guiding our activities in the near future.

### **Committee Three: Western Pacific**

*Admiral William D. Smith, U.S. Navy:* Admiral Martinez, Admiral Kelso. The Western Pacific Committee undertook discussion of some of the major issues, but spent a good part of its time discussing procedural matters. This was the result of the last International Seapower Symposium decision by the Western Pacific Committee to organize a regional organization and proceed with some of the work at a greater frequency than the two-year interval of this symposium. We heard a report early on Monday about the First Western Pacific Naval

Symposium. In addition, there has been other work that has been going on, which I will talk about in my report.

There were four major issues discussed by our committee. Probably the most important and most prevalent discussion centered upon the need for a common doctrine for navies in a regional situation: to be able to operate and communicate. The Western Pacific nations realized this some time ago and have been taking steps over the past two years to develop a common tactical signals manual; a draft was discussed in a workshop a few months ago and is proceeding into smoother form. This common doctrine problem was so widespread enough among the committees that Admiral Kelso will offer some comments on the subject in his closing remarks, therefore I will not highlight our work any further.

The other issue of great importance that we talked about was environmental concerns, and these environmental concerns center, again, upon cooperation among members, principally on the naval side, to share essential information. Because the Western Region has had a workshop, in addition to their symposium, I will address further the environmental area and actions being taken in the Western Pacific region as a result of some of the reports from the workshop.

Exercise planning was another area that was discussed at some length, and we had the benefit in our workshop of Admiral Martinez's presence and participation and his experience of thirty years of operation with Exercise UNITAS. For those members who are not familiar with that acronym, UNITAS is an annual exercise among South American, Western Hemisphere navies that is built around a cruise that circumnavigates South America. Exercises are held with each nation as the principal force proceeds past that country. This exercise has developed good procedures for successful operations, and Admiral Martinez gave us some of his lessons learned: Principally, that by starting several months in advance and war-gaming and working out the exercises at a shore facility, they could do a much more proficient job at sea. The command and control of these exercises was rotated frequently and multilateral exercises were always rotated, sometimes between the sea and the shore commanders. UNITAS was even changed in a rotation from its historic clockwise to a counter-clockwise direction to provide some better exercise scenarios and opportunities.

The fourth area we discussed was the area of communications improvements for coalition warfare and what methods might be available to improve that communication. We discussed briefly the U.S. Navy's recent fielding of a common information system and the possibility that a gateway ship of another nation could have that equipment and then further distribute information to its own ships as a way to reduce cost.

In the procedural area, there have been some very interesting developments from the Western Pacific group, meeting outside of this forum. After the symposium in the Western Pacific was planned at the last meeting, it was quickly realized that a workshop to prepare for that symposium would be necessary to

make the symposium much more productive. So we had a report from Colonel Lim, Director of Operations, the Navy of the Republic of Singapore, who gave us the summary of the workshop that was conducted in preparation for their symposium. I think this information is important, because it points the way for some of the regional committees who might want to proceed with regional meetings to gain more benefit from a larger symposium such as this one.

The first session of this Western Pacific workshop centered on the maritime information exchange directory. This directory is a vehicle to provide a navy-to-navy communications guide for critical information that should be exchanged between neighboring navies. The areas that are being worked on are marine pollution, search and rescue, humanitarian activities, narcotics trafficking, high seas robbery, and fisheries infringement.

They also had a very productive session on interoperability in the navy multilateral framework. There, they discussed procedures and information exchange for areas such as replenishment at sea, helicopter operations, search and rescue.

Their third session was devoted principally to the draft tactical signals manual, which I discussed earlier. They are seriously considering command-post exercises in order to exercise this tactical signals manual. All of that is a very helpful series of steps forward.

In discussing the procedural efforts, because this committee has been ongoing, there was talk of the next symposium, and it was agreed that the Royal Malaysian Navy would host the next symposium a year from now and that Admiral Shariff would act as host. He also volunteered to host the preparatory workshop that will be held in May or June, about six months before the symposium. It was believed to be essential to invite a Seventh Fleet representative, because there has been considerable exercise work going on with the Seventh Fleet, and that will be achieved as part of the next workshop.

Toward the end of our meeting, Admiral Haryono from the Indonesian Navy announced that the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Indonesian Navy will occur in 1995. *Sail Indonesia* will be a program of Tall Ships and sailing races to celebrate this fiftieth anniversary. He wanted to announce this to the Western Pacific Region and also offer to host a regional symposium in 1995. This additional procedural information, I feel, is important to give to the members here, because it points a way forward for those regional committees that want to make more progress than is possible once every two years. Hopefully, the work done by the Western Pacific Symposium can be helpful to the other committees to solve some of their regional problems. That completes my remarks.

#### **Committee Four: Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf**

*Vice Admiral Michael P. Kalleres, U.S. Navy:* It was amazing how many similar topics came up with each of the groups with just a bit of a different twist to it,

but a very similar type of look. We had eleven nations represented from Bahrain, Egypt, France, India, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Union of South Africa, United Arab Emirates, and United States. Three issues came up that were most important, and all were tied together with cooperation, coalition, and doing something more than what we sometimes say happens in many bureaucratic organizations. The three topics were port access in the regions in times of crisis and when there are disasters; second was environmental protection and coordinated efforts, with regard particularly to that area in the GCC, but we got some very good input also from our representatives from India, Pakistan, and South Africa; and the needs for standardized procedures in publications, doctrine, and command and control, which was a key area of discussion for everyone.

In the first area regarding port access, the group discussed, in general, that if there were another serious threat as we experienced during the Gulf War, the states in the region would be inclined to cooperate and act collectively. The experience indicated that they would join to preserve the freedom of navigation and also access to the ports, with several concerns. Nations that have a single port, of course, have concern because you can have only so much help coming into a port before it is blocked from being used again or you have severely interrupted the economy to such a point that they cannot operate and activate the port itself. They would also like us, with regard to that cooperation, to think in times of peace about better enforcement. That is where the discussion came to the subject of pollution. This is a real problem that started, of course, not just during the Gulf War when there was massive pollution in the water masses. Subsequent to the war, polluters had been entering the Gulf area where there is an absence of standardization of requirements for the tankers that carry fuel. It was noted that the average age of ships was about eighteen years and getting older. Many are not hull protected, and there is not a general agreement in that area. It was also noted that, because the Law of the Sea Conference was signed off several years back, there really are not any significant codicils of the Law of the Sea with regard to pollution. This was thought to be a topic that should be raised. Waiting for another Law of the Sea conference may take a very long time, therefore, it was recommended that, regionally, a set of regulations be established—as you heard Admiral Smith just talk about what was happening out in the Western Pacific. Several examples were provided where there was a great deal of economic pressure on individual countries by the shippers, *et cetera*, and therefore, another reason for cooperation was that because you would stop a ship, for safety or whatever in your port, there was great pressure to get it off-loaded anywhere and move it on and so forth. Most recently, there were several incidents of violation of the basic laws of good seamanship, where collisions occurred and one of the violators sailed off, unidentified. This concerned everyone and it evolved to not only having a common doctrine for

the groups, or common codicils between the groups, but also having a command and control system that would allow them to report to one another.

The discussion you have heard in the last few days, of course, is about concern regarding high technology equipment and so forth, but you can really start at a fairly simple system that everyone can use and almost take off the shelf at a very inexpensive rate. For example, as the Sealift Commander, I am able to talk to ships through a very simple satellite system with a very inexpensive computer, allowing me to talk to my ships and units, warn other units, and talk to the command unit, without having to go through a very high cost process. It is a leasing system which has a maintenance program, which might be of interest to many.

The other problem we had, of course, is that some navies of the world have the *posse comitatus*, or the ability to arrest or set standards, as our Coast Guard does. Other navies do not, because their coast guards do it. For some, both navy and coast guard share in this effort. The issue is that we need to do some standardization, and that was talked about internally within the group, and I think this was something that was very important to everyone.

The rules have to be understandable, but I think the concern is going to be there, because if you look at worldwide shipping right now, we are not building many tankers. This means that tankers are going to get older, and there are going to be safety problems. As you know, double-hulls are not the only sum answers, since three of the last five disasters have involved double-hulled ships. We have got to establish some sort of setup, because—and the group agreed—we are severely damaging the environment around our ports, which is both a maritime safety and economic access problem.

The committee expressed great interest in controls. That was one of the key issues—to better identify violators and then to continue, passing that information to other countries within the region. That was discussed as several parts of the same thing. It got back down to Law of the Sea, also the International Maritime Organization, and multilateral agreements in the near term, which I think is a very propitious process.

The last item that we discussed was the standardization of procedures and publications. The members in that area felt reasonably comfortable with the ATP and ATP-like doctrine. They expressed some frustration that not everyone had the same document and same changes as the process went. I was heartened to hear, though, that the reason for their concern was that they realize from lessons learned in the past several years that pre-planning is the way to respond, both for a military crisis if we have to operate as a hostile force and for humanitarian reasons. Preplanning is the key and we need to have the same procedures. There is no commonality in helicopter procedures, either for rescue at sea or for reporting. There is no commonality right now, other than what is issued, for example, in the Gulf regions with regard to the maritime interdiction, which is

pretty much silent in the ATP documents, as you well know. I think this is something that they felt they needed to do. The comment was that the rules and doctrine are passed out to everyone; our navies all worked along side each other in the Gulf in these many thousands of interdictions, as you heard Admiral Kelso describe. But, there is a role that varies with the commander who is operating, because they are picking up a message that was handed on from a message and handed on from another message, instead of having it as a standardized tactical doctrine or publication. It was felt that this was something very important to work on.

One of the recommendations was, since the ATPs work pretty well, to follow on and try to get something working from ATP itself on maritime interdiction. For the nations that were small and had only vessels such as missile boats and a limited number of helicopters and aircraft, they could be trained for the applicable portions of the tactical publications. Trying to swallow the entire doctrine is somewhat akin to consuming a large animal all in one bite. To be able to figure out what was applicable to their forces, they asked for some help in training and evolution.

There is a story about an old farmer that met a wizard. One day, while he was ruminating about his poorness, the wizard gave him one wish: anything he wanted, wealth, riches, to be as rich as his friend, the other farmer, who had many chickens and many cattle for milk and food. The farmer thought for a moment and the wizard said, "Hurry up, hurry up and give me your decision. What do you want, wealth, riches, what?" The farmer said, "No, I want you to kill his chickens."

That is not good, because it means going to the lowest common denominator. We really have to start from there and move up. Our group said, "we have got to practice all this doctrine that we are going to start working with." I think we can do that. The Naval Central Command always stands by to help you all out and there are various organizations that can host standardization, but I think that is the key.

#### **Committee Five: Mediterranean, Eastern Atlantic, and Black Sea**

*Vice Admiral Stephen F. Loftus, U.S. Navy:* Admiral Kelso, Admiral Martinez, fellow delegates, ladies and gentlemen. I think you are going to notice that my presentation will follow this recurring theme that seems to center around interoperability, communications, and rules of engagement.

We opened our first session with expressions of welcome to all the delegates, but specifically to those delegates from countries who are attending the Seapower Symposium for the very first time: Albania, Benin, Romania, and the Ukraine. Our discussions began with a general summary of the morning's formal presentations, but with an overall focus on this historic situation of change and risk and opportunity. We feel that the navies of the world face similar missions and

budgetary considerations and have a unique opportunity now to forge closer coalition relationships. Central to this opportunity is the ability to communicate effectively.

The ensuing discussions relative to a common basis of communications defined the levels of communication from the basics of general information exchange to the specifics of tactical data information exchange.

One area of clear concern is a multi-maritime force capability to clearly communicate intentions, and I underscore the word intentions. Committee delegates referring to existing and potential combined operations and exercises focused on three basic aspects: interoperability, shared technologies, and rules of engagement. Various delegates expressed a view that coalitions functioned best when the individual members of a coalition possess interoperability capabilities in the areas of tactical and technical communications. A unified system of communications across the spectrum of routine information exchange to the exchange of tactical data and common rules of engagement for coalition forces were cited as examples. We adjourned after the first day with a desire to continue these discussions on the question of interoperability, but to include considerations of additional regional conferences to focus on this subject.

We opened the next session by continuing the discussion of methods and procedures by which to make available common protocols dealing with general maritime concerns, such as search and rescue, oil spills, navigational hazards, *et cetera*. The delegates agreed on the need for a more commonly accepted procedure as the world's navies enter into a new era of closer cooperation. Subsequent discussions centered on the question of how such common maritime protocols could be developed. A consensus emerged that a first step should be a focus upon the concerns of regional navies; that is, navies operating within a broadly definable geographic area. Examples cited were the somewhat different experiences of navies operating off the coast of West Africa as compared to navies operating in the southern or eastern Mediterranean. Each share basic maritime concerns, but each experience differing applications of their maritime forces. The development of regional resolutions of maritime concerns would consider attributes that are basic to all navies. Communications, technologies, and protocols were identified as areas of immediate interest. Citing the example of search and rescue operations and multi-naval force responses to ecological emergencies, three attributes were identified. The first was interoperability; each maritime force responding to a specific occasion should possess a basic level of common interoperability capabilities. The second is in the area of technology. Each maritime force responding to the specific occasion should possess a basic and common ability to transmit and receive data, ranging from the exchange of general information to the exchange of tactical data that is pertinent to the occasion. One delegate noted the experience of his nation's maritime forces. Commercial maritime communication devices currently provide the sole



method of external communication. Other delegates suggested the eventual development of transportable communications suites, which could be provided to maritime units responding to specific occasions.

The third area was language and terminology. Multiple responses to a common maritime concern could generate problems associated with the use of differing languages, but more importantly, differing terminology. It was noted that a common method of clearly and precisely signaling intentions is an objective that should be achieved. It was suggested that each delegate consider a procedure by which each committee member could first consider the question of precisely what capability factors preclude multiple maritime force responses to common maritime concerns. The question of common terminology was again cited as an example. Identifying those capability factors which would permit extended maritime cooperation at sea could enable regional committees—whether or not established committees are *ad hoc* committees—to begin a process of defining achievable goals and commonly acceptable protocols. It was further suggested that a process of on-going information exchange between the committee delegates would facilitate this process for all delegates.

Finally, the committee concluded its discussion with a summary of its interest in the continuing development of common protocols and capabilities by which naval forces can effectively respond to naval concerns that are common to all mariners. Effectively developed, these protocols, whether by bilateral or multi-lateral cooperation, would serve as a basis for further discussion at Seapower Symposiums.

#### **Committee Six: North Atlantic and Baltic Sea**

*Admiral Carlos Vila Miranda, Spanish Navy:* Admiral Kelso, Admiral Martinez, colleagues. Committee six at this Twelfth Symposium received for the first time the delegates from the Baltic states. This gave us an opportunity to hear opinions that we had not heard heretofore. We discussed the following subjects: NATO membership procedures and common organization for operations, operations under the command of the UN, especially maritime operations, maritime capabilities in the North of Europe, and finally, the recruitment and use of reserve forces.

As to membership in NATO, even though the committee agreed that this was a political decision, some members that are not members of NATO explained why they would like to become members of NATO, *i.e.*, because NATO provides the means to achieve collective security, and also because it serves as a bridge to overcome psychological gaps, establishing a structure by which interoperability, ideas, and technologies can be exchanged.

The second subject was common procedures for operations. The committee agreed that interoperability is critical. The committee members expressed their concern for the lack of common procedures outside of NATO. The committee

believed that, as future operations could include the entire world in a world coalition of forces, all of us involved in these operations should have common procedures. Even though some NATO members could be in disagreement with the use of such common procedures, the committee agreed unanimously that the majority of publications can be sent to countries that are not members of NATO.

As to operations under the command of the UN, committee members believe that security is not guaranteed at present, however this guarantee could be given as the basis of promoting multinational cooperation through several local coalitions. In this case, the UN could be the body under which the collective use of force could be controlled and supervised. Doubts were expressed in the capability that the United Nations has, at present, to control the use of force even though the United Nations has a small group of people who have experience in land warfare. There is a quite visible lack of maritime experience in the staff that is now controlling operations. This is very important and it is also of great concern because, in the future, the use of maritime forces under the UN may be ever more frequent. Finally, on this subject, the question was asked, "in view of recent events, will the UN continue to be as interested as it has been up to now in intervening in worldwide operations?"

The next issue was maritime capability in northern Europe. In the organization of NATO, the elimination of the CINCHAN, the command in chief of the Channel, the main naval command in Europe, creates a gap. This situation is serious and this problem has been made known to SACEUR. NATO will lose valuable maritime experience in its command.

Finally, in this first day—and this is not within the issues that were discussed at this symposium and was not on the agenda—some members spoke about their concern with the recruitment of reserves and the use of reserves. This is not a problem in many countries, but others said that they had difficulty in recruiting personnel in sufficient numbers. Therefore they would need more reserves. The maintenance of reserve forces can be expensive and does present specific difficulties, especially in times of war. We were told by several representatives of countries who have reserve systems, especially the United States, of their satisfaction with their system.

The next day, the second day of our meetings, we returned to the issue of operations under the command of the United Nations. We discussed whether the use of sophisticated forces and expensive forces in these operations compensate, in the long run, for the expenses incurred and whether the long-term results are effective or not. We arrived at the conclusion that, in spite of the costs entailed, the results of the embargoes carried out up to the present show that the costs have been effective and that they are politically viable. This is a weapon that is effective and can make the use of arms unnecessary.

We also spoke of the use of sophisticated units in anti-drug trafficking operations. Here, as was pointed out, there was a problem in using scarce resources that are technologically advanced in these operations. That is, whether we should change the focus that we have to date of interdiction. In other words, to prevent this traffic and try to use more effort in diminishing demand. It was said this year at this symposium that we had not had, in other navies, the activities with regard to anti-drug traffic that we had heard about in the Tenth Symposium. The legal framework of the navies to carry out such operations was discussed and other operations that are law enforcement activities.

Finally, the representatives of the Baltic states spoke, asking what they thought of their situation in the area. They—and this is speaking collectively—requested every type of assistance that could be available in training and education of their maritime forces, an area in which they do not have much experience. The exercises that are essential, such as search and rescue, are an example of the possible cooperation that we can have with these navies and that can help them to develop experience in these fields. The possibility was also mentioned of sending mobile training teams. The U.S. Naval War College was mentioned as a possible center to send such a team. The possibility of establishing a committee between the Baltic states, including Finland, Sweden, and Russia, could lead to cooperation in operations and could facilitate an exchange of information.

Following this, we discussed briefly the problems that arise in these countries because of the flow of refugees crossing borders, coming from the nations of the former Soviet Union, and the measures that are being taken to stop this flow of refugees. There was a general agreement that all non-NATO members of this committee will benefit by increased cooperation, as we have witnessed recently, and by a future exchange of ideas. With this, I conclude my report on the second meeting of the committee of the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea.

## Closing Remarks

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Admiral Frank B. Kelso II, U.S. Navy

**A**DMIRAL MARTINEZ, DISTINGUISHED DELEGATES. As we bring the Twelfth International Seapower Symposium to a close, I would like to say to each of you once again how much I appreciate the time that so many of you have taken, particularly those service chiefs and senior naval leaders with demanding assignments, to be with us in Newport this week.

From my perspective, this conference has been enormously productive, and it is each of you that has made it so, and I thank each of you again. The range of issues that we have listened to and talked about this week is remarkable. Clearly, with a collected experience of a dozen symposia under our belts, we have become quite adept at maximizing our time and our resources, but most importantly, our discussion has been substantive. We have put some complex issues and problems on the table, and I think we have worked honestly toward solving some of them. I would like to thank each of you who have prepared and delivered such thought-provoking presentations as well as those who have chaired and participated in our panel discussions. Traditionally, some of the most fruitful results come from the regional committees, and this year has been no exception, as you have seen.

It would be futile for me to attempt, within a space of a few minutes, to summarize our proceedings over the past couple of days, but as I look back there are some common threads which emerge. First, I think it is important to continue having forums such as the International Seapower Symposium and the regional conferences held throughout the world, where we talk to each other. There is some debate about membership criteria at various levels, but I believe there is an increasing need for inclusiveness. There is no debate whatsoever that maintaining the sea lines of communications in our interdependent era remains critical and that cooperative efforts are essential to doing that. On the continued value of combined-operations exercises, we are clearly in agreement that all of our forces have a role to play. As hard as we try to achieve balance with diminished resources, many of us will have to cope with capability gaps, pooling our efforts in an effective work-around. We cannot change everything overnight. Ultimately, each of our navies—whatever size or structure—has some significant capability which I think can be brought to bear.

I think we are sometimes prone to focus on our frustrations and not the benefits of our combined operations. This is healthy, I believe, because it is how

we improve. But it is not a reason to lose sight of progress achieved. Vice Admiral Buis has observed that the historic achievements of NATO's maritime cooperation are too precious to give up; I could not agree more. There are many, many years of effort that make them possible. The ability to transcend language and political differences is a remarkable success story, which is serving today as a springboard for broader coalition building. We cannot afford to lag in this effort. As Admiral Brigstock has reminded us, the *ad-hoc*-ery of the past may not meet our needs in the future. And as Vice Admiral Shariff has so rightly observed, it is not necessary to reinvent the wheel. I think it is important that we remind ourselves that the international rules of the road or the sea have been with us for a long, long time, and we all have operated by them. We are very fortunate that we have that basis to go on in the maritime arena, no matter what our political leanings might have been in the past.

To get the effort off the ground, which so many of you have focussed on and voiced as critical, I have recently tasked the newly established Naval Doctrine Command to develop a common *Maritime Maneuvering and Tactical Procedures Manual*. I know some of you are doing that regionally, and I hope this will help you in that effort. We should complete a first draft by mid-December and expect to give you a copy of it before too long. It will be unclassified and will be offered to the NATO maritime tactical working group for approval to distribute as a NATO EXTAC. Ultimately, we anticipate its becoming the first seed of the publications with worldwide maritime applicability. I think I have heard from everybody, this week, that we need to start somewhere, and we are willing to take this on and give it a try. We want very much to have your comments as we prepare and distribute it. Hopefully, it will help the issue of communications interoperability that we are talking about. It clearly will not give us the technical needs to be able to get together in every case, but it does give us a start. I think it is important to get that start and to recognize that in order to have the ability to communicate, to be interoperable, we need not only procedures, but we need the time, the money, and whatever it takes to be able to work together.

The world has clearly changed in the sense that there are more of us than ever before who want to work together to insure peacetime cooperation in our world and to insure continued peace in the world. Much of what we have discussed here is not necessarily all military in nature; it is also political. As all of us here know, we have political leadership to whom we have allegiance and who will give us direction in many of these issues in the world. When political directions are clear, it is much easier for us to do our jobs. I do not think there is any question about that. At the same time, we must provide military advice to our political leadership. I think what is very clear is that it is our job to be able to work in a fashion that affords us the ability to operate together as a coalition, if necessary, as a bilateral operation, if necessary, or as a world organization, if necessary. So, when our political leadership wants us to act, we

can do it together and do it together efficiently. I think that is really what we have to keep our eyes on as we go forward in this new world: to continue to exercise together, broaden our exercises when possible, and broaden our educational levels when possible so that we understand each other. Work for these common ideals, common communications, or the common interoperability that we are talking about. In your navies, as in my Navy, we are very capital intensive. The things we operate cost a good amount of money. It takes time to get the political understanding, the political backing, and the direction to reach these things. So we work slowly; it does not happen overnight. But, I think it is important that we come to a place like Newport and focus on these issues, so that when we go back, we know what we are going to work on to become better at it. I am very pleased with what I have heard this week. Working together, we can make significant gains. While we have a long way to go to meet every challenge, I believe this symposium provides a framework to insure the challenges are not ignored. We have conducted our dialogue in a very friendly environment, which comes from a wealth of shared experiences and shared values. There has been some disagreement, but never rancor and skepticism. This is healthy, very healthy. I am optimistic about the future of our ability to train and to operate together in the years to come. I have never been more convinced that our navies are positioned and ready to help move our world closer to peace and stability. Before closing, I would like to express my appreciation to Rear Admiral Joe Strasser and all at the Naval War College for making this week such a professionally pleasant and rewarding one for all of us and our spouses. The support and hospitality which you have provided, Joe, has been spectacular in every way, and we really appreciate it. I hope you will pass my thanks and all the delegates' thanks on to the staff at the club and throughout the War College for all that you have done for us. I know I speak for all of you in the audience when I thank our interpreters also for their heroic efforts to make sure we understand what one another has said.

On a personal note, I would like to say, as I enter the final stage of my tenure as the Chief of Naval Operations, what a great pleasure it has been for me to host two of these important symposia and to develop the friendships that I have with so many of you over the years. I believe the friendships that we develop, when we have the opportunity to gather and talk about our mutual interests in this world, are very important to our ability to operate together. When I know who you are, when I have had the opportunity to meet you, and when I communicate again, it is different then if I did not know you. I think it is very important that we make these friendships and appreciate the difficulties of each of our nations. As Admiral Vila said this morning, there is great scope and a variety of capabilities we are talking about. Admiral Nelson made it very clear what some navies were thinking about in law enforcement, while Admiral Marfiak talked about, in great detail, the very complicated combat situation. We

have talked about peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and all the new ideas in the UN and what is going on in the new world situation. I think, if we look at this period of time, it is unique in the history of our world. I liken it to the end of the Second World War. It was a different world, then. We had the opportunities and the challenges to change. Many turned out good and some perhaps did not, but we had to learn to change with the world. I think this is a new era. I think it is positive in the way it is changing. I am heartened by the number of countries that are represented here, that think it is important to be here and to talk, and I am heartened that we are all talking about peace, that we are all talking about how to go about doing it in this new world, that we are talking about free markets, that we are talking about how our people have greater freedoms. Those things are all positive in our world, and they are great challenges for us. I hope that each of you will be here two years from now and that you will build on relationships we have forged. In the meantime, I wish you a safe return home and fair winds and following seas in the years ahead. Again I thank each of you for coming; I thank each of you for your ideas, for your participation; and I hope I will see you again in a short time. May God bless all of you.

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# Adjournment

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Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser, U.S. Navy

**A**DMIRAL MARTINEZ, ADMIRAL KELSO, distinguished delegates. Before adding my farewell, I would like to make just one or two comments on a subject that I think is very important. Admiral Kelso just spoke of the importance of us getting to know each other and getting to trust each other, developing friendships and camaraderie. There is one area in which I think we do that especially well, and I would just like to review it with you for about two minutes.

We are indeed very grateful to all of your nations for the wonderful officers that you send to us here for our international courses at the Naval War College. Since the Naval Command College was formed in 1956, we have had eleven hundred officers from your navies graduate from that course. A total of seventy-six countries have sent officers, at one time or another, to the Naval Command College. More than half of those officers have become flag officers in your navies. That number would be higher, except the last four or five classes are not yet senior enough to be considered for flag rank. We have had one hundred fifteen (or 10 percent) of the officers become chiefs of service, and twenty-two are serving in that capacity today.

By way of interest, the Class of 1975 has the highest number of flag officers—twenty-nine of thirty-eight in that class have become flag officers. The highest percentage comes from the Class of 1967 in which eighteen of twenty-one officers, over eighty-five percent of that class, became flag officers in your navies. The Class of 1965 also possesses an exceptional flag percentage, with twenty-one of twenty-five officers earning that distinction.

The most chiefs of service have come from the Classes of 1978 and 1980—each of those classes have had seven chiefs of service, while eight different classes have produced five service chiefs.

The Naval Staff College, a much younger group which was established in 1972, has had nearly nine hundred graduates: eighty-three flag officers, and thirty-eight chiefs of service (with eighteen serving in that capacity today). Class 17, which graduated in December of 1980, is this program's most successful class, counting among its membership five flag officers and four chiefs of service, three of whom are here today.

I submit to you that the Naval Command College and Naval Staff College go a long way to promote the type of friendship, the type of camaraderie, and



the type of trust that all of us have talked about as being so important. So, I would encourage all of you, please, in the coming years, to continue to send the very fine, very talented officers that you have sent to our two courses since their inception. They will truly have the opportunity to mix with the future leaders of the world's navies. We are very grateful for your support and we look forward to having representatives from your countries here.

All of you have been wonderful guests, and it has been a pleasure for us here at the Naval War College to host you. I should apologize now for the great financial damage that I know your wives have brought on all of you during their shopping sprees, but I can tell you that Rhode Island appreciates it very much.

I also want to thank the interpreters, as well as Commander Bill Malone of my staff, who is the project officer for the symposium. He made all the hotel arrangements, all the transportation arrangements, and has done a wonderful job.

I think we have discussed some very important subjects here, which will impact on all of us and hopefully make it much easier for us to operate together in the future. I wish each and every one of you a safe trip home, and we hope that you will come back again to Newport. I now declare that the Twelfth International Seapower Symposium is officially closed. Thank you very much for your participation.

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## Regional Committee Minutes

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The first part of the report is a  
 general statement of the  
 purpose of the study. It is  
 to determine the effect of  
 the new method of teaching  
 on the results of the  
 examination. The second part  
 is a description of the  
 method used. The third part  
 is a description of the  
 results of the examination.  
 The fourth part is a  
 discussion of the results.  
 The fifth part is a  
 conclusion.

# Committee One

## Special Group—Service Colleges

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**Chairman:** Vice Admiral Antonio Quesada da Andrade, Portuguese Navy

**Members:**

Albania	Lieutenant General Ilia Vasho
Algeria	Captain Ammar Chibani
	Lieutenant Commander Mahtar Tani
Argentina	Captain Diego Enrique Leivas
Australia	Commodore Robert Letts
Bahrain	Major Jassim Mohammed Jassim
Brazil	Rear Admiral Fernando M. F. Diegues
Chile	Rear Admiral Arturo Oxley
Colombia	Rear Admiral Sergio Garcia Torres
Denmark	Colonel Niels L. Fredenslund
Dominican Republic	Captain Omar Andujar-Zaiter
Ecuador	Captain Miguel Saona Roca
Egypt	Rear Admiral Hassan Hosny Amin
Finland	Commander Hans Holmstrom
Gambia	Major Antuman Saho
Germany	Captain Gerhard M. Eichorst
Honduras	Commander Jesus Alberto Alvarez Rivera
Indonesia	Captain F. Wuwung
Israel	Captain Arie Gavish
Italy	Captain Sirio Piangiani
Japan	Rear Admiral Hideaki Kaneda
Korea	Rear Admiral Ha Jong-Keun
Latvia	Colonel Karlis Kreslins
	Colonel Valdis Matiss
Malaysia	Commander Noor Aziz bin Yunan
Netherlands	Captain W.J.J. van der Knapp
New Zealand	Captain Raymond J. Gillbanks
Norway	Captain Leif Andersen
Oman	Commander Rashid bin Taj Al-Raisi
Peru	Rear Admiral Hugo Aturo Arevalo Escaro
Philippines	Captain Cleo Erfi
Qatar	Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Al-Abdul Jabbar
Romania	Commander Victor Costache
Saudi Arabia	Captain Yousef Al-Younis

Spain	Vice Admiral Juan J. Romero Caramelo
Thailand	Captain Sombat Augsornsri
Turkey	Rear Admiral Atilla Senkul
Ukraine	Rear Admiral Victor V. Makarov
United Arab Emirates	Lieutenant Colonel Abdulla Ataq
United Kingdom	Commodore Robert J. Fisher
United States	Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser
Uruguay	Captain Antonio Bugna
Venezuela	Rear Admiral Jose Quintero Torres

**Rapporteur:** *Professor David F. Chandler*

**Session One: Monday, 8 November 1993:**

Vice Admiral Antonio Quesada da Andrade, Director of the Portuguese Naval War College, as committee chairman, solicited topics for discussion which included how curricula in our colleges must change in the new global environment; how we can share ideas on change; the role colleges might play in the development of naval doctrine; and what, indeed, "naval doctrine" means.

Considerable discussion focused on the new roles and missions facing navies in the aftermath of the Cold War, including non-traditional missions (*e.g.* humanitarian aid, peacekeeping, peacemaking, *etc.*) and roles involving other than purely military or single-service organizations. These argue for a broadened education in areas such as joint and coalition warfare, political and social sciences, management, *etc.*

Several delegates suggested that since we may assume that students already have a level of naval tactical awareness before their arrival at the service college, we must strive instead to broaden their intellectual awareness, hone their ability to analyze and synthesize the increasing wealth of information that comes with technology, and improve their ability to communicate with others.

Caution was urged lest we abandon our traditional role of educating officers on military matters to such a degree that we impose damaging losses on our officer community to the peril of the nation. While it is important that officers be aware of how political leaders make their decisions and how the military can influence that decision-making process, perhaps they can acquire that knowledge without sacrificing the military nature of the service college education.

A discussion ensued concerning the nature of "doctrine" and whether a navy indeed needs a formal doctrine. While some agreed that in their war at sea, sailors have traditionally relied more on their strengths of flexibility and adaptability than on formal doctrine, the complexity of warfare today, imposed, for example, by sophisticated command and control arrangements and rules of engagement, argues for the development of doctrinal publications and documents to guide the naval commander at sea.

In closing, the chairman suggested that the role of war gaming in service colleges be pursued in further discussions. Rear Admiral Strasser offered the committee delegates a tour of the U.S. Naval War College's war-gaming facilities during the second day of the symposium.

**Session Two: Tuesday, 9 November 1993:**

The session opened with the chairman's suggestion that the delegates discuss briefly one area not covered in the first session: namely, the relationship between service colleges and civilian institutions. Cooperative arrangements were described, whereby students in one country earn a degree from a neighboring private university; and in another, where the service college is accredited by a regional civilian agency to award its own master of arts degree. Another delegate shared with the committee a description of a program in Europe whereby the students of service colleges in several countries enjoy one week of exchange visits, promoting a better understanding of their respective allies and neighbors.

In conclusion, the delegates expressed the hope for future—equally fruitful—exchanges and reiterated that the readiness and effectiveness of our armed forces will directly reflect the quality of education we provide to military officers in our service colleges.

The chairman closed the session with thanks to all the committee members for their cooperation and with an expression of gratitude on behalf of all the delegates to Rear Admiral Strasser for his hospitality. All participants then adjourned to Sims Hall for an orientation tour of the Naval War College's war-gaming facilities.

## Committee Two

### Caribbean, South Atlantic, and Eastern Pacific

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**Chairman:** Admiral Alfredo Arnaiz Ambrossiani, Peruvian Navy

**Members:**

Argentina	Admiral Enrique Emilio Molina Pico
Bahamas	Lieutenant Commander Davy F. Rolle
Barbados	Lieutenant Commander David Dowridge
Bolivia	Captain Luis A. Daza Montero
Chile	Rear Admiral Carlos Schnaidt
Colombia	Vice Admiral Hernando Garcia Ramirez
Dominican Republic	Vice Admiral Ivan Vargas Cespedes
Ecuador	Vice Admiral Oswaldo Viteri Jerez
El Salvador	Captain Mario Argueta Franco
Guatemala	Captain Jose M. Valladares Lanuza
Honduras	Captain Bruno Giordano Fontana Hedman
Jamaica	Commander Hardley M. Lewin
Mexico	Vice Admiral David Jose Leal Rodriguez
United States	Vice Admiral Robert T. Nelson, USCG
Uruguay	Rear Admiral Mario Martinez Lanzani
Venezuela	Vice Admiral Julian Enrique Mauco Quintana

**Rapporteur:** *Lieutenant Commander Bruce M. Ross, U.S. Coast Guard*

**Session One: Monday November 8, 1993**

The committee chairman opened the session by expressing his appreciation for being designated to preside over the Regional Committee of the Caribbean, South Atlantic, and Eastern Pacific, and proceeded to say that during the Eleventh International Seapower Symposium the following themes were discussed: naval missions in peacetime, naval participation in the fight against drug trafficking, and international naval cooperation as well as a summary of recent combined naval exercises in which the represented navies participated. These issues can be used as points of reference for the development of the points of view of the navies represented in the Regional Committee. The theme assigned to the present symposium, "Maritime Coalitions and International Security," has a direct relationship with the central issues previously mentioned, and it will be interesting to know the current points of view concerning interoperability of the navies of the region with respect to said activities.

Another point discussed was the fact that the UN and the OAS have required the participation of naval forces in different types of operations, such as: blockade of ports, interdiction of illegal immigrants and refugees, support for the fight against drug traffic, protection of life at sea, and others. All of these operations are related in their characteristics, such as, maritime lines of communication, size of forces, the roles that nations have assigned their navies, as well as the bilateral and multilateral accords that are in force. In view of this, the following central theme is proposed: "The Development of Naval Cooperation in the Region."

One representative advanced the idea that perhaps the Caribbean nations (specifically the English-speaking Caribbean nations) should increase their interaction with South America vice the traditional trend to "look to the North" in matters of naval training and cooperation. The idea was favorably received by several representatives of South American navies, and the nations of the Caribbean were invited to participate more actively in the regional conferences in accordance with established programs.

Agreements will establish the manner in which cooperative activities are to take place and will define the rules of engagement for operational activities.

Several representatives expressed the view that inter-naval cooperation depended mainly on the level of communications between the navies and the communication systems they use. In addition to the VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) Satellite System that will be available soon to the Inter-American Naval Network (IANT), it would be advisable to establish complementary communication systems to permit continuous exchange of information between operational or administrative levels included in agreements such as intelligence, maritime traffic control, and Search and Rescue (SAR). In this manner, a faster, more efficient system will be available to achieve the established purposes.

The regional committee adjourned with the intention of continuing its discussion of these issues in tomorrow's session.

### **Session Two: Tuesday, 9 November 1993**

The chairman of the committee opened the meeting with a summary of the previous day's proceedings as well as adding some additional ideas with respect to the theme of regional cooperation that was discussed in today's plenary session, noting that discussion of legal and national political issues should be avoided. Noting that the central issues proposed yesterday for discussion were regional cooperation as well as communications to effect coordination with respect to inter-navy cooperation, delegates were invited to air their opinions on these subjects.

One delegate advanced the view that accords for cooperation will be reached when the concerned countries perceive that such accords reflect their interests; and another representative stated that when the United Nations requires the intervention of a multinational force, our countries can offer their participation



in accordance with the bases for accord for the particular objective. Other representatives continued on this theme, saying that the agreement for employing naval units would depend on the location in which their participation would be necessary, since the costs of operating them are high. An important issue for interoperability between navies in combined operations is the compatibility of systems and equipment aboard, since incompatibilities between certain United States and European equipment have been found. Furthermore it was considered a good idea to establish lower level bilateral accords such as those attendant to the UNITAS exercises.

Given that the control of drug traffic is a mission that many navies have been assigned, it was determined that regional cooperation could be oriented on reinforcing these missions. Regarding this, it is important to take account of issues of sovereignty and national and international laws. It was mentioned that during the meeting of intelligence directors, concrete accords were reached concerning support measures in the fight against drug traffic as well as the publication of an inter-American telephone directory for the interchange of information.

Regarding the issue of communications, it was considered necessary, as a first effective step, to exchange telephone and fax numbers between naval authorities at their corresponding levels, with the objective of implementing accords in different areas of regional cooperation more effectively and rapidly.

In conclusion, after two days of sessions on the theme of regional cooperation and communications measures to make it more effective, various forms of realizing this goal were considered and the intent was expressed that they will be used at the first opportunity to establish direct communication between naval authorities.

Considering the subject fully discussed, the session was adjourned.

# Committee Three

## Western Pacific

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**Chairman:** Admiral William D. Smith, U.S. Navy

**Members:**

Australia	Vice Admiral I.D.G. MacDougall
Canada	Rear Admiral R.C. Waller
Chile	Admiral Jorge Martinez Busch
Indonesia	Rear Admiral Haryono
Japan	Vice Admiral Kazuya Natsukawa
Malaysia	Vice Admiral Dató Seri Mohamed Shariff bin Ishak
New Zealand	Rear Admiral Ian A. Hunter
Philippines	Vice Admiral Virgillio Q. Marcelo
Singapore	Colonel Lim Cherng Yih Richard
Thailand	Admiral Santiparb Moo-Ming
Tonga	Lieutenant Colonel Fetu' Utolu Tupou
United States	Rear Admiral Thomas D. Ryan

**Rapporteur:** *Professor Carol J. Figerie*

**Session One: Monday, 8 November 1993**

The topics of concern which the committee identified were:

***Non-Availability of Common Doctrine for Working Together.*** Considerable effort has been made by various nations to benefit from the standardization that went into the NATO doctrine during the past forty-five years. There is an extant response due from the U.S. as to whether or not certain documents can be released. The U.S. is still exploring this issue. Moreover, there is a positive change in mind-set occurring in NATO, which should help this problem. NATO members are receiving requests almost monthly for this type of information from Warsaw Pact nations. If the movement for the release of these documents takes place, clearly they should be offered first to nations in the Pacific.

There are two approaches being pursued: 1) blanket approval from NATO or 2) rewriting publications sufficiently to call them non-NATO publications. It was suggested that perhaps it would be easier for the U.S. to get clearance for releasing these documents if the type of documents needed was made clearer. Certainly, gaining approval for those documents that deal with humanitarian, peacekeeping, and search and rescue issues would be much easier.

Western Pacific (WESTPAC) nations realized that the release of NATO documents would take some time. Therefore, they have been preparing their own documents over the past two years because they need a common level of information. However, to go from ground zero takes a long time. They have a lot of things to do, and it would save time if they did not have to reinvent the wheel. The *Tactical Signals Manual* that was issued at the workshop a few months ago evolved from the lowest common denominator.

***Environmental Concerns.*** Nations in the region are looking for a common information code on maritime environmental accidents. The premise was that under International Maritime Organization (IMO) a policy would be formed, but not all regional partners have signed up. What they were attempting to achieve was a connection between making policy within the IMO and implementation of that policy at the national level. While it was recognized that this issue is an international problem with other governmental agencies involved, there is no reason why the tail should not wag the dog. The waters in WESTPAC are very congested, and the series of archipelago chains brings a different focus to pollution; however, this same problem exists in EASTPAC. International traffic pollutes all areas. What nations in the region are working on in workshops is an information exchange. Some members noted that the scope of this problem is beyond the navies, and other agencies were charged with bringing this issue up at the international level. Others noted that if there were some agreement among navies it would facilitate the process in other governmental agencies. Certainly, the exchange of information about pollutants or potential pollutants would be very valuable. This could help the navies in their relations with other international agencies, since the navies are looked upon very suspiciously because they are often exempt in terms of compliance with some of the standards. Therefore, if the navies are doing something, it probably is a step in the right direction.

***Need for Interim Workshop.*** During the July 1993 WESTPAC Workshop, it was determined that there was a need for an interim workshop between the ISS and the regional symposium in November. Committee members asked for a volunteer host. Vice Admiral Shariff, chief of the Royal Malaysian Navy, agreed to host a workshop in May or June 1994.

***Membership of Western Pacific Naval Symposium Group.*** There are no real guidelines as to who are members and who are non-members. Currently, the hosting nation decides the membership. In the case of the ISS, it seems to be done to achieve a balance. There was concern about the manageability of the size of the membership, and the disadvantage in having too many members, since it would make progress more difficult in a practical sense.

Realizing the need to limit the size of the membership, Rear Admiral Waller of Canada proposed that the question of membership be discussed at the next workshop with the formal decisions being made at the symposium to be held in November 1994.

**Agenda for Future ISS.** The delegates were concerned about the lack of an agenda for the regional committee discussions. They expressed a desire to have ISS committee discussions proceed, by general agreement, from ongoing WESTPAC projects determined at interim workshops and regional symposia. The ISS regional committee meetings could also serve as a forum where various documents could be signed or endorsed and specific objectives agreed upon. This would make the meetings more formal and give them structure.

Admiral Martinez of Chile offered to share his thirty years of UNITAS combined operational experience with the membership in UNITAS. The members agreed that they would be wise to take advantage of his offer, and it was determined that Admiral Martinez would communicate with Admiral Shariff of Malaysia prior to the next workshop so that the committee would have the advantage of his insights prior to the next regional symposium.

**Proceedings of Second Western Pacific Naval Symposium Workshop.** Colonel Lim, Chief of Staff, Naval Staff, Republic of Singapore Navy, summarized the proceedings of the Second Western Pacific Naval Symposium Workshop. The first session centered on the Maritime Information Exchange Directory (MIED). The directory is a vehicle to provide a navy-to-navy communication guide of time-critical information. The areas explored for information exchange were: 1) Marine Pollution, 2) Search and Rescue, 3) Humanitarian Activities, 4) Suspicious Activities Involving Narcotics Trafficking, 5) High Seas Robbery, and 6) Fisheries Infringement. The document states that reporting would be on a volunteer basis. Member countries were asked to provide submissions, based on a provided format, to the Royal Australian Navy for compilation by October 1993, and this was done. The draft was circulated to members for comments before ISS 1993. There have been some deviations from the prescribed format, and discussions are necessary on this issue.

In the second session, participants discussed the issue of "Inter-operability in the Naval Multilateral Framework." The goal of that session was to present the Royal Malaysian Navy's proposal for facilitating interoperability among members. The proposal explored formulating common procedures and exchange of information among participating navies in the areas of: 1) Replenishment at Sea, 2) Helicopter Operations, 3) Search and Rescue, 4) Control of Shipping, 5) Naval Exercise Request, 6) Disaster Relief, 7) Weather Forecast, and 8) Avoidance of Accidents at Sea.

The following areas were discussed in more detail: Helicopter Operations (U.S. representative agreed to examine extending HOSTAC documents to cover all WPNS members); WESTPAC Tactical Procedures; Control of Shipping (WPNS members may request to send observers to exercises such as *Exercise Bell Buoy*); Weather Information; and Navigational Warnings.

In the third session, participants discussed the *Tactical Signals Manual* (TSM) and Command-Post Exercises (CPX). Since all members do not have equal access to NATO-controlled publications, there is a need for a common TSM to increase interoperability. The objective of the Command-Post Exercises is to test communications paths and means between participating navies. It was also agreed that an exercise would be designed to trigger communications among WPNS nations with the participation of the U.S. Navy.

**UNITAS.** Admiral Martinez was asked to say a few words about the last command and control and information game. Admiral Martinez regarded the game as very successful and believed there were three issues which helped contribute to that success: 1) UNITAS was prepared by working the details about two to three months in advance of operations. All the exercises were first played in their shore facility to determine if they were achieving the objective, and adjustments were made as necessary. 2) The command and control of the operations was rotated. In every exercise, command and control shifts from one side to the other, and multi-lateral command exercises are always rotated. Normally, alphabetical order is used to rotate command and control of activities. This has proceeded very well because rules are reviewed every year. It is one of the best ways to improve multi-lingual capability to exchange information between two or more navies. 3) UNITAS was performed counterclockwise, *i.e.*, it starts in the Pacific and ends in the Atlantic. Participants believed the objectives they were seeking were obtained.

### **Session Two: Tuesday, 9 November 1993**

Using panel discussions and presentations on the second day as a basis, further consideration was given in session two to the issues addressed in the first session.

**Release of NDPs by OPNAV.** Admiral Smith asked Admiral Ryan, USN, to supply information to the committee on what is going on to date regarding the release of standardized documents. OPNAV has been trying to get NATO publications cleared through NATO in an unclassified manner without success. Since then, they have been working on six NDPs—NDP-1 *Naval Warfare*; NDP-2 *Intelligence*; NDP-3 *Naval Operations*; NDP-4 *Naval Logistics*; NDP-5 *Naval Planning*; and NDP-6 *Naval Command and Control*. NDP-1 will be available in February or March of 1994. NDPs-2 through 6 are in various stages of preparation, with an expected completion date of December 1994. Naval

Doctrine Command has responsibility for developing the publications. Additionally, Naval Doctrine Command is preparing a synthesized version of ATP-1, which will go to the NATO working committee in January 1994. If approved, it will be published by the U.S. as an unclassified document. Admiral Ryan was asked to supply the address of the Naval Doctrine Command to the members of the group so that they could get in touch with the command on any questions that might come up with their regional planning initiatives.

***Improving Communications in Coalition Warfare.*** Discussion centered around the difficulty in consolidating communications equipment on ships among coalition members. The U.S. has fielded a system which basically combines all available data inputs from intelligence nets into one system. It is now on two hundred thirty ships. For exercise purposes, this capability can be put on other ships fairly easily, since it does not require a long shipyard period. Concern was expressed regarding the costs of the hardware that will be required for such a system. It was suggested that costs could be reduced by utilizing a task group command ship outfitted with the system which could provide information to other ships under that flag. This system is being used in the Adriatic where a Link 11 feeds everyone.

Considered most important was establishing baseline circuits so that everyone would have a minimum standard and not head in different directions. One proposed concept was developing a pool of equipment which would be jointly held by the navies. It was recommended that the U.S. Navy provide a description of the standards for numbers and capabilities of common equipment which should be on each ship for use in coalition operations.

***Seventh Fleet Representative at ISS.*** A suggestion was made to invite a Seventh Fleet representative to the next ISS. This committee has been leading the concept of working at a regional level. There is great interest in other panels doing the same thing. Therefore, the recommendation was made that future ISS conferences here in Newport should become a more cohesive operation derived from various regional symposia. Admiral Smith noted that he would take this up with the school.

***Sail Indonesia '95.*** In August '95, the Indonesian Navy will celebrate its fiftieth anniversary. Area members were invited by the Indonesian chief of naval staff, Vice Admiral Tanto Koeswanto, to participate in a fleet review and parade of Tall Ships. The program is being refined, and details will be forthcoming.

***Regional Symposium '95.*** The committee suggested that Indonesia host the next regional symposium in '95. Rear Admiral Haryono will raise this possibility with his superiors.

# Committee Four

## Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf

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**Chairman:** Vice Admiral Michael P. Kalleres, U.S. Navy

**Members:**

Bahrain	Lieutenant Colonel Yousef Ahmed Mallalah
France	Rear Admiral Jean-Luc Duval
India	Commodore K.V. Bharathan
Kuwait	Colonel Ahmed Yousef Al-Mullah
Oman	Commodore Abdul Aziz Al-Zidgali
Pakistan	Vice Admiral Khalid M. Mir
Qatar	Colonel Juma'an Jowher Al-Abdullah
South Africa	Vice Admiral Robert C. Simpson-Anderson
United Arab Emirates	Colonel Mohammed Khalfan
United States	Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, Jr.

**Rapporteur:** *Professor Roger W. Barnett*

**Session One: Monday, 8 November 1993**

Last year's discussions included multilateral operations, mine countermeasures, ports and port facilities, pollution and ordnance disposal, and cooperative evolutions of navies.

**Port Access.** Adequate depth is a problem, both in approaches to many ports of the region and in alongside berths. Small states frequently have only a single port, so traffic and vulnerability to mining are also problems. South Africa is an exception, having six major ports that are all well developed. Some other states, Mozambique, for example, have good ports with poor infrastructure.

**Navigation.** Lack of adequate weather prediction can be troublesome for safe operations.

**Environmental Protection.** Damage to the environment in the Gulf, as a result of Iraq's actions in the Gulf War, turned out to be less severe than was anticipated. The effects, for the most part, were confined north of Dubai. Still, environmental protection has assumed a place of increased importance in all ports, and the amount of tanker traffic on the sea lanes of the region causes apprehensions about the possibility of a major oil spill and the problems that would cause. Countries with a small number of ports, or a single port, are understandably and necessarily

very sensitive to environmental issues. Spills, even far offshore, hundreds of miles at sea, can cause problems as well. Not only spills but contaminated water discharge overboard is of concern. Strong restrictions in some geographic areas can result in heavy pollution in areas with fewer restrictions or with less capability to observe potential polluters. Another problem is the fact that many ships are old and subject to leaking—especially in a seaway. Pollution can affect food supplies, even to the point of people being concerned about eating potentially polluted fish. Thus, more rigorous environmental controls for the high seas would be of interest. Often violators are difficult to catch and violations are difficult to prove, however, and a strong international legal regime on environmental damage would not be easy to enforce.

With respect to organizational approaches to pollution prevention and control, states have a variety of methods. In some states there is an interaction of interests and capabilities between the Navy (or Coast Guard) and other state environmental agencies.

A command and control communications net between ships and agencies of different states would appear to be a useful and inexpensive way to coordinate on environmental matters. This could even be a FAX network. Memoranda of Agreement on operating procedures offer another possibility to help ease environmental problems, where specific provisions in the Law of the Sea are missing or inadequate. Inspections can also help, but they, and the efforts they require, can increase the cost of seaborne commerce.

***Security of the SLOCs.*** If there were serious threats to the Gulf, the states of the region would be inclined to cooperate and to act collectively. The Gulf War experience indicates that regional states would join to preserve freedom of navigation. This would be a matter of enforcing provisions of the Law of the Sea. Greater sharing of information among countries would be useful in this regard as well as on environmental questions.

### **Session Two: Tuesday, 9 November 1993**

Extended discussion from Session One on environmental protection reinforced the need for new controls to protect areas in which the current Law of the Sea is inadequate. Changes to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, action through the International Maritime Organization, and bilateral and multilateral Memoranda of Agreement were discussed as possible avenues to relieve the problems.

***Need for Standardized Procedures and Publications.*** Operations over the last several years have demonstrated the need for standardized procedures and publications for international maritime operations. For example, helicopter operations and refueling at sea (procedures, equipment, and safety precautions)



vary greatly from nation to nation. NATO has been suggested as one possibility to draw upon to offer such procedures to non-NATO states. These could importantly facilitate communications and operations.

Navies already use ATPs for standardization and pre-planning, but these need to be updated in a more timely fashion and more widely distributed. One country noted that it had submitted changes through both the United States and the UK and had seen no reflection of its inputs. ATPs also should be tailored by each navy so that they are directly applicable to its own forces and operations. Training in the specially tailored publications would then help to facilitate and improve combined operations significantly.

**Maritime Interdiction.** This is clearly a growth area for naval operations, but there is a lack of standard procedures and training for the forces of different states. Currently, therefore, this subject tends to be chaotic and confusing. While communications equipment is becoming more reliable and less expensive, standard basic doctrine and procedures for maritime interdiction are urgently needed.

### **Final Report.**

Three major topics formed the primary focus of attention during these sessions: port access in the region, environmental protection, and the need for standardized procedures and publications.

**Port Access in the Region.** The region contains a wide variety of ports. Their ability to handle increased shipping loads in a time of crisis varies significantly. Inadequate depth to handle large ships is a widespread problem, both in the approaches to ports and alongside berths. States with only one port have additional difficulties with traffic and because of their vulnerability to mining.

**Environmental Protection.** Environmental protection has assumed a place of increased importance in all ports, and the amount of tanker traffic on the sea lanes of the region causes apprehensions about the possibility of a major oil spill and the problems that would cause. Countries with a small number of ports, or a single port, are necessarily and understandably especially sensitive to environmental issues.

Spills and contaminated water discharge from ships, even far offshore, can cause problems as well. Another problem is the fact that many ships are old, and subject to leaking—especially in a seaway. Strong restrictions in some geographic areas can result in heavy pollution in areas with fewer restrictions or poor capability to observe potential polluters. Because of the potential harmful effects to the environment and to the food supply from pollution, more rigorous

environmental controls for the high seas would be helpful. The committee expressed its interest in greater controls even though violators are difficult to catch, violations are difficult to prove, and a strong international legal regime on environmental damage would be difficult to enforce.

With respect to organizational approaches to pollution prevention and control, states have a variety of approaches. In some states there is an interaction of interests and capabilities between the Navy (or Coast Guard) and other state environmental agencies. Possible methods to effect new environmental regulations could include new provisions for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, action through the International Maritime Organization, and multilateral Memoranda of Agreement. Inspections can also help, but they—and the efforts they require—can increase the cost of seaborne commerce.

Finally, on this issue, the committee expressed an interest in a command and control communications net, voice, or perhaps even FAX between ships and agencies of different states to coordinate on environmental matters.

***Standardized Procedures and Publications.*** Increasing requirements for operations among ships of many navies have demonstrated that procedures, equipment, and safety precautions vary greatly from nation to nation. Thus there is an ever-expanding need for standardized procedures and publications so that states can work together effectively at sea.

In no area is the shortcoming in standardization and interoperability felt more acutely than in maritime interdiction operations. This is an area that has exhibited strong growth in recent years, but procedures and publications have not kept pace.

Navies already use ATPs for standardization and pre-planning, but they are no longer timely and need to be updated and more widely distributed. ATPs also should be tailored by each navy so that they are directly applicable to its particular forces and operations. Training in the specially tailored publications would then help to facilitate and improve combined operations significantly.

# Committee Five

## Mediterranean, Eastern Atlantic, and Black Sea

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**Chairman:** Vice Admiral Stephen F. Loftus, U.S. Navy

**Members:**

Albania	Commodore Edmund Zhupani
Algeria	General Chaabane Ghodbane
Benin	Commander Prosper Bere Kiando
Bulgaria	Vice Admiral Ventseslav K. Velkov
	Lieutenant Colonel Petar Petrov
Egypt	Rear Admiral Mamdouh Mohammed Sedeek
France	Vice Admiral Marc Merlo
Gambia	Mr. Sulayman Alieu Jack
Greece	Commodore C. Kechris
Guinea	Lieutenant Commander Alimon Diallo
Israel	Rear Admiral Amichay Ayalon
Jordan	Colonel Hussein Ali Al-Khasawneh
Lebanon	Brigadier General Alberto Ghorayeb
Morocco	Captain Mohamed Laghmari
Romania	Rear Admiral Constantine Iordache
Senegal	Captain Moustapha Mamadou Thioubou
Tunisia	Captain Hammouda Haddad
Turkey	Vice Admiral Ilahmi Erdil
United States	Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak

**Rapporteur:** *Professor Saverio A. De Ruggiero, Naval War College*

**Session One: Monday, 8 November 1993**

Vice Admiral Loftus, committee chairman, opened discussions of the regional committee with expressions of welcome on behalf of the United States Navy. The committee's discussions began with a general summarization of the morning's formal presentations, with general focus on this historic era of change, risk, and opportunity. The navies of the world, many faced with similar mission and budgetary considerations, have a unique opportunity to forge closer coalition relationships. Central to this opportunity is the ability to communicate effectively.

The ensuing discussions, relative to a common basis of communication, defined levels of communication—from the basics of general information

exchange to specifics of tactical data information exchange. One area of clear concern is a multi-maritime force capability to clearly communicate intentions.

Committee delegates, referring to existing and potential combined operations and exercises, focused on three basic aspects: interoperability, shared technologies, and rules of engagement. Various delegates expressed a view that coalitions function best when the individual members of a coalition possess interoperability capabilities in the areas of tactical and technical communications. A unified system of communications that spans the spectrum of routine information exchange to the exchange of tactical data, and common rules of engagement for coalition forces, were cited as examples.

The committee adjourned with a desire to continue discussions on the questions of interoperability, including considerations of additional regional conferences to be focused on this subject.

### **Session Two: Tuesday, 9 November 1993**

Committee Session Two continued the discussion of methods and procedures by which to make available common protocols dealing with general maritime concerns, such as search and rescue, oil spills, navigational hazards, etc. The delegates agreed on a need for more commonly accepted procedures as the world's navies enter a new era of closer cooperation.

Subsequent discussions centered on the question of how such common maritime protocols could be developed. A consensus emerged that a first step should be a focus upon the concerns of regional navies, that is, navies operating within a broadly definable geographic area. Examples cited were the somewhat different experiences of navies operating off the coast of West Africa as compared to navies operating in the southern or eastern Mediterranean. Each share basic maritime concerns, but each experience differing applications of their maritime forces.

The development of regional resolutions to common maritime concerns would consider attributes basic to all navies. Communications technologies and protocols were identified as an area of immediate interest. Citing the examples of search and rescue operations and multiple naval force responses to ecological emergencies, such as an oil spill, three attributes were identified:

**Interoperability.** Each maritime force responding to the specific occasion should possess a basic level of common interoperability capabilities.

**Technology.** Each maritime force responding to the specific occasion should possess a basic and common ability to transmit and receive data, ranging from the exchange of general information to the exchange of tactical data pertinent to the occasion. One delegate noted the experience of his nation's maritime forces. Commercial maritime communications devices currently provide the sole method of external communication. Other delegates suggested the

eventual development of transportable communications suites which could be provided to maritime units responding to specific occasions.

*Language and terminology.* Multiple responses to a common maritime concern could generate problems associated with the use of differing languages and terminology. It was noted that a common method of clearly and precisely signalling intentions is an objective that should be achieved.

The committee chairman suggested that each delegate consider a procedure by which each committee member would first consider the question of precisely what capability factors preclude multiple maritime force responses to common maritime concerns. The question of common terminology was cited as an example. Identifying those capability factors that would permit extended maritime cooperation at sea could enable regional committees, either established or *ad hoc*, to begin a process of defining achievable goals and commonly acceptable protocols. The chairman suggested further that a process of ongoing information exchange between the committee delegates would facilitate this process for all delegates.

The committee concluded its discussions with a summary of its interests in the continuing development of protocols and capabilities by which naval forces can effectively respond to naval concerns common to all mariners.

# Committee Six

## North Atlantic and Baltic Sea

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**Chairman:** Admiral Carlos Vila Miranda, Spanish Navy

**Members:**

Belgium	Rear Admiral Willy M. Herteleer
Canada	Vice Admiral Peter W. Cairns
Denmark	Vice Admiral Hans J. Garde
Estonia	Captain Tarmo Kouts
Finland	Rear Admiral Sakari Visa
Germany	Vice Admiral Hans-Rudolph Boehmer
Ireland	Commodore John J. Kavanagh
Latvia	Captain Gaidis Zeibots
	Captain Mars Krasts, USN (ret.) translator
Lithuania	Commodore Raimundos Baltuska
Netherlands	Vice Admiral Nico W.G. Buis
Norway	Rear Admiral Kjell A. Prytz
Poland	Vice Admiral Romuald Andrzej Waga
	Lieutenant Commander Podporucznik Stanislaw Krol
United Kingdom	Rear Admiral John R. Brigstocke
United States	Vice Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr.
	Rear Admiral Thomas F. Hall

**Rapporteur:** *Professor Paul J. St. Laurent*

**Session One: Monday, 8 November 1993**

Admiral Carlos Vila Miranda, Spain's Chief of the Naval General Staff and Committee Chairman extended his welcome to all members of the committee and particularly to those attending the symposium for the first time. He stated that this was a unique occasion to present opinions which heretofore have not been discussed.

The initial discussion centered around the recent BALTAP exercise. The question was raised as to its value to first time participants and observers. Those commenting stated that, indeed, it is beneficial, promotes mutual understanding and creates an atmosphere within which valuable training can occur.

Following this discussion the committee focused on five general areas, all of which interrelate:

- Membership in NATO.

- Common operating procedures.
- Operations under UN auspices, particularly maritime.
- Maritime expertise in Northern Europe.
- Raising and utilizing reserve forces.

**NATO Membership.** Although the committee agreed that participation in NATO is a political question, some non-NATO members of the committee expressed their rationale for possible membership in NATO in the future. Since NATO provides the means for collective security, it also offers the capability to bridge psychological gaps, that is, it creates a structure within which interoperability, ideas, and shared technologies occur. It was also suggested that NATO itself may change as a result of a changing world.

**Common Operating Procedures.** Interoperability in exercises and during operations is critical. Committee members expressed their concern for a lack of common operating procedures outside of NATO operations. Since future operations will entail worldwide coalition, those involved should have the basic ability to operate together. Standing NATO procedures offer a foundation upon which to develop such common procedures, possibly under United Nations auspices. Although some NATO members may be reluctant to use these documents as the basis for an international set of procedures, a consensus indicated that a number of NATO publications should be made available to non-NATO members.

**UN Operations.** International security cannot be guaranteed. However, with the promotion of multinational cooperation through small potential coalitions or larger alliances, it may be more attainable. The UN may be the practical body under which to organize and control the collective use of force. Questions were raised, though, as to the ability and level of experience available within the UN to employ such force. Although the UN employs a small group with land-based experience, there is a specific lack of maritime expertise available. This is of particular concern because of the potential for the employment of maritime forces in future UN-sponsored operations. Finally, in light of recent operations, the question was raised as to whether the UN will continue to become as involved as it has in the recent past.

**Maritime Expertise in Northern Europe.** As a result of organizational changes within NATO, the forthcoming elimination of Commander in Chief, Channel (CINCHAN), Europe's only major NATO Command, creates a void of maritime expertise available in Northern Europe. This situation has been addressed to SACEUR, since he will experience a loss of maritime influence in his headquarters.

**Reserve Forces.** Some committee members voiced concern for the recruitment and use of reserve personnel. Although not a problem for some nations, others indicated that for the first time it was becoming difficult to recruit sufficient numbers. Maintenance of a reserve force can be expensive and presents its own set of problems, particularly in wartime employment. If a reserve force is to be maintained, the nation must establish the specific role for which the force will be used. The accessibility of the force, the pool from which it will come, and the missions to which it will be assigned are all questions that must be asked if the reserve force is to be viable.

The chairman adjoined the committee and thanked the members for their open and candid comments in this session.

### **Session Two: Tuesday, 9 November 1993**

In this session the chairman asked if there were any additional topics committee members wished to investigate, particularly regarding the future role of maritime forces under UN operation. A discussion ensued on the costs and benefits of employing expensive and sophisticated platforms in such roles as enforcing embargoes or in counter-drug operations. Embargoes, for instance, must be long-term operations if they are to be effective. During the course of an embargo, complex equipment and vessels are being utilized for a relatively simple task. In the course of such operations, the effectiveness of these limited resources may be impaired and war-fighting skills affected. Despite the costs associated with these embargoes, they have proven to be an effective and politically viable weapon that sometimes precludes the necessity for a "hot war."

Members of the committee agreed that counter-drug operations, on the other hand, have a requirement for some level of sophistication in the vessels and platforms employed. Here, again, the question was raised about the employment of scarce naval resources in such operations. Should the focus change from interdiction to a greater effort placed on reducing demand? The chairman indicated that in the previous symposium, navies of smaller nations requested assistance in their drug operation efforts. However, this has not been discussed during this current symposium. At issue again, also, is the lack of law enforcement authority available to naval forces engaged in such operations. Some success has been achieved here, for instance, with the use of U.S. Coast Guard Teams with naval vessels of both the U.S. and the UK operating under Joint Task Force 4 in the Caribbean. Whereas some nations rely to a great extent on non-military resources in counter-drug operations, there was general agreement that the requirement for maritime forces to support such missions will continue to exist. The point was made that the number of vessels involved in such operations should not be the concern, but that the capability of the platform and crew to accomplish the task is of primary importance.



The discussion then returned to the issue of common operating procedures. The chairman asked representatives of the Baltic nations for their thoughts in this area. Collectively, they requested whatever help might be available to assist them in training and educating their newly formed forces in areas in which they have little expertise. Such fundamental exercises as in Search and Rescue operations is but one example where they might benefit from the collective expertise of their Western neighbors. The possibility of sending mobile training teams to assist them was raised as well as conducting periodic meetings, possibly establishing a committee among the Baltic nations, Finland, Sweden, and Russia. This could lead to a functioning cooperative and might expedite the exchange of information. A short discussion followed on the problems they have experienced with the stream of refugees from nations of the former Soviet Union through their borders and actions taken to stem the flow. It was generally agreed that all non-NATO members of this committee will benefit by the increased cooperation shown recently and the future exchanges of ideas.

The chairman adjourned the session and thanked each member for his participation.

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## List of Delegates

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# Twelfth International Seapower Symposium

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## List of Delegates

- Albania** Commodore Edmund Zhupani  
Commandant, Albanian Naval Forces
- Lieutenant General Ilia Vasho  
Chief, Albanian Armed Forces General Staff
- Algeria** General Chaabane Ghodbane  
Commandant, Algerian Naval Forces
- Captain Ammar Chibani  
Algerian Naval Forces
- Argentina** Admiral Enrique Emilio Molina Pico  
Chief of Staff, Argentine Navy
- Captain Diego Enrique Leivas  
Secretary of the Chief of Staff  
Argentine Navy
- Australia** Vice Admiral I.D.G. MacDougall  
Chief of Naval Staff  
Royal Australian Navy
- Commodore Robert Letts  
Director, General Naval Manpower
- Bahamas** Acting Commander Davy F. Rolle  
Royal Bahamas Defence Force
- Bahrain** Lieutenant Colonel Yousef Ahmed Mallalah  
Commander, Bahrain Amiri Naval Forces
- Major Jassim Mohammed Jassim  
Assistant to the Commander  
Bahrain Amiri Naval Forces

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- Barbados** Lieutenant Commander David Dowridge  
Officer Commanding  
Barbados Coast Guard
- Belgium** Rear Admiral Willy M. Herteleer  
Chief of Naval Staff  
Belgian Navy
- Benin** Commander Prosper Bere Kiando  
Commander, Benin Navy
- Bolivia** Captain Luis A. Daza Montero  
Naval Attaché
- Brazil** Rear Admiral Fernando M. F. Diegues  
President, Naval War College
- Bulgaria** Vice Admiral Ventseslav K. Velkov  
Commander-in-Chief, Bulgarian Navy
- Lieutenant Colonel Petar V. Petrov  
Defense, Military, Naval and Air Attaché
- Canada** Vice Admiral Peter W. Cairns  
Commander, Maritime Command
- Rear Admiral R.C. Waller  
Commander, Maritime Forces Pacific
- Chile** Admiral Jorge Martinez Busch  
Commander in Chief, Chilean Navy  
Senior symposium delegate: ISS XII
- Rear Admiral Carlos Schnaidt  
Vice Chief of Staff, Chilean Navy
- Colombia** Vice Admiral Hernando Garcia Ramirez  
Commander of Colombian Naval Forces
- Rear Admiral Sergio Garcia Torres  
Director, Admiral Padilla Naval Academy
- Denmark** Vice Admiral Hans J. Garde  
Chief of Staff, Headquarters Chief of Defence

- Colonel Niels L. Fredenslund  
Commanding Officer, Royal Danish Defence College
- Dominican Republic**  
Vice Admiral Ivan Vargas Cespedes  
Chief of Staff, Dominican Navy
- Captain de Corbeta Omar Andujar-Zaiter  
Aide to the Chief of Staff, Dominican Navy
- Ecuador**  
Vice Admiral Oswaldo Viteri Jerez  
Commanding General of the Ecuadorian Navy
- Captain Miguel Saona Roca  
Director of the Naval War College
- Egypt**  
Rear Admiral Mamdouh Mohammed Sedeek  
Assistant Commander in Chief for Logistics  
Egyptian Navy
- Rear Admiral Hassan Hosny Amin  
Commanding Officer, Alexandria Naval Base
- El Salvador**  
Captain Mario Argueta Franco  
Commander, Salvadoran Navy
- Estonia**  
Captain Tarmo Kouts  
Chief, Estonian Border Guard
- Finland**  
Rear Admiral Sakari Visa  
Commander-in-Chief, Finnish Navy
- Commander Hans Vilhelm Holmstrom  
Leader of the Naval Warfare Branch  
General Staff Officer Course  
National Defence College
- France**  
Vice Admiral Marc Merlo  
Commander, Joint Staff College
- Rear Admiral Jean-Luc Duval  
Commander, Naval Advanced Studies Center
- Gambia**  
Mr. Sulayman Alieu Jack  
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence

Major Antuman Saho  
Commander of the Marine Unit  
Gambian National Guard

**Germany** Vice Admiral Hans-Rudolph Boehmer  
Commander-in-chief, German Fleet

Captain Gerhard M. Eichorst  
Head, Naval Section  
Federal Armed Forces Staff College

**Greece** Commodore C. Kechris  
Director, Naval War College

**Guatemala** Captain Jose M. Valladares Lanuza  
Commander, Atlantic Naval Base

**Guinea** Commander Amara Bangoura  
Chief of Staff, Guinean Navy

Lieutenant Commander Alimon Diallo Madou Alimou  
Defense, Military, Naval and Air Attaché

**Honduras** Captain Bruno Giordano Fontana Hedman  
Commander, Honduran Navy

Commander Jesus Alberto Alvarez Rivera  
Chief, Logistics Department  
Honduran Navy

**India** Commodore K. V. Bharathan  
Naval Attaché

**Indonesia** Rear Admiral Haryono  
Commander, Military Sealift Command

Captain F. Wuwung  
Naval Attaché

**Ireland** Commodore John J. Kavanaugh  
Flag Officer Commanding Naval Service

**Israel** Rear Admiral Ami Ayalon  
Commander in Chief, Israel Navy

- Captain Arie Gavish  
Naval Attaché
- Italy**  
Rear Admiral Luigi Donolo  
Commandant, Naval War College  
  
Captain Sirio Piangiani  
Chief of Plans and Policy Division  
Italian Navy General Staff
- Jamaica**  
Commander Hardley M. Lewin  
Commanding Officer  
Jamaica Defence Force Coast Guard
- Japan**  
Vice Admiral Kazuya Natsukawa  
Vice Chief of Staff  
Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force  
  
Rear Admiral Hideaki Kaneda  
Head, Plans and Programs Division  
Maritime Staff Office
- Jordan**  
Colonel Hussein Ali Al-Khasawneh  
Commander, Royal Jordanian Naval Force
- Korea**  
Rear Admiral Ha Jong-Keun  
President, Naval Command and Staff College  
and Commander, Naval Education and  
Training Command
- Kuwait**  
Colonel Ahmed Yousef Al-Mullah  
Commander, Kuwait Naval Forces
- Latvia**  
Captain Gaidis Zeibots  
Commander in Chief, Latvian Naval Forces  
  
Colonel Karlis Kreslins  
Deputy Chief, National Defence Academy
- Lebanon**  
Brigadier General Alberto Gorayeb  
Commander, Lebanese Navy
- Lithuania**  
Commodore Raimundos Baltuska  
Chief, Lithuanian Navy



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- Malaysia** Vice Admiral Dató Seri Mohamad Shariff bin Ishak  
Chief of Navy, Royal Malaysian Navy
- Commander Noor Aziz bin Yunan  
Staff Officer-1  
Headquarters Royal Malaysian Navy
- Mexico** Vice Admiral David Jose Leal Rodriguez  
Naval Attaché
- Morocco** Captain Mohamed Laghmari  
Chief, Naval Communications
- Netherlands** Vice Admiral Nico W.G. Buis  
Commander in Chief, Royal Netherlands Navy
- Captain W.J.J. van der Knaap  
Chef de Cabinet of the Commander in Chief  
Royal Netherlands Navy
- New Zealand** Rear Admiral Ian A. Hunter  
Chief of Naval Staff  
Royal New Zealand Navy
- Captain Raymond J. Gillbanks  
Defense Advisor (Designate)  
New Zealand High Commission, Ottawa
- Norway** Rear Admiral Kjell A. Prytz  
Inspector General, Royal Norwegian Navy
- Captain Leif Andersen  
Commandant, Naval Staff College
- Oman** Commodore Abdul Aziz bin Somar Al-Zidgali  
Commander, Batinah Naval Area Command  
Commanding Officer  
Said bin Sultan Naval Base
- Commander Rashid bin Taj Al-Raisi  
Commanding Officer, SNV *Nasr Al Bahr*
- Pakistan** Vice Admiral Khalid M. Mir  
Commander, Karachi

- Captain Muhammed Nashat Raffi  
Naval Attaché
- Peru** Admiral Alfredo Arnaiz Ambrossiani  
Commandant General, Peruvian Navy
- Rear Admiral Hugo Aturo Arevalo Escaro  
Director, Superior School of Naval Warfare
- Philippines** Rear Admiral Virgillio Q. Marcelo  
Flag Officer in Command, Philippine Navy
- Captain Cleo Erfi  
Naval Attaché
- Poland** Vice Admiral Romuald Andrzej Waga  
Commander, Polish Navy
- Lieutenant Commander Podporucznik S. Krol  
Naval Staff, Polish Navy
- Portugal** Vice Admiral Antonio Quesada da Andrade  
Director, Naval War College
- Qatar** Colonel Juma'an Jowher Al-Abdullah  
Director of Technical Services  
Qatar Emiri Navy
- Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Al-Abdul Jabbar  
Deputy Director of Operations for Training  
Qatar Emiri Navy
- Romania** Rear Admiral Constantine Iordache  
Chief of Staff, Romanian Navy
- Commander Victor Costache  
Defense, Military, Air and Naval Attaché
- Saudi Arabia** Captain Yousef Al-Younis  
Commandant, King Fahd Naval Academy
- Senegal** Captain Moustapha Mamadou Thioubou  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
Senegalese Navy

- Singapore** Colonel Lim Cherng Yih Richard  
Director of Operations  
Republic of Singapore Navy
- South Africa** Vice Admiral Robert C. Simpson-Anderson  
Chief, South African Navy
- Spain** Admiral Carlos Vila Miranda  
Chief of Staff, Spanish Navy
- Vice Admiral Juan J. Romero Caramelo  
Director, Naval War College
- Thailand** Admiral Santiparb Moo-Ming  
Deputy Commander in Chief  
Royal Thai Navy
- Captain Sombat Augsornsri  
Staff Officer to Deputy Commander in Chief  
Royal Thai Navy
- Tonga** Lieutenant Colonel Fetu' Utolu Tupou  
Commander, Tonga Defence Services
- Tunisia** Captain Hammouda Haddad  
Head, Tunisian Coastal Commission  
Commander, Tunisian Coast Guard
- Turkey** Vice Admiral Ilahmi Erdil  
Chief of Staff, Turkish Naval Forces
- Rear Admiral Atilla Senkul  
Commander, Naval War College
- Ukraine** Vice Admiral Vladimir G. Bezkorovainy  
Commander in Chief, Ukrainian Navy
- Rear Admiral Victor V. Makarov  
Director, Sebastopol Naval Institution
- United Arab Emirates** Colonel Mohammed Khalfan  
Commander  
United Arab Emirates Navy

- Lieutenant Colonel Abdulla Ataq  
 Director of Operations  
 United Arab Emirates Navy
- United Kingdom** Rear Admiral John R. Brigstocke  
 Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff  
 Royal Navy
- Commodore Robert J. Fisher  
 Commandant  
 Royal Navy Staff College
- United Nations** Mr. Derek G. Boothby  
 Head, Europe Division  
 Department of Political Affairs  
 United Nations
- United States** The Honorable John H. Dalton  
 Secretary of the Navy
- Admiral Frank B. Kelso II  
 Chief of Naval Operations
- Admiral William D. Smith  
 Former U.S. Representative  
 to the Military Committee, NATO
- Admiral Paul D. Miller  
 Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command  
 Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic
- Admiral Henry H. Mauz, Jr.  
 Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet
- Lieutenant General Charles C. Krulak  
 Commanding General  
 Marine Corps Combat Development Command
- Vice Admiral Robert T. Nelson  
 Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
- Vice Admiral Leighton W. Smith, Jr.  
 Deputy Chief of Naval Operations  
 Plans, Policy and Operations

Vice Admiral Stephen F. Loftus  
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations  
Logistics

Vice Admiral Michael P. Kalleres  
Commander, Military Sealift Command

Rear Admiral Joseph C. Strasser  
President, Naval War College

Rear Admiral Thomas D. Ryan  
Director, Submarine Warfare Division

Rear Admiral Thomas F. Hall  
Commander, Naval Reserve Force  
Chief of Naval Reserve

Rear Admiral Walter F. Doran  
Director, Operations, Plans and Political-  
Military Affairs

Rear Admiral Philip J. Coady, Jr.  
Director, Surface Warfare Division

Rear Admiral Thomas F. Marfiak  
Head, Surface Warfare Plans, Programs and  
Requirements Branch

Mr. Jerry Kahan  
Center for Naval Analysis

**Uruguay**

Rear Admiral Mario Martinez Lanzani  
Chief of General Staff, Uruguayan Navy

Captain Antonio Bugna  
Commanding Officer, High Seas Forces

**Venezuela**

Vice Admiral Julian Enrique Mauco Quintana  
Commanding General, Venezuelan Navy

Rear Admiral Jose Quintero Torres  
Director, Superior Naval War College

