


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

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




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


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JOINT DIRECTIVE OF U.S. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

(From ComSoPacFor War Diary, July 1942)

022100 - From COMINCH to CINCPAC - Info COMSOPAC & COMSOWESPAC - For offensive operations in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA the UNITED STATES Chiefs of Staffs have agreed on this joint directive.

Para. 1. Objective:- Offensive operations will be conducted with the ultimate objective of seizing and occupying the NEW BRITAIN-NEW GUINEA-NEW IRELAND AREA.

Para. 2. Purpose:- Denying the area to JAPAN.

Para. 3. Tasks:- (a) 1. Seize and occupy SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS, TULAGI, and adjacent positions.

(b) Task Two:- Seize and occupy the remainder of the SOLOMON ISLANDS, LAE, SALAMAUA and the northeast coast of NEW GUINEA.

(c) Task Three:- Seize and occupy RABAU and adjacent positions in the NEW GUINEA-NEW IRELAND AREA.

Para. 4. General Instructions

(a) Determination by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff will be made regarding the composition of the forces to be used, the timing of the tasks, and the passage of command.

(b) August 1st is tentatively set as target date for planning purposes.

(c) Throughout the conduct of all three tasks direct command of the tactical operations of the Amphibious Forces will remain with the Naval Task Force Commander.

(d) The U.S. Chiefs of Staff may order the withdrawal of the naval attached units of the U.S. Fleet upon the completion of any particular phase of the operation in the event that: (1) developments and conditions which would unduly jeopardize the aircraft carriers, (2) if an emergency arises in another Pacific Area which demands such withdrawal. The eastern and western boundaries of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA and of the SOUTH PACIFIC AREA respectively will, as of August 1st, 1942, be Longitude 159 degrees East from the Equator southward. ✓

Para. 5. Forces.

(a) Forces now under the command of the Supreme Commander SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA including ground, air, and naval;

(b) At least 2 aircraft carriers with accompanying cruisers and destroyers, and the SOUTH PACIFIC Amphibious Force, with the necessary Transport Divisions;

(c) Marine air squadrons and all available land-based air support in the SOUTH PACIFIC AREA; ✓

(d) The utilization of Army occupational forces in the SOUTH PACIFIC AREA to garrison TULAGI and adjacent Island positions; troops from AUSTRALIA to provide other required garrisons.

Para. 6. Command.

(a) TASK ONE - Seize and occupy SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS, TULAGI and adjacent positions. (1) CincPac will designate Task Force Commander, (2) The Supreme Commander of the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA will attach necessary naval reinforcements and landbased air support and provide for jurisdiction (interdiction?) of enemy air and naval activities westward of the operating area;

(b) TASK TWO - The seizure and occupation of the remainder of the SOLOMONS ISLANDS and of LAE, SALAMAUA and the north-east coast of NEW GUINEA. Task Forces engaged in this operation will be under the direction of the Supreme Commander SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.

(c) TASK THREE - Seizure and occupation of RABAUL and adjacent positions in the NEW GUINEA-NEW IRELAND AREA. The Task Forces engaged in this operation will be under the direction of the Supreme Commander SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA. It is assumed Ghormley will be made Task Force Commander at least for TASK ONE which he should command in person, in operating area. He should also have conference with MacArthur.

Cincpac File UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET VO
No.
A16-3/(17) FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Serial 0151W

9 July, 1942.

SECRET

Subject: Letter of Instructions.

Task Force ELEVEN - Vice Admiral Fletcher.

SARATOGA	1 CV
MINNEAPOLIS - Rear Admiral Wright ASTORIA, NEW ORLEANS	3 CA
PHELPS, DEWEY, HULL, MACDONOUGH, WORDEN, FARRAGUT, DALE	1 DL, 6 DD
CALHOUN, GREGORY, McKEAN, LITTLE	4 APD

Task Force SIXTEEN - Rear Admiral Kinkaid

ENTERPRISE	1 CV
NORTH CAROLINA	1 BB
PORTLAND - Rear Admiral Tisdale SALT LAKE CITY	2 CA
ATLANTA	1 CL
BALCH, BENHAM, ELLET, MAURY, GWIN, GRAYSON, MONSSEN	1 DL, 6 DD

Task Force EIGHTEEN - Rear Admiral Noyes

WASP	1 CV
SAN FRANCISCO - Rear Admiral Scott QUINCY, VINCENNES	3 CA
SAN JUAN	1 CL
FARENHOLT, BUCHANAN, AARON WARD, LAFFEY, LONG, STERRETT, STACK, WILSON	8 DD

Cincpac File UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
No. FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
A16-3/(17)

VO

Serial 0151W

9 July, 1942.

SECRET

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: Commander South Pacific Area.

Subject: Letter of Instructions.

References: (a) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet, three part
despatch No. 022100 of which you are an
information addressee.
(b) My serial 0143W of June 30, 1942.
(c) Information regarding enemy positions,
strength and disposition Southwest Pacific,
attached hereto.

1. There are indications that the enemy will attempt to extend to the South and Southeast the control he now holds on most of the NEW GUINEA-NEW BRITAIN-SOLOMON Area. Latest information regarding the enemy in this area is contained in reference (c).

Included

2. The strength of the striking forces which the enemy can bring to bear has been greatly decreased by his losses during the battles of Coral Sea and Midway. Due to these losses he may decide that he is not strong enough to extend control by a sea-borne advance. If this is the case he may or may not attempt an overland advance on Port Moresby. In anyevent, it has been found feasible for the United Powers with the means now available, to undertake the recapture of bases in the Tulagi area.

3. You are hereby designated Task Force Commander for Task One, reference (a). You will exercise strategic command in person in the operating area, which is interpreted initially to be the NEW CALEDONIA-NEW HEBRIDES area.

4. The following forces of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, in addition to those already under your command, are hereby assigned to you for Task One:

Cincpac File UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
No.
Al6-3/(17) FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

VO

Serial 0151W

9 July, 1942.

SECRET

Subject: Letter of Instructions.

Marine Forces

PRES. HAYES, PRES. ADAMS, PRES. JACKSON,
CRESCENT CITY, ZEILIN

5 AP

ALHENA, BETELGUESE

2 AK

Ground

3rd Defense Battalion
2nd Marines (Reinforced)

Air

VMSB 231, 232
VMF 223, 224
VMO 251

Miscellaneous Vessels

CIMARRON, KASKASKIA, PLATTE, KANAWHA

4 AO

RAINIER

1 AE

ARGONNE

1 AG

ALDEBARAN, MAJABA, TALAMANCA

3 AK

HOPKINS, TREVER, ZANE, SOUTHARD, HOVEY

5 DMS

NAVAJO

1 AT(S)

5. Information has been received from the Commander Southwest Pacific Area that there will be available on August 1, 1942, the following forces:

Cruisers

AUSTRALIA
CANBERRA
CHICAGO
HOBART

Destroyers

Desron 4 (consisting
of 9 DD)

You are authorized to apply directly to the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area for additional forces required.

Cincpac File UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
No.
A16-3/(17) FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Serial 0151W

9 July, 1942.

SECRET

Subject: Letter of Instructions.

6. With the forces under your command you will commencing about August 1, 1942, seize and occupy the SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS, TULAGI, and adjacent positions, in order to deny that area to Japan.

7. Logistic support for this operation will be provided by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The following arrangements have been made. Two fleet tankers, the CIMARRON and PLATTE, will accompany Task Force 11. The KASKASKIA will proceed to the South Pacific from Pearl Harbor about July 20th. The KANAWHA will fuel Task Force 18 then proceed to Noumea. Chartered tankers with a total of 225,000 barrels fuel oil will arrive at Noumea on July 22, 1942, and again with the same amount on August 2, 1942. It is expected that about 225,000 barrels of fuel oil per carrier task force per month will be made available to you in the New Caledonia area. Requirements for diesel fuel, aviation gasoline, and stores for Pacific Fleet Task Forces will be met as requested by you.

8. Communications will be generally in accordance with PAC SEVENTY, modified as directed by you.

9. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, will remain at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, and may from time to time issue further instructions in connection with this operation. I have full confidence in your ability to carry this operation to a successful conclusion.

C.W. NIMITZ

Copy to:

Cominch (4 copies complete)

Reference "C" to CincPac File No. A16-3/(17), Serial O151W, 7/9/42.

SECRET

Information on Enemy Forces and positions
in the SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA up to 10
July 1942.

(All dates herein are 1942, except where
otherwise specified).

SECRET

BUKA PASSAGE Buka Islands (Solomon Islands)

Located on E.E. shore of Buka Island, across the strait from Bougainville Island, and approximately 1/4 mile from the water.

The landing strip runs N.E./S.W. The surface is soft after rain. The approaches are cleared of trees, but remainder of area is heavily forested with trees up to 70 ft. in height. Prevailing winds from S. W. April to October and N. W. the remainder of the year. No hangars.

Though previously damaged, the runway may now be serviceable for light bombers and fighters. However, as late as 21 May, the aerodrome remained unserviceable.

Sohana Island opposite Buka Passage is occupied and is the location of at least one AA battery. Reported ORANGE working to improve this field; planes expected soon.

CAPE GLOUCESTER (West New Britain)

Indications flood waters have caused some damage to runways, and remained unserviceable, with no activity end of May.

DEBOYNE Islands

A seaplane and flying boat base was set up by ORANGE "near" position 10-44S, 152-25E. New buildings were erected on shore.

It is believed this seaplane base has been abandoned.

Little or no AA defense. (No sketch or photo available)

DEBOYNE GROUP

General information:

1. The DEBOYNE GROUP consists of three islands and a large coral girt lagoon lying 9 miles West of the island of MISIMA. The lagoon is roughly triangular in shape some 18 miles in length from East to West and 10 miles in width with two excellent deep water entrances, one in the western corner called West Pass (Depth 10 fathoms) and one in the East called Redlick Pass (Depth 6 fathoms). The three islands are named Panniet, Pana-Pom-Pom and Nivani.

DEBOYNE GROUP (Continued)

2. Panniet, the largest island stands on the Northern end of the Lagoon. Its well wooded center rises to an elevation of 700 feet. Its Northern or seaward coast rises sheer from the water to elevations of more than a hundred feet and thence, in general, slopes gently Southward to flat beaches and coral shoals on the lagoon side. There is sufficient drinking water on this island to supply several villages situated opposite shallow breaks in the encircling coral reefs. Large vessels cannot approach closer than a mile to this shore on account of the reefs.

3. The island of Pana-Pom-Pom stands surrounded by deep water in the center of the lagoon with the island of Nivani immediately South and separated from Pana-Pom-Pom by a channel not over a third of a mile wide. There is a good anchorage for vessels up to 5,000 tons burden in the open Western end of this channel. A good sandy or shingle beach 20 feet in width is found on Pana-Pom-Pom. It is about a mile in length and faces the anchorage with a native village at its Western end. It is most probable that the Japanese have landed here and that their stores are hidden beneath the coconuts back of the beach.

4. Although the best beach on Pana-Pom-Pom lies on its Southern Shore, the island can be landed upon anywhere in its entire circumference. There are two small native settlements on the North Western shore and one upon the North Eastern, where there is a good anchorage close off shore. Opposite this anchorage there is a storehouse of native materials built by a Philippine resident by the name of Ab Gow. Drinking water is not present in Pana-Pom-Pom. Around the coast there are coconuts, but the center is still dense bush.

5. Nivani, the smallest of the three islands is only a few hundred acres in extent. It is entirely covered with coconuts and is uninhabited by natives except a few employees of the plantation. The only buildings on the island are a store, a European residence, a copra drying shed and a few small outhouses standing back of a good shingle beach facing the channel between Nivani and Pana-Pom-Pom. It is probable that the Japanese have occupied these buildings as they are the only European built edifices in the entire Deboyne group. There is no drinking water on Nivani Island.

6. In addition to the three above mentioned islands there are two or three tiny patches of dry ground on the coral reefs which surround Deboyne Lagoon. Two of these, called Nibub and Rara (or Lau) Island near the Western entrance to the lagoon through Redlik Passage, are covered with low bushes and might be used in its defense.

DEBOYNE GROUP (Continued)

7. Schooner Captains who are familiar with the seas around Deboyne are:

Alex Markwell - Port Moresby
Arthur Evensett - Townsville

8. Total population Panniet - 600; Pana-Pom-Pom - 200; Nivani - none except a few employees.

Maps - Chart No. 2124 on Louisiades, No. 1477 for details on Deboyne Group.

FAISI Solomon Islands (7-06S, 155-54E)

Emergency Seaplane Anchorage.

FAISI Islands - off E. cape of Shortland Islands. (Note: Shortland Island is often locally referred to as FAISI).

The channel between the W. shore of FAISI and the E. shore of Shortland Islands, provides N.E./S.W. run of unlimited length. The west edge is indicated by beacons which mark the E. extremity of Shortland coastal coral. S.W. of FAISI, between Shortland and the neighboring islands is a similar run NNE/SSW. These 2 alighting areas are connected by the narrow strait at the W. end of FAISI. N.E. winds occasionally blow down channel and produce choppy water in strait.

Buoys installed harbor end of April may indicate further use by ORANGE patrol planes.

Considerable shipping has been noted recently.

FINSCHHAFEN (North Coast New Guinea) (6-33 S., 147-52 E.)

Emergency seaplane anchorage, N. of Cape Cretin.

Alighting area is in open sea, N. of entrance.

Water is uniformly deep except for 4 coral heads N. of buildings at W. of entrance. Langemark Bay would probably be a suitable alighting area in N.W. wind.

GASMATA (New Britain) ((6-18 S., 150-20 E.)

Emergency Seaplane anchorage.

GASMATA (Continued)

Gasmata Island lies about 2 miles S. of the mainland of New Britain. At the W. end of the island is a small settlement, and a narrow strait separating Gasmata Island from the next W. island. This strait forms an entrance to the large lagoon formed by the islands and the S. coast of New Britain.

The seaplane alighting area is 1 mile, E. to W. immediately inside the entrance, and about 600 yards N. to S. The water in this area is apparently very deep, but the N. limit is marked by steep coral reefs. Further E., the water is considerably encumbered by reefs.

Tsu Bumer

A land aerodrome is located 3 miles ENE of the entrance, on the mainland of New Britain. This field is utilized as a fighter base. Buildings on each side, SE end. AA batteries located each corner and a group of 3 guns along road N. side. Also one AA position near cove off N.W. end runway. Various types planes were reported here the end of May.

GIZO (Solomon Islands (8-06S, 156-52E))

Seaplane harbor, located S.E. extremity GIZO Island.

Alighting area is 1 mile N.W./S.E., 3/4 mile N.E./S.W. Hills, approximately 250 ft. high lie on the N. and W. shores. Slight tidal stream in the harbor, increasing outside.

NORTH COAST GUADALCANAL.

Japanese thoroughly reconnoitered vicinity Point Danger (09-30S, 160-20E) middle of May, possibly in search for an aerodrome site.

Early in June, Japanese vessels visited Lunga (9-22S, 160E). Extensive fires were seen all over grassy plains North Central Guadalcanal, presumably in preparation for landplane runway. Lunga has been used extensively by ORANGE of late. Tents sighted E. and W. of Lunga Point. (No sketch or photo).

HOPOI, New Guinea (6-45 S., 147-18 E.)

Location 21 miles E. of Lae.

Limited types of aircraft - one way ground. Early morning winds liable to be across ground. The N.W. end may be soft after heavy rain.

Japs had been reported using this aerodrome in May.

4

KAVIENG (New Ireland - Lat. 02-34S, Long. 150-50E)

Located N.W. extremity of New Ireland Island about 3 miles E. of the town of Kavieng.

The surface of the airfield is good, but soft after rains. Field is surrounded by coconut plantations. Prevailing winds from S.E., May to September, and N.W. October to April. Altitude 100 ft. Construction activity noted on runway late June 1942 and on large T shaped clearing north thereof.

ORANGE bombers have used this field. Though previously damaged, repairs were completed the end of May, but no enemy aircraft were observed on the field. Several VF have been observed in flight over the aerodrome.

AA defenses unknown.

The harbor contains a seaplane anchorage.

Kavieng is known as an important center for the copra trade. The Strait between here and New Hanover is used as an anchorage is the point of rendezvous for convoys enroute to and from the Rabaul area.

The Japs plan to build an arsenal at Kavieng.

KIETA Bougainville Island (Solomon Islands) (6-12S, 155-40E)

Seaplane Harbor. Located E. coast of Bougainville.

Alighting area 2 1/2 mi by 1 1/2 mi. Shelter can be obtained from any wind. Shores very steep too. Alighting area 2 1/4 mi. (N.W./S.E.) and 1 1/2 mi. (S.W./N.E.). The water is very deep, except for a reef in the center of the E. entrance and fringing coral reefs around the shoreline of the harbor. Obstructions - 3 beacons (one 49 ft. high) in the N. entrance.

✓ The only landplane runway is 11 miles S.E. of KIETA and is unsatisfactory. Direction N.W./S.E. This field is over-~~grown~~ grown with grass. There is a small camp located on the beach, but no activity.

LAE (New Guinea)

Lae aerodrome is located 1/2 mile W. of settlement on N. shore of Huon Gulf, 2 miles E. of the mouth of Markham River. Altitude is approximately sea level. Thick shrub grows on both sides of field. Normal winds are N.W. during morning, S.E. during afternoons. Very heavy rainfall from June to October.

TULAGI (W. of Florida Is.) Solomon Islands (9-07S, 160-10E)

Seaplane base only.

Japs landed here 8 May and occupied Florida and Gavutu Islands as well, in the immediate vicinity of the VP base.

AA Positions

(a) One AA gun South of the store in the center of Makambo Island, which is located in Tulagi Harbor.

(b) Three 3-inch AA guns located Gavutu Island, (9-07S, 160-12E just E. of Tulagi) as follows: (1) about equi-distant between the oil tank wharf and the jetty on the island. (2) Immediately S. of the Shore end of the jetty. (3) At N.W. end of the low ridge in the S. of the island.

(c) Three 3-inch AA guns located Tanambogo Island, (just E. of Tulagi) in the N.W. center of the island as well as near the wharf.

(d) Four 3-inch AA guns near buildings S.E. end Tulagi Harbor.

Searchlights probably installed in the area.

Enemy strength in area 31 May, estimated at 600. Believed concentrated at Gavutu and Port Purvis (8 miles S.E. Tulagi).

Allied air raid end of May resulted in burning gun pit and engine ship, Gavutu all buildings E. side have been razed. No damage to oil tanks. Although no a/c have operated from Tulagi since the first of June, considerable activity is noted vicinity Gavutu, especially at night. One large and two small warships have been observed anchoring in Tulagi nightly.

Oil dumps are reported at Gavutu wharf and Tanambobo Island.

Japanese patrol boats are believed to have recently rounded up Europeans remaining in the Solomons. (Photo (small) and sketch page 77-78 RAAF pub. 32(A)).

AIR STRENGTH IN THE AREA UNDER REVIEW, AS OF 20 JUNE 1942.

	<u>VF</u>	<u>VB</u>	<u>Patrol Planes</u>	<u>Float Planes</u>	<u>VO</u>	<u>Total</u>
New Britain)						
New Ireland)	25	33	12	10	0	80
New Guinea	39	10	0	0	0	49
Solomons	0	0	3	4	0	7

AVAILABLE OUTSIDE AREA FOR QUICK REINFORCEMENT OF AREA UNDER STUDY

	<u>VF</u>	<u>VB</u>	<u>Patrol Planes</u>	<u>Float Planes</u>	<u>VO</u>	<u>Total</u>
Marshalls (Inc. Gilberts)	36	24	24	36	0	120
Truk - Ponape area.	36	18	12	18	0	84

ESTIMATE OF PROBABLE ENEMY SEABORNE STRENGTH

(a) On 15 July under present known conditions:

✓ 4 CA	Crudiv 6 (4-AOBA)
✓ 3 CL	Crudiv 18 (1 KASHIMA - 2 TATSUTA)
12 DD	Desron 6, reinforced
4 XPG(XCL)	Gunboat Division 8
4 XAM	Minesweep Division 16
8 PC	SC Divs 51-53
12 SS	Subron 7 (reinforced)
2 AV	MOTORO, KAMO I
3-4 XAV	Air tenders (FUJIKAWA MARU etc)
4 (plus?) MTB	Motor torpedo Squadron attached 8th Base Force Rabaul.
6-8 AP	8th Base Force (Reinforced)
3-4 AK	8th Base Force (Reinforced)

(b) On August 1st assumingcommencing July 15th vessels and units listed in (a) along plus:

	<u>Cardiv 4</u>	<u>Cardiv 5</u>	
3 CV	RYUJO	ZUIKAKU	
2 XCV maybe	JUNYO	SHOKAKU (estimate repairs complete July 15th)	
(4 CV (1 XCV	ZUIHO		
	<u>Batdiv 3</u>	<u>Crudiv 8</u>	<u>Desron 10</u>
2 BB	HARUNA KIRISHIMA	TONE CHOKUMA	NAGARA 12 DD
6 CA	<u>Crudiv 4</u>		
	ATAGO TAKAO		

Crudiv 5

3 CL MYOKO
36 DD (Inc. HAGURO
plane guards)

Desron 2

JINTSU
12 DD

Desron 4

2 AV SENDAI
12 DD

Airon 7

CHITOSE
CHIYODA

Subron 8

12 SS 12 SS

2-3 XAV Miscellaneous Air-tenders
aux. Seaplane Tenders.

Comsopac File No.
A4-3/A16-3.

Serial 0017.

MOST
SECRET

COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC AREA
and
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER.

July 16, 1942.

Operation Plan
No. 1-42.

TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Task Force SIXTY-ONE (Expeditionary Force),
Vice Admiral Fletcher.
Task Forces ELEVEN, SIXTEEN and EIGHTEEN, less
detachments.
Task Force FORTY-FOUR - (4 CL - 0 DD).
Task Force SIXTY-TWO (South Pacific Amphibious Force).
- (b) Task Force SIXTY-THREE, Rear Admiral McCain.

Aircraft South Pacific Force.
Aircraft temporarily attached and basing on
islands in South Pacific Area.

1. Information.

(a) Enemy Information - See Annex A.

(b) United Nations Forces will conduct offensive operations in the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas. Such operations will be divided chronologically and geographically into Three Tasks. This plan deals with the operations incident to Task One, only.

(c) The eastern and western boundaries of the Southwest Pacific and South Pacific Areas respectively will, as of August 1st, be Longitude 159° East from the equator southward.

Comsopac File No.
A4-3/A16-3.

Operation Plan (CONT)
No. 1-42.

1. Information (CONT)

(d) The Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area will, for Task One, provide for the interdiction of enemy air and naval activities westward of the operating area. Air scouting of the area will be as arranged with Commander Task Force SIXTY-THREE. Submarines of the Southwest Pacific Force will operate in the Rabaul area.

(e) Occupational forces will be utilized, under orders to be issued later, to garrison the TUIAGI-GUADALCANAL Area, freeing the amphibious forces for further offensive action.

(f) Airfield construction material and personnel will be forwarded to seized areas as soon as available.

(g) Approximately 5 submarines of the Pacific Fleet will operate in the vicinity of TRUK between about July 22 and August 20.

(h) Landing fields are available at the following places:-

FANTAN: NAUSORI - 1 runway 3600', grass surface, suitable for carrier based planes, NOT for heavy bombers. OPERATIONAL CAPACITY - 10.

NANDI: - 2 runways 7000', 11 "hurricane pits" and 8 revetments. OPERATIONAL CAPACITY - unlimited.

NAREWA: - 2 runways 5000'. OPERATIONAL CAPACITY - unlimited.

GRIFFITHS
FIELD - 1 emergency landing strip 2400'.
(1 mile east of NAREWA).

Comsopac File No.
A4-3/A16-3

Operation Plans (CONT)
No. 1-42.

1. Information (CONT)

<u>POPPY:</u>	<u>TONTOUTA</u>	- Under repair, can land carrier aircraft with caution, could base one Group here.
	<u>PLAINES</u> <u>Des</u> <u>GAIACS</u> <u>(NEPUI)</u>	- 1 runway 7000', no facilities. OPERATIONAL CAPACITY - 36.
	<u>KOUMAC</u>	- 1 runway 4000'. OPERATIONAL CAPACITY - 50.
<u>ROSES:</u>	-	- 1 runway 6000', dispersal area for 20 planes, will take heavy bombers. OPERATIONAL CAPACITY - 25.
<u>BUTTON</u>	-	- 1 bomber strip under construction. Date available for use to be accounced.

(i) The following aircraft are now in the South Pacific Area or are expected to arrive during July:-

<u>ROSES:</u>	6 VSO 18 VF
<u>POPPY:</u>	18 PBY-5 1 PB5A 3 VSO 38 P39 (Army) 18 Hudsons (Med. Bombers)(RNZAF)(July) 16 B17 (Army) (July) # 12 F4F4 plus 1 or more F4A (Phtographic) (VMO 251)
<u>FANTAN:</u>	12 PB5 3 Singapores (Pat. Planes)(RNZAF) 14 Hudsons (RNZAF) 9 Vincents (Obsn)(RNZAF) 18 VF 10 B17 (Army)(July) #

NOTE: AN ADDITIONAL 11 B17's ARE EXPECTED IN THE POPPY-FANTAN AREA IN JULY.

Operation Plan (CONT)
No. 1-42.

BLEACHER: 6 VSO
24 VF

STRAW: 16 VSO
17 VSB (Dive bombers-scouts)
18 VF

2. (a) This force will successively seize, occupy and defend (1) TULAGI and adjacent positions, (2) the SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS, for the purpose of denying those areas to Japan and in preparation for further offensive action.

(b) The operation will be conducted in Three Phases:-

Phase I. A rehearsal of the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL attack, conducted in the FIJI Area, commencing about July 27, local time.

Phase II. The seizure and occupation of the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL Area on Dog Day.

Phase III. The seizure of NDENI in the SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS.

3. (a) The Expeditionary Force will:-

Phase I, starting about July 27, local date, conduct rehearsals, in the FANTAN Area, of the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL attack.

Phase II, On Dog Day capture and occupy TULAGI and adjacent positions, including an adjoining portion of GUADALCANAL suitable for the construction of landing fields. Initiate construction of landing fields without delay. Defend seized areas until relieved by forces to be designated later. Call on Task Force SIXTY-THREE for special aircraft missions.

Phase III, Occupy and defend NDENI. Initiate construction of landing fields without delay.

(b) Task Force SIXTY-THREE will:-

Phase I, continue scouting operations.

Comsopac File No.
A4-3/A16-3.

Operation Plan (CONT)
No. 1-42.

Phase II, cover the approach to, and the operations within, the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL Area by search. Execute air attacks on enemy objectives as arranged with Commander Expeditionary Force. Render aircraft support on call. Initiate scouting from NDENI by about 12 VPB not later than Dog minus 2 Day. Initiate scouting from East Coast MALAITA with about 12 VPB beginning Dog Day.

Phase III, cover the approach to and the seizure of NDENI by search operations.

Commander Task Force SIXTY-THREE will arrange with the Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area relative to coordination of aircraft scouting.

3. (x) (1) The Commander South Pacific Force will arrange for a conference between representatives of the Expeditionary Force, Amphibious Force, and Aircraft South Pacific Force, in order to arrange the details of air support and the coordination of air activities.
- (2) Dog Day, set tentatively at August 7, 1942, local time, will be promulgated by despatch.
- (3) Destroy important enemy forces at any opportunity.
- (4) Bombing by units of the South Pacific Force of all submarines is interdicted west of Longitude 155° East.

4. (a) FUEL:

During Phase I period, all vessels to fuel to capacity.

Available -

PLATTE	Fuel Oil	12,000	tns	-	Avgas	500,000	gal.
CIMARRON	"	12,000	"	-	"	500,000	"
KASKASKIA	"	13,000	"	-			

Upon completion fueling these tankers proceed to FANTAN ONE, or as directed.

Operation Plan (CONT)
No. 1-42.

Available -

W. POPPY - CHARTERED TANKERS (arrive 22 July)
Fuel Oil 225,000 bbls.

CHARTERED TANKERS (arrive 2 August)
Fuel Oil 225,000 bbls.

KANAWHA - (arrive 28 July)
Fuel Oil 7,200 tons. (51,000 bbls.)

SABINE - (7 August, or as directed)
Diesel 16,000 bbls. Avgas -
(bulk) 800,000 gal.
(Deck load - drums) 30,000 gal.

CHARTERED TANKERS (arrive 15 August)
Fuel Oil 225,000 bbls. Avgas -
(drums) 600,000 gal.

FANTAN ONE-PLATTE (2 August) Avgas 500,000 gals.
CIMARRON(2 August) " 500,000 gals.

FANTAN TWO-IN STORAGE ASHORE - Diesel 76,000 bbl.

ROSES -IN DRUMS - Avgas 265,000 gals.

BUTTON *IN DRUMS - " 150,000 gals.

Chartered tankers remain WHITE POPPY to fuel fleet units, replenish fleet tankers, or as directed.

(e) REPAIRS.-----.

Facilities for minor repairs only.

FULCRUM - dockyard - drydock (564' overall),
RIGEL.

LONGBOW - floating drydock, can take CA.

BLEACHER - WHITNEY.

W. POPPY - 2 - 800 ton marine railways.

(f) AMMUNITION.

Fleet units, rearm to capacity after Phase I from AE. After rearming fleet units, AW proceed FANTAN ONE, or as directed. Amphibious Forces; 3 units in AP's, 7 units in AK's.

Comsopac File No.
A4-3/A16-3.

Operation Plan (CONT)
No. 1-42.

5. (a) COMMUNICATIONS.

Annex B.

(b) TIME.

Use Zone Zero Time.

(c) Use Grid System established by Cincpac despatch 211951 of April, 1942.

(d) Commander South Pacific Force initially at FULCRUM, Will move to ARGONNE in WHITE POPPY on date to be announced later, about D minus 5 day.

(e) This Plan effective upon receipt.

/s/ ROBERT L. GHORMLEY,
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander South Pacific Force
and
South Pacific Area.

ANNEX

- A - Enemy Information.
- B - Communications.

Comsopac File No.
A4-3/A16-3

Serial 0017

MOST
SECRET

COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC AREA
AND
SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER.

JULY 16, 1942.

A N N E X " A "

(EXCERPTS FROM)

TO OPERATION PLAN 1 - 42

SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE

CHARTS: (GENERAL)
USN H.O. 2896
USN H.O. 165
ONI 51
USN H.O. 184

1. Resume of enemy situation.

A. (General) Captured documents obtained by CINGPAC confirm previous reports of consolidation and improvement of bases in the SOLOMONS and BISMARCKS with further reinforcements to arrive soon. Interchange of air units between NEW BRITAIN and the MARSHALLS and movements of air units from EAST INDIES to RABAU is indicated by COMSOWESPAC, who identifies elements of the FOURTH Fleet operating in the SOLOMONS and BISMARCKS, and predicts the early arrival of a submarine division in the NEW BRITAIN area.

in the SOLOMONS are: GAVUTU, GIZO, REKATA BAY, FAISI, KIETA, and BUKA PASSAGE. A major land-plane base is established at RABAU (BISMARCKS) and others are under construction at GUADALCANAL, and KIETA,

- B. (Estimated Land Strength)
"Enemy Situation" July 16
- c. (Estimated Sea Strength)
"Enemy Situation" July 9-10
- d. (Estimated Air Strength)
"Enemy Situation" July 17
- e. Enemy Bases (SOLOMONS)

APPENDIX 1 - TULAGI and VICINITY
APPENDIX 2 - GUADALCANAL (LUNGA)

Comsopac File No.
A4-3/A16-3

(2. Intelligence Annex A)

APPENDIX 3 - SANTA ISABEL (REKATA BAY)
GIZO
SHORTLAND (FAISI)
BOUGAINVILLE (KIETA)
BUKA (BUKA PASSAGE)

5. Reports and distribution.

Special intelligence summary to COMSOPACFOR as of
0000, daily, via radio.

Situation overlay and general intelligence summary
to COMSOPACFOR as of 0000, daily, via most expedient means.

APPENDIX III

SANTA ISABEL (REKATA BAY)
GIZO I (GIZO)
SHORTLAND (FAISI)
BOUGAINVILLE (KIETA)
BUKA PASSAGE (SOHANNA I)
OTHER OCCUPIED AREA - SOLOMONS

- (A) TERRAIN
Previously issued.
- (B) METEOROLOGICAL
Previously issued.
- (C) HEALTH CONDITIONS.
Previously issued.
- (D) NATIVES - INHABITANTS
Previously issued.

(e) SANTA ISABEL (REKATA BAY)

First indication of enemy activity on SANTA ISABEL I., was reported by the District Officer, who observed four large vessels and four floatplanes anchored on July 7. Confirmed by aerial reconnaissance 9th which sighted one transport, three destroyers. On July 14, one transport or supply ship, four cruisers, one flying boat, and one floatplane are reported anchored in REKATA BAY indicating a new base being established.

(f) GIZO I. (GIZO)

COMSOWESPAC reported on July 13, one small schooner at this point. Previous dispatches reported buoys established at this point, which probably indicates a new seaplane anchorage.

(g) SHORTLAND (FAISI)

COMSOWESPAC reported this as seaplane base in June. Ground reconnaissance report July of 14 RDO BEATE believed reliable, observed approximately 100 naval or marine landing forces who have two A/A guns near District Officer's house at LOFUNG. The majority of the troops are stated as being at LAMTER, with some in dugout on hill near Government wharf. Two schooners were stationed here on the 14th. A previous report (same source) stated only twenty Japs were at FAISI guarding a large aircraft fuel dump near LOFUNG Planatation.

(h) BOUGAINVILLE (KIETA)

Enemy seaplane base from which mainly flying boats and reconnaissance aircraft operate according to reports. On June 29, COMSOWESPAC estimated 500 marines or naval ground forces. Renewed activity and possible enemy reinforcements indicated in COMSOWESPAC which stated that five warships arrived July 3.

(i) BUKA PASSAGE (BUKATI)

(Land and seaplane base). Natives reported enemy construction airdrome north side BUKA PASSAGE on June 24. COMSOWESPAC estimated 600 marines or naval ground forces on June 29. Airfield work was

reported as continuing on June 27 & July 2. On July 8, EFATE forwarded coastwatcher report stating considerable air activity at this point, with one warship observed afternoon, and a large schooner at SOHANNA I., that night.

ANNEX "B" TO
COMSOPAC'S OPERATION PLAN NO. 1-42
COMMUNICATION PLAN NO. 1-42

All paragraphs of PAC-70 (corrected through Change No. 1) and its appendices are effective except as amplified or modified below:

<u>Paragraph</u>	<u>Effective CSP</u>
1120	Effective concurrently with OpPlan 1-42.
1161	(4) effective. Landing force voice circuits in this category during the landing.
2121	During Phase I maintain absolute radio silence except for enemy contacts. At all other times, condition 12 effective. Utilize aircraft and shore radio facilities to maximum extent to preserve radio silence when not actually landing or in contact with enemy.
2141	Paragraph (a) effective.
2200	South Pacific Shore Radio Communications: <u>BASE COMMAND CIRCUIT:</u> (NPU, NXO, NOP, NBV, ZGN, WVJN, WVJN1) 7995 KCS 13380 KCS 16400 KCS
2200	<u>BROADCAST TO BASES:</u> (LOTE---ALL COMGEMS, ISLAND BASES) 1000/Z - 5322 KCS 2200/Z - 10644 KCS <u>SPECIAL SHORE RADIO CIRCUITS AND GUARDS:</u> <u>Duples Circuit:</u>

AUCKLAND-HONOLULU

AUCKLAND-HONOLULU

<u>NPM</u>	<u>NWZ</u>
8090	8522
9050	10644
13375	11104
16180	17500

Direct Circuit:

AUCKLAND-SYDNEY

NWZ- 4025 Series - VHD9

TaskForComs - 4205s(P)-4295(S)

Radio AUCKLAND (NWZ)

Ship-Shore - 4235 Series

Rdo AUCKLAND (NWZ)

Rdo AUCKLAND (ZLE) also guards 4235 Series
& answers on WS (6880,
13760 KCS)

Rdo WELLINGTON (ZLP)

Rdo SUVA (ZGM)

Ship-Shore - 355 KCS

Radio TUTULLA

Radio WELLINGTON

2210

Effective Radio Frequency Plans (appendix B):

TASK FORCE 61 - Task Force 1 Plan.

TASK FORCE 63 - Task Force 3 Plan.

Use 4115 Series for interbase Aircraft communication.

COMTASKFORCE 63 place all shore based reconnaissance air on common frequency if practicable and advise COMSOPAC frequency to be used.

COMSOPAC on TASKFORCOMS frequency.

COMSOWESTPAC requested have transmitter on this frequency, if available.

NOUMEA.....WHITE POPPY
TONGATABU.....BLEACHER
AUCKLAND.....FULCRUM
SUVA.....FANTAN TWO
NANDI.....FANTAN ONE
SAMOA.....STRAW
BORABORA.....BOBCAT
EFATE.....ROSES

2. Coast Watchers.

Coast Watcher Stations, manned by New Zealand and Australians, make reports to parent station. SOLOMONS make reports at 2000, 0000, 0430, 1030 ZED, using play-fair cipher keyword FISHERWOMEN. Frequency 6765 KCS.

GILBERTS, ELLICE, PHOENIX and TONGA groups report to parent on 7000 KCS (alternate 3730 KCS.) Parent stations report to SUVA on 13400 KCS (1800-0600 ZED) and 6700 KCS (0600-1800 ZED). Alternate frequency 9000 KCS.

COMGEN ROSES, Port Director SUVA and COMGEN STRAW will summarize Coast Watcher reports, encipher them in Channel 104 (FERREC and GOPOF), address to all ships and bases SOPAC area and transmit to NWZ. NWZ will relay them via NPM FOX and NWZ LOTE Broadcasts.

ROBERT L. GHORMEY

MOST SECRETOPERATION ORDER

No. 1-42

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
TASK FORCE SIXTY-ONE,
U.S.S. SARATOGA, Flagship.At Sea,
July 28, 1942.TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) (61.1) Air Support Force Rear Admiral Noyes
 (61.1.1) SARATOGA, MINNEAPOLIS,
 NEW ORLEANS, PHELPS,
 FARRAGUT, WORDEN,
 MACDONOUGH, DALE
- (61.1.2) ENTERPRISE, NORTH CAROLINA,
 PORTLAND, ATLANTA, BALCH,
 MAURY, GWIN, BENHAM, GRAYSON
- (61.1.3) WASP, SAN FRANCISCO,
 SALT LAKE CITY, LANG,
 STERRETT, AARON WARD, STACK,
 LAFFEY, FARENHOLT
- (b) (61.2) Amphibious Force Rear Admiral Turner
 Task Force 62 plus
 QUINCY, VINCENNES, ASTORIA,
 SAN JUAN, DEWEY, HULL,
 ELLETT, BUCHANAN, MONSSEN,
 WILSON
 Task Force 44 less SALT LAKE CITY

1. Information

- (a) As in Commander South Pacific Operation Plan No. 1-42 and subsequent despatches.

2. This force will seize, occupy and defend, (1) TULAGI and adjacent positions, (2) the SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS. The purpose of these operations is to deny these positions to enemy forces and to prepare bases for our own future offensive operations.

3. (a) Air Support Force (61.1)

Proceed to TULAGI area in tactical support of Amphibious Force. On D day and subsequently, (1) cooperate with Commander Amphibious Force by supplying air support, (2) protect own carriers from enemy air attacks, (3) make air searches as seems advisable or as ordered.

MOST SECRETOPERATION ORDER
No. 1-42 (Cont'd)

July 28, 1942.

3. (b) Amphibious Force (61.2)

- (1) Proceed to TULAGI to arrive early D day, departing Latitude 19°-45' S., Longitude 178°E., 0500 GCT, August 1, 1942, on course 280° to Latitude 16°-40' S., Longitude 159° E., thence course north to TULAGI. Speed of advance 12 Knots.
 - (2) On D day seize and occupy TULAGI and adjacent positions, including an adjoining portion of GUADALCANAL suitable for the construction of landing fields. Initiate construction of landing fields without delay. Defend seized areas until relieved by forces to be designated later.
 - (3) On departure of carriers call on Task Force 63 for special aircraft missions.
 - (4) Furnish escort as needed from own forces for unloaded AP's and AK's which are returning to WHITE POPPY.
 - (5) Occupy and defend NDENI. Initiate construction of landing field without delay.
- (X) (1) D day, set tentatively at August 7, 1942, local time, will be promulgated by despatch.
- (2) Damaged ships proceed to main rendezvous, WHITE POPPY, or such friendly ports as the Commanding Officer deems expedient; report arrival to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Commander South Pacific and Task Force Commander.
 - (3) The following reference points are effective as rendezvous positions:

PHEASANT - Latitude 12-20 S., Longitude 161-15 E.
QUAIL - Latitude 14-00 S., Longitude 161-15 E.
OSTRICH - Latitude 16-35 S., Longitude 161-20 E.

MOST SECRET

OPERATION ORDER
No. 1-42 (Cont'd)

July 28, 1942.

4. Logistics

- (a) All ships fuel to capacity before leaving FANTAN area.
 - (b) Position and assignment of tankers available for topping off DD's, DMS's, and APD's enroute TULAGI, will be announced later.
 - (c) Repair facilities as in Commander South Pacific Operation Plan No. 1-42.
5. (a) Communications as in Annex "A".
- (b) Use zone zero time except for local operations at TULAGI, use zone minus 11.
 - (c) Use grid system established by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet despatch 211951 of April 1942.
 - (d) Commander Task Force 61 in SARATOGA.
 - (e) This order effective upon receipt.

FRANK JACK FLETCHER
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Commander Task Force SIXTY-ONE.

ANNEX:
"A" Communication Plan.

AIR SUPPORT FORCE
U.S.S. WASP, Flagship
August 4, 1942

OPERATION PLAN
Number 2-42

TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Carrier
SARATOGA
ENTERPRISE
WASP
- (b) Carrier Combat Patrol
Fighter assigned
- (c) Transport Combat Patrol
Fighters assigned
- (d) Air Support Flights
Air Group Commanders
Fighters and scout-bombers assigned
- (e) Air Reserve
All torpedo plane squadrons

1. Information is contained in Commander South Pacific Force Operation Plan No. 1-42, Commander Task Force Sixty-One Operation Order 1-42, Commander Task Force Sixty-Two Operation Plan A3-42, supporting plans of other commanders, and supplementary intelligence.

2. Carrier aircraft will give support and air protection during the capture and occupation of the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL AREA and adjacent positions by the South Pacific Amphibious Force.

3. (a) Carriers furnish flights in accordance with Annex A. SARATOGA operate in center lane, WASP to west and south, ENTERPRISE to north and east at distance of 8,000-12,000 yards.

All radars will be operated unless interference occurs, in which case ENTERPRISE will have primary guard on SC, WASP on SG.

One carrier's deck should be clear for launching at all times.

(b) Carrier Combat Patrol will cover all three carriers, with ENTERPRISE as primary Fighter Control Ship.

(5) For aircraft returning to the carrier area the recognitions bearing will be two seven zero or zero or zero nine zero throughout "D" day. Standard procedure will govern in other respects.

(6) For night launching Wasp aircraft rendezvous southwest, Saratoga aircraft ahead and Enterprise aircraft northeast of parent carrier.

4. Armament and fuel for aircraft generally in accordance with Annex "A"

5. Commander Air Support Force in WASP. Communications in accordance with Annex "B". Use zone minus eleven time. Unless otherwise signalled "H" hour for TULAGI is zero seven three zero and "zero" hour for GUADALCANAL is zero eight three zero. Sunrise at TULAGI six hours and thirty one minutes.

LEIGH NOYES,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander Air Support Force.

TASK FORCE SIXTY-TWO
U.S.S. McCAWLEY, Flagship

00/Cy

FE25/A16-3/A4-3
Serial 0010

S E C R E T

OPERATION PLAN)
NUMBER A3-42.)

TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) Transport Group Xray (62.1), Captain REIFSNIDER.
(1) Transdiv Afirm (62.1.1), Captain THEISS.
FULLER (AP14), AMERICAN LEGION (AP35), BELLATRIX (AK20).
(2) TransDiv Baker (62.1.2), Captain McFEATERS,
McCAWLEY (AP10), BARNETT (AP11), GEO. F. ELLIOTT (AP13),
LIBRA (AK53).
(3) TransDiv Cast (62.1.3), Captain REIFSNIDER,
HUNTER LIGGETT (AP27), ALCHIBA (AK23), FOMALHAUT (AK22),
BETELGEUSE (AK28).
(4) Transdiv Dog (62.1.4), Captain KILAND.
CRESCENT CITY (AP40), PRESIDENT HAYES (AP39),
PRESIDENT ADAMS (AP38), ALHENA (AK26).
(b) Transport Group Yoke (62.2), Captain ASHE.
(1) Transdiv Easy (62.2.1) Captain ASHE.
NEVILLE (AP16), ZEILIN (AP9), HEYWOOD (AP12),
PRESIDENT JACKSON (AP37).
(2) Transdiv Twelve (62.2.2), Commander HADLEY.
COLHOUN (APD2), GREGORY (APD3), LITTLE (APD4), MCKEAN (APD5).
(c) Fire Support Group Love (62.3), Captain RIEFKOHL.
(1) Fire Section One (62.3.1).
QUINCY (CA39), 2 VOS Seaplanes.
(2) Fire Section Two (62.3.2),
VINCENNES (CA44), 2 VOS Seaplanes.
(3) Fire Section Three (62.3.3),
ASTORIA (CA34), 2 VOS Seaplanes.
(4) Fire Section Four (62.3.4), Comdr. CHILLINGSWORTH.
HULL (DD350), DEWEY (DD349)
(5) Fire Section Five (62.3.5), Lt. Comdr. GARDNER.
ELLET (DD398), WILSON (DD408)

Note: This plan is not complete.

S E C R E T

OPERATION PLAN)
NUMBER A3-42.)

- (d) Fire Support Group Mike (62.4), Rear Admiral SCOTT.
SAN JUAN (CI54), MONSSEN (DD436), BUCHANAN(DD484).
- (e) Minesweeper Group (62.5), Commander HARTT.
HOPKINS (DMS13), TREVER (DMS16), ZANE (DMS14),
SOUTHARD (DMS10), HOVEY(DMS11).
- (f) Screening Group (62.6), Rear Admiral CRUTCHLEY, R.N.
HMAS AUSTRALIA, HMAS CANBERRA, HMAS HOBART,
USS CHICAGO (CA29), DESRON FOUR.
2 VF Squadrons.
8 VOS Seaplanes, 5 from Chicago, 1 each from
AUSTRALIA and CANBERRA, 1 From VINCENNES.
- (g) Air Support Group (62.7).
1 VF Squadron, plus 1 additional VF Squadron
for initial mission.
3 VSB Squadrons, plus 1 additional VSB Squadron
for initial mission.
- (h) Landing Force (62.8), Major General VANDEGRIFT.,
(1) GUADALCANAL Group (62.8.1), Major General VANDEGRIFT.
Troops as in Annex D.
6 VOS Seaplanes, 3 each from ASTORIA and QUINCY.
- (2) TULAGI Group (62.8.2), Brig. General RUPERTUS.
Troops as in Annex D.
2 VOS Seaplanes from VINCENNES.

(1) (a) At TULAGI, GAVUTU, and vicinity are enemy garrison troops and outposts, AA guns and possibly anti-surface guns, and a seaplane base with a few patrol planes and fighters. Numerous picket boats are present, possibly submarines and motor torpedo boats, and occasionally cruisers, destroyers and transports. Water less than 100 fathoms in depth must be presumed to be mined.

(b) On GUADALCANAL in the POINT LUNGA Area are an enemy garrison, AA guns and possibly anti-surface guns, and an airfield which may be in commission. Near TETERE is a smaller garrison, and an airfield under construction. Waters less than 100 fathoms in depth must be presumed to be mined.

1(c) Air attack by shore-based planes from the RABAU - SALAMAUA Area is to be expected.

S E C R E T

OPERATION PLAN)
NUMBER A3-42)

(d) For detailed information see Intelligence Plan, Annex E which includes photographs and charts of the area showing terrain and enemy installations and positions.

(e) Task Forces ELEVEN, SIXTEEN and EIGHTEEN, (less detachments), constituting Task Force SIXTY-ONE, will support Task Force SIXTY-TWO. Army aircraft in AUSTRALIA, and Army and Navy shore-based planes in the SOUTH PACIFIC (Task Force SIXTY-THREE) will support our landing by reconnaissance and by attack on enemy bases.

2. This force will, on D-Day, capture and occupy TULAGI, GAVUTU, and GUADALCANAL ISLANDS, and subsequent to the main operation will destroy enemy minor forces in outlying positions on FLORIDA and nearby islands. The purpose of the operation is to deny these positions to enemy forces and to prepare bases for our own future offensive action.

3. (a) and (b) Transport Groups XRAY and YOKE:

(1) Land troops, equipment and supplies in the GUADALCANAL - TULAGI Area in accordance with Landing Force Plan, Annex D. Furnish Naval elements of shore parties. Land Naval Headquarters and Naval Local Defense Force in accordance with Annex K. Transdiv Twelve vessels act as control and salvage vessels for Beach BLUE Landings; Line of Departure 5000 yards bearing 225 degrees from center of beach. Vessels of both transport groups anchor in swept areas for discharging cargo when so directed by Group Commanders.

(2) As soon as the Parachute Battalion is embarked in boats, HEYWOOD proceed to Transport Area XRAY in vicinity of Beach RED and debark remaining troop units in compliance with Annex D, Landing Force Plan.

(3) Concurrently with the execution of the task prescribed in paragraph 3(h)(1) of Annex D, BETELGEUSE land at Beach RED tanks of the 3rd Defense Battalion. Upon completion proceed to transport Area YOKE in the vicinity of TULAGI and execute the task prescribed in paragraph 3(h)(2) of Annex D, Landing Force Plan.

(c) Fire Support Group Love support landing on GUADALCANAL in accordance with Ships' Gunfire Plan, Annex A. In case of air attacks, defend transports and troops with AA fire, acting under the direction of Commander Screening Group. Support Screening Group in case of surface attack. Fire Support Group Love is authorized to call on Screening Group for support to silence gunfire from shore directed at ships.

S E C R E T

OPERATION PLAN)
NUMBER A3-42.)

(1), (2), (3), Fire Support Sections One, Two, and Three each furnish one naval gunfire liaison officer, two radio operators, and one TBO or TBX radio, for shore fire control parties, to control called ship's gunfire: Section One to BARNETT, Section Two to FULLER, Section Three to McCAWLEY. Use USF 100 Baker for communication. Sections One and Three also furnish three VOS seaplanes to Commander Landing Force, TULAGI Group, for the same purpose. Section Two furnish one VOS seaplane to the Commander, Screening Group, for anti-submarine patrol.

(4), and (5). Fire Support Sections Four and Five at ZERO minus thirty minutes, take stations as control and salvage vessels, marking Line of Departure for initial boat wave as follows: Section Four Leader, with KOLI POINT bearing 120° , distant 4500 yards; Section Five leader, with Section Four leader bearing 090° , distant 2500 yards; second vessels of sections to East and West of section leaders respectively. After delivery of scheduled gunfire continue to act as salvage vessels as long as required, then report to Commander Screening Group for duty. Prior to ZERO minus thirty minutes, screen Transport Group XRAY.

(d) Fire Support Group Mike support landings in TULAGI-GAVUTU Area in accordance with Gunfire Plan, Annex A. In case of air attack, defend transports and troops with AA fire, acting under the direction of Commander Screening Group. Support Screening Group in case of surface attack. Cruiser furnish one naval gunfire liaison officer, two radio operators, and one TBO or TBX radio for shore fire control party to control called ship's gunfire. Use USF 100 Baker. Transfer personnel and equipment to NEVILLE-prior to D-minus 2Day. DDs act as control and salvage vessels for GAVUTU landing; Line of Departure distant 3500 yards, bearing 150° from hilltop on GAVUTU. See Operation Chart, Annex F. Fire Support Group Mike is authorized to call on Screening Group for gunfire to silence gunfire from shore directed at ships. Prior to proceeding on fire support missions, screen Transport Group YOKE.

(e) Minesweeper Group.

From H plus 5 minutes to H plus 10 minutes fire 2-ship concentration on BUNGANA ISLAND and 3-ship concentration on GAVUTU ISLAND, for covering landing on FLORIDA ISLAND. Ammunition expenditure desired: 3" or 4", 60 rounds per ship; 20mm., 2000 rounds per ship. Act as control and salvage vessels for landing on FLORIDA ISLAND; Line of Departure distant 4000 yards, bearing 160° from Hilltop on GAVUTU. See Operation Chart, Annex F. Then sweep in accordance with Minesweeping Plan, Annex B.

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OPERATION PLAN)
NUMBER A3-42.)

(f) Screening Group

Screen Transport Groups XRAY and YOKE against enemy surface, air, and submarine attack. Maintain one VF Squadron over Transport Area during daylight hours as cover against air attack, employing radar and Fighter Director Control Group obtained from Air Support Group. When called on by Fire Support Groups, silence fire from shore batteries firing at ships and boats.

(g) Air Support Group.

(1) Furnish air support in accordance with Air Support Plan, Annex C.

(2) Provide one Fighter Director Group, on CHICAGO, to report prior to D-minus 2 Day.

(3) Provide Two Air Support Director Group, with radio, one for McCAWLEY and one for NEVILLE, to report prior to D-minus 2 Day. Director Group on McCAWLEY controls through Senior Carrier Group Commander in air; director group on NEVILLE is stand-by.

(h) Landing Force seize and occupy GUADALCANAL and TULAGI-GAVUTU area in accordance with Annex D, Landing Force Plan. Liaison planes accurately mark extremities of Beach RED at ZERO Hour minus twenty minutes, and Beach BLUE at H hour minus twenty minutes; maintain smoke marks until assault waves have landed.

(x)(1) For beaches, transport areas, and lines of departure see Operation Chart, Annex F.

(2) Use Grid system prescribed by CSP-734, pages 40 and 41. Point of origin of basic grid, Latitude NINE DEGREES THIRTY MINUTES SOUTH, Longitude ONE HUNDRED SIXTY DEGREES EAST. Length of sides of lettered squares TEN minutes of latitude and TEN minutes of longitude. See Annex M, Gridded Chart.

(3) On D minus one day, on signal, Groups (a) to (f), inclusive, take Attack Force Approach Disposition "AR-3", Annex I, and proceed in accordance with courses and times shown in Approach Plan "AR-11", Annex J, to Transport Areas XRAY and YOKE. Repel enemy attacks enroute and after arrival, maneuvering as prescribed by Group Commanders. Squadron Commanders, by screened speed light and tactical radio, will signal "Stop", and "Back", on arrival of transports in transport areas.

(4) So far as possible, avoid entering waters less than 100 fathoms in depth until swept.

S E C R E T

OPERATION PLAN)
NUMBER A3-42.)

(5) H Hour is the signalled time for the first landing in the TULAGI Area. ZERO Hour is the signalled time for the first landing in the GUADALCANAL Area. ZERO HOUR will be specified by signal and radio on arrival in the transport areas by Commander, Task Force SIXTY-TWO for the GUADALCANAL Area, and H Hour by Commander, Transport Group YOKE, for the TULAGI Area, but will be advanced or retarded by signal by those Commanders, as may be required by circumstances. These signals must go immediately to interested commanders and vessels present, and also to all carriers of Task Force SIXTY-ONE. It is planned to arrive in the Transport Areas about thirty minutes BEFORE SUNRISE. For planning purposes it is estimated that HYPO Hour will be about EIGHT HOURS LOVE, and ZERO Hour about EIGHT HOURS THIRTY MINUTES LOVE.

(6) Upon completion of the operation, Air Support Group revert to direct command of Commander Task Force SIXTY-ONE; and Task Forces (a) to (f), inclusive, less Transdiv Twelve (62.2.2), retire in accordance with Attack Force Retirement Plan, Annex L, under command of the Second in Command, Task Force SIXTY-TWO.

(7) This plan effective on signal on D minus One Day. D Day is tentatively set as AUGUST SEVENTH, 1942. The TASK ORGANIZATION will be dissolved on order of Commander Task Force SIXTY-ONE.

(8) Use screened speed lights for speed changed when essential turning off as soon as need has passed. Turn on screened speed lights one-half hour before arrival Transport Areas.

(9) Colors will be hoisted day and night during landing operations.

4. For Logistic Plan, See Annex G.

5. (a) Communication Plan as in Annex H. Except for enemy contacts or other grave emergency, PRESERVE RADIO SILENCE UNTIL ARRIVAL TRANSPORT AREAS; THIS INCLUDES VOICE MANEUVERING CIRCUITS.

(b) USE ZONE TIME LOVE.

(c) Commander Task Force SIXTY-TWO and Commander Landing Force in McCAWLEY until their transfer ashore. The Second in Command of Task Force SIXTY-TWO is Rear Admiral V.A.C. CRUTCHLEY, R.N., in H.M.A.S. AUSTRALIA. Commander Landing Force, TULAGI Group in NEVILLE until transfer ashore.

R.K. TURNER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Task Force SIXTY-TWO.

S E C R E T

ANNEX EASY TO OPERATION PLAN NO. A3-42

INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

Task Force SIXTY-TWO
U.S.S. McCAWLEY, Flagship
July 30, 1942.

Maps: Refer to H.O. Charts 165, 184, 2896, 2916, 2918
and 5801.

1. SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION-

(a) (General) Information obtained by Commander-in-Chief, PACIFIC FLEET, reports Japanese plans for the consolidation and improvement of bases in the SOLOMON-BISMARCK area with further reinforcements to arrive soon.

Additional reports indicate that the Japanese are also reinforcing their bases on the east coast of NEW GUINEA and are expanding southward there to obtain air fields inland from GONA, with KOKADA airfield as initial objective.

There has been a shifting of aircraft between the EAST INDIES, the MARSHALLS and NEW BRITAIN, with indications that the air force in the NEW BRITAIN-SOLOMON area has been increased. Evidence of an increase is further substantiated by the appearance of a new type fighter, and the appearance of the type Zero fighter with pontoon and wing tip floats.

It appears that four additional cruisers have moved to RABAU and that five divisions of submarines may now be operating in NEW BRITAIN and AUSTRALIAN waters.

Known enemy seaplane bases in the SOLOMONS are: GAVUTU, GIZO, FAISI, BUKA PASSAGE, KIETA and REKATA BAY (Isabel Island).

A probably enemy seaplane base appears to be under preparation about the center of MARAMASIKE estuary between MALAITA and MARAMASIKE Islands.

A possible enemy seaplane base is at TANABULI in the Southeast end of ISABEL ISLAND (50 miles northwest of TULAGI).

Enemy landing fields are known to exist in the SOLOMONS At GUADALCANAL, BUKA and at KIETA. This latter appears to be receiving added personnel and equipment as two transports were seen there on July 26, 1942.

S E C R E T

ANNEX EASY TO OPERATION PLAN NO. A3-42 (CONT).

(b) Estimated Land Strength-

(1) TULAGI and vicinity:

Troops - 1 Battalion reinforced	750
1 AA Battalion reinforced	600
Naval and Air Personnel (84th Guard Division)	<u>500</u>

Total 1850

Bulk of force in TULAGI-GAVUTU-TANAMBOGO-MAKAMBO area. Detachments of 15 to 30 men as shown in Appendix 1.

Installations: Radio station on MAKAMBO, seaplane base at GAVUTU. Fuel dumps on east side of south end of TULAGI, at MAKAVBO and on FLORIDA ISLAND just east of HAG-ALU. Possibly landing strips on west end of FLORIDA ISLAND at KOMBE. Heavy AA guns two (2) on TULAGI, two (2) to four (4) on GAVUTU and TANAMBOGO. Light AA guns (under 3"), two (2) on TULAGI eleven (11) to thirteen (13) on GAVUTU and TANAMBOGO, two (2) at TANAVULU Point on FLORIDA ISLAND at west end of SANDEFLY PASSAGE. Anti Surface guns two (2) to four (4) on TULAGI, one (1) on GAVUTU, one (1) on BUNGANA ISLAND southeast of TULAGI).

Dugouts are reported on southeast coast of TULAGI and on TANAMBOGO Island.

(2) GUADALCANAL:

Troops	
1 regiment reinforced	2,300
1 AA regiment (3")	500
1 heavy MG Bn (used as AA troops)	325
2 Engineer Units	1,050
Air personnel)	
Advance Staff)	200
Service Squadron)	
Labor units	<u>900</u>

Total 5,275

The bulk of the force on GUADALCANAL appears to be concentrated between KUKOOM (to west of LUNGA POINT) - LUNGA-TENARU with a small garrison at TETERE and detachments of about 30 men at other points as indicated on Appendix 2.

S E C R E T

ANNEX EASY TO OPERATION PLAN NO. A3-42 (CONT)

Installations:

Docks at KUKOOM and LUNGA POINT.

Stores, motor transport, radio station at LUNGA.

Airfield southeast of LUNGA may be completed; one at TETERE and possibly one at TENARU under construction.

Heavy AA Guns, eight (8) between KUKOOM and LUNGA RIVER and four (4) on hill in rear (south) of KUKOOM. Light AA Guns, KUKOOM, LUNGA, TENARU and TAIVU and possibly on SAVO ISLAND off northwest tip of GUADALCANAL.

(c) Estimated Sea Strength:

BISMARCK-NEW GUINEA-SOLOMON area:

Cruiser Division 6 and possibly

Cruiser Division 8 ---

? ?
11 cruisers

Destroyer Squadron 6 and Destroyer Division 34 ---

13 destroyers

2 Submarine Divisions and quite possibly 3 more ---

15 submarines

Subchaser Divisions 21, 23 and 32

Div. 23 and possibly Div. 21

at TULAGI. ---

12 Subchasers

One seaplane tender (at RABAU).

An unknown number of MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS

(8-10 were reported at TULAGI).

Transport and cargo vessels

15 to 17

4 small submarines were reported at KUKOOM but this seems doubtful.

(d) Estimated Air Strength:

NEW GUINEA-BISMARCK-SOLOMON Area:

Best available information places Japanese air strength in this area at about 150 planes. Based on in-completed information it appears that there are about 6 VF squadrons (10 planes each) of which one squadron is a new type and one squadron is type Zero equipped with pontoon and wing tip floats. Similarly there appear to be about 60 VB planes and 30 VP planes.

About 8 VF, float plane type, have been operating from the TULAGI area and 7 to 10 VP (4 engine type) have

S E C R E T

ANNEX EASY TO OPERATION PLAN NO. A3-42(CONT)

been operating in the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area.

2. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ENEMY INFORMATION-

- (a) Will ORANGE begin use of landing fields at BUKA, KIETA and GUADALCANAL prior to D-Day?
- (b) Will ORANGE reinforce TULAGI-GUADALCANAL area prior to D-Day? What forces? Where?
- (c) What are precise location of Orange AA guns and coast defense guns in TULAGI-GUADALCANAL Area?
- (d) Will ORANGE launch an offensive down through the SOLOMONS prior to D-Day? What force will he employ?
- (e) Will ORANGE begin an offensive into NEW-GUINEA prior to D-Day, that will prevent full use of his available air and naval forces to oppose our operation?
- (f) After our seizure of objective will ORANGE counter-attack? When? With what force?
- (g) What will be meteorological conditions from D minus 3 days to D plus 3 days?
- (h) Will ORANGE succeed in establishing strong seaplane bases on ISABEL and MALAITA Islands by D-Day?

3. MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION-

The Commander South Pacific Forces and Commander Air Forces, South Pacific, have been requested to furnish the foregoing information.

4. RECONNAISSANCE AND OBSERVATION-

- (a) Prior to D minus 5 days Commander South West Pacific Area Proposes the maintenance of normal aerial surveillance of Area (PORT MORESBY-KAVIENG-BUKA-ONGTONG JAVA) VAMURAI.
- (b) Commander South Pacific Force has proposed that beginning D minus 2 days Commander South West Pacific Forces search area west of 158° East Longitude while Commander South Pacific Force undertakes to cover area east of 158° East Longitude and overlap that Longitude to the west for 125 miles.
- (c) Air scouting has been directed from NDENI ISLAND by D minus 1 day. Air scouting previously directed from MALAITA ISLAND on D plus 1 Day may be cancelled because of presence of enemy force already located in that area.

S E C R E T

ANNEX EASY TO OPERATION PLAN NO. A3-42 (CONT)

(d) On D-Day and thereafter, ground observation and reconnaissance will be as directed by COMMANDING GENERAL FIRST MARINE DIVISION. Air and naval reconnaissances will be requested from Commander Task Forces 61 and 63.

(e) Task Group commanders provided with Australian officer guides will make such use of native guides and scouts as may appear desirable. Food, tobacco, and funds will be made available through First Marine Division for payment of these native guides and scouts.

S E C R E T

ANNEX EASY TO OPERATION PLAN NO A3-42 (CONT)

6. GENERAL METEOROLOGICAL AND WEATHER INFORMATION

Date	Sunrise		Twilight	Sunset		Moonrise	
	Zone Time Love	G.M.T.		Zone Time Love	G.M.T.	Zone Time Love	G.M.T.
Aug 5	0634	1934/4	22 Min	1818	0718	0049	1349/4
6	0633	1935/5	"	1818	0718	0136	1436/5
7	0633	1933/6	"	1819	0719	0223	1523/6
8	0633	1933/7	"	1819	0719	0311	1611/7
9	0632	1932/8	"	1818	0718	0359	1659/8
10	0632	1932/9	"	1818	0718	0446	1746/9

Tides are regular. Currents are strong, from 2 to 4 knots flood to eastward, ebb to westward. Tide rips and eddies are frequent and strong due to uneven bottom, winds and currents. Times and heights of tides based on approximate data only. Mean temperature 80°F, humidity 78%. Rainfall 8" in August. Wind from East to Southeast 75% of the time with 13% calm. When wind backs through north to west, expect squalls, and rain. Mean amount of cloud 60% at 0900. Moon will be in the last quarter.

Weather conditions are normally good in August. Rain may be expected, particularly in the late afternoon and evening.

A4-3/A16-3
Serial 0016

AIRCRAFT SOUTH-PACIFIC FORCE
U.S.S. CURTISS
Flagship

MOST
SECRET

July 25, 1942

Operation Plan
No. 1-42.

TASK ORGANIZATION

~~No. 39~~

(a) Task Group 63.1, Colonel Rich (AC), U.S.A.

69th Bombardment Squadron.
New Zealand Hudson Squadron.
67th Pursuit Squadron.
2 PBY airplanes.

(b) Task Group 63.2, Colonel Saunders (AC), U.S.A.

11th Bombardment Group.

(c) Task Group 63.3, Commander Browder, U.S.N.

CURTISS - Attached VP.

(d) Task Group 63.4, Lt. Comdr. Alderman, U.S.N.

McFARLAND - Attached VP.

(e) Task Group 63.5, Commander Hitchcock, U.S.N.

MACKINAC - Attached VP.

(f) Task Group 63.6, Major Bauer, U.S.M.C.

✓ VMF Squadron 212.
✓ VS Squadron D-14.

(g) Task Group 63.7, Lt. Col. Hart, U.S.M.C.

✓ VMO Squadron 251.

Corrections
made
ComAirSoPac
310811 July

1. Information

(a) Enemy Information - See Annex A.

(b) Own Forces - See Annex B.

(c) United Nations Forces will conduct offensive operations in the South Pacific and Southwest Pacific Areas. Such operations will be divided chronologically into Three Tasks. This plan deals with the operations incident to Task One only.

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Operation Plan (Cont'd)

No. 1-42

1. Information (Cont'd)

(d) The eastern and western boundaries of the Southwest Pacific and South Pacific Areas respectively will, as of August 1st, be Longitude 159° East from the equator southward.

(e) The Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area will, for Task One, provide for the interdiction of enemy air and naval activities westward of the operating area, Air scouting of the area will be as arranged with Commander Task Force SIXTY-THREE. Submarines of the Southwest Pacific Force will operate in the Rabaul Area.

(f) Occupational forces will be utilized under orders to be issued later, to garrison the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL Area, freeing the amphibious forces for further offensive action.

(g) Airfield construction material and personnel will be forwarded to seized areas as soon as available.

(h) Approximately 5 submarines of the Pacific Fleet will operate in the vicinity of TRUK between about July 22 and August 20.

(i) Landing fields are available at the following places:-

FANTAN: NAUSORI - 1 runway 3600', grass surface, suitable for carrier based planes, NOT for heavy bombers. OPERATIONAL CAPACITY - 10.

NANDI - 2 runways 7000', 11 "hurricane pits" and 8 revetments. OPERATIONAL CAPACITY - 35.

NAREWA - 2 runways 5000', OPERATIONAL CAPACITY - 35.

GRIFFITHS
FIELD - 1 emergency landing strip 2400'.
(1 mile east of NAREWA).

ComAir OPac
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Serial 0016

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Operation Plan (Cont'd)
No. 1-42

1. Information (Cont'd)

POPPY: TONTOUTA - Under repair, can land carrier aircraft with caution, could base one CV Group.

PLAINES - 1 runway 7000', no facilities.
Des OPERATIONAL CAPACITY - 36.
GAIACS
(NEPUI)

KOUMAC - 1 runway 4000'. OPERATIONAL CAPACITY - 20.

ROSES: - - 1 runway 6000', dispersal area for 20 planes, will take heavy bombers.
OPERATIONAL CAPACITY - 25.

BUTTON:- - 1 bomber strip under construction. Date available for use to be announced.

(j) The following aircraft are available in the South Pacific:

ROSES: 6 VSO
18 VF

POPPY: 21 PB5-5
1 PB5-5A
3 VSO
38 P-39
*6 Hudsons (RNZAF)
**27 B-17
10 B-26
***16 F4F-3P

FANTAN: 9 PB5-5
3 Singapore (RNZAF)
12 Hudsons (RNZAF)
9 Vincents (RNZAF)
17 VF
12 B-26
8 B-17

BLEACHER: 6 VSO
24 VF

MOST
SECRET

Operation Plan (Cont'd)
No. 1-42

1. Information (Cont'd)

STRAW: 10 VSO
 17 VSB
 18 VF

- * Additional 12 Hudsons expected from New Zealand.
- ** Poppy, Button - Roses Area.
- *** To Button when landing strip completed.

2. This force will, in:

- (a) Phase I - Conduct normal scouting operations.
- (b) Phase II - Cover the approach to, and the operations within the TULAGI-GUADALCANAL Area by aircraft search. Execute air attacks on enemy objectives.
- (c) Phase III - Cover the approach to and the seizure of NDENI by aircraft search, in order to support the successive seizure, occupation and subsequent defense of (1) TULAGI and adjacent positions and (2) the SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS.

3. (a) Task Group 63.1 Be prepared to search sectors from PLAINE DES GAIACS, as may be directed, to a depth of four hundred miles. Conduct anti-submarine patrols and provide A/S coverage to incoming and outgoing shipping as may be required. Provide air courier and flag plane service to Commander South Pacific. For defense of POPPY operate under Commanding General that base.
- (b) Task Group 63.2 Maintain daily search of sectors one and two (Annex CAST). Track important enemy contacts. Execute air attacks on enemy objectives as directed. Be prepared to render air support to our task forces on call. Base initially one squadron at PLAINE DES GAIACS, two squadrons ROSES dash BUTTON area and one squadron in reserve at FANTAN ONE. Establish group headquarters in CURTISS.

MOST
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Operation Plan (Cont'd)
No. 1-42

(c) Task Group 63.3

- (1) Dog minus five day - CURTISS proceed SECOND CHANNEL, ESPIRITU SANTO, escorted by McFARLAND, to arrive about zero two hundred Dog minus three day.
- (2) Dog minus three day - Arrange distribution of attached VP aircraft as follows:
 - (a) Two at WHITE POPPY assigned Commander Air Forces, WHITE POPPY.
 - (b) Ten at WHITE POPPY awaiting further distribution.
 - (c) Four at HAVANNAH HARBOR, of which two are searching a sector of which that base is origin, limiting bearings - three two two dash three three nine, distance five hundred fifty miles.
 - (d) Nine proceed BUTTON from WHITE POPPY.
- (3) Dog minus two day - Search sectors three and four. Arrange distribution of remaining VP aircraft as follows:
 - (a) Seven proceed WHITE POPPY to NDENI searching sector five enroute on a two time visibility basis and report Task Group 63.4 upon arrival.
 - (b) Three proceed BUTTON from WHITE POPPY reporting Task Group 63.3 upon arrival.
 - (c) Two proceed BUTTON from HAVANNAH HARBOR reporting Task Group 63.3 upon arrival.
- (4) Dog minus one day.
 - (a) Search sectors three and four.
- (5) Dog Day.
 - (a) Search sector three.
 - (b) Transfer ten planes to Task Group 63.5 at

MOST
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Operation Plan (Cont'd)
No. 1-42

3. (Cont'd)

MARAMASIKE ESTUARY (east coast MALAITA), six of these planes to search sector four enroute, western two planes on a four times visibility basis; remainder on a two times visibility basis. Four planes proceed direct.

- (c) Transfer two planes from HAVANNAH HARBOR to BUTTON.
 - (6) Dog plus one and succeeding days - Search sectors three and seven.
 - (d) Task Group 63.4 - Depart WHITE POPPY in company with and escorting CURTISS as far as BUTTON; thence proceed NDENI to arrive about zero two hundred Dog minus two day. Beginning Dog minus one day search sector five (Annex CAST).
 - (e) Task Group 63.5 - After departure CURTISS assist as may be required in tending aircraft and accommodating flight crews based WHITE POPPY. On Dog minus three day proceed MARAMASIKE ESTUARY (east coast MALAITA) to arrive about zero two hundred Dog day. Beginning Dog plus one day search sector four (Annex CAST).
 - (f) Task Group 63.6 - Provide three VOS planes for inshore A/A patrol vicinity SEGOND CHANNEL (ESPIRITU SANTO). Provide all possible service to bombardment aviation temporarily basing ROSES. In conjunction with Task Group 63.7 operate in defense of ROSES and BUTTON under Commanding General ROSES.
 - (g) Task Group 63.7 - Provide all possible service to bombardment aviation temporarily based BUTTON. In conjunction with Task Group 63.6 operate in defense of ROSES and BUTTON under Commanding General ROSES.
- (X) (1) Dog day is tentatively seven August.
- (2) Aircraft search visibility is considered as being twenty miles.

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Operation Plan (Cont'd)
No. 1-42

(X) (Cont'd)

- (3) Track enemy surface forces discovered. Radar tracking doctrine (Annex EASY) effective. Reconnaissance planes without radar will conform to general principles thereof, modified as requisite to maintenance of contact, include practicable bombing ceiling in amplifying reports.
- (4) Planes shifting to advanced bases will time departure from previous base to arrive as late in the day as practicable but not later than sunset.
- (5) Tenders be prepared to make coordinated night bombing and torpedo attacks on enemy forces, if directed.
- (6) Patrol planes when patrolling will carry a full allowance of machine gun ammunition and four depth bombs. Bombardment aircraft on reconnaissance flights will carry full allowance of machine gun ammunition and such delay fused bombs as is practicable. Patrol and Bombardment aircraft will carry bombs as directed on bombing missions. (Be prepared to carry incendiary bombs).
- (7) Lost plane procedure as set forth in Annex FOX.
- (8) Attacks on Subs west of 155E from equator to 10S and west of 156-30E south of 10S prohibited. Failing notice to contrary subs east of above long. considered hostile.
- (9) Planes so equipped keep 1 FF on when within 120 miles own surface force on bases.
- (10) As soon as practicable after daily search, tenders and bases will report coverage of assigned sector in % including delineation those parts not searched.
- (11) On Day day VPB and VB remain outside my area bounded by line 15 miles off shore Guadalcanal-Florida Islands.

MOST
SECRET

Operation Plan (Cont'd)
No. 1-42

(X)(Cont'd)

- (12) On Dog dash one day if weather forecast indicates favorable navigation conditions planes leaving sectors three and five will take off at such a time as to arrive outer limit of search sector at sunset returning leg by radar. On Dog day planes searching sectors two one four take off at such time as to be abreast Tulagi by sunrise.
- (13) This operation plan will be placed in effect on Dog minus five day.
4. (1) CURTISS in SEGOND CHANNEL, ESPIRITU SANTO, available for emergency repairs damaged VP aircraft which are flyable; PLAINE DES GAIACS for bombers.
- (2) By arrangement with ComNav Unit ROSES, about 25,000 gallons avgas in drums will be delivered at GRACIOSA BAY (NDENI) for Task Group 63.4 prior to Dog plus two days and additional gas and provisions as may be required later.
- (3) Avgas and ammunition in all tenders and at all land-plane bases.
5. Communications as set forth in Annex DOG. Commander Aircraft, South Pacific Force in CURTISS. Use Zone ZED Time, except with forces involved use zone love time, anticipate names used in each case.

J. S. McCain
Rear Admiral
Commander Aircraft, South Pacific Force.

ANNEXES

- A. Enemy Information.
B. Own Forces (To be issued as an adenda later).
C. Search Plans.
D. Communication Plan.
~~E~~ Radar Tracking Plan.
F. Lost Plane Procedure.

MOST
SECRET

TO OPERATION PLAN 1-42

AIRCRAFT SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE

~~SECRET~~

CHARTS: (GENERAL)
USH H.O. 2896
USH H.O. 165
USH H.O. 184

1. Resume of enemy situation.

(a) (GENERAL) Captured documents obtained by CINCPAC confirm previous reports of consolidation and improvement of bases in the SOLOMONS and BISMARCKS with further reinforcements to arrive soon. Interchange of air units between NEW BRITAIN and the MARSHALLS and movement of air units from EAST INDIES to RABAU is indicated by COMSOWESPAC, who identifies elements of the FOURTH Fleet operating in the SOLOMONS and BISMARCKS.

Enemy's known seaplane bases in the SOLOMONS are: TULAGI, GAVUTU, GIZO, REKATA BAY, FAISI, KIETA, and BUKA PASSAGE. Major land-plane bases are established at RABAU (BISMARCKS), SALAMAU and LAE (NEW GUINEA), and others are under construction at LUNGA, BUKA and KIETA. One runway on field near LUNGA (GUADALCANAL) reported completed July 17. Serial 43 seaplanes reported basing in SANDFLY PASSAGE (FLORIDA ISLAND).

(b) Enemy bases (SOLOMONS)

APPENDIX I - TULAGI and VICINITY
APPENDIX II - GUADALCANAL (LUNGA)
APPENDIX III - SANTA ISABEL (REKATA BAY)
GIZO.
SHORTLAND (FAISI)
BOUGAINVILLE (KIETA)
BUKA (BUKA PASSAGE)

2. Counter-Intelligence.

(a) Our forces may expect to meet all forms of ruses and deception. The enemy has shown considerable skill in the art of camouflage, use of dummy targets and ruses.

(b) Personnel will be instructed to give only name, rank, and serial number, in the event of capture. Personnel will remove all unit identifications, letters or diaries, from clothing and equipage before entering combat zone.

J. S. MCCAIN

TULAGI AND VICINITY

(A) BASES

TULAGI, GAVUTU, TANAMBOGO, MACAMBO, HALAVO, FLORIDA.

(B) INSTALLATIONS

GAVUTU One horizontal gun. A-A gun (3 inch) on hill near wireless station. Thirteen flying boats reported anchored off Commandant's headquarters, July 12-17.

TULAGI One A-A gun (3 inch) near Police Superintendent's house. Two A-A guns (3 inch) near Hetherington House. 1600 troops reported based here (July 17). Government Wharf. Large oil stocks by side of road from Government Wharf to China Town. No Japanese in China Town, But occupy all official houses and buildings near Government Wharves, carpenter's house, and New China Town. Five float type Zero fighters intercepted photo planes 24 July - one possibly shot down. Three Serial 43 Sea-planes, 4 engine Type 97 Kawanisi, moored between Tanambo Island and Gaomi Island, GAVUTU HARBOR (Probably 4 more on patrol). Two Serial 35 Type 96 Mitsubishi float type fighters on water close to shore just north Government Wharf, TULAGI.

TANAMBOGO A-A guns (3 inch).

MACAMBO A-A guns (3 inch). Radio station. Kerosene and benzine stores in shed.

HALAVO Detachment of troops.

TANNAVAULA (West end SAND FLY PASSAGE). A-A guns (3 inch).

FLORIDA ISLAND Possible fighter strips being constructed at KOMBI, northeast coast FLORIDA ISLAND, Latitude 09-06 S., Longitude 160-20 E.

MOST
SECRET

APPENDIX II

GUADALCANAL

(A) Landing Field

Troops observed burning grass plains behind LUNGA, TEMARU and KOKUUM July 14. One runway reported completed July 17.

(B) Installations

LUNGA POINT Pontoon jetties (July 7. A-A guns (3 inch). Machine gun mounted trucks. Supply dumps. Approximately 1200 troops, (July 17).

KUKOON Large wharf under construction (July 17). A-A guns (3 inch). Machine guns on hill to westward. Triple barrelled automatic gun on manager's house. Mother ship discharged four 100-foot submarines (July 20). Supply dumps.

TAIVU A-A battery - caliber undetermined.

SANTA ISABEL (REKATA BAY)
GIZO I (GIXO)
SHORTLAND (FAISI)
BOUGAINVILLE (KIETA)
BUKA PASSAGE (SOHANNA I)

(A) SANTA ISABEL (REKATA BAY)

Ships anchored in REKATA BAY. Seaplane base.

(B) GIZO (GIXO)

Seaplane anchorage.

(C) SHORTLAND (FAISI)

Seaplane base. A-A guns (3 inch) at LOFUNG. Fuel dumps.

(D) BOUGAINVILLE (KIETA)

Seaplane base. Ship anchorage. Report of landplane base under construction.

(E) BUKA PASSAGE (SOHANNA I)

Natives reported enemy constructing airdrome north side BUKA PASSAGE on June 24. COMSOWESPAC estimated 600 marines or naval ground forces on June 29. Airfield work was reported as continuing on June 27 and July 2. On July 8, EFATE forwarded coast watcher report stating considerable air activity at this point, with one warship observed afternoon, and a large schooner at SOHANNA I. that night.

TO OPERATION PLAN 1-42 ~~SECRET~~

From: Commander Aircraft, South Pacific Force
To: Aircraft, South Pacific Force.

Subject: Prescribed Search and Tracking Doctrine for Radar Equipped Aircraft.

1. The succeeding paragraphs contain the prescribed general doctrine for search and tracking by radar equipped aircraft. Radar equipment is presumed to be similar to that currently installed in type BPY-5 airplanes. Equipment of different design may require modification of the recommended searching technique in order to obtain maximum effectiveness.

2. When searching with radar, aircraft should remain well below any overcast and should avoid passing through rain squalls insofar as practicable. Recommended search altitude under normal conditions is between 1500 and 2500 feet. If the area being searched is clear with high ceiling, altitudes up to 4000 feet can successfully be used.

3. Radar should be connected to the "sweep" antenna for four minutes out of every five and to the "homing" antenna during the fifth minute, exclusive of time required to shift from one to the other. This provides good all-around coverage when conducting a regular search along a given track.

4. Lacking specific information to the contrary, it should be assumed that an enemy ship or force for which search is being conducted, is also equipped with radar. Every effort, consistent with the assigned mission, should be made to avoid disclosing presence to the enemy. With this in view the following procedure is prescribed for plane making contact:

- (a) Immediately upon making radar contact reduce altitude to not over 200 feet and fly on retirement course.
- (b) Send contact report giving enemy position and, as estimated, the number of ships. Use encoded indicator signifying that contact was made by radar only.
- (c) Continue on retirement course until approximately 45 miles distant from the enemy, then change course 90 degrees to the right or left and fly 20 miles to a position for commencing another approach.

Subject: Prescribed Search and Tracking Doctrine for
Radar Equipped Aircraft.

ANNEX "E" (Cont'd)

- (d) From the latter position approach the enemy, maintaining altitude below 200 feet except as necessary to re-establish radar contact at maximum distance and maintain the contact intermittently until sight contact is made.
- (e) After making sight contact, retire as before and send amplifying report.
- (f) If plane is to continue as tracker, steps (c), (d) and (e) should be repeated. In this case the succeeding amplifying reports should include the approximate true bearing of tracker from the enemy.
- (g) Be prepared to make MOs on request.

5. In the event an additional tracker is used, it should take position on the side of the enemy opposite that of the first tracker and follow the procedure of 4 (c), (d), (f) and (g) above. Both trackers should coordinate their movements so as to remain on opposite sides of the enemy, and to time their contacts insofar as practicable, so that one contact is being made while the other tracker is at the end of his retirement.

J. S. McCAIN

ANNEX "F"

TO OPERATION PLAN 1-42

~~16. 33~~

LOST PLANE PROCEDURE

- (a) Lost Plane transmits ZDO IMI (Numerals).
- (b) Base station transmits ZDA (Meaning transmit MO's and call sign).
- (c) Plane flies in a circle transmitting MO's interspaced with call sign. At least once each minute the plane will cease making MO's and listen for Base to break by making long dashes. This indicates cease making MO's and means base station has obtained RDF bearing.
- (d) Plane is then directed to fly for 10 minutes on a certain heading which is 90° from bearing obtained, transmitting MO's.
- (e) Plane then turns to heading ordered and transmits course being flown. (LZT used always for time).
- (f) Base transmits corrected heading as required and continues to check from time to time by asking for MO's.
- (g) Plane flies heading as directed.
- (h) When picked up on the Radar plot identify plane by directing radical change of course for a short distance.

J. S. McCain

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It will be noted that these instructions are written with the conviction that the enemy will be located ~~well~~ at such a distance that destroyers will have time to concentrate into a squadron organization, and then to prepare for attacking the enemy from the westward. ✓

No provision appears to have been made for action in the event of a surprise raid in which the enemys presence would not be detected until within gunrange- the situation which actually transpired.

242306 JUNE

FROM: COMINCH TO: CINCPAC INFO: COMSOPAC, COMSOWESTPAC.

FOR THE EXECUTION OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS INDICATED IN COMINCH 231255 THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS ARE CONTEMPLATED PARA (1) SEIZURE AND INITIAL OCCUPATION OF TULAGI AND ADJACENT ISLANDS TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY TASK FORCE SET UP BY CINCPAC. FORCES

TO BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE TO INCLUDE AT LEAST TWO CARRIERS WITH ACCOMPANYING CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS. SOUTH PACIFIC AMPHIBIOUS FORCE CONSISTING OF FIRST DIVISION LESS SEVENTH REGIMENT PLUS SECOND REGIMENT. EIGHT AFIRM PREP SAIL,

THREE AFIRM KING SAIL, FOUR AFIRM PREP SAIL, AND ONE AFIRM KING OF PACAMPFOR. FOUR AFIRM PREP DOG SAIL IN PACIFIC AND TWO AFIRM PREP DOG SAIL NOW ENROUTE PACIFIC. TWO CONVERTED LUMBER SCHOONERS. TWO MARINE FIGHTERS AND TWO MARINE DIVE BOMBERS

SQUADRONS IN ADDITION TO VICTOR MIKE OPTION TWO FIVE ONE NOW ENROUTE SOUTH PACIFIC. LAND BASED AIR SOUTH PACIFIC AREA. PATROL PLANES AS DESIGNATED BY CINCPAC. PAREN RELEASE OF ARMY AIRCRAFT NOW IN HAWAII AND SLATED FOR SOUTH AND SOUTHWEST PACIFIC WILL BE

TAKEN UP HERE WITH ARMY PAREN. LAND BASED AIR AUSTRALIA AND MORESBY. SURFACE FORCE AND SUBMARINE TASK GROUPS FROM SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FORCES. (2) MARINE AIR SQUADRONS TO BE FITTED OUT WITH AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE TO YOU. THEY WILL REQUIRE TRANSPORTATION TO

SOUTH PACIFIC BY CARRIERS AND/OR SEATRAN. AS ARRANGED BY YOU. RETENTION WASP IN SAN DIEGO AREA FOR CARRIER QUALIFICATIONS PRIOR TO MOVEMENT AND POSSIBLY FOR TRANSPORTATION ONE SQUADRON IS SUGGESTED. (3) PERMANENT OCCUPATION OF SEIZED ISLANDS IN

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA WILL PROBABLY BE UN ACCOMPLISHED BY TROOPS FROM AUSTRALIA UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDER SOUTHWESTPAC AREA. TRANSPORTATION FOR THESE FORCES BY AMPHIBIOUS FORCE AFIRM PREPS AND AFIRM KINGS MAY BE NECESSARY. DISCUSSION WITH ARMY

UNDERWAY HERE AS TO WHETHER ADDITIONAL ARMY TROOPS WILL BE SENT FROM THE UNITED STATES. AND AS TO OTHER QUESTIONS THIS PARAGRAPH. (4) A DIRECTIVE BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR THE EXECUTION OF THIS OPERATION WILL BE ISSUED. THIS DESPATCH SENT FOR YOUR

IMMEDIATE INFORMATION IN REGARD PREPARATION PLANS. MARINE SQUADRONS AND WASP MOVEMENT. LEARY PASS THIS DESPATCH TO MACARTHUR AND MAKE SURE HE HAS SEEN REFERNCED DESPATCH. CHIEF OF STAFF US ARMY INFORMED BY HAND.

S E C R E T

Subject.....Special Instructions to SCREENING GROUP and Vessels temporarily assigned.

Reference....COMTASKFOR 62 memorandum F.E. 25/AIG-3/AR-3 Operation Plan Number A3-42.

1. OBJECT OF SCREENING GROUP.

To protect the convoy

- (a) during passage to theatre of operations;
- (b) in the disembarkation area;
- (c) during withdrawal

against surface, air and submarine attack by the enemy.

2. It is my intention that the SCREENING GROUP and vessels temporarily assigned to me shall act in accordance with the following instructions and be guided by the principles set forth hereunder.

3. DURING PASSAGE TO THEATRE OF OPERATIONS.

(a) Attack by enemy surface force - Day.

- (1) CRUISERS move out and destroy or beat off the enemy whilst he is still outside range of the convoy.
- (2) CRUISERS to remain interposed between the enemy and the convoy.
- (3) CRUISERS to avoid being led on a general chase and consequently outside effective supporting distance.
- (4) DESTROYERS continue to screen the convoy.
- (5) CRUISERS rely on speed and evasive steering as anti-submarine measures.

(b) Attack by enemy surface force - NIGHT

During the operation there will be a moon during the latter part of the night. It is essential that an enemy force be beaten off before it sights or reaches the convoy and that our own naval forces are concentrated so as to avoid confusion in a night action. When passage disposition has been promulgated, it may be necessary to give special night stations to cruisers to ensure these objects.

(c) Enemy Air Attack.

Against this form of attack the escort group shall support the convoy formation by developing the maximum volume of

Subject.....Special Instructions to SCREENING GROUP and vessels temporarily assigned.

effective A.A. fire. The station of the Screening Group on the convoy formation will ensure concentration of the fire of all units and mutual fire support.

(d) Enemy Submarine Attack.

- (i) When weather permits, anti-submarine patrols with aircraft from CRUISERS of the SCREENING GROUP, may be ordered. Generally however, A/S patrols for T.F. 62 are being maintained by carrier aircraft of COVERING FORCE.
- (ii) The station of destroyers on the screen ensures anti-submarine protection to the limitations of asdics. Destroyers which have hauled out to investigate a contact or to counter attack a contact, are to re-join the formation when the contact can no longer constitute a menace to the force.
- (iii) It is expected that the force will normally zig-zag only by day.

4. APPROACHING THE DISEMBARKATION AREA.

Before approaching the combat area, CRUISERS may be concentrated in the VAN of SQUADRONS of the APPROACH DISPOSITION so as quickly to overwhelm any enemy surface forces (which may include cruisers) found in the area or encountered emerging from the area. In this event C.T.G. 62.6 and C.T.G. 62.4 will take charge of the CRUISERS in the VAN of X-RAY and YOKE respectively.

5. IN THE DISEMBARKATION AREA - DAY.

(a) Attack by Enemy Surface Force.

- (i) The force we have available in the disembarkation area to deal with this threat, will be:-

"AUSTRALIA")	
"CANBERRA")	
"CHICAGO")	8-inch guns.
"VINCENNES")	
"ASTORIA")	
"QUINCY")	
"HOBART"		6-inch guns.
"SAN JUAN"		5-inch guns.

16 DESTROYERS (DESRON FOUR plus FIRE SUPPORT SECTIONS 4&5 and destroyers of FIRE SUPPORT GROUP MIKE).

Subject:.....Special Instructions to SCREENING GROUP AND vessels temporarily assigned.

(ii) The enemy force must be destroyed or beaten off and yet the protection given to A.P's, A.K's landing craft and troops must continue to be effective.

(iii) It is my intention, therefore, to divide into TWO GROUPS, the Naval forces available to counter enemy attack with a surface craft. Either or both group may be brought against the enemy depending on the size and composition of his force.

"AUSTRALIA" GROUP - "AUSTRALIA", "CANBERRA", "CHICAGO",
"SELFRIDGE", "PATTERSON", "BAG-
LEY", "BLUE" and "ALBOT".

"VINCENNES" GROUP "VINCENNES", "QUINCY", "ASTORIA",
"HENLEY", "HELM", "JARVIS" and
"MUGFORD".

(iv) If both "AUSTRALIA" and "VINCENNES" groups are ordered to attack the enemy, it is my intention that "VINCENNES" group shall act independently of the movements of the "AUSTRALIA" GROUP so as to give greatest mutual support.

(v) It is my intention that the fire of "AUSTRALIA" and "CANBERRA" shall be concentrated under MASTER SHIP CONTROL.

(vi) It is my direction that the DESTROYERS of each group engaged, shall concentrate under their particular Senior Officer (COMDESRON 4 or COMDES DIV 7) and attack the enemy with torpedoes and gunfire as soon as he is being effectively engaged by our cruiser force.

(vii)...../-

Subject:.....Special Instructions to SCREENING GROUP and vessels temporarily assigned.

- (vii) It will be my aim to meet the enemy to seaward of the area between SAVO ISLAND and SEALARK CHANNEL and that the force engaging him shall remain interposed between the enemy and this area. It is expected that our extensive air reconnaissance will give warning of the approach of enemy surface forces.
- (viii) In the event of the "AUSTRALIA" or BOTH groups being ordered away from the disembarkation area to meet the enemy, it is my wish that Rear-Admiral SCOTT in "SAN JUAN" shall direct the activities of the vessels remaining in the disembarkation area, so as to afford the best possible protection to our AP'S, AK's and landing forces.
(In the event of both GROUPS leaving the area, the forces remaining will consist of "SAN JUAN", "MONSSEN" (?) and "BUCHANAN" initially with YOKE, and "HOBART", "WORTH" "HULL", "DEWEY", "ELLET" and "WILSON" initially with X-RAY. Note that "ELLET" and "WILSON" will be initially with YOKE if their fire support and salvage mission have been discharged vide paragraph 5 (c) (iii).

(b) Enemy Air Attack.

- (i) The object of the screening group CRUISERS shall be to oppose enemy air attacks on transports with the full volume of their A.A. fire. Therefore when the convoy units reach the disembarkation area, the screening group CRUISERS shall remain underway, outside the 100 fathom curve, in the close vicinity of the Squadron (YOKE or X-RAY) to which they were attached. DESTROYERS shall also develop their full volume of A.A. fire against enemy aircraft and shall be alert to the possibility of engaging with close range weapons, any enemy aircraft which may attempt to strafe our transports and landing boats but shall be careful not to hamper the latter.
- (ii) Against air attack it is my direction that FIRE SUPPORT GROUPS LOVE and MIKE shall independently support transports and boats of X-RAY and YOKE respectively.
- (iii) A CARRIER V.F. SQUADRON is being maintained over the disembarkation area and a fighter director group will be in "CHICAGO". There will also be many other friendly aircraft over the area. (vide AIR SUPPORT PLAN).
- (iv) Units engaging aircraft targets must be careful to avoid firing upon friendly aircraft and shall at once shift fire from targets which are about to be attacked by our own fighters.

Subject:.....Special Instructions to SCREENING GROUP and vessels temporarily assigned.

(c) Enemy Submarine Attack.

- (i) CRUISER AIRCRAFT, one each from "VINCENNES", "CHICAGO", "AUSTRALIA" and "CANBERRA" will be assigned A/S patrol tasks, depending on the time the transport groups will reach the disembarkation area. It will be the object to have an initial patrol using the four available aircraft and subsequently to allot to each aircraft a further patrol period. Aircraft are to be armed with A/S bombs.
- (ii) After the transport sections have reached the disembarkation area, destroyers shall afford A/S screen as follows
- For transports of SQUADRON YOKE - "HENLEY", "HELM" and "BLUE".
- For "CHICAGO" and "CANBERRA" - "BAGLEY"
- For transports of SQUADRON X-RAY - "SELFRIDGE", "JARVIS" "MUGFORD" and "RALPH TALBOT".
- For "AUSTRALIA" and "HOBART" - "PATTERSON".
- (iii) Prior to ZERO MINUS 30 MINUTES, Fire Support Sections 4 and 5 ("WORTH", "HULL", "DEWEY", "ELLET" and "WILSON") provide additional screen for TRANSPORT GROUP X-RAY and after delivery of gunfire scheduled and completion of duty as salvage vessels provide additional screen as follows:-
- for TRANSPORT GROUP X-RAY "WORTH", "HULL" and "DEWEY".
- for TRANSPORT GROUP YOKE- "ELLET" and "WILSON".
- Prior to proceeding on Fire Support Missions, FIRE SUPPORT GROUP MIKE ("SAN JUAN" (C.T.G. 62.4) "MONSSEN", BUCHANAN) provide additional screen for TRANSPORT GROUP YOKE.
- (iv) ONE HOUR before sunset RALPH TALBOT and BLUE leave disembarkation area and act in accordance with paragraph 6(a).
- (v) CRUISERS of SCREENING GROUP Remain underway in combat area and shall maneuver so as to keep in close support of transports and outside 100 fathom curve.

6. IN THE DISEMBARKATION AREA - NIGHT.

- (a) One hour before sunset RALPH TALBOT and BLUE leave disembarkation area and establish anti-submarine patrol and RADAR guard watch to give warning of approach of surface craft or submarines.

Subject:.....Special Instructions to SCREENING GROUP and vessels temporarily assigned.

Between position 0859S. 15955E and position 0901S.
15949E - RALPH TALBOT.

Between position 0905S. 15942E and position 0909S.
15937E - BLUE.

In the event of an enemy surface force being detected, immediate report is to be made - the force is to be shadowed and frequently reported and when about to be engaged by cruisers, the destroyers in contact may be ordered to illuminate the enemy force with searchlight.

- (b) "AUSTRALIA", "CANBERRA", and "CHICAGO", screened by PATTERSON and BAGLEY, will be underway SOUTH of a line drawn $125^{\circ}(T)$ from center of SAVO ISLAND and WEST of longitude $160^{\circ} 04'E$. VINCENNES, ASTORIA and QUINCY, screened by JARVIS and HELM will be underway NORTH of the above line and WEST of longitude $160^{\circ} 04'E$.
- (c) SAN JUAN (C.T.G. 62.4) and HOBART, screened by MONSSEN and BUCHANAN, remain underway EAST OF longitude $160^{\circ} 04'E$ and cover AP'S and AK'S against enemy light forces entering disembarkation area from EASTWARD.
- (d) Remaining destroyers of DESRON FOUR reinforced by FIRE SUPPORT SECTIONS FOUR AND FIVE continue to give A/S protection (and if necessary A.A. fire support) to transports. If ordered to form a STRIKING FORCE, all DESTROYERS of DESRON 4 less BLUE and RALPH TALBOT concentrate under COMDESRON 4 (in SELFRIDGE), FIVE miles NORTH WEST of SAVO ISLAND. In the event of contact with enemy surface units, the STRIKING FORCE will at once attack with full outfit of torpedoes and then maintain touch from WESTWARD. The STRIKING FORCE will engage the enemy in gun action when our CRUISERS engage, provided it is quite clear that OWN FORCES are not in the line of fire, and must be prepared, if ordered, to illuminate the enemy targets for our cruiser gunfire.
- (e) At daylight, ALL UNITS resume tasks outlined in paragraph 5.

7. WITHDRAWAL OF TRANSPORT FORCE.

In accordance with ATTACK FORCE RETIREMENT PLAN.

8. NOTE.

Although not assigned fire support missions in the combat area,

Subject:.....Special Instructions to SCREENING GROUP and vessels temporarily assigned.

ships of the SCREENING GROUP must be prepared to engage shore targets if ordered and must be prepared to silence by gunfire any shore defences OUTSIDE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY OUR TROOPS, which open fire on ships of the convoy or on ships of the screening group. In addition it should be noted that FIRE SUPPORT GROUPS LOVE and MIKE are authorized to call on SCREENING GROUP for support in silencing gunfire from shore.

V. CRUTCHLEY.

REAR-ADMIRAL.
COMMANDER, TASK GROUP 62.6.

231255 JUNE

FROM: COMINCH TO: COMSOWESTPACFOR INFO: COMSOPAC,
CINCPAC.

BRITISH CAN BE EXPECTED TO AGREE TO COOPERATION OF DETACHMENT EASTERN FLEET INCLUDING AT LEAST TWO CARRIERS FOR OPERATION DIRECTED TOWARD SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF TIMOR OR OTHER SUITABLE PLACE PROVIDED DETACHMENT CAN BE USED IN CONJUNCTION

WITH LAND BASED AIR IN NORTHWEST AUSTRALIA INCLUDING AIR UMBRELLA PARA THIS PROJECT TO BE TIMED WITH SEIZURE AND OCCUPATION OF TULAGI BY SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE WHICH IS TO INCLUDE UNIT SAIL TASK FORCE CONTAINING AT LEAST TWO CARRIERS ALSO

TO BE EMPLOYED IN CONJUNCTION WITH LAND BASED AIR IN NORTHEAST AUSTRALIA AND IN NEW CALEDONIA AND NEW HEBRIDES PARA BRITISH HAVE BEEN GIVEN TARGET DATE AUGUST FIRST

230017 JUNE

FROM: CINCPAC TO: COMSOPACFOR

NOW CONSIDER SINKING FOUR CAST VICTORS AT MIDWAY PRACTICALLY CERTAIN. IF SITUATION PERMITS I EXPECT TO MAKE AVAILABLE

TWO CARRIER TASK FORCES FOR OPERATION CORAL SEA AREA ARRIVING ABOUT FIFTEEN JULY. THERE MAY BE RELIEVED BY TWO OTHERS ABOUT

TWENTY AUGUST WITH OVERLAP OF ABOUT FOUR DAYS. DESIRE EXHAUST ALL POSSIBILITIES OF EMPLOYING STRIKING POWER THESE FORCES

PARTICULARLY DURING OVERLAP TO EJECT ENEMY FROM SUCH OF SOLOMON-NEW GUINEA-NEW BRITAIN REPEAT BRITAIN BASES AS MAY BE PRACTI-

CABLE. TO THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCES YOU NOW KNOW TO BE AVAILABLE THERE MAY BE ADDED THE TWO RAIDER BATTALIONS OF ABOUT NINE HUNDRED MEN EACH. BASE EQUIPMENT IS APPARENTLY GOING TO BE

AVAILABLE BUT SOME DIFFICULTY IN SUPPLYING GARRISON AND BASE DEFENSE AIRCRAFT IS PROBABLY. ANY EXTENSION OF CONTROL

MADE WILL OF COURSE DECREASE THREAT TO PRESENT BASES AND THUS MIGHT RELEASE SOME OF THEIR DEFENSES FOR THE NEW BASES. PLEASE GIVE ME YOUR PRELIMINARY COMMENTS BY DESPATCH.

DISPATCHES JULY

COMSOPAC
050008 July

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: COMSOWESTPACFOR
INFO: CINCPAC

INFORMATION REQUESTED AS TO AVAILABILITY AND WHAT SHIPS WILL BE ATTACHED TO THIS FORCE FOR TASK ONE. MOVEMENTS OF TRANSPORTS REQUIRE ESCORTS FROM YOU, ALSO OFFSHORE AND INSHORE GUNFIRE SUPPORT OF LANDING ATTACK, ANTISUBMARINE SCREEN AND ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE SCREEN AROUND TRANSPORT AREA. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT A MINIMUM OF 4 CRUISERS AND 12 DESTROYERS WILL BE NEEDED. SENIOR GUNNERY OFFICER OF ATTACHED SHIPS SHOULD BE SENT TO WELLINGTON FOR A CONFERENCE ON 15 JULY WITH COMGEN 1st MARDIV AND AMPHIBIOUS FORCE COMMANDER.

COMSOPAC
050011 July

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: COMSOWESPACFOR
INFO: CINCPAC

WILL VISIT GENERAL MACARTHUR AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE AND WILL ADVISE PROSPECTIVE DATE. INFORM HIM I APPRECIATE HIS INVITATION. ON ACCOUNT OF EARLY COMMENCEMENT OF TASK ONE AND THE GREAT DETAIL OF PLANNING NECESSARY, WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY MINIMUM OFFICERS AND MY STAY MUST BE AS SHORT AS POSSIBLE.

COMSOPAC
050500 July

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: CINCPAC

IT IS REQUESTED THAT 6 DMS* BE ASSIGNED TO THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE SOUTH PACIFIC FOR PROSPECTIVE OPERATIONS.

070125

FROM: CINCPAC
TO: COMSOPACFOR

AFTER CONSULTATION WITH FLETCHER AND MY STAFF, TURNER SUGGESTS THE FOLLOWING MAJOR FEATURES FOR THE FORTHCOMING OPERATIONS IN SOPAC AREA. TURNER EXPECTS TO ARRIVE AUCKLAND JULY 11TH. REINFORCEMENT OF SANTO AND CONSTRUCTION OF LANDING FIELDS TO BE CARRIED OUT AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE. ON JULY 6TH 2 MARSTON MATS ARE LEAVING PEARL IN OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES; ONE MAT FOR SANTO. CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL FROM EFATE (ONE MAT FOR LATTER). USE GUADALCANAL CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL TO BE OBTAINED FROM TONGA OR WEST COAST AS DECIDED LATER. NDENI TO BE OCCUPIED AND DEFENDED. SEND ONE DESTROYER WITH GROUND AND AIR RECONNAISSANCE PARTY TO ARRIVE NDENI ABOUT JULY 25TH TO DECIDE ON SITES FOR AIR AND SEAPLANE BASE AND LOCATION OF DEFENSE FORCE. DIVERT TRANSDIV 2 TO TONGA. TRANSDIV 2 DEPART TONGA IN TIME TO ARRIVE AT NDENI ON DOG MINUS TWO DAY; THE 2ND MARINE REGIMENT IS ASSIGNED AS GARRISON. NDENI GARRISON WILL BE REINFORCED BY THE 5TH MARINE DEFENSE BATTALION (LESS 1/3 ANTI-AIRCRAFT ELEMENTS) ON ARRIVAL FROM THE EAST COAST. AIRCRAFT BASE AND NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL WILL BE SUPPLIED FROM THE UNITED STATES LATER. ON DOG DAY, APPROXIMATELY 1 AUGUST, CAPTURE TULAGI, GAVUTU, FLORIDA AND GUADALCANAL ISLANDS. FORCES OF THE 1ST MARINE DIVISION, LESS 7TH REGIMENT, PLUS 1ST RAIDER BATTALION, 3RD

070125
(Contd)

MARINE DEFENSE BATTALION, 1/3 OF AA ELEMENTS, 5TH DEFENSE BATTALION, 3rd BARRAGE BALLOON SQUADRON AND SIX PLANES VMO-251. TRANSDIVS 8, 10, AND 12. TASK FORCES 11, 16, 18, ANZAC SQUADRON, AND POSSIBLY ALSO TASK FORCE 17. REHEARSAL OF LANDING ATTACK IS CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL EMPLOYING 1ST MARINE DIVISION LESS 7TH REGIMENT PLUS 1ST RAIDER BATTALION, TASK FORCES 11 AND 17, AUSTRALIAN SQUADRON, AND 5 DMS TO BE ASSIGNED. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT SIX DAYS, STARTING JULY 23RD, WILL BE REQUIRED FOR TWO COMPLETE REHEARSALS, SECOND ONE TO INCLUDE FIRING BY SHIPS, AIRCRAFT AND TROOPS. FIJI IS RECOMMENDED AS SITE FOR REHEARSALS AND DEPARTURE POINT FOR EXPEDITIONARY FORCE BECAUSE OF CENTRAL POSITION RETIRED FROM ENEMY OBSERVATION AND APPARENTLY BETTER LANDING BEACHES. AS PREVIOUSLY INDICATED THESE OPERATIONS WILL BE COVERED AND SUPPORTED BY AIR FROM AUSTRALIA AND BY VPB AND ARMY AIRSOPAC. BEGINNING ABOUT DOG MINUS TWO AND FROM EAST COAST OF MALAITA BY SIMILAR NUMBER BEGINNING ON DOG DAY, SUGGEST SCOUTING FROM NDENI BY ABOUT 12 VPB.

CINCPAC
041844

FROM: CINCPAC
TO: COMSOPAC (FOR ACTION)
COMTASKFOR 11 (BY HAND)

IT IS DESIRED THAT AIR AND GROUND RECONNAISSANCE OF THE FIJI'S BY OFFICERS OF THE 1st MARINE DIVISION BE MADE FOR SELECTION AND ARRANGEMENT WITH THE FIJI GOVERNMENT FOR SUITABLE LANDING AREA FOR REHEARSAL OF THE COMING AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS. INVOLVED IN THE REHEARSAL WILL BE ACTUAL SHIPS GUNFIRE, AERIAL BOMBING AND FIRING BY INFANTRY AND ARTILLERY WEAPONS. SUGGESTED AS POSSIBLE SITES ARE THE FOLLOWING:- ONO ISLAND ON THE WEST COAST; WEST END OF THE NORTH COAST OF KANDAVU ISLAND; SOUTHWEST END OF THE NORTHWEST COAST OF TAVEUNI ISLAND. COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGES WHICH MAY BE INCURRED AND MOVEMENT OF PERSONNEL IN THE VICINITY OF OPERATIONS ~~REHEARSALS~~ TO PLACES OF SAFETY MUST BE MADE. WITH THE COMMENCEMENT OF REHEARSALS ABOUT 23rd JULY PRACTICES A AND D SECTION 1 L F T P 191, PLUS BOMBING, ARTILLERY, MACHINE GUN AND RIFLE PRACTICES WILL BE FIRED TWICE.

✓ 081012 *July*

FROM MACARTHUR AND GHORMLEY
TO: CHIEF OF STAFF - COMINCH (ACTION)

PART ONE - A CONFERENCE HAS BEEN HELD BETWEEN GENERAL MACARTHUR AND VICE ADMIRAL GHORMLEY PURSUANT TO THE DIRECTIVE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF CONTAINED IN COMINCH 022100 WITH REGARD TO THE EXECUTION OF THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION AS THEREIN DIRECTED. THE PLAN OF THE OPERATION IN BROAD OUTLINE IS AS BELOW INDICATED. MANY DETAILS OF EXECUTION AND TIMING OF THE PHASES MAY BE MODIFIED MATERIALLY AFTER CONFERENCE WITH THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE AND CARRIER FORCE COMMANDERS WHO HAVE NOT YET ARRIVED. TASK ONE ORTHODOX LANDING ATTACK IN THE TULAGI-GUADALCANAL AREA BY THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE. THE

081012
(Contd)

OPERATION TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE INTERDICTING AIR AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FORCE WEST OF THE OPERATING AREA AND BY THE PARTICIPATION OF ITS NAVAL ELEMENTS. TASKS 2 AND 3 ARE BASED UPON TWO MAJOR CONCEPTS:- (a) IN ORDER TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FIGHTER AND BOMBER COVERAGE FOR SURFACE ELEMENTS THE MOVING PROGRESSIVELY FORWARD OF AIR ECHELONS; (b) RABAU TO BE ISOLATED PRIOR TO ITS FINAL ASSAULT.

081014

PART TWO OF 081012

TASKS 2 AND 3 HAVE BEEN DIVIDED INTO FIVE PHASES IN THE EXECUTION OF THIS CONCEPT IN WHICH THE TIMING MAY BE MODIFIED TO COMPENSATE FOR VARIATIONS IN THE SCHEDULED DEVELOPMENTS OF AIRFIELDS AND THE AVAILABILITY OF SHIPPING. PHASE ONE:- THE CAPTURE OF THE AIRFIELD AT GASMATA ON NEW BRITAIN, AND THE CAPTURE OF LAE AND AALAMAUA IN NEW GUINEA. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FIGHTER COVERAGE FOR THE SURFACE VESSELS CARRYING THE ATTACKING FORCE TO LAE, IT IS NECESSARY, PRIOR TO THE INITIATION OF THIS PHASE TO CONTINUE DEVELOPMENT IN THE PORT MORESBY AREA AND TO PROVIDE AIRFIELDS AT MILNE BAY AT THE SOUTHEASTERN TIP OF NEW GUINEA AND AT BUNA ON THE NORTH COAST ON NEW GUINEA NORTHEAST OF PORT MORESBY. PHASE TWO:- OCCUPATION OF CAPE GLOUCESTER TALASEA ON NEW BRITAIN WITH THE LEAST PRACTICABLE DELAY AT THOSE POINTS. PHASE THREE:- THE CAPTURE OF LORENGAU ON THE WEST END OF BUKA ISLAND IN THE SOLOMONS. PHASE FOUR:- THE CAPTURE OF KAVIENG. PHASE FIVE:- THE CAPTURE OF RABAU.

081015

FROM: PART THREE OF 081012

ALTHOUGH BUT ONE DIVISION IS TRAINED AND EQUIPPED FOR LANDING

~~XXXXXX~~
081015
(Contd)

ATTACK ADEQUATE GROUND TROOPS ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE OPERATION, AND IT IS PROBABLE THAT LOSSES NORMAL TO THIS TYPE OF OPERATION WILL PREVENT ITS EMPLOYMENT THROUGHOUT. ADEQUATE SHIPPING IS LACKING FOR THE TRANSPORT OF THE INFANTRY DIVISIONS. AS NOW LAID DOWN, TASK ONE REQUIRES THE PRESENCE OF AP'S AK'S AND SUPPORTING SHIPS IN THE TULAGI AREA FROM 36 HOURS TO FOUR DAYS WHERE THEY WILL BE OUTSIDE THE RANGE OF ANY SUPPORTING AIR BASE AND EXPOSED TO CONTINUED HOSTILE AIR, SURFACE AND SUBMARINE ATTACK. FOR THE INTERDICTION OF HOSTILE AIR OR NAVAL OPERATIONS AGAINST THE TULAGI AREA, THE AIR FORCE NOW IN SIGHT FOR THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA IS NOT ADEQUATE. THE CARRIER TASK GROUPS WILL THEMSELVES BE EXPOSED TO ATTACK BY LAND BASED AIR WHILE UNPROTECTED BY OUR LAND BASED AVIATION, AND IT IS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL THAT THEY WILL BE ABLE TO RENDER FIGHTER SUPPORT TO THE TRANSPORT AREA, ESPECIALLY SHOULD HOSTILE NAVAL FORCES APPROACH.

081017

PART FOUR OF 081012 - DUE TO THE DEPTH OF THE EXISTING HOSTILE RECONNAISSANCE, SURPRISE IS NOW IMPROBABLE. THE SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF THE PHASES OF TASKS 2 AND 3 WILL DEPEND ON OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN AIR SUPERIORITY. AT THE PRESENT TIME THIS IS DOUBTFUL DUE TO THE NUMBERS OF RESERVE PLANES AVAILABLE AND TO THE FACT THAT THE FIGHTERS ARE NOW OPERATING UNDER A DISTINCT HANDICAP BECAUSE OF THEIR LIMITATIONS AS TO ^{AL}LATITUDE AND RANGE. AS REGARDS ALTITUDE, IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THIS CONDITION WILL BE PROGRESSIVELY AMELIORATED AS REPLACEMENTS ARRIVE WITH EQUIPMENT PERMITTING OF EFFICIENT OPERATION AT TWENTY TO TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND FEET.

081018

PART FIVE OF 081012 - THERE HAS BEEN A MARKED CHANGE IN THE ENEMY SITUATION IN THE OBJECTIVE AREA DURING THE LAST THREE WEEKS WHICH HAS BEEN INDICATED IN THE OPERATION REPORTS SUBMITTED TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT. AT KAVIENG, RABAU[✓]L, LAE, SALAMAUA, BUKA AND GUADALCANAL[✓] THE ENEMY HAS BEEN AND IS MAKING A MAJOR EFFORT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AIRFIELDS, WHICH WILL GREATLY FACILITATE THE OPERATION OF HIS AIR ELEMENTS THROUGHOUT THE AREA. AT THE PRESENT TIME IT APPEARS HE IS INSTALLING THE HEAVY EQUIPMENT FOR AN AIR BASE ON GUADALCANAL HAVING SHOWN BY RECENT RECONNAISSANCE 4 CRUISERS, 6 TO 8 DESTROYERS 4 TRANSPORTS, 8 MOTOR TROPEDO BOATS AND NUMEROUS LANDING BARGES. GROUND INSTALLATIONS HAVE BEEN INITIATED AND 5 LANDING JETTIES AHVE BEEN CONSTRUCTED. RECONNAISSANCE PLANES, FOR THE FIRST TIME ON JULY 7TH, ENCOUNTERED ANTI[✓]AIRCRAFT FIRE.

081020

PART SIX OF 081012 - THE TWO COMMANDERS ARE OF THE OPINION, ARRIVED AT INDEPENDENTLY, AND CONFIRMED AFTER DISCUSSION, THAT THE INITIATION OF THIS OPERATION AT THIS TIME WITHOUT A REASONABLE ASSURANCE OF ADEQUATE AIR COVERAGE DURING EACH PHASE WOULD BE ATTENDED WITH THE GRAVEST RISK WHICH HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY DEMONSTRATED BY THE JAPANESE REVERSES AT THE CORAL SEA AND MIDWAY BATTLES. ONCE INITIATED, THE OPERATION SHOULD BE RAPIDLY PUSHED TO ITS FINAL CONCLUSION, BECAUSE A PARTIAL ATTACK, LEAVING RABAU[✓]L IN THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY, ENABLING HIM TO SUPPORT BY LAND BASED AVIATION THE HEAVY CONCENTRATION THAT COULD BE EFFECTED FROM THE TRUK AREA WOULD EXPOSE THE INITIAL ATTACKING ELEMENTS TO THE DANGER OF DESTRUCTION BY OVERWHELMING FORCE. IN VIEW OF THE RECENTLY DEVELOPED STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY POSITIONS, THE SHORTAGE OF AIRFIELDS AND AIRPLANES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF STRONG AIR SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION, AND OF THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT SHIPPING THAT WOULD MAKE POSSIBLE THE CONTINUED MOVE-

Blue shortage //

081020
(Contd)

MENT OF TROOPS AND SUPPLIES, IT IS OUR CONSIDERED OPINION THAT THE SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE OPERATION IS OPEN TO THE GRAVEST DOUBTS. THEREFORE, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THIS OPERATION BE DEFERRED PENDING THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF FORCE IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC AND THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREAS, AND IN THE MEANWHILE WE PROCEED WITH AN INFILTRATION PROCESS THROUGH THE NEW HEBRIDES AND THE SANTA CRUZ ISLAND GROUPS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH STEPPED UP AIR FIELD CONSTRUCTION IN NEW GUINEA, WITH A VIEW TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF BASES FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE OPERATION WHEN IT IS DEEMED THAT ADEQUATE MEANS ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE EXECUTION OF ALL THREE TASKS IN ONE CONTINUOUS MOVEMENT. END

090633

FROM: CINCPAC
TO: COMSOPACFOR

IN BRIEF THIS IS MY SERIAL 0151W NOW IN AIRMAIL TO YOU. YOU ARE HEREBY DESIGNATED TASK FORCE COMMANDER FOR TASK ONE COMINCH PART 022100. IN THE OPERATING AREA WHICH IS INTERPRETED TO BE INITIALLY THE NEW CALEDONIA-NEW HEBRIDES AREA YOU WILL EXERCISE STRATEGIC COMMAND IN PERSON. THE FOLLOWING PACFLEET FORCES ARE ASSIGNED TO YOU IN ADDITION TO THOSE ALREADY UNDER YOUR COMMAND:- TASK FORCE 11, ADMIRAL FLETCHER, 1CV, 3 CA YDL, 6 DD, 4 APD; TASK FORCE 16, REAR ADMIRAL KINCAID, 1 CV, 1BB, 2 CA, 1 CL, 1 DL, 6 DD; TASK FORCE 18, REAR ADMIRAL NOYES, 1 CV, 3 CA, 1 CL, 8 DD. MARINE FORCE 2ND MARINES REINFORCED, 3RD DEFENSE BATTALION, VMVMSB 231 AND 232, VMF 223 AND 224, VMO 251. 5 AP, 5 AK, 4 AO, 1 AE, 1 AG, 5 DMS, 1 AT SALVAGE. COMMANDER SOUTHWEST PACIFIC WILL HAVE AVAILABLE THE AUSTRALIA, CANBERRA, CHICAGO, HOBART, PLUS DESRON 4. FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES REQUIRED YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO APPLY DIRECTLY TO SUPREME COMMANDER SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA. COMMENCING ABOUT AUGUST 1st WITH FORCES

090633
(Contd)

UNDER YOUR COMMAND YOU WILL SEIZE AND OCCUPY SANTA CRUZ ISLANDS, TULAGI AND ADJACENT POSITIONS IN ORDER TO DENY THAT AREA TO JAPAN. CINCPAC WILL SUPPLY THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR THIS OPERATION. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THIS ARE AS FOLLOWS:- 2 FLEET TANKERS, CIMARRON AND PLATTE WILL ACCOMPANY TASK FORCE 11; ABOUT JULY 20TH KASKASKIA WILL PROCEED TO SOUTH PACIFIC AREA FROM PEARL; KANAWHA WILL FUEL TASK FORCE 18, THEN ON TO NOUMEA. ABOUT JULY 22ND CHARTERED TANKERS WITH A TOTAL OF 225,000 BBLs. FUEL OIL WILL ARRIVE AT NOUMEA AND WITH SAME AMOUNT AGAIN ON AUGUST 2ND. IT IS EXPECTED ABOUT 225,000 BBLs. FUEL OIL PER CV TASK FORCE PER MONTH WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU IN NEW CALEDONIA AREA. REQUIREMENTS FOR DIESEL FUEL, AVGAS AND STORES FOR PACFLT TASK FORCES WILL BE MET AS REQUESTED BY YOU. COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE GENERALLY IN ACCORDANCE PKC SEVENTY, MODIFIED AS DIRECTED BY YOU. CINCPAC WILL REMAIN AT SUB BASE PEARL AND, FROM TIME TO TIME, MAY ISSUE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS OPERATION. I HAVE FULL CONFIDENCE IN YOUR ABILITY TO CARRY THIS OPERATION TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

122359

FROM: CINCPAC
TO: COMTASKFOR 16
INFO: COMSOPAC

COMPOSITION TASK ORGANIZATION - TASK FORCE 16, REAR ADMIRAL KINKAID - ENTERPRISE, NORTH CAROLINE, PORTLAND, ATLANTA, BALCH, MAURY, BENHAM, ELLET, GWIN, GRAYSON, MONSSEN. DAILY BULLETINS AND INFORMATION IN ACCORDANCE MY OPORD 34-42 FURNISHED COMTASKFOR 16 ONLY. PLAN - TO SUPPORT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THAT AREA, TASK FORCE 16 WILL PROCEED TO SOUTH PACIFIC. TASKS - SORTIE FROM PEARL, ZERO HOUR 1830Z/15 JULY, ORDER DESTROYERS AT MINUS 1 HOUR, ATLANTA ZERO HOUR, PORTLAND PLUS 5 MINUTES NORTH CAROLINA PLUS 15 MINUTES, ENTERPRISE PLUS 25 MINUTES; SCREENING LANE 6 MILES, 215 DEGREES FROM XRAY TO OPTION.

182118
(Contd)

DEPARTMENT PREPARED, IN CASE USE ANTI-AIRCRAFT REGIMENTS FROM BOTH BORA BORA AND TONGATABU, TO FURNISH 1 GUN BATTERY, 1 AUTOMATIC WEAPONS BATTERY, AND 1 SEARCHLIGHT PLATOON AS REPLACEMENT FOR BORA BORA. REMAINDER OF REGIMENT TO TONGATABU. CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY, INFORMED.

211021

FROM: COMAIRSOPAC
TO: COMSOPAC

STATES VMO 251 SETTING UP PLANES AT NEW CALEDONIA. UNTIL AND UNLESS WING TANKS RECEIVED UNABLE FLY FROM ESPIRITU SANTO TO MORE ADVANCED BASE. PILOTS NOT QUALIFIED FOR CARRIER LANDINGS; BADLY NEED GUNNERY AND TACTICAL TRAINING. WHEN FIELD AT ESPIRITU SANTO IS READY, PLAN BASE THAT SQUADRON THERE IN CONJUNCTION VMF 212 (NOW AT EFATE) FOR GUNNERY AND TACTICAL TRAINING AND DEFENSE OF EFATE AND ESPIRITU SANTO UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SQUADRON MATERIALLY ABLE PROCEED WESTWARD.

222245

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: CINCPAC

STATES PARAGRAPH 6 OF ENCLOSURE (A) CINCPAC SERIAL 01994 WOULD INDICATE NECESSITY FOR APPROVAL BY UNITED STATES CHIEFS OF STAFF BEFORE COMSOPAC CAN MOVE ARMY TROOPS FROM PRESENT BASES TO RELIEF OF MARINE CORPS FORCES IN SEIZED AREAS. THIS RESTRICTION IS CONTRARY TO COMSOPAC'S UNDERSTANDING OF PRIOR INSTRUCTIONS COVERING THIS OPERATION AND, BECAUSE OF THE DISTANCE AND TIME INVOLVED, IS LIKELY TO PROVE A HANDICAP. FURTHERMORE, BECAUSE OF PRESENT UNCERTAINTY AS TO EMPLOYMENT OF NEW ZEALAND TROOPS, AND INABILITY TO DETERMINE AT THIS TIME AS TO WHEN RELIEF SHOULD TAKE PLACE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SUBMIT A DEFINITE PLAN FOR THIS RELIEF NOW. COMSOPAC

201300

FROM: COMSOPAC

TO: COMTASKFORS 11, 16, 18, 44, COMAIRSOPAC, COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC

COMSOPAC OPERATION PLAN 1-42 TO BE MODIFIED - PARA. 3 (b),

PHASE 2 TO READ AS FOLLOWS - "COVER THE APPROACH TO, AND THE
OPERATIONS WITHIN, THE TULAGI-GUADALCANAL AREA BY SEARCH.

ATTACKS ON ENEMY OBJECTIVES BY AIR AS ARRANGED WITH COM-
MANDER EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. AIRCRAFT SUPPORT RENDERED ON CALL.

INITIATE PATROL PLANE SCOUTING FROM NDENI ABOUT DOG MINUS

1 DAY AND FROM EAST COAST MALAITA ABOUT DOG PLUS 1 DAY".

MAKE CORRESPONDING CHANGE IN COMSOPAC 170602.

122359
(Contd)

FLIGHT 62 WILL PROVIDE AIR COVERAGE. REMAINDER OF AIR GROUPS WILL RENDEZVOUS OVER CARRIER AT PLUS 3 HOURS IN CENTER OF OPERATING AREA C-11. VIA POINTS S03 AND H68, PROCEED TO NUKUALOFA ANCHORAGE, TONGATABU, ARRIVING LOCAL FORENOON 24 JULY. AT 0000Z/15 JULY THIS ORDER BECOMES EFFECTIVE. CONTROL OF TASK FORCE 16 PASSES TO COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE AT 0000Z/20 JULY WITHOUT FURTHER ORDER. TO BE FUELED AND PROVISIONED TO CAPACITY PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. FUEL WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE AT NUKUALOFA; DETAILS IN SEPARATE DESPATCH. ZONE ZERO TIME WILL BE USED. POINTS GIVEN ARE ACCORDING TO PACIFIC AREA GRID MYDIS 211951 OF APRIL. COMMUNICATIONS PAC 70 PLUS MODIFICATIONS FOR SOPAC AND SOWESTPAC AREAS PREVIOUSLY ISSUED. CINCPAC AT PEARL; COMSOPAC AT AUCKLAND, LATER TRANSFERRING TO ARGONNE. OPERATION ORDER NO. 36-42. COMGEN TONGA WILL BE INFORMED BY WHITNEY OF ESSENTIAL DETAILS AND IS TO ARRANGE FOR OFFICER PILOT TO MEET EACH HEAVY SHIP OF THE FORCE ENTERING NUKUALOFA.

140240

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: CINCPAC

RECOMMENDS ESTABLISHMENT OF AMPHIBIOUS FORCE AS OF 15 JULY - TURNER DELAYED, EXPECTED AUCKLAND TODAY OR TOMORROW, BUT BELIEVE THAT DOES NOT EFFECT ESTABLISHMENT OF FORCE.

140937

FROM: COMSOWESTPACFOR
TO: COMSOPACROR - MACARTHUR TO COMSOPAC REGARDING HIS 110045

WILL FURNISH YOU ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION EXTENDING RECONNAISSANCE TO SECURE MAXIMUM COVERAGE. EVERY FACILITY THIS AREA IS AVAILABLE TO YOU.

142226

FROM: COMINCH
TO: COMSOPAC

IT IS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE ARMY TO PROVIDE GARRISON TROOPS FROM UNITED STATES FOR SANTA CRUZ-TULAGI-GUADALCANAL. IT IS THEIR INTERPRETATION "TO TAKE ALL FOLLOW UP MEASURES POSSIBLE IN SUPPORT OF SEIZURE AND FIRM OCCUPATION OF THE TULAGI AREA". IS RELEASE OF ARMY OCCUPATIONAL FORCES IN REAR POSITIONS OF SOUTH PACIFIC AREA FOR GARRISONS IN FORWARD POSITIONS? THIS IS IN REPLY TO YOUR 130414 REGARDING USE OF NEW ZEALAND TROOPS, AM OF THE OPINION THAT PROPOSAL WOULD REOPEN THE FIJI QUESTION. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TAKE UP AT THE PROPER TIME THE USE OF NEW ZEALAND TROOPS FOR GARRISON FORCES IN ADVANCED POSITIONS IF YOU BELIEVE YOU CAN HANDLE WITHOUT UPSETTING ARRANGEMENTS MADE. COMBAT UNITS PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED ARE BEING DISPATCHED FROM THE UNITED STATES AS FOLLOWS:- FOR FIJI, 20 JULY - 1 FA BATT, 1 CA BATT, 1 INF. REGT, LESS 1 BN; FOR NEW CALEDONIA, 20 JULY - 1 CAV REGT. LESS ANIMALS PLUS AIR CORPS FILLERS AND MINOR MISCELLANEOUS TROOPS EACH PLACE.

1%)
150137

FROM: CINCPAC
TO: COMINCH
INFO: COMSOPAC

COMSOPAC 130414 SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN CONNECTION MY 130211. REQUEST COMMENT WHETHER WORDS "FOLLOW UP MEASURES" INCLUDES PROVIDING TROOPS FROM U.S. TO GARRISON SANTA CRUZ-TULAGI-GUADALCANAL AREAS. I CONSIDER ANTI-AIRCRAFT RECOMMENDED MY 130211 IS MINIMUM ESSENTIAL FROM U.S. AND ADDITIONAL TWO REINFORCED REGIMENTS DESIRABLE. IN ANY EVENT DESIRE AUTHORIZE GHORMLEY, SUBJECT TO YOUR APPROVAL, TO LAY GROUND WORK NOW WITH NEW ZEALAND AUTHORITIES FOR SENDING THEIR FORCES NORTHWARD TO GARRISON BASES WHEN THREAT TO NEW ZEALAND IS LESSENERED.

150237

FROM: CINCPAC
TO: PACFLT

ESTABLISHES AMPHIBIOUS FORCE SOUTH PACIFIC EFFECTIVE 0000,
GCT, 16 JULY, 1942. COMPOSITION TRANSDIVS 8 AND 10, 1ST
MARINE DIVISION LESS 7TH, PLUS 2ND REGIMENT. REAR ADMIRAL
R. K. TURNER, U.S. NAVY COMMANDS. FOLLOWING UNITS TEMPORARILY
ASSIGNED DUTY WITH AMPHIBFORSOPAC - TRANSDIV 12, CRESCENT CITY,
PRESIDENT HAYES, PRESIDENT ADAMS, PRESIDENT JACKSON, KEILIN,
ALHENA, ALCHIBA, BETELGUESE, 1ST MARINE RAIDER BATTALION,
5TH MARINE DEFENSE BATTALION, 3RD MARINE BARRAGE BALLOON
SQUADRON.

160400

FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: CINCPAC

RECEIVED PICADOR PLAN IN TODAY'S MAIL. INTEND TO USE 7TH
MARINES ONLY IN CASE OF NECESSITY. THE UNCERTAINTY OF HOSTILE
REACTION TO PENDING OPERATIONS DICTATES THE WISDOM OF PRE-
PARING MOST AVAILABLE EFFECTIVE FORCE IN MY AREA FOR POSSIBLE
EMERGENCY USE. AS SOON AS SITUATION ALLOWS WILL RELEASE
ORDERS FROM STANDBY.

160612 FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: CINCPAC

AUGUST 7TH TENTATIVELY SET AS DOG DAY ON ACCOUNT OF THE DELAY IN ARRIVAL OF TRANSPORTS AT WELLINGTON AND DELAYS DUE TO WEATHER IN UNLOADING AND RELOADING. COMMENCE REHEARSALS OF EXERCISES IN FIJI AREA NOW SCHEDULED 27 JULY LOCAL.

161544 FROM: VICE OPNAV
TO: CINCPAC, COMSOPACFOR

JOINT LOGISTIC PLAN SOUTH PACIFIC AREA ASSIGNS RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT SOPAC BASES AS FOLLOWS: NAVY RESPONSIBILITY, ALL CLASSES FOR SAMOAN AREA. FOR OTHER BASES, CLASSES ONE, TWO AND FOUR WHICH ARE AVAILABLE THROUGH JOINT PURCHASING BOARD. ALL OIL, GAS, AND LUBE, AMMUNITION AND GENERAL SUPPLIES FOR NAVAL FORCES, ARMY RESPONSIBILITY, ALL CLASS ONE FOR BOTH SERVICES NOT OBTAINABLE THROUGH JOINT PURCHASING BOARD.

201755 FROM: COMSOPAC
TO: COMAIRSOPAC

IN PENDING CONFERENCE WITH FLETCHER, QUESTION OF BOMBING OF SHIPPING AND INSTALLATIONS OBJECTIVE AREA SHOULD BE DECIDED. YOUR 190646. SEE SOPAC OPERATION PLAN 1-42, PARA 3(b) AND PARA 3 XRAY 1 AND 3.

182118 FROM: COMINCH
TO: CINCPAC

REGARDING UNAVAILABILITY OF ARMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT - WAR DEPARTMENT STATES ANTI-AIRCRAFT REGIMENT AVAILABLE FOR TRANSFER TO SOUTH PACIFIC AREA CAN BE MOVED FROM DEFENSIVE POSITION ON WEST COAST AND DESPATCH EARLY IN AUGUST. ASKS WHAT ISLANDS IN SOUTH PACIFIC INTENDED TO TAKE ANTI-AIRCRAFT REGIMENTS FOR PENDING OPERATIONS. STATES WAR

222245
(Contd)

REQUESTS THAT HE BE GIVEN FULL AUTHORITY TO EMPLOY THE FORCES IN THIS AREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS JUDGMENT IN FURTHERANCE OF THE DIRECTIVES HE HAS RECEIVED.

281830

FROM: ~~COMINCH~~
TO: COMSOPAC

YOUR 170602 AND 201300, IT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT ATTACKS BE NOT DELAYED BEYOND AUGUST 7TH. THAT THIS DATE BE ANTICIPATED, IF POSSIBLE, IN ORDER THAT ENEMY MAY NOT BE GIVEN TIME TO PERFECT INSTALLATIONS NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN OBJECTIVE AREAS FOR USE AGAINST US.

DISPATCHES JULY

SECRET

CINCPAC
070231 July

FROM: ANY USN SHIP CINCPAC TO: COMSOPACFO

INFO: COMINCH,
COMSOWESTPACFOR

FOR USE OPERATION COMINCH THREE PART 022100
FOLLOWING CODE NAMES ASSIGNED. ENTIRE OPERATION
PESTILENCE. TULAGI OPERATION WATCHTOWER. TULAGI
TRAINING OPERATION DOVETAIL.. NDENI OPERATION
HUDDLE. TULAGI RINGBOLT. GUVUTU ACIDITY. FLORIDA
RUNABOUT. GUADALCANAL CACTUS. MALAITA ECSTASY.
OTHER NAMES WILL BE ASSIGNED AS REQUESTED BY YOU.
COMSOWESPAC HAS AUTHORITY ASSIGN NAMES HIS AREA.
FROM: COMSOPAC TO: COMSOWESTPAC INFO: CINCPAC
DO NOT INTEND EMPLOY YOUR SUBMARINES WITH THIS
FORCE FOR TASK ONE. YOUR ZERO NINE SEVENTEEN
SEVENTEEN. PASS TO CINC SOWESPAC AREA. REQUEST
YOU EMPLOY THEM IN FURTHERANCE INTERDICTION TASK
ASSIGNED YOU DURING TASK ONE.

COMSOPAC
100546

CINCPAC
101959

FROM: CINCPAC TO: COMGENHAWDEPT INFO: COMSOPAC,
DOCAIRSOPAC,
COMINCH
TRANSFER FROM HAWAII 26 B-17 WITH NECESSARY GROUND
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO FANTAN POPPY AREA..
ON ARRIVAL THAT AREA GROUP COMMANDER REPORT FOR DUTY.
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION 16 AT POPPY 10 AT FANTAN.
CINCPAC WILL PROVIDE NECESSARY SURFACE TRANSPORTATION.
DESIRE COMPLETE MOVE BY JULY 26.

COMINCH
102100

COMINCH TO: COMSOPAC INFO: CINCPAC, COMSOWESTPAC

COMINCH
102100 (cont)

SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF KK PART 1 OF 2 KK FULLY APPRECIATE THE DISADVANTAGE OF UNDERTAKING TASK 1 BEFORE ADEQUATE FORCES AND EQUIPMENT CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THE CONTINUANCE WITHOUT INTERRUPTIONS OF TASKS 2 AND 3. THIS REFERS TO YOUR 081012 PARA 2 THEY FEEL HOWEVER THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO STOP WITHOUT DELAY THE ENEMY'S SOUTHWARD ADVANCE THAT WOULD BE EFFECTED BY HIS FIRM ESTABLISHMENT AT TULAGI. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT ENEMY AIRFIELDS AT GUADALCANAL WILL SERIOUSLY HAMPER IF NOT PREVENT OUR ESTABLISHMENTS SANTA CRUZ AND ESPIRITU SANTO. WITH THESE AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN MIND THEY DO NOT DESIRE TO COUNTERMAND OPERATIONS ALREADY UNDERWAY FOR THE EXECUTION OF TASK 1 PARA 3 CINCPAC HAS ALREADY MADE PREPARATION TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SHIPBORNE AIRCRAFT AND ADDITIONAL SURFACE FORCES FOR TASK 1. ARMY HAS SET UP IN HAWAII AVAILABLE FOR SOUTH PACIFIC AREA 1 HEAVY BOMBARDMENT GROUP OF THIRTY FIVE PLANES. ARMY ALSO PLANS TO INCREASE RATE OF FLOW OF REPLACEMENT AIRCRAFT AND WILL TAKE ALL FOLLOWUP MEASURES POSSIBLE IN SUPPORT OF THE SEIZURE AND AFIRM OCCUPATION OF THE TULAGI AREA.

PARA 4 ADDRESSEES ARE DIRECTED TO ITEMIZE TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SPECIFIC ADDITIONAL FORCES NOT NOW PROSPECTIVELY AVAILABLE BUT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE EXECUTION OF TASK 1 PARA 5 WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT OTHER DEMANDS TO MEET THE WORLD SITUATION MAY

SECRET

COMINCH
102100 (cont)

PREVENT THE ASSEMBLY OF FORCES AND EQUIPMENT IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FOR IMMEDIATE EXECUTION IF TASK 2 AND 3 IT IS DESIRED THAT LOCAL EFFORTS IN PREPARATION FOR THESE TASKS BE VIGOROUSLY PUSHED COMMA INCLUDING DETAILED OPERATIONAL PLANNING PART 6 PARTICIPATION IN OPERATIONS BY BRITIAN EASTERN FLEET IN NORTHWEST AUSTRALIAN AREA HAS BEEN DEFINITELY POSTPONED. NIMITZ PASS TO EMMONS AND LEARY PASS TO MACARTHUR. COMSOPACFOR ADVISE IF YOU HOLD HIGHER CRYPTO SYSTEMS THAT THIS. CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY INFORMED.

COMSOPAC
112000

FROM: COMSOPAC TO:COMINCH INFO:CINCPAC,COMSOWESPAC
CONSIDERING PRESENT KNOWN DISPOSITION HOSTILE FORCES
1 CONSIDER MEANS NOW PROSPECTIVELY AVAILABLE SOPAC
SUFFICIENT FOR ACCOMPLISHMENT TASK ONE PROVIDED
SOWESPAC AREA BE FURNISHED SUFFICIENT MEANS FOR
INTERDICTION HOSTILE AIRCRAFT ACTIVITIES BASED ON
NEW BRITAIN DASH NEW GUINEA NORTHERN SOLOMONS AREA.
REFER COMSOWESPACFOR ZERO EIGHT TEN TWELVE WHICH
IN PART QUOTE THE AIR FORCES NOW IN SIGHT FOR THE
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREAS IS NOT ADEQUATE TO INTERDICT
HOSTILE AIR OR NAVAL OPERATIONS AGAINST TULAGI AREA
UNQUOTE. IN THIS CONNECTION I WISH TO EMPHAZIZE
THAT THE BASIC PROBLEM OF THIS OPERATION IS THE
PROTECTION OF SURFACE SHIPS AGAINST LAND BASED
AIRCRAFT DURING THE APPROACH THE LANDING ATTACK AND

SECRET

COMSOPAC
112000 (cont)

THE UNLOADING. BY COPY THIS DISPATCH MCARTHUR IS REQUESTED TO ANSWER THAT PART OF YOUR INQUIRY RELATIVE TO THE ADDITIONAL MEANS NECESSARY TO EFFECT THE REQUIRED INTERDICTION.

COMSOPAC
170602

FROM: COMSOPAC TO: CTF 11, 16, 18, 44:
COMSOPACAMPHIBFOR
COMAIRSOPAC

FINFO: CINCPAC, COMSOWESPACFOR, COMINCH
SOPAC OPERATION PLAN 1-42 BEING DISTRIBUTED,
BRIEFED AS FOLLOWS: TASK ORGANIZATION. AFIRM.
TASK FORCE 61 "EXPEDITIONARY FORCE" VICE ADMIRAL
FLETCHER COMPOSED OF COMBINED TASK FORCES 11,
16, 18, 44 AND 61 "AMPHIBFORSOPAC". BAKER.
TASK FORCE 63 REAR ADMIRAL MC GAIN COMPOSED OF
LAND BASED AIRCRAFT AND PATROL PLANES OF SOPAC
AREA. PARAGRAPH 1. CINC SOWESPAC AREA WILL
INTERDICT WESTWARD OF OPERATING AREA. AIR SCOUT-
ING BY SOWESPAC AS ARRANGED WITH COMTASKFOR 63.
OWN SUBMARINES IN VICINITY RABUL AND TRUK. PART
2 OF MY 130605. UTMOST SECRET. PARAGRAPH 2.
THIS FORCE WILL SEIZE OCCUPY DEFEND SUCCESSIVELY
TULAGI AREA AND SANTA CRUZ. OPERATION IN THREE
PHASES: PHASE 1. REHEARSAL OF TULAGI ATTACK IN
FIJI AREA BEGINNING ABOUT 27 JULY. PHASE TWO.
SEIZURE TULAGI AREA ON DOG DAY. PHASE THREE
SEIZURE NDENI REPEAT NDENI... PARAGRAPH THREE.
AFIRM. TASK FORCE SIXTY ONE. PHASE ONE. CONDUCT
REHEARSALS. PHASE TWO. CAPTURE OCCUPY TULAGI AREA

SECRET

COMSOPAC
170602 (cont)

AND ADJOINING PORTION GUADALCANAL. CONSTRUCT LANDING FIELD. DEFEND UNTIL RELIEVED. PHASE 3 OCCUPY AND DEFEND NDENI. CONSTRUCT LANDING FIELD.. PARAGRAPH 3 BAKER. TASK FORCE 63 PHASE 1 CONTINUE SCOUTING. PHASE 2 COVER APPROACH TO AND OPERATIONS IN TULAGI AREA BY SCOUTING. EXECUTE AIR ATTACKS. RENDER AIRCRAFT SUPPORT ON CALL. INITIATE PATROL PLANE SCOUTING FROM NDENI BY DOG MINUS 2 DAY AND FROM MALAITA ON DOG DAY. COMTASKFOR 63 ARRANGE WITH SUPREME COMMANDER SOWESPAC AREA RELATIVE COORDINATION AIRCRAFT SCOUTING.. PARAGRAPH 3 X-RAY CONFERENCE WILL BE ARRANGED BY SOPAC BETWEEN INTERESTED COMMANDERS THIS FORCE ON COORDINATION AIR ACTIVITIES. DOG DAY TENTATIVELY AUGUST 7 WILL BE PROMULGATED BY DESPATCH. BOMBING BY OUR UNITS OF ALL SUBMARINES INTERDICTED WEST OF LONGITUDE 155 EAST.. PARAGRAPH 4. LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS PROMULGATED IN WRITTEN PLAN.. PARAGRAPH FIVE USE ZONE O TIME. MAINTAIN RADIO SILENCE DURING PHASE 1. COMMUNICATIONS ACCORDING TO PAC 70. COMSO PAC INITIALLY AT FULCRUM MOVES TO ARGONNE AT WHITE POPPY ABOUT DOG MINUS 5 DAY. LEARY PASS TO MAC ARTHUR.

COMAIRSOPAC
190646

FROM: COMAIRSOPAC TO: COMSOPAC
IN VIEW NECESSITY HAVING TENDER AT ADVANCED
BASE DAY BEGINNING VICTORY PREP OPERATIONS

SECRET

COMAIRSOPAC
190646

RECOMMEND PARA 3 BAKER YOUR 170615 BE MODIFIED TO DELAY ONE DAY EACH SUCH OPERATIONS FROM MALAITA AND NDENI. CHART STUDY INDICATES DURING THAT STAGE ADEQUATE COVERAGE TO NORTHWARD CAN BE AFFORDED FROM BUTTON ON DOG MINUS TWO AND BUTTON AND NDENI ON DOG MINUS ONE AND DOG DAYS. ADVISE THAT ABOUT 6 VICTOR PREPS APPEAR TOTAL PRACTICABLE TO OPERATE FROM NDENI. NUMBER FEASIBLE FROM MALAITA DEPENDS ON RESULTS RECONNAISSANCE MARMASIKE ESTUARY WHICH APPEARS ONLY PRACTICABLE ADVANCED BASE THAT ISLAND. IS BOMBING OF SHIPPING AND INSTALLATIONS TULAGI AREA PRIOR TO AND DURING PHASE 1 PERMITTED PROVIDED SUITABLE PLANES BECOME AVAILABLE. COMAIRSOPAC SENDS TO COMSOPAC.

~~XXXXXXXX~~
COMSOWESPAC
191034

FROM: COMWESTPAC TO: COMSOPAC

THE FOLLOWING PLAN OF AIR OPERATION WILL BE EXECUTED IN SUPPORT TASK 1 MACARTHUR TO GHORMLEY. PRIOR TO DOG MINUS FIVE EXISTING FORTY EIGHT HOUR AERIAL SURVEILLANCE WILL CONTINUE OVER AREA PORT MORESBY-LORENGAU-KAVIENG-BUKA-ONGTONG JAVA-TULAGI-SAMURA!. THEREAFTER ALL AIRCRAFT OPERATION OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA WILL BE PROHIBITED EASTWARD OF ONE HUNDRED FIFTY EIGHT DEGREES FIFTEEN MINUTES EAST (158°15' E) LONGITUDE BETWEEN THE EQUATOR AND FIFTEEN DEGS SOUTH (15° S) LATITUDE UNLESS MISSIONS ARE REQUESTED BY YOU. STARTING DOG MINUS FIVE FOLLOWING SUPPORT WILL BE GIVEN

SECRET

COMWESTPAC
191034 (cont)

COLON DOG MINUS FIVE TO DOG PLUS FOUR DAIL REC-
ONNAISSANCES AREA PORT MORESEY-MADANG-KAVIENG-
ONGTONG JAVA-POINT PRASLIN "NORTH WEST OF ISABEL
ISLAND" - EASTERMOST POINT NEW GEORGIA ISLAND -
TAGULA ISLAND GMA AVIATION WILL BE PREPARED TO
STRIKE HOSTILE NAVAL TARGETS DISCOVERED IN THIS
AREA WITHIN FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY MILES RANGE PORT
MORESBY DURING SAME PERIOD; MORNING DOG DAY TO DOG
PLUS FOUR DAYS INTERDICT HOSTILE AIR OPERATIONS IN
AREA RABUL-KAVIENG AND DENY HOSTILE REFUELING
OPERATIONS FROM BUKA ISLAND IF USED; DOG TO DOG PLUS
FOUR DAYS SHORTER RANGE AVIATION TO ATTACK LAE AND
SALAMUA PERIODICALLY TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT TO
RABUL FROM THAT AREA. WILL ADVISE IF CURRENT
DEVELOPMENT MILNE BAY PERMITS OF EXTENDED RANGE OF
BOMBER OPERATIONS. ALL AVAILABLE AVIATION IN THIS
AREA SUBJECT TO ACTUAL LIMITATIONS OF RANGE WILL
OPERATE IN YOUR SUPPORT ON REQUEST TO CINC SWPA.
YOUR COMMENT OR CONCURRENCE REQUESTED. NAVAL SUPPORT
WILL BE GIVEN AS PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED. SUGGEST YOU
SEND COURIER TO MY HEADQUARTERS BRISBANE WITH DETAILED
PLAN OF OPERATIONS TO ARRIVE BY DOG MINUS FIVE.
FURTHER DETAILS RELATIVE COMMUNICATION PLAN WILL FOLLOW.

COMPHIBSOPAC
200130

FROM: COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC TO: CTF 11 INFO: CURTISS,
COMSOPAC,
COMAIRSOPAC

PLAN SORTIE EIGHT HOURS MIKE 22 JULY ARRIVE RENDE-
ZVOUS WITH TRANSDIV 12 CINGPAC GRID POSITION HYPO

COMAIRSOPAC
220737

REF: 210530 REQUEST FOR COMMENCE ON MACARTHUR'S
AIR OPERATIONS PLAN IN SUPPORT TASK ONE

SECRET

D -R- A- F -T

Pursuant to the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Contained in COMINCH 022100 a conference has been held between General Mac Arthur and Vice Admiral Ghormley with regard to the execution of the offensive operation as therein directed. The plan of the operation in broad outline is as indicated below. Many details of execution and the timing of the phases may be modified materially after conference with the Amphibious Force and Carrier Force Commanders who have not yet arrived.

Task One. Orthodox landing attack by the Amphibious Force in the Tulagi - Guadalcanal Area. The Southwest Pacific Force to support the operation by interdicting air and naval activities west of the operating area and by the participation of its naval elements.

Tasks Two and Three are based upon two major concepts:

a. The progressive movement forward of air echelons in order to provide sufficient fighter and bomber coverage for surface elements.

b. The isolation of Rabaul prior to its final assault. In execution of this concept Tasks Two and Three have been divided into five phases in which the timing may be modified to compensate for variations in the scheduled development of airfields and availability of shipping.

Phase one: The capture of Lae and Salamaua in

SECRET

CTR 11
210948

FROM: COMTASKFOR 11 TO: COMTASK 62
SENT BY COMTASK FOR ELEVEN TO COMTASKFOR SIX TWO.
YOUR 200130 PLAN IN GENERAL APPROVED EXCEPT USE
CARRIER AIRCRAFT NOT UNDERSTOOD WILL DECIDE POINT AT
CONFERENCE. REPLYING SUBPARAGRAPHS CAST ASTORIA QUINCY
VINCENNES HULL DEWEY ELLET WILSON. DOG SAN JUAN "REAR
ADMIRAL SCOTT" GRIDLEY BUCHANAN. GEORGE COMMANDER TASK
FORCE FORTY FOUR AUSTRALIA CHICAGO CANBERRA HOBART
DESRON FOUR.

ANSWER TO NAMES OF VESSELS ASSIGNED AND COMMANDERS
NOT IN THIS COMMAND. TASK ORGANIZATION PROPOSED.

COMA IRSOPAC
220737

CTR 63
FROM: COMAIRSOPAC TO: COMSOPAC
HANDLE AS MOST SECRET. BEGINNING DOG MINUS TWO DSY
(DAY) MY SEARCH SO DISPOSED AS TO ISOLATE CORAL SEA
EAST OF LONGITUDE ONE FIFTY EIGHT FROM ENEMY INTERFERENCE
WITHOUT DETECTION AND TO COVER TARGET AREA TO NORTHWARD
AS FAR AS RANGE OF AIRCRAFT PERMITS. THIS COVERAGE
INCREASING IN EXTENT AS SCOUTS MOVE TO SUCCESSIVE
ADVANCED BASES. SUGGEST SOWWESPAC AIRCRAFT BEGINNING
THAT DAY COVER APPROACHES TO CORAL SEA AND TARGET AREA
BY SEARCH WEST OF LONGITUDE ONE FIFTY EIGHT TO MAXIMUM
EXTENT NUMBER AND RANGE OF AVAILABLE SCOUTS PERMIT.
FOR INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS MY SCOUTED AREA OVERLAPS
AN AVERAGE OF ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY MILES WEST OF THAT
LONGITUDE. SUGGEST (SUGGEST) SUBJECT FOREGOING CONCUR
IN PLAN OUTLINED IN YOUR TWENTY ONE ZERO FIVE THIRTY.
COPIES OF MY OPPLAN AS PERFECTED AFTER OUR CONFERENCE
WILL BE FORWARDED COMSOWWESPAC. COMAIRSOPAC SENDS

SECRET

COMPHIBSOPAC
200135(cont)

DIRECTION OF AIR SUPPORT GROUP AND ONE SIMILAR GROUP BE SENT FLAGSHIP SCREEN TO DIRECT FIGHTER COVER PARA CONSIDER MOST DESIREABLE ALL VESSELS OF ATTACK FORCE BE UNIT SAIL SHIPS PARA COMSOPAC HAS DIRECTED STRICT RADIO SILENCE BE PRESERVED DURING REHEARSALS PARA AS SOON AS YOU CAN ANSWER BY RADIO REQUEST DECISION ON FOREGOING COMMA NAMES OF VESSELS ASSIGNED AND NAMES OF GROUP COMMANDERS NOT IN THIS COMMAND.

COMSOPAC
201300

FROM: COMSOPAC TO: CTF 11, CTF 16, CTF 18, CTF 44,
COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC.

INFO: COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPACFOR.

HANDLES AS MOST SECRET. COMSOPAC SENDS ACTION TO COMTASK FORCES 11 16 18 44 COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC COMAIRSOPAC AND FOR INFORMATION TO COMINCH CINCPAC AND COMWESPACFOR. NONE EXCEPT ACTION AND INFORMATION ADDRESSEES DECODE BEYOND HERE. MODIFY COMSOPAC. OPERATION PLAN 1-42 PARA 3 BAKER PHASE 2 TO READ AS FOLLOWS "COVER THE APPROACH TO, AND THE OPERATIONS WITHIN, THE TULAGI-GUADALCANAL AREA BY SEARCH. EXECUTE AIR ATTACKS ON ENEMY OBJECTIVES AS ARRANGED WITH COMMANDER EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. RENDER AIRCRAFT SUPPORT ON CALL. INITIATE PATROL PLANE SCOUTING FROM NDENI ABOUT DOG MINUS ONE DAY AND FROM EAST COAST MALAITA ABOUT DOG PLUS ONE DAY". MAKES CORRESPONDING CHANGE IN COMSOPAC ONE SEVEN SIX ZERO TWO(17602). LEARY PASS TO MACARTHUR.

SECRET

COMPHIESOPAC
200130 (cont)

TWO ZERO FIVE SEVEN (2057) TIME FOURTEEN HOURS
MIKE 26 JULY PARA RECOMMEND TASK FORCE 11 AND
18 AND TRANSDIVE 2 RENDEZVOUS THIS FORCE SAME
PLACE AND TIME IN ORDER PERMIT CONFERENCES AND
DISTRIBUTION PLANS FOR REHEARSALS PROPOSED TO
BEGIN TWENTY EIGHT JULY NORTH AND WEST COASTS
KORO ISLAND.

COMPHIESOPAC
200135

FROM: COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC TO:CTF 11 INFO:
COMAIRSOPAC
COMSOPAC

FOLLOWING TASK ORGANIZATION PROPOSED FOR ATTACK
FORCE AFIRM TRANSPORT GROUP XRAY TEN AFIRM PREP
SIX AFIRM BALOR TRANSPORT GROUP YOKE THREE AFIRM
PREP FOUR AFIRM PREP DOG CAST FIVE SUPPORT GROUP
FIVE THREE CAST AFIRM FOUR DOG DOG SIX VICTORY
OPTION SAIL SEAPLANES DOG ONE SAN JUAN TWO DOG
EASY MINE SWEEPER GROUP FIVE DOG MIKE SAIL FOX
AIR SUPPORT GROUP VICTOR FOX THREE VICTORY SAIL
BAKER SQUADRONS WITH ONE ADDITIONAL SQUADRON EACH
TYPE FIRST TWO HOURS OF DOG DAY GEORGE SCREENING
GROUP THREE CAST AFIRM DOG DOG TWO VICTOR FOX
SQUADRONS EIGHT VICTOR OPTION SAIL SEAPLANES
HYPO LANDING FORCE TROOPS PLUS TEN VICTOR OPTION
SAIL SEAPLANES PARA IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD APP-
ROXIMATELY HALF OF AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE
IN TRANSPORT AREA CONTINUOUSLY DURING DAYLIGHT
PARA RECOMMEND ONE AIRCRAFT CONTROL GROUP FROM
CARRIERS BE TRANSFERRED TO MCCAWLEY FOR VOICE

SECRET

COMAIRSOPAC
220737 (cont)

New Guinea and the airfield at Gasmata on New Britain. Prior to the initiation of this phase it is necessary to continue development in the Port Moresby area and to provide airfields at Milne Bay at the Southeastern tip of New Guinea and at Buna on the north east of New Guinea northeast of Port Moresby in order to provide fighter coverage for the surface vessels carrying the attacking forces to Lae.

Phase Two: The occupation of Cape Gloucester and Talasca on New Britain and of Madang on New Guinea, airdromes at those points to be put in operation with the last practicable delay.

Phase Three: The capture of Lorengau on the west end of Buka Island in the Solomons.

Phase Four: The capture of Kavieng.

Phase Five: The capture of Rabaul.

Adequate ground troops are available for the operation although but one division is trained and equipped for landing attack and it is probable that losses normal to this type of operation will prevent its employment throughout. Adequate shipping is lacking for the transport of the infantry divisions. Task One as now laid down requires the presence of AP's, AK's and supporting ships in the Tulagi area from thirty-six hours to four days, where they will be outside the range of any supporting air base and exposed to continued hostile air, surface and sub-

DISPATCHES JULY

SECRET

CINCPAC
070231 July

FROM: ANY USN SHIP CINCPAC TO: COMSOPACFO

INFO: COMINCH,
COMSOWESTPACFOR

FOR USE OPERATION COMINCH THREE PART 022100
FOLLOWING CODE NAMES ASSIGNED. ENTIRE OPERATION
PESTILENCE. TULAGI OPERATION WATCHTOWER. TULAGI
TRAINING OPERATION DOVETAIL.. NDENI OPERATION
HUDDLE. TULAGI RINGBOLT. GUVUTU ACIDITY. FLORIDA
RUNABOUT. GUADALCANAL CACTUS. MALAITA ECSTASY.
OTHER NAMES WILL BE ASSIGNED AS REQUESTED BY YOU.
COMSOWESPAC HAS AUTHORITY ASSIGN NAMES HIS AREA.
FROM: COMSOPAC TO: COMSOWESTPAC INFO: CINCPAC
DO NOT INTEND EMPLOY YOUR SUBMARINES WITH THIS
FORCE FOR TASK ONE. YOUR ZERO NINE SEVENTEEN
SEVENTEEN. PASS TO CINC SOWESPAC AREA. REQUEST
YOU EMPLOY THEM IN FURTHERANCE INTERDICTION TASK
ASSIGNED YOU DURING TASK ONE.

COMSOPAC
100546

CINCPAC
101959

FROM: CINCPAC TO: COMGENHAWDEPT INFO: COMSOPAC,
DOCA IRSOPAC,
COMINCH

TRANSFER FROM HAWAII 26 B-17 WITH NECESSARY GROUND
PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TO FANTAN POPPY AREA..
ON ARRIVAL THAT AREA GROUP COMMANDER REPORT FOR DUTY.
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION 16 AT POPPY 10 AT FANTAN.
CINCPAC WILL PROVIDE NECESSARY SURFACE TRANSPORTATION.
DESIRE COMPLETE MOVE BY JULY 26.

COMINCH
102100

COMINCH TO: COMSOPAC INFO: CINCPAC, COMSOWESTPAC

COMINCH
102100 (cont)

SECRET

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PARA 4 ADDRESSEES ARE DIRECTED TO ITEMIZE TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SPECIFIC ADDITIONAL FORCES NOT NOW PROSPECTIVELY AVAILBLE BUT ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO THE EXECUTION OF TASK 1 PARA 5 WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT OTHER DEMANDS TO MEET THE WORLD SITUATION MAY

SECRET

COMINCH
102100 (cont)

PREVENT THE ASSEMBLY OF FORCES AND EQUIPMENT IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC FOR IMMEDIATE EXECUTION IF TASK 2 AND 3 IT IS DESIRED THAT LOCAL EFFORTS IN PREPARATION FOR THESE TASKS BE VIGOROUSLY PUSHED COMMA INCLUDING DETAILED OPERATIONAL PLANNING PART 6 PARTICIPATION IN OPERATIONS BY BRITIAN EASTERN FLEET IN NORTHWEST AUSTRALIAN AREA HAS BEEN DEFINITELY POSTPONED. NIMITZ PASS TO EMMONS AND LEARY PASS TO MACARTHUR. COMSOPACFOR ADVISE IF YOU HOLD HIGHER CRYPTO SYSTEMS THAT THIS. CHIEF OF STAFF ARMY INFORMED.

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SECRET

COMSOPAC
112000 (cont)

THE UNLOADING. BY COPY THIS DISPATCH MCARTHUR IS REQUESTED TO ANSWER THAT PART OF YOUR INQUIRY RELATIVE TO THE ADDITIONAL MEANS NECESSARY TO EFFECT THE REQUIRED INTERDICTION.

COMSOPAC
170602

FROM: COMSOPAC TO: CTF 11, 16, 18, 44:
COMSOPACAMPHIBFOR
COMA IRSOPAC

FINFO: CINCPAC, COMSOWESPACFOR, COMINCH
SOPAC OPERATION PLAN 1-42 BEING DISTRIBUTED,
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TASK FORCE 61 "EXPEDITIONARY FORCE" VICE ADMIRAL
FLETCHER COMPOSED OF COMBINED TASK FORCES 11,
16, 18, 44 AND 61 "AMPHIBFORSOPAC". BAKER.
TASK FORCE 63 REAR ADMIRAL MC GAIN COMPOSED OF
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AREA. PARAGRAPH 1. CINC SOWESPAC AREA WILL
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SEIZURE TULAGI AREA ON DOG DAY. PHASE THREE
SEIZURE NDENI REPEAT NDENI... PARAGRAPH THREE.
AFIRM. TASK FORCE SIXTY ONE. PHASE ONE. CONDUCT
REHEARSALS. PHASE TWO. CAPTURE OCCUPY TULAGI AREA

SECRET

COMSOPAC
170602 (cont)

AND ADJOINING PORTION GUADALCANAL. CONSTRUCT
LANDING FIELD. DEFEND UNTIL RELIEVED. PHASE
3 OCCUPY AND DEFEND NDENI. CONSTRUCT LANDING
FIELD.. PARAGRAPH 3 HAKER. TASK FORCE 63 PHASE
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155 EAST.. PARAGRAPH 4. LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS PRO-
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COMMUNICATIONS ACCORDING TO PAC 70. COMSO PAC
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POPPY ABOUT DOG MINUS 5 DAY. LEARY PASS TO
MAC ARTHUR.

COMAIRSOPAC
190646

FROM: COMAIRSOPAC TO: COMSOPAC

IN VIEW NECESSITY HAVING TENDER AT ADVANCED
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SECRET

COMAIRSOPAC
190646

RECOMMEND PARA 3 BAKER YOUR 170615 BE MODIFIED TO DELAY ONE DAY EACH SUCH OPERATIONS FROM MALAITA AND NDENI. CHART STUDY INDICATES DURING THAT STAGE ADEQUATE COVERAGE TO NORTHWARD CAN BE AFFORDED FROM BUTON ON DOG MINUS TWO AND BUTON AND NDENI ON DOG MINUS ONE AND DOG DAYS. ADVISE THAT ABOUT 6 VICTOR PREPS APPEAR TOTAL PRACTICABLE TO OPERATE FROM NDENI. NUMBER FEASIBLE FROM MALAITA DEPENDS ON RESULTS RECONNAISSANCE MARMASIKE ESTUARY WHICH APPEARS ONLY PRACTICABLE ADVANCED BASE THAT ISLAND. IS BOMBING OF SHIPPING AND INSTALLATIONS TULAGI AREA PRIOR TO AND DURING PHASE 1 PERMITTED PROVIDED SUITABLE PLANES BECOME AVAILABLE. COMAIRSOPAC SENDS TO COMSOPAC.

~~XXXXXXXX~~
COMSOWESPAC
191034

FROM: COMWESTPAC TO: COMSOPAC

THE FOLLOWING PLAN OF AIR OPERATION WILL BE EXECUTED IN SUPPORT TASK 1 MACARHUR TO GHORMLEY. PRIOR TO DOG MINUS FIVE EXISTING FORTY EIGHT HOUR AERIAL SURVEILLANCE WILL CONTINUE OVER AREA PORT MORESBY-LORENGAU-KAVIENG-BUKA-ONGTONG JAVA-TULAGI-SAMURA!. THEREAFTER ALL AIRCRAFT OPERATION OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA WILL BE PROHIBITED EASTWARD OF ONE HUNDRED FIFTY EIGHT DEGREES FIFTEEN MINUTES EAST (158°15' E) LONGITUDE BETWEEN THE EQUATOR AND FIFTEEN DEGS SOUTH (15° S) LATITUDE UNLESS MISSIONS ARE REQUESTED BY YOU. STARTING DOG MINUS FIVE FOLLOWING SUPPORT WILL BE GIVEN

SECRET

COMWESTPAC
191034 (cont)

COLON DOG MINUS FIVE TO DOG PLUS FOUR DAILY RECONNAISSANCES AREA PORT MORESBY-MADANG-KAVIENG-ONGTONG JAVA-POINT PRASLIN "NORTH WEST OF ISABEL ISLAND" - EASTERMOST POINT NEW GEORGIA ISLAND - TAGULA ISLAND CMA AVIATION WILL BE PREPARED TO STRIKE HOSTILE NAVAL TARGETS DISCOVERED IN THIS AREA WITHIN FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY MILES RANGE PORT MORESBY DURING SAME PERIOD; MORNING DOG DAY TO DOG PLUS FOUR DAYS INTERDICT HOSTILE AIR OPERATIONS IN AREA RABAU-KAVIENG AND DENY HOSTILE REFUELING OPERATIONS FROM BUKA ISLAND IF USED; DOG TO DOG PLUS FOUR DAYS SHORTER RANGE AVIATION TO ATTACK LAE AND SALAMUA PERIODICALLY TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT TO RABAU FROM THAT AREA. WILL ADVISE IF CURRENT DEVELOPMENT MILNE BAY PERMITS OF EXTENDED RANGE OF BOMBER OPERATIONS. ALL AVAILABLE AVIATION IN THIS AREA SUBJECT TO ACTUAL LIMITATIONS OF RANGE WILL OPERATE IN YOUR SUPPORT ON REQUEST TO CINC SWPA. YOUR COMMENT OR CONCURRENCE REQUESTED. NAVAL SUPPORT WILL BE GIVEN AS PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED. SUGGEST YOU SEND COURIER TO MY HEADQUARTERS BRISBANE WITH DETAILED PLAN OF OPERATIONS TO ARRIVE BY DOG MINUS FIVE. FURTHER DETAILS RELATIVE COMMUNICATION PLAN WILL FOLLOW.

COMPHIBSOPAC
200130

FROM: COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC TO: CTF 11 INFO: CURTISS,
COMSOPAC,
COMAIRSOPAC

PLAN SORTIE EIGHT HOURS MIKE 22 JULY ARRIVE RENDE-
ZVOUS WITH TRANSDIV 12 CINCPAC GRID POSITION HYPO

SECRET

COMAIRSOPAC
220737

REF: 210530 REQUEST FOR COMMENCE ON MACARTHUR'S
AIR OPERATIONS PLAN IN SUPPORT TASK ONE

D -R- A- F -T

Pursuant to the directive of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Contained in COMINCH 022100 a conference has been held between General Mac Arthur and Vice Admiral Ghormley with regard to the execution of the offensive operation as therein directed. The plan of the operation in broad outline is as indicated below. Many details of execution and the timing of the phases may be modified materially after conference with the Amphibious Force and Carrier Force Commanders who have not yet arrived.

Task One. Orthodox landing attack by the Amphibious Force in the Tulagi - Guadalcanal Area. The Southwest Pacific Force to support the operation by interdicting air and naval activities west of the operating area and by the participation of its naval elements.

Tasks Two and Three are based upon two major concepts:

a. The progressive movement forward of air echelons in order to provide sufficient fighter and bomber coverage for surface elements.

b. The isolation of Rabaul prior to its final assault. In execution of this concept Tasks Two and Three have been divided into five phases in which the timing may be modified to compensate for variations in the scheduled development of airfields and availability of shipping.

Phase one: The capture of Lae and Salamaua in

SECRET

CTR 11
210948

FROM: COMTASKFOR 11 TO: COMTASK 62
SENT BY COMTASK FOR ELEVEN TO COMTASKFOR SIX TWO.
YOUR 200130 PLAN IN GENERAL APPROVED EXCEPT USE
CARRIER AIRCRAFT NOT UNDERSTOOD WILL DECIDE POINT AT
CONFERENCE. REPLYING SUBPARAGRAPHS CAST ASTORIA QUINCY
VINCENNES HULL DEWEY ELLET WILSON. DOG SAN JUAN "REAR
ADMIRAL SCOTT" GRIDLEY BUCHANAN. GEORGE COMMANDER TASK
FORCE FORTY FOUR AUSTRALIA CHICAGO CANBERRA HOBART
DESRON FOUR.

ANSWER TO NAMES OF VESSELS ASSIGNED AND COMMANDERS
NOT IN THIS COMMAND. TASK ORGANIZATION PROPOSED.

COMA IRSOPAC
220737

CTR 63
FROM: COMAIRSOPAC TO: COMSOPAC
HANDLE AS MOST SECRET. BEGINNING DOG MINUS TWO DSY
(DAY) MY SEARCH SO DISPOSED AS TO ISOLATE CORAL SEA
EAST OF LONGITUDE ONE FIFTY EIGHT FROM ENEMY INTERFERENCE
WITHOUT DETECTION AND TO COVER TARGET AREA TO NORTHWARD
AS FAR AS RANGE OF AIRCRAFT PERMITS. THIS COVERAGE
INCREASING IN EXTENT AS SCOUTS MOVE TO SUCCESSIVE
ADVANCED PHASES. SUGGEST SOWWESPAC AIRCRAFT BEGINNING
THAT DAY COVER APPROACHES TO CORAL SEA AND TARGET AREA
BY SEARCH WEST OF LONGITUDE ONE FIFTY EIGHT TO MAXIMUM
EXTENT NUMBER AND RANGE OF AVAILABLE SCOUTS PERMIT.
FOR INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS MY SCOUTED AREA OVERLAPS
AN AVERAGE OF ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY MILES WEST OF THAT
LONGITUDE. SUGGEST (SUGGEST) SUBJECT FOREGOING CONCUR
IN PLAN OUTLINED IN YOUR TWENTY ONE ZERO FIVE THIRTY.
COPIES OF MY OPPLAN AS PERFECTED AFTER OUR CONFERENCE
WILL BE FORWARDED COMSOWWESPAC. COMAIRSOPAC SENDS

SECRET

COMPHIBSOPAC
200135(cont)

DIRECTION OF AIR SUPPORT GROUP AND ONE SIMILIAR
GROUP BE SENT FLAGSHIP SCREEN TO DIRECT FIGHTER
COVER PARA CONSIDER MOST DESIREABLE ALL VESSELS
OF ATTACK FORCE BE UNIT SAIL SHIPS PARA COMSOPAC
HAS DIRECTED STRICT RADIO SILENCE BE PRESERVED
DURING REHEARSALS PARA AS SOON AS YOU CAN ANSWER
BY RADIO REQUEST DECISION ON FOREGOING COMMA NAMES
OF VESSELS ASSIGNED AND NAMES OF GROUP COMMANDERS
NOT IN THIS COMMAND.

COMSOPAC
201300

FROM: COMSOPAC TO: CTF 11, CTF 16, CTF 18, CTF 44,
COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC, COMAIRSOPAC.

INFO: COMINCH, CINCPAC, COMSOWESPACFOR.

HANDLES AS MOST SECRET. COMSOPAC SENDS ACTION TO
COMTASK FORCES 11 16 18 44 COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC COMAIR-
SOPAC AND FOR INFORMATION TO COMINCH CINCPAC AND
COMWESPACFOR. NONE EXCEPT ACTION AND INFORMATION
ADDRESSEES DECODE BEYOND HERE. MODIFY COMSOPAC.
OPERATION PLAN 1-42 PARA 3 BAKER PHASE 2 TO READ
AS FOLLOWS "COVER THE APPROACH TO, AND THE OPERATIONS
WITHIN, THE TULAGI-GUADALCANAL AREA BY SEARCH. EXECUTE
AIR ATTACKS ON ENEMY OBJECTIVES AS ARRANGED WITH
COMMANDER EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. RENDER AIRCRAFT
SUPPORT ON CALL. INITIATE PATROL PLANE SCOUTING
FROM NDENI ABOUT DOG MINUS ONE DAY AND FROM EAST
COAST MALAITA ABOUT DOG PLUS ONE DAY". MAKES
CORRESPONDING CHANGE IN COMSOPAC ONE SEVEN SIX ZERO
TWO(17602). LEARY PASS TO MACARTHUR.

SECRET

COMPHIESOPAC
200130 (cont)

TWO ZERO FIVE SEVEN (2057) TIME FOURTEEN HOURS
MIKE 26 JULY PARA RECOMMEND TASK FORCE 11 AND
18 AND TRANSDIVE 2 RENDEZVOUS THIS FORCE SAME
PLACE AND TIME IN ORDER PERMIT CONFERENCES AND
DISTRIBUTION PLANS FOR REHEARSALS PROPOSED TO
BEGIN TWENTY EIGHT JULY NORTH AND WEST COASTS
KORO ISLAND.

COMPHIESOPAC
200135

FROM: COMAMPHIBFORSOPAC TO: CTF 11 INFO:
COMAIRSOPAC
COMSOPAC

FOLLOWING TASK ORGANIZATION PROPOSED FOR ATTACK
FORCE AFIRM TRANSPORT GROUP XRAY TEN AFIRM PREP
SIX AFIRM BALOR TRANSPORT GROUP YOKE THREE AFIRM
PREP FOUR AFIRM PREP DOG CAST FIVE SUPPORT GROUP
FIVE THREE CAST AFIRM FOUR DOG DOG SIX VICTORY
OPTION SAIL SEAPLANES DOG ONE SAN JUAN TWO DOG
EASY MINE SWEEPER GROUP FIVE DOG MIKE SAIL FOX
AIR SUPPORT GROUP VICTOR FOX THREE VICTORY SAIL
BAKER SQUADRONS WITH ONE ADDITIONAL SQUADRON EACH
TYPE FIRST TWO HOURS OF DOG DAY GEORGE SCREENING
GROUP THREE CAST AFIRM DOG DOG TWO VICTOR FOX
SQUADRONS EIGHT VICTOR OPTION SAIL SEAPLANES
HYPO LANDING FORCE TROOPS PLUS TEN VICTOR OPTION
SAIL SEAPLANES PARA IT WOULD BE UNDERSTOOD APP-
ROXIMATELY HALF OF AVAILABLE AIRCRAFT WOULD BE
IN TRANSPORT AREA CONTINUOUSLY DURING DAYLIGHT
PARA RECOMMEND ONE AIRCRAFT CONTROL GROUP FROM
CARRIERS BE TRANSFERRED TO MCCAWLEY FOR VOICE

SECRET

COMAIRSOPAC
220737 (cont)

New Guinea and the airfield at Gasmata on New Britain. Prior to the initiation of this phase it is necessary to continue development in the Port Moresby area and to provide airfields at Milne Bay at the Southeastern tip of New Guinea and at Buna on the north east of New Guinea northeast of Port Moresby in order to provide fighter coverage for the surface vessels carrying the attacking forces to Lae.

Phase Two: The occupation of Cape Gloucester and Talasca on New Britain and of Madang on New Guinea, airdromes at those points to be put in operation with the last practicable delay.

Phase Three: The capture of Lorengau on the west and of Buka Island in the Solomons.

Phase Four: The capture of Kavieng.

Phase Five: The capture of Rabaul.

Adequate ground troops are available for the operation although but one division is trained and equipped for landing attack and it is probable that losses normal to this type of operation will prevent its employment throughout. Adequate shipping is lacking for the transport of the infantry divisions. Task One as now laid down requires the presence of AP's, AK's and supporting ships in the Tulagi area from thirty-six hours to four days, where they will be outside the range of any supporting air base and exposed to continued hostile air, surface and sub-

SECRET

COMAIRSOPAC
220737 (cont)

marine attacks. The Air Force now in sight for the Southwest Pacific Area is not adequate in interdict hostile air or naval operations against the Tulagi area. The carrier task groups will be themselves exposed to attack by land-based air while unprotected by our land-based aviation and it is extremely doubtful that they will be able to render any fighter support to the transport area, especially should hostile naval forces approach. Surprise is now improbable due to the depth of the existing hostile reconnaissance. The successful execution of the phases of Tasks Two and Three will depend upon our ability to maintain air superiority. This is doubtful at the present time due to the numbers of reserve fighter planes available and to the fact that the fighters are now operating under a distinct handicap because of their limitations as to altitude and range. It is anticipated that this condition will be progressively ameliorated as regards altitude as replacements arrive with equipment permitting of efficient operation at 20,000 to 25,000 feet.

During the last three weeks there has been a marked change in the enemy situation in the objective area which had been indicated in the operations reports submitted to the War Department. The enemy has been and is making a major effort in the development of airfields at Kavieng, Rabaul, Lae, Salamaua, Buka

SECRET

COMA IRSOPAC
220737 (cont)

and Guadalcanal which will greatly facilitate the operation of his air elements throughout the area. It appears at the present time he is installing the heavy equipment for an air base on Guadalcanal, recent reconnaissance having shown four cruisers, six to eight destroyers, four transports, eight motor-torpedo boats and numerous landing barges. Five landing jetties have been constructed and ground installations have been initiated. Anti-aircraft fire was encountered there by reconnaissance planes for the first time on July seventh.

It is the opinion of the two Commanders, that the initiation of this operation at this time without a reasonable assurance of adequate air coverage during each phase would be attended with the greatest risk as has been thoroughly demonstrated by the Japanese reverses in the Coral Sea and at Midway. The operation, once initiated, should be pushed through rapidly to its final conclusion, because a partial attack leaving Rabaul in the hands of the enemy enabling him to support by land-based aviation the heavy concentration that could be effected from the Truk area would expose the initial attacking elements to the danger of destruction by overwhelming force.

It is our considered opinion that in view of the recently developed strength of the hostile positions, of the shortage of transports and airplanes for the continued maintenance of strong air support through-

SECRET

COMAIRSOPAC
220737 (cont)

out the operation and of the lack of sufficient shipping that would make possible the continued movement of troops and supplies, that the successful accomplishment of the operation is open to the gravest doubts.

It is recommended that this operation be deferred pending the further development of forces in the South Pacific and Southeast Pacific areas and that in the interim we proceed with an infiltration process through the New Hebrides and the ~~SIXX~~ Santa Cruz Island groups, in conjunction with accelerated air fields construction in New Guinea, with a view to the development of bases for the support of the operation when it is decided that adequate means are available for the execution of all three Tasks in one continuous movement.

COMSOWESPAC
230240

FROM: COMSOWESPAC TO: COMSOPAC
HANDLE THIS WITH UTMOST SECRECY. PARAGRAPH THREE
XRAY FOUR YOUR SERIAL ZERO ZERO SEVENTEEN (0017)
OF SIXTEEN JULY. SUBMARINES NOW OPERATING SOLOMON
ISLANDS. PROPOSE MOVE ALL SUBS WEST OF LONGITUDE
ONE FIVE FIVE EAST (155 E) BY TWO AUGUST. ADVISE.

(ANSWERED)
(AFFIRMATIVE)

COMSOPAC
230250

FROM: COMSOPAC ACTION: COMSOWESPAC INFO: COMAIRSOPAC
MACARTHUR
COMAIRSOPAC PLANS FOR AIR SEARCH FOLLOW: BEGINNING FOR
MINUS TWO DAY SOPAC SEARCH SO DISPOSED AS TO ISOLATE
CORAL SEA EAST OF LONGITUDE ONE FIFTY EIGHT FROM

SECRET

COMSOPAC
230250 (cont)

ENEMY INTERFERENCE WITHOUT DETECTION AND TO COVER TARGET AREA TO NORTHWARD AS FAR AS RANGE OF AIRCRAFT PERMITS, THIS COVERAGE INCREASING IN EXTENT AS SCOUTS MOVE TO SUCCESSIVE ADVANCED BASES. SUGGEST SOWESPAC AIRCRAFT BEGINNING DOG MINUS TWO DAY COVER APPROACHES TO CORAL SEA AND TARGET AREA BY SEARCH WEST OF ONE FIFTY EIGHT EAST LONGITUDE TO MAXIMUM EXTENT NUMBER AND RANGE OF AVAILABLE SCOUTS PERMIT. FOR INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS SOPAC SCOUTED AREA WILL OVERLAP AN AVERAGE OF ONE HUNDRED TWENTY MILES WEST OF THAT LONGITUDE. COPIES OF OUR FINAL AIR SEARCH WILL BE FORWARDED LATER. SUBJECT TO ABOVE CONCUR YOUR PLAN AS CONTAINED COMSOWESPAC NINETEEN TEN THIRTY FOUR.

COMSOWESPAC
260955

FROM: COMSOWESTPAC TO: COMSOPAC
CONCUR IN YOUR SUGGESTION TWO THREE ZERO TWO FIVE ZERO FOR SEARCH AREA SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AIR FORCES "FROM MACARTHUR TO GHORMLEY" SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AIR FORCES WILL FROM DOG MINUS TWO TO DOG PLUS FOUR SEARCH WATER AREAS TO LIMIT OF RANGE SOUTHEAST OF LINE MADANG DASH KAPINGAMARANGI ISLANDS "ONE DEGREE NORTH - ONE FIVE FOUR DEGREES FORTY FIVE MINUTES EAST" AND NORTHWEST OF THE LINE TAGULA ISLAND - EASTERNMOST POINT NEW GEORGIA ISLAND - MAIN ISLAND EIGHT DEGREES THIRTY MINUTES SOUTH - ONE FIVE SEVEN DEGREES FIFTY FIVE MINUTES EAST (157°55' E) - THENCE ALONG ONE FIVE EIGHT DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE COMSOWESTPAC PAYING PARTICULAR ATTENTION TO ENTRANCES TO CORAL SEA

SECRET

COMSOWESPAC
260955 (cont)

FROM THE NORTH AND THE EAST STOP OUR AIRCRAFT
PROHIBITED STARTING DOG MINUS TWO DAYS FROM OPERATION
EAST OF ONE FIVE EIGHT DEGREES EAST LONGITUDE STOP
OTHER DETAILS OF SUPPORT NO CHANGE FROM COMSOWESPAC
**
ONE NINE ONE ZERO THREE FOUR

. REF: SOPAC PLANS FOR AIR SEARCH
** REF: PLAN OF AIR OPERATION WILL BE EXECUTED
IN SUPPORT OF TASK ONE MACARTHUR TO
GHORMLEY

COMSOPAC
270515

FROM: COMSOPAC TO: COMAIRSOPAC
COMSOWESTPAC TWO SIXTY NINE FIVE FIVE HAS BEEN
PASSED TO YOU FOR INFORMATION AND COMMENT. GHORMLEY
SENDS TO MCCAIN. NOTE THAT AREA SOUTHEAST OF LINE
TAGULA ISLAND - EASTERNMOST POINT NEW GEORGIA ISLAND
IS NOT COVERED. THIS MAY BE ADVISABLE DUE TO PENDING
OPERATION OF OWN FORCES THEREIN.

COMAIRSOPAC
280533

FROM: COMAIRSOPAC TO: COMSOPAC
CONCUR IN SEARCH PLAN ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ COMSOWESPAC TWO
SIX ZERO NINE FIVE FIVE. AREA SOUTHEASTSIDE TAGULAP
ISLAND - NEW GEORGIA COVERED BY OUR BAKER SEVENTEENS.

260955: INRE: SEARCHING PLAN AND THE AREA TO
BE COVERED

CTF 61
290857

FROM: CTF 61 TO: CTF 63 INFO: COMSOPAC, CTF 62,
CTF 18.

YOUR OPERATION PLAN 1-42. ASSUME ON DOG MINUS ONE
DAY PLANES SEARCHING SECTORS THREE AND FIVE WILL ARRIVE
OUTER LIMIT SEARCH AT SUNSET SEARCHING RETURN LEG BY
RADAR. NOTE THAT ENEMY STRIKING GROUP COULD APPROACH
UNDETECTED TO LAUNCH AIR ATTACK SUNRISE DOG DAY BY

SECRET

WASP
072358
(VISUAL)

WASP ACTION COMTASKFORCE 18 TOR: 0038 RECD
COMPLETED SEARCH SECTOR TWO EIGHT ZERO DASH 1138
ZERO FOUR ZERO RADIUS TWO HUNDRED. COVERAGE 8
AVERAGES SIXTY FIVE PERCENT ACCOUNT THICK WEATHER
NORTH OF ISLANDS. ONE SCOUT SHOT DOWN ENEMY TWIN
FLOAT PLANES NORTH OF ^{A BAY} REKTATA^X TWO SCOUTS SHOT UP
SMALL CRAFT FLYING ENEMY COLORS. OTHERWISE NEGATIVE

CTG 61.1
080005
(VISUAL)

COMTASKGROUP 61.1 ACTION SARATOGA TOR: 0049 RECD
MORNING SEARCH FOR CARRIER NEGATIVE. AUTHORIZED 1149
VF AGAINST IMPENDING BOMBING ATTACK. 8

CTG 61.2
080030

FROM: COMTASKGROUP 61.2 TO: COMSOPAC 1430
SQUADRON X-RAY ATTACKED 0100Z/8TH BY ABOUT 8
40 TWIN-ENGINE TORPEDO PLANES AND 8 HIGH ALTITUDE
BOMBERS. JARVIS HIT IN FORWARD PART OF SHIP BY
TORPEDO; DISABLED, AM TOWING INTO SHALLOW WATER.
ELLIOT ON FIRE AMIDSHIPS FROM BOMB HIT. NOT KNOW
YET WHETHER SHIPS CAN BE SAVED. AT LEAST 12 ENEMY
PLANES SHOT DOWN; PROBABLY MORE BY SHIPS AND FIGHTERS.

Comsowespac
080046

COMSOWESPAC TO: ALL TFC, SWPAC PACFLT CINCPAC RECD
OUR AIRCRAFT SIGHTED 1 DD 06-52 S 154-20 E Fox 0032
COURSE 180 AT 1546 K SEVENTH GEREY Bells (-11)8th
2316(-11)7th

ORANGE BASE
(CTF 62)
080107

ORGANGE BASE TO ALL STATIONS RECD
THERE ARE POSSIBLY ONE OR MORE SUBS 1207(-11)8th
IN THE TRANSPORT AREA.

SECRET

COMSOWESPAC
072242

FROM: COMSOWESPAC TO: COMSOPAC

0942
8

40 LARGE TWIN-ENGINE PLANES PASSING NORTH
BOUGAINVILLE FROM NORTHWEST TO SOUTHEAST AT
2242Z/7.

SARATOGA
072246
(VISUAL)

SARATOGA TO: COMTASKGROUP 61.1

0946
8

RED BASE AGAIN REQUESTS EIGHT VF FOR COMBAT
PATROL FROM ME. ADVISE.

CTG 61.1
072315
(VISUAL)

COMTASKGROUP 61.1 ACTION COMTASKUNIT 61.1.1 TOR:2329

YOUR 072246 NEGATIVE. INVITE YOUR ATTENTION
TO PRESENT SITUATION IF ENEMY CV SHOULD BE
LOCATED AND I ORDERED YOUR ATTACK GROUP
LAUNCHED. YOUR FIGHTERS SHOULD ALSO BE READY
FOR LAUNCHING FOR ACTUAL BOMBING ATTACK UNTIL
NOON.

REC'D
1029
8

CTF 16
072350
(VISUAL)

COMTASKFORCE 16 ACTION COMTASKFORCE 11 COMTASKFORCE
18

INTERCEPTED MESSAGE QUOTE FORTY BOMBERS
PASSING NORTH BOUGAINVILLE AT 0942. ESTIMATE
DUE TULAGI BETWEEN ELEVEN DASH TWELVE HUNDRED.
SUGGEST ALL ~~XXX~~ SARATOGA AVAILABLE FIGHTERS
TULAGI AT 1100 PLUS ONE HALF WASP FIGHTERS..
OVER CARRIERS ALL ENTERPRISE PLUS ONE HALF
WASP. FROM FIGHTER DIRECTOR

1050
8

CTF 18
072351
(VISUAL)

COMTASKFORCE 18 ACTION COMTASKFORCE 61 TOR: 2359

REPORTED FORTY LARGE TWIN ENGINE BOMBERS TO
ARRIVE FROM NORTHWEST BETWEEN NOON AND
THIRTEEN HUNDRED

REC'D
1059
8

SECRET

CTF 62
072000 (about)

FROM: CTF 62 TO: TF 62
ENEMY SUBMARINE REPORTED NEAR.
MAY ENTER AREA TODAY.

RECD 0710(-11)8th

CTF 16
072058
(VISUAL)

COMTASKFORCE 16 ACTION COMTASKGROUP 61.1
FIGHTER DIRECTOR REQUESTS SARATOGA LAUNCH
8 VF COMBAT AIR PATROL FOR CARRIERS AT 0830.
AND AT 1030

0758
8

CTG 61.1
072120
(VISUAL)

COMTASKGROUP 61.1 ACTION COMTASKFORCE 16
YOUR 072058 NOT APPROVED. SARATOGA MUST BE
READY TO LAUNCH FOR OR IN CASE OF ATTACK.
PLEASE CARRY OUT MY 070510.

0820
7

CTG 62.6
072211
(VISUAL)

FROM: CTG 62.6 TO: CTF 62
AS SECOND IN COMMAND, WHEN YOU HAVE TIME.
COULD I HAVE ROUGH OUTLINE OF PRESENT
SITUATION AND FUTURE INTENTIONS.

0911
8

CTG 61.1
072225
(VISUAL)

COMTASKGROUP 61.1 ACTION SARATOGA
SARATOGA DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE COMPLYING
WITH MY ORDERS FOR TODAY'S OPERATIONS WHICH
REQUIRE HER UNTIL NOON TO MAINTAIN FIGHTERS
AND ATTACK GROUP READY FOR LAUNCHING AT ALL
TIMES IN CASE OF BOMBING ATTACK OR ~~XXXXXX~~
LOCATING OF ENEMY CV. PLEASE REFER CONFLICT-
ING REQUEST TO ME

0925
8

SECRET

CTG 61.2
071030 (cont)

ONE WASP DIVE BOMBER SHOT DOWN BY ZERO FIGHTER
ACCORDING TO PILOT WOUNDED GUNNER LOST.

COMSOPAC
071142

FROM: COMSOPAC TO: CTF 62,63

2242
7

*Probably
who sent
this message*

REPORTED ENEMY SUBMARINE IN POSITION LAT.
10° SOUTH - LONG. 162° EAST.

COMSOUWESPAC
071146

COMSOUWESPAC CTG 62.6 (RECD 0003(-11) 8th
2246(-11) 7th-
POSITION 06-52 S 154 - 20 E, 1 DD, COURSE 180

COMSOWESPAC
071219

COMSOWESPAC TO: CINCPAC ALL TF CDRS.
PAC
ALL TF CDRS.
SWPAC

(RECD
2360(-11)
7th

~~XXXX~~

FORTRESSES SIGHT 6 UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS ST.
GEORGE'S CHANNCAL COURSE SE. AT 0131 GCT
IN 03-45 S 151-56 E SIGHTED 1 CRUISER 3 CL
1 DD COURSE 270 SPEED 30

||

COMSOPAC
071330

FROM: COMSOPAC TO: CTF 62
REPORT SITUATION.

0030
8

COMSOWESPAC
071930

COMSOWESPAC TO: CINCPAC ALL TF CDRS.
PAC
ALL TF CDRS.
SWPAC

RECD
0738
(-11)
8th

7TH - SUB REPORTS FOLLOWING SHIPS PASSED
THROUGH 04-58 S 152-50 E COURSE 140 HIGH
SPEED. 1000(-10) 7TH 1 DD 2 UNKNOWN. 1900
(-10) 2 DD 3 LARGER UNKNOWN.

SECRET

CTG 61.2
071030 (cont)

NO ENEMY SHIPS PRESENT. IN BOTH AREAS OPENED SHORE BOMBARDMENT 1910Z/6th, WITH SHIPS AND PLANES. LIGHT GUN OPPOSITION SOON SILENCED. LANDINGS BEGAN FLORIDA AREA 2040, INITIAL ~~NO~~ OPPOSITION LIGHT GUADALCANAL 2210 NO OPPOSITION. AT 0290Z/7TH ABOUT 25 ENEMY TYPE 97 BOMBERS PASSED OVERHEAD DROPPED SEVERAL BOMBS, NO DAMAGE, PROCEEDED TOWARD CARRIERS; TWO SHOT DOWN, TWO DAMAGED. ABOUT 10 ENEMY TYPE 99 DIVE BOMBERS MADE ONE 250 POUND HIT ON MUGFORD 0400, CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE AFTER DECK HOUSE, 2 GUNS OUT, ENGINES OK, 15 MISSING 50 SERIOUSLY INJURED 2 ENEMY PLANES SHOT DOWN. SITUATION AT 0900:-GUADALCANAL ALL TROOPS ASHORE ESTIMATED OCCUPY ON WEST LINE TENARU RIVER AND ON EAST SECURITY LINE ABOUT LONGITUDE 160-06 AT NEIGHTEST PLACE IN CONTACT WITH ENEMY. ON FLORIDA SIDE HALAVO OCCUPIED NO OPPOSITION. TULAGI OCCUPIED EXCEPT EAST AND; LIGHT CONTINUES GAVUTU CAPTURED, HEAVY CASUALTIES, TANANBOGO STILL IN HANDS OF ENEMY, ATTACK UNDERWAY. TOMMORROW REQUEST MAXIMUM FIGHTER COVER TWO VSB SQUADRONS CONTINUOUSLY IN AREA. REQUEST SCOUTING AGAINST APPROACH ENEMY SURFACE FORCES FROM WESTWARD. EARLY MORNING 8TH EXPECT SEND OUT SANTA CRUZ OCCUPATION FORCES LESS PRESIDENT JACKSON WILSON PLUS MCCAWLEY FULLER HEYWOOD TREVER MUGFORD SOME OTHER APs LATER IN DAY. TONIGHT 2 DMS SEARCHING FOR FIGHTER PILOT DOWN NEAR RUSSEL ISLAND.

SECRET

CTF 61
070500
VISUAL

COMTASKFORCE 61 ACTION COMTASKGROUP 61.1 TOR:0605
IN VIEW CARRIER DIVE BOMBERS ENCOUNTERED THIS
AFTERNOON REVISE NIGHT OPERATIONS TO ARRIVE
LAUNCHING POSITION SOUTH OF CAPE HENSLOW IN THE
MORNING. MAKE EARLY SEARCH. BOMBERS LAST SEEN
LEAVING TULAGI ON WESTERLY COURSE

REC'D
1705
7

CTF 18
070510
VISUAL

61.1
COMTASK FOR 18 ACTION SARATOGA ENTERPRISE WASP
OPERATIONS TOMMORROW SATURDAY FORENOON WASP
SEARCH TOWARD RABAU^{8 away}L PRIMARILY FOR REPORTED
CAST VICTOR ALSO STANDBY COMBAT PATROL TO BE
USED AS REQUIRED BY ENTERPRISE. ENTERPRISE
COMBAT PATROL AND FIGHTER DIRECTION DUTY.
SARATOGA SPOTTED FOR WASP FIGHTERS AND ATTACK
GROUP. AFTERNOON SAME BUT ENTERPRISE REPLACES
WASP AND SARATOGA REPLACES ENTERPRISE EXCEPT
THAT ENTERPRISE RETAINS FIGHTER DIRECTION CONTROL.
WASP REPLACES SARATOGA. COMBAT PATROL TO BE
DIVIDED BETWEEN CVS AND TRANSPORTS OTHER MISSIONS
FOR AMPHIB FORCE TO BE FURNISHED ~~XX~~ IF REQUESTED

REC'D
1610
7

*CV searches
8 August*

CTF 18
070527
VISUAL

COMTASKFORCE 18 ACTION COMTASKFORCE 61
ART HAS ALREADY BEEN TOLD TO SEARCH. MY
INFORMATION DIVE BOMBERS PROBABLY LAND BASED
FROM RABAU^L VIA BUKA OR KIETA

REC'D
1627
7

CTG 61.2
071030

FROM: COMTASKGROUP 61.2 TO: COMSOPAC 2130
APPROACH A COMPLETE SURPRISE, 18 ENEMY SEA-
PLANES DESTROYED ON THE WATER, 1 SMALL SCHOONER,

*11
2120*

SECRET

COMA IRSOPAC
041436 (cont)

THEREFORE, FOLLOWING MODIFICATION OF PLAN:- (a)
CARRIERS PRIOR WITHDRAWAL LEAVE 1 FIGHTRON GUAD-
ALCANAL AND FLY 14 FIGHTERS EQUIPPED BELLY TANKS
TO EFATE. PILOTS EFATE MARFIGHTRON MAN THOSE
PLANES AND FLY GUADALCANAL. CARRIER FIGHTER PILOTS
BE RETURNED SHIPS IN CARRIER 2-SEATERS (GARBLE) RE-
QUIRED RETURN TO EFATE WILDCATS. FORMER PREFERRED
AS WOULD THUS PROVIDE A FIGHTRON AT EFATE USING
EXCESS PILOTS OF THAT MARFIGHTRON. (c) LONG ISLAND
FLY OFF HER MARFIGHTRON AND RETRIEVE CARRIER FIGHTRON
GUADALCANAL. CARRIERS SEND TO EFATE 15 SPARE BELLY
TANKS COMPLETE OR WHATEVER LESSER NUMBER AVAILABLE.

CTF 18
062023
(VISUAL)

COMTASKFORCE 18 ACTION SARATOGA ENTERPRISE TOR:0113
COMMENCING AT 1215 WILL AUGMENT CARRIER COMPAT PATROL
AND DECREASE AIR SUPPORT FLIGHTS BY FOUR GREEN
FIGHTERS

REC'D
1213
7

CINCPAC
062325

FROM: CINCPAC TO: CTF 62 INFO: CTFs 61,63
COMSOPAC
COMSOWESPAC

AT SEVEN HOURS ITEM ORGANGE AIR COMMAND AT RA BAUL
(COMDR FIFTH AIR ATTACK FORCE) HAD SEVENTEEN FIGHTERS
AND EIGHTEEN LONG RANGE BOMBERS AVAILABLE. SENDING
THE LATTER OUT AFTER YOU. (SAME AS COMDR SOPAC 070027
CURTISS 070119).

CINCPAC
062336

FROM: CINCPAC TO: COMSOPAC INFO: COMSOWESPAC
CTFs 61,62,63

SECRET

CINCPAC
062336 (cont)

11
10 36/44w

ENEMY SUBS ARE ENROUTE TO ATTACK BLUE OCCUPATION
FORCES AT TULAGI. *I-121*
I-122

COMSOPAC
070027

(SAME AS CINCPAC 062336).

CURTISS
070119

(SAME AS CINCPAC 062336).

CTF 61
070357
(VISUAL)

1457/7th

COMTASKFORCE 61 ACTION COMTASKGROUP 61.1
COMTASKUNIT 61.1.2

TOR: 0555

REC'D
1645

7

SUGGEST MORNING SEARCH TOWARD RABUL IN
VIEW ENEMY CV REPORTED THERE.

CTF 16
070414
(VISUAL)

COMTASKFORCE 16 ACTION COMTASKGROUP 61.1

TOR: 0455

REC'D
1555

7

PRESENCE DIVE BOMBERS INDICATES POSSIBILITY
ENEMY CV THIS VICINITY. SUGGEST SEARCH

SECRET

DISPATCHES AUGUST

(INCLUDES COMSOPAC WAR DIARY WHICH
CONSISTS ONLY OF DISPATCHES)

COMSOPAC
020240

FROM: COMSOPAC TO: COMTASKFOR 61

AM INFORMED YOU PLAN TO WITHDRAW CARRIER SUPPORT FROM TULAGI AREA PRIOR TO DOG PLUS 3 DAY. NECESSITY EXISTS OF PROVIDING CONTINUOUS FIGHTER COVERAGE FOR THAT AREA. FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION, THE FOLLOWING PLAN IS PROPOSED:-

(a) CARRIERS, PRIOR TO WITHDRAWAL, LEAVE 2 FIGHTER SQUADRONS AT GUADALCANAL (ASSUMING FIELD IS READY), (b) PROVIDING BELLY TANKS FIT FIGHTER PLANES AT EFATE, CARRIERS FLY TANKS TO EFATE ABOUT DOG PLUS 4 DAY, THEN EFATE PLANES FLY TO GUADALCANAL DOG PLUS 6 DAY, (c) FROM POSITION 200 MILES SOUTH OF GUADALCANAL, LONG ISLAND FLY FIGHTER PLANES TO GUADALCANAL AND RECEIVE CARRIER PLANES FOR SUBSEQUENT RETURN TO CARRIERS? ONLY ON CONTINGENCY NO HOSTILE CARRIERS BE DETECTED SUBSEQUENT TO LANDING YOUR FIGHTERS THESE FIGHTERS WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY RELEASED TO YOU.

COMSOPAC
022220

FROM: COMSOPAC TO: CTFS 61, 62, 63, 16, 18.

DOG DAY HEREBY DESIGNATED AS AUGUST 7TH, LOCAL DATE,
UNDER COMSOPAC OPERATION PLAN 1-42.

COMAIRSOPAC
041436

FROM: COMAIRSOPAC TO: COMSOPAC

HAVE ASCERTAINED THAT THE DUE TO MECHANICAL DIFFICULTIES INSTALLATION BELLY TANKS ON F4F3A PLANES AT EFATE WILL REQUIRE MINIMUM 10 DAYS IF ALL FITTINGS AND ACCESSORIES PROVIDED. OTHERWISE, AN AIR STATION JOB. RECOMMEND

SECRET

CTF 61
290857

BEING TO NORTHWEST OF SECTOR FIVE AND NORTH OF SECTOR
THREE AT SUNSET DOG MINUS TWO DOG MINUS ONE DAY. ON
DOG DAY SUGGEST PLANES SEARCHING SECTORS TWO AND FOUR
BE A BREAST TULAGI BY SUNRISE.

COMAIRSOPAC
300820

FROM: COMTASKFOR 63 TO: COMTASKFOR 61 INFO: COMTASKFOR 18
COMTASKFOR 62
COMSOPAC

IF WEATHER FORECAST INDICATE FAVORABLE NAVIGATION COND-
ITIONS WILL COMPLY YOUR TWO NINE ZERO EIGHT FIVE SEVEN
AS REGARDS SECTORS THREE AND FIVE DOG MINUS ONE. OTHER-
WISE DAYLIGHT SEARCH WILL BE MADE, ON DOG DAY WILL COMPLY
REGARDING SECTORS TWO AND FOUR.

SECRET

CTF 62
090508 (cont)

CRISTOBAL:- Captain Reifsnider IN COMMAND OF
5 APs, 5 AKs, CHICAGO, 4 DDs, 5 DMs, speed
AMOUNT 12. JARVIS ENROUTE ALONE TO EFATE,
EXPECT TO PROVIDE ESCORT.

CTF 62
090815

FROM: COMTASKFORCE 62 TO: COMSOPAC 1915
9
TODAY'S SUMMARY DETAILS LAST NIGHTS NAVAL
BATTLE OBSCURE, BUT IN GENERAL AS FOLLOWS:-
CTF 62 TO USUAL ADDRESSEES - OBJECT OF ENEMY
SURFACE ATTACK WAS TRANSGROUP X-RAY AT GUAD-
ALCANAL; WE HAD OUTER SCREEN IN 2 DIVISIONS,
ONE NORTHEAST AND ONE SOUTH OF SAVO CONSISTING
OF ASTORIA, VINCENNES, QUINCY, 3 DDs PLUS 1 DD
RADAR OUTPOST, OTHER OF CHICAGO, CANBERRA, 4 DDs,
1 DD RADAR OUTPOST, ALL PATROLLING. INNER SCREENS
OF SAN JUAN, APD, DDs FOR YOKE GROUP AUSTRALIA,
HOBART, DDs FOR X-RAY GROUP. AT 0145L AIRCRAFT
FLARES, PROBABLY FROM CRUISER PLANES, WERE ACC-
URATELY DROPPED THROUGH CLOUDS TO SILHOUETTE GROUP
YOKE, FLARES CONTINUED REGULARLY FOR ABOUT HALF
HOUR. AT SAME TIME ENEMY CAS DDs OR TORPEDO
BOATS PROBABLY SUBS WERE INTERCEPTED BY SCREEN
NORTH AND SOUTH OF SAVO, HEAVY RUNNING ACTION CON-
TINUED ABOUT 40 MINUTES. NO KNOWLEDGE OF DAMAGE
TO ENEMY EXCEPT 1 SUB PROBABLY SUNK. WE LOST
ASTORIA, VINCENNES, QUINCY, CANBERRA, CHICAGO
TORN DOED IN BOW, RALPH TALBOT, PATTERSON DAMAGED.
HEAVY CASUALTIES MAJORITY SAVED. ATTACK DID NOT

SECRET

CTF 61
090315

FROM: CTF 61 TO: COMSOPAC

1415
9

FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF MESSAGES DELIVERED FROM
TURNER. QUOTE AT ZERO EIGHT SIXTEEN FORTY FIVE
SURFACE ATTACK ON SCREEN COORDINATED WITH USE AIR-
CRAFT FLARES. CHICAGO HIT TORPEDO CANBERRA ON FIRE.
AT TWENTY ONE HUNDRED ZED. HEAVY ACTIONS CONTINUE TO
WESTWARD. MORE OF OUR SHIPS IN TROUBLE. SUBMARINES
IN AREA. AT TWENTY ONE FIFTY TWO ZED. QUINCY SUNK
BY TORPEDOES AND GUNFIRE. AIR ATTACK ENROUTE. AT
TWENTY THREE TWENTY FIVE ZED. VINCENNES SUNK BY
GUNFIRE AND TORPEDOES. ZERO TWO FORTY FIVE CAS-
UALTIES HEAVY. AT TWENTY THREE FIFTY EIGHT. ASTORIA
HAS FIRE IN WARDROOM DESTROYER ORDERED TO PUMP AND
~~ALCHIBA~~
ALCHIBRA TO TOW THROUGH LUNGA CHANNEL TO ROSES AS
CHANCE TO SAVE HER. MOVEMENTS REQUIRES PROTECTION
WHICH I AM UNABLE TO PROVIDE. UNQUOTE. DIRECT TURNER
TO MAKE REPORTS DIRECT TO YOU INFO TO ME.

COMAIRSOPAC
090335

FROM: COMAIRSOPAC TO: COMPATWINGS PACFLT

1435
9

DUE TO OPERATIONAL LOSSES PEYS THIS COMMAND
NOW TOTAL 26. REQUEST LINE BE MADE READY AND
MINIMUM OF 4 BE DISPATCHED CURTISS AT ESPIRITU
SANTO EARLIEST PRACTICABLE DATE.

CTF 62
090508

FROM: COMTASKFOR 62 TO: COMTASKFOR 61
COMSOPAC
COMAIRSOPAC

1608
9

THE FOLLOWING DEPARTED GUADALCANAL 0400Z/9TH
FOR NOUMEA VIA LENGU CHANNEL AND NORTH OF SAN

SECRET

SARATOGA
082303
(VISUAL)

SARATOGA ACTION COMTASKFORCE 61 1003
9
SEARCHED SECTOR TWO SEVEN ZERO DASH THREE
THREE ZERO RADIUS ONE SEVEN FIVE MILES ORIGIN LAT
ELEVEN DASH FOURTEEN SOUTH LONG ONE SIX ONE DASH
ZERO ONE EAST RESULTS NEGATIVE NINETY FIVE PERCENT
COVERAGE

CTF 61
090000 (about)
(VISUAL)

COMTASKFORCE 61 ACTION COMTASKFORCE 18 REC'D
1114
9
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY TOR: 0014
DOUBLE COMBAT AIR PATROL AND STANDEY FOR
AIR ATTACK

CTF 61
090000 (about)
VISUAL

COMTASKFORCE 61 ACTION COMTASKFORCE 16 COMTASKFORCE 18 REC'D
1114
9
TOR: 0014
I HAVE ASSUMED TACTICAL COMMAND OF THE
FLEET XCTF 18 ASSUME COMMAND OF AIRCRAFT

AUCKLAND
090009

FROM: RDO AUCKLAND TO: NOUMEA 1109
9
INDICATIONS FIFTH AIR ATTACK EIGHTH FLEET
UNITS AND SPECIAL LANDING FORCES INVOLVED IN
PROJECTED OPERATIONS AGAINST GUADALCANAL.
SERIAL ZERO ONE ONE. TIME MENTIONED TODAY
NINTH ITEM TIME. (TOR 0032)

CTF 61
090050

FROM: CTF 61 TO: COMSOPAC 1150
9
AM RECEIVING DISPATCHES FROM TURNER DES-
CRIBING HEAVY LOSSES IN CRUISERS IN ENGAGE-
MENT WHICH CONTINUES TO WESTWARD. ARE YOU
RECEIVING THEM.

SECRET

CTF 62
081941 (cont)

71
30 41

COVER FOR ATTACK ON ENEMY SURFACE FORCE THIS AREA

0641
9

CINCPAC
081955

FROM: CINCPAC TO: COMINCH INFO: COMSOPAC 0655
9
ASSUMING SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION PRESENT OPERATIONS
RECOMMEND PENDING INITIATION TASK TWO THAT TASK
ONE BE EXTENDED TO PERMIT CHORMLEY TO HAVE CONTROL
AS PRACTICABLE NORTHWEST ALONG THE SOLOMONS TO
INCREASE SECURITY OF TULAGI AREA.

COMSOWESPAC
082107 (about)

(HARMEN) ELECONNEN ACTION ANY US NAVAL SHIP
NPM NR 805 Z TOR: 2140

REC'D
0840
9

FROM STO HEARD FORMATION AIRCRAFT GOING
SOUTH EAST AT 2107Z/8

(Toward Tulagi)

2107
11
3207
28
0807

CTF-18
082139
(VISUAL)

COMTASKFORCE 18 ACTION COMTASKFORCE 61
FOLLOWING INTERCEPTED ON SIX NINE SEVENTY
FROM ORGANGE BASE TO SARATOGA FLIGHT TWO
ZERO THREE TO ADMIRAL FLETCHER FROM ADMIRAL
TURNER APPRECIATE KNOWING ADMIRAL FLETCHERS
PLAN BY MESSAGE DROP

0839
9

CTF-18
082225
(VISUAL)

COMTASKFORCE 18 ACTION COMTASKFORCE 11 TOR: 2309
CAN BREAK ONLY PORTION CTF 62 081405 AS FOLLOWS
QUOTE AIR ATTACKS TODAY RESULTED IN LOSS

1009
9

ELLIOTT SEVERE DAMAGE JARVIS PROBABLY INCRE-
ASING TOMMORROW AND ABSENCE AIR SUPPORT REQUIRE
ME TO WITHDRAW ALL SHIP TEMPORARILY FROM THIS
AREA TO AVOID UNWARRANTED LOSS UNQUOTE REMAINDER
GARBLED

SECRET

COMAIRSOPAC
081233

COMAIRSOPAC TO: CTF 61 INFO: COMSOPAC
CTF 62

SEARCH COVERAGE 8 AUGUST. SECTOR 1 NOT SEARCHED
DUE WEATHER. SECTOR 2 LEFT HALF 80% TO 650
MILES, RIGHT HALF NOT SEARCHED DUE WEATHER.
SECTOR 3 - 85%. SECTOR 4 - 95% OUTER 50 MILES
NOT COVERED. SECTOR 5 - 95%. FANTAN SECTOR
80% HUDSONS 100%. SECTOR 7 - 85%. ALL SECTORS
NEGATIVE EXCEPT UNIDENTIFIED PLANE REPORTED
55V37 - 080445.

COMAIRSOPAC
081554

FROM: COMAIRSOPAC TO: 0154
9

ENEMY SEAPIANE TENDERS BELIEVED OPERATING
REKATA BAY, (SANTA ISABEL). DIRECT PLANE IN
WESTERN SECTOR IN ESTIMATE EARLIEST POSSIBLE
TODAY NINE AUGUST. REDUCE PLANES ON SEARCH AS
NECESSARY FROM ROSTWARD SUB SECTORS TO MAKE FOUR
PLANES AVAILABLE FOR NIGHT TORPEDO ATTACK THIS
FORCE. PAKER SEVENTEENS HITTING SAME TARGET ABOUT
NOON.

CTF 62
081645

COMTASKFOR 62 ACTION COMTASKFOR 61 TOR: 0053

SURFACE ON SCREEN COORDINATED WITH USE

REC'D
1153
9

AIRCRAFT FLARES CHICAGO HIT TORPEDO

CANBERRA ON FIRE

CTF 62
081941

COMTASKFORCE 62 ACTION COMTASKFORCE 61 TOR:0025

UNABLE DEPART AS PLANNED BECAUSE INSUFF*

REC'D
1125

ICIENT SUPPLIES HAVE BEEN LANDED REQUEST

SECRET

COMSOWESPAC
080717

COMSOWESPAC 0807 FOX AND BELLS
SCHEDULE NPM 706Z FOX WHO NERK
0 AIRCRAFT REPORTS AT 2325Z/73
CRUISERS 3 DESTROYERS 2 SEP-
PLANE TENDERS OR GUNBOATS 0549S
156-07E COURSE 120 TRUE SPEED
15 KNOTS AT 0027Z/8 2 SUBMARINES
0735S 154-07E COURSE 150 TRUE
0717Z/8.

COMSOPAC
Recd 1845
(-11) 8th
CTG 62.6

COMSOWESPAC
080847

COMSO ESPAC, AIR SIGHTING 0001Z/8
POSITION 05-42S 156-05E 2 CA CL
1 SMALL UNIDENTIFIED. 1 CRUISER
SIMILAR SOUTHAMPTON CLASS.

ALL TF COMSOPAC
CDRS PAC

CTF 61
081040
(VISUAL)

ENTERPRISE ACTION COMTASKFOR 61 081040/TOR? 0225
COMPLETE REPORT SATURDAY PM SEARCH SECTORS 270 090
DISTANCE 260 MILES WEST 220 MILES NORTH AND EAST X
NO CONTACTS X NO ACTIVITY TUNNIBULI BAY MARINE REKATA
BAY X ONE PBV AIRBORNE NORTH MALIATA X MACKINAC AND DD
3PBV ONE PBV AT MARAMASIKE WITH MARKER BUOYS IN PLACE X
HEAVY SQUALIS 100 MILES EST AND 140 MILES NORTHEAST CLEAR
TO WESTWARD X SEVENTY PERCENT COVERAGE

2140
8

COMSOWESPAC
081125

COMSOWESPAC TO: CINCPAC ALL TFC PACFLT ALL TFC SOPACFLT
PLANE REPORTS 1 CRUISER IN 5-40 S 153-55 E AT 2245 GCT/7
COURSE 280 SPEED 25. 8000 TON 2 STACKS 3 TURRETS.

SECRET

CTF 61
080425
(VISUAL)

COMTASKFORCE 61 ACTION COMTASKGROUP 61.1 TOR: 0530
IN VIEW OF POSSIBILITY OF TORPEDO PLANE ATTACK RECD
AND REDUCTION IN OUR FIGHTER STRENGTH I INTEND 1630
TO RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL OF CARRIERS. 8
DO YOU AGREE. IN CASE WE CONTINUE PRESENT OPER-
ATION I BELIEVE SAME AREA SHOULD BE USED TOMMORROW
AS TODAY. WHAT DO YOU THINK

FROM: COMTASKGROUP 61.1:- YOUR 080425 AFFIRMATIVE TO
BOTH QUESTIONS 0515

CTG 61.1
080512
(VISUAL)

COMTASKGROUP 61.1 ACTION COMTASKFORCE 61 1612
IF WE ARE TO REMAIN TOMMORROW RECOMMEND SAME 8
PLAN OF NIGHT OPERATIONS AS MY PLAN THREE FOR
LAST NIGHT. ALSO SAME PLAN OF AIR OPERATIONS FOR
TOMMORROW SUNDAY AS FOR TODAY EACH CARRIER MOVING
UP ONE PLACE IN FORENOON AND AGAIN IN AFTERNOON FOR
EXAMPLE FORENOON WASP COMBAT PATROL AFTERNOON SEARCH
STANDEY CAP

CTF 61
080707

FROM: COMTASKFOR 61 TO: COMSOPACFOR 1807
TOTAL FIGHTER STRENGTH REDUCED FROM 99 TO 78. 8
IN VIEW OF A LARGE NUMBER OF ENEMY TORPEDO AND
BOMBER PLANES IN AREA RECOMMEND IMMEDIATE WITH-
DRAWAL OF CARRIERS. REQUEST YOU SEND TANKERS IMMED-
IATELY TO RENDEZVOUS DECIDED BY YOU AS FUEL RUNNING LOW.

SECRET

CTF 16
080215
(VISUAL)

COMTASKFORCE 16 ACTION COMTASKGROUP 61.1 TOR: 0333
SUGGEST WASP RECALL ALL VF. SARATOGA AND
ENTERPRISE EACH MAINTAIN 6 VF OVER DVS AND
SIX OVER TULAGI RECALLING ALL OTHERS FOR LATER
REPLACEMENTS.

RECD
1433
8

CTF 16
080236
(VISUAL)

COMTASKFORCE 16 ACTION COMTASKGROUP 61.1 TOR: 0410
THIS MORNING FIGHTER SECTION LEADERS CONTACTED
TWIN ENGINE HORIZONTAL BOMBERS AND SIMILAR
ENGINE TORPEDO PLANES. SEVEN TORPEDO PLANES
BURNING ON WATER. THIS SECTION ACCOUNTED FOR
ONE TORPEDO AND THREE BOMBERS. PILOTS OPINION
SOME TWIN ENGINE BOMBERS CARRYING TORPEDOES

RECD
1510
8

CTF 61
080317 (about)
(VISUAL)

CTF 61 TO: TF 61.1

"SUMMARY SITUATION ASHORE. APPROACH COMPLETE SURPRISE.
LIGHT OPPOSITION SILENCED BY PLANES AND BOMBARDMENT.
GUADALCANAL TULAGI OCCUPIED. ENEMY RESIST TANAMBIGO.
LATTER PLACE NOW BEING BOMBED. NO SERIOUS DAMAGE OUR
FORCES FROM AIR ATTACKS EIGHTER YESTERDAY OR TODAY.
OVER 30 TO 40 ENEMY PLANES ACCOUNTED FOR. OUR PLANES
LOSSES LIGHT IN COMPARISON". (ENTERPRISE ACTION REPORT).

CTF 61
080400
(VISUAL)

COMTASKFORCE 61 ACTION COMTASKGROUP 61.1 TOR:0440
REQUEST ANY AVAILABLE INFORMATION ABOUT ATTACK
THIS NOON. WERE PLANES ACTUALLY CARRYING
TORPEDOES.

RECD
1540
8

SECRET

TASKFOR 61, COMTASKFOR 62, RDO NOUMEA DELIVER TO COMGEN SOPAC FOR INFO.
COMGEN FANTAN HAS IN ANOTHER SYSTEM.

COMSOPAC
101006

GHORMLEY SENDING TO MACARTHUR ACTION AND TO COMINCH CINCPAC
COMTASKFOR 61, 63, INFORMATION. BELIEVE ENEMY WILL EXECUTE
LANDING ATTACK AGAINST OUR TROOPS EN CACTUS AREA. REQUEST YOU
CONCENTRATE YOUR SUBMARINES IN THAT AREA. REQUEST YOU CONTINUE
AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AS IN YOUR 2609 55 JULY.

2106
10

COMSOPAC
101016 Same as 101006

COMTASKFOR 62
101202

WE HOLD TULAGI, SAVUTU, MAKAMBO AND TANANBOGO AND HAVE 5,000
MEN THAT AREA WHICH WAS TAKEN ONLY AFTER BITTER FIGHTING DUE TO
RESTRICTED AREAS. OUR CASUALTIES THERE ESTIMATED ABOUT 450.
VANDERGRIFT TO GHORMLEY. JAP CASUALTIES 100%, RUNNING OVER 1,000.
ALSO HOLD KUKOOM TO KOLI POINT GHADALCANAL; DIGGING IN TO DEFEND
BEACHES. HAVE FEW TOOLS AND NO BARBED WIRE. PATROLLING TO MOP
UP GARRISON OF 300 TROOPS AND 2,000 PIONEERS WHO WITHDREW TO
BUSH. HAVE DISPOSED OF A NUMBER AND HAVE SUFFERED A FEW CAS-
UALTIES. AIR FIELD READY FOR FIGHTERS AND DIVE BOMBERS.

COMTASKFOR 62
101220

GUADALCANAL AIRFIELD OCCUPIED 8th. FIELD CAN BE ROUTED AND
READY FOR USE BY FIGHTERS AUGUST 11th. WILL HAVE MACHINE GUN
AMMUNITION, GAS AND OIL READY THEM. NO AVIATION GROUND PERSONNEL.
RUNWAY 2600 x 150' CAN BE EXTENDED IN A FEW DAYS TO 4200'. CAP-
TURED CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT MATERIAL AND INSTALLATIONS IN PROGRESS
MOST COMPLTE. PRELIMINARY SURVEY INDICATES NOTHING MORE NEEDED

SECRET

SEVEN EXPECTED ORDER OF ENTRY HEAVY SHIPS INTO PORT AS HARBOR
WILL BE CROWDED AND ANCHORAGE ASSIGNMENTS WILL BE MADE.

COMAIRSOPAC:
100958

REGARD THIS AS MOST SECRET. IN VIEW CHANGED SITUATION WATCHTOWER
CANCEL ANNEX CAST AND SUB PARAGRAPHS OF PARA GRAPH THREE MY OP
PLAN ONE DASH FORTY TWO EXCEPT AS HEREIN NOTED (THIS FROM COMSO-
AIRPAC). ARIRM X OO CHANGE COMMA ADD DAILY SEARCH TWO BAKER
TWENTY-SIXES SECTOR FIVE X BAKER DAILY SEARCH TWO BAKER SEVEN-
TEENS SECTOR ONE X THREE BAKER SEVENTEENS DAILY MAINTAIN OFFEN-
SIVE PATROL COVER WATER AREA BETWEEN ISABEL - MALAITA AND GUAD-
ALCANAL - NEW GEORGIA LINES ARRIVING ANLA SUNRISE X KEEP MAXIMUM
STRIKING FORCE ON CALL X CAST X DAILY SEARCH SEVEN PREP BAKER YOKES
SECTOR THREE X DOG TRANSFER DATTACBMD AIRCRAFT CURTISS, OPERATE AS
DIRECTED TUESDAY. DAILY SEARCH THREE PREP BAKER YOKES SECTOR ONE
FOX NO CHANGE. GEORGE NO CHANGE. SECTORS ONE TO FIVE AS FOLLOWS.
ONE ORIGIN BUTON TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX DASH THREE HUNDRED SIX
DISTANCE SEVEN HUNDRED X TWO ORIGIN BUTON THREE HUNDRED X THREE
ORIGIN BUTON THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN DASH ZERO ZERO FOUR DISTANCE
SEVEN HUNDRED X FOUR ORIGIN FANTAN THREE PREP BAKER YOKES TWO
HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT DASH THREE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN DISTANCE SEVEN
HUNDRED X FIVE ORIGIN PLAINE DES GIAACS THREE HUNDRED FORTY FOUR
DASH ZERO ZERO SIX DISTANCE FOUR HUNDRED X ALL BEARINGS TRUE X DIST
DISTANCE IN NAUTICAL MILES X EXPEDITE COVERAGE REPORTS ON COMPLETION
SEARCH X FROM COMAIRSOPAC DELIVERED BY HAND TO THE FOLLOWING FOR
ACTION COM ELEVEN BOMB GROUP COMMA CURTISS COMMA MACKINAC COMMA
MCFARLAND X RDO NOUMEA DELIVER COMDR AIRFORCE POPPY FOR ACTION
ACTION TO BALLARD X INFO TO COMSOWESPAC COMMA CINCPAC COMMA COM-

SECRET

CANNOT BE DELAYED. BELIEVE ESSENTIAL TO IMPROVE AIRDROMES
ESPIRITU SANTO AND EFATE WITH ADDED FIGHTER STRIPS. CUB
DETACHMENT INTENDED FOR SANTA CRUA ISLAND WILL BE LANDED
ESPIRITU SANTO. WITH A VIEW TO BASING THEM AT GUADALCANAL
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, DESIRE YOUR EARLIEST RECOMMENDATION
PRESENT DISPOSITION PLANES FROM LONG ISLAND AND KITTYHAWK,
AND YOUR EARLY RECOMMENDATION REGARDING ADDED FACILITIES AT
ESPIRITU SANTO AND EFATE.

COMGEN 1st MARDIV:
100915

AIRFIELD GUADALCANAL READY TO RECEIVE FIGHTERS AND SCOUT BOMBERS,
COVERAGE AVAILABLE FOR 36 FIGHTERS AND 9 SCOUT BOMBERS. ABOUT $\frac{2015}{10}$
24 ENEMY BOMBERS ESCORTED BY ABOUT 12 FIGHTERS OVER AREA ABOUT
1300L. RECOMMEND PLANES ARRIVE ABOUT 1600L. REQUEST DATE AND
TIME OF ARRIVAL.

COMSOPAC:
100940

HAVE JUST MADE CONTACT WITH VANDEGRIFT BY RADIO. MCCAIN IN
CURTISS AT BUTTON ENTRANCE OF WHICH IS MINED. IF POSSIBLE WITH*
OUT UNDULY
WEAKENING YOUR DEFENSE, WHEN NEAR BUTTON SEND DESTROYER OR OTHER
AVAILABE SMALL VESSEL INTO BUTTON DURING DAYLIGHT TO DELIVER
REPLIES TO FOLLOWING QUESTIONS FOR TRANSMITTAL TO ME BY PRIORITY
RADIO. ONE HOW MANY WOUNDED ON BOARD VESSELS PROCEEDING WHITE $\frac{2140}{10}$
POPPY TWO WHAT SHIPS IN NEED REPAIRS BEFORE FURTHER OPERATION
THREE ARE AFRIM KINGS LOADED FOUR WHAT IS ETA WHITE POPPY FIVE IS
ASTORIA WITHOUT MOTIVE POWER SIX WHAT SHIPS WERE SUNK IN SHALLOW
WATER WHERE EASY CAST MIKE MIGHT BE EASILY RECOVERED BY ENEMY.

SECRET

COMSOPAC
091000

(Same as 090830)

COMAIRSOPAC
091153

FROM: COMAIRSOPAC, TO: MACFARLAND

2253
9

IF 2ND MARINES HAVE NOT STATED LANDING,
SEARCH TO RADIUS 450 MILES, PLANES RETURNING
DIRECT TO ESPIRITU SANTO FROM OUTER LIMIT UNLESS
CONTACT REQUIRING TRACKING. MACFARLAND, BREEZE AND
ALDRICK WITH REMAINING PLANES RETIRE TO ESPIRITU SNATO,
DEPARTING AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE TOMMORROW. EVACUATE
SURVEY PARTIES, IF 2ND MARINES HAVE STARTED LANDING, CON-
DUCT REGULAR SEARCH AND CONTINUE OPERATIONS ACCORDING TO
PLAN.

COMSOPAC
091230

TO: COMTASKFORCE 63, VESSELS OF TASK FORCE 62 WITH-
DRAWING IN SEVERAL GROUPS AND POSSIBLE ONE OR TWO
SINGLE SHIPS. INTEND TO PROCEED NORTH OF SAN
CRISTOBAL TO NOUMEA, EXCEPT THREE OR FOUR SHIPS TO
EFATE. CARRIER GROUPS PROCEEDING TO FUELING RENDEZVOUS
TO WEST OF LINE ESPIRITU SANTO-EFATE. MODIFY SEARCHES
TO PROVIDE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE COVERAGE FOR TASK FORCE 62 UNITS.

2330
9

COMSOPAC
092120

TO: COMAIRSOPAC X DO NOT KNOW CONDITION AIRFIELD
GUADALCANAL. HAVE ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE REENFORCEMENT
HEAVY BOMBERS AND LONG RANGE FIGHTERS. INTEND TO MAKE
ESPIRITU SANTO STRONG POINT FROM WHICH TO BASE SUPPORT AND
REENFORCEMENT TULAGI AND GUADALCANAL AND OCCUPATION SANTA
CRUZ ISLAND. LONG ISLAND AND KITTYHAWK ARRIVE SHORTLY
WITH MARINE PLANES, GREEN CREWS. THE DISCHARGING OF THESE VESSELS

0820
10

SECRET

COMSOPAC
090834

(SAME AS COMSOPAC 090830)

RDO CANBERRA
090940(about)

RDO CANBERRA ACTION ANY US NAVAL SHIP 1044
9
FROM JER 0940 AT LEAST 10 TWIN ENGINE BOMBERS
NOW PASSING FROM NW TO SE 2344Z/9

SECRET

CTF 62
090815 (cont)

REACH TRANSPORTS OR SHORE FORCES. TRANSPORTS
REMAINED AREA TODAY TO LAND MORE FOOD AND
AMMUNITION PROBABLY 30 DAYS (FOUR UNITS OF FIRE
ON HAND). DEPARTED TONIGHT VIA LENGU CHANNEL
IN VIEW IMPENDING HEAVY ATTACKS. GUADALCANAL
NO CHANGE CONSOLIDATING. TULAGI, GAVUTU, TANANBOGO
ENTIRELY IN OUR HANDS. WE ARE MOPPING UP ON
MAKAMBO. LANDING STORES SERIOUSLY INTERRUPTED
IN LAST NIGHTS ACTION AND TODAY'S AIR ALARM
WHICH PROVED FALSE.

COMSOPAC
090830

FROM: COMSOPAC TO: CINCPAC INFO: COMINCH
COMSOWESTPACFOR

1930
9

CARRIERS SHORT OF FUEL PROCEEDING TO FUELING
RENDEZVOUS. HAVE BEEN UNABLE GET SITUATION REPORT
FROM TURNER. DIRECT FLETCHER INFORMS ME QUOTE
AM RECEIVING DESPATCHES FROM TURNER DESCRIBING
HEAVY LOSSES IN CRUISERS IN ENGAGEMENT WHICH
CONTINUES TO WESTWARD UNQUOTE. ALSO IN GARBLED
MESSAGE: CHICAGO HIT TORPEDO, CANBERRA ON FIRE,
MORE OF OUR SHIPS IN TROUBLE, SUBMARINES "QUESTION"
IN AREA, QUINCY SUNK BY TORPEDO, AIR ATTACK EN
ROUTE UNQUOTE. PARA AM WITHDRAWING OTHER NAVAL
SURFACE FORCES AND PATROL PLANES UNTIL SUCH TIME
AS I HAVE SHORE BASED AIRCRAFT IN SUCH STRENGTH
THAT I CAN PROTECT MY LINES OF COMMUNICATION TO
CACTUS AND SUPPLY CACTUS WITH SUFFICIENT AVIATION FOR
EFFECTIVE DEFENCE. REQUEST IMMEDIATE AIR REFORCE-
MENT ESPECIALLY LONG RANGE FIGHTERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS

SECRET

COMSOPAC
112220

TO BE HANDLED MOST SECRET. DELAYED REPORTS FROM
TURNER STATE. CHICAGO TORPEDOED IN STEM CAN
MAKE TWELVE KNOTS. PATTERSON MUGFORD RALPH
TALBOT DAMAGED BY GUNFIRE. ASTORIA BLEW UP AND
SUNK. ELLIOTT STRANDED STILL BURNING. COMSOPAC
SEND ACTION CINGPAC INFO COMINCH.

0920
12th

COMSOPAC
120216

FROM: COMSOPAC TO: COMTASKFOR 63 INFO: CTF 61,62
COMINCH
CINCPAC
COMSOWESPACFOR

EARLY ESTABLISHMENT AIR AT CACTUS

IMPERATIVE, LOAD ALL AFIRM PREP DOGS

1316
12

PRESENT AND ARRIVING WITH AVGAS AVLUB

BOMBS AMMUNITION AVIATION GROUND PERSONNEL

AND MATERIAL AVAILABLE AND DESPATCH EARLIEST

POSSIBLE VIA LENGU CHANNEL TO ARRIVE CACTUS

LATE AFTERNOON UNLOAD DURING NIGHT AND DEPART

FOLLOWING MORNING RETURN BUTTON. FURNISH AIR

COVERAGE. AVIATION GROUND PERSONNEL WILL BE

REPLACED BUTTON FROM WILLIAM WARD BURROWS.

AVIATION WILL BE FLOWN CACTUS FROM LONG ISLAND.

COMSOPAC
121056

COMSOPAC SENDS. LEARY PASS TO MACARTHUR ACTION

CINCPAC
INFO:CTF61,63.

LARGE ASSEMBLAGE VESSELS RA PAUL AS REPORTED IN

COMSOWESPACFOR 120335 MAY INDICATE INITIATION

EXPECT MOVEMENT AGAINST CACTUS - RINGBOLT AREA.

IF AIR STRIKING GROUPS AS OUTLINED YOUR 191034

SECRET

COMSOWESPAC
110236 (cont)

RA BAUL CONTINUING WHERE SUBS NOW OPERATING AND HARU SUNK RECENTLY, (d) OPERATIONS OFF RA BAUL OFFER TARGETS BOTH ON ENTRY AND DEPARTURE.

CINCPAC
112209

FROM: CINCPAC TO: RDO WASHINGTON 0909
RDO NOUMEA (COMSOPAC) 12

INFO: COMINCH, CINC SOWESPAC

CLOSE ASSOCIATION CINC SECOND AND CINC FIRST AIR FLEET WITH CINC FOURTH AND EIGHT FLEET AND ELEVENTH AIR FLEET SUGGESTS PROBABILITY OF FORMATION OF STRONG STRIKING FORCE FOR EMPLOYMENT IN BISMARCK - SOLOMONS IN NEAR FUTURE. PRELIMINARY ORGANIZATION SEEMS TO BE FIRST AIR FLEET TASK FORCE: HIYEI KIRISHIMA SHOKAKU ZUIKAKU RYUJO HOSHO TONE CHIKUMA KUMANO PLUS ANOTHER CRUISER. SECOND FLEET TASK FORCE: HARUNA KONGO MYOKO HAGURO MAYO TAKAO ONE XRAY AFIRM VICTOR TWO DESDIVS. NEED FOR LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS PLUS NECESSITY ASSEMBLE DESTROY SCREEN FROM PRESENT ESCORT MISSIONS INDICATE MOVEMENT SURFACE REINFORCEMENTS WILL NOT MATERIALIZE FOR SEVEN DASH TEN DAYS. PARA. EVERY MEANS AVAILABLE MUST BE EMPLOYED TO STRENGTHEN OUR POSITION IN RINGBOLT CACTUS AREA PRIOR TO ARRIVAL ABOVE FORCE IN AREA. COVER MUST BE FURNISHED BY CARRIER AIRCRAFT AS LONG AS NECESSARY AND CARRIERS WHILE WITHIN RANGE ENEMY AIR BASES SHOULD BE GIVEN MAXIMUM PROTECTION BY ACTION OF SHORE BASED AIR AGAINST THESE BASES.

SECRET

COMSOPAC
110206

GHORMLEY SENDING FLETCHER ACTION.

COMINCH 1306
CINCPAC 11th
COMTASKFOR
62,63,16,18
for information
Leary pass to
MacArthur.
Harmon will have
by hand.

IN ADDITION TO THE CONTINUING
PRIMARY TASK OF DESTROYING
HOSTILE CARRIERS ENCOUNTERED,
THE PRESENT TASK OF CARRIER
TASK FORCES ARE: AFIRM COVER
BUTTON WHILE POPPY LINE OF
COMMUNICATIONS BAKER SUPPORT
CACTUS RINGBOLT GARRISON BY DESTROYING
SHIPS OF HOSTILE ATTACK FORCE CAST COVER
MOVEMENT OF OUR AVIATION GROUND CREWS
GROUND EQUIPMENT AND AVIATION SUPPLIES
INTO CACTUS AREAS. I HOPE WE CAN GIVE
YOU ABOUT TWENTY FOUR HOURS WARNING OF
HOSTILE LANDING ATTACK FORCE MOVING
AGAINST CACTUS, AND I ESTIMATE MOST PROBABLE
POINT OF HOSTILE LANDING AS WEST END OF CACTUS.
WELL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF PLANS UNDER TASK CAST
ABOVE.

COMSOWESPAC
110236

FROM: COMSOWESPAC TO: COMSOPAC

(THIS FOR GHORMLEY FROM MACARTHUR) - AERIAL RECONN-
AISSANCE BEING CONTINUED AS REQUESTED. COMSOESPACFOR
DOES NOT RECOMMEND SHIFT SUBMARINE OPERATING AREAS
FOR FOLLOWING REASONS:- (a) (Garble--) SUBS AVAIL-
ABLE ; (b) TIME REQUIRED SHIFT TO OTHER AREA; (c)
PRESENT INTELLIGENCE INCIATES JAP CONCENTRATION

SECRET

A FEW CASUALTIES. AIR FIELD HEADY FIGHTERS AND DIVE BOMBERS.

SECRET

CINCPAC
102147

ESTIMATE ORANGE STRENGTH BISMARCK SOLOMONS ONE CHOKAI, 4 AOBA, 2 TENRYU, 1 YUBARI, 6 KAMIKAZE, 4 MINEDAZE, 4 RO SUBS 8 ITEM SUBS 1 CHITOSE, 2 TO 4 KAMIGAWA, 4 PT, 4 PC, 2 DM, 16 SC, 4 AM, 6 to 8 AP, 4 to 6 AK, ENROUTE FROM MALAYA 2 MOGAMI, 4 SHIGURE, 1 KAMIKAWA. ENROUTE FROM EMPIRE 8 ASASHIO, 1 to 2 KAMIKAWA. HAVE NO HINT OF DAMAGE TO ENEMY SURFACE CRAFT EXCEPT HIS ANNOUNCEMENT TO J 2 DAMAGED CA. HEAVY AIR REINFORCEMENTS HAVE ARRIVED OR ARE ENROUTE RABAU BAY, ENEMY AIR LOSSES IN RECENT ENGAGEMENTS WERE VERY LIMITED. NO INDICATION WHY CV HAS YET LEFT EMPIRE. YOUR 101006 MOST IMPORTANT TO SUCCESSFUL ACCOMPLISHMENT TASK ONE THAT LANDING BE PREVENTED. ASSUME YOU WILL USE CARRIER TASK FORCES AS PRACTICABLE IN OPPOSITION THERETO. MOST IMPORTANT THAT AIRCRAFT OF SOWESPAC DETECT AND REPORT MOVEMENT IN TIME AND THAT WHEN OUR CARRIERS ARE IN RANGE OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT THEIR BASES BE BOMBED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO EFFECT MAXIMUM DAMAGE DURING SUCH PERIOD.

COMSOPAC
102230

FOLLOWING IS FIRST SITUATION REPORT GIVEN ME BY VANDERGRIFT TIMED TEN TWELVE ZERO TWO. WE HOLD TULAGI GAVUTU MAKAMBO TAUAMBONGO AND HAVE FIVE THOUSAND MEN THAT AREA WHICH WAS TAKEN ONLY AFTER BITTER FIGHTING DUE RESTRICTED AREA. OUR CASUALTIES THERE ESTIMATED ABOUT FOUR FIFTY. JAP CASUALTIES ONE HUNDERD PERCENT, RUNNING OVER ONE THOUSNAD. ALSO HOLD KUKOON TO KOLI POINT GUADALCANAL DIGGING IN TO DEFEND BEACHES. HAVE FEW TOOLS AND NO BARBED WIRE. PATROLLING TO MOP UP GARRISON THREE HUNBERD TROOPS AND TWO THOUSAND PIONEERS WHO WITHDREW TO BUSH. HAVE DISPOSED OF A NUMBER AND HAVE SUFFERED

SECRET

AT PRESENT EXCEPT CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL TO MAKE FINE AIR BASE. SURFACE MISTURE OF CLAY AND CEMENT. NO MATS REQUIRED. RECOMMEND FOR PRESENT THAT CUB MATERIAL NOT BE SENT FORWARD UNTIL FURTHER SURVEY, BUT THAT PREPARATIONS BE MADE TO SEND CONSTRUCTION PERSONNEL. REPORT ON APPARENTLY EXCELLENT RADAR INSTALLATION WILL BE MADE LATER.

COMTASKFOR 62
101300

DELAYED IN TRANSMISSION DUE TO CIRCUIT CONGESTION AND RADIO SILENCE IN THIS SITUATION SUMMARY AS WELL AS YESTERDAYS AND ALSO REPORT ON GUADALCANAL AIR BASE. FIRST DETACHMENT THIS FORCE DEPARTED GUADALCANAL THROUGH LENGO CHANNEL LATE AFTERNOON LOCAL 9th WITH PART OF TRANSPORTS ESCORTED BY WOUNDED VESSELS AND MINESWEEPERS. FINAL DETACHMENT FORMED OFF TULAGI AFTER DARK AND PASSED OUT SAME ROUTE. NO CONTACT WITH ENEMY SINCE NIGHT ACTION PREVIOUS NIGHT, EXCEPT DD'S DROPPED DEPTH CHARGES ON THREE REPORTED SOUND CONTACTS VICINITY CINCPAC GRID LOVE 536063 ABOUT 0200Z/10th. LOCATION JARVIS NOT KNOWN. REQUEST COMAIRSOPAC COVER AS POSSIBLE AND INFORM ME IF SIGHTED. IT SEEMS PROBABLY ENEMY UNAWARE OUR LOSSES. RECOMMEND NO PUBLICITY. SOME EVIDENCE HAS APPERARED THAT ENEMY ALSO SUFFERED IN THE NIGHT ACTION. NOTHING FURTHER AS TO DEVELOPMENTS ON SHORE. 0913634, THENCE COURSE 157 AT 13.5 KNOTS TOWARD NEW CALEDONIA CMA AND TO DETACH TRANSDIVS 2 AND 12 TO ARRIVE EFATE MORNING OF 12th LOCAL, PREPARATORY FURTHER OPERATIONS. COMTRANSDIV 12 WILL DEBARK AVAILABLE TROOPS FOR REENFORCEMENT GARRISON ON ARRIVAL. PLAN ARRIVE BULAPT PASS ABOUT 0200Z/13th. REQUEST COMSOPAC MAKE NECESSARY PILOT AND BERTHING ARRANGEMENTS. THIS IF FINAL SUMMARY FOR PRESENT.

SECRET

THOUSAND RATIONS AND IN EXCESS OF THREE UNITS OF FIRE. IN FLORIDA AREA TOTAL PERSONNEL SIX THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED WITH FORTY NINE THOUSAND RATIONS UNBALANCED AMMUNITION BUT AMOUNTING NEARLY FIVE UNITS. PERSONNEL INCLUDING MARINES AND NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES PARA.

ABOUT SIXTEEN DOUBLE ZERO GUADALCANAL TRANSPORTS DEPARTED THROUGH LINGO CHANNEL ESCORTED BY REMAINDER OF COMPATANT VESSELS PARA.

NO CONTACT WITH ENEMY THEREAFTER EXCEPT DEPTH CHARGES DROPPED ON REPORTED SOUND CONTACTS NEXT DAY PARA. ON ELEVENTH DETACHED TRANS

DIVS TWO AND TWELVE TO PROCEED TO BUTON FOR REFORCEMENTS GARRISON IN PREPARATION FURTHER OPERATIONS. SAME DAY CHICAGO MUGFORD PATTERSON

DEPARTED TO PROCEED NOUMEA AT SLOW SPEEDS CHICAGO ONLY ABLE TO MAKE TWELVE KNOTS PARA PRIOR NIGHT ACTION OF EIGHT DASH NINE JARVIS

DIRECTED TO DEPART THROUGH LINGO CHANNEL ESCORTED BY SOUTHARD DESTINATION ROSES. SOUTHARD UNABLE TO LOCATE JARVIS DURING NIGHT

NEXT DAY FOUND JARVIS AND DEPARTED ALONE VIA CAPE ESPERANCE PROBABLY ENROUTE NOUMEA. CONSIDERABLE CONCERN FELT AS TO SAFETY THIS VESSEL

DUE TO SERIOUS STRUCTURAL DAMAGE TO HER HULL PARA. ON TENTH HULL WAS DETACHED TO CARRY DISPATCHES TO BUTON AND TO REPORT TO COMSOPAC.

ON TWELFTH DEWEY ELLET WILSON MONSSEN BUCHANAN DETACHED TO REPORT COMTASKFOR SIXTY ONE IN ACCORDANCE HIS REQUEST PARA TASK FORCE

SIXTY TWO WITH HIM DETACHMENTS ARRIVED NOUMEA THIRTEENTH PARA PRELIMINARY TABULATION SURVIVORS COLON QUINCY SIX EIGHTEEN OF WHICH

FORTY FOUR ARE OFFICERS VINCENNES SIX NINETY OF WHICH FORTY ARE OFFICERS ASTORIA INCOMPLETE BELIEVE ABOUT SIXTY FIVE ELLIOT THREE ZERO

EIGHT OF WHICH TWENTY THREE ARE OFFICERS CANBERRA SEVEN THIRTY SIX OF WHICH FIFTY ARE OFFICERS. CAPTAINS OF VINCENNES ASTORIA SAVED.

CAPTIAN OF QUINCY LOSS. CAPTIAN OF CANBERRA DIED ON BARNWIT ON TWELFTH. RALPH TALBOT TWELVE KILLED AND TWO MISSING IN ACTION JARVIS

ABOUT SIXTEEN MISSING OR KILLED PATTERSON LOSSES NO REPORT MUGFORD FIFTEEN MISSING FIVE DEAD PARA TOTAL WOUNDED REQUIRING HOSPITALIZATION

INCLUDING MARINES RETURN TO VESSELS EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY ONE OF WHICH APPROXIMATELY SIX HUNDRED REQUIRE HOSPITALIZATION FOR MORE

THAN TWO WEEKS. AN ADDITIONAL EIGHTY NINE WOUNDED FROM CANBERRA REPORT ON CASUALTIES NOT EXACT BELIEVED FROM FRAGMENTARY INFORMATION

MARINES

ABOUT FOUR HUNDRED AND FIFTY OF WHICH HALF WERE KILLED

SECRET

IT IS THE OPINION OF COMTASKFORCE SIXTY TWO THAT THE ENEMY HAS PLANNED A VERY LARGE AND COMPLETE MILITARY BASE IN THE TULAGI - GUADALCANAL AREA WITH TI ITS USEFULNESS FOR FURTHER OPERATIONS TO THE SOUTHEAST. THIS OPINION IS BASED ON HIS OBSERVATION OF THE MOST ELABORATE PREPARATIONS IN PROGRESS FOR CONSTRUCTION OF AIRFIELDS OF STORE HOUSES AND OF QUARTERS. AS A CONSEQUENCE TO THE OPERATIONS OF THE PAST FEW DAYS ~~THE~~ ENEMY REACTION IS EXPECTED TO BE VIRGOROUS.

SECRET

0915/13-L Aug From:

To: GEN MARSHALL

AGWAR STOP MR FIFTY TWO STOP RERAD NINE ZERO SIX AUGUST ELEVEN
STOP CAPACITY BASES THIS AREA ADEQUATE HANDLE FOUR SQUADRONS
HEAVY CMA TWO SQUADRONS MEDIUM BOMBERS AND EIGHT SQUADRONS
FIGHTERS ALLFULL STRENGTH STOP THIS EXCLUSIVE OF CATUS STOP
EFFECTIVE OPERATIONS TARGETS CACTUS AREA MUST BECONDUCTED
THROUGH BUTTONS WITH LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS FROM ROSES STOP
BUTTONS CAN HANDLE NINE AND ROSES FIFTEEN HEAVY BOMBERS AT
PRESENT STOP PROCEDURE HAS BEEN TO STAGE INTO THESE ADVANCED
BASES AIRPLANES FROM POPPY AND FANTAN STOP VIEW OF OFFENSIVE
ACTION AGAINST CACTUS AREA AND NECESSITY FOR COVERAGE FOR
SECURITY AND FLEET PROTECTION ONE FULLY HEAVY GROUP NECESSARY
AND CAN BE EFFECTIVELY EMPLOYED STOP MORESBY TO CACTUS IS TWO
FIVE ZERO MILES FURTHER THAN FROM BUTTONS STOP MILNE BAY IS
ABOUT FOUR ZERO MILES FURTHER AND REPORTED AVAILABLE EMERGENCY
USE ONLY STOP MACARTHURS MOST EFFECTIVE EFFORT IN SUPPORT
CONSIDERED ATTACK AIR AND SEA OBJECTIVES RABAU AND BOUGAINVILLE
AREA WITH SPECIAL ATTENTION INTERDICTION MOVEMENT FORCES
SOUTHEAST FROM RABAU STOP TWO MEDIUM SQUADRONS CAN BE EFFECTIVELY
EMPLOYED IN SECURITY OF BASES CMA FLEET COVERAGE AND STRIKING
FORCE USING BOTH BOMBS AND LIMITED NUMBER TORPEDOES STOP
BAKER TWO FIVES WILL BE DIVERTED ONLY EXTREME EMERGENCY STOP
MY INTENTION IS TO DIVERT ONLY SUFFICIENT HEAVY BOMBERS AND
BAKER TWO SIXES TO REPLACE ATTRITION AND THIS ONLY AS NECESSARY
UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES EXISTED AT THE TIME STOP MACARTHUR ADVISED
STOP COMMUNIEATION AND CLOSER COORDINATION CAN BE SECURED BY
OPERATING IN THIS AREA CMA AS COMPARED WITH SOWESPAC AREA CMA

SECRET

SINCE NAVAL FORCES INVOLVED ARE OPERATING UNDER COMSOPAC
STOP FUTURE BOMBER OPERATIONS FROM CACTUS COUPLED WITH
NECESSITY DEFEND REAR BASES WILL INCREASE REQUIREMENTS
AIRCRAFT ALL CATEGORIES STOP SEE MY NR THIRTY ONE AUGUST
FIVE STOP MARSHALL FROM HARMON STOP GHORMLEY CONCURS

SECRET

CANBERRA HEAVILY HIT BY GUN FIRE AND TORPEDO HITS ON FIRE AND AL-
MOST IMMEDIATELY OUT OF ACTION LATER SANK AT ZERO EIGHT THIRTY NINTH.

ENEMY TURNED NORTHEAST AND AT ZERO ONE FIFTY FIVE OPENED FIRE ON
NORTHERN CRUISER DIVISION THEN BEARING ZERO TEN FROM THEM AND DIS-

TANCE FIVE THOUSAND TO EIGHT THOUSAND YARDS . OUR CRUISERS THEN ON
COURSE THREE FIFTEEN SPEED TEN. HEAVY GUNFIRE DUEL ENSUED UNTIL ALL

THREE OF OUR CRUISERS WERE HEAVILY STRUCK BY PROJECTILES AND TORPEDOES
VINCENNES AND QUINCY OUT OF ACTION WITHIN FIFTEEN MINUTES QUINCY SANK

ZERO TWO FORTY AND VINCENNES AT ZERO TWO FORTY FIVE AFTER EXPLOSIONS
ENEMY CIRCLED REAR OF NORTHERN CRUISER DIVISION HEADED NORTH WEST

AGAIN FIRED HEAVILY ON THREE CRUISERS BEGINING ZERO TWO TEN AND PUT
ASTORIA OUT OF ACTION THE SHIP SINKING DURING DAYLIGHT AT TWELVE

FIFTEEN. WILSON AND HELM ENGAGED WITH GUNFIRE RECIEVED NO DAMAGE
RALPH TALBOT HEADED SOUTH AT HIGH SPEED ABOUT ZERO TWO FIFTEEN WAS

ILLUMINATED AND FIRED ON AND HIT ONCE BY OWN VESSELS POSSIBLY DOG
DOG. AT ZERO TWO EIGHTEEN TALBOT ENGAGED ENEMY FIRING FIRST TORPEDOES

TO STARBOARD AND LATER TO PORT BELIEVES MADE AT LEAST ONE HIT. TALBOT
BADLY DAMAGED BUT GOS BEYOND RANGE AT ZERO TWO THRITY BUT WAS ABLE

LATER TO RETIRE WITH FORCES AT NOUMEA. FIRE CEASED AT ZERO TWO THIRTY
AND ENEMY NOT AGAIN SEEN. BELIEVE THAT ENEMY WAS HIT AS GUN DUEL

WITNESSED FROM TRANSPORT AREA DID NOT APPEAR INTERELY ONE SIDED PARA
ENEMY USED SEARCHLIGHTS ONCE OR TWICE BUT APPARENTLY NO STAR SHELL.

BELIEVED TO HAVE EXCELLENT SYSTEM OF SCOUTING AND GUNNERY RADAR AND
PROBABLY INTEROG FOX FOX FOR USE AGAINST SHIPS. ENEMY GUNPIRE VERY

RAPID EXTREMELY ACCURATE FROM FIRST SALVO AND DID NOT DIMMISH IN
ACCURACY. THE NIGHT WAS VERY DARK WITH LOW HANGING CLOUDS ALL

FLARES BEING DROPPED THROUGH CLOUDS TO PROVIDE EXCELLENT ILLUMINATION
CONSIDERED POSSIBLE ENEMY PLANES MAY HAVE HOMED ON ENEMY RADIO

STATION IN TETARE PAREN GUADALCANAL PAREN PARA. AS A RESULT OF ACTION
FOUR OF OUR HEAVY CRUISERS WERE SUNK CHICAGO TORPEDOED IN BOW

SLIGHTLY DAMAGED BY GUNFIRE PATTERSON HIT BY ONE SHELL TWO GUNS
DISABLED TALBOT CONSIDERABLE DAMAGED TO STRUCTURE ELECTURAL AND

GUNNERY INSTALLATIONS PARA. OWING TO INSUFFICIENT FOOD AND AMMUNITION
LANDED TO SUPPORT GARRISON UNLOADING CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE NIGHT

INTERRUPTED BY ONE FALSE AIRCRAFT ALARM. TOTAL PERSONNEL LANDED
GUADALCANAL TEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED WITH FIVE HOUNDRED AND SEVENTY

SECRET

MARINE REGIMENT PARA DURING THE NIGHT UNLOADING OPERATIONS CONTINUED. EVERY EFFORT MADE TO UNLOAD MAXIMUM AMMUNITION AND FOOD IN VIEW OF APPARENT NECESSITY OF RETIREMENT FOLLOWING DAY BECAUSE OF GREATLY INCREASED ENEMY ACTION AND NECESSITY FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CARRIER GROUPS FOR REFUELLING. DURING THE NIGHT THE ENEMY SURFACE RAID OCCURED WITH THE OBVIOUS INTENTION OF DESTROYING TRANSPORTS. NIGHT PROTECTION OF TRANSPORT AREA WAS AS FOLLOWS COLON RALPH TALBOT AND BLUE ON RADAR PATROL FIVE MILES NORTH AND FIVE MILES WEST OF SAVO ISLAND RESPECTIVELY. FIVE TO EIGHT MILES BEHIND RADAR PATROL IN THE NORTH HALF OF AREA CRUISER DIVISION OF VINCENNES QUNICY ASTORIA SCREENED BY WILSON AND HELM. IN SOUTH HALF OF AREA TEN MILES TO SOUTHWEST OF BLUE CRUISER DIVISION OF CHICAGO AND CANBERRA SCREENED BY BAGLEY AND PATTERSON. AUSTRALIA ORDINARILY WITH THIS DIVISION BUT THIS NIGHT NEAR TRANSPORT AREA BECAUSE OF CONFERENCE BETWEEN COMMANDERS TASK FORCE SIXTY TWO FORTY FOUR AND CONGEN MARINES ON SITUATION. IN TULAGI AREA TRANSPORT SCREENED BY SEVERAL DOG DOG AND FOUR AFIRM PREP DOG AND THE SAN JULAN ON PATROL FIVE MILES TO WESTWARD. SOUTHERN TRANSPORTS SCREENED BY HOBART AND SEVERAL DOG DOG WITH FIVE DOG MIKE SAIL FORMING SOUND SCREEN ACROSS WEST END LINGO CHANNEL. IN CASE OF ALARM ALL DOG DOG EXCEPT THOSE SCREENING CRUISERS ORDERED TO CONCENTRATE FIVE MILES NORTHWEST SAVO ISLAND AS TORPEDO STRIKING FORCE. ABOUT MIDNIGHT RADAR PATROL DESTROYERS REPORTED SEVERAL SMALL ENEMY PLANES. THESE REPORTS GOT THROUGH TO CRUISER DIVISION BUT NOT TO EITHER TRANSPORT GROUP. AT ZERO ONE FORTY FIVE AN EXCELLANT SPREAD OF AIRCRAFT FLARES WAS DROPPED SOUTHWEST OF GUADALCANAL TRANSPORTS SILHOUETTING THEM FOR ENEMY ATTACK. TRANSPORTS DEPARTED NORTH AND EAST COMTASKFOR FORTY FOUR CONCENTRATED AUSTRALIA AND HOBART NORTH OF LUNGA POINT AND ORDERED CONCENTRATION OF SCREENING DOG DOG. AT ZERO ONE FORTY BAGLEY RIGHT HAND SCREENING DESTROYER COURSE THREE FIFTEEN SAW SEVERAL ENEMY VESSEL APPROACH AT HIGH SPEED CLOSE TO SOUTH COAST OF SAVO ISLAND GAVE WARNING AND FIRED TORPEDOES. CHICAGO AND CANBERRA HAD JUST REVERSED PATROL COURSE WERE HEADING COURSE ONE FIFTEEN. ENEMY CONSISTING PROABLY OF THREE CRUISERS AND FOUR DESTROYERS HEADED EAST PASSING CRUISERS ABOUT FOUR THOUSAND YARDS FIRING GUNS AND TORPEDOES GUN FIRE BEING RETURNED BY OUR CRUISERS. CHICAGO HIT IN BOW BY ONE TORPEDO AND BY A FEW PROJECTILES

SECRET

BOUND HIT ON MUGFORD. TWO OF THESE PLANES SHOT DOWN BY GUN FIRE
PARA BY TWO ZERO ZERO ZERO ALL TROOPS INTENDED FOR GUADALCANAL

HAD BEEN LANDED TOTAL ABOUT TEN THOUSAND AND OCCUPIED BEACH HEAD
ABOUT FIVE THOUSAND YARDS ACROSS THREE THOUSAND YARDS DEEP BUT

NO CONTACT WITH ENEMY. ON FLORIDA SIDE HALEVO WAS OCCUPIED WITHOUT
OPPOSITION ABOUT FOUR FIFTHS TULAGI CAPTURED AFTER STIFF FIGHTING.

GAVUTU WAS CAPTURED BUT HEAVY LOSSES WERE SUSTAINED IN AN ATTEMPT
ON TANAMBOGO. SEVERAL CARRIER FIGHTERS BELIEVE SHOT DOWN DURING

DAY AND ONE CARRIER DIVE BOMBER BY ENEMY TYPE BOMBER NO PLANES
LOSS FROM AA FIRE ON SHORE PARA BY MORNING OF SECOND DAY BEACH

BADLY CONGESTED ON GUADALCANAL. LITTLE EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES
LANDED FLORIDA AREA BECAUSE OF ENEMY OPPOSITION. AT NOON FORTY

TYPE NINETY SEVEN TWIN ENGINE TORPEDO PLANES APPROACHED FROM
BEHIND FLORIDA ISLAND AND ATTACKED THE GUADALCANAL TRANSPORTS

AND SCREEN. THESE HAVING RECEIVED A WARNING FROM BOUGAINVILLE
COAST WATCHERS ABOUT FORTYMINUTES EARLIER WERE UNDERWAY AT BEST

SPEED IN A DEFENSE FORMATION BETWEEN GUADALCANAL AND FLORIDA.
THE PLANE ATTACK WAS PUSHED THROUGH THE DISPOSITION AT LOW

ALTITUDE TORPEDOES DROPPED AT HEIGHT FROM TWENTY FEET TO ONE
HUNDRED FEET. DISPOSITION WAS MANEUVERED AND AVOIDED ALL TORPEDOES

EXCEPT ONE WHICH HIT JARVIS IN FORWARD PART OF SHIP CAUSING
EXTENSIVE STRUCTURAL DAMAGE AND DESTROYING COMMUNICATION BUT

NOT MOTIVE POWER. ONE TORPEDO PLANE CRASHED ELLIOT STARTING BAD
FIRE AND CAUSING FINAL LOSS OF SHIP. ATTEMPTS WERE MADE TO SAL-

VAGE WITHOUT SUCCESS SHIP TORPEDOED BY OWN FORCES BUT DRIFTED ON
SHOAL BEFORE SINKING STILL BURNING WHEN LAST SEEN. AT LEAST

TWELVE ENEMY PLANES WERE SHOT DOWN IN TRANSPORT AREA AND TWO BY
LANDING BOATS WHEN THESE WERE ATTECKED AT LANDING BEACH. PART OF

THESE WERE SHOP DOWN BY FIGHTERS BELIEVED ADDITIONAL ONES DES-
TROYED TO THE WESTWARD. ABOUT SEVEN OF OUR FIGHTERS PROBABLY LOST

LANDING ON CARGO CONTINUED INTERRUPTED BY SECOND AIR ALARM WHICH
PROVED FALSE. AT END OF DAY KUKUM AREA AND AIR FIELD ON GUADAL-

CANAL OCCUPIED WITH SLIGHT OPPOSITION ENEMY TROOPS AND CONSTRUCTION
WORKERS HAVING SCATTERED DUE TO GUN FIRE AND BOMBING. TETARE

AREA STILL IN HANDS OF ENEMY. IN FLORIDA AREA TULAGI GAVUTU AND
TANAMBOGO CAPTURED EXCEPT FOR A FEW SNIPERS. SEVERE ENEMY RESISTANCE
REQUIRED THE USE OF THE THREE INFANTRY BATTALIONS OF THE SECOND

SECRET

COMSOPAG
131400 (cont)

SIXTY TWO APPROACH WAS COMPLETE SURPRISE TO ENEMY.
SHORE BOMBARDMENT OF GUADALCANAL AND TULAGI WAS
OPENED AT ZERO SIX SEVENTH WITH SHIPS GUN FIRE AND
BOMBING FROM CARRIER PLANES. EIGHTEEN ENEMY SEA
PLANES WERE DESTROYED ON WATER AND ONE SMALL SCHOONER.
LANDINGS BEGAN FLORIDA AREA AT ZERO SEVEN TWENTY
GUADALCANAL AT ZERO NINE TEN FIVE MILES EAST OF LUNGA
POINT WITH LITTLE OPPOSITION. SHALLOW AREAS SWEEP
FOR MINES BUT NONE FOUND. AT FIFTEEN TWENTY ABOUT
TWENTY FIVE ENEMY TYPE NINETY SEVEN BOMBERS PASSED
OVERHEAD EIGHT THOUSAND FEET DROPPED SEVERAL BOMBS
NO DAMAGE BUT PROCEEDED TO ATTACK CARRIERS WITHOUT
FINDING THEM TASK FORCE SIXTY TWO SHOT DOWN TWO AND
DAMAGED TWO BELIEVE ADDITIONAL SHOT DOWN BY CARRIER
FIGHTERS. ONE HOUR LATER TEN ENEMY TYPE NINETY
NINE BOMBERS ATTACKED TWO DOG DOG MADE ONE TWO FIFTY

SECRET

COMSOPAC
121056 (cont)

JULY ARE STILL AVAILABLE ATTACKS ON SUCH GROUPS 2156
OF VESSELS WOULD BE OF INESTIMABLE BENEFIT IN 12th
FURTHERANCE OUR JOINT OPERATIONS.

COMINCH
121250

FROM: COMINCH TO: CINCPAC INFO: COMSOPAC 2350
FOR ADDRESSES ONLY ALL OTHER STOP DECRYPTING. 12
INCOMPLETE REPORTS ARE DISTURBING AS TO SHIPS
LOSSES AND REQUIRE SPECIFIC CONFIRMATION TO
INCLUDE HOW (GOV) LOSSES CAME ABOUT.

COMSOPAC
131400

FROM: COMSOPAC TO: CINCPAC INFO: COMINCH
REPLY TO YOUR TWELVE TWENTY TWENTY FIVE. FOR
PURPOSE OF CLARITY IN NARRATIVE ZONE TIME IS USED
THROUGHOUT. OPERATION COMMENCED ONE EIGHT DOUBLE
ZERO ONE AUGUST WHEN TASK FORCE SIXTY TWO DEPARTED
FROM POSITION THIRTY MILES SOUTH OF KANDAVU FIJI
ISLANDS COVERED BY TASK FORCES SIXTY ONE AND SIXTY
THREE. PROCEEDED ON COURSE TWO EIGHT ONE TO
LONGITUDE ONE FIVE NINE EAST IN ORDER TO AVOID
ENEMY OBSERVATION AND TAKE THEM FROM THE REAR.
ONE TWO DOUBLE ZERO AUGUST FIVE FORCE PROCEEDED
NORTH THROUGH XXX BAD WEATHER WHICH HINDERED AIR
OPERATIONS. WEATHER CLEARED DURING NIGHT OF SIXTH
TO PERMIT FIXING POSITION OF TASK FORCE SIXTY TWO
AND PERMITTING IT TO PASS BETWEEN GUADALCANAL AND
RUSSELL ISLANDS COMPLETE RADIO SILENCE. PRESERVED
NO ENEMY CONTACTS ENROUTE PARA TASK FORCE SIXTY