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MILITARY STRATEGY IS AN IMPORTANT PART OF NATIONAL STRATEGY, AND MUST FIT INTO THE NATIONAL STRATEGY.

MILITARY STRATEGY IS LARGELY BASED ON GEOGRAPHY.

NAVAL STRATEGY IS A PART OF MILITARY STRATEGY. IT MUST FIT INTO THE OVERALL PATTERN OF MILITARY STRATEGY.

THE INTEGRATION OF NAVAL STRATEGY INTO MILITARY STRATEGY; AND OF MILITARY STRATEGY INTO NATIONAL STRATEGY HAS BEEN GREATLY FACILITATED BY THE ORGANIZATION SET UP BY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT PASSED LAST SUMMER.

PRIMARY PURPOSE OF NAVAL STRATEGY IS CONTROL OF NECESSARY SEA AREAS AND DENIAL OF USE OF SEA TO ENEMY.

NAVAL STRATEGY OF ANY COUNTRY IS PRIMARILY BASED ON ITS GEOGRAPHY AND ITS CAPABILITIES.

EXAMPLES -- U.S., BRITISH EMPIRE, JAPAN, GERMANY, ITALY, RUSSIA, FRANCE, SPAIN.

VALUE OF INSULAR VERSUS CONTINENTAL POSITION IN DEVELOPMENT OF SEA POWER.

SECURITY OF HOME BASE IS ESSENTIAL, PARTICULARLY WITH PRESENT DAY CAPABILITIES OF LONG RANGE AIR BLOWS.

SEA POWER PROTECTS INSULAR COUNTRY, WHICH THEREFORE DOES NOT REQUIRE GREAT LAND FORCES TO PREVENT INVASION BY HOSTILE

NEIGHBORS.

CONTINENTAL COUNTRY WITH POWERFUL HOSTILE NEIGHBORS MUST SECURE HOME TERRITORY BY LAND AND AIR FORCES. ITS RESOURCES DO NOT PERMIT CONSTRUCTION OF SUPREME NAVY IN ADDITION.

CONDITION WHICH WOULD OBTAIN IF ONE COUNTRY OBTAINED CONTROL OF EUROPE AND ASIA. POSSIBLE HOSTILE NEIGHBORS WOULD BE ELIMINATED, VERY GREAT RESOURCES AND MAN POWER WOULD BE OBTAINED, AND COUNTRY WOULD CHANGE FROM CONTINENTAL TO INSULAR COUNTRY. IT WOULD THEN BE ABLE TO BUILD GREAT SEA POWER.

ROLE OF AIR IN NAVAL POWER. LONG

RANGE STRIKING POWER, RECONNAISSANCE.

A.S. WARFARE

EFFECT OF LAND BASED AIR POWER IN  
LIMITING AREAS IN WHICH HOSTILE SHIPS CAN  
OPERATE. SHRINKAGE OF SECURITY AFFORDED  
BY SEA BARRIERS. CASES OF GREAT BRITAIN  
AND JAPAN, VERSUS U.S.

EFFECT OF DISTANCE FROM TARGET ON  
PERCENTAGE OF HITS IN WAR.

SECURITY FOR U.S. IN WAR OBTAINED BY  
PUSHING OUR FRONT LINES TOWARD ENEMY,  
THEREBY SHORTENING OUR RANGE TO HIM, WHILE  
KEEPING HIS RANGE TO US LONG.

PUSHING OUR FRONT LINES TOWARD ENEMY  
INVOLVES CONTROL OF SEA COMMUNICATIONS.  
SEA POWER INSURES THIS CONTROL -- UNDER  
WATER, ON SURFACE, AND IN THE AIR -- PLUS  
THE ABILITY THROUGH MERCHANT SHIPPING TO  
USE THIS CONTROL FOR WAR PURPOSES.

CONTROL OF SEA MUST BE OBTAINED BY DEFEATING OR CONTAINING ENEMY FLEET, BY OBTAINING CONTROL OF THE AIR IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS, AND BY KEEPING WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS LOSSES DUE TO ENEMY SUBMARINE ACTIVITY. EXAMPLES FROM WORLD WARS I AND II.

USES OF SEA CONTROL WHEN GAINED.

IMPORTS AND EXPORTS. SUPPORT OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS. TYPES OF OVERSEAS OPERATIONS -- RAIDS, AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS FOR CAPTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF BASES.

NECESSITY FOR BASES. KINDS OF BASES

-- HOME AND ADVANCED. NEEDED FOR SUPPORT OF NAVAL, LAND AND AIR FORCES. EXAMPLES FROM WORLD WAR II.

SECURITY OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION IS

ESSENTIAL, EXCEPT FOR RAIDS WHICH ARE LOGISTICALLY SELF-CONTAINED.

SUCCESS OF OUR MOVEMENT ACROSS PACIFIC DURING WORLD WAR II WAS RESULT OF OUR ABILITY TO KEEP DOWN LOSSES FROM ENEMY SUBMARINES; OUR GREAT INCREASE IN NUMBER OF CARRIERS, WHICH ENABLED US TO GET CONTROL OF THE AIR IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS; OUR IMPROVEMENT IN AMPHIBIOUS TECHNIQUE, WHICH ENABLED US TO LAND AGAINST HEAVY OPPOSITION; OUR MOBILE LOGISTIC SUPPORT; AND OUR FLEET STRENGTH, WHICH PREVENTED SUCCESSFUL INTERFERENCE BY JAPANESE FLEET WITH OUR AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.

DIFFERENCE IN CAPABILITIES OF CARRIER AND LAND BASED AIRCRAFT. LIMITATIONS ON

SIZE OF CARRIER PLANES REDUCE RANGE BUT IMPROVE ACCURACY OF HITTING. LARGE LAND PLANES HAVE GREATER RANGE, BUT AGAINST SMALL TARGETS THEY ARE OFTEN SO INACCURATE AS TO BE INEFFECTIVE, PARTICULARLY IF TARGETS ARE WELL PROTECTED, OR ARE MANEUVERABLE. LARGE LAND PLANES CAN CARRY MUCH GREATER WEIGHT OF EXPLOSIVES, HENCE, WITH THEIR REDUCED ACCURACY, ARE BETTER FOR AREA BOMBING. MORE MISSIONS FOR SMALL PLANE.

USE OF NAVAL PATROL PLANES FOR RECONNAISSANCE. RELATIVE VALUE OF SEAPLANES VERSUS LAND PLANES FOR THIS PURPOSE. SEARCH, ANTI-SUBMARINE PATROL, WEATHER OBSERVATION.

USES OF SUBMARINES. OPERATIONS



AGAINST SHIPPING IN WATERS UNDER ENEMY  
CONTROL. A.S. WORK. RECONNAISSANCE.  
WEATHER OBSERVATION. RESCUE OF DOWNED  
AVIATORS IN ENEMY WATERS. PICKETS TO DE-  
TECT ATTACKING ENEMY AIRCRAFT.

VALUE OF RADAR.

NEW WEAPONS. ATOMIC BOMB. RADIO  
ACTIVE MATERIALS. BIOLOGICAL AGENTS.  
GUIDED MISSILES. NEW SUBMARINES WITH  
LONG SUBMERGENCE AND HIGH UNDERWATER SPEED.

CONCLUSION. REGARDLESS OF NEW DE-  
VELOPMENTS WE MUST BE PREPARED TO CARRY  
WAR TO ENEMY, NOT PERMIT HIM TO BRING IT  
TO US. THIS MEANS OVERSEAS OPERATIONS,  
IN WHICH CONTROL OF THE SEA IS VITAL.  
SUCH OPERATIONS INVOLVE THE CO-ORDINATED  
USE OF SEA, GROUND AND AIR FORCES, EACH

IN ITS PROPER SPHERE.

IN BOTH NAVAL AND LAND OPERATIONS, CONTROL OF THE AIR IN THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS IS A REQUIREMENT, BUT NEITHER NAVAL NOR AIR FORCES CAN CAPTURE AND HOLD LAND. THIS REQUIRES GROUND FORCES, OF WHICH THE INFANTRYMAN IS THE BACKBONE.

AMERICANS ARE A PEACE LOVING PEOPLE, THEY HAVE GREAT PATIENCE UNDER PROVOCATION, BUT, AS PROVED BY THEIR REACTION TO THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR, THERE IS A LIMIT TO THEIR PATIENCE. THE UNITED STATES CAN BE DEPENDED UPON NOT TO COMMENCE A WAR, BUT IT CANNOT BE DEPENDED UPON NOT TO ENGAGE IN ONE UNPREPARED.

BY KEEPING OUR OBJECTIVES IN INTER-

NATIONAL POLITICS AND OUR MILITARY STRENGTH MORE IN CONSONANCE WITH EACH OTHER THAN WE HAVE IN THE PAST, WE SHOULD REDUCE THE CHANCES OF OUR BEING ATTACKED OR OF OUR BEING PUSHED INTO A POSITION FROM WHICH MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL BY BOTH SIDES TO A CONTROVERSY BECOMES A PRACTICAL IMPOSSIBILITY. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, CREATED BY THE NATIONAL DEFENSE ACT LAST SUMMER, GIVES US A BODY WHICH SHOULD KEEP OUR FOREIGN POLICY AND OUR MILITARY POLICY IN LINE WITH EACH OTHER.

IF THE UNITED STATES SHOULD EVER AGAIN BE FORCED INTO WAR, OUR POLITICAL OBJECTIVES SHOULD BE REASONABLE, SO THAT

THEY MAY BE ATTAINED WITHOUT DEMANDING AN UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER. THE WAR SHOULD BE WAGED WITH A MINIMUM OF UNNECESSARY DESTRUCTION, BOTH OF HUMAN BEINGS AND PROPERTY. WORLD WAR II SHOULD TEACH US THAT WE MUST TRY TO OBTAIN OUR ENDS WITHOUT THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR ENEMY'S CIVILIZATION.

CONTROL OF THE SEA WILL ENABLE US TO CHOOSE WHERE AND WHEN WE SHALL FIGHT.