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**CONFRONTING A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: DETERRENCE, ARMS
CONTROL, AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVISITED**

by

Jeffrey E. Thieret

Major USAF

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the U.S. Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Advanced Research.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the U.S. Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:



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Paper directed by
Stephen O. Fought
Director, Defense Analysis
Department of National
Security Decision Making

Approved by:



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Abstract of
CONFRONTING A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: DETERRENCE, ARMS
CONTROL AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVISITED

The end of the Cold War and the resultant collapse of the bipolar world order are resulting in the gradual emergence of regional Third World powers. America is left unchallenged as a global superpower, yet its national strategy must now adapt to deal with a certain degree of multipolarity based upon these regional power centers. The U.S. can achieve global security through of impellance. Impellance, which is proactive and forcible, replaces the entrenched bipolar Cold War national security strategy with a globally oriented one. The added strength of reliable alliances allows an impellent U.S. to lead a collective of nations which desire a new world order. Impellance addresses the need for increased protection against a rising ballistic missile threat in the Third World. Ballistic missile arsenals are viewed as regionally destabilizing, giving belligerent nations the ability to leapfrog over neutral or adjacent nations to inflict psychological and physical damage upon once insulated states. Third World ballistic missile systems are rapidly improving through arms and technology transfers. Arms control efforts via impellent strategy, concentrating upon multiple aspects of the proliferation equation, provides both incentives and disincentives to slow the horizontal spread of technology and arms. Improved ranges and accuracies will still occur through indigenous regional improvements and natural technology transfers. Significantly improved anti-tactical ballistic missiles are needed to counter the rising regional threats which arms control alone cannot prevent. Global networking of regional pockets of antitactical ballistic missiles can provide a limited degree of protection against increased-range regional missiles. The bipolar 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty did not consider a multilateral ballistic missile threat. The Treaty is the best existing vehicle to address proliferation control and multilateral defense requirements. The current period of cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR presents an opportunity to amend or redraft the ABM Treaty to address the multi-axis threat and allow appropriate defensive methods.

PREFACE

The topic of this study is a direct offshoot of the U.S. Naval War College's 1990 Global War Games. Set in the late 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet regime presented the specter of a multipolar world which the U.S. was ill prepared to face. Entrenched bipolar reasoning was a serious obstacle to overcome; thereby the question surfaced asking "what is the nature of deterrence in a multipolar world?" This was the seed that, once planted, generated this research path.

International events were breaking at a rapid pace as this paper was put through the final review cycle. The ground war phase for the liberation of Kuwait had just concluded, with events in the Gulf War proving timely to the subject matter of this work. In addition, SDIO announced plans to reorganize the Strategic Defense Initiative Program to concentrate upon ground based inter-continental ballistic missile active defenses with additional concentration on tactical ballistic missile defenses. Their new direction applies directly to the independent conclusions reached in Chapter IV.

Many of the personal interviews would not have been possible without the references provided by Professor Kenneth E. Freeman, U.S. Naval War College and Mr. Thomas W. Johnson, Assistant for Policy and Planning in the SDIO/External Affairs. Their help proved invaluable to the completion of this product.

Special recognition is deserved by those who took their valuable time to interview with the author. With their insight, knowledge and expertise in the appropriate subject areas, analysis was simplified to a great extent. In alphabetical order, acknowledgement is due to the following: Mr. Frank C. Carlucci, The Carlyle Group; Dr. Albert Carnasale, John F. Kennedy School of Government; Air Force Captain Chuck Costanza, SDIO; Dr. Susan Koch, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Ambassador Paul H. Nitze, Johns Hopkins University; Professor Theodore A. Postol, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Mr. Baker Spring, The Heritage Foundation; Ms. Kathleen Roummelle, SDIO; and Mr. Will Tobey, U.S. National Security Council Staff.

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CONFRONTING A MULTIPOLAR WORLD:
DETERRENCE, ARMS CONTROL AND
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE REVISITED

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Issue of Change.

We are facing a strategic transformation born of the success of our postwar policies. Yet, such fundamental political change will likely be turbulent. There may be setbacks and new sources of instability. Happy endings are never guaranteed.¹

The world bears witness to an era of profound change, much of it the result of events transpiring in the midst of the Soviet sphere of influence within the past decade. As a result, the most significant global political unrest since the end of the Second World War is redrawing the map of Eastern and Central Europe; the Middle East is in turmoil; and the USSR has turned visibly inward to deal with political, economic and social crises rocking their regime. Soviet internal convulsions will occupy them for years, if not decades to come. "The overall effect . . . is to create an increasingly diverse international system, replacing the bipolar order of the postwar period."²

The impact of these changes upon United States strategy and policy decisions is enormous. As a new global arrangement turns towards multipolarity, U.S. national and global commitments are also likely to shift. "Adjusting to this new geopolitical circumstance will be difficult for the United States. Its commitments around the world have

1. George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: The White House, 1990) P. 5.

2. Yezid Sayigh, Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries, Adelphi Papers, no. 251 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990) p. 64.

increased in the past decade. . . but the means of fulfilling those commitments are becoming more difficult." ¹

During the Cold War the U.S. placed deterrence as the cornerstone of its national defense strategy. Deterrence - or more accurately the threat of response to hostile aggression - remained pivotal to U.S. national defense strategy during the course of the bipolar ideological conflict. With the emergence of multipolarity, strategy is experiencing a state of flux. What is the nature of deterrence in a multipolar world? Is deterrence an adequate word to describe what is now required through U.S. national defense strategy? The U.S. Naval War College's 1990 Global War Games attempted to explore the question.

The perceived retreat of the superpowers seems certain to alter the behavior of regional players, sometimes in very negative ways. Potential enemies will have more, and in some cases better, conventional forces. Third World possession of nuclear, chemical, biological, and sophisticated conventional weapons raises a host of painful questions. Our concepts of deterrence, preemption, retaliation, escalation, and active and passive defenses must all be reexamined.²

America finds herself victorious, yet alone as a true world superpower in the 1990s. Can the U.S. metamorphose its national strategy to one which fits its global leadership role? The answer may well determine whether the U.S., like its Cold War adversary, will retract into neo-isolationism or embraces the broad scope of responsibilities borne by a true global superpower.

Many surprises and complex issues face America as it confronts the ramifications of its Cold War victory. Multipolarity may unleash many leadership challenges for the U.S.. It is ironic to look back upon the bipolar confrontation as stabilizing, yet by Cold War standards, multipolarity embodies increased instability. Countries once under the sponsorship of the U.S. or the USSR are emerging as regional powers in the possession of formidable arms arsenals. Integral to U.S. national strategy and global security is a means of

1. Joseph Kruzal, ed., 1988 - 1989 American Defense Annual (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988) p. 13.

2. Henry C. Bartlett and G. Paul Holman, "Global War Games & The Real World," Proceedings (February 1991): 28.

preventing the destabilizing effects of rampant proliferation and technology transfers within volatile Third World regions.

Arms control has produced some admirable successes between the U.S. and the USSR; the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks are the most notable. Can multilateral arms control benefit from the success of these bilateral regimes? What agency or vehicle can successfully implement and enforce multilateral arms control agendas to limit rampant ballistic missile proliferation? What defense options do America and her allies have to protect them should arms control measures fail?

Recent events in the Middle Eastern Gulf War demonstrate that bipolar logic does not necessarily apply to Third World regional conflict in today's multipolar strategic environment. The ballistic missile threat is not an immediate one for the continental U.S., but America's allies are faced with a growing danger. Recently demonstrated tactical ballistic missile protection works against limited range and capability threats. Are they sufficient, or is a global system of defense mandated by missile booster and guidance evolutions now occurring in the Third World?

The U.S. may well decide that protection from inter-continental ballistic missiles is necessary. How does the U.S. comply with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty while defending its vital interests from the dangers of ballistic missile attack? Are the Soviets as concerned about Third World ballistic missiles, and if so, would they be agreeable to modifying or renegotiating the existing Treaty accord? What modifications are needed, and should such a revamped treaty be limited to the U.S. and the USSR alone? If treaty participation is widened, who should be offered to join?

The following chapters address U.S. national and global strategies to cope with multipolar ballistic missile proliferation. The logical place to begin is determining America's recent political and strategic course of evolution, and to examine the alternatives available to enhance national, regional and global security.

CHAPTER II

NATIONAL VERSUS GLOBAL U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY

U.S. Defense Requirements in Transition.

How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we could prohibit in like manner the preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the means and the danger of attack. . . A wise nation. . . does not rashly preclude itself from any resource which may become essential to its safety. ¹

. . . the chief national security lesson of this decade is simply this: strength secures peace. ²

Separated by nearly two-hundred years of history, these statements convey the same essential message; for any nation to remain strong, it requires a complete, viable defense that adequately fulfills the critical security needs of its times. The concept of defense - and specific strategies imparted to it - are consequently defined differently by successive generations.

The Articles of Confederation addressed the overriding strategic issue of its period, primarily in Article III, as ". . . creating a defensive [emphasis added] alliance of thirteen independent states to protect against foreign interference."³ Since then, the U.S. has fully accepted a commitment not only to its own prosperity, but to that of its allies as well.

America stepped into the role of a global superpower, champions of preserving the fragile world order that remained at the end of the Second World War. Its charter was to lead and protect democracies and economies emerging in the shadows of a hegemonic USSR. For the first time in its history the U.S. embraced the security and well being of

1. James Madison, "The Federalist Number 41," American Government and National Security, ed. Richard C. Remy (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1989), 24.

2. President George Bush, 21 March 1989, "United States Army Posture Statement, FY90/91." p. 1.

3. Richard C. Remy, ed., American Government and National Security (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1989) p. 17.

other nations in times of peace. Their safety and prosperity were U.S. cardinal interests as well. The "Cold War" cemented the "Western" alliance together, with the U.S. at the helm. The West faced a precise problem with a definite aim; the problem was monolithic communist expansion; the aim was containment through deterrence. We confronted one enemy with one policy-strategy match. Deterrence was defined by former President Ronald Reagan as the following:

Deterrence means simply this: Making sure any adversary who thinks about attacking the United States or our allies or our vital interests concludes the risks to him outweigh any potential gains. Once he understands that, he won't attack. ¹

Deterrent strategy has been described as many things by many people. Perhaps the best definition is that it is comparable to playing chicken. Deterrence became conceptually oriented towards the response offensive, i.e., punishment. To the Soviets the message was very clear; "attack our interests and we will respond asymmetrically with all of our nuclear might." Yet we could not protect against a first strike nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attack should and when it occurred, i.e., denial of objectives. Deterrence thus became synonymous with reactive or punishing defense.

Response offense deterrence has not changed much in the last 30 years. Today, our ability to secure victory in an all-out war relies upon "a decisive and completely secure superiority in offensive nuclear weapons that virtually eliminates any possibility of retaliation (i.e., the perfect offense)."² In the pure and simple response offense deterrence world, a viable ballistic missile defense is considered by many as destabilizing. For two equal offensive giants, the one with a denial of objectives capability possessed the decided advantage. Hence active defenses were felt to tilt the bipolar equation, increasing the potential for conflict. The offense with the best defense could feel more secure in launch-

1. Christopher J. Lamb, How to Think About Arms Control, Disarmament, and Defense (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988) p. 63.

2. Arthur L. Bennett, Jr., Command of the Aerospace: Convergence of Theory and Technology in Shaping an Aerospace Force for 2025 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1986) p. 4.

ing a first strike. The defensive capabilities against ballistic missiles were therefore limited by the Anti-ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972, which remains in force today.

Response offense deterrence fell out of favor throughout the 1970s and 1980s, particularly concerning its applicability to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO defense policy clearly stated that if it were suddenly attacked by the Warsaw Pact, even with conventional forces, it would respond - or punish - with nuclear weapons if necessary. The loss in credibility for the punishment aspect of deterrence, eventually pointed out by the NATO members themselves, centered around the lack of a way to deny the obvious Warsaw Pact nuclear reply to NATO's nuclear volley. NATO could threaten to use nuclear weapons, but could not protect against their subsequent use against them. Hence the chicken analogy.

After nearly five decades of direct ideological and proxy military confrontation between the East and the West, the Cold War has thawed. Deterrent strategy and its perfect offense, or big stick, direction proved adequate for the containment policy it once served. Two adversaries successfully deterred each other from total war with their response offense nuclear inventories.

The head-to-head confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR has lessened significantly with democratization in Eastern and Central Europe. Indications of diplomatic mending are evident with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Reduction Treaty and the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). It must be stressed, however, that the Soviet threat which gave birth to the need for a response offense deterrent strategy has not diminished. The Soviet regime's improved nuclear arsenal, combined with ongoing domestic chaos, may make them ". . . a greater, instead of a lesser, threat in the future." ¹ Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney remains concerned about the potential Soviet threat; questions about continued democratization and demilitarization leave him ". . . some cause for

1. Paul H. Nitze, Interview with Author, 14 January 1991.

concern."¹ The U.S. faces an unstable and powerful Soviet Union and a jittery Third World situation as well. Such an environment will prove very troublesome for future policy/strategy planners. Bipolar logic and threats of punishment do not easily fit the emerging new world order.

The Adequacy of Response Offense Deterrence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recognized by the end of the 1970s that response offense deterrence is incomplete without a full marriage to protective deterrence.² Response offense, or the threat of punishment, was reaching the limit of its once useful life. Realizing the Soviets were edging toward offensive strategic dominance, General Vessey, Chairman of the JCS briefed President Reagan on 11 February 1983 on the possibility of a "... long-term strategy based on strategic defense. . . ." and questioned the President "... wouldn't it be better to protect the American people than avenge them?"³ President Reagan took to heart the recommendation of the JCS, and in March of that year announced the beginning of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Integrated Deterrence.

The causes of war remain as they were described by Thucydides, namely fear, ambition, and the desire for gain. . . . [Therefore] war, and the potential for war, will remain a feature of international politics.⁴

U.S. defense strategy fundamentally continues to deter aggression, though the nature of deterrence is shifting from the response offense to denial of objectives. This does not mean the abandonment of offensive capabilities. Denial of objectives is com-

1. Casey Anderson, "Air Force on Course for Major Restructuring," Air Force Times, 18 February 1991: 13.

2. Donald R. Baucom, "Hail to the Chiefs," Policy Review 53 (Summer 1990): 69.

3. Baucom, 72.

4. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Future of Force and American Strategy," The National Interest 21 (Fall 1990): 8.

prised of both offensive and defensive capabilities. The defensive aspect of denial entails passive characteristics, such as the ability to harden strategically significant areas, and active measures, such as the deployment of ballistic missile defenses. The variable nature of Soviet relations, and the strategic threat that they still impose, demands retention of a formidable offensive nuclear response capability. However "the range of options for responding to enemy aggression could now include defensive response options." ¹

Together the U.S. and the USSR are facing a new threat, one emerging from the shadows of the eclipsed bipolar world. Soon, many small and medium powers will possess improved ballistic missile arsenals and the ability to propel them towards both American and Soviet vital interest. In the meantime, very real and serious regional instabilities are increasing in frequency. These problems, and the unreliable nature of the evolving Soviet state, are issues that response offense deterrence alone cannot deal with. The shortcomings of punishment oriented deterrence clearly admitted, increased attention is now given to denial of objectives deterrence as the strategic key to success. Iraq, and the Gulf War aggression against Kuwait, provides an excellent case study.

When Iraq pulled away from its decaying Soviet orbit and invaded Kuwait, a Western vital interest, all the strategic nuclear and conventional retaliatory might of the U.S. did not deter Saddam Hussein. The threat of punishment had no affect. Nuclear arsenals do not threaten regional non-nuclear powers and their "weapons of mass destruction" because they know we will not be the first to use them.² The U.S. led coalition responded to the Iraqi aggression, yet the coalition forces naturally assumed a denial of objectives role. Denial involved both the offensive military capability of the coalition, the active defense of the Patriot anti-missile missile system, and passive defensive measures such as chemical warfare protection, trenches, and hardening likely allied targets. The mere threat of

1. Bennett, 61.

2. Robin Ranger, "After the Cold War," Policy Review 53 (Summer 1990): 12.

response proved unable, however, to keep a hegemonic medium regional power from invading in the first place. The shift from a bipolar to a multipolar world with small, previously neglected powers rising in prominence, ". . . will involve additional potential initiators of a conflict or war, shifting coalitions of major actors, an increase in global uncertainty, and thus a more dangerous world than a bipolar one." ^{1*} This dangerous world requires the ability to deny aggressors, and potential aggressors, their objectives.

The roles of offensive and defensive deterrence, when opposing the aggressive ambitions of an adversary, are flexible and interchangeable. To prevent misreading the intent of which deterrence is being used in what context (bipolar or multipolar), deterrence should connote a "balanced offensive-defensive emphasis" in the denial perspective. ² Integrated deterrence inherently blends the response offense with passive and active defensive protection to provide the capabilities required to support U.S. policy world-wide with limited forward presence forces. Integrated deterrence is a crucial part of U.S. national security strategy.

The Gulf War amplifies the fundamental need for an integrated deterrence capability. Iraq has demonstrated that ballistic missiles pose very real dangers to regional stability and U.S. global interests. The sudden and disturbing use of SCUD missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia demonstrated; (1) that ballistic missiles have the potential to destabilize a wide region in a very short period of time, i.e., they are quick in accomplishing their mission and can reach beyond immediate regional neighborhoods; and (2) ballistic missiles do not have to be effective against military targets to be a potent psychological weapon of war. Ballistic missiles can damage the "people" element of the "trinity of war" and their will to

1. Nils Peter Gleditsch and Olav Njolstad, eds. Arms Races (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1990) p. 378.

* Iraq's invasion also confirmed the decay of bipolarity. The USSR would never have allowed Iraq to commit its transgressions in the bipolar past for fear of directly confronting the U.S. and initiating the next world war.

2. Bennett, 76.

continue the cause.^{1*} Reactions elicited are as significant as targets destroyed.

For the first time in history, however, an effective anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) active defense was available. The Patriot anti-missile missile system demonstrated remarkable "protective" capability despite relatively primitive technology and limited range. The Patriot proves the necessary first step evolutionary adjunct to a fully capable integrated deterrence strategy. The Patriot's ATBM shield helped keep the Gulf War from quickly boiling over into a much more involved conflict. Israel, without the protection provided by the Patriot, would most likely never have subjected its population to the repeated psychological and physical shock of ballistic missile attacks from an avowed Arab enemy. Without an active defensive system on their soil, it is doubtful that passive defense alone would have appeased the Israeli leadership and population. The very foundation of the U.S. led coalition was kept intact by thwarting Saddam Hussein's attempts to broaden the War.

So successful appears the Patriot in protecting "civilian populations" that other nations are expressing strong desires to acquire the system. Raytheon stock is rapidly rising as the company harvests the benefits of a proven active defensive weapon system. The Patriot is only a glimpse of what the ATBM weapon of the future could be capable of. Such protection is vital to the concept of forward presence.

Proactive Defense. U.S. policy and economic realities demand forward presence vs forward deployment of U.S. troops and supplies; forward presence relies upon integrated deterrence. The logic follows: The U.S. is sure to face reduced defense expenditures in the near term; at the same time, the U.S. has a steadily increasing range of global commit-

1. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) p. 89.

* The other two elements of the "Trinity of War" are the commander and his army, and the government.

ments. Reduced funding will impact U.S. capability to defend those commitments.

The proposed 1992 defense budget marks the first step in a massive restructuring of the military that would scrap the current command structure and shrink the force by one-fourth over five years.¹

Therefore the U.S. must (1) maintain its ability to reconstitute forces in order to face the potential of a reemergent Soviet threat to Europe and other vital interest areas; and (2) have a viable defensive (active and passive) capability to counter any immediate crisis that threatens forward presence forces, vital interests, or allied vital interests.² The natural course of strategic evolution recognizes the need for a combined offensive/defensive, or integrated, capability. The implicit instability of a multipolar world demands it.

In order to handle the uncertain nature of security threats encountered in the multipolar world, integrated deterrence must combine with the elements of forward presence to develop a proactive instead of a reactive defense. Proactive defense anticipates significant problem areas. More importantly, proactive defense allows for the protection of U.S. assets, allies and vital interests with means other than response oriented capabilities. Passively and actively defending, responding offensively when necessary, integrated deterrence will proactively deny potential adversaries their objectives.

National security strategy is gradually adapting to encompass the global nature of U.S. power and influence, and the changing nature of deterrence. The U.S. is embracing its global commitments with a comprehensive approach, one that involves all national assets.

National Security Strategy.

... it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The

1. William Matthews, "Budget Plan Points Way to 4 Commands Replacing 10," Air Force Times, 18 February 1991: 3.

2. Captain Larry Seaquist, USN, "U.S. National Security Strategy," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI, 3 January 1991.

circumstances that endanger a nation are infinite. . . ¹

In the face of future global uncertainty, the U.S. is implementing a security plan with broad international breadth and scope. President Bush's August 1990 National Security Strategy confronts not only the on-going implications of continued Soviet instability, but of Third World regional conflict as well. Such a strategy is a major milestone. The U.S. does not have a history of proactive strategic thinking. Instead, our strategies were reactions to aggression and to perceived sources of aggression and involved primarily a punishment oriented response offense deterrence. Now the nation faces a watershed transition period, a period of "violent peace". ² The revised U.S. national strategy shifts proactively to confront this new era, taking on a distinctly global flavor. U.S. leadership recognizes that America is in a unique position of strength, one from which it can influence the world order for decades to come.

President Bush's National Security Strategy stresses that in order to fulfill our potential as a true global power in a multipolar world, we must benefit from each of the following seven areas that endow our national power; form of government, political, economic, military, technology, ecology, and social health. ³ The President acknowledges the unique credentials the U.S. alone possesses to lead the community of nations toward a peaceful coexistence. He amplifies in his 1991 State of the Union address:

Among the nations of the world, only the United States of America has had both the moral standing, and the means to back it up. We are the only nation on this earth that could assemble the forces of peace. ⁴

National strategy transforms to global strategy. As the global superpower of the 1990s, almost every action taken at home by the U.S. will directly influence regional and global

1. Alexander Hamilton, "Federalist Papers, Number 23", American Government and National Security, ed. Richard C. Remy (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1989), 23.

2. Seaquist, Lecture, 3 January 1991.

3. Seaquist, Lecture, 3 January 1991.

4. President George Bush, "State of the Union Address, 19 January, 1991.

issues abroad.

U.S. Global Commitments. President George Washington warned against "foreign entanglements," yet great powers must out of necessity enter into such relationships. "A great power is as responsible for what it does not do, yet is in its power to do, as for what it does. Power breeds responsibility."¹ It is, however, unwise and impossible for the U.S. to become directly involved in every potential regional conflict on the globe. Future force structures and economic realities alone prevent such an alternative. The U.S. none-the-less is rising as a force of "global balance" through its unique and powerful position, much like Great Britain at the height of its maritime empire.² The U.S. has traditionally sought to defuse hegemonic hopes, and therefore has the diplomatic credibility to ". . . assume the balancer's role."³ For such a global policy to have any credibility, ". . . it must have common elements, even if it is applied differently from region to region."⁴ We must foster new relationships using all instruments of national power. Every attempt must be made to solidify the multipolar condition that the U.S. victory in the Cold War is in large part responsible for. Global power in a multipolar world involves much more than simply safeguarding solely our own national interests. Our national interests are inseparably tied to those of our allies and partners.

Impellance. To meet the burdens of global leadership, President Bush recognizes that all the instruments of national power must be used simultaneously and interchangeably to solidify our leadership position. The U.S. can then guide an unstable world to a

1. Irving Kristol, "Defining our National Interest," The National Interest 21 (Fall 1990): 21.

2. Christopher Layne, "After the Cold War," Policy Review 53 (Summer 1990): 9.

3. Layne, 9.

4. Robert S. Litwak and Samuel F. Wells, Jr. Superpower Competition and Security in the Third World (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988) p. 23.

peaceful coexistence through its own moral strength, military might, economic leadership, etc. Global strategy, as President Bush has noted, must encompass all national strengths to fulfill the global balancer's role. Under worldwide scrutiny U.S. actions must be carefully planned and well executed. The U.S. is in a position to implement its globally oriented national security strategy through impellance.

Impellance is a notional term derived from the word "impel."

impel (vt) [impellent: n-s)] - to urge or drive by force or constraint: exert moral pressure on or affect with marked moral compulsion in a particular direction: to create or generate by force or constraint.¹

When the President speaks of a U.S. with the moral force and the national strength to "... fulfill the long-held promise of a new world order," he calls for an impellent strategy.² Vital to impellance is each of the seven foundational elements President Bush announces in his August 1990 National Security Strategy. He also recognizes the extreme importance of healthy and stable alliances. A global power cannot conduct its necessary leadership activities without the intricate organic web of crucial alliances which comprise much of its vital interests. The mutual influence of each upon the other is imperative:

We cannot lead a large group of nations unless we take their interests, as well as our own, in mind. We must therefore assimilate their interests into ours. This is how you lead.³

Impellent strategy is the essential and comprehensive U.S. global strategy for confronting a multipolar world. To impel, the U.S. must wield all instruments of national power in one neat package. In this manner impellance comprises a complete and multi-faceted strategy for facing an uncertain global environment. The diverse nature of impellance requires it be built upon each key element of U.S. national strength. The U.S. acts nationally on a global scale. With the added strength of trusted allies, impellance will be of

1. Philip Babcock Gove, ed., Webster's Third World New International Dictionary (Springfield, MA: C&C Merriam Co, 1976) p. 1132.

2. Bush, 29 January 1991.

3. Nitze, Interview With Author, 14 January 1991.

tremendous benefit when confronting delicate global or regional issues such as multilateral arms control regimes, alliance structures, and economic relationships. From a strictly military standpoint, impellance fundamentally embraces integrated deterrence. Proactive defense protects forward presence and regional stability, and drives towards a globally applied integrated defensive capability.

The global strategy of impellance rejects the implication that the U.S. maintains sole responsibility for peaceful coexistence in each region of the world. Instead, the varied strengths of American national power, combined with those of our allies and various limited partners, propels impellance towards achieving the ultimate goal of rational and peaceful coexistence. America, while the dominant force globally, is destined to lead and not to dominate global political relationships.

Impellance does not involve offensive actions in all instances. Impellance uses whatever means available to move toward stability. It encourages collective defenses and alliances, yet provides the necessary amount of retaliatory power to deter potential aggressors. Impellance inherently includes traditional concepts of deterrence. Reality dictates that impellance remains flexible, and able to respond to a wide range of crises. Impellance subsequently demands a fast response capability across several levels of possible action. Impellance, while proactive, may quickly deny any adversary its intended objectives. The volatile multipolar condition requires the global strategy of impellance, and impellance requires the tools of speed and flexibility in order to assume and execute its tasks.

Impellent strategy needs the cohesive web of alliances to provide a wide reaching web of security arrangements across vital regions of the world. The purpose of these arrangements must focus upon ". . . any and all potential aggressors," and not just one enemy.¹ Any single nation now appears at great risk by deciding to stand alone in the multipolar world. There is much to be said, however, for not placing a total reliance upon

1. Cohen, 7.

collective securities, for they are often not in agreement upon how to impel an aggressor to bend to the wishes of the many. Collective arrangements place the U.S. vulnerable to demagogic agencies.¹ With this risk kept in mind, the proven arrangements of armaments and alliances must remain indispensable strategic factors.² The task of impellance is to bring alliances, and each of their strengths, together to effectively and proactively defend the collective against emerging multipolar threats. In the same manner, impellance without flexible and proactive defenses is not capable of reacting with the speed and flexibility required to stabilize dangerous regional environments.

Impellance in Action. When asked if the U.S. was the only superpower in the new world order, Vice President J. Danforth Quale replied: "certainly in terms of economic and military combined."³ Recent events demonstrate the unfolding of U.S. global superpower status to maintain world order. The Gulf War gives two concrete examples of U.S. impellance. In the first, the U.S. provided the moral force and the military might to confront Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. The U.S. led efforts to enact the wide range of United Nations (UN) resolutions, economic embargoes, and finally the use of force to resolve a powder-keg regional issue. The USSR was convinced to abandon their client and support the UN resolutions, while just as significantly the U.S. impelled the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) to abstain from their veto power in UN Security Council Resolutions. The U.S. convinced other Arab coalition partners that driving Iraq out of Kuwait would be to their own best interests. Before finally wielding the military might of coalition military forces, the U.S. formed a cohesive blend of each of its national strengths to bind the nation into a global leadership role behind President Bush. With the nation united in action, the U.S. performed in its own and in the coalition's best interests. The use of coali-

1. Frank C. Carlucci, Interview with author, 6 December 1990.

2. Cohen, 7.

3. J. Danforth Quale, Cable Network News Newsmaker Sunday, 2 February 1991.

tion military forces against Iraq was impellance in action.

In the second instance, a much more intricate impelling methodology was used. The impellance was directed at Israel, avowed enemy of Iraq and of several of the Arab coalition partners. In the past, at the slightest Arab provocation, the Israeli's responded immediately and decisively, and occasionally intervened preemptively to prevent possible harm to the Israeli population. Israel, however, was impelled by the U.S. to remain passive despite the repeated SCUD attacks from Iraq. The U.S. convinced Israel that their best interests were served by the U.S. led coalition's military forces already pounding targets in the Iraqi theater. The U.S. used diplomatic pressure, active defensive military aid through Patriot missile batteries, and international economic assistance to convince the Israeli's to not broaden the war and subsequently threaten the cohesion of the coalition. America is the only global power able to adequately confront and achieve success dealing with such a delicate regional affair. The U.S. had all the elements of national strength combined to wield an effective force, a force which could morally and militarily lead the coalition against Iraq and keep Israel out of the conflict.

Stability in the Middle East region impacts a diverse segment of the international order. While impellance attempts to stabilize the critical mass of the Middle East, radical fundamentalist factions view continued U.S. presence and influence in the area as neocolonialism in action. It should come as no shock to the American political and military leadership that many of the pro-U.S. Middle Eastern political authorities are in the minority in their own countries. The situation in the region will remain fragile for some time to come, a true challenge for impellent strategy.

Another fragile political situation exists in Eastern and Central Europe. The security of these regions is at risk from the internal and intra-regional transformations and the rapid rate of change at which they are occurring. These areas will soon find themselves facing the added risk of extended-range ballistic missile arsenals from volatile neighboring regions. Indeed, the Soviet Union will may become vulnerable to ballistic missile attack

from the Koreas, India, Pakistan, Israel, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Iran; the Chinese are possible targets for Pakistan, India, and North or South Korea; and NATO, in particular the entire southern flank, is vulnerable to attacks on almost every side.¹ Impellance must be able to counter sources of instability through diplomatic actions such as arms control, and to counter threats when arms control fails. Impellance must be equipped to confront virtually any contingency. Proactive in nature, flexible and fast in response, able to deny a wide range of adversaries their objectives, the organic web of national strengths and strategic and diplomatic alliances give impellance its potency.

Impellance, if proactively planned and continuously implemented, will continue to support a broad spectrum of U.S. global leadership responsibilities. Global strategy can flow freely from political to military to economic, etc. - or all may work together - to satisfy specific national, regional, or global security needs. With impellance we maintain "the ability to project American power to build and preserve the international equilibrium - globally and regionally - in support of peace and security."²

Observations. The U.S. cannot become a global force without the full, continued support of its own population and government. Of all the elements of national power, these two form the very foundation of U.S. strategy and policy. In the same regard, the U.S. is no longer the isolated island nation of bygone eras. Alliances are critical to future success. The U.S. is primarily committed to each citizen, yet must also consider the needs of each allied nation as well.

U.S. citizens need to understand that domestic actions impact international order, just as events overseas influence American lives at home. The education process must

1. Martin Navias, Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Third World Security, Adelphi Papers, no. 252 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990) p. 44.

2. George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington: The White House, 1990) p. 1.

convince Americans they are key members of a community of nations, and must begin to behave accordingly. Without domestic popular support, the orb of American global influence shall soon be eclipsed. Soon thereafter each American will begin to feel the impact.

Essential to the successful implementation of impellance is the strength of each area of national power. In many regards, U.S. impellance power is reduced by each weak link in the chain. If the economy is impotent, impellance will suffer. Efforts are presently underway to attempt to strengthen U.S. economic capabilities and assets with a series of banking reorganizations proposed in February 1991 by the Bush administration. The U.S. cannot provide economic leverage to impellance strategy with its own financial house in disorder.¹ In the same regard military power, and the ability to forcefully implement the elements of that power, becomes extremely important. The U.S. must have the means to back up its words when diplomacy fails to peacefully impel.

Of immediate concern to global, regional and U.S. security is the threat of ballistic missiles. Aside from a proactive defense at home and abroad against such systems, the prospects of arms control still hold value and hope as a viable element of impellance strategy. A comprehensive arms control regime may help to limit the extent of the ballistic missile proliferation problem. Arms control is the first line of defense for controlling regional proliferation. Impellance can positively affect multipolar arms control efforts through U.S. led initiatives.

1. Nitze, Interview with Author, 14 January 1991.

CHAPTER III

ARMS CONTROL AND BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION

Arms Control Strategy. Arms proliferation is perhaps the most significant issue confronting President Bush's new world order. Liberated from the constraints of bipolar politics, developing nations are ripe for regional conflict. The United States' impellance strategy faces its toughest obstacle in multilateral arms control. President Bush's August 1990 National Security Strategy set the groundwork for a continuous wave of forward thinking methods to effectively counter threats to U.S. interests and security. Impellance, as an international catalyst, must rivet global attention upon the serious and potentially destabilizing arms proliferation issues. Proactive by design, impellance becomes the centerpiece for U.S. arms control strategy. "Western governments should begin now to define their objectives in arms control. At this point, the West does not know what to protect or what to seek from arms control forums."¹ In a period of violent peace and budget reductions the U.S. is certain to pursue arms control as opposed to unilateral cuts. One danger that must be avoided is America "... compromising technology options in the arms control process."²

A brief examination of internal and external sources of regional arms proliferation is necessary. The key task is providing a framework in which impellance can guide the international community into a series of stable relationships.

1. Nanette C. Gantz, Extended Deterrence and Arms Control, R-3514-FF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1987) p. 24.

2. Joseph F. Pilat and Paul C. White, "Technology Strategy in a Changing World," The Washington Quarterly no. 2 (Spring, 1990): 87.

The Internal Sources of Proliferation.

Since arms are not the sole cause of war, negotiated arms limitations are not likely to eliminate armed conflict between and among countries.¹

Many regional factors within and around lesser developed countries continue to fuel the infusion of arms and related technology into the Third World. Post-colonial political boundaries endure as a cause of much regional instability. Ethnic, cultural and religious unrest continuously incite regional confrontation.² Modern weapon inventories provide a necessary degree of psychological support for fundamental nation building. Conflict frequently arises where fundamental national pride becomes displaced by goals of regional supremacy or hegemonic dominance.³ Third World countries thus become vulnerable to the deft manipulation of regional dynamics by self-interested arms exporters. They become convinced that they must embrace the primacy of weapons to remain inviolate against their presumably hostile neighbors. This often motivates the acquisition of a large arms inventory to provide the necessary means of self defense.

"Despite severe economic problems, Third World countries continue to receive about two-thirds of the global flow of major weapons. Almost half of this flow was, by the mid 1980s, directed towards five nations - Iraq, Egypt, India, Saudi Arabia, and Syria."⁴

The distorted priority placed upon weapons acquisition in the Third World places arms programs above even the most basic needs of the civil population. National existence takes priority over any hardships the population must endure. A disproportionate amount of power and influence is fixed in the hands of the Third World military leadership, most

1. Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, eds, International Arms Control (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984) p. 336.

2. Yezid Sayigh, Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries, Adelphi Papers, no. 251 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990) p. 71.

3. Andrew L. Ross, Arms Production in Developing Countries: the Continuing Proliferation of Conventional Weapons, N-1615-AF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1981) p. 20.

4. Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 5.

often at the expense of the civil leadership.¹ Military leaders often fail to take the fundamental needs of the population into consideration. There is the constant possibility of hegemonic rulers ascending to power in the Third World, rulers who are even less interested in the needs of their regional neighbors than in the needs of their people.

The capacity constantly exists for certain hegemonic rulers to rise and resist all who challenge them. Such leaders, though fiercely determined, are not always the most sensible in their actions. Castro, Kaddafi, Khomeini and Saddam Hussein are textbook examples of Third World leaders who exhibit the "hubris-nemesis complex".^{2*} These leaders do not conform to logical and moral methods of operation. Each hubris-nemesis leader holds his respective population in total control, eager to obey his every command. The hubris-nemesis leader is often unpredictable and dangerous. Each has an unquenchable thirst for power, and will attempt to satiate that thirst through national and then regional dominance. Massive amounts of military arms are the hubris-nemesis ruler's security blanket. Quick recognition of rising hubris-nemesis leaders will enable the appropriate planning and required actions to stop them short of attaining their hegemonic goals. If left to develop to the extreme, the hubris-nemesis leader may become a very potent source of anti-U.S. sentiment throughout his nation, and perhaps his entire region. Regional security is not compatible with regional dominance.

As regional states strive to provide for their own security, their growing military capability may in-turn pose a perceived threat to the security of its neighbors. The acquisition of weapons, meant to ensure national survival through strong defense, often results in unrestricted regional arms races which further threaten stability and state security. The

1. Ohlson, 51.

2. David Ronfeldt, Three Dark Pieces, P-7607 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1990) p. 10.

* According to Ronfeldt, "hubris is the pretension to be godlike . . . Nemesis was the goddess of divine vengeance and retribution." Each such hubris-nemesis leader will be filled with a sense of hubris, each committed to being the nemesis of the U.S.; for these men, America is the epitome of hubris, and hence a jealous rival and the chosen enemy.

never-ending cycle of escalatory arms activity thus presses the need for the most advanced systems on the market.

The External Sources of Proliferation. Regional Third World arms proliferation is a direct offshoot of the bipolar superpower confrontation. During the Cold War the U.S. and USSR traded large amounts of arms to their Third World clients. The arms sold were usually inferior equipment that provided the most basic of defense needs.¹ Political motives drove the superpowers to supply arms to developing countries. Neither superpower, however, envisioned the long-term impact of its extensive arms export actions.² The U.S. and the USSR still remain principal arms exporters. However, in the past decade several other substantial sources of arms have appeared. Each arms supplier has its own set of reasons for continued production and export of arms and related technologies. Until recently, each had its own original set of purchasers. Now all will sell arms to just about anyone.

The Middle East has been fertile grounds for arms proliferation in the recent past. Several of the region's nations are the largest current recipients of U.S. arms merchandise. Two fundamental causes exist for continued U.S. arms exports to the Middle East region; political pressures from within both the U.S. and the Middle East countries themselves have kept a steady stream of arms flowing into that region; and the prospect of huge economic gains have resulted in a relentless defense industry lobby for continued export of American made arms.³ Regional influence, as well as the continued health of American defense industries, are significant keys to U.S. arms export decisions.

1. Martin Navias, Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Third World Security. Adelphi Papers, no. 252 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990) p. 19.

2. Ohlson, 112.

3. Ze'ev Schiff, "The New Military Balance: Challenges Ahead," Middle East Insight, Vol VII, no. 5 (1990): 48.

The arms industries provide the instruments for a viable U.S. security plan. Defense related industries supply America with the worlds most powerful arsenal of weapons and delivery systems. Since the collapse of the bipolar order and the apparently diminished immediate threat of the Soviet Union, defense industries must either expand markets or face closures. The U.S. Senate, in Senate Bill S. 1379, declared the following:

The vitality of the industrial and technology base of the United States is a foundation of National Security. It provides the industrial and technological capabilities employed to meet national defense requirements in peacetime and in time of national emergency.¹

The concern remains that the immense importance delegated to U.S. national security within the industrial base will threaten American ability to remain competitive in the next century.² But for the immediate future, many strongly believe "there is a significant disconnect between U.S. foreign policy and supporting military strategy on one hand, and the extension of that policy to the U.S. industrial base on the other."³ Policy statements stress the continuing necessity for military assistance to U.S. allies worldwide:

Military assistance supports some of the most basic and enduring elements of our National Strategy: Collective security and Forward Defense. Military assistance enhances our allies ability to deter and combat aggression without the direct involvement of U.S. forces. In addition, security assistance also forms a vital part of the cooperative arrangements through which our forces gain access to critical military facilities throughout the world, a fundamental prerequisite for forward defense against aggression.⁴

The U.S., as we shall see, is not alone in the dilemma between economic well-being and adequate defense of its interests.

The Soviet Union is experiencing similar military production overloads with the thawing of the Cold War. Moscow's monetary collapse has increased an already desperate need for economic gain. Soviet "... arms exports are a means of alleviating many of the

1. Fredrick J. Michel, "The Changing Industrial Base," National Defense 459 (July/August 1990): 16.

2. Michel, 16.

3. Michel, 16.

4. Frank C. Carlucci, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1990 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989) p. 63.

costs associated with military inflation and cushioning the effects of falling domestic demand."¹ The Soviet economy is almost entirely dependent upon arms production and export. Military sales turn the wheels of their limited industrial base. Arms production is simply what the Soviets built their economy around, and therefore it is what they do best. It is the only cash crop in the Soviet Union. Certainly political motivations remain as an additional reason for continued Soviets arms shipments. International bonds established through arms sales provide essential elements necessary for successful Soviet foreign policy. Arms export to developing nations maintain secure foreign policy bonds.

While much of the proliferation responsibility rests with the Cold War superpowers, the supply of arms continues at an increased and alarming rate through new sources. Several regional Third World domestic arms industries are fully capable of producing weapons of significant range and effectiveness. The Western European consortium almost matched the USSR share of the world arms market by the mid-1970s; China and Israel began producing weapons for their own use when external sources were difficult to come by - and they now defray the cost of those systems through exports; and lesser developed, but rapidly growing, producers including Brazil, Argentina, India, Taiwan, South Korea and South Africa saturate the arms market with less advance products, non-the-less fueling horizontal escalation.²

Most of the smaller arms producer/exporter countries did not originally design the weapons which they currently produce. These nations became "... beneficiaries of licences made available by the armament firms in the developed world."³ The major power's arms industries benefit financially from the arrangement, while the smaller producers acquire the prestige and financial gain of building and exporting their own arms. The contractually

1. Ohlson, 60.

2. Ohlson, 114.

3. Ohlson, 36.

legitimate small producers are replacing the major powers as the primary suppliers to the Third World.

"Because of the strength of economic incentives to export arms, developing countries will be disinclined to adhere to the rules of any arms control regime established by the advanced industrial states."¹

The Ballistic Missile Threat. The key issue confronting arms controllers in the multipolar world is the proliferation of ballistic missiles and related technologies. ". . . The superpowers and great powers lead the arms race and thus have a special responsibility in the field of disarmament."² Regional instabilities fired by arms proliferation threaten global stability and the new world order.

"The diffusion of military technologies to the developing world will create potent new military powers in regions where successful rapid U.S. intervention in a crisis could be stalled by well-armed, radical states."³ The most regionally destabilizing weapon is the ballistic missile. Ballistic missiles become trans-regional devices that threaten not only immediate neighbors, but inter-regional ones as well. Iraqi SCUD missiles launched against Israel present an alarming example of how ballistic missiles can leap over neutrals to inflict damage on the enemy of choice.

An oft-stated justification for acquiring longer-range ballistic missiles is the desire to gain a viable space launch capability. It is no secret ". . . there is a strong correlation in the Third World between an interest in space launchers and the desire to acquire long-range ballistic missiles."⁴ Developing countries in search of space launch systems believe that the regional stature achieved through orbital launch capability will ". . . help them to

1. Ross, 30.

2. Ohlson, 224.

3. Jed C. Snyder, "After the Cold War," Policy Review 53 Summer 1990): 15.

4. Navias, 18.

achieve broad political objectives, particularly an expanded regional role and greater attentiveness to their concerns on the part of the more powerful nations." ¹ Expanding one's regional role often comes at the expense of another's influence. Yet it is entirely legitimate to claim a right to the free and unrestricted use of space. To differentiate between ballistic missile development and space launch vehicles is impossible without verification methods that are intrusive to sovereign states.² The fact remains "... verification is an essential element of the arms control process."³ It is unlikely that national technical means (NTMs) will soon acquire the capability to discern differences between ballistic missiles versus orbital lift vehicles through non-intrusive means.

The major powers cannot prevent the domestic production of arms and cannot destroy or reduce existing Third World stockpiles without the cooperation of the concerned parties. One can diffuse the proliferation process by limiting the export of ballistic missile technologies to the Third World.

Technology Proliferation and the Third World. Third World nations have a recognized weakness that must be exploited to successfully slow proliferation of the longer-range weapons. The Achilles heel of Third World ballistic missile programs is advanced technology. Developing nations are not as dependent upon the influx of weapons themselves as on the influx of improved weapons related technology.⁴ For nations with existing arsenals of ballistic missiles, technology must be the primary focus of any arms control effort.

If it is decided that certain new technologies are counter-productive and ought to be limited, new technologies can be restricted in one of three stages: during research and development,

1. Navias, 11.

2. Sanford Lakeoff and Herbert F. York, A Shield in Space? Technology, Politics, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) p. 160.

3. Dick Cheney, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990) 3.

4. Ross, 26.

during testing of the weapon, or during the production and deployment of the weapon. ¹

The increased growth of multinational corporations nourishes the fledgling Third World arms industries through the globalization of technology, and that trend is prone to endure.²

The high cost of developing technologies, intense international competition, and the emergence of worldwide markets will stimulate this process as well as increase incentive for technology producers to join with those already in those markets. Corporations that cannot depend upon government support to develop technology will look for support elsewhere, including foreign governments.³

Technology is necessary to improve indigenous Third World ballistic missile programs. Without the imported technology, increased ranges may still occur, but at a much slower pace. Iraq, for example, incorporated technology imports to improve the range of the Soviet supplied SCUD missiles. The SCUD functions basically upon 1950s and 1960s technology. The Patriot anti-missile system which effectively countered the SCUD works on 1970s and 1980s technology. Newer ballistic missiles might negate the limited advantage that the Patriot now provides. No doubt such advances will occur. The gap between Third World and large power capabilities should close much slower with properly enforced technology control mechanisms.

Since ballistic missiles are the most regionally destabilizing - and morally offensive - threat, it is of the utmost concern to limit the speed of its evolution. Nations, much as Iraq did, will continue to attempt technology acquisition by any means, including theft, coercion, terrorism and quasi-legal third-party transfers. The implications of unstable regimes with highly accurate, long-range ballistic missiles - capable of carrying chemical, biological or nuclear payloads, are unsettling. Improved technology allows capability that far exceeds

1. Christopher J. Lamb, How to Think about Arms Control, Disarmament, and Defense (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988) p. 238.

2. Thomas J. Welch, "Technology, Change, and Security," The Washington Quarterly 2 (Spring 1990): 115.

3. Welch, 112.

the needs or the territorial defense strategies of most Third World states.¹

Unfortunately, a viable and effective technology control regime does not exist. The lesser powers often view such regimes as attempts by the major powers to force participation at the former's expense. There are, however, some laudable attempts to limit ballistic missile technology transfers to developing states.

The Missile Technology Control Regime. Recently, during the Gulf War, the allied coalition rewarded Syria for their participation with a gift of one billion dollars. President Hafez Assad immediately began the search for sellers of big ticket items. "... U.S. officials believe that the Syrian leader's top priority is to obtain new, more advanced and accurate missiles."²

The proliferation of arms suppliers in recent years has complicated an already complex issue. It reportedly took four years to negotiate the 1986 [MTCR] agreement by Western industrial nations not to export rockets or rocket components to other nations."³

The U.S., United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy and France endorsed the MTCR. "The major shortcoming of the MTCR is that neither Mainland China nor the Soviet Union is involved."⁴ The MTCR, while recognizing the implicit need for limiting the supply side of critical missile component technology transfer, and "... certain Third world activities have to be controlled," has never received the necessary support required to accomplish its primary goal.⁵ The MTCR remains basically a gentlemen's agreement.

1. Baker Spring, Heritage Foundation Policy Analyst, Interview with Author, 4 December 1990.

2. Jim Mann, "Syria Goes Arms Shopping with \$1 Billion in Gulf Aid," The Los Angeles Times, 6 December 1990: A1-5.

3. Joseph Kruzal, ed., 1988-1989 American Defense Annual (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988) p. 134.

4. Baker Spring, "Meeting the Threat of Ballistic Missiles in the Third World," The Heritage Foundation Background (21 September 1989): 9.

5. Navias, 68.

Without the participation of the USSR and the PRC it stands doomed to failure.¹

The Soviets must realize that their nation is much more at risk from the intermediate-range ballistic missile threat than almost any other nation outside of Israel. With domestic disorder threatening the very survival of the Soviet system, perhaps they are more aware than ever of the impending external threat. The stark reality facing the Soviets is that the Third World recipients of Soviet arms transfers may soon bite the hand that fed them. Uncertainties which face the "Union" of Soviet Socialist Republics inflate the importance of any externally imposed risks placed upon the Soviet system. In the Southern Soviet Republics, the resident Moslem population is in the majority. Should these republics rebel, other Third World Moslem nations may be capable of aiding their brothers. "The Moslem problem within their borders, and the growing fundamentalism in the Moslem world in general, cannot be comforting to the Soviets."² Perhaps Moscow will display a propensity toward considering the full range of MTCR limitations to reduce any further danger to their security. By limiting immediate external threats, the Soviets can turn inward to solve more pressing problems.

The Chinese, meanwhile, show absolutely no intention of complying with the MTCR. During a recent fact-finding mission to Mainland China, former Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci raised the issue of MTCR compliance to the Chinese delegation. "They pretended not to hear, or even understand me. I received no reply."³ The PRC turned a deaf ear because they have much to lose by limiting arms and technology exports to the developing nations. There are sizable economic incentives which favor continued Chinese arms proliferation. Money acquired through arms sales significantly defrays the cost of their own weapons production programs. They in-turn enlist an eager clientele

1. Spring, 9.

2. Paul H. Nitze, Interview with Author, 14 January 1991.

3. Frank C. Carlucci, Interview with Author, 6 December 1991.

who's suppliers essentially dried up when the major Western nations agreed to the MTCR provisions. As China provides arms to the Third World, the recipient countries become dependent upon continued Chinese arms and technology sales. Increased Third World dependence furthers China's own hegemonic designs. China is demonstrating an astute political awareness of the strategic, as well as the economic importance of such an arms supply/demand arrangement. The collapse of the bipolar order has opened a wide new market for the Chinese. China can attempt to prevent U.S. or USSR preeminence in the world through its own unrestricted arms deals, giving the developing nations what others will not. In return, the Chinese develop a rich clientele of Third World nations dependent upon them for continued arms support. The potential gains in money, prestige and power are too great for the Chinese to pass up.

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. China is involved deeply in another treaty enigma.

Although almost all states well advanced in nuclear technology are members of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], two of the nuclear weapon states and at least six of the states with significant nuclear facilities have not become parties to the NPT [Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty], nor is there any current likelihood that they will do so. The latter are thus not subject to mandatory safeguards over all the fissile materials in their possession.¹

The two nuclear weapon states not party to the NPT are China and India. In the area of the Indian sub-continent, regional conflict has been fermenting between the PRC and India for years. India, a Soviet client, confronts Chinese hegemony in their northern regions. India will not sign the NPT because the PRC has not. India possess intermediate range ballistic missiles to counter any threat imposed by Chinese missiles, which have intercontinental ranges. Caught in the middle of the dispute is Pakistan, which may possess nuclear weapons. Pakistan refuses to sign the NPT until India does likewise. In the meantime, Pakistan is aggressively pursuing an intermediate-range ballistic missile program. "In Pakistani declaratory statements, reference has been made to the need to deploy missiles for the

1. Ohlson, 230.

purpose of deterring enemy missiles in particular, and aerial delivery capabilities in general." ¹ Each of the three regional nuclear or near-nuclear powers refuse to sign the NPT until the other does. ²

The Chinese exacerbate the arms control paradox by their non-participation in the NPT and MTCR. The solution is not simple. The Chinese are traditionally tough negotiators. The U.S. is unable to drive the PRC away from their arms export practices through normal diplomatic and military means. Traditional forceful diplomatic measures may turn the PRC more inward, increasing their proliferation practices instead of slowing them. The approach requires confronting the Chinese through subtle yet relentless impellent strategy, and employing all national and alliance strengths to win the Chinese over.

The Impellance Approach. A viable technology control regime will involve some degree of sacrifices, and also provide significant benefits, for all parties involved. This need not result in the loss of power or prestige for any single nation. The challenge for impellent strategy is to convince the Chinese that they in fact have more to gain than lose by participating in a multilateral arms control regime. To accomplish this, the U.S. must employ the full range of impellance strategy to sway the Chinese. Through national strengths, alliances and economic partnerships, it may be possible for the U.S. to steer the Chinese away from arms proliferation practices. America must understand China's needs, work to alleviate any fears and misunderstandings, and build a common trust.

As the global "moral force" and sole remaining true superpower, the U.S. is in the strong position to impel the Chinese. Such impellance would involve a choice of incentives versus sanctions. The course of action remains totally dependent upon the Chinese approach to multilateral arms and technology control regimes. Impellance efforts would take

1. Navias, 12.

2. Ohlson, 210.

two necessary fronts, one direct, the other indirect. Neither is totally dependent upon the other, but each is mutually supporting. Both may convince the Chinese to begin adhering to the MTCR and the NPT via their domestic and international actions.

The indirect approach involves enlisting the cooperation of the USSR. The Soviets are America's logical partner to persuade the Chinese to control their proliferation practices.¹ While the Soviets adhere to the NPT, they have yet to endorse the MTCR. A prominent reason is their previously discussed economic dependence upon arms exports. The Soviet's fear becoming vulnerable to external perils as well as the internal ones generated through Perestroika and Glasnost. With the potential for regional instability on all borders, the USSR cannot afford external threats while confronting its own internal problems. The U.S. can convince the Soviets through impellance that abiding by the MTCR could do much to benefit them by increasing their international stature. Presented another way, Saddam Hussein's SCUD attacks could happen only through the Soviet export of those missile systems to Iraq. In large part the Soviets are indirectly responsible for the use of those weapons against non-military targets. In the near term, adding to the turmoil in outlying republics, the Soviets may face the threat of ballistic missile use against them by radical Third World agencies and rebel internal factions. The first step to dealing with these Soviet problems requires the USSR to relinquish missile technology exports to the Third World. The security of the Soviet Union may be strengthened by this action. The less ballistic missiles that surround the USSR, the less of a threat to their peripheral security should those missiles ever be turned against them. The Soviet's stand to benefit economically as well.

Halting ballistic missile exports would initially have an adverse impact an already reeling Soviet economy. To soften the economic strain accepted by the USSR, the U.S. could initiate economic assistance programs and most favored nation status for the USSR.

1. Nitze, Interview, 14 January 1991.

To further encourage and reward full Soviet MTCR compliance, the U.S. could impel the major economic powers to assist the USSR in restructuring its fragile economy. In return for their assistance, the world economic powers would benefit from increased regional stability in sensitive market areas through the cessation of Soviet ballistic missile technology export practices. The Soviet market is a ripe challenge for Western investment, with a formidable economic restructuring required. Aside from the desperately needed economic assistance, Moscow would receive valuable international recognition for its missile technology limitations. The Soviet Union would increase its stature globally and internally by enhancing regional stability through arms and technology control. The USSR might quickly develop a stable market economy through the trade-off involving ballistic missile technology export for one of economic nation-building.

Economic aid and most favored nation status for the Soviets would quickly grab the attention of the PRC. The Chinese are also a budding economic force, and have long desired most favored nation status with America. The primary, and direct focus of U.S. impellance is enticing the China to participate fully in the NPT and MTCR. Though not essential for impelling the PRC, having the Soviets folded into the impellance strategy would make the task that much easier.

The Hong Kong lease expires between Great Britain and China in 1998. The Chinese will soon acquire one of the important economic centers of the world. The odd marriage of communism and capitalism has already begun on the Mainland, with the Chinese expanding markets and increasing capital assets in the recent past. The U.S. can tie the prospects of the Chinese playing the world market successfully to their participation in the NPT and the MTCR. Impellance can direct the Chinese to make the right choices. The impellance effort would take the form of a carefully planned set of incentives and

sanctions presented to the Chinese government.* If the Chinese chose to participate in the MTCR and the NPT, they would stand to make considerable profits to offset losses accrued through decreased military sales. Participation would also bring a diverse and fertile range of incentives offered through the world economic community. The financial incentives and increased world markets would benefit all of China, down to the smallest village.

The Chinese do not appear to care much about world opinion, but they remain deeply committed to domestic well-being, internal stability, and eliminating outside influence. The major benefit for the Chinese, should they join the MTCR and NPT, is the quality of life improvements available to all the people. The major detraction is political contamination and some degree of outside influence through the process of impellance. The U.S. must make every effort to ensure that the pros outweigh the cons in order to enlist the PRC into a viable arms control regime.

In order to drive a harder bargain, impellance can act to dry up segments of the Chinese arms market. The primary focus of impellance would be to eliminate the need for ballistic missile acquisition or improvement. The most obvious solution is to offer Patriot anti-missile batteries to vulnerable Third World states in return for refraining from arms proliferation practices. More discussion on this subject will follow later in this chapter in "Third World Incentives."

Once the U.S. impels the world economic community to contrast any future dealings against Chinese NPT and MTCR participation, China then has basically two choices; (1) to continue arms exports and rely upon those alone as its major source of capital and influence; or (2) halt ballistic missile technology exports and abide by the MTCR and NPT to open up a lucrative and diversified international trade market. Put another way, China can improve its regional security and influence through economic competition, or hurt its

* The idea for teaming economic incentives and sanctions against China in return for NPT and MTCR participation resulted from a discussion between the author and Dr. Robert S. Wood, Dean, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI, on 8 January 1991.

economic prospects through continued arms export practices.

Japan and the Koreas are cornering the Pacific Rim market for commercial exports. It must be clear to the Chinese leadership that they are in the center of ". . . a geopolitical and geostrategic transformation in the international security order in favor of the importance of Asia, and particularly Northeast Asia."¹ China has the means available to competitively enter into that market and claim its share. As an added incentive, the U.S. could offer the coveted most favored nation status long sought by the Chinese in return for cooperation with the MTCR and NPT.

Impellance must help China to see the long range implications to its own security if it continues ballistic missile technology exports. The U.S. and the USSR have many experiences to share with the Chinese. In particular, events in the Middle East can illustrate the consequences of further ballistic missile technology exports.

Impellance may help to tackle both the Soviet and the Chinese elements of the proliferation equation. Economics and diplomacy become effectively tied together as the impellance guides the two communist powers to conform to the NPT and/or MTCR. In return, the U.S. must recognize the legitimate concerns of each party and adapt them accordingly into the impellance process. Impellance cannot succeed without addressing the fundamental interests of all parties concerned. Impellance becomes the broker in a bargaining match with no higher authority.

There remain several potential pitfalls concerning the encouragement of economic incentives and sanctions against the USSR and China. Both regimes are traditionally very closed systems that resent attempts at external influence. U.S. impellance must not appear as hostile in its intent. The process must stress the benefits of cooperation. The risk is present that either country may perceive U.S. impellance as economic blackmail. This could promote instead of prevent hostilities at both the regional or international levels.

1. Colin S. Gray, "Maritime Strategy and the Pacific: The Implications for NATO," Naval War College Review (Winter 1987): 11.

Another danger is impellance must not inadvertently unite the two communist powers into an economic force. This alliance could prove troublesome to the Western economic powers. Conversely, as two aggressive emerging economic powers, impellance must ensure that conflict does not ensue as the USSR and China compete for the same markets. Although the basic tenants of capitalism encourage direct economic competition, ". . . [it] can lead to protectionism and even economic warfare. History tells us that economic warfare ultimately creates fertile ground for military confrontations." ¹ Much like the diplomatic mastery of Otto Von Bismarck, the U.S. must strive to achieve a balance of power in the Central and North East Asian area as Bismarck successfully strove to do in the Europe of his day. The fine line must be tread which keeps the two powers apart, yet prevents the likelihood of hostilities. This applies with equal concern to relationships between China and the other Pacific Rim nations, as well as between the USSR and Europe.

The proposals presented here deserve more involved study at the appropriate diplomatic and economic levels. What bears significance is that through a fundamentally economic and diplomatic impellent approach, the major proliferators may agree to some degree of technology control. The task at hand then turns to the problem of regional Third World arms suppliers and horizontal proliferation.

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. There are established standards from the bipolar arena which have significance to the multipolar world of the 1990s. The U.S. and the USSR ushered in a long sought-after era of arms control cooperation with the signing of the INF Treaty. The Treaty effectively bans all nuclear capable ground based missile systems with ranges from 500 to 5500 kilometers (310 to 3417 miles), associated

1. Michel, 16.

launcher and support equipment, support facilities, and operating bases.¹ Although primarily a political tool for the USSR and the U.S. against both European and respective domestic public opinions, the INF Treaty is a good example of bipolar cooperation to limit a specific class of weapons. Another major milestone of the INF was the degree of intrusive monitoring which the treaty allowed between the two superpowers, as specified in the INF "Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles."²

Former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Director Kenneth Adelman recently proposed "Globalization" of the INF Treaty.³ Such a multilateral treaty would attempt to ban the deployment of all missiles within the ranges of the U.S./USSR negotiated INF Treaty which Third World nations currently, or might soon, possess.⁴ If the intermediate-range ballistic missiles are successfully banned on a multilateral basis, evolution towards longer-range missile systems becomes more difficult, if not impossible. Agreement to the necessary verification procedures would preclude a participating nation from conducting the research and development (R&D) and testing necessary to perfect longer-range ballistic missile systems.

A Global INF Treaty is constrained by the following: (1) its verification methods are intrusive to national sovereignty and must be freely allowed; and (2) ". . . No country will accept or comply with treaties unless they are in its interests."⁵

1. Sidney N. Graybeal and Patricia Bliss McFate, "Assessing Verification and Compliance," Defending Deterrence, Antonia Handler Chayes and Paul Doty, eds. (London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1981) p. 183.

2. Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, (Washington: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1990) pp. 431-443.

3. Spring, 10.

4. Spring, 10.

5. Blacker and Duffy, 337.

It is at the regional level where arms and conflict become married. Regional proliferation is the root of the arms control problem in a multipolar world. Ballistic missiles provide a way for regional powers to extend their influence beyond their regional confines. Regional proliferation is where all agreements must concentrate, where all available efforts must be directed.

The spread of ballistic missile systems is a truly global Third World phenomenon. Developing states in the Middle East, South Asia, Latin America and South Africa either possess or have demonstrated the intent to acquire ballistic missiles with the object of deploying and, in some cases, marketing these systems.¹

The problem of Third World ballistic missile proliferation is an ever expanding one. An increasing number of Third World nations now have the capability to strike targets at ranges more than 500 kilometers away. (See Table I) For most, this capability far exceeds that required solely for the defense of its borders. Extended-range weapons will naturally foment intra-regional and inter-regional instability. Secretary of Defense Cheney stated his concerns well before the Iraqi SCUD attacks upon Israel and Saudi Arabia:

Proliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, as well as modern long-range delivery systems in the Third World constitutes a grave threat to U.S. interests.²

The U.S./USSR signing of the INF sets the standard for other nations to follow. However, major power and UN sponsored arms control attempts at regional levels are often interpreted as blatant attempts to dominate the regional powers. Impellence can alleviate the fear that the U.S. is attempting to disarm the Third World. It can bring to bear a wide variety of appealing incentives to encourage Third World participation in a Global INF Treaty regime.

Third World Incentives. The most important incentive impellence can offer is a complete series of economic aid packages to the Third World nations. The Third World can be bargained with via a broad scope of economic incentive packages to aid in deterring

1. Navias, 7.

2. Cheney, 2.

TABLE I

THIRD WORLD BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY¹

MISSILES INVENTORY: RANGE GREATER THAN 300 km							
COUNTRY	CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABLE	NUCLEAR RESEARCH CAPABLE	AT "THE LIMIT" OF NUCLEAR POWER	MISSILE	MAX RANGE ESTIMATED (KM)	CEP ESTIMATE PRECISION (M)	WARHEAD WEIGHT (KG)
Afghanistan	Yes	No	No	*SCUD-B (Operational)	300	900	1000
Argentina	No	Yes	No	CONDOR II (Development)	1000	700	400-500
Brazil	No	Yes	No	MB/EE-1000 (Development)	1000	700	900
				SS-1000 (Development)	1200	700	1000
Egypt	Yes	No	No	BADR-2000 (Development) (CONDOR II)	960	700	450
India	Yes	No	Yes	AGNI (Development)	2500	N/A	1000
				X (Project)	5000	N/A	N/A
Iran	Yes	Yes	No	SCUD-B (Operational)	300	900	1000
Iraq	Yes	No	Partly	AL-ABBAS (Development)	900	4000	200
				AL-ABED/BM (Project)	2000	N/A	N/A
Israel	?	?	?	JERICO II (Development)	1500	N/A	100
				X (Project)	>5000?	N/A	N/A
Libya	Yes	Yes	No	SCUD-B (Development)	300	900	1000
				**M-9 (Development)	600	300-600	N/A
North Korea	Yes	No	No	SCUD-B (Operational)	300	900	1000
Pakistan	Yes	No	Partly	HAFT II (Development)	300	N/A	N/A
Saudi Arabia	Yes	No	No	***CSS-2 (Operational)	2700	2400	2000
South Africa	Yes	No	Yes	X (Project)	?	?	?
Syria	Yes	No	No	M-9 (Project)	600	300-600	N/A
Taiwan	Yes	No	No	TIEN-MA (Development)	1000	N/A	N/A

*SCUD-B is the NATO designation for the SS1c surface-to-surface tactical missile system. This missile has been exported to Egypt, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Iraq, and South Yemen. Iraq used SCUD-B as the basis of its AL-ABBAS and AL-HUSSEIN missiles. SCUD-B is manufactured in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and, possibly, China.

**M-9 is a Chinese export.

***CSS-2 is exported to Saudi Arabia from China.

1. Tim Kennedy, "Missile Threat Revealed," *National Defense* no. 459 (July/August 1990): 14.

the influx of destabilizing ballistic missile components and technologies. Industrial assistance, agricultural aid, financial relief, and non-military technological assistance may help persuade developing nations to abstain from proliferation. The U.S. alone cannot foot the bill, and so all of the major economic powers must provide adequate financial assistance to nations which agree to limit their ballistic missile arsenals.

Financial incentives alone will not convince the Third World to stifle arms and technology proliferation. A defense capability against expansionist regional rivals is needed. Third World nations have essentially four alternatives to guard against enemy ballistic missile attack: (1) preemptive attacks, which are response offensive in nature; (2) ATBMs [anti-tactical ballistic missiles], or active defenses; (3) hardening and dispersion of important military assets; and (4) preparing the civilian population for the possibility of conventional and non-conventional missile attacks by developing a civil defense system (both are passive defenses).¹ The first alternative is the poorest choice, a last resort to repel imminent attack. Resident governments can easily provide the third and fourth choices. It is the second alternative, active defense, that appears most likely to elicit the interest of states in volatile regional areas.

The most timely and lucrative incentive that U.S. impellance has to offer is the Patriot anti-missile system. Proven in combat, the Patriot is an effective tactical ballistic missile (TBM) defense. The Patriot could extend U.S. active defenses to cover participating Third World non-proliferation parties. In return for Third World nations limiting their domestic ballistic missile acquisition or production, the U.S. could agree to sell them Patriot systems. Indeed, the U.S. could extend the Patriot offer to the Soviet Union or China as further encouragement to comply with the NPT and/or MTCR. A viable active defensive system to deny regional hegemonic or hostile objectives removes the need for total reliance upon a response offense arsenal to punish or respond to any initial enemy

1. Navias, 252.

aggression.

The U.S. could also offer forward presence forces to select vital interest areas to guarantee the security of developing nations which agree to limit their own retaliatory ballistic missile forces. Concentrating upon necessary regional active and passive defensive assets instead of disproportionate response offense forces would free up additional capital to invest in civilian quality-of-life improvements.

Limiting ballistic missile development and deployment through a Global INF regime will significantly curtail the right to pursue space launch capability. The extended ranges needed to achieve orbital velocities will not be possible while adhering to a Global INF list of restrictions. To satisfy the need for the national and regional prestige afforded by orbital lift capability, and consequently discourage further extended range ballistic missile development, U.S. impellance strategy could guide space capable nations to provide reduced cost orbital lift assets for Third World Global INF signatories.¹ Reduced cost space lift would allow more funding to channel into legitimate satellite technology development. Unfortunately, nations which are on the verge of achieving orbital launch capability, or which already possess a strong ballistic missile system, will be less willing to participate in a Global INF regime. For nations refusing to accept economic and military incentives to halt proliferation practices, the U.S. and its allies might enforce a meaningful set of sanctions upon the proliferating nations through impellance.

Sanctions for Third World Non-compliance. Those nations refusing to participate in a Global INF type regime become subject to a limited range of direct and a wide range of indirect sanctions. Impellance could attempt to enforce the denial of certain non-essential commercial goods. This wide-reaching approach might be extremely difficult to enforce; it is hard enough to restrict military hardware and technology sales, let alone sales of

1. Will Tobey, National Security Council Policy Analyst, Interview with Author, 7 December 1990.

day-to-day goods. This action would serve as more of a message of international disfavor. The U.S. could certainly curtail economic aid packages to developing nations suspected of actively seeking to acquire ballistic missile technology and hardware. Each economic power might strictly enforce its own set of sanctions, banning the export of all high technology components. The U.S. can multiply the effects of sanctions by providing the denied objects or capabilities to the non-complier's regional neighbors. For example, any arms control regime non-complier would not receive Patriot or future ATBM capability and related technologies. Immediate neighbors in compliance with the treaties may receive ATBM defense systems (See Chapter IV, "Tactical Ballistic Missile Defenses"). The non-complier stands defenseless against the very threat he holds against his neighbors. The twist is that his ballistic missile threat becomes severely reduced, or totally negated, by supplying Patriot systems to cooperating regional powers. Such a non-complier would have wasted huge amounts of national treasure on a system that did not deliver the expected return in destructive capability. The Patriot has amply demonstrated that the negation of an offensive threat is the required and logical first step for ensuring regional stability. More time becomes available for the rational planning and diplomatic dialogue required to diffuse volatile regional crises. The UN has demonstrated its ability to serve as a vehicle for regional and global dialogue, furthering the values of a new world order.

The United Nations and Impellance. The Gulf War against Saddam Hussein proved a momentous demonstration of international solidarity through the UN. The impellance response to the Iraqi invasion convinced the Soviets to vote against their former client, and guided China into abstaining from their crucial veto alternative. The UN systematically confronted the Gulf Crisis in outstanding fashion, effectively "cutting off" Iraq from the rest of the world through a series of decisive and progressive UN actions. The U.S., as the impellent force, provided the bulk of the military and moral might required to confront the hegemonic tenancies of Saddam Hussein's hubris-nemesis personality. U.S. impellance, aligned against Iraq and along with UN allies, sent a strong signal to

would-be hubris-nemesis rulers. Individual nations need not face the overtures of aggressive regional dictators alone. Such rulers can expect to confront global impellance via UN resolutions and internationally approved actions.

UN actions working with impellance have introduced a new system of crisis management into President Bush's new world order. Through the legitimate international agency of the UN, impellance acts under the tenants of international law. UN action against Iraq has set the precedent for future actions against like-minded states. Through the leadership and sound moral logic of U.S. led impellance strategy, the world might ably deal with the very real and demonstrated threat of ballistic missile proliferation and hegemonic designs.

Observations. The proliferation of ballistic missile technology is widespread, although only a handful of powers possess first rate systems. While it is possible to limit the major power technology supply problem, developing nations will continue to acquire technical improvements to their ballistic missile inventories. As the worst case, the Third World will continue to gain the high technology components required to improve their missile arsenals through China, the USSR, and other sources; as the best case, developing countries will have to rely upon indigenous technology alone to acquire the desired missile ranges and accuracies. Impellance can slow the growth of ballistic missile proliferation through the control of external sources of related technologies. It is impossible to entirely stop the spread of ballistic missiles, and the increased ranges and improved accuracies of those systems. The threat will remain, and therefore a method of countering that threat is essential. The danger is very clear. A proactive method of action must confront the growing ballistic missile threat. The Patriot anti-missile system has performed admirably against the antiquated SCUD. Impellance must concentrate on producing a more expanded, technologically sophisticated means to protect against the future threat of highly accurate, long-range ballistic missile attack; regional and global security may depend on it.

CHAPTER IV

FACING THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

The unrelenting progress of mankind causes continual changes in the weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of fighting. ¹

Alfred Thayer Mahan
"The Influence of Seapower upon History"

Western security interests cannot remain unaffected by the spread of high technology weapons to the Third World. The ability of an increasing number of developing nations to employ ballistic missiles in order to penetrate Western air space is a new strategic reality that will have to be considered by Western policy-makers in the 1990s. ²

The Issues. The recent use of ballistic missiles and the alarming spread of related technologies to the Third World are the critical strategic issues which impellance must confront during the next several decades. Arms control treaties and gentlemen's agreements such as the MTCR may slow the progress of ballistic missile development. However, the proliferation of more sophisticated, longer-range systems capable of carrying nuclear, non-nuclear and conventional payloads is very probable. Response offense, or the threat of it, will prevent neither proliferation nor the regional conflicts which could lead to further ballistic missile use.

Each area of impellent strategy plays an important part in attempting to confront regional Third World unrest and the increasing menace of ballistic missiles. However, this chapter weaves amid three primary paths necessary to produce adequate active defenses. First, there is a technological path, which entails improving existing passive and active missile defenses. This approach also explores new and improved methods to counter the increasingly complex nature of the ballistic missile threat. The second path requires domestic political acknowledgement of the increased need for ballistic missile defenses,

1. Christopher J. Lamb, How to Think About Arms Control, Disarmament, and Defense (Englewood Cliffs, CA: Prentice-Hall, 1988) p. 237.

2. Martin Navias, Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Third World Security, Adelphi Papers, no. 252 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990) p. 71.

and funding support for research, development, construction and deployment of additional active BMD systems. The third course entails a diplomatic effort to sway the international opponents and enlist all the potential advocates of workable ballistic missile defense systems. This approach demands reevaluation all bipolar agreements curbing active ballistic missile defenses. The three paths must necessarily work together in a multipolar environment for the protection of U.S. and allied populations, assets, and vital interests.

A reliable response to this emerging threat must include ballistic missile defense. . . Relying on [response] offensive deterrence or arms control for security has always been a risky proposition. To continue doing so in a strategic environment that includes widely divergent countries armed with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction would be excessively and needlessly dangerous.¹

The range of multipolar threats that the U.S. confronts encompasses Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a likely Third World ICBM capability, and a confirmed Third World TBM threat. The latter is the more immediate concern given the widespread amount of TBMs stockpiled throughout the Third World, and their recently demonstrated use in the Persian Gulf War. The absence of a politically dominating bipolar U.S./USSR confrontation places full attention upon the ascendancy of the Third World and the TBM threat which it poses. Impellance will press the proliferation issue from all sides, but when arms control fails, adequate defense proves a necessary and logical next step.

Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense. While the bipolar superpowers concentrated upon their own huge nuclear ICBM arsenals, and the threat that they posed to each other, the Third World was busy buying, borrowing, building and upgrading a formidable TBM force. In a Pentagon influenced by response offensive theory, active and passive defenses received less and less funding. Certainly the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) and Nike surface to air missiles (SAMs) spearheaded initial attempts to defend against a growing Soviet missile threat. As time passed, these systems were neglected or

1. Keith B. Payne, "After the Cold War," Policy Review no. 53 (Summer 1990): 11.

deactivated as ". . . skepticism about the wisdom of ballistic missile defense began to grow."¹ This train of thought continued in the 1960s and 1970s as the U.S. disregarded the substantial Soviet TBM arsenal as unreliable and ineffective.² Evidently the Soviets felt their TBMs had limited strategic value as well, since they traded or sold a large number of these weapons to the Third World. Those developing nations subsequently spent huge amounts of time and money upgrading once limited systems into substantial weapons of war. Since the Third World TBMs had no evident nuclear or long-range capability, the U.S. failed to focus upon the potential problems these weapons could later cause.

With the advent of America's SDI, and the collapse of the bipolar environment, the relaxed view on TBMs has changed rather quickly. The TBMs have come of age, and stand as a significant strategic threat for the 1990s and beyond. It is rational to assume that in time the Third World will make significant range and accuracy improvements to their once limited TBM arsenals. Nuclear and non-nuclear TBM payloads are a reality of the 1990s, and must be confronted by regional and large powers alike.

During the decades in which the U.S. shied away from methods to counter TBMs, U.S. strategic emphasis on nuclear response offense precluded additional funds to produce modernized ATBM systems. However, the U.S. managed to continue the most basic research, development and testing. "American research into ATBM technology goes back nearly 40 years to the 1951 Plato project."³ Despite years of experimentation and analysis, the Patriot anti-missile system is America's only available 1990s ATBM resource.

The Patriot, or more accurately the Patriot PAC-12, was originally designed as a ground-to-air aircraft interceptor. Only later was it modified for ATBM capability, and the missile has since demonstrated in combat that it is extremely capable of defending against

1. Antonia Handler Chayes and Paul Doty, eds., Defending Deterrence (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989) p. 28.

2. James Hackett, "Dangers Lurking in the Scud-B," The Washington Times, 12 December 1990: G4.

3. Hackett, G4.

limited TBM attack. The Patriot is primitive by U.S. technology standards, and must face a Third World TBM capability that is improving dramatically through technology and missile component imports. TBMs with reduced radar signatures, decoy defensive systems, and multiple warheads are within the technical reach of several larger power anti-Western agencies.

As noted, the U.S. increased its efforts in ATBM research in conjunction with the Strategic Defense Initiative decisions in the 1980s. The U.S. encouraged allied participation as well. The Israeli Arrow, 80 percent funded by the U.S. and the recipient of much U.S. technical assistance, is intended as an improved capabilities ground-based ATBM which will form part of Israel's contribution to the SDI.¹ The system remains far from ready for deployment at the time of this study. Other domestic programs, most affected by reductions in SDI funding, are currently under development and testing:

The Pentagon has at least five different projects to develop an anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM). . . but none is likely to produce an operational missile for U.S. forces until 1996 at the earliest.²

The Corps Surface-to-Air Missile (CORPSAM) program, worth over hundred million dollars, is meant to replace the Hawk and Chapparel missiles, and provide ATBM capabilities to forces sent to the Third World in forward presence roles.³

The present-day usefulness of ATBMs rest in their flexible basing and relatively rapid response capability. Forewarning of an impending regional crisis can allow prepositioning of ATBM batteries along front-line areas near hostile states. ATBMs are therefore regionally stabilizing active defenses for the following reasons: As the Patriot so amply demonstrated, ATBMs confine regional conflicts to those nations directly involved in the disagreement. TBMs, when countered with ATBMs, lose their ability to leap over neutrals

1. Navias, 11.

2. Hackett, G4.

3. Tim Kennedy, "Missile Threat Revealed," National Defense (July/August 1990): 14.

to expand hostilities to other nations. ATBMs also prevent the large powers from becoming vulnerable to TBM attack from strategically small or insignificant nations. Adequate active ballistic missile defenses prevent larger powers from being drawn in to limited regional conflicts through annoying escalatory TBM assaults by hostile regional powers. Overall, ATBMs in the right hands significantly enhance the ability to deny potential aggressors their varied objectives and keep regional conflicts confined to the initial parties involved.

Third World hostile intentions may place U.S. and allied blood and treasure at the most immediate risk. Forward presence forces, and U.S. allies in regionally volatile situations, will increasingly rely upon an ATBM capability for active defense. Continued ATBM development and deployment is important to the success of impellent strategy and maintaining a secure and peaceful new world order. The U.S. must protect those whom it leads.

Deployment of ATBMs protecting our allies would send the message that the security of the U.S. and its allies were coupled, and would attempt to confront the Third World offensive capabilities.¹

Regional stability induced by ATBMs is a relative concept. In the right hands, ATBMs are indeed regionally stabilizing. An exceptional danger exists, however, when agreeing to market or deploy ATBM systems to nations with obscure political goals. "ATBMs could act as a shield behind which a country could launch military attacks, secure in the knowledge that its home land was protected."² Such use of ATBMs is thus not stabilizing. This problem has no apparent simple solution. Today's political and military friend, through a coup or rebellion, transforms into tomorrow's foe. Detailed analysis of the benefits versus the risks must constantly be weighed before substantial ATBM assistance is

1. Sanford Lakeoff and Herbert F. York, A Shield in Space? Technology, Politics, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) p. 235-236.

2. Navias, 252.

rendered to a Third World regional power. For this reason the U.S. should first attempt to arrange loaning high technology ATBMs to unstable political regimes. The equipment would be best kept under direct U.S. supervision. To preclude a hostile regime from taking over the retain possession of sizable U.S. provided ATBM assets, it is wise to include built-in methods of protection to preclude inadvertent or unauthorized use.

With the success of Patriot anti-missile missiles in the Gulf War, many nations are increasingly interested in obtaining such systems. The Patriot, though relatively primitive, costs around one million dollars per missile. Future high technology ATBM versions will cost significantly more. Only the wealthier allied nations are capable of purchasing such expensive defenses. The U.S. can expect pressure to provide ATBM protection to those vital interest areas not able to fund expensive and complex active defenses themselves. Although able to act in advisory roles to ensure the proper function of high technology ATBM systems, the U.S. alone cannot afford to protect every ally.

Legitimate questions remain concerning the cost and effectiveness of ATBM systems. Less expensive alternatives to active defenses are available, particularly against relatively inaccurate TBMs such as the SCUD. Even against weapons with pin-point accuracy, some argue that passive defensive measures are as militarily effective as ATBMs, and at much less the cost. This argument applies to military targets only.

Even if TBMs prove to be capable of threatening certain classes of targets, are anti-TBM defenses the most appropriate response to the threat? For example, a strategy of hardening fixed facilities and improved use of mobility and/or concealment when possible might buy a great deal of protection against conventionally armed TBMs as well as other plausible evolving threats.¹

In addition to cost and political debate, ATBM systems will encounter two additional problems as technologies proliferate throughout the Third World and become married to TBM systems; the development of defensive countermeasures, and an imminent

1. Benoit Morel and Theodore A. Postol, "A Technical Assessment of Potential Threats to NATO from Non-Nuclear Soviet Tactical Ballistic Missiles," New Technologies and the Arms Race, Carlo Schaerf, Brian Holden Reid and David Carlton, eds. (London: MacMillan, 1989) p. 108.

ground or air launched cruise missile threat. Each may negate much of the protection provided by systems currently under development.¹ Despite the logical and legitimate claims that the above arguments make, there are other factors that must be considered as essential to the ATBM cost versus effectiveness debate.

The SCUD TBM was oft stated by U.S. Central Command Commander-in-Chief General Norman Schwarzkopf to have little military value, and did not deserve the amount of attention they received based purely upon strategic significance. An inordinate amount of time was spent seeking and destroying the SCUDs because of their impact upon the civilian populations in the Gulf War theater. The invaluable benefits provided by the Patriot were political and psychological, providing protection to coalition and Israeli civil populations.

Although the protection of the population remains paramount, new technology ATBMs must act as more than a comfort blanket for the populace. Ways must be found to expand the ATBM potential across the developing threat spectrum. ATBMs must adequately shield forward presence forces and significant military, political, cultural, economic and societal assets from attack. Dispersed in pockets around areas of significant value, future ATBM systems can work in integrated regional networks to provide viable active defenses.

Connecting regional ATBM colonies into a global ATBM network with a unified battle management facility may one day provide a measure of limited global protection.* Proactively planning to protect the U.S. and its allies from the global nature of the ATBM threat is not at all frivolous, and springs from the concept of a ground based SDI. "De-

1. Morel and Pöstol, 111-113.

* The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO) have completed a study addressing "Global Protection Against Limited Strike" (GPALS). GPALS reportedly addresses the ability to achieve a unified, wide reaching global ATBM system with technological means either currently available or undergoing research, development and testing. GPALS was in publication and not yet available for review at the time this study was being completed.

veloping and deploying effective defenses against this kind of threat to ourselves and our allies - and even our adversaries - is entirely consistent with the SDI program rationale and objective."¹ A global ATBM line of defense could stand ready to fold into the Phase One deployment of the SDI system once the political and diplomatic roadblocks permitting such active defenses are removed.

ATBM systems pose no threat to existing treaty regimes. The Soviets and the U.S. ensured that the language of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic ABM Treaty protected tactical defenses.² Global ATBM networking is a safe and logical first step towards a complete system of active defenses that would provide a limited degree of protection across the full spectrum of ballistic missile threats.

Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile Defense.

The true strength of a prince does not consist so much in his ability to conquer his neighbors, as in the difficulty they find in attacking him.³

Montesquieu
"The Spirit of the Laws"

The focus of America's ICBM defensive effort must remain the USSR. The Soviet threat will persist for the foreseeable future. "Whatever the Soviet Union's economic, political, cultural and moral impoverishment, Soviet investment continues in strategic military weaponry."⁴ Despite recent headway in the INF Treaty and START negotiations, technological improvements to the Soviet arsenal sufficiently compensates for the Soviet's decreasing numerical superiority. "The USSR is the only nation which can destroy the U.S.

1. Henry F. Cooper, "Iraq, SDI, and the Changing World," The Heritage Lectures (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1989): 2.

2. Albert Carnasale, Interview with Author, 21 November 1990.

3. Lamb, 75.

4. Ken R. Holmes and Baker Spring, eds., SDI at the Turning Point: Reaching Strategic Defenses for the 1990s and Beyond (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1990) p. 101.

in 30 minutes."¹

While living in an age of Perestroika and Glasnost, the internal predicament of the Soviet state is alarming. Civil war is a dire possibility; religious and cultural rebellion, particularly in the southern and Baltic republics, could quickly split the nation. The recent elevation of Soviet hard-liners to positions of power within the Soviet regime is not very reassuring for continued democratization and demilitarization. Although considerably weakened, the USSR remains a military force none-the-less through its immense, modernized strategic nuclear arsenal.

While the Soviets reduced the size of their conventional forces and pulled troops out of Afghanistan and parts of Eastern Europe, they also have continued to modernize their ballistic missile force, send better submarines to sea and pursue research in advanced strategic weapons.²

A chaotic USSR in the possession of such a formidable arsenal of warheads is not at all a comforting thought. The Soviet strategic threat will not simply disappear. It may very well increase.

In addition to the USSR, other areas and nations bear watching as potential strategic threats. China, India, South Africa, regional powers in the Middle East, South America and Europe will soon have the capability to strike the U.S. with long-range ballistic missiles. These threats cannot be discounted, considering the insecure nature of a multipolar world. The potential for all out nuclear war has lessened in the 1990s. It is primarily the numerically confined strategic threat, such as accidental or limited ICBM launches that requires the stabilizing influence of ABM systems. Active defenses can ensure that limited inter-continental strikes do not escalate into global war.

Comprehensive Active Defenses. The continuing, yet somewhat shackled development on the SDI provides a viable alternative to prevent limited or inadvertent ICBM

1. Paul H. Nitze, Interview with Author, 14 January 1991.

2. William Matthews, "Budget Plan Points to 4 Commands Replacing 10," Air Force Times, 18 February 1991: 13.

attack upon the U.S., its allies, and their vital interests. The full phase completion of the SDI system is estimated to cost many billions of dollars. Major General Carl G. O'Berry, deputy chief of staff for Systems, Integration Logistics and Support at the Air Force Space Command, delivered the following remarks on the relative cost of the SDI program:

"It's estimated that a viable BMD [ballistic missile defense] system will cost \$60 billion. But lets put that in perspective. In 1995 dollars, it cost the United States \$100 - 120 billion to put Neil Armstrong on the moon in 1969. If that was worth it, . . . the defense of our nation against hostile actions in the future, at a relatively lower cost, must also be a solid investment. ¹

The above estimates relate to the fully deployed SDI system as envisioned by President Reagan and the JCS. The reliability of the amount given may be questioned as to its accuracy, yet a fully deployed system is not required. Only a partial, or ground based ABM system is needed to provide protection against limited or inadvertent ballistic missile strike. Such a ground based system could evolve out of the global ATBM network. However, current ABM Treaty limitations forbid testing or deployment of any portion of a system which has demonstrated ABM capabilities.

"Tested in an ABM mode" as stated in ABM Treaty Articles II, V and VI specifically applies to inter-continental defenses, yet a unified ATBM network might be seen as approaching the legal boundary of the ABM treaty (See Appendix).² The fact remains, as stated in the ABM Treaty, U.S. Unilateral Statement B, that as long as a system is not tested against a target with "characteristics of strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory" and is not purposefully designed to possess those abilities, it does not violate the Treaty (See Appendix).³ True, ATBM systems may have the capacity to expand rapidly into an ABM mode of operations. As long as such a system is not designed for nor tested in that

1. Colonel H.E. Robertson, "Ballistic Missile Defense," Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders AFRP 190-1 (Washington: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, December 1990): 3.

2. Herbert Lin, New World Technologies and the ABM Treaty, (London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988) p. 84.

3. Lin, 91.

capacity, it does not violate the Treaty. The Soviets are keenly aware of this technicality.

"... three Soviet SAMs [surface-to-air missiles] - the SA-5, the SA-10, and the SA-X-12 - may already have some ABM capability. The SA-5 has been tested in conjunction with ballistic missile flights but is considered to have, at most, a marginal BMD capability. The SA-10 and the SA-X-12, according to the DOD, may have some ability to intercept certain types of U.S. ballistic missiles.¹

The path for either the U.S. or the USSR to legally expand active defenses for protection against ICBM threats remains blocked by continued adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty. Reexamination of the Treaty, its applicability to the multipolar environment, and the repercussions of continued adherence, renegotiation or abrogation are necessary.

The ABM Treaty: A Product of Bipolar Politics. The 1972 ABM Treaty and its agreed interpretations are the product of bipolar logic, a logic that may be outdated and inappropriate for the strategic situation of the 1990s.

The purpose of the ABM Treaty is to prevent each country from deploying defenses of their territories against strategic ballistic missiles. However, technological and political developments not widely anticipated in 1972 may erode the treaty regime unless the United States and the Soviet Union explicitly take these developments into account in the future.²

The era of bipolar politics which gestated and delivered the ABM Treaty is now only history. At the time of the Treaty's negotiation, the U.S. and the USSR were concerned that the addition of ballistic missile defenses would stimulate a renewed arms race in an attempt to overcome any advantage that such a defense might give.³ Since 1972 solid progress has been made on agreements to reduce stockpiles of offensive weapons for both sides, even if only on paper. The INF has eliminated a large class of nuclear ballistic missile forces, and the proposed START negotiations will further attempt to decrease longer-range ballistic missile inventories as well as other strategic assets. Rampant offensive

1. Sanford Lakeoff and Herbert F. York, A Shield in Space? Technology, Politics, and the Strategic Defense Initiative (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) p. 70.

2. Lin, 1.

3. Lakeoff, 3.

escalation has visibly begun to reverse course. The first concern of ". . . halting and then reversing the arms race . . . by reducing the numbers of existing weapons or eliminating them entirely" is in the process of being achieved.¹

Another significant factor - the actual emergence of multipolarity - does not threaten the ABM Treaty regime so much as the security of the two nations which continue to abide by it. The ABM Treaty restricts the U.S. and the USSR, and only those two nations, in the development and deployment of ABM systems. It is not likely that other nations will achieve viable ABM systems in the near term. What is disturbing is that the Soviets and America have left themselves unable to defend against a ballistic missile threat neither considered at the signing of the Treaty. The combined TBM capability of the Third World may one day rival that which the two military superpowers currently present each other. The ABM Treaty environment must be reevaluated to address this imminent multipolar ballistic missile risk. It now appears that both the U.S. and the USSR face a common strategic threat.

In the past, arguments were delivered which stressed the futility of building a comprehensive shield to protect against the massive Soviet ICBM arsenal. In that bipolar situation, many considered achieving a leakproof layered defensive shield as doubtful. Compounding the problem was the potential for the Soviets to develop methods to counter at least some of the defensive attributes such a system would offer, and at a fraction of the expense that SDI cost to deploy.² Opponents of SDI stressed that not only did defense breed offense, but the new offense was often smarter and more difficult to defend against than the original against which the defense was designed to counter.³ An example is the U.S. development of the multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) to compensate for

1. Lamb, 150.

2. Herbert York, Does Strategic Defense Breed Offense? (Lanham: University Press of America, 1987) p. 20.

3. York, 21.

limited amounts of U.S. missile launch platforms versus a growing Soviet ICBM threat. The advantage always seemed to rest with the offense.

The logic of the defense breeding offense argument is distorted by entrenched bipolar reasoning. The above argument loses much ground when applied to the Third World ballistic missile powers. Smaller military powers cannot yet saturate defensive networks with massive offensive assaults and decoys. Third World ballistic missile strikes are likely to remain limited in quantity and in defensive counter-measures capability for the foreseeable future. Countering these limited Third World attacks provides stability and prevents regional conflicts from widening and drawing in larger powers.

In the bipolar world now past, active defenses were destabilizing, giving one side the edge in a preemptive attack.

If both sides were to deploy space-based defenses using speed of light weapons, the temptation to strike first, in a counter-defensive mode, would be greater than it is in a condition of offensive mutual deterrence.¹

There is another side of this argument; (1) there will always remain some doubt that the other side's defenses will work better and therefore will give him the advantage; and (2) each side is more vulnerable to a first strike attack with limited numbers of offensive forces and no active defenses to protect them. The most stable arrangement for two military powers to have is for both to possess active defense capabilities.² (See Figure 1)

The stability active defenses could provide is lost due to the restrictions imposed by the ABM Treaty. The multipolar condition adds to the instability. Continued adherence to the ABM Treaty prevents the U.S. and the USSR from being able to defend against a demonstrated and improving Third World ballistic missile threat. The ABM Treaty in effect increases the vulnerability of the U.S. and the USSR. This then elevates the relative strategic power of any Third World country with offensive ballistic missile forces while

1. Lakeoff, 162.

2. Lamb, 149.

decreasing that of the U.S. and the USSR.

FIGURE 1

COMPARATIVE FORCE POSTURES

		STATE A'S FORCE POSTURE	
		Offensive	Defensive
STATE B'S FORCE POSTURE	Offensive	#1 Unstable	#2 Ambiguous, Mix of Off. and Def. Capabilities
	Defensive	#3 Ambiguous, Mix of Off. and Def. Capabilities	#4 Highly Stable

SOURCE: Christopher J. Lamb, How to Think About Arms Control, Disarmament, and Defense (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988) p. 149.

The U.S. and the USSR must reevaluate the significance of the ABM Treaty to the current world political order. Each must weigh the benefits that the Treaty provides against the disadvantages incurred by not allowing at least limited active protection against Third World ballistic missile attack or inadvertent ICBM launch.

The Significance of ABM as an Arms Control Vehicle. The ABM Treaty is held sacred by international and U.S. proponents alike for its unique accomplishments in the bipolar era. "The ABM Treaty of 1972 is regarded by many as the most important arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union currently in force."¹ The Treaty is held in such high regard because it attempted to directly decrease the danger

1. Lin, xiii.

of nuclear exchange by declaring the substance of the U.S./USSR deterrent association.¹ More so than the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, (SALT), START negotiations, the INF Treaty or the MTCR, the ABM Treaty is viewed as the epitome of arms control achievement. Any attempt to alter or abrogate the Treaty would be viewed with the utmost international and bilateral U.S./USSR scrutiny.

Yet renegotiation to the ABM Treaty holds the best of both the arms control and active defensive approaches to stabilizing the ballistic missile threat. The ABM Treaty is the best existing vehicle which can address both the concerns of global ballistic missile proliferation and the ability to defend national and international blood and treasure should arms control fail. For this reason, more so than any other, renegotiation of the ABM Treaty holds much more appeal than simply implementing further arms control initiatives or active defenses alone. The ABM Treaty is the arms control standard of the century, and to adapt that Treaty to the changing strategic environment is a logical and wise endeavor. While the 1972 accord is intended to remain in effect for unlimited duration, the fact that the Treaty negotiators considered that extraordinary events jeopardizing supreme national interests could lead to withdrawal indicates that change was anticipated.²

Nothing is unlimited in international politics, and if both sides, or even one, see a compelling interest to depart the [ABM] Treaty, it will be so. Hopefully, a renegotiated accord based upon the current global realities and concerning all possible players will be conducted prior to the eventual lapse of the '72 accord.³

Now is the time for change. The change does not require an immediate withdrawal from the 1972 Treaty, but entails a deliberate series of evolutions to that might lead to either amendment or renegotiation and redraft of the 1972 accord. Regardless of which approach is decided, the Soviets and the U.S. Congress are the keys to achieving success.

1. Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffey, eds., International Arms Control (Sanford, CA: Sanford University Press, 1984) p. 242.

2. Lin, 87.

3. Matthew Bunn, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security (Washington: The Arms Control Association, 1990) p. 59.

The Soviet - U.S. Congress Connection. The USSR in all likelihood is acutely aware of the inherent dangers that Third World ballistic missile proliferation presents. If some type of amendment, renegotiation or totally new treaty regime is attempted, the Soviets are a key element to the final solution. They are central to altering international opinion toward renegotiation of the ABM Treaty, and to changing U.S. political opinion towards abandoning the 1972 accord.

The U.S. Senate, having ratified the ABM Treaty, holds it as nothing less than sacred. The Congress has gone so far as to dictate to the SDIO and the Executive Branch that the U.S. will adhere to the narrow interpretation of the Treaty as signed in 1972. This was deemed necessary after President Reagan asked Philip Kunsberg to examine the ABM Treaty to determine if it prevented the testing of new technology SDI components. Mr. Kunsberg decided that the ABM Treaty gave no indication that the negotiators wished to exclude "... the testing and development of futuristic technologies."¹ Chief ABM negotiator Gerald C. Smith, when asked about the Kunsberg opinion, "... felt there was never any intention to allow such development and testing for space based ABM by either the U.S. or the USSR."²

As a matter of political savvy and opportunistic ploy, the Soviets have since linked the future of the START negotiations and Defense and Space Talks (DST) with the narrow interpretation of the ABM mandated by the U.S. Congress.³ The SDIO is now bound by Congress' decree. Ambassador Henry Cooper, Director of SDIO, feels that the U.S. must resist this Soviet diplomatic test for the following reasons: (1) The U.S. has nothing to lose continuing a position of broadly interpreting the Treaty; (2) the ABM

1. Lakeoff, 42.

2. Lakeoff, 43.

3. Henry F. Cooper, "SDI and Arms Control," SDI at the Turning Point, Kim R. Holmes and Baker Spring, eds. (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1990) p. 89.

Treaty negotiating record provides as good a case for the broad as for the narrow interpretation, despite some opinions to the contrary; (3) neither the broad nor the narrow is verifiable by NTMs; and (4) if the U.S. holds firm, all indications are that the Soviets will eventually move towards the U.S. position.¹

The Soviets indeed show signs of being more liberal interpreting the ABM Treaty and SDI related research.

Just before the beginning of Round XII of the DST in Fall 1989, Ambassador Yuri Kuznetsov, the Soviet Chief DST negotiator, reviewed the Soviet position and, as reported by TASS on September 26 1989, said that 'all devices that are not weapons can be permitted (in space).'²

And earlier that year, on July 20 1989, Soviet Professor B. Etkin was discussing the applicability of space-based ABM systems and global war, and issued the following quote in Pravda:

But what if the conflict is not global? What if we are talking about guarantees against accidental launches, or above all, missile launches of extremist groups? Such a limited system including ground- and space-based positions for combating extremist missile launches is within the bounds of technical solutions.³

It is said that the art of negotiation "... focuses on procedure instead of substance," as well as highlighting mutual interests and mutual gains.⁴ The key to readdressing the ABM Treaty lies in both the U.S. and the USSR acknowledging the Third World ATBM threat, and the potential for that threat to evolve into a significant menace (mutual interests). The aim in the 1990s is not to protect the ABM Treaty regime. The aim is to "... protect the right to deploy strategic defenses in the future [mutual gains]."⁵ Recognizing our common interests and common threats, instead of emphasizing differences, seems the

1. Cooper, "SDI and Arms Control," 89.

2. Cooper, "SDI and Arms Control," 91.

3. Cooper, "Iraq, SDI, and the Changing World," 4.

4. Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981) pp. 136-137.

5. Holmes and Spring, 106.

pivotal first step in strategic defense discussions. The important concept to grasp is that by highlighting mutual interests, the U.S. can influence the Soviets, who in turn can influence the international community. Together all can be turned upon the U.S. Congress to ratify amendments or a new treaty if called for.

Common Interests, Mutual Gains. International arms control negotiations may drag on for many months, or even years. While ABM Treaty renegotiation or abrogation is considered, the 1972 accord must remain in effect. Only when new agreements are reached should the existing ABM Treaty be retired.

The U.S. and the Soviets would take a walk, not run approach to altering the ABM regime. Like a sequel to a popular movie, the second treaty must live up to the success of the first. The U.S. and the USSR must begin by joint acknowledgement of the increasing menace of Third World TBMs to regional and global security. The presence of this threat may negate the context of the agreement reached in the opening statement to the 1972 Treaty, which states "... that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons." ¹ Next, the two might agree to pursue ATBM networks to preclude limited short- and intermediate-range launches by "extremist groups" or other agencies. This step would establish a comprehensive ground-based ATBM network against limited TBM strike. Battle management satellites placed into orbit could link the ATBMs into a active defensive network. The battle management assets would be perfectly legal under the terms of the ABM Treaty, as noted by Soviet Ambassador Kuznetsov, so long as they did not have the capability for, and were not tested or used in an ABM mode. The U.S. could share certain ATBM and battle management facilities to promote bilateral good will, and allow verification and compli-

1. Lin, 83.

ance inspections in and around its ground facilities in accordance with protocol procedures adapted from the text of the INF Treaty.

These bilateral ATBM agreements, although perfectly legitimate if done unilaterally, would draw world attention in upon the increasing scope of the Third World TBM proliferation problem. It would bring the two ABM signatories closer together working on common interests and building a level of mutual trust. The next step involves renegotiating or scrapping the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Multipolar ABM and Treaty Renegotiation. The 1972 ABM Treaty has outlived the bipolar logic which necessitated its drafting and implementation. Multipolarity has overcome the context of the U.S./USSR nuclear holocaust mind set. The current danger facing the parties to the Treaty involve lesser developed countries attacking either the U.S. or the USSR, or drawing them into regional conflicts through the destabilizing use of TBMs. Ballistic missile defenses (BMDs) might prevent this from occurring. The ABM Treaty remains in effect, however, and prevents the development and deployment of a full range of necessary BMDs.

If SDI is to be deployed, the ABM Treaty will have to be amended or terminated. The reason: The ABM Treaty explicitly prohibits the deployment of a nationwide strategic defense system. The ABM Treaty particularly disallows the deployment of anti-missile weapons in space.¹

Two alternatives exist for a new or modified ABM Treaty regime. The first involves primarily the U.S. and the USSR. As original signatories, each may feel that they must together address the issues first before other nations are considered as signatories. The second alternative opens a new ABM Treaty to a wider group of nations, totally acknowledging the emerging multipolarity of the 1990s.

In the first alternative, as the Third World limited-range threat develops into a longer-range one, the U.S. and USSR would begin a series of amendments to the Treaty to address the need for active defenses in an increasingly multipolar world. Such amend-

1. Cooper, "SDI and Arms Control," 86.

ments might specifically note the addition of longer-range ballistic missile threats from parties not agreed to the 1972 accord. The expanded-range Third World ballistic missile threats, while not as extensive as that which the U.S. and the USSR presented each other, were neither considered nor foreseen in 1972 agreement. Amendments in accordance with Article XIV would address the nature of the multipolar threat, and a need to protect against it (See Appendix). Specifically, amending Articles III and VI would allow a wider area of limited ground based ABM deployment. Modifying Article V would allow increased testing of ground based systems, at levels agreed to by both parties. Article IX would be adapted to allow protection of allies and vital interest. Article XI would be extended to include all applicable ballistic missile capable parties. Finally, Article XV would allow the treaty to be superseded by a newer treaty when approved.

While amendments to the ABM Treaty proceeded, the established ground-based global ATBM network could serve as a starting point for limited BMD while new ABM systems were considered for deployment. Testing of ground-based ABM systems would be permitted to commence at once, as would limited tests of space-based battle management coordination of ground based ABM systems. These bilateral agreements and amendments would conform in principle to the U.S.'s April 1988 Everett Panel's recommendations that SDI Phase I be reorganized to prioritize space surveillance and ground-based interceptors.¹ While limited, ground based ABM testing and development were being completed, and ABM amendments were approved, a fully capable ground based ATBM network would remain in place to provide the first stage of limited ballistic missile protection.

One step beyond amendment is complete bilateral renegotiation of the 1972 accord. The above events could lead to a perceived need for a totally new treaty regime. In this situation, the amended 1972 Treaty must remain in effect to ensure a smooth and safe

1. Lakeoff, 117.

transition to a new treaty regime. Once both the U.S. and the USSR feel comfortable with the progress of the new treaty, and compliance and verification procedures were established, the 1972 accord would be nullified and the new treaty signed and ratified.

A second alternative involves soliciting other space capable nations to join in a new ABM Treaty regime. Such an alternative completely acknowledges the permanence of global multipolarity. The French have expressed concern about abrogating the ABM treaty and establishing unequal zones of security, resulting in the creation of a "fortress America."¹ Should a new treaty regime fail to include other space-capable nations, those other nations would resent the revival of a "Yalta complex - the fear of the superpowers making a quantum leap in technology, thereby freezing France and Europe out of a race to the future."² SDI deployment without international consultation would entail the additional problem of the ensuring the freedom to use and develop space by all nations. The U.S. and USSR would tend to dominate prime orbital areas for their SDI battle management and surveillance systems, excluding other nations from select orbital access.

Opening a new ABM Treaty to other space capable nations would receive warm international and domestic replies. While using the bipolar agreement as a standard, other emerging powers would now be offered membership in the arms control club. The two military superpowers could introduce a resolution into the UN Security Council warning of the spread of intermediate- and long-range ballistic missiles and related technologies. Unanimous opinion for the resolution is not required. Yet a clear signal is sent by the text of such a resolution to proliferating nations. Next, the U.S. and the USSR would announce their intention to modify the ABM Treaty based upon multipolar ballistic missile proliferation. The two nations could explain their logic as follows: the original ABM Treaty was

1. Dean Godson, SDI: Has America Told Her Story to the World? (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1987) p. 58.

2. Godson, 58.

agreed to in a bipolar context; changes in the military capabilities of the Third World expose the two nations to a wider range of threats than was present in 1972. The current threat situation demands a new treaty. In order to conform to the evolving multipolar dynamics, and political realities, the two nations would proclaim that the treaty would initially be open to the five members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany and Japan.* The Security Council could be tasked with handling the compliance and verification of the treaty, and dealing with violations in a manner that the Council unanimously agrees to.

Other space capable nations might periodically be offered the chance to join and comply with the provisions of the treaty. The treaty is then amended to reflect the addition of the new treaty members. Each member would be subject to the compliance and verification standards determined unanimously by the UN Security Council, subject to on-site inspections of all ground based facilities, to include battle-management control centers and ground relay stations. As the key members to the treaty, the U.S. and the USSR may offer to share their battle management facilities with other Security Council and space capable members. Those agencies accepting the offer must conduct their monitoring and ground network tie-ins to the battle management system from the facilities located on U.S. or USSR soil. Battle management access to U.S. and Soviet facilities will be extended only to those nations willing to completely conform to the treaty's compliance and verification standards. Those nations unwilling to abide by the treaty's provisions will not be party to the protective shield which the limited, ground based ABM system would provide nor the information that battle management facilities could furnish.

The purpose of an international ABM Treaty is to allow limited global protection against accidental or terrorist ballistic missile strike. The system would not be the grand,

* The concept for expanding the ABM Treaty regime to the UN Security Council, plus Germany and Japan, evolved from a discussion with Dr. Robert S. Wood, Dean, College of Naval Warfare Studies, and Professor John T. Hanley, Jr., Assistant Director for Strategic Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI on 8 January 1991.

multi-tiered shield as envisioned by President Reagan and the JCS. Space based weapons would remain prohibited. However, under the guidance of the UN Security Council, the limited testing of space capable components could occur. In this way, as the nature of the multipolar ballistic missile threat evolves, the system of active defense is prepared to evolve along with it. Once the ground based system reached its permitted level of deployment, stringent on-site inspections would occur regularly to ensure complete compliance. Violations against compliance standards would face Security Council resolutions, embargoes, sanctions and basic international incredulity and disfavor.

Such an international ABM Treaty regime, while diffusing the power of the U.S. and the USSR to some degree, allows a tighter international control over emerging space capable nations. The large, developed nations of the UN Security Council, plus Germany and Japan, would give guidance to the Third World and provide a stable inter-regional environment relatively free from inadvertent or limited ballistic missile attack. The larger nations are therefore less likely to be held hostage by the lesser nations. The above alternatives recognize the trade-off necessary between viable arms control mechanisms and the right to actively defend one's interests when arms control might fail. The opportunities for arms control failing have increased as more players entered the field. International participation may help influence the lesser developed countries, while providing a large degree of trust and recognition in the emerging space powers of the 1990s.

An international treaty would allow impellance strategy open access to the monitoring and control of strategic defensive assets for a major portion of the globe. As impellance builds diplomatic trust and good will within the UN community of nations, the U.S. is able to influence the degree of deployment for active ABM systems and orbital systems by most space capable nations. To the adverse side, the U.S. again opens itself up to possible demagogic agencies by treaty participation through the UN Security Council. Emerging multipolarity in the new world order will eventually demand some degree of international participation.

Should the U.S. and the USSR remain locked into the 1972 ABM Treaty, they will become more open to the emerging Third World ballistic missile threat. The relative power of the two nations will erode. For the U.S., the erosion could mean the dilution or eventual loss of its global power status. For the USSR, the deterioration could be catastrophic. Both powers must open their political eyes to view the threats which the emerging world order may present in the not too distant future. The 1972 Treaty, monument to arms control that it is, must be amended or replaced to reflect current conditions.

Congress is not the initiating stage in a new or modified ABM Treaty, but the terminal stage. As such, Congress cannot be expected to abrogate the 1972 Treaty unless a new and comprehensive one is in hand. The international ABM alternative places added pressure upon Congress to approve a new treaty, helping them to realize the true nature of the threat that faces the U.S., its allies, and their vital interests in the next century. "In a Congress of 535 members, 33 senators plus one can block a treaty."¹ Getting around Congress requires a little external help. Help that a multilateral ABM Treaty regime could provide.

Observations. The 1972 ABM Treaty, Article XV, allows either signatory to withdraw from the Treaty ". . . if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests."² Neither the U.S. nor the USSR are expected to remain subject to the provisions of the treaty if it is not in their best interests. Should further, more violent political unrest erupt in the Soviet Union, the U.S. must be prepared to act in its own best interest. Events may transpire so quickly, and so violently that if unprepared to counter all possible contingencies, the U.S. may suffer unforeseen consequences precipitating from a crumbling USSR. Should the worst occur,

1. Lamb, 166.

2. Lin, 87.

America must rapidly discard its bipolar luggage, look after its own best interests, and plan proactively for any and all alternatives. One such alternative must remain; abrogation or withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Should the Soviet Union fracture, what will take its place? How will U.S. global leadership be affected? Will the Soviets attempt to take the U.S. down with them? Will other nations attempt to exploit Soviet weaknesses through overt military means? Through impellance, the proactive nature of the U.S. to deny any adversary his objectives gives the nation the capacity to act forcefully and constructively to usher in President Bush's new world order. Impellance requires the flexibility to respond, and to both actively and passively defend U.S. National security interests.

America has a history of waiting for the worst to happen. The U.S. has traditionally reacted to world events. It is not wise to wait for a demonstrated need before acquiring an ABM system. By then it may prove too late. Just as it was wise to modify the Patriot anti-aircraft missile to provide ATBM capability, so too might it be wise to give future ATBMs the ability to expand into limited ground based ABM systems at little more than a moments notice. Change will occur suddenly as the multipolar world settles out. America's success will rely in large part on her ability to cope proactively with changes, no matter how sudden.

If a withdrawal from the Treaty is required, will the U.S. have enough testing accomplished to deploy a viable and affordable system? The Nitzze Criteria for SDI demand that the system be (1) effective, (2) affordable, and (3) it is survivable.¹ The only way to guarantee the Nitzze criteria are met is to grow into a functional ABM system through a comprehensive ATBM global network. A comprehensive ATBM network may allow a rapid transformation to one with limited ABM capability should an unforeseen global crisis mandate such an alternative. A global ATBM network will provide the ability

1. Nitzze, Interview with Author, 14 January 1991.

to protect U.S. forward presence forces, allies, and shared vital interests from the very real and present threat of Third World TBMs.

Just as the Patriot provided psychological support for the Israeli and Saudi Arabian populations, so might a limited ABM system one day provide the same support for U.S. and allied populations. The insanity of bipolar punishment oriented offenses no longer fits the multipolar world. The integrated deterrence of denying an adversary's objectives remains as the only viable alternative. The ability to respond is retained, yet both active and passive defenses are thoroughly incorporated into the global strategy of impellance. Impellance, the versatile tool of a globally powerful U.S., must remain capable of responding to any contingency.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Transformation has begun at the national security strategy level to deal with the increased global commitments burdens now borne almost solely by the U.S.. Witnessing the collapse of a shallow Soviet system may have influenced President Bush and his advisors as to the importance of our form of government, political stability, economic well-being, military strength, technological edge, ecological standards, and social health towards maintaining a true global superpower status. With the added element of international alliances, the U.S. is in the position to influence the world order across a broad spectrum of interests. This influence, the proactive ability to make things happen, is called impellance.

Impellance is the means with which to wield all the elements of national power, along with that of our allies, to positively influence events along a morally correct path. Impellance embraces a global leadership role, and each nation which accepts the leadership and guidance that America alone can offer. All will benefit from the arrangement.

As the global impellent force, the U.S. must gradually induce change, bearing in mind the needs and interests of those which attempts to steer. In the absence of bipolarity, much potential for conflict arises, a great many of which the U.S. alone cannot - or does not wish to - resolve. The U.S. provides the support, leadership and military might (if required) to aid the resolution of volatile regional problems with elusive and problematic settlements. The U.S. must place its power at the disposal of the collective to preserve the good of the collective. The UN serves as an adequate agency to forward the goals of impellent strategy. Without participating within the UN, the U.S. will appear as dominating, rather than guiding, global affairs. National priority demands that America continues to guard her own best interests as best possible, vigilant of demagogic agencies which might use the collective against her.

Impellance moves nations to accept accountability for their actions in the judgment of a new world order through the UN, in cooperation with world economic centers, with regional assemblies, and with individual countries . This becomes increasingly important in the arena of arms control concerning the ballistic missile proliferation problem. Impellance can be brought to bear upon both the seller's and the buyer's side of the equation to effectively limit the spread of missile technology and components. The legitimate concerns of each side of the proliferation equation must be addressed before multilateral arms control can hope to succeed. A system of sanctions and incentives may help to guide nations to embrace arms control accords. Should they choose to deliberately ignore world security in lieu of their own, arms control strategies may prove inadequate to deal with proliferation practices.

Should arms control fail within regional areas, conflict may overflow into other regions, or perhaps globally, through the use of ballistic missiles. Much of the ballistic missile proliferation problem is entrenched in bipolar response offense reasoning. Country "A" must possess ballistic missiles if country "B" has them, in order to respond to country B if he attacks. No country can expect to allow itself to remain helpless to the rising ballistic missile threat. Evolving multipolar order is virtually certain to experience some degree of friction as relationships settle out.

Third World ballistic missile threats were not considered in the text of the 1972 ABM Treaty, a bilateral document conceived in a bipolar world. The 1972 ABM Treaty is outdated in the 1990s and places both America and the USSR at unnecessary risk. The Treaty must either be amended or renegotiated to consider the new ballistic missile threat facing the two original signatories, and the entire world. Though held as the finest existing example of arms control to date, the ABM Treaty can be modified to encompass aspects of limited ballistic missile defense. While the framework of the Treaty must remain as originally intended, provisions are now necessitated by events which allow some degree of global protection from a growing multipolar ballistic missile threat.

The widest degree of acceptance for a new treaty could be gained by initially opening the ABM regime up to the UN Security Council, plus Germany and Japan. After these seven nations formed the multilateral context of the treaty, other space capable nations would be invited to join. Arms control and ballistic missile defense are concerns facing the entire globe. Opening the ABM Treaty to multilateral, trans-global participation would spread responsibility for arms control across each region of the globe, while ensuring adequate degrees of protection are allowed to participating nations.

The author will explore a multipolar path to a revised ABM Treaty with additional research conducted in the near future at the U.S. Naval War College. Under the direction of Professor Stephen O. Fought, Director of Strategic Analysis, National Security Decision Making Department, an attempt will be made to dissect the bilateral 1972 Treaty and reorient it to the current multipolar condition and the increased threat of longer-range ballistic missiles. Alternatives for amendment and redraft of the ABM Treaty will be the primary focus of the proposed research effort.

Impellance, arms and technology control, and active defenses as part of a global denial of objectives defense strategy are essential elements of President Bush's new world order. Allied needs must be satisfied as the U.S. leads towards a system of peaceful coexistence within each region and throughout the world. The U.S. has the capacity to accomplish these goals through the logic, strength and moral compulsion afforded by impellance.

APPENDIX

TEXT OF THE 1972 ABM TREATY¹

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.
2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

1. Taken from Herbert Lin, New Technologies & The ABM Treaty (Cambridge, MA: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988) pp. 83-87.

Article II

1. For the purpose of the Treaty and ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

- (a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;
- (b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and
- (c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

- (a) operational;
- (b) under construction;
- (c) undergoing testing;
- (d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
- (e) mothballed.

Article III

Each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within an ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers in test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.
2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, not to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party undertakes:

- (a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and
- (b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decisions to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of United Nations.
DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic

UNILATERAL STATEMENTS

B. Tested in ABM Mode

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement:

Article II of the Joint Text Draft uses the term "tested in an ABM mode," in defining ABM Components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of "tested in an ABM mode," we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be "tested in an ABM mode" if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from the application of these criteria.

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CENTER FOR NAVAL WARFARE STUDIES ADVANCED RESEARCH PROGRAMS

ADVANCED RESEARCH ASSOCIATE APPLICATION

22 October 1990
(Date of application)

91-W-02
ARP Control No.

A. NAME Thieret Jeffrey E. Major USAF CNCS
(Last) (First) (M.I.) (Rank) (Svc) (Coll)

B-52 Instructor Navigator [REDACTED] TOP SECRET/SBI 24 NOV 87
(Desig/MOS) (SSN) (Security Clearance/Date Granted)

B. ADDRESS [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
(Number and Street) (City and State) (Zip)

C. TELEPHONE [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

D. TITLE/TOPIC OF PROPOSED PROJECT The Strategic Defense Initiative and
Conventional Theater Deterrence

E. CHARACTER/STYLE OF PROPOSED RESEARCH

Research is to be performed during Winter trimester and will be an Individual project.

F. FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Travel \$ _____ Per Diem \$ _____ Total \$ 1,000

Trips to (No. of days) Washington D.C. (5), Maxwell AFB, AL (2)

G. EDUCATION

DATES	INSTITUTION	MAJOR	DEGREE
<u>JUN 87</u>	<u>Golden Gate University</u>	<u>Public Administration</u>	<u>MPA (4.0 QPA)</u>
<u>1986</u>	<u>USAF Air Command and Staff College (Correspondence)</u>		
<u>1984</u>	<u>USAF Squadron Officers School (Correspondence)</u>		
<u>1976</u>	<u>University of Pittsburgh</u>	<u>Developmental Psychology</u>	<u>BS (3.2 QPA)</u>

H. EXPERIENCE/BACKGROUND

DATES	ORGANIZATION	LOCATION
<u>DEC 85-JUN 90</u>	<u>31 Test & Evaluation Squadron</u>	<u>Edwards AFB, CA</u>
<u>DUTIES: Advanced Cruise Missile Deputy Director for Operations, B-52G Global Positioning System/Conventional Weapons Integration Test Director, ACM Chief of Navigation, ACM Flight Test Radar Navigator.</u>		
<u>SEP 82-DEC 85</u>	<u>416 Bombardment Wing</u>	<u>Griffiss AFB, NY</u>
<u>DUTIES: Wing B-52G Standardization/Evaluation Radar Navigator, Instructor Radar Navigator, Radar Navigator</u>		

I. ACADEMIC/SCIENTIFIC HONORS AND PROFESSIONAL SOCIETY MEMBERSHIPS:


Golden Gate University MPA (with Distinction), United States Naval Institute Member, Cruise Missile Association Member.

J. RECORD OF AUTHORSHIP/PUBLISHING

DATE	TITLE/DESCRIPTION	INSTITUTE/PUBLISHER
<u>FEB 88</u>	<u>B-52 GPS/CWI Operational Flight Test Plan</u>	<u>Strategic Air Command</u>
<u>APR 89</u>	<u>B-52 GPS/CWI Final Test Report (SECRET)</u>	<u>SAC</u>
<u>1989</u>	<u>Advance Cruise Missile B-52 Flight Crew Technical Orders</u>	<u>SAC</u>
<u>1987</u>	<u>31 TES Squadron Monthly History Reports</u>	<u>SAC</u>
<u>DEC 87</u>	<u>"Seventy Years of Excellence"</u>	<u>SAC's Combat Crew Mag.</u>

K. PRELIMINARY LIAISONS

Mr. Hank Cooper, Director, SDIO, the Pentagon, Washington D.C.
Lieutenant Colonel James Burke, SDIOD, the Pentagon, Washington D.C.
Mr. Arthur (Lee) Bennett, Jr., Science Applications International Corporation.
Colonel Thomas Mehnkin, SPACECOM, Colorado Springs, CO

L. FACULTY ADVISOR'S NAME	DEPT.	SIGNATURE OF ADVISOR
<u>Professor Steve Fought</u>	<u>NSDM</u>	<u></u>

January 25, 1991

MEMORANDUM

From: Director, Advanced Research Program
To: MAJ Jeffrey Thieret

Subj: IMPRESSIONS ON YOUR MIDTERM STATUS

1. Let me take this opportunity to convey some impressions based on your midterm brief.
2. I think you have the makings of your paper by turning your brief on its head. The last three points of your conclusions seem to form the issues of your paper. Your first bullet is based upon a misinterpretation of what CAPT Seaquist meant to say (not entirely your fault). Your second bullet on offensive versus defensive deterrence may be more accurately cast in the role of offense and defense in deterrence. Ballistic missile defenses also have a role in offense and defense for achieving aims other than deterrence. A section on the technical differences between ABM and ATBM might be useful. I would be surprised if you were not able to work in current events.
3. If you focus your issues I think that you have the makings of a top notch paper.
4. Please call me if you would like to discuss any of these ideas.

Sincerely,


J. HANLEY

cc. Dr. R. S. Wood
Prof. S. O. Fought
LCDR J. C. Benigno

SUBJECT: The Strategic Defense Initiative and Conventional Theater Deterrence.

PURPOSE: To explore the viability and capability of SDI technology for use against conventional short or intermediate range cruise/ballistic missile attack; to examine the scenarios for possible use of SDI technology for offensive and defensive conventional tactical battlefield use; to explore the range of policy choices available, and the impact presented, by developing, fielding and employing such a system; to identify the technologies required to produce this capability, be it space or land based; to examine the impact of SDI technology use in the conventional arena on research and development efforts; and to examine the implications of SDI use in the conventional arena on the ABM Treaty.

SCOPE: The increase in technology proliferation to Third World countries and terrorist organizations increases the likelihood of conventional and/or chemical attack against U.S. and allied forces. Quieter signatures for short and intermediate range conventional cruise/ballistic missiles, combined with better accuracy, make the prospect of protection using current defense systems questionable. Any nation or group, with the right clandestine contacts, may soon be able to launch conventional/chemical attacks against a Western nation for political, propaganda, etc., purposes.

NWC Global '90 introduced several scenarios applying SDI technology. Technology proliferation and illegal technology transfer resulted in short and intermediate range threats to U.S. theater deployed forces. Recent events in Iraq, Libya, and Central/South America raise the question of how to properly deter, and should deterrence fail - respond, to conventional/chemical attack by advanced technology weapon

systems. A wide range of policy choices are available for exploration in light of the thaw in the cold war. A viable deterrence against hostile Third World or terrorist actions is vital if superpowers are to be kept from being drawn into regional conflicts via calculated belligerence.

Current treaty guidelines must be considered while deciding the benefits of employing SDI, whether space or surface based, in conventional theaters of conflict. If the ABM treaty does not support the use of SDI for such deterrence, the implications of violating the ABM treaty should be considered in terms of both offensive and defensive use.

METHODOLOGY: Briefly examine the technological feasibility and R&D efforts required for employing SDI in the conventional theater; determine the scenarios for possible use of SDI capabilities in the conventional theater; explore the policy choices available, both at the national and international level, for using SDI in the conventional arena; investigate the implications on the ABM treaty for R&D, fielding, and both the offensive and defensive use of such a system; determine the policy impact upon possible ABM treaty violations; and investigate SDI conventional measures of effectiveness.

ANTICIPATED DATA SOURCES: SDIO, the Pentagon, Washington D.C.; Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington D.C.; Science Applications International Corporation, Arlington VA; The State Department, Washington D.C.; Space Command, Colorado Springs, CO; National Defense University Library, Washington D.C.; The Naval War College Library; The Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, AL.

NATURE OF THE PRODUCT: A think piece of approximately 100 pages,

produced in entirety at the Naval War College.

AUDIENCE FOR WHOM WRITING: SDIO, the Pentagon; SPACECOM; military members and national leaders interested in the proactive application of new technologies for the defense of U.S. and allied interests against high technology conventional/chemical attack.

POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF WORK: To stimulate the applications of SDI outside the strategic nuclear arena against impending technological proliferation and hostile intentions. Information produced to-date has not adequately considered methods of effectiveness for SDI in a conventional capability.

EXPECTED SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: SECRET (possible TS annex)

SDI AND CONVENTIONAL THEATER DETERRENCE

**A NWC ADVANCED RESEACH PROJECT
PROPOSAL**

**PRESENTED BY:
JEFFREY E. THIERET
Major, USAF**

FORWARD PRESENCE

- DECREASED DEFENSE BUDGET 1990'S & BEYOND
- INCREASED REGIONAL TURMOIL
 - Threat to vital US/Allied Interests
- PROACTIVE vs REACTIVE FORCES
- DEFEND MORE WITH LESS
 - Quick and Measured Response

GLOBAL WAR GAMES '90

- BIPOLAR vs MULTIPOLAR WORLD
- TECHNOLOGY PROLIFERATION
 - Third World
 - Terrorist States/Organizations
- THE NATURE OF DETERRENCE?
 - Nuclear Threat - Detailed Policy (SIOP & SDI)
 - Conventional Threat? - Wide Range of Possibilities
- RESPONSE
 - Nuclear Retaliation - Unrealistic vs Third World
 - Conventional - Reactive; Enemy Objectives Achieved
- SDI AS A CONVENTIONAL THEATER ALTERNATIVE

MISSILES INVENTORY: RANGE GREATER THAN 300 km

COUNTRY	CHEMICAL WEAPONS CAPABLE	NUCLEAR RESEARCH CAPABLE	AT "THE LIMIT" OF NUCLEAR POWER	MISSILE	MAX RANGE ESTIMATED (KM)	CEP ESTIMATE PRECISION (M)	WARHEAD WEIGHT (KG)
Afghanistan	Yes	No	No	*SCUD-B (Operational)	300	900	1000
Argentina	No	Yes	No	CONDOR II (Development)	1000	700	400-500
Brazil	No	Yes	No	MB/EE-1000 (Development)	1000	700	900
				SS-1000 (Development)	1200	700	1000
Egypt	Yes	No	No	BADR-2000 (Development) (CONDOR II)	960	700	450
India	Yes	No	Yes	AGNI (Development)	2500	N/A	1000
				X (Project)	5000	N/A	N/A
Iran	Yes	Yes	No	SCUD-B (Operational)	300	900	1000
Iraq	Yes	No	Partly	AL-ABBAS (Development)	900	4000	200
				AL-ABED/BM (Project)	2000	N/A	N/A
Israel	?	?	?	JERICHO II (Development)	1500	N/A	100
				X (Project)	>5000?	N/A	N/A
Libya	Yes	Yes	No	SCUD-B (Development)	300	900	1000
				**M-9 (Development)	600	300-600	N/A
North Korea	Yes	No	No	SCUD-B (Operational)	300	900	1000
Pakistan	Yes	No	Partly	HAFT II (Development)	300	N/A	N/A
Saudi Arabia	Yes	No	No	***CSS-2 (Operational)	2700	2400	2000
South Africa	Yes	No	Yes	X (Project)	?	?	?
Syria	Yes	No	No	M-9 (Project)	600	300-600	N/A
Taiwan	Yes	No	No	TIEN-MA (Development)	1000	N/A	N/A

Chart 1

*SCUD-B is the NATO designation for the SS1c surface-to-surface tactical missile system. This missile has been exported to Egypt, Syria, Libya, North Korea, Iraq, and South Yemen. Iraq used SCUD-B as the basis of its AL-ABBAS and AL-HUSSEIN missiles. SCUD-B is manufactured in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Egypt and, possibly, China.

**M-9 is a Chinese export.

***CSS-2 is exported to Saudi Arabia from China.

SOURCE: Aerospace

CONCEPTS OF EXPLORATION

- FEASIBILITY
- TECHNOLOGY REQUIRED
 - Offensive vs Defensive
- ABM TREATY IMPLICATIONS
- POLICY CHOICES
- METHODS OF EFFECTIVENESS
 - With vs Without SDI
- POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR USE

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- SDIO - WASHINGTON D.C.
- NWC LIBRARY
- NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
- SPACECOM - COLORADO SPRINGS
- AIR UNIVERSITY LIBRARY - MAXWELL AFB